AFRO EURASIAN STUDIES

MUSIAD
INDEPENDENT INDUSTRIALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION

GHANA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MILITARY REGIMES, 1966–1993: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW

AFRO EURASIAN STUDIES - VOLUME: 11 / ISSUE: 2 pp. 40-68

Abdallah Imam Haruna, PhD Candidate, Ankara Social Sciences University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Political Science and International Relations

E-mail: abdallahimam.haruna@student.asbu.edu.tr

Orcid ID: 0000-0003-0767-0675

Received: 21.07.2022

Accepted: 05.09.2022

Cite as: Haruna, A. I.. (2022). Ghana's Foreign Policy Under Military Regimes, 1966-1993: An Historical Review, *Afro Eurasian Studies*, 11 (2), 40-68 DOI: 10.33722/afes.1146797

Plagiarism: This article has been reviewed by at least two referees and confirmed to include no plagiarism.

Askeri Rejimler Altında Gana'nın Dış Politikası, 1966-1993: Tarihsel Bir İnceleme
Öz

Bu makale, 1966'dan 1993'e kadar Gana'daki askeri rejimlerin dış politika hedeflerini incelemektedir. Altmışların ortaları ve doksanların başlarında, Afrika ve Latin Amerika'nın en çok askeri darbeye sahip kıta olarak ün kazanmak için birbirlerine meydan okudukları görüldü. Frankofon Afrika'daki askeri karışıklıkların çoğu herhangi bir ciddi uzman analizine zar zor yol açabilse de, Gana ve Nijerya'daki isyanlar birçok askeri uzmana Afrika siyasetinin militarizasyonuna farklı bir boyut kazandırmıştı. 65 yaşında bir egemen devlet olarak Gana, 1966–1969, 1972–1979, 1979 ve 1981–1993 olmak üzere dört askeri rejime tanık oldu. Bu askeri devralma politikaları, her zaman ekonomik kötü yönetim ve gücün idari olarak kötüye kullanılmasıyla suçlandı. Gerçekten de, Gana'nın ekonomisi, 1957'deki bağımsızlığından bu yana, istikrarlı ekonomik büyüme söz konusu olduğunda birkaç aksilik yaşadı. Ülke, küresel Covid-19 salgınının ortasında 6 Mart 2022'de 65. bağımsızlık gününü kutlarken, bu çalışma, son altmış yıldaki askeri rejimlerin dış politikasına odaklanarak, ülkenin bağımsızlıktan bu yana siyasi adımlarının izini sürmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makale, tıpkı askeri subayların yönetmek için siyasi meşruiyetten yoksun olmaları gibi, başarılı dış politika kararları almak için doğru aktörler olmadıklarını kanıtlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gana, Batı Afrika, darbeler, askeri kural, askeri rejim, dış politika

Ghana's Foreign Policy Under Military Regimes, 1966-1993: An Historical Review
Abstract

This paper probes the foreign policy objectives of military regimes in Ghana from 1966 to 1993. The mid-sixties and early nineties saw Africa and Latin America challenging each other for an accolade of notoriety as the continent with the most military coup d'états. Though most of the military disturbances in Francophone Africa could barely provoke any serious expert analysis, the revolts in Ghana and Nigeria had given many military pundits a different dimension of the militarisation of African politics. As a 65-year-old sovereign state, Ghana has witnessed four military regimes: 1966–1969, 1972–1979, 1979, and 1981–1993. These politics of military takeovers were always blamed on economic mismanagement and administrative abuse of power. Indeed, Ghana's economy since independence in 1957 has suffered several setbacks as far as steady economic growth is concerned. As the country celebrated its 65th independence day on 6 March 2022, amidst the global Covid-19 pandemic, this study seeks to retrace the political steps of the country since independence, focusing on the foreign policy of the military regimes within the last six decades. The paper intends to prove that just as military officers lack political legitimacy to govern, they are hardly the right actors to make successful foreign policy decisions.

Key Words: Ghana, West Africa, coup d'états, military rule, military regime, foreign policy

Introduction

The term foreign policy means different things to different scholars. Foreign policy may be seen as the mutual interactions among sovereign nation-states (Bindra 2019; Grare 2002). While many analysts regard it as an external expression or manifestation of the internal objectives of a state, others associate a foreign policy with an elongation of a state's domestic policy (Lampton 2014; Byrd and Komanduri 2013; Eyadat and Mohammad 2010). It is often said that "foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends" (Kissinger 1966: 503). However, the borderline between these highly engaged couples can be anything but thick.

Since 1957 when Ghana gained independence from Britain, the foreign policy of the country has fundamentally remained the same (Sackeyfio-Lenoch 2016). The moment the Gold Coast (former name for Ghana) became the Independent State of Ghana on March 6, 1957, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (the first president of Ghana) made a historic foreign policy pronouncement. He said, "We are going to see that we create our own African personality and identity...We again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa; for our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent" (Asante 1997: 29). Thus, since independence, Ghana's foreign policy has been to put the interest of Africa as its priority (see Gebe 2008; Nanjira 2010; Tieku and Odoom 2020).

By 1962, it became apparent that Nkrumah's major political vision was to export his "version" of continental identity or nationalism to other parts of the African continent (Bluwey 2002). This made Ghana the torchbearer of the fight against colonial dominance in Africa. Ghana became progressively interested in freeing the continent and ultimately uniting the independent African states under a single administrative and economic leadership. Indeed, one of the leading members of the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 was Kwame Nkrumah. Headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, one of the numerous objectives of the organization was to facilitate the independence drive and champion the interests of all states on the continent. The mandates of the OAU also resonated well with Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist ideology and "Black Nationalism" (Grilli 2019: 30).

However, members of the National Liberation Council (NLC) truncated, prematurely, Kwame Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist foreign policy agenda through a military takeover on 24 February 1966. This was the first of many such military interferences in the affairs of the new nation's young democracy. These politics of military takeovers were always blamed on economic mismanagement and administrative abuse of power (Bennett 1975; Okeke 2018). For instance, among other things, the NLC had accused Nkrumah of mortgaging the Ghanaian economy to the weak and underdeveloped economies of the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern

Europe and China (Bluwey 2002). Again, before the military takeover, some opposition elements in Ghana maintained that Nkrumah had brought in shoddy goods from the backward economies of Eastern Europe and China. This paper probes the foreign policy objectives of military regimes in Ghana from 1966 to 1993. As the country celebrated its 65th independence day on 6 March 2022, amidst the global Covid-19 pandemic, this study seeks to retrace the political steps of the country since independence; focusing on the foreign policy of the military regimes within the last six decades. The paper intends to prove that, just as military officers lack political legitimacy to govern, they are hardly the right actors to make successful foreign policy decisions.

