

A Socio-Political Evaluation on the Subjectivity in the Neoliberal Governmentality

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Abstract

Research Paper

This paper aims to explore neoliberal subjectivity in Foucault's governmentality by tracking the socio-political changes from liberalism to neoliberalism. In parallel with the novelty of Foucauldian theory, this paper attempts to shed new light on socio-political components of neoliberal subjectivity in order to understand the market-society. To do this, it is crucial to pinpoint biopolitical instruments and tools as Foucauldian technologies in order to develop a perspective in aiming to unfold inclusionary and exclusionary practices and interventions between different subjectivities under norm imposition.

The analysis of this paper eventually intends to arrive at a critical point on which neoliberal governmentality shows contemporary political elements in the name of neoconservatism. Moreover, these new conservative motives of neoliberalism go hand in hand with the needs of market-society in order to produce self-governable subjects and ideal subject-citizens. By the end of this paper, the debates on neoconservatism and neoliberalism point to a theoretical and sociological possibility to describe basic concepts and terms related to today's discursive practices of neoliberal power. These determined political agendas lead the individual and groups of the population to be more responsible and loyal citizens for the common good of the nations.

Keywords: Biopolitics, Governmentality, Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, Subjectivity.

Neoliberal Yönetimsellikte Öznellik Üzerine Sosyo-Politik Bir Değerlendirme

Öz

Araştırma Makalesi

Bu makale, liberalizmden neoliberalizme sosyo-politik değişimleri izleyerek Foucault'nun yönetimselliğinde neoliberal özneliği keşfetmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Foucaultcu teorinin yeniliğine paralel olarak, bu makale piyasa toplumunu anlamak için neoliberal özneliğin sosyo-politik bileşenlerine yeni bir ışık tutmaya çalışmaktadır. Bunu yapmak için, norm dayatması altında farklı öznelikler arasındaki kapsayıcı ve dışlayıcı pratikleri ve müdahaleleri ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlayan bir perspektif geliştirmek, biyopolitik aygıtları ve araçları Foucaultcu teknolojiler olarak belirlemek çok önemlidir.

Bu makalenin analizi, nihayetinde neoliberal devlet yönetiminin neomuhafazakarlık adına çağdaş siyasi unsurların gösterdiği kritik bir noktayı işaret etmektedir. Dahası, neoliberalizmin bu yeni muhafazakar güdülerini, kendi kendini yönetebilen özneler ve ideal özne-vatandaş üretmek için piyasa toplumunun ihtiyaçları ile el ele gider. Bu makalenin sonunda, neomuhafazakarlık ve neoliberalizm üzerine yapılan tartışmalar, günümüz neoliberal iktidarın söylemsel uygulamalarıyla ilgili temel kavram ve terimleri tanımlamanın teorik ve sosyolojik bir olanağına işaret etmektedir. Belirlenen bu siyasi gündemler, toplumdaki birey ve grupları, milletlerin ortak iyiliği için daha sorumlu ve sadık vatandaşlar olmaya yönlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Biyosiyaset, Yönetimsellik, Neoliberalizm, Neomuhafazakarlık, Öznellik

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Introduction

The aim of this paper is to claim that the nub of biopolitics is situated in the domain of (neo) liberal reason in order to explore the subtler face of Foucauldian power by which the individual is conducted and society is regulated by social norms of the truth. That should remind us of the concept of governmentality, by which Foucault points out the art of governing the other and the self through rationalized knowledge-power (Foucault, 2001a; Lemke 2001, 2007). With the departure, governmentality can be explained around two aspects. While the first aspect points to the rationality of governing through the pertinent technologies and diapositives, the second indicates this rationality that implicitly permeates the internal world of the individual as regard his adaptation to the rules and norms. Thus, governmentality intrinsically refers to micro-and macro-management of governing individuals (each and all) with the help of the truth (Foucault, 2008; Foucault, 2007; Lemke, 2001, 2007; Rose & Miller, 2008). In this context, freedom and (civil) society come into play as the domains for reconstructing neoliberal subjectivity.

