



From Al-Qaida to ISIS: Transformation of Islamist-jihadist hegemonic masculinities and their relations with Western masculinities

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Abstract: Hegemonic masculinities are on the top of gender hierarchies in the world. They create symbolic ideals for other masculinities. One of the types of global hegemonic masculinities is armed masculinities. Jihadist Masculinities, which arise as types of protest to the ideals of hegemonic Western masculinities within the non-West, are now seen as types of global hegemonic masculinities. The article will explain the changing process of the Salafist-Jihadist-Islamist Masculinities with the ISIS example. Firstly, how radical Islamist terrorist organizations attract Muslim people will be explained from critical masculinities perspective. Then, the political and historical analysis will be conducted to answer how ISIS toppled down the hegemony of Al-Qaeda. Thirdly, to understand what ISIS changed in the jihadist-Islamist masculinities and how these changes are successful and effective to make global armed masculinities much more virile and violent than Al-Qaeda period, the construction of the engendered local, regional, and global relations within the narratives of ISIS will be re-evaluated with the lens of critical masculinities studies.

Keywords: global hegemonic masculinities, armed masculinities, Islamist terrorism, ISIS, West/non-West relations, patriarchy

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Introduction

Various types of masculinities are conflict and contest with each other. The effects of the conflicts spread from the local to the national and the international area contribute to shaping the global gender hierarchies. Various actors such as jihadist terrorist organizations shape these transnational and international masculinities. To follow unceasing transformations on the structures of Islamist-jihadist masculinities and their clashes with other gender identities on local, national, regional, and international levels help to discover gaps within these uncompleted gender hierarchies. These gaps can contribute to building less hierarchical gender orders.

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This text aims to understand how hegemonic structures of armed masculinities have transformed within Islamist-jihadist groups and their relations with other transnational hegemonic masculinities in the last decade. For this purpose, this article asks the following questions: How and why does ISIS reconstruct the Islamist-jihadist hegemonic masculinities? How have been the relations between ISIS and other masculinities built on micro and macro space levels? I argue that ISIS abused the weaknesses of Al-Qaida in its leaderless network structure to topple down it and have presented more violent but happier and prouder masculinities than Al-Qaida to those who are in deprivation from nation-state structures and domination of Western values. Hence, it turned modern discourses of Al-Qaida upside down by re-traditionalization of gender statuses and establishing more hostile relations between other hegemonic masculinities, especially Western ones.

Firstly, the article presents the differences between Muslim and Islamist masculinities to reveal how Islamist-jihadist masculinities have risen from the 1980s to today. The main factors that caused the rise of Islamist-jihadist masculinities are the failures of authoritarian regimes, absolute and relative deprivations of the Muslim populations, the

persistent orientalist narrative of inferior and wild Muslim men, and gendered interpretations of Islamist ideologues. Then, I will conduct organizational and historical comparative analysis by applying social movements and political organizations theories to answer how ISIS toppled down the hegemony of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda adapted new communication technology and network-based system. On the other hand, ISIS successfully constructed its hegemony within this centerless network environment by using a "standard operational system" that helps ISIS direct its members on their activities from the base of the organization and monitor the relations between members and cells of the organization. Thirdly, to understand what ISIS changed in jihadist-Islamist masculinities and how these changes are successful and effective to make global armed masculinities much more virile and violent than the Al-Qaeda period, I will re-evaluate the construction of the engendered local, regional, and global relations on the discourses of ISIS magazine *Dabiq*.¹ In this part, this paper will show that ISIS's narratives are more offensive and more virile within this new global network-based system. In addition, this paper elaborates how ISIS has spread the jihad to the whole world by blaming everyone other than ISIS members and abusing the vulnerable positions of Muslims in the West. The discourse analysis will generally focus on the last volume of *Dabiq* magazine because these volumes have legitimized the violent terrorist acts of ISIS to the Western world. Their construction of relations with the West is seen in this volume most frequently.

Conceptual Framework:

Genders are socially and culturally constructed contested concepts. Masculinities also challenge each other and are reconstructed through

¹ I accessed Dabiq Magazine online from Clarion Project Website on 10.01.2021: <https://clarionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/islamic-state-magazine-dabiq-fifteen-breaking-the-cross.pdf>.