Methodology

The analytical method needed to study the subject matter of this paper consists of a qualitative examination of data from primary and secondary sources. The information draws from theoretical and historical references, expert testimonies, military doctrinal data, and contemporary academic publications on the topic. The primary sources, in particular, examine expressed ideas and comments by leaders and government officials in the editorials of the state-controlled Daily Graphic newspapers. This paper assumes that the military leaders and their appointees used these editorials of the government-controlled newspapers to express their policies and ideologies to the public. Content analysis of such editorials, without a doubt, will reveal the similarities and differences in the policy objectives of the various military regimes under review. The author's educational background in African Studies also helps put the analysis in perspective. These sources confirm the significance and legitimacy of the discussion. Being more theoretical and historical than technical, the nature of the subject under discussion limits the possibility of using quantitative analysis for the study.

The historical and theoretical references also form the bases of justification for the study. Historically, case studies of four military regimes from 1966 to 1993 are examined to illustrate the efforts of the military in conducting foreign policies in Ghana. Theoretically, the study examines the writings of ancient and contemporary military theorists to provide an evolving integration between military activities and foreign policy decision-making. I use the expression "evolving integration" because of recent happenings on the continent. Following the epidemic of military takeovers in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, and a failed one in Guinea-Bissau in recent times, some regional security analysts are questioning why Africa is experiencing the current wave of coups after democracy; it might seem, had become entrenched in the continent. From all indications, it seems that the continent is not yet done with military rule. That brings us to the two hypotheses around which the entire discussion in this paper revolves. The two hypothetical questions that Claude Welch (1962: 76) had asked decades ago are very relevant in this context: (a) "Can

a military-based government cope more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered?" (b) "Are some of these problems susceptible to solutions by means congenial to the governing military junta in ways that escaped the preceding civilian regime?"

The analysis of expert testimonies and the reviews of contemporary literature on military diplomacy establish the need and the legitimacy to address the issue of military foreign policy decision-making in relation to the dynamics of the current military takeovers on the African continent, especially in the West African sub-region. In a world that is becoming synonymous with globalization, foreign policy functions throughout the national and international corridors of power; and serves as a significant factor in achieving long-term strategic and operational goals of the international system. Thus, the use of expert testimonies and contemporary literature indicates the growing need to re-examine the role of the military in international relations as well as traditional public diplomacy. The study of doctrinal data of the military also establishes the context of the development and implementation processes of foreign policy decision-making in Ghana since independence on March 6, 1957. The military interventions in the political history of Ghana have significantly affected the country's reputation within the comity of nations, particularly at the levels of regional and international institutions such as ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN. This review, therefore, assesses the established role of these institutions vis-à-vis the framework that drives the foreign policies of military regimes.

Without claiming to be an expert in military governance, the author approaches the subject matter of this paper from the perspective of an "amateur" writer in International Relations and African Studies, with a first-hand experience of the adverse consequences of military regimes. These perspectives and/or experiences range from academic interactions with senior fellows in the fields of International Relations and African Studies to a review of relevant literature in those duo fields of study. Hence, the complete compilations, evaluations, and writing of the paper are achieved through editing, analysing, and synthesizing these diverse sources of information.

The discussion is in three main sections. The preceding section will provide review of literature on some salient themes in the military field, abstracting from the welter of academic, political, and military terminologies that seem to be significant and defining features of military regimes. The second section focuses on the foreign policies of the military governments that had the illegitimate mandate to rule Ghana intermittently from 1966 to 1993. The final discussion section then deduces some general concluding remarks from the discussion, paying greater attention to how military regimes are predisposed to violent conduct and are more likely than their civilian counterparts to take an uncompromising stance in diplomatic negotiations.

Literature Review

This short review of the literature on military regimes illustrates how military pundits and previous researchers have evaluated and analyzed different kinds of military rules across diverse geographical jurisdictions.

The Meaning of Military Rule

The duo terms "military rule" and "military regime" are used synonymously in this discussion to refer to a subtype of an authoritarian regime. According to the United States Army (1940: 2), a military government is "that form of government which is established and maintained by a belligerent by force of arms over occupied territory of the enemy and over the inhabitants thereof." The laws of war determine the legality of a military government (Omo-bare 1990). The end of the Second World War ushered in many military coup d'états in the so-called "Third World" or developing countries (Perlmutter 1980). Between the 1950s and '60s, many African countries had attained independence from their colonial masters; and started the journey to self-determination. Many modernization theorists at the time were quite optimistic that the newly independent nation-states of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East would eventually develop into capitalist democracies where the civilians would exercise unchallenged authority over the military (see Anber 1967; Berger 2003; Klinghoffer 1973). Unfortunately, those theoretical predictions or hypotheses and expectations were never fulfilled as military takeovers in most Third World countries had reached their crescendo between the 1960s and '70s (Decalo 1973; Gershoni 1996).

Origins of Military Rule

Just as the coup d'états differ in form and substance, so are the reasons. Reasons for coups headed by junior officers are markedly different from that of the coups led by those on top of the military hierarchy (Anene 2000; Kposowa and Craig 1993). Yet, the reasons for those two are not the same as those for palace coups. The distinction, largely, lies between the domestic political variables, internal bureaucratic factors within the armed forces, and external influences from powerful international actors (Craig and Kposowa 1990). Regarding domestic political variables, for instance, economic crises resulting in high cost of living, the high relative frequency of political instability emanating from religious or ethnic conflicts, weak or non-functional state institutions, and rickety political parties are some of the factors that mostly precede military coups (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Frantz and Ezrow 2011; Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius 2013). There are several other research reports on the circumstances that necessitate the rise in military regimes in Africa and some parts of Asia and Latin America (see Collier and Hoeffler 2005; DeRouen and Heo 2001; DIX 1994; Maniruzzaman 1992; Sigmund 1993). Such circumstances include the size of the army and military spending (Collier and Hoeffler 2007). However, none of those studies has been able to hazard a direct correlation between

the numerical strength of the military or the size of its budget and the propensity to stage a coup d'état. As Claude (1978: 142) has indicated, "Militaries numbering in the millions have remained politically passive, under a high degree of civilian control. Conversely, armed forces as small as two hundred (as in Togo in 1963) have successfully intervened in the political process and imposed their leaders upon the body politic." Therefore, the size of the military would not necessarily play a major role if all other factors were held constant.