With this introductory of the paper, I take further steps towards developing a critical analysis for neoliberal subjectivity by drawing on Foucauldian perspective. The establishment of the internal and external management of individuals is nourished by technologies of the self and political technologies of power with the aim to construct not only a realm of power relations between the others and the self but also to enable and facilitate the individuals to internalize the respective rationality and its inclusionary rules and norms (Foucault, 1997; Lemke, 2007). The sovereign and disciplinary powers are revealed in the biopolitical age as well, but this time their objectives target nourishing the apparatuses of security for the neoliberal art of government. To illustrate that, disciplinary power in this context has a two-sided effect. On the one hand, the disciplinary practices help individual to adopt market rationality. On the other hand, they work as a mechanism (beyond the different techniques and methods) to enable the individual to take control of their body, to realize its capacity and skills, and to enrich it with new skills and knowledge on the way to 'docility' (Foucault, 2008; Heyes, 2007). In fact, the breaking point for the transformation to biopolitics was to discover "the body as object and target of power" (Foucault, 1995: 136). Therefore, the docile bodies, which must be open to manipulation and analysis, and interferences for subjection and subjugation in order to characterize and cultivate the personalities as the very useful, healthy bodies and normalized minds (Foucault, 1995; Horner-Nadesan, 2008). In addition, now that the human being had been furnished with reason and the capability to thinking, she/he should strengthen his/her autonomy, so to say, his self-government parallel with self-care, self-estimation and self-educating for creating better rapport with the truth of social practices (Heyes, 2007). Therefore, the exploration imposes the political economy upon the individuals through the lens of biopolitics. And normalization appears as the main principle in order to jointly govern the population and individual by means of being able to verify the things as to what is true or false, normal or abnormal, successful or ineffective. The capability of verification provides the power

of normalization to embrace the differences between individuals according to their rewardable or punishable behaviors (Foucault, 1995). Therefore, normalization refers to the dominant frame that hosts the rules and the power relations via medicine, criminology, education, even popular culture. This normalized world helps the individual to realize his existence and his natural capacities. For doing so, the collections of behaviors and the practices constitute the forms of knowledge for generating the subjectivities (Heyes, 2007: 32).

The development of the modern prison and medicine paves the way for criminal personalities or mental illnesses to be classified primarily according to the subjectivities in parallel with a confirmed social order, heterosexual normativity and a healthy profile of mood states, etc. (Heyes, 2007). Thus, this paper begins with the political and economic shift from liberalism to neoliberalism. Then, the paper touches on subjectivity in neoliberal governmentality; particularly, in next subsection the concept of human capital and self-entrepreneurship will be set out. Then, I want to introduce neoliberal technologies for producing self-governable subjects in this paper. Furthermore, the discussions based on the concept of governmentality after Foucault, is in my view, worth briefly mentioning in order to shed light on the ideal citizenship and democracy in times of neoliberalism. Pursuing this route of writing neoliberal subjectivity provides a better understanding of women's subjectivity, inclusionary and exclusionary practices against (idealized) women in times of neoliberalism and neoconservatism.

2. Government as an Art from Liberalism to Neoliberalism

Foucault investigates three forms of power in his contribution of *History of Sexuality: Volume 1 and Society must be Defended* between 1976 and 1977. He displays the mechanisms, technologies of power that are geared towards the conduct of the body and aim at controlling, strengthening the population into way of life expectancy, birth rate, labor, etc. When we look at the lectures given at *College de France* between 1978 and 1979, published under the title of *Security Territory Population and Birth of Biopolitics*, we see that Foucault endeavors to size up the reason of state (*raison d'état*) in early modern Europe in order to mark out the type of rationality that enables the domain of implementation to exercise state power (Foucault, 1988: 73, 2008: 322). To reinforce the reason of political powers for the stronger state losing its privileged domain, the West in the nineteenth century began to offset the rapport between "a rationalization-prone society and certain threats to the individual and his liberties, to the species and its survival" (Foucault, 1988: 58). Liberalism therefore seems to be the critique of excessive government. It appears as a doctrine of the minimal state (Dean, 2002: 101) because the reason of government in the regime of *raison d'état* was unlimited (Foucault, 2008: 37). In this sense, liberal rationality plays a regulative role between the freedom of the individual and control of the population. According to Foucault, the problems of the individual and the problems of the population cannot be separated from each other and from the framework of political rationality. In the liberal art of government, the population

with its specific effects and problems needed more attention as a new political reason concerned with legal subjects and individual free enterprise. Therefore, Foucault explores the political and economic issues of the eighteenth century in order to shed light on liberalism. It needs to be highlighted that liberalism, for Foucault, is neither theory nor ideology. It presents a way in which ‘society’ and ‘represent itself’ needs to be reconsidered, but more importantly, it is “way of doing things” directed towards objectives and regulating itself by continuous reflection. Liberalism...is to be analyzed as a principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government, a rationalization which obeys...the internal rule of maximum economy” (Foucault, 2008:318).