these challenges and changes. The contestations between masculinities also create hierarchies between themselves and different genders. The ones which are on the top of these hierarchies are named hegemonic masculinities. (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, p.832; Beasley, 2008, p.88). As a Gramscian term, hegemony is the class domination of society with both violence and public consent. In the 1980s, the scholars used the concept to understand gender relations and problematized the practices of hegemonic genders that dominate and subordinate other genders. Feminist scholars started to reveal the means of domination such as types of violence inflicted by hegemonic ones or differences of wage labor between genders and the tools that construct public consent to these hierarchies. Therefore, the topics such as the relations between the internal hierarchy of masculinities and femininities and between the genders on the local, regional, global, and transnational levels expanded the scope of the social sciences. (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 831; Hearn, 2009, p. 40). Analysis of these space levels is needed to understand the patriarchy and gender hierarchies better in order to deconstruct the current hegemonies, see the alternative gender structures in the world, find the relations between hegemonic masculinities and the blank spaces within the uncompleted hierarchies and find strategies and tactics for establishing an equal gender structure. The national-level studies map onto the gendered structure of nations. The local level reveals the structures of gender on face-to-face relations and within the local organizations such as in church or families. As for the global and transnational studies, they show us the gender hierarchies in institutional and organized ways and provide us to see the unending contestation between hegemonic genders. This contestation means that internal gender hierarchies and patriarchy are not essential, and there are always possibilities to change for better or worse (Hearn, 2009, p.49). Moreover, Messerschmidt highlighted the necessity of regional and local analysis to explain global hegemonic masculinities better because the global hegemonic order of genders is established via local

and regional ones (2008, p.664). On the international level, scholars have tried to understand the masculinities with the culture and ideas of the West. However, masculinities studies have also started to be "decolonized" as in other disciplines (Connell, 2014, p.5; 2016, p. 304). "In feminist IR literature, these complex relations manifest as West/non-West, North/South, citizen/non-citizen, heterosexual/homosexual, white/non-white, and capitalist/non-capitalist." (Bilgic, 2015, p.325). The forms of gender in the non-West could be explained by looking at the geography's economic and post-colonial status and history. For example, to understand sexual and gender-based violence in African countries today, one should look at colonizers' inflicted violence (Connell, 2016, p.6). Likewise, the gender forms of the Middle East should be understood by looking at their indigenous structure and the relational bonds with other regions, especially with the West during and after the colonialism era and at the age of globalization and neoliberalism.

Contextual Framework: Muslim Men and Islamist Masculinities

Islamism is one of the reactionary political ideologies against the domination of Western civilization and colonizers which arose in the 20th century. As Denoux defines, Islamism is "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives," and the most primary notions on this instrumentalization are "the reappropriation of the past, the "invention of tradition" in terms of a romanticized notion of a largely mythical golden age" (Ayoob, 2004, p.1). The modern interpretations of Islamisms gained popularity among Muslim populations with the Six Days War of 1967 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. They attracted much more people than in the first half of the 20th century. Especially repressive authoritarian regimes and their close relations with Western politicians, weaknesses of states to eliminate economic and social injustice between citizens and to protect

their citizens, absolute and relative deprivation of Middle Eastern citizens and the successful critical political interpretations of Islamist intellectuals, the failures of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalisms made Islamism an alternative against the other ideologies and discourses (Taspinar, 2015, p.81; Farasin, 2017).

Similarly, Muslim men also feel humiliated, and these threats and humiliations reconstruct their forms of masculinities. From the colonizers of the discovery age to the 21st century, Western Churches, businessmen, politicians, and army members have continuously seen the men of Islamic societies like children. Therefore, their primary purpose has been to bring modernity and civilization to the colonized lands, firstly with Christianity, with the enlightenment philosophy, then with capitalism, democracy, and other modern ideologies. (Gerami, 2005, p.449). Bilgic explains this process as hypermasculinization and feminization of the non-West and adds that

... In the case of hypermasculinization, the non-West is represented as authoritarian, barbaric, violent, reactionary, irrational (or sometimes possessing 'cold rationality') (Agathangelou & Ling, 2004). Feminization of the non-West, on the other hand, constructs it as passive, emotional and weak (Han & Ling, 1998: 60 - 62). The non-West, therefore, becomes 'the other' of the West (Doty, 1996; Spurr, 1993)...Hence, the non-West as a geographical space is produced and instrumentalized for the political, economic and social reproduction of the West within the West/non-West gendered power hierarchy (2015, p.325)...

However, Muslim men had their glorious past and their dominance over the region. The pressure of Western men for eliminating the values of Muslim men created a massive reaction against the Westerners. Also, the friendships of regional and local rulers and the repression they used against their Muslim societies develop more enmity to Western

masculinities. This hostility makes Muslim and Islamist masculinities much more violent on domestic and public relations and; push them to become much more virile and aggressive (Connell, 2014, p. 223-24). Especially we can see this within Cold War Politics: the tense relations of Nasser with Soviet dictator Khrushchev, Shah Reza's strict bonds with the USA, and the Western values made Islamism in these geographies much more violent than in other areas where there were weaker interventions of the West like in Turkey (Gerami, 2005, p.450). To protect their honor and manly liberties and; realize the responsibilities of Islamic and national duties (such as protecting their families, family values and emancipating their nations from Western domination), Muslim men initiated to look for solutions. The undermining of the masculinities of these men by Western and Western-sided authorities has been caused to evolve their masculinities more violently and aggressively. As said before, Islamism is the political interpretation of Islam, and due to this, the daily lives of Muslims and the Islamist ideals should be differentiated and categorized under different sections to understand how the different kinds of radical ideals and narratives of Islamism attract Muslims from the whole global region (Haykel, 2016, p. 72). Especially the successes of ISIS and Al-Qaeda in attracting Muslims to their organizations are interesting while they present brutal and dangerous lifestyles to men and much more oppressed and limited conditions to women. From a relational perspective, Muslim masculinities draw us local and regional forms of masculinities. In contrast, Islamist masculinities go beyond the Middle East with the clashes against the global hegemonic Western masculinities.

