



Tentatio as Fallenness and Death as Care: Of Dasein's Many Faces in Early and Later Writings

ULKAR SADIGOVA 

Middle East Technical University

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Abstract: Fallenness in *Sein und Zeit*, is the ontological path one takes to know one's being, to know oneself, which is the penultimate task of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. As he states in *Being and Time*, being-in-the-world is always fallen, and "Falling" (Verfallen) or "Fallenness" (Verfallensein) continues to be a "definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself. The concept of fallenness is grown from seeds of tentatio, it is one's trial to know oneself and temptation of oneself and possibilities: Being-in-the-world is tempting in oneself. The facticity of existence itself is the facticity of life. Fallen, not by choice, into the world is the effect of thrownness into-the-world. The fallenness is also the openness, to the world, to the possibilities. That is why fallenness is the characteristic of Dasein itself. The trial is not necessarily of the negative connotation, but it is also a tempting possibility. To establish the links between the early-Heideggerian temptations, trials and the later conception openness of fallenness is precisely the main task. One additional path that this paper will take is on the links of tentatio/fallenness and death. Fallenness as an existential character of Dasein, is a trial of the world, with the world; a face of infinite possibility/truth/being. This is what Heidegger calls disclosedness and Care. Being-open (disclosedness) is not complete without the "end" of the

ULKAR SADIGOVA ✉

Middle East Technical University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Depart. of Philosophy
Üniversiteler Mah. Dumlupınar Bul. No: 1, Çankaya, Ankara, 06800, TR [ulkarsv@gmail.com]

cycle: death. Thus, openness to death is part of the same ontological existence of the Dasein. The kernels of this thought are already to be found in *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*. In readings of Paul (particularly in Letters to Thessalonians), of Parousia, of openness and calling to death, in spite of death, are already and not yet formulations of being-towards-death. “Is not human life – trial?” – “is not human life death?” or being-towards- death? Death, as not eschatological but as openness, and care is precisely Jan Patocka’s reading of Heidegger which I will benefit from. Thus, to find the traces of Dasein’s many faces as tentatio and openness in early writings and as fallenness and being-towards-death as Care in later writings will be the overall concern of this paper.

Keywords: Heidegger, dasein, tentatio, Augustine, fallenness, death, philosophy of life and death.

Introduction

A confession is always a confession of guilt. Augustine’s confessions are of his temptations; of never-ending tentatio that is both temptation and trial that make the base of guilt. Heidegger’s readings of Augustine have surely paved the way for his future thought on facticity, fallenness and the Dasein. Augustine’s *tentatio* as trial and temptation is inspiring Heidegger to ask: *Numquid non tentatio est vita humana?* [Is not human life a trial?]. This trial and temptation are questioning of being, God, and self - *Quaestio mihi factus sum*. Heidegger’s idea on fallenness presented to us in *Being and Time* is already and not yet formulated starting from the lectures in *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*. Hence, to uncover the links and references the two books will be read in parallel. The fallenness/ the tentatio will be treated as a face of the Dasein.

Dasein is, however, not only two-faced but a layered experience of many faces. Fallenness of Dasein is also its life experience – its facticity – which is also its experience of its death. The death of the Dasein is also formulated in early lectures and emerge as

openness, acceptance, as trial. There is an implication of being-towards-death in the reading of the letters to Thessalonians, and the *cura* of Augustine. The death as Care is a thread that also reveals itself in *Being and Time*. Therefore, the faces of Dasein are interlinked and always show themselves at once.

1. Faces of Dasein

Phenomenology of Religious Life is concerned with factual existence. This factual life of early lectures is already and not yet a Dasein that comes to light in its full existentiality in *Being and Time*. Dasein; the being-in-the-world first reveals itself to us questioning. The penultimate task of Dasein is to know itself. The questioning of oneself becomes possible through Augustine's tentatio. Only through temptations, one knows himself: *quaestio mihi factus sum*. [I have become a question to myself].¹ I can answer these questions only through my factual life – my temptations; my fall. These temptations resemble for Heidegger a feeling of falling in *Phenomenology of Religious Life* which is later conceptualized as fallenness-into-the-world in *Being and Time*. This fallenness of *Being and Time* is the existentiality of Dasein itself. Augustine's tentatio is the kernel of fallenness in Heidegger's magnum opus. Heidegger says, "my 'facticity' is the strongest temptation ... in it, I move in a somehow falling manner."² Being-in-the-world seems as a fallenness – the anxiety of being-here and being-present emerges for Heidegger as an inauthentic life. Thus, the conceptions of earlier lectures find their echoes in *Being and Time* as fallenness and thrownness into the world.