Furthermore, liberalism led to some basic questions raising awareness for the need of government in order to reinforce (civil) society itself. In this way, society causes us think about the development and the improvement of a technology of government in order to measure and justify “too much government” or “excessive power of state” by taking into account the other necessities for a functional and useful government itself (Foucault, 2008: 319). Indeed, the basic question of liberalism is the frugality of government which should be ensured by its own ability to shape and treat freedom as an apparatus of government. As such, freedom in the liberal art of government is a technical means in order to measure and calculate both the self-governed capacities of persons and citizens and the competence of the government for conducting the individuals and population in freedom (Foucault, 2008: 29; Dean, 2002: 37). Hence, “new governmental reason is a consumer of freedom inasmuch as it can only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exists: freedom of the market, freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, the freedom of exercise, freedom of expression and discussion, and so on. Its reason needs freedom” (Foucault, 2008: 63).

Aforementioned, Foucault does not describe liberalism as an ideology; rather he draws attention to the liberal art of government, which means to govern individuals and the population through the technologies and apparatuses of liberal reason. Liberal reason seeks to govern through the choices of free individuals acting upon civil society. To do this, it constructs the necessitated norms of individuals and collective life by means of freedom (Dean, 2002: 40). In this sense, society has a very critical role to play in order to designate necessary liberties, in a way, in which it serves as a domain to surface the transfers of governmental activity (Senellart, 2008: 330). Notwithstanding the positive impression of the concept of freedom and society, “liberalism is not ‘be free’...Liberalism formulates simply ...to produce what you need to be free. You are free to be” (Foucault, 2008: 63). In fact, freedom and society in the rationality of liberalism are two important technologies of government suffused by the life worthy of individuals and the idealized political and economic order of the population. The term of (civil) society as a tool of political rules came to signify the natural domain of freedom and the free choices of the individuals outside any legitimate exercise of power. Due to this, the government’s task is to foster any self-organizing capacities of civil society to the extent of a naturalness of society and its

own internal self-regulations in order to promote its maximal functioning (Rose& Miller, 1992: 179-180). The accentuated reason of fostering civil society is that “liberal mentalities of government do not conceive of the regulation of conduct as dependent only upon political actions...Liberal government identifies a domain outside “politics”, and seek to manage it without destroying its existence and its autonomy” (Rose& Miller, 1992: 180). This shift from limited model of government to the liberated government invokes intrinsically the role of political economy, which Foucault endeavors to draw attention to by describing the new rationalities of government because political economy or the role of the market in liberal reason requires within itself self-limitation of governmental reason amenable to the knowledge of naturalness (Senellart, 2008: 327). Therefore, it is said that new reason of government is pragmatist, that is to say, the new subject of biopolitics is the market (Gambetti, 2012: 32). Hence, as Foucault remarks, “only when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is” (Foucault, 2008: 22).

It seems important to emphasize that which puts forth the critical and problematizing character of liberalism. In doing so, he mentions two different types of liberalism: Classical liberalism and the modern form of liberalism (neoliberalism or economic rationality). (Classical) liberalism tackles the problem connoting how the necessitated market freedom and unlimited exercise of a political sovereignty can be accorded to each other. In fact, it finds its way by delimiting the state’s capacity to possess the knowledge pertaining to the reality of the market, more importantly, to civil society as the natural domain that has its own dynamics and self-regulations (Burchell, 1996: 21). In this context, laissez faire signs “both limitation of exercise of political sovereignty vis-a-vis the government of commercial exchanges, and a positive justification of market freedom on the grounds that the state will benefit more-will become richer and more powerful- by governing less” (Burchell, 1996: 22). One might say, the same criticism against too much government is pertinent to neoliberalism; however, there is a very important difference between liberalism and neoliberalism. Unlike liberalism, neoliberalism does not consider the market as a domain supervised and secured by the state (Burchell, 1996: 23). Neoliberalism construes the relation between state and economy. The State is not the observer of market freedom, which is the service of the organizational principle for the state and society. Obviously, the state behaves in the same way the other market actors (Lemke, 2001: 200; Brown, 2003: 5). These distinctions between the liberalisms presuppose on the basis of government. The social codes embedded in the economic domain are the nub of the decision-making process within the family, married life, or professional life. This means that the rationality of government compared to the rational action of individuals is no longer related to human nature, but to an artificially created form of behavior (Lemke, 2001: 200). However, in the last instance, it seems necessary to formulate the relationship of both liberalisms with government and the governed in which the individual plays an important role. Regarding the matter of individuality, both of them accept the individual as, on the one hand, an object of governmental

action, on the other hand, as a necessary (voluntary) partner of government (Burchell, 1996: 23).

