

Research Article

Periods of Migration Waves and Social Demography of Bosnian Population in Germany

Abstract

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As seen in the case of Bosnia, there are many difficulties in studying the population living abroad. Discussions that started with unclear data on Bosnian society are going on in isolation from each other. A reliable database is needed to develop a realistic and effective program on the Bosnian population in Germany. However, information on first-generation immigrants and subsequent generations is often incomplete and far from reliable enough. Based on German official government statistics, this article focuses on the migration processes and current demographic structure of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian community in the country. According to the data of the German Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt), 289 thousand people have immigration experience or consist of first-generation people, and this number reaches 415,000 with the new generation immigrants descended from them. Nearly half of the population of Bosnian origin in Germany participated in the migration process through family reunification and marriage. 84% of the immigrant population is concentrated in 4 of the 16 states in Germany. Compared to other immigrants in the country, Bosnian society, which has a better level of socio-economic indicators such as education, employment and income level, is experiencing a successful integration process with the host society.

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Arařtırma Makalesi

Almanya'daki Bosna Toplumunun Sosyo-Demografik Yapısı ve Almanya'ya Gôç Süreçleri

Özet

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Bosna örneğinde görüldüğü gibi, yurtdışında yařayan nüfusu incelemenin birçok zorluğu bulunmaktadır. Bosna toplumuna iliřkin net olmayan verilerle bařlayan tartıřmalar birbirinden kopuk bir biçimde ilerlemektedir. Almanya'daki Bosna kökenli nüfus hakkında gerçeđi ve etkili bir program geliřtirebilmek için güvenilir bir veri tabanına ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Ancak ilk kuřak göçmenler ve sonraki nesiller hakkındaki bilgiler genellikle eksik ve yeterince güvenilir olmaktan uzaktır. Bu makale, Alman resmi devlet istatistiklerine dayanarak ÷lkedeki Bosna-Hersek kökenli toplumun Almanya'ya göç süreçleri ve mevcut demografik yapısına odaklanmaktadır. Almanya Federal İstatistik Bürosu (Statistisches Bundesamt) verilerine göre 289 bin kiři göç deneyimine sahip veya birinci kuřak kiřilerden oluşmakta, bunların soyundan gelen yeni kuřak göçmenlerle birlikte bu sayı 415 bine ulaşmaktadır. Almanya'daki Bosna kökenli nüfusun yarısına yakını aile birleřimi ve evlilik yoluyla göç sürecine katılmıştır. Göçmen nüfusun %84'ü Almanya'daki 16 eyaletten 4'ünde yoğunlaşmış bulunmaktadır. ÷lkedeki diđer göçmenlere nispetle, eğitim, istihdam ve gelir düzeyi gibi sosyo-ekonomik göstergeler açısından daha iyi bir düzeye sahip Bosna toplumu, ev sahibi toplum ile bařarılı bir entegrasyon süreci yařamaktadır.

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1. Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina¹ is one of the rare European countries with a high percentage of the population living abroad. Many researchers point this out and most of the reports² that regard the Bosnian migration case contain this data. According to the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugee BiH, there are about 2 million people of Bosnian origin living abroad. This is more than half of its own population. This exactly represents 56 percent out of the 3.53 million BiH citizens (Ministry of Security, 2017). According to data examined by World Bank (2016), this number is 44.6 percent³. Furthermore, most of them have settled permanently in some of the Western European countries, the USA or Australia. Soon after the war in the 1990s, many Bosnians decided to continue their life within the neighbour countries like Croatia and Serbia. The majority of them achieved the right to citizenship. However, during the last ten years, there has emerged a significant outflow of people directed predominantly toward the EU countries. In general, this has been broadly perceived as mass migration. The ongoing flow of population from this region, which many authors (Kupiszewski, 2009; Kupiszewski et al., 2009; Alscher, Obergfel, & Roos, 2015; Vracic, 2018), as well as the most EU agendas referred to as Western Balkan, seems to be unstoppable and becomes a permanent state issue for both the sending and receiving sides. Particularly for the former one, many academics and media portray this as a serious concern. According to some parameters, this has almost become a trend in the region, or what has been referred to in migration theories as the culture of migration. This can be noticed from the increasing public discourses and shared opinions/concerns within the origin societies, though there is a shortage of concrete and precise researches on this topic. With an emigration rate of 45.5 percent, Bosnia and Herzegovina represents one of the primary exporters of migrants (World Bank, 2016). It has been recognized as a migrant source country not only in Europe, but in the world as well; it is the second-largest non-OECD exporter of migrants into the OECD (Dimova & Wolff, 2015); according to World Bank (2016), it belongs to top ten emigration countries.

Primarily due to its extended job market, Germany⁴ has been considered as the most attractive destination for emigrating. Besides the existing many “pull” factors of migration, which can be theoretically used in the explanation of individuals’ migration acts, Germany also represents a traditional destination for many Bosnian emigrants. This traditional migration flow has been characterized by certain labour, forced migration, and social migration patterns. Regarding the labour migration

1. Further in the text BiH.

2. Researchers that work on Bosnian migration case have different investigating points, while many reports are restricted to merely giving information about current emigration records. Vathi and Black (2007) regarding the reports speak of ‘monitoring’ rather than ‘researching’ migration in the region (Kupiszewski, 2009).

3. World Bank (2016) figures are slightly smaller as they relate only to the first generation of BiH emigrants and position Bosnia and Herzegovina at 16th place in the world emigration rate compared to total population in the country (out of a total of 214 countries and territories covered in the Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016).