Augustine states the initial perception of life experience: "already the next moment can make me fall and expose me as someone entirely different."³ This constant fall – the temptations – open

¹ Martin Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 184.

² Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 189.

³ Augustine, *Confessions*, ed. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), bk. 10.

being for possibility. That possibility also includes the possibility of death, the possibility of *Parousia* and the Christian concern that is felt for *Parousia*. At the same time, the concern is always for a delightful life that is always backed by the same temptations. This Augustinian concern (*cura*) is echoed as Care [Sorge] in *Being and Time*, in its entirety as solicitude and anxiety. The Care for life it seems will constitute the most existential characteristic of Dasein of all: Dasein's Being reveals itself as care⁴ while being-in-the-world is always a being-towards-death. Care and Death come always together, facing both ends at the same. With the anticipation of death, there comes certain freedom; in which Dasein can fully embrace its possibilities, even if inauthentically. The inauthenticity of life is always a possibility of this very authentic freedom-towards-death. Hence Heidegger conceives factual life and later Dasein as multi-faced; faces of it are visible all at once. Fallenness-into-world, Care and being-towards-death, the possibility of tentatio echoed in concern for life and death – these are the existential faces of Dasein. The *Being and Time* does not explicitly refer to Augustine in each connection, inevitably though, they are implied. Heidegger's links remain Platonic, the peculiar dualism and the peculiar existentiality of fallenness are Platonic in their very conception. The heritage and the Heideggerian counterpart will be considered side-by-side, always keeping in mind an earlier reading of Augustine and *Being and Time*.

2. Tentatio and Fallenness

2.1. Temptation and Trial

Thou abidest in thyself while we are disquieted with trial after trial. Yet unless we wept in thy ears, there would be no hope for us remaining. How does it happen that such sweet fruit is plucked from the bitterness of life, from groans, tears, sighs, and lamentations?⁵

Life, as is, is trial and temptation. *Tentatio*, which Augustine

⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2013), 227.

⁵ Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 4.

uses in Confession signifies both trial and temptation. By temptations, he says, we are tested daily⁶ and of these trials and temptations, or rather trials of and by temptations, we do not know which ones we are strong enough to pass. The Lord, for Augustine, does not try us beyond our capacity, which temptations are in and beyond our capacity though, we cannot know. Thus, the question of *tentatio* is also a question of oneself. Augustine says:

I would therefore confess what I know about myself; I will also confess what I do not know about myself. What I do know of myself, I know from thy enlightening of me; and what I do not know of myself, I will continue not to know until the time when my “darkness is as the noonday” in thy sight.⁷

Confessions are then of guilt – temptations, and of self. Augustine is confessing himself, his life, his questioning. Of types of temptations, the most complex is the temptation of self. Not particularly lust or curiosity (a certain vain and curious longing in the soul, rooted in the same bodily senses, which is cloaked under the name of knowledge and learning)⁸, but the temptations are life and of Augustine's life experience. The first form, *concupiscentia carnis* [desire of the flesh] and the second form *concupiscentia oculorum* [desire of the eye] – the superfluous desire for learning seem within the capacity of being-human. The third form, of which Augustine says in Book Ten: [The third kind of temptation has not ceased for me, or can it cease in this whole life?] is the secular ambition - *ambitio saeculi*. Hence, Augustine asks: “*Numquid non tentatio est vita humana super terram sine ullo interstitio?*” [Is not human life on earth a trial without intermission?]⁹. Trial and temptation are of life and life itself. *Tentatio* is itself our experience of life.

Heidegger tackles the *tentatio* as factual life experience: it is crucial for him to grasp how “Augustine experiences factual life—

⁶ Augustine, *Confessions*, chap. 37.

⁷ Augustine, *Confessions*, chap. 5.

⁸ Augustine, *Confessions*, chap. 35.