Several other writers have assigned varied reasons for the surge in military regimes in newly independent developing countries between the 1960s and '70s (Bienen 1980; Cowan 1966; Decalo 1973; Perlmutter 1980). Henry Bienen (1980: 172), for instance, has stated that "[T]here is an old debate, going back to the 1950s, as to whether training programs inculcate into developing countries' armed forces values of civilian control, commitment to development, or professionalism as understood by those who do the training." Bienen (1980) cited memoirs of some Ghanaian military officers such as Afrifa and Ocran to buttress the argument that the impact of the colonial heritage on African military personnel and the training they underwent in the hands of the British army had made them less nationalistic than their civilian counterparts. This is closely associated with another significant trigger, which emerged during the Cold War era, the superpower competition (Daron, Davide and Andrea 2010; Dommen and Maizels 1988). At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States doled out large amounts of military assistance to their clients or allied nations to strengthen military capabilities of those states (see Atomic Heritage Foundation 2018; Rowe 1974). Indeed, Kposowa and Jenkins (1993) have argued that there was a direct correlation between the Cold War and the increased military interference in politics in Third World countries. There has been a downward trend in the number of military regimes in the developing world since the Cold War ended and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Another notable phenomenon that had swept across the newly independent African states, which led to the military involvement in African politics, was the single-party system (Smith 2005). The single-party used in this discussion, denotes "a situation in which only one political party, the governing party, exists or is permitted to exist" (Kilson 1963: 263). Except for Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya, and the Republic of Sudan, where no political parties existed at the time, variations of the one-party political system or the tendency to go in that direction could be seen in almost all newly independent African states (Claude 1978; Kilson 1963). Many of the new leaders in post-independence Africa held the view – albeit erroneous – that the single-party system was the most appropriate vehicle to drive home the concept of national unity. Kwame Nkrumah, the founding Prime Minister and the first President of the Republic of Ghana, for instance, was quoted to have stated flatly that, "[O]ne party rule is the most appropriate political instrument for ending tribalism and for planning

development" (Cowan 1966: 289). The focus on the one-party system as a fundamental axis around which the political structure of a state must revolve had resulted in the personalization of political office and the concentration of political power in the hands of a strong executive president (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010). In the final analysis, the military has to step in to get the leader out of office. When the army ousted Nkrumah of Ghana in 1966, among the reasons for the coup that had enjoyed public support was the single-party socialism and communism that Nkrumah had championed. General Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa, for instance, stated that the military takeover became necessary because the President (Nkrumah) had effectively blocked all channels for a peaceful change of government in Ghana (Apter 1972).

Mechanisms and Impacts of Military Rule

As we have seen in the above discussion, seizures of political power by army officers had become the norm rather than the exception in most parts of the 20th century. This was the most common means of imposing autocratic regimes in the developing world. The consequences of these military regimes are varied. It is well known, that the military is a hierarchical institution with a specialty in the deployment of violence and the use of instruments of coercion (Fjelde 2010; Frantz and Ezrow 2011). Thus, the only means of ruling under the military is by use of force (Davidonis 1944). In most cases, however, military regimes attempt to win the trust of the masses by "proclaiming their intention of returning power to civilians after an unspecified period of house cleansing" (Claude 1978: 139). Consequently, some military regimes, in some instances, have allowed general elections to choose national and local level representative bodies (Said 2012). Still, others have relied on the judiciary (covertly or overtly) with a limited degree of independence to propagate the rule of law (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). In rare instances, military regimes have promulgated national constitutions (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). Notwithstanding these seemingly positive circumstances, the mere threat, or use, of torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and the application of military codes of conduct to civilians by the military are commonplace during military rule (Brotz and Wilson 1946).

Even though the military is a significant part of the state apparatus and functions under the laws of the state, the institution enjoys (relatively) a high degree of autonomy. This autonomy, it would seem, is because of the constitutional control they have over the instruments of violence and coercion (Bienen 1978). That said, it is worth noting that the military is not a monolithic society or a single actor. It is a hierarchical institution with ranks and classes, which provide a fertile ground for intense rivalry and horizontal competition among the various service units (Wilson 2016). In ethnically diverse societies such as Ghana and many other African countries, a lack of ethnic balance across the major ethnic groups during military recruitment could result in the security institution being regarded as representing one ethnic

group against others (Chazan 1982; Zeff 1981). These divisions and/or problems are aggravated anytime the military has access to political power. Military regimes that struggled in the past to manage these differences have mostly foundered, leading to uncontrolled counter coups and attempted seizures of political power (Hill 1979).

Transitions from Military Rule

Most military governments of the 1960s and '70s, on many occasions, had become democratic (or civilian) in subsequent decades. The military regimes began by taking steps to woo prominent civilians into the military governments (Anene 1997). For instance, Bienen (1975: 328) revealed that between 1967 and 1974, many "civilians functioned as civil commissioners in the Nigerian federal military government and in state governments." While some of those civilians – such as Aminu Kano and Chief Awolowo – had established themselves politically before 1966, many of them had never been active politicians (Bienen 1975). There have been attempts by several analysts to distinguish between democratization and restoration of civil liberties (see Anene 2000; Arceneaux 2001; Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi 1981; Williams and Masters 2011). The academic literature is also awash with the debate over whether a multiparty system automatically leads to democratization (Gandhi 2015). I will resist the temptation to delve into those debates.

There are varied outcomes when the military presides over political transitions from military rule to democracy. In most cases, the military tends to interfere in the process to ensure that their desired outcome is produced at the end of the transition. A case in point is Ibrahim Babangida's "transition" that never took place. Babangida was a military leader of Nigeria from 1985 to 1993 (Adewuyi 2021). The regime initially set 1990 as the deadline for a return to civilian rule. After a failed coup attempt to outstate the regime, the deadline was rescheduled to 1992, which resulted in the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections in Nigeria (Falode 2019). General Sani Abacha eventually toppled Babangida's regime in 1993 (Kraxberger 2004). Military rules in the 1960s and '70s had ended in several ways. After failed military adventures, many of the military regimes had collapsed. The military regimes of Greece in 1974 and Argentina in 1983 are the best examples of failed military adventures (Inglessis and Adelman 2011). Known as "Argentina's Dirty War" era, the last military regime in Argentina lasted from 1976 to 1983 (Osiel 2001). It was the cruellest and the most murderous military rule ever in the Southern Cone (Ehenson 1999; Gomez 2001). With severe economic problems and increasing public opposition, the regime lost popularity. The military government was forced to step aside in 1983 after Argentina's lost to Great Britain in the Falklands War (Feitlowitz 2001).

Still, other military regimes had managed to negotiate a successful return to a multiparty system where they metamorphosed into civilian governments (Eldem 2020). Ghana's Jerry John Rawlings is an excellent case for analysis of a military

leader turned democratic. Rawlings led a military junta from 1981 to 1992 and became a democratically elected President for two terms, from 7th January 1993 to 7th January 2001 (Bluwey 1998). He also served as a military leader for a short period in 1979. He governed Ghana for nearly 20 of the country's 65 years since independence. President Rawlings' economic policies led to Ghana's unprecedented economic crisis in 1983. Having lost popular support for his handling of the country's economy, according to Boafo-Arthur (1999), he was forced (by external powers) to undertake the structural adjustment program and prepare the country for multiparty democracy. Rawlings founded the National Democratic Congress party to contest the 1992 general elections. The NDC won the election making Rawlings the first President of the Fourth Republic. The National Democratic Congress remains one of "the two big tent parties with national appeal and comprehensive platforms" (Minion 2004: 423). The other party is the liberal New Patriotic Party (NPP).