Muslim masculinities can be explained by the daily lives and thoughts of Muslim men. They live under harsh political repression by authoritarian rulers and under the poor economic situation. The older generations defend and retain the applications of traditional Muslim gender orders due to providing legitimacy to their fatherhood position and protecting their atomic family values like keeping their wives and

children in order (Gerami, 2005, p. 452). The men in the Middle East, who are approximately 21-30 years old, choose different pathways due to the limited education, restricted economic conditions, and repressive political environment. Some decide to immigrate to the West for better options while others do not and cannot migrate and decide to protest the situation and resist the global system that exploits non-Western countries (Gerami, 2005, p. 454). Some decide to resist authoritarian national leaders like in the so-called Arab Spring. For others, the real reason for their grievances is the imperialist powers, and they join the radicalized groups, especially Islamist ones (Gerami, 2005, p. 454). So, the pressures of the authoritarian regimes and the weaknesses of the state to provide necessary resources to their citizens push these men to radical ways and to choose brutal and violent lifestyles, including both traditional and modern ones.

On the other hand, the ideologues Sayd Qutb, Mawdudi, Khomeini, and other intellectuals formed the ideal men figures of Islamism in a modern way. These figures are reconstructed through time, especially with the effects of globalization and neoliberalism. As mentioned before, the Islamist Muslim men figure is a reaction to the global hegemonic Western liberal men figure. The commonalities of these ideals with armed, defensive, violent, misogynist, and traditional men show us that their interpretations of gender roles and order are based on the opposition against the West. So, the Islamist masculinities can be deciphered under protest masculinities. Protest masculinities are the ones that are against the global gender hierarchy. The far-right radical men of Western society can be another example of these masculinities. The uneducated, economically poor part of the Western societies blame the immigrants, other gender groups, feminists, and social democracy supporters by claiming that they disrupt the traditional values and society. Due to their economic and social undervalued situations and political and economic powerlessness from childhood, they radically protest this situation as Adler explains the masculine protest (Connell,

1995, p.111). Radical militarist masculinities arise as an alternative for excluded men in the world as a reaction to the transnational businessmen's and authoritarian leaders' global neoliberal hegemonic masculinities. According to Connell, powerful armed groups are one of the hegemonic globalist masculine forms in today's world due to the strict relations with other global hegemonic groups like businessmen and authoritarian leaders (2016, 11). This perspective helps us to understand how masculinities establish their hegemonies with materialistic perspectives. As an example, one of the most known criminal Russian oligarchs, Victor Bout's relations with both authoritarian leaders such as Kaddafi and the trades of war airplanes and weapons with Islamist terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda (Farah D. and Braun S., 2007) show us these close economic relations between global hegemonic armed masculinities. Hence, the arms and arms trades symbolically construct the militant masculinities with brutal and protective men figures and empower the militant men's positions on gender hierarchy by forming economic and political relations with other hegemonic masculinities.

**Jihadist Masculinities in Leaderless Centerless Organizations:
From Al-Qaida to ISIS**

The jihadist-Islamist hegemonic masculinities are also political masculinities. Political masculinities are "any kind of masculinity that is constructed around, ascribed to, and/or claimed by political players. These shall be individuals or groups or persons who are part of or associated with the political domain i.e.... members of the military." (Starck and Luyt, 2019, p. 435). From the political perspective, the social movement theories can shed light on the changing positions of the jihadist-Islamist groups within the hegemonic structures. Terrorism can be seen as a "subtype of revolutions" because they are in contentious politics by contesting with hegemonic structures of nation-states,

claiming legitimacy and representation of their so-called citizens (Ubayasiri, 5). ISIS and Al-Qaeda have legitimacy due to the weaknesses of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq states, and they created political blocs against the hegemony of these weak authoritarian regimes. These political blocs could gain supporters within their regions easily because of the vulnerable position of the Muslim men, and the revolutionary structure of these organizations radicalize their masculinities in the regional context (Starck and Luyt, 2019, p.438). However, contentious politics is not enough to explain how these groups gain global hegemony. Strategies of ISIS and Al-Qaeda to gain global momentum and the differences between themselves can be explained with leaderless resistance theory. Gray explains this theory by starting with Michels's analysis of oligarchic and authoritarian party structures. He claims that these structures are under change because of the developing transportation and communication technologies (2013, p.656). While political parties were controlling the party's communication, transportation, and material structure, they could easily create oligarchic or authoritarian hegemony among party members. Also, the factions within the parties could not find a way to integrate and create opposition against the party leaders. However, because of the technological developments today, political parties do not control communication and transportation networks. Thus, the factions can easily meet and create fractions within parties, and leaderless actions increase in today's world. Hence, parties should adopt these changes and protect their parties with tactical and ideational hegemony (Gray, 2013, p. 658). Terrorist organizations look like political parties from this leaderless structure. (Gray, 2013, p. 656). Al-Qaeda successfully evolved its structure according to these developing technologies and supported the "free-floating cells" to act independently. Like other new leaderless resistance organizations, Al-Qaeda also determined the targets and sent guides on attacking the targets to its global followers (Gray, 2013; Ingram, 2017, p. 363). Its domination in determining targets and information allowed Al-