The mechanical logic in the neoliberal art of government is not at stake any more. Instead, the forms of human action governed by a specific (economic) rationality are at the center-gravity of government (Lemke, 2001: 197). Foucault mentions two different types of neoliberalism: Ordoliberalism and the Chicago School. Ordoliberalism developed in Germany. It dealt with the question regarding “the extent to which competitive, optimizing, market relations and behavior can serve as a principle not only for limiting governmental intervention, but also rationalizing government itself” (Burchell, 1996: 23). The state and market economy are not different autonomous spheres, they can exist together. In a word, the practice of government assists the rise of market mechanisms and the impact of competition (Lemke, 2001:193). The social strategy of ordoliberals is based on the principle of “equal inequality for all” (Lemke, 2001: 195; Brown, 2003: 7; Donzelot, 2008: 123). This strategy is to generate the competitive and innovative side of the social body (Lemke, 2001: 195). On the other hand, the Chicago school proceeds with the idea that state interventions are necessary for protecting the individual’s rights, otherwise, the competitive identity of the economy could constitute a threat to freedom. All in all, today’s neoliberalism, where it is closed to Chicago school doctrines, redefines the government as an enterprise so as to universalize competition and to invent market shaped systems of action for individuals, groups and institutions. The social and economic domains are not two different areas any more. The economy encapsulates human actions, which must reinforce competition anywhere (Lemke, 2001: 197). This invokes the free market, which includes “maximized competition and free trade achieved through economic de-regulation, elimination of tariffs, and a range of monetary and social policies favorable to business and indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long term resource depletion and environmental destruction” (Brown, 2003: 1).

In line with this, neoliberal rationality based on regulating and limiting governmental activity artificially supports the freedom of individuals because “the contrived forms of the free, entrepreneurial and competitive conduct of economic-rational individuals” carve out “a form of the rational self-conduct of the governed themselves, but a form that is not so much a given of human nature as a consciously contrived style of conduct” (Burchell, 1996: 23-24). Therefore, the neoliberal art of government is more than economy or state. It must produce subjects, forms of citizenship for the nations, behaviors and anything related to the individual, its body, its soul, its choices etc. (Brown, 2003:1). Because of this, the rationality of neoliberal activity should be accepted beyond institutional goals. Neoliberalism between political rationality and the technologies of the self requires the use of individual freedom, which is a technical condition of government (Miller& Rose, 1992: 201; Burchell, 1996: 24). This shows the extension of economic rationality to non-economic domains by conducting the different subjectivities of individuals, something neoliberalism needs to maintain order. For neoliberalism each individual

must be constructed and reshaped according to its own capacities as marketing actors in every sphere of life by changing their social roles such as parents, workers, consumers, producers, children, women, men and so on. These autonomous roles playing for the neoliberal market system can be possible with the consciousness of 'self-care', which refers to an ability to provide the personal service for the material and psychological requirements. Neoliberalism constitutes moral responsibility of individuals regarding the conduct of life spheres. This kind of moral responsibility provides self-control towards unlimited freedom rights. Individuals in their free area calculate and predict the consequences of their actions with the help of morality. Responsibility for the self and for your free choices, lack of skills, education etc. are the backbone of the neoliberal art of government. Hence, the transformation of this economic reason became possible with the aim of individuals in an attempt to optimize the relations with themselves and to work (Rose & Miller, 1992: 199; Lemke, 2001: 202; Brown, 2003: 5-6). All in all, "neoliberalism is a political rationality that tries to render the social domain economic to link a reduction in state services and security systems to the increasing call for "personal responsibility" and "self-care"" (Lemke, 2001: 203). The rationality of neoliberalism is emerging as governmentality (Brown, 2003: 1).

