UN Works on Discrimination within the Framework of Nietzsche's Psychology of Ressentiment

Hatice Nur KESKİN

“Ethnographers commonly find that the people they encounter are trying to do what they consider right or good, are evaluated according to criteria of what is right and good, or are in some debate about what constitutes the human good. Yet anthropological theory tends to overlook all this in favour of analyses that emphasise structure, power, and interest.”

Ordinary Ethics, Michael Lambek (2010:1)

Introduction
With the woke culture that has presented itself in the last few decades, many international organisations (IO) have further initiated actions to primarily create awareness on discrimination. Especially with the large influx of immigration and integration of different races in different societies, the development and accessibility of technology that creates a free environment that is yet to be regulated, questions concerning minorities are high on the agendas of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations as millions of people continue to be the victims of varied forms of racism, racial discrimination, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and other related intolerances.

However, along with the effectiveness, the initial establishment of IOs has been a matter of question in terms of their reasoning and thus their success in applying the policies in which they present solutions to ongoing or rising issues such as discrimination, which continue to exist while assuming new forms.

IOs, such as the UN, are considered experts on international issues. As many works of literature demonstrate, IOs usually provide authoritative knowledge

*TRT World, Araştırma
DOI: 10.37679/trta.1124113
that aims to guide various political arenas. However, some studies covertly follow an instrumentalist reasoning in accrediting ‘expert’ merits to IOs for the practical benefit of their knowledge. According to popular view, the expert authority of IOs stems from using the relevant and socially recognised knowledge to execute tasks (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). However, this idea does not explain how knowledge originates and remains a “socially recognised relevant knowledge”. Therefore, it can be argued that how IOs gain and maintain this “all-knowing” status is yet to be fully researched.

For the past decade, there has been a revival of interest in genealogical arguments, which deals with the philosophy and psychology of things. The recent development of anthropological research on morality (Zigon 2008) and ethics (Faubion 2011) can be perceived as an effort to study the ways people try to act morally and be ethical rather than observing them simply as rational or strategic instruments motivated by power and interest (Fassin, 2013). One of the most famous works in this sense is Nietzsche’s book On the Genealogy of Morality. One of the most fundamental concepts that Nietzsche addresses is the concept of Ressentiment. Nietzsche invokes Ressentiment as an essential factor in the emergence of nearly all the modern outlooks on morality, including moral values of good and evil, guilt etc.

Trying to understand the emotional dimension can assist in developing our understanding of international organisations along with their decisions and reasoning. What is more, it may also improve our analytical grasp of the prejudices that obstruct international cooperation since these prejudices are often primarily reduced to their cognitive aspects. However, this focus on the cognitive dimension can sometimes underestimate how the emotional side can affect the persistence and transformation of negative prejudices. For instance, the experience of Ressentiment may incline towards a negative interpretation of actions and result in wrathful reactions. This can result in a cycle of further negative biases. Therefore, initiating an understanding of the emotional foundations may assist us in offering a more realistic, if not an alternative, perspective on policy options that can improve or reduce the reasoning and implementation of global policies.

Although it would certainly be reductive to limit the scope of this work to the sole consideration of the essence of reasoning within the specific framework of discrimination policies in the UN, it is evident that not enough attention has been provided to ambiguous moral forms and ethical analysis, and that the boundaries between the moral or the ethical and the political are empirically more complex and should be an area of consideration.
Nietzsche’s Ressentiment

Ressentiment is a French word which can be roughly translated as resentment. However, they do differ in the sense that resentment can occur in any situation of social interaction (including, of course, interpersonal interaction) in which others assail one’s self. At the same time, Ressentiment tends to be induced by more durable, intense, and, on occasion, abstract sources, including social-structural features.

During the second industrial revolution, Ressentiment was used by the French elite to portray and criticise what they thought was the secret motivation of revenge behind the proletariat’s protests (Aeschbach, 2017). However, Ressentiment is correlated with a form of superficiality or inauthenticity. The term ressentiment has been used to criticise grand ideologies or doctrines such as Nazism, feminism, the idea of equality, or communism. Several critics believe that Ressentiment is the essential motive behind these movements, making their preliminary motives less admirable. (Aeschbach, 2017).

