

Schmitt, the Constructivist? Possible Contributions to IR Theory *Sosyal İnşacı Schmitt? Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisine Muhtemel Katkıları*

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ABSTRACT	ÖZ
<p>This paper proposes re-reading famous German philosopher Carl Schmitt as a possible contributor to constructivist IR theory. It first examines Schmitt's theories to determine if his writings enable such a reading. The paper argues that Schmitt, in fact, fulfills four criteria to be considered in the constructivist camp. The paper then turns to Wendt's attempt to construct a <i>systemic</i> constructivist theory of IR. It contends that Wendt's endeavor has certain shortcomings; and that these can be solved by Schmitt's contribution. The distinction between "public and private enemy"; and the concept of <i>Grossraum</i> in Schmitt's writings can be utilized as useful tools to solve certain theoretical problems regarding "self vs. other" distinction. In other words, <i>Grossraum</i> can act as a conceptual category to solve the tension between particularism of group self, and hypothetical world state Wendt foresees. Practically that means the possibility of transcending nation-state identities without a necessity to accept that logical conclusion of such a reasoning is a universal world state.</p>	<p>Bu makale meşhur Alman filozof Carl Schmitt'in uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerine katkı sunabilecek muhtemel bir isim olarak yeni bir okumasını önermektedir. Makalede öncelikli olarak Schmitt'in eserlerinde böyle bir yeniden okumanın mümkün olup olmadığı irdelenmektedir. Bu çalışma, Schmitt'in öne sürdüğü analiz ve değerlendirmelerin sosyal inşacı uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi dahilinde telakki edilebilmesini mümkün kılan dört önemli kriteri sağladığını savunmaktadır. Makale daha sonra Alexander Wendt'in sistemik uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi inşası çabalarını mercek altına almakta ve Wendt'in teklifinin bazı açmazları olduğunu; dahası bu açmazların Schmitt'in katkıları ile çözülebileceğini savunmaktadır. Schmitt'in kuramsallaştırdığı "kamusal ve özel düşman" ayrımı; ve yine onun <i>Grossraum</i> kavramsallaştırması, "ben ve öteki" ayrımına dair bazı teorik problemlere katkı sunmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, grup kimliklerinin partikülarizmi ile Wendt'in öngördüğü farazi küresel dünya devleti arasındaki gerilimde <i>Grossraum</i> anahtar bir kavramsal kategori olarak işleyebilir. Daha pratik olarak bu, ulus-devlet üstü kimlikleri mümkün görmenin ille de küresel bir dünya devleti sonucunu mantıksal olarak zorunlu kılmayacağı manasına gelmektedir.</p>
<p>Keywords</p> <p>Carl Schmitt, constructivism, IR Theory, Alexander Wendt, self-other distinction</p>	<p>Anahtar Kelimeler</p> <p>Carl Schmitt, sosyal inşacılık, uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri, Alexander Wendt, "ben-öteki" ayrımı</p>

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1. Introduction

In the last decades, there has been a revival of interest in the writings and thoughts of Carl Schmitt in the Western academia (McCormick, 1998). Although in the previous (first wave) discussions on Schmitt, the political affiliation of the German thinker with the National Socialist regime in the pre-WW II Germany was always a point of reference, the contemporary popularization of Schmitt usually “de-contextualize” him from his early life experiences. The writings of Schmitt are being re-evaluated by social scientists from opposing sides of the political spectrum; from radical left to neo-conservative right (Mouffe, 1999). These developments even led Jürgen Habermas to write that, current questions of world orders can be seen as an ongoing fight between the Kantian and Schmittian projects (Habermas, 2006).

Among other disciplines, in the field of international relations (IR), Schmitt’s effect can be observed especially with regard to his opinions about international law and international structural transformation. Traditionally he is considered as one of the realist theorists of IR, probably because of his expressed admiration for Hobbes and Bodin about whom he writes nobody could stop him to “pray for their souls” (quoted in van Gelderen, 2011). Contrary to this mainstream acceptance, in this paper I will argue that Schmitt’s writings allow us a constructivist reading of him. Moreover, if such a reading can successfully be done, a “constructivist Schmitt” will contribute to the constructivist IR theory in a unique and significant way. Specifically, at the theoretical level, Schmitt’s analysis of friend-enemy distinction can be used to criticize Wendt’s self-other distinction which, I argue, moved to a “less” constructivist direction in his later writings. At the practical level, Schmitt’s projects of *Grossraum* (*Großraum*) and new *nomos* related to it can be useful to build a less war-prone international system. Wendt, I think, is aware of the importance to Schmitt’s thought for his theory. Especially in his Social Theory of International Politics Wendt refers Schmitt’s core themes of “friend vs. enemy” distinction to discuss possible alternative categories of the “other” in inter-state relations (Wendt, 1999: 260). He even assigns Schmitt a privileged position within realism, as opposed to “modern, structurally oriented Realists” (Wendt, 1999: 258) as someone who understands structures with reference to “roles” actors have. This paper, however, tries to move one step further; and uncover possible contributions of a Schmittian perspective to the study of IR.