⁹ Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 10.

the *tentatio* [trial, temptation]—in order to understand accordingly to what extent, the one who lives in such saintliness, and on such a level of enactment, is necessarily a burden to himself¹⁰ for “*nemo quod tolerat amat, etsi tolerare amat.*” The trials are the burden to life that continues without ever ceasing; thus, we ask the question: *Numquid non tentatio est vita humana?* [Is not human life a trial?]¹¹ The desire of food and beverage, of lust and curiosity, are all an experience – how life encounters us and how we encounter life. It is how life haunts us, with trial and temptation with there and not yet. The third form of *tentatio* revolves around the self itself – it is to be taken in an authentic way. Here emerges the self-world, the experience of self. However, the self is lost in this *tentatio*, in false happiness.¹² Only the overcoming of temptation can lead to self-revelation and the authentic life as such.

Tota vita—tentatio [The whole life—temptation]. Giving in to the *tentatio*, the *tentatio* itself already resembles a kind of falling for Heidegger. Heidegger speaks of *molestia*¹³ as a determinant of *tentatio* and the existence being attached to being-here, the Dasein. The *molestia* is *tentatio* being a burden, the facticity itself. In *tentatio*, one knows itself and by *tentatio*, one knows the other: “*In tentatione apparet, qualis sit homo*” [In temptation appears what kind of a human being one is] and “*Nescit se homo, nisi in tentatione discat se*” [You do not know a human being unless you have gotten to know him in temptation]. The *tentatio* is a possibility to know oneself by questioning; precisely why it is facticity. *Quaestio mihi factus sum* [I have become a question to myself]¹⁴ and the world has become a question to me. Experience life uncovers itself as a possibility to either pass the trial and temptation (a trial of temptation), “grasping the authentic direction of concern of one’s own factual Dasein.”¹⁵ The *tentatio* is never an event,

¹⁰ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 152.

¹¹ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 155.

¹² Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 175.

¹³ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 172.

¹⁴ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 184.

¹⁵ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 183.

a singular event which one can understand but an experience that hold the many faces of the Dasein. Already here Heidegger alludes the life experience to a kind of falling (which will be the characteristic of the Dasein in *Being and Time*). He says, "My 'facticity' is the strongest temptation ... in it, I move in a somehow falling manner".¹⁶ Failing the test of tentatio is also a falling¹⁷ as well as an openness and experience of possibility. Thus, such openness can only be where there is a question. The questioning of self is tentatio-falling and opening oneself authentically in relation to oneself.¹⁸

Quaestio mihi factus sum. The *tentatio* is always historical and existential. The experience of self is always here and now; it is always an opening and process in history in which one questions life and experiences life. Heidegger says, "one notices the historical basic meaning of *discere* [to learn, to get to know], which takes place in concrete, factual, historical self-experience."¹⁹ Tentatio is a specifically historical concept. It concerns life itself, indeed it is a concern for life and self-concern (*cura*)²⁰. The tentatio is always an anxiety for life as much as it is a possibility. Being tried; being left open " [dahin "gestellt sein"]"²¹ is also being left open for existence itself, for receiving existence. The questioning of self is possibility and anxiety – it carries the existential character of fallenness of *Being and Time* already. The falling of *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* does not express and reveal the true experiencing of falling; it is a root for future thought of existence; for Dasein. In the next section, the fallenness of *Being and Time* and the links of early and later thought will be discussed. *Tota vita—tentatio*; all life is falling.

¹⁶ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 189.

¹⁷ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 175.

¹⁸ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 186.

¹⁹ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 206.

²⁰ The question of fallenness, care and death will be further discussed in the next chapter. Heidegger, *Being and Time*. Already here concern for life is interlinked with the same fallenness into life and the openness to death (later, being-towards-death).

²¹ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 186.

2.2. Falling into Life

Being-in-the-world is tempting in oneself.²²

...is there not at least some Platonism in the Verfallen?²³

Heidegger's Verfallen or Abfall is reminiscent of Augustine's work as well as lectures on Augustine:

An omnes hoc [vita beata] volunt, sed quoniam caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, ut non faciant quod volunt, cadunt in id quod valent eoque contenti sunt...? (or do all men desire this [the happy life], but because the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that they do not do what they wish, they fall into what they are able to do, resting content with that...?)²⁴