3. (Neo)-Liberal Subjectivity of Biopolitics

The transformation of rationality of government inevitably required a new subjectivity, which unquestioningly demands a change of minds and the way of existing, and then our relations with others and things (Foucault, 1997: XXIII). It should be kept in mind that according to Foucault's account, subjectivation does not proceed on unique subjectivities correlations, but intrinsically refers to a way of thinking and feeling, a way of acting and behaving, in which subjects gradually gain the sense of belonging to society. This sense of belonging moves the subject to emotionally attach his relations with others, himself or things (Foucault, 1997: XXXI). The crucial thing is that Foucault points out the self-governmentality here, through which the individual learns how to bear the responsibilities for personal decisions and beliefs or his social, economic and political roles besides improving his natural skills. As such, this rationality of micromanagement makes the way of thinking and acting at the macro level more manageable so that power can permeate into every level to enrich the body of mastering thoughts and feelings. Thus, neoliberal subjectivity through the lens of biopolitics should be framed in the name of self-entrepreneurship and self-care personalities saturated by market rationality related to "everything concerning the natural character of the mechanisms of competition" (Foucault, 2008: 162). In Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval's contribution to the book *The New Way of the World: On the Neoliberal Society* (2013), it states that neoliberalism does not only connote the institutional and organized tenets, but also the existential norms enabling us to notice others and ourselves. Furthermore, these productive impacts of neoliberalism on the norms regulate society as to the way of market rationality, and this rationality reshapes self-entrepreneur and individualized subjectivities through neoliberal forces. Dardot and

Laval draw attention to the generalization of competition as a behavioral norm, which is nourished by a set of discursive practices, mechanisms and tools. Actually, this constitutes the idea of entrepreneurship in every domain of life (Dardot & Laval, 2013: 4). In line with that, the entrepreneur of the self and for the self is to internalize the rationality of power relations as a competition that engulfs the individuals on the path of existing as normalized subjects. Therefore, the value of behavioral norms is to incorporate the price of our actions and behaviors. Like in *History of Sexuality*, Foucault remarks on punitive behaviors in *Birth of Biopolitics* that enable individuals and institutions to judge each other (2008: 252).

That means, Foucauldian power does not aim to readily attach the subjects to sovereign rationality. Contrarily, this omnipresent power wants to awaken its economic subjects who trace its desires and interests in all areas. That means, the success of the individual is measured as the great internalization of neoliberal rationality that imbues its subjects with the necessities and importance of possessing self-esteem, being self-disciplined and a self-entrepreneur in order to manage their external and internal worlds. While specialized knowledge regarding any issue is placed at the disposal, self-interests proceed on the way in which the motivating emotions and attachments cover unfair competitive relations. All of our relations and dressed up roles gain the reasonable and hopeful meaning and functionalities without being alienated from market rationality. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the discernment and prudence to grasp the norms of order and manage the self are the main corollary of subjectivations that engender the sense of transition in the production of the process of truth. In this sense, the concept of governmentality seeks the subjects to ‘conduct the conduct of other beings-that is, govern them’ (Dardot & Laval, 2013:4). The notion of enterprise is the nub of social relations embedded in neoliberal governmental reason, and accordingly the generalization of the enterprise in every sphere of life naturally carves out subjectivity itself (McNay, 2009: 55). Therefore, in Foucault’s account, neoliberalism cannot define only economic relations and market interest, it implicitly encompasses social control among the individuals (McNay, 2009, p. 55; Donzelot, 2008: 59). To grasp neoliberalism with Foucauldian perspective is the crucial inception of approaching today’s individualized and economized rationality of relations very critically. Therefore, it is well said that this neoliberal understanding of freedom and disciplinary techniques goes hand in hand with biopolitics, and the principle of “equal inequality for all” renders daily life expectations to stimulate market rationality in the name of “personal responsibility” and “self-care” (Lemke, 2001: 195; Brown, 2003: 7; Donzelot, 2008: 123). Ultimately, the regulatory and disciplinary techniques carve out the behaviors and normalize minds, on the one hand, and tame the bodily needs and cultivate body control for developing natural and acquired skills on the other hand (Foucault, 1997: 249; McNay, 2009: 57).

As stated in *Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault describes the action of economic actors whose aim is to just increase satisfied interests through the undivided internal structure (2008: 61). That is the reason why Foucault prefers to call it neoliberal art

of government rather than the principles of neoliberalism (Brown, 2003: 1). In favor of these interwoven mechanisms, neoliberal governmentality seeks to organize society around some objectives based on decentralized and non-proletarian entrepreneurship that should cope with the impacts of economized relations upon collective social bonds by foreseeing possible conflicts because of competition and by always stimulating cooperation among the individualized minds. What is interesting is that if the individual despite the non-proletarian workings and free daily choices falls into the alienation trap, this should be seen as both anticompetitive social tendencies and anti-cooperate practices, it can even be called ‘depression’ hand in hand with specialized experts of psychology, life coaching and so on (Foucault, 2008: 58-59; Dardot & Laval, 2013: 292). Crucially, this brings about two subject positions as a result of discursive practices, and these two subject positions are closely linked. That means, the subject exists in the marketplace and it becomes as a marketplace as well. Both are based on “marketisation of self” (Bröckling, 2012: 1). At this point, we come to Foucault’s main criticism against the matter of homo economicus. As Ulrich Bröckling (2012) once more emphasizes, the (neoliberal) subjectivation does not only presuppose only utilized economic interests; rather the utility of the competitive relations (which might include the religious, politics or gendered interests) is another way for the individual to address to compare itself with the others and even himself. Therefore, competition produces neoliberal subjectivity, and naturally competitive subjects who internalize the price of ‘living’ (Bröckling, 2012: 7).