4. Statistics of persons who canceled their residence in BiH for the period 2016-2019 indicate that Germany and Austria represent the Bosnian emigrants’ primary destination (Ministry of Security, 2020).

patterns, worthy of mention are structural conditions, as current state policies and constraints for free movement of people, visa agreements⁵, and migration controls; that is, immigration policies as a whole as well. Seemingly, these structural conditions at the macro-level cause that the mobilization of people, or particularly this emigration trend has been occurring differently and with its specific dynamics during the last two decades. The general migration dynamic from Western Balkan, as Vracic (2018) looks on that, primarily has been controlled by destination countries. Considering this emigration from the standpoint of social conditions and relations, Halilovich (2012) gives some general insights about most of the Bosnian population and its existing migrant community throughout the world. In his work, he mentions that trans-local factors, as a pattern of migration, have led people to migrate in large numbers to specific locations. Such migration patterns have been created as a result of social networks. Migrant networks are a set of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and nonmigrants to one another through relations of kinship, friendship and shared community origin (Palloni, Massey, Ceballos, Espinosa, & Spittel, 2001, p. 1963). Based on family, friendships, and local communities from the former homeland migrants networks form a phenomenon known as “chain migration”. This is where personal migrant networks occur as a means that facilitates further migration from the source country. It is particularly reflected in the acts of decreasing the costs of the migration process and providing assistance for newcomers, once they immigrate to the host country. Dimova and Wolff (2015) in their Bosnian case study suggest that there has been a positive correlation between migration intentions and recipients of remittance⁶; alluding to the presence of migration networks and looking at remittance as a sign of the strength of family ties. According to the World Bank (2016), Bosnia and Herzegovina is among the top ten remittance⁷ recipients. Efendic et al. (2014) find that one in five respondents received remittances in the past 12 months from family members living abroad, and conclude that this is quite a common case in Bosnia. According to World Bank data for the year 2018, 21 percent of the total amount of remittance was sent from Germany (Ministry of Security, 2020). This is clear evidence of interconnectedness between Bosnian migrants in Germany and their family members in the country of origin. It indicates the existing social networks and frequent kind of mobility between these two places.

These aforementioned considerations help to understand what positions migrants have been in and what kinds of migration experiences these individuals have. However, the lack of literature dealing with the Bosnian migration case is easily noticeable; despite, as Vukovic (2005) mentioned, the important social and economic changes connected with migration. Valenta and Ramet (2011) pointed out that Bosnian emigration, in

5. Travel restrictions to the Schengen Zone were suspended for Bosnians in 2010 and since then, Bosnians have been allowed to enter the Schengen Zone without any visa requirements (Valenta & Strabac, 2013).

6. Remittances, in its narrow financial meaning (flow of money or financial remittances), are considered as the most visible product of international migration and they tend to be the best measured and recorded aspect of the migration experience (Adams, 2003) in (Efendic, Babic, & Rebmann, 2014).

7. According to the World Bank data for 2019, the share of remittances in the GDP of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 10.5% which places Bosnia and Herzegovina in 5th place in Europe in terms of remittances inside the GDP (Ministry of Security, 2020).

general, is still largely unexplored, and cite Marek Kupiszewski's statement, "given the magnitude of migration to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the dearth of literature [on this subject] is rather disappointing (2009, p. 438)". Therefore, the lack of significant findings of emigration, in the first place, has been leading the discourses into somewhat an imprecise way of contemplating this problem within the origin society. Even if it represents one of the most challenging topics in today's Bosnian society, the discussion about emigration issues has not been based on reliable data. Furthermore, as Vracic (2018) mentions, it remains just an emotive issue, rather than a target and strategic approach by policymakers. Certainly, the general ongoing trend of emigration from Bosnia has been perceived as a clear social-economic and political problem. The emigration phenomenon is giving rise to concerns generally associated with the demographic consequences of emigration and the outflows of skilled nationals⁸. Kupiszewski (2009) says that most of authors perceive the process as a brain drain detrimental to development. Many in the country argue that eventually, it will cause various negative repercussions for the society and its capacity for further development prospects. Some of the concerns about emigration issue that could be heard of throughout the public discourses are like: "young people leaving Bosnia", "Bosnia loses its productively-creative"; "fertile capital"; "more educated people tend to emigrate that certainly leaves space for nationalism growing up", and so on. Above all, the percentage of people who are considering leaving the country is pretty high, particularly when it comes to younger strata. Efendic et al. (2014) in their survey conducted on migration intentions found that 55 percent of respondents have intentions to migrate and half of them would settle abroad temporarily. In another study, Efendic (2016) found that the average of those who would emigrate if they had the chance was 45 percent, whilst the findings of the percentages for certain subcategories were: 68 percent among young (18-35 years) respondents; 57 percent of those who are unemployed; and 42 percent for more educated individuals. Even though migration intention does not mean they will all succeed to emigrate, it displays the seriousness of this emigration phenomenon and indicates its further growing trend related to age, economic situation, and education level of participants. As such, all this mentioned above certainly represents a demanding challenge for policymakers, which recently has been a constant issue among academic and public focuses.

While there are several studies that examine potential Bosnian emigrants, very few are those who study individuals that have already emigrated. Dealing with the population living abroad seems to be extremely challenging for Bosnian authorities. Some state reports (Migration Profile of BiH, 2017, 2020), use the secondary sources of data for estimating the emigrated population, or data collected by destination countries. This is an important point especially when it comes to migration-related development⁹ issues such as remittance, transfer of knowledge, and brain drain concerns. Dimova

8. According to the Global Competitiveness Report released by the World Economic Forum in 2010, "Bosnia and Herzegovina ranked 131 (out of 133) in the category of "brain drain from the country", that particularly relates to youth specialists in various fields, masters and doctoral students. According to UNESCO report, "79% of research engineers, 81% of master's degree holders in science, and 75% of PhD graduates in science" have left the country since 1995 (Ziga, et al., 2015, p. 15).