The *cadere* of Augustine, however, signifies the Fall; and Heidegger's although having similar connotations is more than falling. Heidegger rejects the understanding of falling as a form of a movement from concord to discord but rather a fall is existence itself. The *tentatio* of the *Phenomenology of Religious Life* is the preliminary form of Verfallen. Indulging in self – taking oneself to be important “is a falling, since the human being, according to its significance, is a “nothingness” before God.”²⁵ It is the question of “what am I” – my factual existence which is filled with the tendency to bring-to-a-fall.²⁶ The *tentatio*, as already mentioned signifies that fall as a factual life experience which is the “attitudinal, falling, relationally indifferent, self-sufficient concern for significance.”²⁷ The falling is being itself, in literal words, it is the fall in which one is; the (in)authentic question of being. The fallenness of *Being and Time*, however, is a profound existential characteristic of the Dasein. Verfallen signifies a fall; moreover, a collapsing

²² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 177.

²³ Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

²⁴ Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. 10.

²⁵ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 175.

²⁶ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 206.

²⁷ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 11.

– falling down into something. Its existential characteristic is more than a questioning of life but an experience of life that is signified by a fallenness, thrownness into the world. Although the *tentatio* already implied some existentially into the phenomenon of trial and temptation – it was “not yet” a fallenness. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterizes the phenomenon of falling as an existential mode of being-in-the-world.²⁸ Living in the world, experiencing factual life is always a falling. A thrownness into the world; a questioning of the world is the utmost being-self and being-with-others. This is how Heidegger formulates the everydayness of life – a fall each and every day. This everydayness of falling equates with a mode of being that inauthentic in the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*:

Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 'world'. "Fallenness" into the 'world' means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Through the Interpretation of falling, what we have called the "inauthenticity" of Dasein may now be defined more precisely.²⁹

The fallenness into being is thus inauthentic; as opposed to an authentic existence (although it could also be an authentic face; a conscious relational being). The distinction arises then between an authentic and inauthentic life experience. Derrida views this as “within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics [...] revolving around one fundamental axis: that which separates the authentic from the inauthentic and . . . primordial from fallen temporality.”³⁰ Dicenso also agrees, mirroring Derrida; the distinction of authentic and fallen existence which signifies a (neo-Platonic) dualism is essentially metaphysical.³¹ The metaphysical layering of

²⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 221.

²⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 220.

³⁰ Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, 63.

³¹ James DiCenso, “Heidegger’s Hermeneutic of Fallenness,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* LVI, no. 4 (1988): 667.

life experience then is also a characteristic of fallenness; and this characteristic is two-fold: fallenness-into-the-world is inauthentic because the fall is first of Dasein from a “higher” experience of life and secondly because the experienced fallenness of Being is an everyday being-in-the-world. Being is always disclosed to such falling – hence the ontological being is always concerned with falling and always falling itself. *Tota vita—tentatio*; all life is falling.

It seems that similar to the description of life as temptation and trial without cessation, being-in-the-world is characterized by a constant falling in *Being and Time*. Falling is not an intrinsic Dasein but a face of it³² – a characteristic of how it reveals itself to us. The interconnectedness of falling – the temptation is how everyday life is; a basic layer of Being. Fallenness is also characterized by tranquilization³³. The tranquillizing effect of fallenness is superficial (as was the *tentatio*) and alienate one from Dasein; however, at the same time, force Dasein into a different mode of Dasein (inauthenticity) which Dasein exists in “being entangled in itself.”³⁴ The non-Being as a mode of Being is what Dasein subscribes to for us; how we live and experience life itself. The Dasein is itself tempted to fall; hence, the falling of losing self; constantly enhanced by itself and reproducing the falling by a tempting tranquillity. This is why Heidegger says that Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting [*versucherisch*]³⁵ and:

When Dasein, tranquillized, and 'understanding' everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation [*Entfremdung*] in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating.³⁶

It already reveals itself to us how *tentatio* was only a layer of falling; that fallenness is a whole different mode of existence in its

³² As definite existential characteristics, these are not present-at-hand in Dasein, but help to make up its Being. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 219.

³³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 222.

³⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 223.

³⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 221.

³⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 222.

existential nature. Heidegger summarizes the depth of fallenness as such: “the phenomena we have pointed out—temptation, tranquillizing, alienation and self-entangling (entanglement)—characterize the specific kind of Being which belongs to fall. This ‘movement’ of Dasein in its own Being, we call its “downward plunge” [Absturz]”.³⁷ Such is the factual existence of Dasein; the being-present-at-hand; concerned with being-in-the-world. Dasein is fallen only because it is concerned with being-in-world; it problematizes being and cares about being. Authentic existence is then only a modified inauthentic being, as care for which the Dasein is fallen.