Qaeda to rapidly adapt to the new system and create an oligarchic/authoritarian structure. In addition to that, the success of Al-Qaeda's networks to hide from the vast surveillance of Western technology and their vast repertoire about how to attack and take action brought it to a "reputational status." Thus, the core hub of Al-Qaeda became a "storehouse" of "tactics, targets and ideology" (Gray, 2013, p. 662). However, it could not have protected oligarchic hegemony on this networked structure. As Gray states, this is a weakness within the new leaderless resistance. Zarqawi and Al-Baghdadi easily toppled down the hegemony of Al-Qaeda and became the new hegemonic global power with the "ideational and tactical innovations." (Gray, 2013, p. 663). As strategic innovations, ISIS reframed and expanded the enemy concept, decided new targets, and put the jihadists "more eschatological position" and "more risky way of attacks" with Gray's terms (2013, p.666). Henceforth, everyone other than ISIS-aligning Muslims is the enemy of jihadists. After declaring his manifesto "Exit from the Circle of Inefficiency and Failure," ISIS leader Al-Baghdadi explained the strategic changes on the frontline by expanding the battle arenas to protect the Muslim world. The divergence between jihadists occurred at this point. Al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda in 2014, condemned ISIS due to this strategic change and claimed their much more aggressive position harmed jihadist ideology and recommended ISIS to turn back their origin lands in Iraq from Syria (Styszynski, 2014, p.11). Before that, the 9/11 terror attacks were harshly criticized inside by Zarqawi, the founder of the Iraq branch of Al-Qaeda. The failures of Al-Qaeda on terrorizing the West crowned Zarqawi's critics. The former plans and statements of Al-Qaida did not catch the jihadist youth's attention anymore. The simple ideology of Zarqawi, which is based on the failures of the Arab states and blames on Shi'ite population in Iraq, seems more attractive than the delicate West critics of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda did not confirm the attacks on Shi'ites; according to the Afghanistan base of the organization, Shi'ite are ignorant people, and the only people who can be blamed are their

leaders rather than the society. However, Zarqawi's straightforward explanations gained legitimacy with the political purges of the Shi'ite government of Iraq during the US-Iraqi war. (Haykel, 2016, p.76).

Like the tactical and ideational innovations, the new ideal masculinities spread globally from these organizations' "core hub" with hidden "dark networks." Therefore, the new hegemonic jihadist-Islamist masculinities have been affected by ISIS's "eschatological position" and more violent structure of ISIS and have become more aggressive and virile than before. Eschatological position refers to the radicalization of acts and feelings such as hatred via ideological tools within the conflicts between ISIS and its rivals (Gray, 2013, p.666). Also, this new type of oligarchic but leaderless networked resistance of ISIS put "fratriarchy" in front of patriarchy. Fratriarchy, which "is a fusion of 'patriarchy' and 'fraternity' held together through competitive bonding, rituals, and a jointly held understanding among its members..." emerged as a reaction against the neo-patriarchal authoritarian regimes in the Middle East (Myrtilien, 2019, p. 566). With the increase of the young population, the deprivation in the region, and the hatred against the authoritarian leaders converted the political gender structures. As a result of the numerical increase of the young population, we see fratriarchy, both in the new types of armed organizations and the social movements in the Middle East. Secondly, the "common aim" of mujahedeen and their "fraternal conviviality" strengthened this fraternal structure (Myrtilien, 2019, p. 566-7). However, as Gray states, the chaotic situation of the leaderless organizations does not "last forever" (2013, p. 667), and Myrtilien claims the fratriarchy is generally concluded with more violent and virile patriarchal structures (2019, p. 567). Hence, the fratriarchy does not last within Islamist masculinities, too. At the same time, Myrtilien claims that the domination of men in fratriarchy is based on merit (2019, p.566). It should be highlighted that since corruption will dominate, leaderless networks cannot get rid of oligarchic structures.

The ideational innovations should be explained with critical discourse analysis to better understand the radicalization of these masculinities and see how ISIS protects its hegemonic positions within this delicate "leaderless networked resistance" structure. Gray highlighted that new oligarchic structures construct "Standard Operational Processes" to keep the tactical and ideational power under control and protect their hegemony. However, ideational structures are constructed via discourses and performative constructions, and these structures have contradictions in themselves. To see the contradictions for creating counter-narratives, I will re-evaluate the discourses in ISIS' *Dabiq* magazine.