Some of the military rulers had, either through formal or informal agreements, successfully negotiated their way out of political power (Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012). A typical case in point is the Chilean military regime from 1973 to 1990. A 1988 plebiscite voted the military regime out of power, which was followed by a general election in 1989 to return Chile to a multiparty democracy (Loveman 1991). The 1984 Naval Club Pact in Uruguay also fits in this category (Aguero 1998). It is worth noting, however, that not every regime transition leads to democratization. There are instances where a military regime is replaced by another military junta. With this scenario, I draw examples from Ghana and Nigeria. Ghana's Gen. I. K. Acheampong led a military regime under the Supreme Military Council (SMC) from 9th October 1975 to 5th July 1978, when General F. W. K. Akuffo overthrew him in a palace coup. General Acheampong was forced to resign as head of state; and was replaced by his deputy on the ruling Supreme Military Council II (SMC II) (Owusu 1989). In the case of Nigeria, as we have already discussed previously, General Sani Abacha – a military ruler – replaced General Ibrahim Babangida's military regime in 1993 (McGowan 2003).

Most analysts on post-military regimes tend to focus almost entirely on the outcomes of the political processes and the quality of the democratic governments that succeeded the authoritarian regimes (John 1997; Rwengabo 2013; Williams and Daniel 2011). What rarely engages the attention of those analysts is the military prerogatives that were established before the transitions. These prerogatives, in most cases, outlive the authoritarian regime itself (Ensalaco 1995). The prerogatives could be exceptional conditions of service for a category of military officers, entrenched constitutional clauses that give unqualified protection to post-authoritarian regime leaders or a role as ex officio members in domestic security boards. Irrespective of the form or shape of those prerogatives, they most often remain albatrosses around the necks of the civilian governments long after the transition.

Foreign Policy under Military Regimes in Ghana (1966-1993)

The mid-sixties and early nineties saw Africa and Latin America challenging each other for an accolade of notoriety as the continent with the most military coup d'états (McGowan 2003; Morrison and Stevenson 1974). Though most of the military disturbances in Francophone Africa could barely provoke any serious expert analysis, the revolts in Ghana and Nigeria had given many military pundits a different dimension of the militarisation of African politics (Luckham 1994). These coup d'états gave the military a challenging array of new responsibilities, including economic management and foreign policy decision-making. As a 65-year-old sovereign state, Ghana has witnessed four military regimes: 1966–1969, 1972–1979, 1979, and 1981–1993. These politics of military takeovers were always blamed on economic mismanagement and administrative abuse of power (Bennett 1975). Indeed, Ghana's economy since independence in 1957 has suffered several setbacks as far as steady economic growth is concerned. The economic consequences of military regimes will be dealt with on a different platform. The ensuing pages seek to examine the foreign policy options of the military regimes in Ghana within the last six decades.

The National Liberation Council (NLC) and Ghana's Foreign Policy

The National Liberation Council – a group of army and police officers, removed the founding Prime Minister and the first President of the newly independent Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, from office on 24th February 1966 (Harvey 1966). This was Ghana's first post-independence military interference in the country's political affairs. According to the Chairman of the NLC, Lt General J. A. Ankrah, Nkrumah was overthrown because of his dictatorial and repressive rule, corruption and mismanagement of the economy, attacks on academic freedom and curtailment of freedom of expression, interference in the affairs of the armed forces and the police, and the one-party Socialism and Communism (Ankrah 1966; Apter 1972).

The foreign policy of the National Liberation Council did not differ much from that of Nkrumah's administration. In a national broadcast to mark the first hundred days of the regime, General Ankrah stated that:

"*We have endeavoured to keep to our declared policies of non-alignment, balanced neutrality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Some of our detractors have erroneously stated that with the overthrow of Nkrumah, Ghana would abandon its traditional role in African Affairs, particularly in the anti-colonial struggle. We have, by deeds and words given the lie to this"* (Asante 1997: 36-37).

Indeed, the NLC had many detractors, especially outside Ghana. Although many African leaders had some personal reservations regarding Nkrumah's radical pan-African agenda, the coup did not receive the expected approval from the majority of these African leaders (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1967). Many countries, such as Egypt, Guinea, Tanzania, and Somalia developed a lukewarm attitude to-

ward leaders of the NLC in international gatherings (Asante 1997; Bluwey n.d.). Those states accepted the traditional role that Ghana was playing in African affairs, especially the struggle against colonial rule. Zambia, for instance, recalled its ambassador to Ghana immediately after the military takeover in Ghana to demonstrate its disapproval of the coup. Cuba also had to cut foreign ties with Ghana by closing its diplomatic mission in Accra. The NLC regime, however, enjoyed some subtle endorsement from Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, and Togo for obvious reasons. These countries had strained relations with Nkrumah and his style of leadership (Bretton 1966).

Despite the NLC's resolve to keep to the policies of non-alignment, most of the regime's external policies were western-oriented. There was a subtle approval of the coup by the western world, especially the United States of America and the United Kingdom (Afrifa 1967). It did not come as a surprise to many analysts when a powerful government delegation paid official state visits to France, the US, and the UK to strengthen bilateral relations with, and seek financial support from, those countries. Some of the erudite foreign policy analysts attributed the western connection to the outlook and experiences of the new Ghanaian leaders. According to Bennett Valerie Plave (1975: 133), the leaders of the 1966 revolution were "… conservative, pro-Western, British-trained Ghanaian army and police …." Olajide Aluko (1975) also shared similar sentiments when he postulated that all four police officers on the Council were trained at the Metropolitan College, London, England; and all the four army officers on the Council were trained at different army training colleges in Britain, and Colonel A. A. Afrifa went to Sandhurst. They were therefore anti-communist in outlook while they showed affection towards the British way of life, its legal system, and its democratic ideals.