Nietzsche, who has become a key figure in the term ressentiment, provides an empirical study of the term by explaining the historical, social and psychological conditions that permitted early Christian morality to gain force in his book On the Genealogy of Morality (1997). As he states in the preface of the book:

“[W]e stand in need of a critique of moral values, the value of these values itself should first of all be called into question. This requires a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances of their growth, development, and displacement.”

Thus we understand that Nietzsche’s ultimate goal is to question the essence of morality and its emergence.

It should be noted that Ressentiment is different from resentment (although they are usually used in the same sense with the latter as a translation of the former) in the sense that it is used to invoke as an origin to moral values and thus must exist prior to the responses that these values underride. Max Schaler further developed this concept by linking it primarily with the formation of the bourgeois ethos in Western Europe, while Nietzsche confined this emotion to the rise of Christian morality (Meltzer & Musolf, 2002).

In his paper “One Hundred Years of Ressentiment”, Robert Solomon says that Ressentiment involves a ‘keen sense of injustice’ (Solomon, 1994: 116). He argues that Ressentiment starts from a ‘bitter sense of disappointment or humiliation’, but ‘then tends to rationalise and generalise, so project its impotence as a claim—even a theory—about injustice in the world’ (Solomon, 1994, s. 116).
Nietzsche draws attention to the animalistic aspect of humans. According to Nietzsche, humans are proud of their mission to destroy all existing values it carries since, in order to create new values, existing ones must be destroyed. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s thoughts on morality and values are closely related to his entire philosophy. Thus, while his moral understanding is evaluated, his whole philosophy should be handled and interpreted as a whole. Nietzsche argues that 19th century Europe distorts the concepts of God and morality through traditional authorities. Moral discourses always gather rhetorical ideas under the umbrella of ethics, and all existing values are considered sacred. However, Nietzsche states that morality and all values are in decadence and shapes his philosophy as a project to get rid of this collapse.

Nietzsche’s struggle against traditional moral values and his effort to destroy them can be perceived as immoralist. However, his battle is against herd morality, which is where everything related to humans is predetermined by the herd, according to the herd. For the individual who joins the herd thereafter, all cultural values have an apriori nature. The individual must live following the rules and regulations that have been established for the benefit of society. In this case, the individual cannot live their life and thus becomes alienated from their own identity by becoming a part of the heard. It is precisely this type of morality that Nietzsche is against. Although this may make Nietzsche seem immoral, it is, in fact, his desire to destroy this idea to rebuild. What Nietzsche desires to abolish is traditional/cultural morality.

As is well known, one of Nietzsche’s central claims in the Genealogy is that some of our most basic and central moral values arose out of Ressentiment— a hateful and vindictive mental state. As Nietzsche claims in the first essay of the Genealogy, Ressentiment is the principal psychological drive behind what he calls the ‘slave revolt in morality’ (Nietzsche, 1997: XIV): a rebellion of weak individuals filled with Ressentiment, who cannot dismiss their revengeful desires using simple, violent actions, and therefore have to make do with imaginary revenge ‘in effigy’ upon their oppressors because of their physical incapability (Nietzsche, 1997: 20). A central element of this imaginary revenge includes those invented by ‘priests’ and adopted by the ‘slaves’ based on a new ploy of values, where the oppressive masters could be slandered as ‘evil’, and the slaves could consider themselves as ‘good.’ This slave revolt is based on the fateful moral revolution of philosophical significance, in Nietzsche’s view, one that has fundamentally altered the Western moral landscape in that it has given rise to the West’s most fundamental moral values: the values of compassion, altruism, selflessness, equality, and justice, which have become the centre of our moral sphere (Elgat, 2019).
According to Nietzsche, the weak and ordinary person internalises this feeling by suppressing it instead of expressing it in line with the requirements of the ascetic ideal. The inversion of this feeling creates sickness in human consciousness because a person has to act in line with their passions. What makes the human consciousness sick is the inability to act in line with these passions and the internalisation of the feeling of “ressentiment”. Ressentiment is a primitive rampant frenzy against all that is good, with the intent to eradicate the good object:

“For every sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his distress; more exactly, for a culprit, even more precisely for a guilty culprit who is receptive to distress, - in short, for a living being upon whom he can release his emotions, actually or in effigy, on some pretext or other: because the release of emotions is the greatest attempt at relief, or should I say, at anaesthetising on the part of the sufferer, his involuntarily longed for narcotic against pain of any kind. In my judgment, we find here the actual physiological causation of Ressentiment, revenge and their ilk, in a yearning, then, to anaesthetise pain through emotion” (Nietzsche, 1997: 93)

The resentful man is like a hunting dog that only responds to tracks. And he has become unable to distinguish between the traces he follows and the reactions he gives. This causes people to lose control over themselves and their will. And its reactivity does not cease; whatever its object, the reaction takes its anger out of its object as if it were an object of revenge as if it would pay the price for this endless delay and humiliation. After a certain point, the person of Ressentiment sees everything he is subject to as an attack and blames himself for his qualitative weakness of feeling nothing but traces. The resentful person is a being who suffers because of itself: the hardening of the tissue in their consciousness, the speed with which all excitations freeze and fixate, the weight of the scars that invade them; these are all cruel pains. And more profoundly, the memory of the traces is in and of itself vindictive. It is toxic and devaluing because it takes its anger out on the object to compensate for its powerlessness and escape the corresponding stimulation traces. That is why the vengeance of Ressentiment, even when it occurs, is no less ‘spiritual’, imaginary and symbolic (Nietzsche, 1997:146).

Nietzsche makes a remarkable determination at this point. According to him, Ressentiment is the greatest means of taking revenge by disrupting the normal action-reaction relationship, and precisely for this reason, resentment itself is the victory of a “rebellion”. But this victory is the weak victory of the weak; it belongs to the enslaved people’s revolt as slaves. That is, the power of resentment determines the slave.
Nietzsche also expressed the concept of Ressentiment in the chapter “The Tarantulas” of his work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The tarantula is the spirit of vengeance or Ressentiment. Contagion is its poison. Will is a will to punish or judge. His weapon is the thread, the thread of morality. His maxim is equality (equality where everyone starts to look like him)!

In fact, the Ressentiment has started to be used as a kind of domination tool over time. As a result of life conditions such as sacrificing life, feeling of indebtedness (especially in religion), giving and receiving relationships, socioeconomic conditions, both suppressing their wishes and fulfilling moral obligations are imposed on the person. Therefore, the concept of Ressentiment (if we consider that Nietzsche uses the terms slave and herd interchangeably) is closely related to today’s social life. The obligation to act in accordance with the social role has caused the consciousness of people to be introverted and has taken its place on the basis of all social conflicts that arise as a result of Ressentiment. Nietzsche’s critique of ressentiment/slave and ascetic ideal bears traces of a kind of modernism critique besides religion critique.

UN’s Discrimination Policies

The UN, in particular, has strived to establish regulations, significant dates, and goals to fight against increasing discrimination that has become an increasing threat to social order.

After WWII, it was clear that the horrors of the war should never be allowed to occur again. Founded in 1945, the UN sought to prevent future atrocities by affirming in its foundational charter “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” In the following years, member states strived to develop the human rights provisions of the charter, which took 3 years to establish a common vision. On December 10, 1948, the UN’s general assembly adopted the universal declaration of human rights as a common standard of achievement for all nations.

The first 2 articles of the Convention, which is considered as the most translated text of all time, follow as such:

Article 1- All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2- Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this decla-
ration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

In 2009 the then Secretary-General of the UN highlighted the crucial role of the UN in his speech during the World Economic Forum, in which he stated:

“Our times demand a new definition of leadership – global leadership. They demand a new constellation—governments, civil society and the private sector working together for a collective global ground.

From this quote and the UN charter article 71, which emphasises the roles of the NGOs, we understand that the UN considers itself not only as a solution to global issues but also as the foreseer of issues that may arise as the world order changes.

According to Merriam-Webster, discrimination 3 separate but co-related meanings:

1. a: prejudiced or prejudicial outlook, action, or treatment
   b: the act, practice, or an instance of discriminating categorically rather than individually

2. a: the quality or power of finely distinguishing

3. a: the act of making or perceiving a difference: the act of discriminating
   b psychology: the process by which two stimuli differing in some aspect are responded to differently

For the sake of this paper will address the word discrimination with regard to its first meaning. Thus, discrimination occurs when you are given less preferential treatment than another person despite being in a similar situation without lawful justification or proper reasoning. Discrimination can also be used to explain the same treatment to someone whose circumstances are different from another person, as in the case of people with disability (or disabled people).