In this vein, for the process of subjectivation, Foucault points out German Ordoliberalism based on pure competition and the principle of equal inequality as well as American neoliberalism requiring human capital and criminality (Foucault, 2008:219). The essence of the theory of human capital is obviously the problem of labor which has so far fallen off the economic map in spite of its the very important position in the market (Lemke, 2001: 198). But more importantly, the theory of human capital is the departure from the necessity of self-care under the guise of neoliberal governmentality. That is why, the qualification of human capital comes from childhood (even before) permeating each stage of life. It invokes not only medical cares or all activities concerning the health of the individual, nor only bodily needs and desires, but also the consciousness to jointly care and strengthen body and soul for more and more willpower in marketized relations because human capital is not composed of directly merchantable items. On the one hand, genetic risks and skills are implemented by education, nutrition, even love, affection, on the other hand, psychological equilibrium and having personal working and living principles are criteria for life motivation beyond earning a salary. This point at which individual starts to be an autonomous entrepreneur, so to speak, his own boss harbors the secret of the idealized neoliberal subject (Foucault, 2008: 230; Lemke, 2001: 199). Therefore, “the new “spirit” of capitalism, which transfers the entrepreneurial idea of calculation begins to predominate” (Hartmann & Honneth, 2006: 56).

Regarding the analysis of criminality and delinquency, the offense in the framework of law (and social norms) applies equally to every subject, those who should have enough reason to identify the things outside of law and norm, also to cultivate their consciousness not to kill someone, and even not to break any rules to the detriment of himself or someone else (Lemke, 2001: 199). Taking all these expectations of the neoliberal subject together, it can finally be said that the neoliberal subject should grasp the grafted neoliberal rationality in order to increase its sense of belonging to society and have a place in the normalized order. By doing so, all roles of the subject in a life should intrinsically gain competitive meanings such as to be the best mother, the best wife, the best man or woman, the most successful or even the most misfit character. Obtaining the utility leads the subject to desire more pleasure and more satisfaction regardless of working too much and getting more social responsibility. To set out this motivation elaborately, I think neoliberal technologies which construct neoliberal subjectivity should be specified.

4. Neoliberal Technologies in Producing Self-Governable Subjects

Leaning on advanced neoliberal societies, the subjects as the members of society should fulfill the moral ideals in an attempt to achieve their self-transformation in recognition of the institutionalized social order. This means that individualism, in a way, is the expected result of this established order (Hartmann & Honneth, 2006: 42-43). However, the challenge is to keep the interest alive regarding the ubiquitous competition. The rationality of neoliberal governmentality makes this challenge more understandable by prompting new motivational resources such as performance, pleasure, solidarity, satisfaction, happiness and so on. The interesting thing is that these motivational resources contribute to forgetting the basic rights and emancipatory norms as well. This may be called the dilemma of the order but naturally it is not perceived as a problem in order to self-destructively sacrifice some things because “the subjects have “learned” in their role as employees to assume responsibility for their fates” (Hartmann&Honneth, 2006: 46). This subjective role opacifies the nuance between private and professional public sphere, and this means that informal and emotional relations take place in utility-based work processes. In this way, the economization of informal is perplexing among the intersubjective relationships in harmony with economic instrumental interests and rationality (Hartmann & Honneth, 2006: 49).

To construct these subjectivities, different types of technologies ‘each a matrix of the reason’ employs not only the skills but also the attitudes. Foucault mentions about four different technologies. First, there are the technologies of production, which give us permission to produce, modify or transform the things. Second, there are the technologies of sign system, by which we benefit from symbols, meaning or significations. Third, there are the technologies of power, which conduct the behaviors of individuals. Fourth, there are the technologies of self, by which individuals determine their own means so as to conduct and manage through their bodies and souls for both their and state’s happiness (Foucault, 1997:225). The

technologies of self are, so to speak, the political technologies of self which enable the individuals to perceive themselves as a part of the nation or a part of social entity. The political technologies of self provide that a person cultivates himself for the state or sacred things (Foucault, 1997, 225; 2001b: 404). Accordingly, the internal and external management of individuals was reinforced by these technologies with the aim to construct the domain of power relations between the others and the self (Foucault, 1997: 225). Put roughly, different types of technologies do not sign different domains of intervention. In contrast, the rational mode of governing encompasses both processes of individualization and practices of institutionalization of technologies. Subsequently, there cannot be division between micro space and macro space. Both show up the same governing mentality very well (Lemke, 2007: 49). Therefore, it is worth noticing that governmentality and its instruments are intrinsically rooted in ‘the range of multiform tactics’ (Foucault, 2001c: 211).