It is important to note at this point that the National Liberation Council paid little attention to external issues (Asante 1997). To a considerable extent, domestic political pressure created justifiable motivations for this. In other words, the general mood in Ghana before and after the 1966 coup dictated the foreign policy trajectory of the NLC (i.e., a temporal retreat from global affairs). The sentiments across the country were that Nkrumah's administration had concentrated too much on African and international affairs, but paid little attention to Ghana's domestic issues (Bluwey 2002). Others also held a strong conviction that "Nkrumah's violent attacks on the West from 1961 onwards were responsible for the refusal of Western nations to grant long-term loans to Ghana after 1961, and to assist Ghana in securing an international cocoa pact" (Aluko 1975: 60). Thus, at the very dawn of its assumption of office, the NLC regime played on the general mood of the country and restricted its involvement in external matters. For instance, in a radio broadcast to the nation in 1966, General J. A. Ankrah, the Chairman of the NLC stated "… our external relations

shall be guided by our national security, the territorial integrity of all Ghanaians" (Ministry of Information, Ghana 1966: 3). Again, in a meeting with three visiting journalists from Britain, France, and Germany, General Ankrah had reiterated, "the prosperity of Ghanaians is the supreme goal of the foreign policy of the NLC. We shall not deviate from that goal and we shall not compromise over that goal" (Ministry of Information, Ghana 1966: 12). To be charitable to the regime, it is important to acknowledge that the regime's foreign policy trajectory aligned with one of the major theses of foreign policy analysis. The foreign policy of a state is determined, largely, by the interplay between the domestic forces of the state and the changing dynamics of the international environment (Waltz 2001).

The Foreign Policy of the National Redemption Council (NRC)

The government of Prime Minister Kofi Busia was removed from office on 13th January 1972. Ghana came under military rule again for the second time in her 16 years of sovereign nationhood. The coup d'état was led by the acting commander of the Infantry Brigade of the Ghana Army, Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. The officers constituted the National Redemption Council (NRC) and its junta, with Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong as the Chairman and Head of State (Rothchild 1980). In 1976, the military junta was reorganized. A new policy-making organ was created as the Supreme Military Council (Daily Graphic, 12th November 1976). It consisted of all the service commanders of the Armed Forces. Lt. Col. Acheampong was promoted to the rank of General and retained his position as Chairman of the SMC and Head of the State. On 6th July 1978, General Acheampong was ousted in a putsch and put under house arrest (Rothchild 1980). A new Supreme Military Council II was constituted with General Fred W. Akuffo as its Chairman and the new Head of State. As Asante (1997) has indicated, the Supreme Military Council(s) (SMCs) were continuations of the National Liberation Council. Hence, the foreign policy of the Supreme Military Council II naturally adopted the same policy options as the NRC.

Upon assuming office as the Head of State of Ghana, Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong met the press on 17th January 1972. In that press conference, Col. Acheampong laid bare the foreign policy trajectory of the regime:

"*Our foreign policy will, first of all, be based on a vigorous and dynamic African policy. We intend to foster the closest and most cordial relations with all African States. Furthermore, we cannot remain indifferent to the plight of our African brothers still not free and who suffer indignation on the continent of their birth. Accordingly, we shall vigorously support the eradication of the last remnants of colonialism and racial discrimination from the African continent. Our fellow Africans struggling for control of their destiny under the racist regime of South Africa, under the rebel regime of Ian Smith, in Namibia and the Portuguese-held parts of Africa will have our unflinching support"* (Asante 1997: 41).

From a foreign policy perspective, there was a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of the NRC to sound and look like Nkrumah. Acheampong and his regime lent credence to the leading role Ghana was playing at the time to push for the total liberation of the African continent (Ghana 1976). The disastrous political consequences of colonialism were no longer a distant or abstract matter but a grinding reality for every African. The issue of Rhodesia (now the Republic of Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa featured prominently in the initial stages of the NRC foreign policy. The NRC had begun a phantom mobilization of a volunteer brigade, ostensibly, to join the nationalist guerrilla forces in Rhodesia (Bluwey n.d.).

The NRC's foreign policy towards Ghana's neighbours in particular, and Africa in general, received a positive rating from many foreign policy analysts. Though Ghana's relations with Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo, after the coup, were not seriously damaged, the relationship with Nigeria was unsurprisingly exceptional (Aluko 1981). Ghana's relations with Nigeria date back to the pre-colonial era. Thus, before independence, Nigerians had established businesses in Ghana and contributed unmeasurably to the politico-cultural and socio-economic development of Ghana. As of 1931, the largest single group of immigrants in Ghana had come from Nigeria (Yeboah 1986). The economic affluence of Ghana at the time had made the country the "gold coast" for migrants from neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Togo (Honig 2016). Between 1931 and 1963, the population of Nigerian migrants in Ghana increased from 57,400 to 191,802 (Olaosebikan and Ajayi 2014). The net results of these large-scale economic migrants were economic insecurity and youth unemployment with its unintended social vices. The migrants, mostly Nigerians, were accused of posing economic and security threats to Ghana. Therefore, the government instituted policy interventions to control the rising population of aliens in the country. One such policy intervention was the 1969 "Aliens Compliance Order." The order expelled close to 200,000 migrants from Ghana (Peil 1971). Though the policy affected migrants from many countries, such as Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Togo, the Yoruba community in Ghana (mostly from South-Western Nigeria) was the hardest hit. Out of an estimated 191,000 Nigerians in Ghana, the Yoruba constituted about 140,000 at the time (Kobo 2010). Therefore, when the NRC ousted Prime Minister Busia's government, Nigeria was the only West African State that openly rejoiced at the 1972 coup. For instance, Nigeria's most prestigious daily newspaper at the time, The Daily Times, had featured many unprintable comments about the government of the Progress Party (Daily Times 1972). There were clarion calls across Nigeria for the Federal Military regime of Yakubu Gowon to endorse and extend a helping hand to the NRC government.

Ghana, under the NRC, also committed itself to all policy demands of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In an apparent move to cut a niche for itself, the National Redemption Council openly denounced Prime Minister Busia's

proposal to terminate the isolation of apartheid South Africa and to enter into diplomatic negotiations with the regime in South Africa (Rothchild 1980). As I have already discussed in this section, Col. Acheampong, in his maiden foreign policy pronouncement, took a radical and uncompromising stand against the apartheid regime in South Africa and the remaining imperial dominance in Africa. Hence, Ghana was projected as a good African leader with cordial comradeship with fellow African states. In 1973, for instance, Col. Roger Felli, who had just assumed the portfolio for the Foreign Ministry, stated, "Ghana has been welcomed back to her leadership role in Africa. Africa's freedom has always been the central inspiration of Ghana's foreign policy – Ghana without Africa is meaningless and Africa without Ghana is disastrous" (see the West Africa magazine 16th September 1973). Col. Acheampong's government had established a Liberation Information Center in Accra to collaborate on all propaganda activities on the continent. This was meant to strengthen the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa in particular and decolonization in general. The Acheampong regime, unlike the NLC or the Progress Party, provided bilateral assistance to the liberation movements.

The Foreign Policy of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)

A military insurrection on 4th June 1979 removed the Supreme Military Council II from office. A group of young military officers, under the direction of an Air Force Captain, announced themselves as the junta (Feit 1968). That was the insurrection which brought Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings to the Presidency for the first time in the political history of Ghana. This "first coming" of Jerry Rawlings focused exclusively on internal policies. On 4th June 1979, the leader of the junta, Flt. Lt. Rawlings said: *"... we, the young officers of the armed forces and other ranks, rose up in spontaneous mutiny to remove the causes of so much national pollution. Our immediate task was to cleanse the armed forces, which had lost its bearings in the wilderness of indiscipline and unprofessional behaviour. But our fundamental and long-term aim was to launch a revolution which would cleanse the whole nation, turn the hearts and minds of our people against social injustices and ultimately redirect the pattern of our national life..."* (Asante 1997: 43).