Although there are different trends within constructivist IR theory, I will take Alexander Wendt as the representative of constructivist literature, and I will try to construct a dialogue between Wendt and Schmitt. In the next section, I will argue that, with the criteria provided by Wendt, Schmitt passes the qualification test of being a constructivist analyst. After authorizing them as two constructivists, I make a differentiation between early and late Schmitt and Wendt. Comparing some of their earlier and later arguments, I think, while late Schmitt is less “nationalist” and more constructivist, late Wendt is more liberal and less constructivist. In the fourth section, I try to show how Schmitt can make a contribution to constructivist IR literature together with early Wendt. The fifth section is conclusion.

2. Schmitt, the Constructivist

How can we decide that Schmitt qualifies to be called as a constructivist analyst? Contrary to post-positivist trend in constructivism, let me follow the classical hypothesis testing method. One has to, at least, verify the following four propositions, driven from Wendt’s writings, to be considered as constructivist: a) in the general division between rationalist theories and non-rationalist theories, a constructivist analyst should question the assumptions borrowed from economics theory prevalent in rationalist analyses; b) a constructivist theorist has to historicize

and contextualize the *ahistorical* claims of rationalist IR theories and has to believe that they are socially constructed and subjected to change: “anarchy is what states make of it”; c) constructivist analyst has to take identities seriously and believe that identities motivate actors’ behavior for interest perception: “interest presupposes identity”; d) corollary to the last hypothesis, for a constructivist analysis, the desire for recognition of the self has a central point in the self-other dichotomy.

First of all, in the general division of IR theories into rationalist (realism, liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism, democratic peace etc.) vs. non-rationalist (constructivism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, feminism etc) camps, Schmitt’s theory has to be considered under the latter heading. This is because, contrary to many of the assumptions of rationalist theories which are derived from theories of economics, such as rational individual, interest calculation, cost-benefit analysis, Schmitt builds his theories on “non-rational” foundations. Schmitt does not write on abstract individuals living in the state of nature for survival. The individual for Schmitt lives always in a group. Likewise, contrary to Hobbes, for Schmitt the struggle in the state of nature is among groups, rather than individuals (Meier, 1995).

At the more macro-level, Schmitt believes that rationalist assumptions of the Enlightenment project, as far as politics is concerned, have failed. What the Enlightenment thinking had promised was the rationalization of the political sphere. Neither the gradual elimination of war has taken place, nor have the policymakers, as well as individual citizens, stripped themselves off the non-rational elements of identification such as nationalism or international prestige. “Schmitt assumed that the zeal of group members to kill and die on the basis of a non-rational faith in the substance binding their collectivities together refutes the basic tenets of Enlightenment liberalism” (McCormick, 2007: 317).

As far as the *ahistorical* categories, such as anarchy or sovereignty, of realism and liberalism are concerned, Schmitt’s theory historicizes these concepts in a time-space axis. That is to say, Schmitt does not accept that anarchy was/is/will be the organizing principle of international system, as Waltz (1979), for example, argues. For Schmitt, norms and practices that dominate the current international political structures are produced at a specific moment in the human history. Moreover, they are not unchanging forces; rather they are transformed by the will of political agency. *Jus Publicum Europeaum*, as one of the important concepts in Schmitt’s discussion of the international system, which refers to the reciprocal rights, responsibilities and expectations of European nation-states between the 16th and 20th centuries, demonstrates that states can create different regimes of anarchy depending on their mutual consent (Schmitt, 2006). *Jus Publicum Europeaum* created a culture of anarchy for the European nation-state of the time which transformed the “state of nature” in Europe to something more predictable, peaceful and stable. States reciprocally recognized each other’s rights to existence, internal and external sovereignty in an equal manner. That created the difference between international relations within Europe and outside of it. It is almost identical with Wendt’s characterization of a Lockean culture of anarchy (Wendt, 1994). Schmitt’s analysis of *Jus Publicum Europeaum* shows that, rather than seeing the assumption of anarchy as a given, he accepts the socially constructed nature of it and believes in its transformability by its constructors, the states. Hence, for Schmitt, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992).