9. Many issues as migrants' returns or diaspora engaged development; important aspects of the country of origin should be discussed both from the scientific point and from the point of state policies.

and Wolff (2015) argue that this should be taken into account as part of the state's development policy, where institutions such as the World Bank argue in favour of reducing the cost of emigration from developing countries as part of the post-2015 agenda. This also tends to be addressed as part of the main sustainable development programs of the country. However, the aim of this article is to present some sort of evidence base of the Bosnian population living in Germany. Halilovich et al. (2018) claim that considering the size of the BiH diaspora population in Germany, there is quite potential for engagement, both in terms of development as well as knowledge transfer and cultural engagement. Germany recently reported the statistical records on its migrant background population which yield many opportunities for studying it. It would be of special interest to have a much clearer point about these migrants in order to develop and conduct some further research with much more certain dimensions and considerations. To this end, this article portrays some general information that considers the number, spatial distribution, social and economic indicators. Furthermore, it displays a core picture of the highly differentiated backgrounds of Bosnian emigrants. The way emigrants have been pursuing the opportunities for going to Germany can certainly be explained by looking into the historical migration ties and processes that encourage the act of easier emigration from Bosnia toward Germany. Therefore, these short insights about historical migration ties are the starting point for every explanation that generally considers topics related to Bosnians in Germany.

2. Migration Waves

Today it is quite possible and appropriate for many reasons to discuss the Bosnian population that resides in Germany. Whether it is an established migrant community or just a raw number of individuals, there is a clear need for an explanation of today's Bosnian migrants and their certain characteristics analysed through the available data. Today's Bosnian population in Germany consists of several different migration outflows. As many authors argue (Valenta & Ramet, 2013; Halilovich, 2012; Efendic, 2016; see also Karabegovic & Jahic, 2019) the general division is between migration and migrants in the pre-war period, war period, and in post-war Bosnia. This started almost half a century ago, and the process of emigration from Bosnia to Germany, which has been occurring in different patterns, is still an ongoing process even today. Following that division, this part discusses the historical migration dynamics, by which there is an existing significant population of Bosnian in Germany today.

The demands for workers¹⁰, as a result of post-WWII industrial development, led to the large encounter of international labour migration¹¹ toward Germany. In the case of Bosnians, the wall of labour emigration occurred by regulating the bilateral agreement for contract-workers between Germany and Yugoslavia in 1968. Accordingly, as citizens of Yugoslavia many Bosnians on a regular base started emigrating to what was then Western Germany. In spite of that, they were considered as temporary guest workers (germ. 'Gasterbeiter'), but the majority of them decided not to return to their

10. From the mid-1950s, the German government itself initiated and encouraged this immigration for economic reasons. In its initial phase, it was accounted for in bilateral agreements (Munz & Ulrich, 1998).

11. The German authorities at 1960-61 began to organize labour recruitment on a large scale (Munz & Ulrich, 1998), until 1973 and the Petrol crisis.

country of origin. After a certain period of time, these migrant workers managed to settle permanently. Furthermore, they started bringing their families, as a part of the process of family reunification¹² which could be considered as a typical form of social migration. When it comes to numbers, during the 1960s and 1970s, about half a million Gasterbeiter from socialist Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, had found work prior to the outbreak of the war (Kupiszewski, 2009). National data on citizens with temporary jobs and residence in immigration countries (State Institute for statistics, 1994) shows that, by 1991, there were 113.000 Bosnians residing in Germany, where 76.000 of them were workers and the rest 37.000 recorded as a family member. According to the same source, the number of Gasterbeiters in Germany was half of the total Bosnian population living abroad.

The second period includes migration flows during the wartime period of 1990-1996 when hundreds of thousands of Bosnians fled from the war conflicts (Valenta & Ramet, 2011). The refugees headed mainly to the countries of Western Europe, mostly to Germany. According to UNHCR (1996), after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (data for 1996), more than 600.000 refugees had temporary asylum protection in certain European countries, where Germany hosted more than half of them, or approximately 320.000. After the war atrocities in Bosnia ended, the German state was sending back all displaced people who had not been given refugee status under the terms of the 1951 Geneva Convention¹³. They had a so-called “tolerated” *Duldung status* of temporary protection. The government made it clear¹⁴ that the refugees were in Germany on a temporary basis *only* (Dimova, 2006). *Duldung* only means that the state chooses not to implement deportation, although this option remains open. Between 1997 and 1998, Germany repatriated more than 194.100 persons back to BiH (Efendic, Babic, & Rebmann, 2014); 246.000 had been repatriated to BiH by 2005 (Valenta & Ramet, 2011), by force or by using a combination of coercion and extensive pay-to-go schemes (Valenta & Strabac, 2013). However, due to migrant networks and community relations many refugees managed to stay and settle in Germany. More than 20.000 Bosnian refugees succeeded in convincing German authorities that they were entitled to refugee status or humanitarian protection, and settled permanently in the host country (Valenta & Strabac, 2013). The safest way of obtaining a residence permit in Germany for these displaced people, as Dimova (2006) pointed out, proved to be by “demonstrating severe traumatisatation” from the war.

The *post-war flow of people* refers to the period from 1995 onwards. This emigration wave is likely to involve (young) people who are leaving Bosnia due to its high unemployment rate, institutional inefficiencies, dysfunctional political system and

12. After recruitment of foreign workers had been stopped in 1973, new channels of legal immigration to Germany, as Munz and Urlich (1998) point out, were family reunion (with children less than 16 years old and spouses) and asylum.