Media and Terrorism: *Dabiq* Magazines of ISIS

People from the world continue to join ISIS today, and other jihadist organizations from different geographies such as Boko Haram of Nigeria maintain their *bayah*² to the so-called Caliphate of ISIS even it lost lands within both Syria and Iraq. ISIS tries to abuse the weaknesses of states due to the COVID pandemic by strengthening their infrastructure (Guardian, 05 February 2021; Reuters, 16 February 2021). So, the narratives of ISIS are still effective in attracting people to the organization.

ISIS' professional media use is one of the tactics to collect people for the terrorist organization. They do not only have Arabic media. For example, *Dabiq* and *Rumiyyah* magazines are published in different languages, including English, to explain their aims, successes, and worldviews on living issues. The magazines were published at random frequencies between 2014 and 2017. There were 15 volumes published.

² Bayah means "oath of loyalty and allegiance to a leader individual or organization" in Islamic terminology (Ubayasiri, 2019, p.15).

They spread these magazines across the world through various dark networks.

There are several discourse studies on these magazines. Some of the studies reveal the strategies of these magazines to attract people and gain their sympathy and show that how ISIS uses a "cyclical cognitive process" to create an alternative perception for their specific readers (Ingram, 2016, p. 360-62; 2017, p. 460-61). Ingram stated that the "value-, dichotomy- and crisis- reinforcing narratives" are constructed in *Dabiq* magazines. What distinguishes *Dabiq* from other Islamist- Jihadist magazines is that it mainly focuses on rational choice and identity choice to radicalize the people while others' narratives, such as Al-Qaeda's Inspire magazine, use the identity-choice generally (2017, p.365). Ubayasiri questioned the hierarchy of narratives within *Dabiq* and reached the result that to undermine the Westphalian nation-state structure, ISIS's writers prioritize the divine legitimacy of Allah. Then, they delegitimize the nation-states by emphasizing the weaknesses of Arab states and showing themselves as Allah's representatives by explaining their successes and their social aids within the ISIS lands (2019, p.14). These studies show how the myths of ISIS provide the organization a hegemonic position against other Sunni jihadist groups. Anderson and Sandberg studied the propaganda of violence in *Dabiq* magazines by integrating the cultural framing theory and subcultural theories. They claim that ISIS firstly reframes the problems of the Muslim world. Then it frames the solutions as the expansion of the Caliphate by jihad and generates motivation for jihadists and suicide bombers by indicating the traditional Islamic awards such as Jannah, Day of Action, martyrdom, and the successes of ISIS. From the subcultural perspective, the authors accept ISIS as a subcultural organization and explain the violent actions of ISIS with a "sense of otherness," creation of a "popjihadist culture" among young jihadists, and the celebration of traditional masculine values and machismo (2020). Therefore, subcultural theory helps understand why and how ISIS's new-type more

violent masculinities gain global momentum. These studies highlight the power of historically loaded Islamist terms, the design of the *Dabiq* journal, and the usage of machoism and traditional masculinities in explaining the hegemony of ISIS and how they attract the people from the world. However, to understand the change of the horizontal and vertical gender structures within the Islamist-jihadist masculinities and to see the contradictions within the hegemony of ISIS, it should be looked at to the discourses of ISIS with the perspective of critical masculinities studies.

The Method:

This study focuses on ISIS's discourses that have recreated gender identities and reshaped the limitations and opportunities between genders. Also, this study aims to show the relations between hegemonic masculinities on the transnational and the international level. This study employs critical discourse analysis from critical masculinities' lens to see the connections between historical development, organizational change within jihadist armed masculinities, and the discourses. Critical discourse analysis is a tool for "explanatory critique" that seeks to find out "why social realities are as they are, and how they are sustained or changed." (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p.79). While historical and organizational analysis presents us the transformation of "social events and practices" within Islamist-jihadist organizations, critical discourse analysis shows the change within "social structures" that "is the mechanism... as casual forces in terms of which events and practices can be explained." (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p.82). In terms of this explanation, Islamist-jihadist hegemonic masculinities are one of the social structures that shape the social events and practices like the level of violence in terrorist attacks, deciding the attack targets, and identifying the enemies via discourses. Therefore, to understand the successful transformation of jihadist masculinities with ISIS and their

functions better, ISIS's discourses should be critically analyzed by comparing Al-Qaida's narratives. The last volume of Dabiq magazines is analyzed in general to see ISIS's discourses and narratives better.