Another element in Schmitt’s analysis which shares a common ground with the constructivist theory is actors’ identity in making sense of the world. For Schmitt, identities of agents in international politics are crucial because how they perceive the events and processes going around them is a function of how they conceptualize their positions and interests in this web of

relations. That means, contrary to rationalist analyses which separate actors and their interests, and treat the latter as objectively given, for Schmitt both interests and threats are constructed first and foremost in the minds of the actors, which is shaped by their identity. For example, friend and enemy distinction, which can be seen as the basis of the political, is constructed upon the identities of actors. According to Schmitt, groups (tribes, nations, states, or civilizations) decide on friends/enemies on the basis of the perceived threats to their “way of life” (Schmitt, 2007). People want to maintain their distinctions from *others* by preserving their way of living. The way of life, which may include religion, social values, organization of economy, family structures, interpretation of history, meanings attributed to the geography etc. constitute the general life-world of individuals. If we define identity as the answer people give to the question of “who we are”, then these elements of the *way of life* (*Lebensmöglichkeit*) become the components of identity. People define who they are with reference to such kind of social structures. Schmitt’s argument that the defense of the way of life is the basis of the *political* is, in fact, the defense of identity. Thus, in line with constructivism, “there is no portfolio of interests” for groups (Wendt, 1992). The definition of threat and interest is shaped by identity. “Interest presupposes identity” (Wendt, 1999: 231).

The final reason which I want to discuss concerning why a Schmittian analysis is closer to constructivism than any other theory is about the central role of the desire for recognition of the actors in the “self vs. other” binary opposition. Wendt writes:

The corporate identity of the state generates four basic interests or appetites:

1. physical security, including its differentiation from other actors
2. ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities
3. recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force
4. development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level” (Wendt, 1994: 32).

The first three appetites of states are about recognition. As mentioned above friend-enemy dichotomy occupies a crucial place in Schmitt’s analysis. Although at first glance it seems that the conflictual relation between the two is a threat for both sides, it is also the case that the enemy is necessary for self-affirmation. In other words, Schmitt shares the Wendtian insight (which goes back to Hegel’s philosophy of recognition) that through recognition by the *other*, the *self* constructs its own identity. Here, I think, one should also mention the two different categories of *other* in Schmitt’s analysis.

Although Schmitt talks about friend-enemy distinction as a generic concept, there are at least two different types of *others* in his analyses.¹ The first one is an absolute other and the second one is the dignified other. While the former has no value at all in the eyes of the self, and does not share any common category at a higher level of analysis, the latter is a valued other with which the self believes it shares not insignificant commonalities. As Hegel notes, the desire for recognition for the completion of self can only be satisfied if an *other* who is of same value as you recognizes you with his free will. For Schmitt, the dignified other has this same function. To give an example, which is also used by Schmitt, during the *Jus Publicum Europeaum* period, the European member states of this Westphalian system recognize each others’ sovereignty. Through that way the desire for recognition by equals is satisfied. The member states to *Jus Publicum Europeaum* continue to

¹ Slomp thinks there are three kinds of enemy and friend for Schmitt. See Gabriella Slomp. “Carl Schmitt on Friendship: Polemics and Diagnostics” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* Vol. 10, No. 2, 199–213, June 2007

be *others* to each other in the sense that they do not belong to the selves of each other; yet they are dignified and equal others. The Russian and Ottoman Empires, on the other hand, are others of a less valued kind (Lebow, 2008).

3. Late Wendt: Still Constructivist?

After verifying that Schmitt passes the constructivism test designed by Wendtian hypotheses, it is time to find out exactly what kind of a contribution Schmitt can make to contemporary constructivist literature. To this end, first we should decide on what needs to be fixed. For this purpose, in this section I look at an article of “late” Wendt and I argue that claims made in the article is *less* constructivist compared to his earlier writings. If this is so, there can be a niche for Schmitt to enter into discussion and fix the gap.