13. The EU interior ministers met in Maastricht in 1991 where they introduced a new ‘temporary’ category for the impending flood of refugees from former Yugoslavia. According to this Maastricht regulation, Bosnians were never considered as Geneva Convention refugees because, according to the ministers, the Geneva Convention did not consider mass influxes of refugees (Dimova, 2006, p. 4).

14. Unlike the repatriation plans of the other EU countries, Germany did not follow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recommendations to take into account the special situation of Bosnian refugees but forcefully proceeded with its repatriation plan (Dimova, 2006)

some other individual reasons¹⁵. New Bosnian emigrants represent a clear example of migrant experience encountered between “pull” factors in the host country and “push” factors that have been experienced in their country of origin. Unlike the previous wave of refugees that was forced migration, these new emigrants move abroad mostly on the individual base and the migrant motivation can be explained by push-pull theory of migration. Hence, as Castles and Miller (1998) argue, this theory emphasizes the individual’s decision to migrate is based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining in the area of origin or moving to various alternative destinations. Bosnian authorities claim that: low income, the absence of prospects and the lack of economic development are among the main push factors; the existence of substantial social networks abroad, the attraction of living in economically developed societies and better and higher educational and professional opportunities are among the main pull factors (Kupiszewski, Kicinger, Kupiszewska, & Flinterman, 2009). Efendic et al. (2014) in their study found that pull-factors (searching for better life opportunities) are in play rather than push-factors as the dominant reason why individuals would like to move abroad. Domazet et al. (2020) also argue that from 1990 onwards there has occurred a transformation in consideration from certain push factors toward clear pull factors as the dominant reason for leaving the country. The general Bosnian emigration case has been characterized by labour, economic, and war forced migration, but recent flows are broadly considered as economic migration trends. However, this emigration is not just economically motivated and also is not a “searching job” phenomenon. That implies that theoretically this cannot be explained just by economical understanding. Domazet et al. (2020) in their recently conducted study have found that almost half, or 47 percent, of interviewed respondents, have had a job before they emigrated. According to them, this emigration is not just dominated by economic motivations; rather, it should be regarded as a mix of economic, political and social conditions as reasons for moving abroad. Efendic (2016) argues that, in addition to the current post-conflict socio-political environment in Bosnia, higher intentions for emigration are linked to the effects of the typical individual and household conditions (for instance, age, education, unemployment, and low-family income). However, as Castles and Miller (1998) argue, the push-pull model cannot explain why a certain group of migrants go to one country rather than another; for example, why have most Algerians migrated to France and not Germany, while the opposite applies to Turks? One can question the same for Bosnians migrating to Germany. This voluntary migration trend emerged during the early 2000s, while the largest contingents of migrations have taken place over the last five years (Karabegovic & Hasic, 2019). Germany recorded an increase of labour migrants from Bosnia from 100.000 in 2000 to 144.000 in 2006 (Kupiszewski, 2009, p. 55). It shows an increase of 50 percent just in these five years. New parameters show that this number continually rises, mostly due to the liberalization of work visas and other opportunities that facilitated emigration toward Germany. The theory of migrant networks should be considered

15. Bosnian society has generated multiple push factors in the last two decades, which has resulted in unprecedented emigrations from the country. The war and ethnic cleansing forced people to flee from the country, while the postwar period has been characterized by political tensions, discrimination against minority returnees, corruption, and extremely high levels of unemployment (Valenta & Strabac, 2013).

here. The family and community are crucial in migration networks. Networks based on family or on commonplace of origin help provide shelter, work, and assistance in coping with bureaucratic procedures and support in personal difficulties. These social networks make the migratory process safer and more manageable for the migrants and their families. Migratory movements, once started, become self-sustaining social processes (Castles & Miller, 1998). Accordingly, Bosnians' migration to Germany has not stopped until today, but is still the case. In many ways, it represents an ongoing process where old migrants pull new migrants through the constructed social networks. Family reunion scheme, arrangement of marriages in the homeland and opening businesses in the host country especially for jobs in the construction sector appear to be the most common practices among Bosnians to bring new migrants. The existence of the Bosnian migrant community in Germany with its organization and activities helps new migrants to overcome many obstacles they are facing in the host society. Many organizations provide newcomers language courses, administrative support, help in finding accommodation, and in accordance with the purpose of their organization provide conditions for religious and social needs.

Considering the fact that the process of obtaining the worker visa is facilitated today, the unfavourable economic situation and many other factors that exist in the country of origin, the pull factors in the country of settlement, and the existence of migrants' social networks, it is not unusual when whole families together decide to leave Bosnia and move abroad. In addition, Valetta and Strabec (2013) argue that there is an increasing emphasis on people's resources in the most recent migration. According to these facts, many skilled and semi-skilled workers have found their place within the German job market. Furthermore, the ongoing process of 'social migration' which includes family reunification and marriage agreements has been contributing to the growth of the general Bosnian population in Germany. In general, this migration has many impacts on economic, political, and socio-cultural aspects within both societies. Particularly for Bosnian society, the engagement of diaspora and developing transnational practices among migrants tend to be the main focus. Promoting the transnational activities (multi-faceted nature of the relationship) both sides, emigrants and the origin society consider their chance for engagement. The former acts to sustain connectedness to their homeland and thus reinforce their identity. According to Paul (2017), their activities revolve around 'identity maintenance' rather than other transnational activity such as potential investment. The origin society looks at it through the prism of economic and social capital (knowledge and skills transfer) gains. However, the absence of dual citizenship between BiH and Germany barrier to the engagement and constrains many individuals from acting on mentioned base. In their research conducted on the Germany-based Bosnians' transnational activities, Halilovich et al. (2018) show that those individuals who gave up their BiH citizenship due to the German citizenship regime lost their connection to the homeland. While they remain committed to supporting their country of origin, they are often more concerned with humanitarian measures and improving the socioeconomic connections in Germany rather than outright business investments and economic development.