Narrative Analysis of Al-Qaida

Islamist masculinities carry their position from transnational to global hegemony via debates and opposition to others through narrations. From an Islamist perspective, the interpretations of global changes and the conflicts help these terrorist groups legitimize their ideals against the Western powers. For example, ISIS declared that their war is against "Christianity, feminism, liberalism, and atheism" (Dabiq 15, 2016, p.5). Hence, there are interdependencies between regional and transnational hegemonies. Messerschmidt's article "Osama Bin Laden and His Jihadist Global Hegemonic Masculinity" explains the interdependency between Western and Islamist hegemonic masculinities. According to the article, the discourses of Bin Laden show that Al-Qaeda's framing of the umma as the victim of the Crusader villains gives a protector masculinity role to the jihadists of Al-Qaeda (2018, p.668). The victim role of umma makes the Muslim societies feminized and the ones who needed to protect like the wives of the Muslim men. The duty of Muslim society, therefore, is to support and obey the jihadists. The Western soldiers and politicians are the villains who should be driven out from the Muslim geography. So, unlike to be known, Bin Laden draws a defensive picture to the eyes. The main villains are the Israelis who have been occupied the Palestinian/Muslim lands for decades and the USA, which did not have any sympathy or "any feelings of human rights" to the umma, according to Bin Laden. He used the dead Iraqi children to exemplify the hatred of the so-called Crusaders against umma, and so, he legitimized their jihadist actions by victimizing the umma (Messerschmidt, 2018, p.669). According to Bin Laden's discourses, tough and armed jihadist Muslim men are necessary to defend Muslim societies. These men should be

virtuous by fighting against the evil, aggressive, and toxic Crusader men who occupied all holy Muslim territories. These can be explained with cultural framing theory: by creating an alternative worldview, political groups can mobilize the masses, or in this context, the terrorist organizations can pull the free-floating cells to their core hubs successfully (Gray, 2013; Anderson and Sandberg, 2019, p.1509). Bin Laden frames the problems of the Muslim world and the solutions. Thus, people have been mobilized by looking to the world through this perspective. This frame is gendered; not only feminized umma and virile mujahedeen but also the traditional family and the enmity to homosexuality are the other chief elements of the ideal jihadist men that are drawn within this frame. Other features of the jihadist men overlap with traditional militant hegemonic masculine characteristics: "more morally oriented, self-disciplined, physically able, emotionally controlled, martially skilled, or intelligent than civilians, members of other branches, different occupational specialties, and of different rank." (Hinojosa, 2010, p.179). These characteristics of ideal jihadist men make them the fathers of the inferior feminine umma.

Also, the morally righteous and legitimately violent character of Al-Qaeda masculinity shows that this perfectly fits the hypermasculine characteristics of the global hegemonic masculinities, which are shaped by political-militaristic relations on international order (Rehan, 2018, p.24). So, as Messerschmidt explains, Al-Qaeda established a defensive jihadist global hegemonic masculinity by claiming that Bin Laden and his friends are the protective men figure to the feminine umma, which is weak and needs protection against the Western evil villains (2018, 678). On the other hand, we see the same picture within the discourses of European and American presidents who wage a global war on terror, especially against Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Bush, Obama, or Trump narrated the scenario by claiming that the Western citizens are the weak feminine individuals, and the military of the West is the hero who protects the Western society from Muslim terrorists. This example can clearly show

the interdependency and the interrelations of the global hegemonic masculinities. The other cannot survive if one of these narratives does not exist (Messerschmidt, 2018, p. 679). However, both sides are under change, and ISIS represents the new alternative hegemonic jihadist masculinities.

Critical Discourse Analysis of ISIS

After the successful occupations in Iraq and Syria during Arab Spring and with attractive propaganda worldwide, ISIS took the position of Al-Qaeda in the international arena as the number one enemy of the West. There are similarities between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in their narrations; their ideological backgrounds are based on 20th-century Islamist ideologues; both want to create an Islamic State and emancipate all Muslim regions. However, the differences are essential to understand the changes within the hegemonic structures and to reveal the contradictions within the discourses and narratives.

Firstly, while other Islamist terrorist groups are and were put themselves in a defensive position, it can be claimed that ISIS turned the jihadist movement into a global offensive movement all across the world. They reconstructed "Us-other" discourses by generating the Islamist version of the "clash of civilization" narratives. The group of the "other" became much more crowded. Not only the leaders and militaries of the West but also their citizens became vilified because their countries are ruled by "Will of the People" and this "has implicated their populations in the crimes their militaries commit against the Muslim nation, making the obligation to target them even more obvious for the doubtful" (Dabiq 15, 2016, p.28). Also, every Muslim other than those who obeyed the ISIS Caliphate is the enemy, and they should be killed according to them. For example, the governments of the Sunni countries and other terrorist organizations and Islamist Parties like Hamas and Muslim Brothers are targeted as enemies (Dabiq 15, 2016). They were blamed as "*murtaḍ*"

(apostate) and in cooperation with the West. The other factor of the enmity to these large groups is the spread of knowledge everywhere. Everyone can read and research on Islam so, the duty of the rescript (*tabligh*) became secondary, and "real dawah is waging jihad" (Dabiq 15, 2016, p.28). So, for them, due to the democratic regime types of the modern nation-states, the easy access to the knowledge of Islam, everyone who does not join ISIS became the villains who act according to blockade the path of truth.