As Gilles Deleuze (1992:4) mentions, the different control mechanisms, which are as equally strict and harsh as the previous models of confinements surrounded by disciplinary techniques have appeared in parallel with the development of neoliberalism. However, currently the subjects can be kept employed in spite of more pressure, control, surveillance and liabilities through the discourse of the spirit of cooperation by which connotation they implicitly imply being like family and having family codes. Stimulated emotional feelings through summoning family bonds retrain the conflicts and intolerance as to (professional) public spheres (Deleuze, 1992: 5). In this context, it is worth emphasizing that the idea of corporation plays a key role as a neoliberal technology in return for destructively competitive relations. As Deleuze (1992: 6) ironically touches upon the soul of cooperation:

Marketing has become the center or the ‘soul’ of corporation. We are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world. The operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our masters. Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was long duration, infinite and discontinuous. Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in depth.

On the other side of coin, unconditional devotion exhausting and precarious work circumstances and pragmatic community relations inevitably (and contrary to expectations) cause harassment, stress, alienation, etc. The neoliberal subject starts to feel inadequate and deeply lonely regarding his performance, motivation and production in all areas of life. More interestingly, it is the fact that under the guise of polished satisfaction, the neoliberal subject loses the meaning of fondly producing things and of willingly attaching the emergence of depressed and problematic individuals with inciting the help of the officially experts as well as the omniscient beings (Dardot & Laval, 2013).

Concluding this subsection, the neoliberal subjectivity in the age of biopolitics is based on two different kinds of subjects. On the one hand, the implicit construction of rational and reflexive subject is endowed with the capability of monitoring bodily and psychic necessities. The subject's good self-government at work and home indicates the idealized side of neoliberal subjectivity. On the other hand, the subjects deprived of the capability of self-government are marked as risky or 'bad subjects', somehow generating the reason for an upsurge of more surveillance and control (Horner-Nadesan, 2008: 212-213). In other words, human capital and criminality work for the benefit of market on the grounds of rationalizing control and teaching the subject what is true and false. The logic of the equilibrium in Foucault's account simply presupposes the correlation of the knowns and the unknowns, which have been the basic battles of neoliberal subjects with themselves and with society (as neoliberalism is battling with itself).

In Lieu of Conclusion: Governmentality in the Times of Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism after Foucault

Taken together all forms of governmental rationalities from ancient Greeks to the neoliberalism of today, governmentality is not reducible to a mere sort of mechanisms and technologies, but it encompasses the art of our thoughts and our practices associated with political rationality that precisely needs specific knowledge in order to govern us internally and externally. Foucault carves out the 'art of government' between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries by proffering the idea of *raison d'état* and the police, by which we encounter the modern western art of government. *Raison d'état* ensures the certain rational knowledge as being independent from customs and traditions (Foucault, 2001b: 404-406). The reason is the way in which the people are governed as the nature of state itself. In the same vein, Foucault signifies two earlier traditions in terms of reason of state: pastoral power and Machiavelli's the Prince. Pastoral power leans on the subjection and domination of individuals by the divine. This subjection deals with the single and specific individuals that have consciousness to pertain to their duty in society. That is to say, pastoral power is not concerned with the land but with individuals. Pastoral power aims to obtain more and more information about individuals to re-produce the knowledge for governing them as sacred commandments and moral norms, by which personal and social salvation could be ensured by godly authorities endowed with the competence of surveillance, punishment or confirmation of the behaviors and thoughts. In this way, each individual gains awareness of his responsibilities by regularly confessing his sins or deeds, which is the main resource of the knowledge for the construction of truth in order to govern the individuals not through the existence of the king, but through a dignitary (Foucault, 1997: 225-230). The second is Machiavelli's the Prince, which problematizes the relation between the king and the state. In this context, the expansion of state and its power are the most important. This is the reason why the state howsoever is related to neither the wisdom of God nor the strategies of the king. The main problematization is concerned with the state itself in terms of its nature and rationality. Hence, the aim of government is to endure

the state and its sway is compatible with political rationality underpinned by practices and certain of measured knowledge that make it possible to show up the capacity of the state on a specific territory (Foucault, 2001b: 407-408).