3. Death and Care

3.1 *Cura* and Openness to Death

Augustine’s *cura* inspires the care [sorge] of *Being and Time*, however, *cura* in *Phenomenology of Religious Life* is translated as a concern. Care and concern both shall signify one and same, however, the anxiety aspect of tentatio might prove “concern” to be a better fit for earlier lectures, while the care of *Being and Time* signifies anxiety as a different interlinked face of Being. The *cura* of earlier texts is the surface of Sorge of the magnum opus of Heidegger. Derrida says, “Heidegger, following the tradition of the *cura* but without naming Plato, evokes nothing more than the solicitude of the Vulgate, Seneca, and the *merimna* of the Stoics which, however, like the Platonic *meletē*, also signifies care, concern, and solicitude”.³⁸ The solicitude of being-in-the world carries with itself the anxiety of being-here and in earlier lectures, Heidegger speaks of *curare* as the basic character of the factual life.³⁹ The concern is always for a happy life. The concern for life is interdependent, or rather in Heidegger’s words relational; it alters in the historical-factual experiences of life. The concern for life is fear and desire (“*adversa in prosperis timeo*” [in prosperity I

³⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 223.

³⁸ Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death: Religion and Postmodernism*, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 12.

³⁹ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 151.

fear adversity]); it is historical because it is factual; in my temptations also emerges a concern for power; for validation of others – such is the life that Augustine calls a *misera vita* in which these communal-worldly contexts of experience are thoroughly dominated by such a *curare*.⁴⁰ The *curare* does not only have negative connotations. The *curare* also lets oneself into life:

It (*curare*)...leads into the significance of the world, delightful, curious self-significance. In this, the “wherein,” whereinto, itself has a pull [fortziehend]. The letting-go is now itself led; it only keeps alive the direction in general – “further,” “more” – but it leads into the world, and indeed into the historical facticity; therewith, the latter undergoes a shrinking and “finally opens up” [“geht letztlich auf”].⁴¹

One already can see the link of *cura* and *tentatio*. *Cura* as a characteristic of factual experience operates along with temptation; it exists as concern for a happy life; for delight where *tentatio* lies.⁴² The happy life; or the concern for it is also of temptations which are themselves delights of life. The *cura* – the desire – is always beside temptation.

The desire places one into an awaiting (hence a historical awaiting)⁴³ – it also signifies a certain uncertainty. *Cura* itself is also the anxiety of the unknown in face of God, of an uncertain future. Heidegger speaks of such awaiting in the letters to Thessalonians – in the context of *Parousia*. Fritsch says, “If the *parousia* is not interpreted as expecting the Messiah every day, but as increasing the anguish in standing alone before God, Christian life, as opposed to “late Judaism”, articulates the primacy of enactment over the expectation of an event.”⁴⁴ *Parousia* then signifies here a kind of anxiety, as well as the expectation that is historical and

⁴⁰ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 171.

⁴¹ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 190.

⁴² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 205.

⁴³ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 130.

⁴⁴ Matthias Fritsch, “Cura et Casus: Heidegger and Augustine on the Care of the Self,” in *The Influence of Augustine on Heidegger: The Emergence of an Augustinian Phenomenology*, ed. Craig J. N. de Paulo (Lewinston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), 17.

eternal. For Paul, and his *cura*, still expected *Parousia*, even before his death.⁴⁵ The expectation of *parousia* though is not a blind awaiting but a conscious desire for it. Paul says: you know exactly that he will come.⁴⁶ This expectation is embodied in a certain *cura* – in desire for the coming. The endless expectation along with desire signifies the same insecurity of *tentatio* – the constant falling of the factual life experience. *Parousia* is the most characteristic element of the Christian life – the worldly life, factual existence of an insecure being. The being-here of Christianity, the knowledge of *Parousia* is a preliminary conception of being-towards-death. The same anxiety and care are already visible in the Letter to Thessalonians. For Heidegger, Paul views the Thessalonians as *Entschlafenen* – those who have passed away.⁴⁷ That who is not Christian is unprepared for death, not guided on how to die and the why. The facticity of Christian life awaits both coming of the Christ along with coming for death; his death is meaningful and expected: the way in which God resurrected Christ, so too will he bring the dead to him along with Christ.⁴⁸ The uncertainty of Christian life then is powered by desire towards the facticity of the end. Heidegger says, “The uncertainty can become great, for instance those “who have passed away”: what will become of us? The dead in Christ!”⁴⁹ Death is connotated with reunification with Christ; the concern for a happy life is always a concern for death.