In his 2003 article entitled “Why a World State is Inevitable” Wendt argues that the world history moves progressively and teleologically into the direction of the establishment of a world state (Wendt, 2003). He thinks that the anarchic international system is inherently instable because there is always the possibility of outbreak of war. This instability can only be eliminated by making declaration of wars among states impossible, which can only be achieved by a world-state. Wendt’s progressive theory follows a five-stage path, each associated with a different culture of anarchy: Hobbesian system of states, Lockean society of states, Kantian world society, collective security, and the World State.

Apart from the content of the analysis, the article, I think, is not in parallel with earlier articles of Wendt with regard to its methodological premises. In his article “Collective Identity Formation and the International State” Wendt deals with a similar problem of transcending the nation-state borders to constructs larger units but in a smaller scope than world state (Wendt, 1994). Instead of a world state, he proposes an “international state.” Contrary to his development of teleological argument in the World State article, in the “International State” article Wendt intentionally keeps himself distant from teleology. He writes that “I specifically do not impute any directionality or *teleology* to the historical process” (Wendt, 1994: 388; emphasis added.). With regard to the collective identity formation, the early Wendt also avoids making historically progressive claims or “inevitability” arguments. He writes:

“There is nothing inevitable about collective identity formation in the international system. It faces powerful countervailing forces, and I do not mean to suggest that the logic of history is progressive; there are too many examples of failed collective identities for that” (Ibid: 391).

From state of nature to a society of states, and then to a security community, Wendt follows the chain of Hobbes, Lock and Kant. He replaces Waltz’s aim of survival with the aim of recognition; and concludes that unless every component of the structure (every state and possible states) is equally recognized, the system will not achieve stability and peace. To avoid war, we have to have equal recognition for everybody, which in turn will lead us to establishment of a world state.

Is this theory still a constructivist one? We can give one positive and three negative answers to that question. Yes, it is still a constructivist theory mainly because it uses main approach of constructivism and its vocabulary. That is, what makes a world state inevitable (and at the same time what makes it possible) is a desire for recognition which is exclusively about identities of the self. Wendt uses the same argument about expansion of the self to incorporate former “others” into the new expanded self in his earlier articles. Creation of a security community, for example, was possible by accepting some “others” as part of one’s self so that an attack on one is perceived as an attack on all. World state assertion is an extended version of these earlier arguments/articles. In the new definition, the self is so extended/expanded that it includes everybody. Likewise, the

role attributed to identity, and the connection between material and non-material resources indicate the continuation of analysis in the theory.

On the other hand, some negative answers can also be given to the question about Wendt's persistence in constructivism. To put it differently, one can argue that a constructivist analysis does not necessarily require arguing that a world state is inevitable. One of the reasons for this is that norms in constructivist theory are not necessarily related with a certain kind of political system. Ideas, which are the bases for norms, are not determined by an outside factor for constructivism. Actually, this is the most important assertion of the theory: ideas (and their offshoots: norms, values etc) are independent agents in international politics. Neither power politics nor interest calculation has a deterministic influence on ideas. Hence, for ideas/norms to emerge and to be spread, no political or material framework becomes a precondition (no base-superstructure determination, as it is the case for Marxist theory). On the other hand, Wendt limits the possibility of a non-violent world to a world state. Yet constructivism envisions that a norm, such as equal suffrage rights for women or unacceptability of torture, as well as the norm of non-violence can emerge at any five stages of Wendt's analysis.

If we look at the question from a material capabilities angle, Wendt's conclusion again is not inevitable. According to him, we have to merge Weber's and Hegel's definition of state. To be more specific, Wendt uses Hegelian concept of state to reach a Weberian one, with legitimate monopoly over power. This is necessary to deter (or punish) a possible aggressor after we all embrace the norm of non-violence. However, a world state is not necessary to achieve this aim because none of the existing states in the world has the capability to win a war against a sufficient combination of other states of the world. (One should remember Hobbes here who argues that in the state of nature no one individual can win a fight against a sufficient coalition of others). If this is the case, the only problem remaining is coordination. In fact Wendt refers to this point when he argues that in pre- world state stages, there is collective action problem. In other words, if a mechanism to solve the coordination/collective action problem is developed, we can deter possible aggressor without a world state; and I think, world state is only one of the solutions for this problem, not an inevitable one. An easier solution can be found within constructivism, and in fact within Wendt's own explanations. The process by which definition of the "self" is made more inclusive is at the same time the process by which collective responses can be formulated. The example of NATO demonstrates this point. Without a world state, NATO by its military capability, can deter every threat to its survival before they emerge; and member states do not have to give up their sovereignty in the organization. Likewise, the possibility for every member state to withdraw its commitment to the alliance is always existent, yet even in that case the joint forces of the remaining powers make it irrational for the aggressor to attack on the alliance.