3.Data and Statistics

This article is based on secondary statistical data that serve as the main source of information on Bosnian immigrants. This article tends to show insights into the socio-demographic characteristics of the target population by using the official statistics of the destination country. Analysing this content will be helpful in understanding the general position and different dimensions of Bosnians in Germany. This should be considered as a starting point for some further research and concrete analyses. However, it should be borne in mind that many statistics could be far from real numbers. It depends on different official definitions and baseline norms for counting migrant population; whether it is based just on non-nationals or considers others though. Therefore, many authors working on these issues argue that it is difficult to estimate the total number of Bosnian immigrants because they have been accorded different status levels in the various receiving countries. For example, some countries choose to exclude naturalised migrants from their statistics. Other countries primarily identify immigrants on the basis of citizenship, while yet others use place of birth as the deciding criterion. Only a few receiving countries provide extensive data on first and second-generation Bosnians (Valenta & Ramet, 2011). However, in some of the previous researches on Bosnian migrant (Valenta & Strabac, 2013; Efendic et al., 2014), it is mentioned that host countries, as well as the institutions and organizations dealing with emigration statistics in the home country meet many obstacles in their estimations: for the former - foreign origin population; for the latter - population living abroad. Firstly, this is due to the situation where many migrants, regarding their origin or dual citizenship, appeal to be from two or three different countries. As the dissolution of former Yugoslavia still can be considered as a recent event and the relationships between new countries are still being closely maintained, many individuals de facto and de jure find themselves belonging to more than one country.

This situation is different when it comes to German statistics on the migration population. New official reports to some degree solve the aforementioned obstacles and ambiguities. The statistics on Bosnians in Germany, with the most comprehensive content ever, has been presented by *Statistisches Bundesamt – Destatis* for the year 2018. *Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund - Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus* (BMEM) report is the source of information that has been used for collecting the data for this research work. In addition to this, data on naturalization records have been obtained mainly from the reports of - *Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit – Einbürgerungen*¹⁶.

What is practically important here is that the BMEM (2019) statistical report contains the data about the first and second generation of immigrants. However, consideration of the birthplace was the baseline norm that revealed real or much more exact number of one foreign population residing in Germany. Some previous statistics tended to show the number of Bosnians in Germany who still retain Bosnian citizenship¹⁷.

16. These reports are available at <https://www.destatis.de> for each year from 2004 up to 2018.

17. Furthermore, with the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, there were Bosnian Croats and Serbians residing in Germany who declined to take Bosnian citizenship but preferred to replace their former Yugoslavian citizenship with Croatian or Serbian citizenship. These Bosnian born immigrants do not appear in the German statistics as Bosnian because the statistics on immigrants do not usually indicate the place of birth but, rather, the current citizenship of an individual (Valenta & Ramet, 2011).

Also, this is the first time that second-generation or individuals without migration experience but with migration backgrounds have been included. According to this report, one should be considered as having a migration background when he or she, or at least one of his/her parents did not acquire German citizenship by birth. All of these data contents were lacking in some previous reports in which the country of origin and their institutions tend to use in estimating population living abroad. Bosnian authorities in their reporting on Bosnian migration profile use the migration statistics of recipient countries, although, Efendic et al. (2014) point out that this data is not sufficiently standardized or comparable; however, they consider them incomplete due to lack of data on the second generation, or descendants of Bosnian migrants. By this, they certainly have declared a clear intention to count on people of Bosnian origin who were born abroad. Besides the absence of concrete strategies, this could be seen as a determined state approach in dealing with these issues. Moreover, the Constitution of BiH assigns “immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation” to the state level. It sets out that a citizen of BiH abroad must enjoy the protection of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Therefore, these forms of information enable officials and researchers on migration, with their different aspects of examining this phenomenon, to include a much more exact estimation of Bosnian diaspora in Germany. Hence, in this study it will be presented as some sort of an updated review of the Bosnians in Germany with a much richer amount of information; those who were born there or not, whether they did acquire German citizenship or not - they will all be a part of this general insight.

4.Socio-Demography

According to the analysis of BMEM (2019) report, in 2018 there were 20.8 million¹⁸ residents in Germany with a migrant background, which corresponds to every fourth resident. Generated by the aforementioned three main migration outflows, today’s Bosnians in Germany represent a significant part of the migrant population. According to this report, there were 415.000 Bosnian origin people residing in Germany. Throughout this migration background report, extracted people with migration experience (those who migrated from the county of origin to the receiving country) methodologically are regarded as sub-category of data. Therefore, for some practical reasons, and at certain points, these data have been separately presented.

Table 1: Bosnian population in Germany

	Total (in thousands)	Men	Women
Migrant background	415	211 (51 %)	204 (49 %)
Migration experience	289 (69 %)	145	145

Source: BMEM (2019) report.

18. Ethnic German immigrants that had migrated to Germany after 2WW (1946-1989), known as ‘Aussiedler’ were not included in this number. They are not considered as with migrant background, even they have had migration experience (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019).

Apart from the total number of migrants with background, or 415.000 who have been considered as Bosnians, almost 70 percent are those who have migration experience. They are well-known as the first migrant generation, Bosnian citizens who once have moved to Germany. The rest of the population is considered as their descendants born in Germany; German-born people with one of the parents being Bosnian and having migration experience, or how the report exactly refers - those who did not acquire German citizenship by birth.