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council proclaimed a moral revolution against the Acheampong regimes of 1972 and 1978 and their offspring, the Akuffo regime of 1978/79 (Oquaye 1980). According to the AFRC, these regimes had no ambition for Ghana; and governed without moral principles. There was corruption in government, the military, and civil and public services. Therefore, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings led a small group of officers to stage a mutiny that brought the AFRC to power (Barbara 1982). The mission of the military junta was to rid the system of corruption (with their "house decking" campaign) and return the country to multiparty democracy.

Thus, the regime did not see the need to send emissaries to Ghana's development partners abroad to explain the objectives of the coup. Ghana paid a huge

price for this foreign policy indifference (Rothchild 1980). Nigeria, at the time, was responsible for supplying about 80% of crude oil to Ghana. However, after the coup and the subsequent execution of the former Heads of State of Ghana (General. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong and Lieutenant. General. Frederick W.K. Akuffo), the government of Nigeria cut off the supply of oil to Ghana (Aluko 1981). That resulted in an unprecedented fuel shortage in Ghana. The OAU and the Commonwealth Secretariat also condemned the summary executions and demanded explanations from the AFRC (Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild 1982). However, the military junta did not yield to the pressure emanating from the international community. Perhaps, the only foreign policy move the AFRC made was the decision to attend the Non-Aligned Conference in Cuba. Chairman Rawlings took advantage of the Cuban Conference to explain the aims and aspirations of the AFRC to the Non-Aligned Movement (Asante 1997). That was before the AFRC had surrendered power to President Limann and his PNP Administration on 24th September 1979, just after three and half months at the helm of affairs. The 112 days in office were not all to be seen of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings in the Ghanaian political landscape. After two years of a multiparty democracy under the leadership of Dr. Hilla Limann, Rawlings ousted Limann's government on 31st December 1981, accusing it of economic mismanagement (Jeffries 1982). A Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) was quickly set up to stir the affairs of the new government. I now wish to turn the spotlight on the foreign policy of the PNDC.

The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and the Foreign Policy of Ghana

The economic mismanagement of the previous military regimes between 1972 and 1979 tended to be the bane of the Limann's Administration. The People's National Party (PNP) government inherited a country with stagnated economic growth. However, President Limann's lackadaisical approach to duty and his uninspiring leadership facilitated the passing of the "death verdict" on his administration (Handley and Greg 2001). On 31st December 1981, a coup d'état, led by none other than Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, was proclaimed. Rawlings later announced the establishment of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) with himself as the chairperson of the junta. The PNDC was to become the longest serving military regime in the political history of Ghana – from 1981 to 1992.

The initial stages of the PNDC regime were preoccupied with efforts to stabilize the country and re-engineer economic growth. The government of President Limann was under enormous difficulties and increasing public pressure to deal with the shortage of essential commodities. Ghana's foreign reserves, which stood at 33 million dollars, were at an all-time low (Owusu 2016). A few months before the December 1981 coup, a renowned Ghanaian lawyer, Mr. William Eugene Ofori-Attah (Paa Willie), made the following observations about Ghana:

"*Chaos threatens the thin social fabric of Ghana. Organised labour is in revolt against the government and its private-sector employers. Students in secondary schools and teacher training colleges are in revolt against their teachers, principals, and headmasters. The police are fighting soldiers; prisoners are on strike against prison warders. Farmers are threatening to withhold food from the market, and every Ghanaian seems to be angry with every other Ghanaian"* (Paa Willie, February 1981). That was a true reflection of the economic conditions of Ghana on the eve of the removal of the PNP's administration from power. Thus, these domestic difficulties dictated the initial foreign policy trajectory of the PNDC government. However, the retired Flight Lieutenant knew that before he could do anything meaningful on the foreign front, he needed to capture the support of the disillusioned public. In his maiden public statement, Chairman Rawlings proclaimed:

"*Fellow Ghanaians, as you will notice, we are not playing the national anthem. In other words, this is not a coup. I ask for nothing less than a REVOLUTION-something that will transform the social and economic order of this country. Fellow citizens, it is now left to you to decide how this country is going to go from today. We are asking for nothing more than popular democracy. In other words, the people should be part of the decision-making process of this country"* (Daily Graphic, January 1982).

Unlike previous military governments, and in line with its proclaimed popular democracy and public participation in decision-making, the PNDC regime established political structures across the nation to facilitate mass participation in the political process. Therefore, both internal and external policies became the amalgamation of diffused public interests. However, foreign policy was still the prerogative of the Chairman and official members of the PNDC. A few months after the assumption of power, the regime triggered an aggressive foreign policy agenda to garner financial support from the international community to deal with the domestic economic problems (Shillington 1992).

The regime's first foreign trips consisted of delegations to Cuba, Libya, Eastern Europe, and Nicaragua to solicit financial support and foster closer diplomatic relations (Asante 1997). As we can see from the initial countries visited by the PNDC delegations, the regime was initially inclined to the socialist ideology and did not seem to have any well-defined international economic policy. However, as time went on and the reality began to hit hard, the regime invited the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to the negotiation table as the country wanted to embark on a structural adjustment program to resuscitate the dying economy (Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild 1982; Kraus 1991). At that time, sustained structural adjustment and economic liberalization were seen as being inextricably linked to democratization (Adejumobi 1996; Boafo-Arthur 1999). Therefore, many governments in the developing world, with the support of the IMF and the World Bank, adopted adjustment policies before political liberaliza-

tions. The PNDC regime, thus, established economic diplomatic relations with the two Bretton Woods institutions and many other International Financial Institutions that were willing to come on board to help Ghana out of her economic woes. Undoubtedly, a good relationship with the IMF and the World Bank naturally boosts a nation's international reputation. As a result, with time, Ghana's economic relations with the West and other developed economies attracted positive reviews.

During the PNDC's administration, Ghana established diplomatic missions in Bulgaria and the Republic of Cuba and signed cultural and economic agreements with Sofia and Havana (Asante 1997). It is also on record that the PNDC government sent some of its loyal revolutionary cadres and newly recruited foreign-service personnel to Bulgaria, Cuba, Libya, and the USSR for training (Bluwey n.d.). In addition, there was an agreement between the PNDC government and the Cuban state for Ghanaian students to study diverse fields of medicine in Cuba. The government replicated that agreement in Moscow during the Soviet Union era giving Ghanaian students the rare opportunity to study in Russia. These were the heydays of the Soviet regime when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would offer African students full scholarships to study in different fields.