The third reason why from a constructivist point of view a world state is not inevitable is a simple one. If "anarchy is what states make of it", then states may create a different culture of anarchy without a world state. One of the core claims of Wendt in his earlier articles is that, an egoistic, self-help anarchy is one of the ways to construct anarchy. States can develop an altruistic culture of anarchy. It is still anarchy (not a world state) but it is not one of constant warfare where "man is wolf to man". As a result, within Wendt's own writings we can conclude that world state is not inevitable or there is a contradiction between his earlier and later claims. I believe, he is aware of that tension. That is why he states two times in his world state article that he still believes "anarchy is what states make of it" but I think not convincingly.

Last but not least, a possible world state has to solve the problem of recognition as far as the state identity is concerned. The construction of the self is only possible when an equal other recognizes

the self. If there are no other political entities equal to world state which can recognize it in order for its identity to be completed who would recognize it? Wendt's answer for this question is twofold. First, he argues, the people in this world state will recognize it; and second the *other* for the world state will be its past. For the first reason, I would reply that citizens of world state do not have the necessary qualification of equality with the recognized entity. For the second, the past has no agency to recognize the current state. Thus, the self of the world state cannot be completed and remains, hopelessly, in need of another equal political entity for recognition.

4. Early Wendt plus Late Schmitt: *Grossraum* as a new Path for Constructivism

What I tried to show in the previous section is that constructivist theory needs a new systemic project which does not suffer from the shortcomings of the project of an "inevitable" world state. To be more specific, apart from various research interests that scholars in the constructivist tradition successfully pursue such as international norm diffusion (Checkel, 1997) or role of elite identities on foreign policy decisions (Weldes, 1999) which deal mainly individual-level and state-level questions, what is lacking is a systemic-level constructivist projection on world politics. As I argued in the previous section, Wendt's attempt to fill that gap is problematic from a constructivist point of view for the reasons discussed above, such as the belief in teleology, retreat from "anarchy is what states make of it" argument and absence of any politically equal severing entity to recognize the *self* of world state. I think, Schmitt's theory provides a systemic level projection for constructivism which can avoid criticisms directed against Wendt's world state. As a proposal of such kind, I now turn to *Grossraum* theory of Schmitt and the *nomos* related to it.

Towards the end of his *The Nomos of the Earth*, Schmitt speculates three possible scenarios for the post-WW II international order (Schmitt, 2006). The first can be called as a uni-polar world created by a super-power and victor of the war – a tragedy in Schmittian terms. Second is the "passing of the 'off-shore balancer' torch from the UK to the U.S. in the Cold War context – a second worst option." Third is the creation of a new world order based on a balance among a multiplicity of *Grossraums* which is the favored option by Schmitt (Teschke, 2011).

The concept of *Grossraum* can be defined as a greater territorial space or pan-region which is constituted by the coming together of a number of nation-states in a certain geographical region. Although member states to the *Grossraum* retain their distinct states and political centers, they act in harmony with other member states of the *Grossraum* in certain fields. The creation of the *Grossraum* functionally serves the purpose of the protection of its member states from outside intervention. Individual nation-states which are vulnerable to outside intervention by powerful forces are protected under the umbrella of the *Grossraum*. In that sense, main purpose of this political unity is to prevent intervention of the outside forces in a geographical region. Monroe Doctrine of 1832 which signs the creation of a U.S. dominated *Grossraum* in the Western hemisphere is cited as the example (and a sign of the beginning) of the creation of a *Grossraum*. This can also be viewed as the transition from the *nomos* of *Jus Publicum Europeum* to the *Grossraum* of large territorial units.

In addition to its functional purpose of the prevention of non-intervention by outside forces, *Grossraum* signifies some kind of cultural/civilizational unity. As mentioned above, the root of the *political* for Schmitt is the desire of people to protect their distinct way of life from perceived aggressors. Members of the *Grossraum* share a feeling of unity for their way of life. Because of this shared conception of the way of life, although formally citizens of different nation-states, member peoples of the same *Grossraum* have same kind of threat perception. An aggressor against one member country of the *Grossraum* is perceived as a common enemy because of the

shared understanding of the way of life. To put it differently, although an aggressor country against one member of the *Grossraum* is not private foe (*inimicus*) of the people of other member states, it is perceived to be a public enemy (*hostis*) against which a collective defense mechanism naturally operates.