Regarding men-women proportion among those with Bosnian migrant origin, there is no significant difference, both men and women are equally represented. Combined by different types of migrants, as a result of different migration waves, 289.000 Bosnians in Germany form an apparently diverse migrant community. It can be perceived by looking at the data that regard the reasons for migrating to Germany. As it follows, it appears that 30 percent came to work; 30 percent came through the procedure of family reunion. About 20 percent of Bosnian migrants have gained resident permits by using refugee rights. For 10 percent of this population, marriage was the reason why they moved to Germany. Family reunion and marriage arrangements, in the report separately mentioned, together represent a sort of social migration phenomenon characteristic for almost every second Bosnian who migrated to Germany. This data confirms some general insights on the origin and structure of the Bosnian Diaspora. What started as temporary labour migration in 1968, soon thereafter accompanied by sort of social migration and during the 1990s characterized by the flow of war refugees, today occurs as a continual outflow of the new generation of Bosnians motivated to move primarily due to economic and then to some other factors.

4.1.Naturalization of Bosnians

Statistisches Bundesamt (2019a) reports the rate of naturalization among the migrant population in Germany. Exact data has been available for the last twenty years in several separate reports. Data for 1998-2018 shows that there are almost 48.000 of Bosnians who passed through the naturalization process. This is a relatively significant proportion of the population regarding the number of above mentioned Bosnian people who moved to Germany. Certainly, naturalization provides some sort of benefits, or how Liebig and Von Haaren put it 'having the host-country nationality is generally associated with better labour market outcomes for immigrants' (Liebig & Von Haaren, 2011, p. 48). However, due to non-existing bilateral agreement on dual citizenship between two states Germany and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnians being naturalized in Germany mostly are not permitted to retain Bosnian citizenship. German citizenship laws changed in the early 2000s to allow for dual citizenship to individuals born in Germany, but, as Karabegovic (2017) points out, this does not apply for most of the Bosnian refugees who came to Germany during the 1990s, hence forcing them to choose one or the other. Therefore, as the outcomes of the naturalization process Bosnians predominantly, or exactly (the data 2005-2018) nine out of ten appeared to renounce their previous citizenship.

Little above half of naturalized Bosnians, or precisely 55 percent of them appears to be women. Riphahn and Saif (2018) in their study on naturalized migrants in Germany, demonstrate that naturalization reduces the risks of unemployment and welfare

dependence for female immigrants. Regarding these findings and the proportion of naturalized Bosnian women, further can be expected that this rate remains at the current level or it might arise even more.

The average age of those Bosnians who have become naturalised Germans is a little bit over 30 years old (data available for 2005-2018). This is due to the regulations that require a certain period of time for one to be able to apply to obtain citizenship. Regarding the right/reason by which they obtained German citizenship, the vast majority (85 %) applied for it on the basis of 8 years of resident permit. The rest are those naturalized by the co-naturalization of family members and by marriage to a German citizen.

4.2. Age

Regarding the age of the Bosnian migrant population in Germany, it can be clearly seen that the vast majority are of adult age, or exactly 80 percent are those above 18 years old. Among those who have migrant experience, this percentage is a little bit higher, or it comes almost to 94 percent. Furthermore, the average age shows that they are older; 45 years old those who belong to first-generation migrants in comparison to the average of 38 years old within the combined population of Bosnians.

	-18	18+	18-35	18-35	%	Average	First entrance	Residing period
Migrant background	79	336	48 11,50%	109	26.26	38.1		
Migration experience	18	271	11 3,81%	67	23.18	45.8	23.3	22.9
Men	40	171	24	56	26.54	37.8		
Women	39	164	24	52	25.49	38.3		

Source: BMEM (2019) report.

In table 2, there are extra two age ranges calculated and added. In the first group, it appears that one out in ten is high-school age population or precisely between 10-20 years old. For some further research that may include the young population and issues that regard the second/third generation of Bosnians in Germany this data can be a starting point. The second age range is between 18-35 years old, and according to these statistics, every fourth Bosnian with migrant background belongs to this age group. This age group has been used in TIES²⁰ study on examining integration outcomes of the migrant population. It may also be useful for some further research focusing on return migration as a “win – win scenario” for Bosnia.

The data regarding when migrants made their first entrance are also available as a part

19. (10-20, 18-35 age groups – author’s own calculation).

20. The Integration of European Second Generation (The Integration of the Second Generation in Germany – Results of the TIES survey on the Descendants of Turkish and Yugoslavian Migrant).

of these statistics. With an average of 23 years old, it shows that Bosnians dominantly in relatively young ages move to Germany. Furthermore, an average residing period of over 20 years shows the clear intention of the migrants to settle permanently and for good. Certainly for some more precise examination, focus on separation between old and newcomers is required. However, this can be an important finding regarding the issues of potential migrant returnees, which should consider the host and the country of origin as well.

4.3. Marriage Status

As it can be seen in Table 3 every second Bosnian residing in Germany appeared to be married. There is no significant difference between the proportion of married men and women. In other words, married male and female Bosnians appear to be married in equal percentages. The number of marriages is significantly higher among the first-generation, and it is has been recorded up to 65 percent. This is expected regarding the fact that this population appears to be older. The reports' data also contain information about the widow and divorced among the Bosnian population in Germany. The information is suitable for some further deeper research.

Table 3: Marriage status

	Not-married	%	Married	%	Widow	Divorced
Migrant background	170	40.96	207	49.8	12	25
Migration experience	67	23.18	188	65.0	12	22
Men	93		105	49,8	0	10
Women	77		102	50	10	14

Source: BMEM (2019) report.