Ghana's diplomatic relations with Libya under Rawlings were at an all-time high. As indicated above, the PNDC restored bilateral and diplomatic ties with the North African country immediately after it took charge of the governance of the country (Shillington 1992). Under President Limann, diplomatic relations with Libya had been everything but affable. It is worth recalling that after the execution of the former heads of state and several military generals by the PNDC regime, the Nigerian government suspended the supply of petroleum products to Ghana. Rawlings had to rely on Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's Libya for oil (Asante 1997). However, it would seem that because of Rawlings' outstanding relationship with the Libyan leader, the PNDC's diplomatic relations with Ghana's neighbours and the Western World were uncordial. The return of Jerry Rawlings to the political scene did not come as a piece of pleasant news to the leaders of the West African sub-region. On one hand, after taking the leadership role of the country, President Hilla Limann established outstanding diplomatic ties with the governments of Ghana's neighbouring countries and helped enhance political and socio-economic cooperation in the sub-region (Bluwey 2002). On the other hand, almost all the leaders in the West African sub-region looked at Rawlings with subtle disdain and apprehension because of his relations with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. When Rawlings first emerged on the political scene, he developed a personal relationship with Muammar Gaddafi because the two leaders shared the same ideology – the Socialist Ideology. Besides, some African governments had accused Gaddafi of unchecked subversive conduct across West Africa and elsewhere on the Continent. He took his anti-imperialist ideology or agenda around Africa and offered military and financial

support to numerous militant and rebel groups to ferment political instabilities in some parts of Africa (St John 1983). President Limann had shared these common sentiments regarding the conduct of Gaddafi with other governments of West Africa.

Rawlings' posture did not help matters either. His initial foreign policy decision toward neighbouring countries was seen as non-collaborative. Instead of the usual courtesy visits by new leaders to the neighbouring states to announce their presents and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations, Rawlings had ordered the closure of Ghana's land border and banned night flights into Ghana (Bluwey 2002). These actions by the PNDC brought Ghana into hostile confrontations with her immediate neighbours. It degenerated into allegations and counter-allegations of subversions and incitements of the masses against sitting governments (West Africa, 1982). The PNDC responded to the reactions of these foreign leaders with insults and threats as if the regime was not aware that those affected by Ghana's decisions were sovereign nations who also had the interests of their countries to protect. It is worth noting at this point that Ghana, like every sovereign nation, had the national interests to protect within the comity of nations in the West African sub-region. However, achieving set targets of national interests requires the collaboration and cooperation of neighbouring or other states in the region. For instance, since the 1970s, a joint cement project Ghana had with Togo and the Ivory Coast was doing very well for all the countries. However, due to the closure of the borders, the project and other informal cross-border commodity transactions with Nigeria, Togo, and Cote D'Ivoire had to be truncated. As these acrimonious relations were festering among these neighbouring West African states, subversive elements within the countries seized the opportunity to cause cross-border crimes. The PNDC regime then accused Cote D'Ivoire of granting asylum to Ghanaian political dissidents and allowing its territory to be used as a "launch pad" by Ghanaian rebels.

Conclusion

There is little convincing information about decision-making within military regimes in Africa, especially in the subfield of foreign policy analysis. The discussions in this paper reveal some captivating vignettes of military foreign relations in which form, rather than substance, dominates the decision-making processes. Of course, this cannot be seen as a general pattern of military diplomacy across the African Continent and beyond. However, what can be generalized at least, based on the literature review, is that foreign policy decision-making, whether under military or civilian regimes, is highly centralized in many countries on the African Continent.

Looking at the Ghanaian situation, the substantive diplomatic outcome we can derive from the military regimes under review is that those regimes failed to demonstrate a clear-cut commitment to the foreign policy trajectory of Ghana in either international politics or inter-African relations. In other words, they did not seem to follow the strict foreign policy position of the country since indepen-

dence. Personal interest, rather than national ideological stance, determined the diplomatic trajectory of the military regimes. For instance, during the Cold War, the foreign policy stance of Ghana (under Kwame Nkrumah) was that of non-alignment. However, despite the NLC's resolve to stick to the non-alignment policy position, most of the regime's external policies were western-oriented. Whereas the NLC found comfort in aligning its foreign policy to the interests of powerful western states, the AFRC/PNDC had established a cordial relationship with other developing nations in Latin America. By the end of 1982, a year into the return of Rawlings to the political scene, it was clear that the PNDC regime had found solace with countries such as Cuba, and Nicaragua, among others. All these countries were ideologically sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Thus, with his anti-western dispositions, President Rawlings was ideologically skewed toward the Eastern bloc and was believed to be highly attracted to Marxist-Leninist policies.

What runs through the military regimes in this write-up is that they all adopted suppressive and uncompromising measures to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Contrary to the rhetoric of "house cleaning" or "fighting corruption" in the immediate aftermath of a coup, these military leaders are far from being selfless nation builders and lack the moral high ground to pursue a successful foreign policy that would inure to the interests of the nation they claimed to love. That brings the discussion back to the hypothetical questions posed earlier: (1) "Can a military-based government cope more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered?" (2) "Are some of these problems susceptible to solutions by means congenial to the governing military junta in ways that escaped the preceding civilian regime?" The answer to these two questions cannot be in the affirmative – at least from the perspective of Ghana's foreign policy during the military regimes under review. Military regimes, given their nature and character, lack the constitutional legitimacy; and the political will to create and promote the conducive environment and diplomatic circumstances that are required to foster good foreign relations and friendly neighbourliness. At best, military governments represent a roadblock to understanding the complexities of the international system. At worst, they are predisposed to violent conduct and are more likely than their civilian counterparts to take an uncompromising stance in diplomatic negotiations.

The forgone analyses provide reasonable grounds to infer that the military regimes in Ghana seemed to have set aside the most orthodox diplomatic caution and behaved in ways that frittered away the last drops of goodwill and respect that the country had left within the comity of nations. The poor quality of foreign policy in those regimes was also a reflection of the lack of intellectual sophistication in governments and the breakdown of the moral fibre of Ghanaian society. For a young middle-income nation such as Ghana, what is needed is a foreign policy that is in line with the country's aspirations and national interests.

Such national interests need to be anchored in democratic development and the socio-economic well-being of the citizens. It should not be driven by any imperialists' political orientation that is meant to gratify internal or external reference groups.

References

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univ. Press

Adejumobi, S. (1996). The Structural Adjustment Programme and Democratic Transition in Africa. Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 29(4): 416-433.

Afrifa, A. A. (1967). The Ghana Coup: 24 February 1966. London: Frank Cass, p. 133.

Aguero, F. (1998). Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America. Mershon International Studies Review 42(2): 383–404.

Aluko, O. (1981). Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy. London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 130-131.