With the aim of specifically focusing on discrimination, the UN adopted two covenants: The International Covenant on Civil Rights and Political Rights (ICCPR) and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Subsequent to this development, the UN established several treaties as human rights instruments, which include:

- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (CERD) (Signed in 1966, entered into force in 1969)


The UN also signed conventions Against torture (signed 1984, entered into force in 1987), children’s rights (signed 1989, entered into force in 1989), migrant worker and family member rights (1990), and disabled people (or person with disabilities) rights (2007).

CERD is the primary centre of international attempts to address racial discrimination, broadly defined as discrimination based on skin colour, ancestry, ethnicity, and national origin. The Convention’s victims include minorities, indigenous peoples, non-citizens, and caste or descent groups. Especially with the new wars on top of the continuing wars, which have resulted in a huge influx of migration and displacement, nearly all national societies are becoming more diverse in terms of ethnicity or ‘race’. This influx, in turn, has paved the way for racism, xenophobia, white supremacy, patriarchy, etc., making discrimination one of the most problematic issues of our time. Currently, there are 173 States Parties to the Convention. While the Convention was formulated and drafted in the context of discrimination as a foreign policy concern regarding colonialism and Apartheid, CERD has played a crucial role in warning governments about the global extent of racial discrimination and the persistence of racist discourse.

According to the Convention, “racial discrimination” is defined as:

“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” (article 1).

This article highlights several important factors. Firstly, it describes the primary prohibition for areas of discrimination: “race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin” (Note that religion is not emphasised at this point). Any groups or people who may be perceived as inclusive of the traits in this list are protected from discrimination by CERD. This list is often referred to as “the protected groups” concerning CERD. Even though these groups are mentioned broadly in the first article CERD has adopted certain articles that specify groups such as women (G.R. 25), indigenous persons (G.R. 23), the Roma (GR 27), Dalits (GR 29), non-citizens including refugees (GR 30), African descendants, particularly those in the diaspora (GR 34), Muslims subjected to Islamophobia, and more generally
persons whose religious identity has been used as a basis for discrimination—namely racism (GR 32).

There are other ‘mechanisms’ accompanying the range of standards, at the UN level, including the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; the Ad Hoc Committee on the elaboration of complementary standards, the Group of Independent Eminent Experts, the Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective implementation of UN Charter, Articles 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c) and 76(c). In terms of pre-UN Charter principles, the proscription of discrimination on the grounds of birth, nationality, language, race, and religion was a feature of the system to protect minorities under the League of Nations. In the complex analysis of racial discrimination, the transmission of racist ideas and attitudes through multiple forms and occasions of hate speech plays an indispensable role.

It is essential to highlight that although issues relating to religion are addressed in a broad range of texts, including ICERD, there is no global convention on religious freedom. The principal convergence points for religious freedom are Article 18 of both the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Additional protection from discrimination on the grounds of religion is factored into many texts, and religious minorities are also included in texts on minority rights.

In his essay, “Forms of Hate Speech and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)” (2010), Thornberry points out the distinct separation “differentiation of treatment will not constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate.” (Thornberry, 2010: 101). Thus, differential treatment will constitute discrimination “if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied under a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim” (CERD General Recommendation 30 on Discrimination against Non-Citizens, A/59/18, Chapter VIII, paragraph 4.) The Committee has insisted that, in appraising discrimination, “the specific characteristics of ethnic, cultural and religious groups be taken into consideration” as stated in Article 1.4:

“Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.”