The victims of the ISIS-aligned Muslims also become heroes in these new narratives. For example, while Al-Qaeda uses the dead children to legitimize the jihad (Messerschmidt, 2018, p. 669), ISIS put the pictures of jihadist children soldiers from Palestine to the Philippines in his journals as a cause for pride (Dabiq, 2016). The martyrdom culture of Islam can explain this situation. Soldier children and their families are honored with martyrdom. Also, fighting within the war makes boys men. This situation is also linked with the increasing violence of armed masculinities since the roles of the feminized societies of Islam and the West within the narratives of Al-Qaeda and the West are slipped to the villain position from the victim position with the emasculation of them by ISIS.

Women in ISIS

On the other hand, the role and position of the women became much more hidden and secret than Al-Qaeda's jihadism in ISIS discourses. They are invisible even in the textual propagandas of ISIS. There is no picture or photograph of the women within the journals and videos of ISIS, and they persistently try not to use words such as "she, wife, women," as much as possible. The only thing which has been feminized is the lands of Islam, and the main aim of ISIS is to emancipate

"Constantinople and Rome" from the *Dar-ul Qufr*³ (Dabiq 15, 2016; p.7). Hence, the narratives of the construction of nation-states are seen within the ISIS narratives. The military men who have emancipated themselves from feminized values will be the savior of the lands like in the motherland narratives of the nation-states. The difference between them is that ISIS tries to turn back to the laws and rule of these lands to the era of the Golden Age according to their interpretation of the Quran, while nation-states' main aim is to modernize the country. This difference is significant in understanding the role of women on ISIS-controlled lands. While the modernization of women is one of the triggering factors of the modernization process, the traditionalization of lands is also linked with putting women within the domestic area and under the rule of men. The ban of jihad for women is an example of this re-traditionalization process. While Al-Qaeda supports women jihadists, ISIS dictates that women should not wage jihad; they should encourage men to jihad and care for their children and elders by obeying them (Dabiq 15, 2016). Al-Qaeda's world narrative presented a modern interpretation of the world's situation by opposing the Western rulers and militaries themselves. However, ISIS focuses on the values and ideals of the West, and they create a much more traditional outlook to the global structure. The denial of human reason and chaos becomes the ground base for re-traditionalization. Human reason is seen as the source of chaos and arrogance if it is not a means to contemplate the creation of Allah. The essential of the human is to obey Allah, and it is obeying men and being a good mother for the women. This narrative pushes the world on much more divided and Orientalist or Occidental positions by making all people responsible for this global war and the leaders' re-traditionalization of the two religions of Islam and Christianity.

However, the relations between genders within ISIS in practice are a bit different inside the organization. Women have more freedom

³ Dar-ul Qufr means the lands that are ruled by infidels in Islamic terminology.

than the narratives. They cannot wage jihad; however, they can organize attacks, and ISIS supports their sisterhoods with other women in the organization. This situation can explain why women all around the world have joined ISIS. These are provided some kinds of emancipation from the Western structures for women. Western understanding of emancipation of women is based on "free from restraint, control, or power of the another; especially to free from bondage; to release from paternal care and responsibility and make *sui juris*; and to free from any controlling influence as traditional mores and beliefs." (Kneip, 2016, p.93). However, the emancipation of women within ISIS can be sorted as "taking control of their lives" with "traveling to Syria"; getting rid of "parental restrictions and reaching "sense of belonging with the sisterhood" understanding of ISIS; "yearning to free themselves from Western restrictions" by getting away from a victimized position as a Muslim woman in the West and "gaining power and control over their husbands and respect from the community as a female jihadist." (Kneip, 2016, p.93). This sense of emancipation can be seen within the texts of female writers in *Dabiq*. For example, Umm Khalid al-Finlandiyya repetitively talks about the family structure, false Christianity, the "*hijrah*" to Syria, and how she feels thankful to God after the "*hijrah*" and her active position within the ISIS lands (Dabiq 15, 2016, p. 35-36). Also, the women who lost their spouses during jihad have seen a more prestigious position. So, women, especially Muslim women who live in the West, accept the subordination to jihadist men due to the hope of emancipation from the pressures of the West's xenophobic and anti-migrant societal structure.

On the other hand, their narratives display the men in ISIS as happy people within the fraternal structure. ISIS men are singing songs together in propaganda videos. The texts strongly highlight the equality among men and their mutual war against the West under the so-called divine order of Allah. Within the destabilized environment of Syria and Iraq in the 21st century and becoming marginalized within Europe, these

Muslim boys and young men joined ISIS by readily believing their propagandas. Even they do not believe sufficiently in the necessity of jihadism, do not have rooted hatred against liberal values and traditions; they went to ISIS lands for gaining power and honor (Necef, 2016, p.6). The fraternity of ISIS, which is explicitly presented with the IS propaganda machine, seems very attractive to them because it rescues them from establishing families within the economic crisis and the marginalization from society and putting themselves in a position where they feel equal. They can show their superiority on the battlefield, and they can freely act in a misogynistic way against women by turning back to the traditional roles of society (Crone, 2020, p.584). In other words, ISIS narratives focus on Muslim men's "sense of otherness" in the West. The "sense of otherness" turns these men's masculinities more violent and virile, as explained in subcultural studies by celebrating otherness, romanticizing war and honor, and creating a "pop jihadist culture" which attracts young men excluded from the society (Andersen and Sandberg, 2020, p.1517-8). So, ISIS abuses this discrimination and repression of the West and the weaknesses of Muslim states by benefiting from their advantage of owning lands, and it advertises the Caliphate lands with positive themes for both men and women. As Ingram stated, ISIS uses rational choice by emphasizing positive sides of the Caliphate and framing the West as discriminative and xenophobic rather than identity-choice strategies of Al-Qaeda (2016, p.461; 2017, p.365). This strategic change within the narratives transforms global Islamist-jihadist masculinities and local, regional, and global relations between gender identities.