The BEME report analysed shows the data on inter-marriages as sociologically quite an interesting point. Accordingly, 74 per cent of Bosnians in Germany appear to be married to a foreigner who is not a German citizen. This reflects the relatively significant number of Bosnians who have not acquired German citizenship yet. On the other hand, it does not mean that they would not apply for it once when the conditions have been fulfilled. Furthermore, 21 per cent or 44.000 Bosnians are married to a German citizen. Out of that 25.000 (or 12 % in the whole population) are married to non-immigrant Germans and 19.000 (9 % in total) to a German with migrant background. Accordingly, one in ten Bosnians appears to be married to ethnic Germans. This phenomenon of inter-marriages between ethnically Bosnians and Germans reflects the multicultural dimension of the Bosnian immigration case and it can be put in the content of their incorporation in the host society. However, for Bosnians, it is more likely to say that they belong to the group that practise endogamy.

4.4. Education

According to data from the BEME report, 289.000 (70 %) have finished some sort of school. Furthermore, 20 percent of this population have not started their education yet, while almost 8 percent have no education degree at all. It has been noted that there is a problem in comparing other countries' school systems with the German system of educational level, regarding acceptance of foreign degree (Surig & Wilmes, 2015). This level matching difficulty is obvious especially when it comes to high school

education.

BMEM shows the proportions of different types of high school. Here, both categories are split into four main types of high school. As it can be seen, most Bosnians with migrant background have finished a high school labelled as “Hauptshule”. The least number of them chose “Fach-hochschulereif” type of high school. The report also shows the data about the profession, where it has been calculated that 101.000 have no professional degree. Judging by the academic scope, it appears that around 83 percent did not acquire any university degree. The rest of them or exactly 21.000 have graduated from some university, mostly in teaching departments, whereas 9.000 have acquired some of the high qualified professional school.



Graphic 1: Bosnians in Germany – high school education

Source: BMEM (2019) report.

4.5. Households and Economic Situation

The BMEM report provides certain insights on household conditions of the migrant population. According to the reports’ data there are 224.000 Bosnian households in Germany, or to put in another way, the entire Bosnian population resides in this number of households. This data could be used in tracing some further research regarding different (social, political, economic) points to examine. A vast number of Bosnian households can be considered to have migrant backgrounds. Almost 86 percent of the entire Bosnian population in Germany live in a household with more than one migrant origin member. The following data further show the size of Bosnian family units. These are generally considered as nuclear families traditionally consisting of married parents and their children. The average number of members is 2.52 per one household. In every third household, there is a child under 18 years old. The report shows that there are 20 percent of members who are not employed. For the vast majority of households one, two, or more members appear to be employed. The average income per household is 3000 Euro, whilst per person it comes to around 1200 Euro.

Further data on the economic situation of Bosnians are given per person. Half of the population sustain their existence by working in some sort of professional occupation. They are considered as working mass or, to put in another way, those who are still able to provide for themselves working on some job position. The rest of the population consists of non-working mass. They are those who receive a pension or some sort of social payment assistance, and unemployable persons who are children depending

on their parents. The unemployment rate is significantly low, and it is known that 3.3 percent of Bosnians in Germany do not have any job. As a predicament of successful integration in the host society, many studies point out migrants' involvement in the job market. Thus, the TIES study (2016) shows that the ex-Yugoslav migrant population in Germany compared to the Turkish migrant community has a lower unemployment rate. It has been taken as an indicator of better integration of the former community (to which Bosnians belong).

Further data on professional orientation shows that 6 percent of Bosnians own some sort of private business in Germany, and also there are 5 percent of those who work some kind of internship. It could be said that Bosnians have been evenly distributed throughout the job sectors. Looking at the proportion they occupy: a little more than 30 percent of Bosnians are employed in some sort of industry (predominantly manufactory and construction sector); a little less than 30 percent are those who work in the transportation, trade, hosting, and catering sector. Only 3 percent of Bosnians occupy some position in German public offices. The rest of the working Bosnian population, 83.000 or around 35 percent, find their job on some line within the service industry. The average wage they earn is between 1500-2600 Euros.

German is a spoken language in 54 percent of households. Extracting the first-generation or those who have moved to Germany, the proportion appears to be less than half, or around 48 percent. The question about the spoken language among the migrant community, particularly inside the family or among co-ethnics or friends of the same origin, has been devoted to certain attention throughout many migrant-oriented types of researches. Therefore, this constitutes an important reference point for both integration problems on the one hand and concerns about the protection of immigrants' social and cultural identities on the other. Using primarily the German language in many sorts of communications and interactions for those with migrant background indicates their better integration. Accordingly, better integration outcomes, as has been pointed out in the TIES study (Surig & Wilmes, 2015), certainly facilitate migrants' accessibility to different civil and social rights in the host country. However, the language of origin represents one of the main elements and factors in maintaining cultural tradition and social identity. The presence of Bosnian supplementary schools in Germany with language programs and cultural education reflects as Karabegovic (2017) argues the overall belief of maintaining the Bosnian heritage while integrating into German society. Therefore, most Bosnians are considered duo lingual, so they are able to speak in both German and Bosnian, depending on the sort of social interaction and symbolic meanings. Communicating in the Bosnian language for most Bosnians represents a distinctive sense of themselves in the German society, while a high level of proficiency in the German language helps them improve the standard of their lives in the host society.

4.6.Spatial Distribution

Our analysis of the BMEM report considers and collects data on the spatial distribution of population with a migrant background. Table 4 shows the number of Bosnian origin population according to the 16 German federal provinces they have settled in.