Before going into details of the reasons why Schmitt's theorization of *Grossraum* should be considered as a contribution to constructivist theory and solution to some of the problems in Wendt's world state predictions, let me explain the distinction I make between early and late Schmitt. The concepts of *nomos* and *Grossraum* emphasized in the later writings of Schmitt display some kind of a difference in the thinking of Schmitt from his earlier writings. The concept of *nomos* can be defined as the "concrete spatial order of a community. It is a Law which exists prior to any particular positive laws. '*Der nomos der erde*' is thus roughly equivalent to 'world order' or 'the Law of the Earth' and thus defines a problem space in which notions of world order and international law intersect" (Dean, 2006: 4) The emphasis on the order and "law of earth" is seen as a replacement of Schmitt's earlier decisionist legal thinking by the institutional legal thinking, exemplifies it in the concept of *nomos* (Ibid.). In that sense, it seems to me legitimate to make a differentiation between early and late Schmitt. Moreover, one has to keep the strict state control over knowledge production in the Nazi Germany in mind. For example, concerning some of the vagueness in the degree of homogenization within *Grossraum*, Teschke (2011:88) writes that "this vagueness reveals the tactical precautions that Schmitt had to heed under the watchful eyes of the SS, as his *Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung* went through four editions between spring 1939 and July 1941, forcing him to adjust his *Großraum* idea to the ever more spectacular German foreign-policy successes." In a similar vein, Zarmanian (2006: 61) asserts that while the appropriation of *Grossraum* theory by the Nazi elite was aiming the creation of a despotic pan-region, for Schmitt it includes the guarantee of plurality. In this respect Slomp (2007: 208) writes "I believe that Schmitt was correct in saying that he was a nationalist but not of Hitler's kind."

One of the important contributions, as well as solution proposal, of Schmitt's analysis of *Grossraum* is on the question of recognition for international actors. In a world state, there is no other equivalent entity which would recognize the state for the completion of its *self*. Existence of multiple *Grossraums*, on the other hand, enables both internal and external recognition. Internally, since member states to a *Grossraum* do not lose their state self, the *Grossraum* is recognized first by its member state. Externally, as in the case of the member states of the *Jus Publicum Europeanum*, multiple *Grossraums* will recognize each other as equal and sovereign entities, and in return will be recognized by them. In addition to this theoretical solution to the problem of recognition, multiple *Grossraums* will be practically useful for the constitution of peace globally. Although it cannot be seen as a proposal to eliminate all of the wars on the world - an argument which is detested by Schmitt because its supporters use it to mask their brutal attacks on others - establishment of large-scale territorial units with the logic of security communities to prevent outside intervention will create a world with "multiple-NATOs". Small and middle power states will be protected from the intervention of super-powers thanks to that defense mechanism.

In parallel with constructivist literature and specifically Wendt, Schmitt thinks that categories of self, friend and enemy are not fixed but open to change. The possibility of transformation of the self into a more inclusive and altruistic one is also shared by Schmitt. In such a process, former others can be perceived as the part of the new expanded self. The important question with regard to the creation of the inclusive self is whether or not there are limits to it. That is to say, can a self of a state become so much expanded that it can include all of the former *others*, which would mean a world state? For the internal heterogeneity of the self of the state is concerned, is there

an intolerable heterogeneity in a state? Are there any incommensurable “selves” that would make it difficult to be united? Wendt cites the example of the European Union as a proto-world state. He asserts the future world state will be similar to current EU. In their discussion of the diversity within the EU, Beck and Grande argue that the difference within Europe does not block further EU integration because they presuppose that these differences are not impossible to coexist (Beck and Grande, 2007). That means, different levels of integration or different local cultures, for example between Hungary and Britain, or between Germany and Bulgaria are not unmanageable; and we can accommodate them within the general European culture (*civilization?*).

Yet, the question is can we imagine a “self” which feels itself as a coherent unit with diversity of its constitutive parts, without attempting to make them homogenous? Wendt does not explicitly discuss whether this new self will homogenize every “other” or not. In fact, he discusses the question but not in the form that I formulated here. Wendt talks about a dual (if not conflicting) processes: one the one hand diffusion of norm will have a homogenizing effect; on the other hand, he writes that they will retain their differences.