Conclusion:

Islamist masculinities are adjusted themselves to the changing conditions. Materialistically, the new types of "leaderless network resistance" structures and recreation of order by new "idealistic and

tactical oligarchic orders transform the gender hierarchies and characteristics. While Al-Qaeda adapted themselves to the leaderless networked organization by benefiting from the developed communication and transportation technologies and hiding their dark networks successfully, ISIS toppled down Al-Qaeda's hegemony with their "tactical and ideational inventions." Tactical inventions provide easier ways to manipulate the vulnerable young Muslims of weak Middle Eastern states to the ISIS and the new leaderless networked structure caused to the construction of "fratriarchy" within the new global armed jihadist-Islamist men. The fratriarchy provides an environment for much more violent and virile masculinities.

The differences of the themes and narratives of ISIS from Al-Qaeda and other Islamist organizations, such as the vilifying and emasculating societies, the decreasing role and much more hidden status of women, the enmity to the ideas and ideologies of the West rather than Western militarism and imperial tendencies of the USA are significant to understand the changing notion of global hegemonic armed masculinities and revealing the relations between themselves and other positions within the gender structures. More violent masculinities are gaining hegemony with these changes of narratives. The reactions of these changes can be seen in both materialistic and discourse analyses of the Western hegemonic armed masculinities. The Western far-right and populist masculine figures and the xenophobic gangs no longer need to legitimize their radical violent masculinities due to increasing attacks and more visible propagandas of ISIS. There is less need to femininize and victimize the umma or the Western society to be morally righteous. The celebration of the otherness and macho cultures, putting the victims out of the sight and revival of "clash of civilizations" narratives generated more violence on both sides. The discourses and performances of the radical right populist leaders also revived the traditional structures within Western societies. From there, we can say that the ideological and symbolic global hegemonic masculinity characteristics have

reconstructed themselves in the last decade by the rise of both ISIS' and the USA's violent attacks on the Islamic and Western societies. Also, the far-right radical masculine discourses and performances always harm their societies rather than the rivals' ones. While the harms of ISIS violence are primarily upon the Middle East, the attacks of far-right xenophobic Western men harm their countries. Now the threat of these new global armed and political masculinities seems gone with the fall of Trumpism in the USA and the losses of ISIS. However, if new counter-narratives are not constructed, they can probably come back to the arena with more effective discourses and more violent performances. The new counter-narratives should deconstruct the xenophobic, anti-immigrant discourses, and the relations with Muslim states should be more citizen and civil society-based rather than empowering their corrupted leaders.

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El Kaide'den IŞİD'e: İslamcı-mücahit hegemonik erkekliklerin dönüşümü ve Batı tipi erkekliklerle ilişkileri

Öz: Küresel hegemonik erkeklikler toplumsal cinsiyet hiyerarşilerin zirvesinde yer almaktadırlar ve sembolik, ideal erkeklik modelleri sunarlar. Bu erkekliklerden biri de silahlı erkekliklerdir. Mücahit erkeklikler Batı dışı bölgelerde Batı tipi hegemonik erkeklik ideallerine karşı bir protesto biçimi olarak ortaya çıkmışlardır ve şimdi hegemonik bir erkeklik biçimi olarak varlıklarını sürdürmektedirler. Bu makalede Selefi-Mücahit erkekliklerin değişim süreci IŞİD üzerinden incelenecektir.

Öncelikle, eleştirel erkeklikler çalışmaları gözünden köktenci İslamcı terörist grupların hangi yollarla Müslümanlar için bir cazibe yarattığı açıklanacaktır. Ardından, toplumsal hareket ve siyasi organizasyon teorilerinden faydalanılarak IŞİD'in nasıl El-Kaide'nin hegemonyasını devirdiği açıklanacaktır. Son olarak IŞİD'in mücahit-İslamcı erkekliklerde neleri değiştirdiği ve bu değişimlerin küresel silahlı erkeklikleri nasıl El-Kaide döneminden daha şiddet yanlısı ve erkekçe dönüştürdüğünü anlamak için IŞİD'in kendi naratiflerindeki cinsiyetlendirilmiş yerel, bölgesel ve küresel ilişkilerinin inşası yeniden değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: küresel hegemonik erkeklikler, silahlı erkeklikler, İslamcı terörizm, IŞİD, Batı-Batı dışı ilişkiler, fratriyarka