Aluko, O. (1975). After Nkrumah: Continuity and Change in Ghana's Foreign Policy. Issue: A Journal of Opinion 5(1): 55–62.

Anber, P. (1967). Modernisation and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos. The Journal of Modern African Studies 5(2): 163–79.

Anene, J. N. (2000). Military Elites and Democratization: Ghana and Nigeria. Journal of Political & Military Sociology 28(2): 230–45.

Anene, J. N. (1997). Military Administrative Behavior and Democratization: Civilian Cabinet Appointments in Military Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Public Policy 17(1): 63–80.

Ankrah, J. A. (1966). Broadcast to the nations. Thursday, 24 February 1966 (Mimeographed, Balme Library, University of Ghana, Legon.

Ankrah, J. A. (1966). "Press Conference." Thursday, 1 March 1966. Accra: Ministry of Information 1966.

Apter, D. E. (1972). Ghana in Transition: A Retrospective View. In Ghana in Transition, Princeton University Press, pp. 362–414.

Arceneaux, C. (2001). Military Regimes and Transition Control in the Southern Cone and Brazil: Implications for Democratization in Latin America. Journal of Political and Military Sociology 29(2): 259–74.

Asante, K. B. (1997). Foreign policy making in Ghana: options for the 21st

century. Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Ghana Office.

Atomic Heritage Foundation. (August 24, 2018). Proxy Wars During the Cold War: Africa. Cold War History. Available at: https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/proxy-wars-during-cold-war-africa.

Barbara, Okeke E. 1982. 4 June: A Revolution Betrayed. Enugu: Ikengo Publishers.

Berger, M. T. (2003). Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945-1975. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34(3): 421–48.

Bennett, V. P. (1975). Epilogue: Malcontents in Uniform-The 1972 Coup D'Etat. Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, pp. 307-308.

Bennett, V. P. (1975). Soviet bloc-Ghanaian Relations since the Downfall of Nkrumah. In Warren Weinstein (ed.) Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa. London Praeger, pp. 785-133.

Bienen, H. (1980). African Militaries as Foreign Policy Actors. International Security 5(2): 168-186.

Bienen, H. (1978). Military Rule and Political Process: Nigerian Examples. Comparative Politics 10(2): 205-225.

Bienen, H. (1975). Transition from Military Rule: The Case of Western State Nigeria. Armed Forces & Society 1(3): 328-343.

Bindra, S. S. (2019). Analysing Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Perspective. World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 23(3): 26–43.

Bluwey, G. K. (2002). Foreign Policy and Decision-Making Process in Ghana: Issues, Ground Rules and Actors in LECIA, Ghana's Foreign Policy Option, Conference Proceedings, Legon, (11): 43-54.

Bluwey, G. K. (1998). State Organizations in the Transition to Constitutional Democracy. In Ninsin, K. A. (ed.), Ghana: Transition to Democracy. Accra: Freedom Publications, pp. 105-111.

Bluwey, G. K. (n.d.). The Foreign Policies of the Succession of Governments from 1996 to 2000. Unpublished Manuscript.

Boafo-Arthur, K. (1999). Ghana: Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics of Continuity. African Studies Review 42(2): 41-72.

Bretton, H. L. (1966). The Rise and Fall of Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa. London: Pall Mall Press.

Brotz, H. and Everett, W. (1946). Characteristics of Military Society. American Journal of Sociology 51(5): 371–75.

Byrd, D. and Komanduri, M. S. (2013). Foreign Policy Accomplishments in Obama Era. Race, Gender & Class 20(3/4): 147–65.

Chazan, N. (1982). Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana. Political Science Quarterly 97(3): 461–85.

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship data Set. Available at: https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DDpage.html.

Claude, W. E. (1978). Long term consequences of military rule: Breakdown and extrication. Journal of Strategic Studies 1(2): 139-153.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2007). Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d'Etats. Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2005). Coup traps: why does Africa have so many coups d'état? Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University.

Cowan, G. L. (1966). The Military and African Politics. International Journal 21(3): 289- 297.

Craig, J. J. and Kposowa, A. J. (1990). Explaining Military Coups D'État: Black Africa, 1957-1984. American Sociological Review 55(6): 861–75.

Daily Graphic, 12 November 1976, p. 1

Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times, issues 2 and 3, January 1982.

Daily Times (of Nigeria), Issues of 15, 16, and 17 January 1972.

Daron, A., Davide, T. and Andrea, V. (2010). A Theory of Military Dictatorships. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(1): 1–42.

Davidonis, A. C. (1944). Some Problems of Military Government. The American Political Science Review 38(3): 460-474.

Decalo, S. (1973). Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies 11(1): 105–27.

DeRouen, K. and Uk, H. (2001). Modernization and the Military in Latin America. British Journal of Political Science 31(3): 475–96.

Dix, R. H. (1994). Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America. Armed Forces & Society 20(3): 439–56.

Dommen, E. and Alfred, M. (1988). The Military Burden in Developing Countries. The Journal of Modern African Studies 26(3): 377–401.

Eldem, T. (2020). Military Coups and Military Disengagement. In Farazmand, Ali. (ed.) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_4171-2

Ensalaco, M. (1995). Military Prerogatives and the Stalemate of Chilean Civil-Military Relations. Armed Forces & Society 21(2): 255–70.

Eyadat, Zaid and Mohammad, M. (2010). Culture and Foreign Policy: American Foreign Policy Post 9/11. Il Politico 75, 2(224): 163–77.

Falode, A. (2019). The Military and Nation-Building in Nigeria: The General Ibrahim Babangida Regime, 1985-1993. International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences (85): 37-48.

Feit, E. (1968). Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria. World Politics 20(2): 179–93.

Feitlowitz, M. (2001). 'We Know Nothing. It Isn't Taught': Secret Histories of Argentina's Dirty War. Agni, (54): 225–333.

Fjelde, H. (2010). Generals, dictators, and kings. Conflict, Management, Peace Sci. 27(3):195–218.

Frantz, E. and Ezrow, N. (2011). The Politics of Dictatorship: Institutions and Outcomes in Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Gandhi, J. (2015). Elections and Political Regimes. Government and Opposition 50(3): 446–68.

Gebe, B. Y. (2008). Ghana's Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D'itat. The Journal of Pan African Studies 2(3): 160-186.

Geddes, B., Wright, J. G. and Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: a new data set. Perspect. Polit. 12.

Gershoni, Y. (1996). The Changing Pattern of Military Takeovers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Armed Forces & Society 23(2): 235–48.

Ghana, Fourth Year in Office of Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong (Accra, 1976), p. 268;

Gomez, F. J. (2001). Military Rule in Argentina, 1976-1983: Suppressing the Peronists. Unpublished MA Dissertation, the University of Texas at Austin.

Grare, F. (2002). Foreign Policy Options. Economic and Political Weekly 37(44/45): 4568–71.