I think we can solve the dilemma of “homogeneity vs. difference” for the expansion of the self with the help of Schmitt by conceptualizing two different kinds of “others”: a compatible and an incompatible other. The first one is a *psychological other* whereas the second is an *ontological other*. For Schmitt, every self has a capacity to a certain degree to adapt itself to transformations which occur by incorporating an “other” to it, hence creating a new self. During the process of incorporation, both parties experience some kind of transformations of the self. Yet, there are certain features of the self, the transformation of which would mean that it is not the same self anymore. In other words, even in stages of fusion with *another*, the core characteristics of a self, the “way of life” in Schmitt’s terms, have to be preserved if that self wants to survive.² If fusion with an “other” does not annihilate the core aspects of the self, if it is a “compatible other” or “psychological other”, they might want to give up some of their sovereignty to construct a *Grossraum*. Whereas if incorporation of an “other” into the self-causes a change in the cores of either side, then it is an “incompatible” or “ontological other.” The extraordinary success of the theory of *Grossraum* is that, it changes the status of ontological others in their nation-state phase, to respected equal others in the *Grossraum* phase.

The fourth contribution of Schmitt’s theory is the solution it proposes to the tension between predicting major tendencies in international politics and the trap of teleological inevitability. Contrary to Wendt’s argument, Schmitt does not argue that the future predominance of *Grossraums* is an inevitable and irreversible process. Rather, he writes that it is one of three possible routes that world politics may follow. At a deeper level, this difference pertains to the (dis)belief in the constructed nature of political concepts such as anarchy and sovereignty. Developing a theory of international politics with the assumption of the constructed nature of these concepts disqualifies any inevitability and irreversibility. This is because the agency of human beings has to be disregarded, and construction of anarchy and sovereignty has to be transferred somewhere out of the societal sphere.

Fifth, and last, in contrast to lack of historical and geographical reference points in the rationalist IR tradition, Schmitt’s analysis of *Grossraum* operates within a time-space axis. With that regard, Wendt’s world state has to be considered in the former group of theories. The limits of historical

² I am aware that, it sounds as an essentialist argument here, but since Wendt broke the rule of mainstream social science by teleological argument, I think it is fair to respond him with another non-popular (or even hated) type of criticism, the essentialist one.

and geographical possibilities work as a balance to seemingly limitless social constructivist thinking. That is to say, the acceptance that political structures are socially constructed gives the impression that creation of any kind of social structure is possible by social consensus/construction. Although at the theoretical level the premise gives that impression, at the practical level there are some historical and geographical limitations for the immediate creation of any kind of social norm and structure. For example, although “anarchy is what states make of it”, the historical experience of anarchy that the political actors have lived in so far carries its blueprint in the identities of actors. Since identities are the motivating factor of behavior, for the historically constructed identity of a political actor, in the practical and immediate decisions, there are certain limits to future construction opportunities in the short run. The limiting effect of history (path-dependence) is also valid for the limiting effects of geography. Keeping these considerations in mind, Schmitt’s theory of *Grossraum* provides an analysis of the factors of social construction and limitations of history and geography.

5. Conclusion

Contrary to mainstream readings of his theory, in this paper I aimed at developing a constructivist reading of Carl Schmitt. His admittance of socially constructed nature of anarchy, his emphasis on the role of identity, and the importance he attributes to self-other/friend-enemy distinctions, I think, make such an endeavor legitimate. Furthermore, I argued that the attempt of Wendt to answer the need for a systemic IR theory from a constructivist perspective has certain shortcomings. Instead, Schmitt’s theory of *Grossraum* both theoretically and practically merits “recognition” as a constructivist systemic IR theory. There is one theoretical puzzle which, I think, deserves further research for the subjects discussed here. It is about the necessity of *other* for the construction of the *self*. The literature is divided into two on the question. While one side argues that for the construction of identity of the self, *other*, as an out-group member, is not necessary; the second group asserts that for every *self*, there is a necessity for *other*. Currently both camps justify their positions as treating their answer as an assumption for the theory. Yet, finding ways to “desacralize” the answers and changing the situation of the answers from assumption to a hypothesis to be tested will provide further insight for theories that deal with any kind of “self vs. other” distinction.

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