However, the state as the focused issue of political rationality brought about a gap between the state and individuals. Indeed, individuals could have enough attention in the domain of the state insofar as he or she contributes to the strength of the state. As such, an individual should work, produce or consume for the state, and he or she could even die for it where appropriate. And yet, this gap between the state and the individuals invokes the latter art of government, which is the police. Even though Foucault describes the function of the police in the case of Germany and France in detail, it suffices to say that the police could be construed as the new techniques of power by which the integration of individuals was aimed at constructing civil respect and controlling public morality (Foucault, 2001b: 411-412). In fact, these earlier arts of government are easily connected with the modern art of government as well because the development of governmentality intrinsically presupposes the aimed economic, social, technical processes (Foucault, 2001b: 416). Therefore, the notion of governmentality can be grasped as a ‘guideline’ which enables us to identify the way of thoughts in which we encounter historical constructions from ancient Greek to neoliberalism (Lemke, 2001: 191, 2007: 44).

Contemporary biopolitics, especially after the 1980s, has taken on a new form focusing on traditional, religious values and norms beside neoliberal aims. American neoconservatism is based on moral-political rationality and neoliberalism, both are intertwined and at the intersection point, where democracy appears as a balanced element (Brown, 2006:691-692). Without questioning whether or not democracy addresses the social and political needs, the question as to how neoconservatist rationality enters the fray along with neoliberal rationality is for now worth briefly mentioning. The first has a regulatory and moral role, while the second is based on a completely amoral, exploitative and exclusionary logic. In truth, both try to describe citizenship after calling on the name of order as democracy according to the favor of universal principles and rights, equality, political autonomy, liberty, and rule of law (Brown, 2006: 696). An active citizenry and the public good are at the heart of political rationalities. Constitutional and human rights are restricted by these political rationalities as well. In addition to neoliberal subjectivity, neoconservatist rationality with the help of religious and traditional references aims at strengthening the loosening ties between gradually more isolated individuals. In spite of the upsurge of working hours for better living standards and the breadth of ‘free rights’, they bring about not only depressed individuals, but more fundamentally a decline in the birth rate, a weak population, a lack of sense of belonging to society and a rise of criminality and conflicts because of the lack of family cohesion and love relations. At this point, neoconservatist rationality of the government steps in to fill the gaps posed by neoliberalism. Furthermore, with the help of the notion of citizenship, individuals are subjected to control and surveillance as required security diapositives through licenses, codes and insurance numbers or bank numbers. In this context, the

matter of control emerges from neoliberal subjects as citizens of the state. Therefore, good citizenry should undertake responsibility for a stronger welfare society and secured relations in families, firms, communities (Rose, 2000: 325-327). In line with this, there are marginalized spaces, associated with anti-citizens, non-citizens and failed citizens, those that cannot or do not enterprise their lives or manage their own risk, additionally, attaching any moral and traditional communities (Rose, 2000: 331). The failed citizens are the bad subjects who somehow do not want to participate in an 'active life' with its most familiar face. Therefore, an ideal citizenry, that is endowed with self-governable subjectivity, becomes the most important indication of liberal democracies. More importantly, the operations of democracy bring about geographic and social exclusions as well (Holmer-Nadesan, 2008: 181). In this vein, neoliberal rationality can occupy a land by promising 'modest-power sharing' through free elections, individual liberties for the sake of democracy (Brown, 2003:9).

Taken together, neoliberal and neoconservatist governmentalities appear to be in a kind of sham fight, just as they head toward the interest of the market. Ultimately, their desire is to engender self-governable subjects and be able to name these ideal subject-citizens by implicitly denoting the excluded, unsuccessful and counter kind. In the scope of this work, female subjectivity as a part of neoliberal rationality shall be explored in order to determine gendered strategies and performance to, in turn, aspire to career gendered professional identities, which apparently require more energy, time, surveillance and self-surveillance in return for the social and market norms (Holmer-Nadesan, 2000:223). Needless to say, the correlation between the analysis of criminality and the theory of human capital should have been clarified but the nub of this paper is based on the impacts of market rationality and the expectations it places on its subjects. This may basically be summed up with notion of 'responsibility', which connote self-governable subjects, so to speak, loyal citizens for the common good.

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