3.2 Care and Being-towards-Death

[T]hose who practice philosophy in the right way are in training for dying and they fear death least of all men.⁵⁰

Being is always a being-towards-death. In *Being and Time*, the links of death and care are central to the Dasein. The Dasein is always existential as are all its faces. Care [*Sorge*] emerges in *Being*

⁴⁵ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 81.

⁴⁶ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 72.

⁴⁷ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 98.

⁴⁸ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 81.

⁴⁹ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 98.

⁵⁰ Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

and Time as one face/possibility of Dasein: “as one of Dasein's possibilities of Being, anxiety-together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it-provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being. Dasein's Being reveals itself as care.⁵¹ Care is an ontological element of Being explanation of which Heidegger undertakes as his task. Heidegger openly states that apart from thrownness-into-the-world; the factual existence is always embodied in concern; that being itself gives meaning to the “care”.⁵²

The concern (*cura*) of Augustine, is replaced by the term Care – it consists of both concern [Besorgen] and solicitude [Fürsorge]. It embraces the characteristics of Being – it signifies the care for oneself, for the Other, etc., it is not only existential but also co-existential. Care already is Dasein; not an added characteristic of it but rather, being-in-the-world already signifies care. The other characteristics of Dasein may come *a posteriori*, however, care is already existentially a priori; it already lies in and “before” factual life.⁵³ Establishing being-in-the-world as Care, Heidegger must uncover the underlying link of the end of life- Death, “dying” he says, always signifies Dasein’s being-towards-death.⁵⁴ To grasp being-towards-death, one needs to understand fully the being-here. The phenomenon of care, then, seems to be the basis for Death. This concern linked to dying is inevitably Platonic – is not Dasein itself Platonic? Derrida likens this link to one in *Phaedo* of Plato:

....as the attentive anticipation of death, the care brought to bear upon dying, the meditation on the best way to receive, give or give oneself death, the experience of a vigil over the possibility of death, and over the possibility of death as impossibility. That very idea, namely, this meletē or epimeleia that one can rightly translate by "care" or "solicitude," opens the vein-and begins the vigil, - within

⁵¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 227.

⁵² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 237.

⁵³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 238.

⁵⁴ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 291.

which will be inscribed the Sorge ("care") in the sense Heidegger confers on it in *Being and Time*.⁵⁵

Cura as solicitude evokes precisely this being-towards-death, readiness for death and the care for it. Life itself, the Dasein is always care and always a being-towards-death. The self is always ready, and this Platonic link can be visible from the Dialogues:

The truth rather is that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint [in other words Socrates describes this separation of the invisible soul, this secreting of the self by means of which the soul retreats from the visible body to assemble itself within itself, in order to be next to itself within its interior invisibility separation and invisibility indeed being the criteria for secrecy], having never voluntarily 'during life had connexion with the body, which she is ever avoiding (*phēgousa*), herself gathered in herself (*synthroismene hautis eis heauten*) [whenever Levinas refers to the *Phaedo*, as he often does in his different texts on death, he underlines this assembling of the soul upon itself as the moment when the self identifies with itself in its relation to death], and making such abstraction her perpetual study (*hate meletosa aei touto*)-all this means that she has been a true disciple of philosophy (*he orthus philosophousa*) and therefore has in fact been always practising how to die without complaint (*kai to onti tethnanai meletosa rhadios*). For is not such a life the practice of death (*melete thanatou*)?⁵⁶

A solicitude in face of death is precisely this manifestation of *cura*; of care and concern for life – the desire for it and the aversion of its end. The soul, the “immortality” of it (such as in *Phaedo*) is that which accepts death; keeps vigil for it, awaiting! This awaiting is the same awaiting of Thessalonians; of redemptive death; of delight. *Meletē thanatou* is what care assembles itself in.

Derrida goes even further as to say that “this concern for death, this awakening that keeps vigil over death, this conscience

⁵⁵ Derrida, *The Gift of Death: Religion and Postmodernism*, 12.