Ressentiment in Discrimination Policies
So far, we have provided information on Nietzsche’s Ressentiment and a brief background on the history of UN’s discrimination policies, with a slight emphasis on the confusing religious factors. When observing the initial founders of the UN and the conventions, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed the idea to Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, in which The United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China would enforce peace as “the four policemen.” At this point, it is highly convenient to contemplate Nietzsche’s first essay in The Genealogy of Morals, in which he highlighted how “dark” and “black” are used as negative terms, presumably because of the dark-haired peoples of Europe whose blonde, Aryan conquerors overran (Nietzsche, 1997: 14). He notes the association of “good” with “war” and “warlike.” (Nietzsche, 1997: 14) Nietzsche’s dislike for the masses and for democratic responses is not just a conceited and elitist act. In The Genealogy of Morals, he clarifies the “master morality” of the ancient aristocracy and the “slave morality” that developed among the lower classes. While his outlook on approving master morality and disapproving slave morality is further complicated, there is a great deal about slave morality, as expressed in Christianity and democracy, that he finds despicable. According to Nietzsche, those too weak to fight a physical battle like soldiers have established slave morality as vengeance upon their aristocratic masters. Thus, Ressentiment. The weak resent the supremacy of their masters and feel further resent because they cannot enact vengeance upon their masters. Thus, because they cannot strike back in any substantial way in this life, one method the weak induce to cope is by inventing the idea of an afterlife and divine justice, which will avenge them after death. Thus, according to Nietzsche, divine justice is the invention of a people too weak to secure justice for themselves. (Nietzsche, 1997).

Nietzsche also claims that the slave class invented the concept of evil. The aristocratic masters and everything about them were considered “evil” and detestable. By contrast, the slaves identified the notion of “good” with everything that these masters were not: poor, unhappy, sick, weak, mediocre—in short, they identified themselves as “good.” This new slave morality completely reversed the older master morality.
Considering the initial aims of the UN, in the previous chapter, the UN was, in fact, established so that history would no longer face the devastations of wars that were carried out by super-powers it may be prudent to make the assumption that those who did not want “war” passed on the formation of the UN as a method of not being part of this method of power, or seek power through alternative means that do not include a physical battle.

Specifying the concept of discrimination, it should equally be noted that this definition has broadened its terms, transitioned and developed over time to include or exclude groups. As nations intertwine further with the ongoing wars, countries become closer through technology and travel developments, new concepts emerge as well as the definitions attributed to these concepts. For example, in his first essay, Nietzsche suggests that those to whom “goodness” was presented were not the ones who defined “good.” Instead, the “good” themselves (the noble and the powerful) defined the term based on comparing the groups they considered inferior: the commoner, poor and weak. Their powerful position included the power over discourse. In other words, they decided what would be called “good” and what “bad.” Thus it can be argued that the definitions based on discrimination have been framed to suit the powerful.

The concept of discrimination, in its essence, is a perilous road as there is the notion of being more “cautious” and “careful” towards what one considers as “the other”. When considering that the UN convention is an internationally binding document, applicable for all member states, the decision on what is discriminatory and what is not may change from culture to culture or generation to generation (one prime example is the development of gender discourse and representation of gender identity throughout the years).

It should be noted that Nietzsche does not completely oppose slave morality. In fact, he appreciated the ingenuity and directing power that can change the system of morality. What he opposes is the underlying Ressentiment that leads to the conclusion that life is something to be suffered and justice and happiness are to be found in the afterlife. This Ressentiment is the foundation of slave morality; Christianity and democracy are particularly damned, first for basing their morality on Ressentiment. Second, it is hypocritical enough to deny this fact. Nietzsche would state that modern Christians and democrats even deny the inspiration of the creators of that slave morality. Today, they are just uncreatively continuing a tradition.

While they are among people with similar cultures and backgrounds, noblemen
are respectful and gentle, but among strangers, they turn into uncaged “blond beats”, as Nietzsche calls them (Nietzsche, 1997: 58). The word “barbarian” in the book is often associated with the violence that is emitted by noble people from time to time. (Nietzsche, 1997: 23, 146).

Contemporary ideas and ideals may suggest an inclination of progress and refinement in humanity from the “blond beast” but Nietzsche does not think as such. According to him there is nothing good about the defeat of master morality in support of slave morality. These barbarians may have been terrifying in the past, but they were also admirable. However, in today’s world of Ressentiment, it is neither: it is merely “mediocre” (Nietzsche, 1997: 24). Nietzsche characterises the nihilism he detests in contemporary society as exhaustion with humanity. We no longer fear humanity, but we also no longer have hopes for, reverence, or affirmation of humanity. Nietzsche fears that our slave morality has rendered us insipid and dull. When considering this from a UN perspective and what it has accomplished to prevent the atrocities that took place during WWII, it is safe to assume that the international policies, which present themselves as effective in providing everyone with equality in a safe environment, seem to prevail as ineffective when in they are tried to be implemented. For example, despite the overwhelming regulations to prevent gender discrimination internationally, the issue continues to exist on a global scale on a social, economic, and political level (Keskin, 2022). This means that despite having rules and regulations on gender discrimination, the UN seems to have issues in following their execution in member states.