	Frequency	Percent
Baden-Württemberg	104	25,1
Nord-Westphalia	98	23,6
Bayern	96	23,1
Hessen	47	11,3
Berlin	17	4,1
Reinland-Pfalz	16	3,9
Niedersachsen	14	3,4
Hamburg	8	1,9
+ Region²¹	15	3,6
Total	415	100

Source: BMEM (2019) report.

According to data from 2018, some 68 percent of total migrant background populations in Germany live in four²² out of 16 federal provinces (Lender): Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Hessen, and North Rhine-Westphalia. Therefore, it is not unlikely that these four regions in Germany appear with a high density of Bosnians though. The vast majority (83 %) of the Bosnian origin population live in these four federal provinces. These are highly industrialized areas. Munz and Ulrich (1998) mention that these large urban agglomerations in West Germany with a large proportion of iron and steel, automobile, and chemical industries and specialized services once have demanded a large amount of worker supplies. Shortly after settling, Gasterbeiters began to organize migrant workers' clubs, which thereafter served as a base for gathering on the ethnic lines. Even though asylum seekers and victims of war under temporary protection were distributed among the Lender (according to the system to foster regional burden-sharing), soon after they achieved legal and permanent residence permit, as Karabegovic (2017) argues for Bosnians, they naturally moved to areas (Lender) where established co-ethnic communities already existed. As this regional concentration is mostly the result of economic structures (Munz & Ulrich, 1998),

21. The cumulative percentage is the author's own calculation

22. According to data from BMEM (2019) report, the four federal provinces contain North-Rhine Westphalia 25%; Baden-Wurttemberg 17.5%; Bayern 15.6%; Hessen 10% of the total migrant background population in Germany. The report shows the proportion of the migrant population in these regions: North Rhine Westphalia 25.6%; Baden-Wurttemberg 30.4%; Bayern 25.6%; Hessen 30% consisted of population with a migrant background.

newcomers attracted by job opportunities and pulled by migrant networks were more likely to move to regions with a high concentration of Bosnians. Every fourth person with Bosnian origin in Germany resides in the region of Baden-Württemberg. This distribution is followed by Nord-Westphalia and Bayern with a high concentration of Bosnians. After them, Hessen comes as the fourth region where there are an existing significant number of Bosnian migrants. Worthy of mention is also Berlin, as a capital city with 17.000 Bosnian origin residents. It must be pointed out that there is a similarity in dispersal between the two categories; whether it displays a combined category with migrant background or it is about an extracted category of those with migrant experience, they are both dispersed throughout the same regions. What also can reinforce this knowledge is the location of Bosnian migrant religious communities that apparently follow the spatial distribution of its co-ethnic population. There are available data for the Bosnian Muslim community (IGBD²³), which shows that 65 (85%) out of 75 established branches are located in the aforementioned four 'Lender'. This is clear evidence that Bosnians follow the pattern of migration where social networks are the most important part of this migration dynamics.

5. Conclusion

From the days when it claimed that it was not an immigration country, Germany has now evolved to a country with a significantly high proportion of migrant origin population. Germany as a developed country sets out many migration programs and policies. However, migrant population continues to grow, and apparently, Bosnians have been part of that reality. Many point to it as a serious concern primarily within the origin society. While Bosnia and Herzegovina keeps losing its own population, the worst scenario would be adopting the behaviour/opinion/principle of thinking by migrants - "Ubi lucrum ibi patria", or "Where there is bread, there is (my) country". One should bear in mind that this would make any possible migrants' returnees less likely. On the other hand, it might diminish many migrant purposive actions directed toward the homeland through the forms of transnational engagements. Bosnian authorities should start working on the programs and strategies to prevent this trend, which is, for itself, definitely a negative one. Today it is quite possible to discuss the first, second, and even third generation of Bosnian migrants in Germany. Therefore, this article shows that the Bosnian population in Germany has been growing constantly due to certain structural changes (the simplification of procedures, and other forms of immigration policies), whereas as a matter of fact this process of migration has been facilitated. Also, the presence of social networks can be seen in the example of remittance amounts, social form of migration, as well as spatial distribution - migrants' intention to concentrate in the few specific industrial areas with a high density of Bosnians. Thus, following already established practices, newcomers choose a destination and settle in accordance with their networks. Therefore, migrant networks seem to be an important means/concept of whole process and its dynamics. Once again we can argue about trans-local factor among the Bosnian migrant community as a pattern of migration.

23. Islamische Gemeinschaft Der Boschnaiken in Deutschland (IGBD) / Bosnische Moscheen in Deutschland (for more information check it at) http://igbd.org/?page_id=43.

Bosnians in Germany seem to be a quite heterogeneous group composed of people who migrated due to several different reasons. During the time of their migration the legal conditions and individual perspectives were not the same. Different migration waves have brought different categories of people. It has started with the workers coming predominantly from rural areas; then it was followed by the war refugee groups consisted of the people with different educational and occupational background; and today it continues with the ongoing flow of professionally skilled new emigrants adapted to the German job market. With their descendants who due to endogamy predominantly grow up within the Bosnian families and with the fact that half of them prefer to speak the Bosnian language among themselves; we can hope that this population, culturally and economically, is not lost for Bosnia yet.

Bosnian emigration toward Germany is certainly subjected to the analysis of the push factors in the source country, but to the pull factors in the destination county as well. The patterns of this migration must be drawn on by using different sources of data. Data that have been collected throughout the reports analysed represent clear statistical determination. Further, the data could be used as an orientation for designing more concrete research with different approaches. It is important when it comes to remittance and remigration issues. As a means of developing programs, the diaspora engagement activities focus on the forms of social capital though, like transfer of knowledge, referring not just to the people who recently left the country, but to the descendants of the first-generation Bosnian origin Germans as well.

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