⁵⁶ Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, 435. For comments, see Derrida, *The Gift of Death: Religion and Postmodernism*, 14.

that looks death in the face is another name for freedom.”⁵⁷ Heidegger’s Dasein makes the link of freedom and the *tentatio*; a life that is temptation, that is a possibility, the Dasein that receives the existence is free.⁵⁸ The concern of life – the concern of being-towards-death emerges then as freedom – as being left open; being open to existence. A similar phenomenon of Care and Death is visible in Jan Patočka, a student of Heidegger who views Western philosophy as Care of the Soul. He says, in *Heretical Essays*:

Another important moment: The Platonic philosopher triumphs over death in the sense that he doesn't run from it, he looks it straight in the face. His philosophy is *mete thanatou*, concern for death; the concern of the soul is inseparable from the concern for death which becomes authentic concern (*prava'*) for life; (eternal) life is born from this event of looking death in the face, from the triumph (*premozenf*) over death (perhaps it is nothing but this "triumph"). Yet when that is combined with the relation to the Good, with the identification with the Good and with deliverance from the demonic and the orgiastic, it signifies the reign of responsibility and, along with it, of freedom. The soul is absolutely free, it chooses its own destiny.⁵⁹

For Patočka, freedom is precisely this triumph over death. For Heidegger, one might say it is freedom-towards-death; the acceptance of possibility (*tentatio*) and life (*care*).

The anxiety in face of death is manifested in the Being-in-the-world.⁶⁰ Such anxiety, facticity of life and falling are the very characteristics of “being-towards-the-end”⁶¹; the freeing acceptance of the end and the constitutive faces of Death. The fascinating co-existential faces of Dasein are thus clearer. The lines between them blurred, they exist as being-in-the-world. The temptations of every day, the fallenness is already a being-towards-death. It exists as awaiting; however, its fallenness-into-the-world can only signify

⁵⁷ Derrida, *The Gift of Death: Religion and Postmodernism*, 15.

⁵⁸ Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 186.

⁵⁹ Jan Patočka and James Dodd, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 115.

⁶⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 251.

⁶¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 251.

an inauthentic life and an inauthentic being-towards-death. Just as the “the experience of a vigil over the possibility of death, and over the possibility of death as impossibility”; the inauthenticity itself is a possibility of authenticity.⁶² The authentic being-towards-death perhaps is not only an awaiting but concern – anticipation that is co-existential with receiving death itself. Such care is also in ties with freedom; with freedom-towards-death. Anticipation, and an acceptance (*Parousia?*) of death. Rather than aversion, an affirmation of its actuality. Anticipation of death and a freedom-towards-death in face of giving oneself death – such is an authentic being-towards-death. The *tentatio* - the fallenness; the *cura*, concern – and Care come together in face of non-being, in face of Death. All faces of Dasein exist to form in(authentic) existence and anticipate Death. *Numquid non tentatio est vita humana?* – Is not human life being-towards-death?

Conclusion

There are multiple yet intersecting paths this paper has taken. Augustine's tentatio, particular in the reading of Heidegger has been re-read and constituted as a characteristic of factual life in its openness and possibility, in its concern for life itself. The existentiality of tentatio, although already visible is formulated fully in *Being and Time*. The echo of tentatio is heard from fallenness-into-the-world, which is an existential face of Dasein – the everydayness in which the tempting nature of being is manifested. The fallenness-into-the-world carries the same, if not more weight as the *tentatio* – questioning, possibility and concern. Visible at once, the co-existentiality of Dasein's characteristics have become clear precisely in the link of fallenness and concern. The *cura* (concern) of Augustine is powered by a desire for a happy life which must also mean death and anticipation of it. The concern for life is always a concern for death just as being-in-the-world and dying is always a being-towards-death. Care as another existential characteristic of Dasein, is the care of life as well as care for anticipation

⁶² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 259.

of death. The Platonic *meletē thanatou* has been re-read and structured as care and death as one. This anticipation, acceptance of death culminates in freedom: freedom-towards-death. Concern and anxiety for Parousia have been replaced with the same inauthentic anxiety in face of death and alternatively in an authentic, freeing Care for Death. Temptations of Augustine and concern for happy life have at once become a Dasein – fallen, caring, possibly free and always mortal.

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