**Conclusion**

Globalisation may have its positive sides, but it also paves the way to discrimination issues with ethnic difficulties through the increasing structural, institutional and established examples of racism that exist in countries and communities as a result of migration the phenomena of allies. However, it can also create awareness among countries and communities about other cultures and differences, eliminate taboos, and enrich cultures (Thornberry, 2002). These issues on ethnicity and nationalism have been put in the spotlight by the academic world, which Thornberry (2002) highlights as the following:

“Liberals, communitarians and republicans, cultural Minority rights in Europe relativists and agnostics, idealists and sentimentalists, post-modems who would leave it as it is, and fundamentalists who would turn it all over to Eternity, have all visited the shores of ethnicity and nationalism.”
Disciplines seem to work with the urge to consider, conceive and inform about “ethnic/minority questions”. Some of the great European thinkers of our age have been undecided on these issues (Bowring, 1999).

This psychoanalysis of the origin of our moral values is essential because, if Nietzsche is correct, it seems that some of our most valued principles (or policies) cannot be considered the absolute authoritative or trustworthy position that we consider them to have. They are not, according to Nietzsche, based on divine or perfect history but instead are the product of hate and revenge, which should make us question their existence in the first place. Thus, if this is the case, we as a society have a reason to reject these values and refuse to abide by them or conduct based on them. This is the essence of what Nietzsche aims for us to question in his book On the Genealogy of Morality (Elgat, 2019). The problem, however, with this way of interpreting Nietzsche’s criticism is considered genetic misconception, as Alexander Nehamas puts it:

Nietzsche’s view of the origin of our current values, even if it is correct, does not show that we should not identify goodness with altruism or utility. Nothing is objectionable simply because it has objectionable origin. Had Nietzsche made this argument he would indeed have been, as he sometimes seems to be, guilty of falling into the genetic fallacy, which amounts to confusing the origin of something with its nature or value. (Nehamas, 1985: 110).

According to Elgat (2019), this means that our genealogical values do not have anything to do with the authority or validity of these values, and it does not mean that these feelings were referred to while these values were formed or implemented.

Although Nietzsche does not believe that the essence of justice is based on Ressentiment, he makes some subtle references to their relations. However, In his book Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche, through Zarathustra, speaks out to those who preach democracy, equality, and justice as “tarantulas” that discreetly excrete their revenge poison. They seek to take revenge on those who are not their equals by preaching equality.

“Thus do I speak unto you in parable, ye who make the soul giddy, ye preachers of EQUALITY! Tarantulas are ye unto me, and secretly revengeful ones!

But I will soon bring your hiding-places to the light: therefore, do I laugh in your face my laughter of the height.

Therefore do I tear at your web, that your rage may lure you out of your den of lies, and that your revenge may leap forth from behind your word “justice.”
Thus, we can conclude that Nietzsche’s ideal world is not tainted with pity and equality, which is forced. Instead, it should be innovative freedom that accepts the natural inequality between people. Thus, each person will be their principal drive. Nietzsche’s ideal virtues of creativity and self-improvement are pursued because they are good in and of themselves, not because they are “virtuous”. What is more, pity is a corrupt concept for the pitied and the person who is pitying because suffering is a part of life and self-development, and the urge to commiserate suffering emerges from the urge of Ressentiment that sees inequality as cruel (Nietzsche, 1997).

We have seen that origins and efficiency are very different. Concepts that have existed for a long time have changed in terms of meaning, interpretations, and purposes by different powers that control and overpower it. Thus, IOs, such as the UN and its implementation of policies that have evolved and developed over time, can signify that a “will to power” is acting upon it. Through the “effectiveness” of the execution of these policies, it can also be argued that concepts have no inherent resolution or perseverance. Instead, they are only given purpose by the different forces and wills that act upon them.

Reference


