

## **Effectiveness of Regional Organisations in Solving Security Problems of North Africa: The Libyan Civil War (2011-2022)**

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**Abstract:** When the international competition areas and formations of power projections are examined, it is seen that the North Africa region is at the center of international conflicts and is being redesigned by the effects of global rivalry. Besides, the civil wars that swept through and shattered the Middle East and North African countries such as Libya have demonstrated the reality that Arab regimes and autocratic governments with very weak institutional systems are vulnerable to sudden popular events. The country has slid into serious political instability and civil turmoil ever since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. After the beginning of the multi-sided civil war in 2014, which is also called the second Libyan civil war, Libya has been divided into two parts as the eastern and western governments. It is also seen that the African Union and the Arab League don't have enough capacity to respond effectively to the crises that occurred in their area of responsibility. In this study, the current situation has been revealed by examining how effective the regional organizations are in solving the security problems of Libya. In addition to this, an evaluation is also presented about the necessity of viable strategies for developing their conflict management capacities.

**Keywords:** African Union, Arab League, North Africa, The Libyan Civil War, Security Problems, Regional Organisations.

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## **Kuzey Afrika'nın Güvenlik Sorunlarının Çözümünde Bölgesel Örgütlerin Etkinliği: Libya İç Savaşı (2011-2022)**

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**Özet:** Uluslararası rekabet alanları ve güç kapasitesinin oluşumları incelendiğinde, Kuzey Afrika bölgesinin uluslararası çatışmaların merkezinde yer aldığı ve küresel rekabetin etkileriyle yeniden dizayn edildiği görülmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Libya gibi Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika ülkelerini kasıp kavuran iç savaşlar, Arap rejimlerinin ve kurumsal sistemleri çok zayıf olan otokratik hükümetlerin ani gelişen halk hareketlerine karşı savunmasız olduğu gerçeğini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Ülke, Kaddafi rejiminin çöküşünden bu yana ciddi bir siyasi istikrarsızlığa ve sivil kargaşaya sürüklenmiştir. 2014 yılında ikinci Libya iç savaşı olarak da adlandırılan çok taraflı iç savaşın başlamasının ardından Libya, doğu ve batı hükümetleri olarak ikiye bölünmüştür. Buna ek olarak, Afrika Birliği ve Arap Birliği'nin kendi sorumluluk alanlarında meydana gelen krizlere etkin bir şekilde yanıt verecek kapasiteye sahip olmadıkları görülmektedir. Bu çalışmada bölgesel örgütlerin Libya'nın güvenlik sorunlarının çözümünde ne kadar etkili oldukları hususu incelenerek mevcut durum ortaya konmuştur. Bununla birlikte, çatışma yönetimi kapasitelerini geliştirmek için uygulanabilir stratejilerin gerekliliği hakkında bir değerlendirme de sunulmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Afrika Birliği, Arap Ligi, Kuzey Afrika, Libya İç Savaşı, Güvenlik Sorunları, Bölgesel Organizasyonlar.

## **Introduction**

New global dynamics and the latest changes in security perception reveal that collective and more effective approaches are needed to ensure regional security. A new understanding of global rivalry has emerged in global politics, which is not only the result of the confrontation of states against each other, but also the asymmetrical conflict models such as states against non-state actors, or conflicts between different groups within the state emerge as proxy wars as in the case of the Libyan crisis. Moreover, these multidimensional new security challenges also cause deep economic and social changes and transformations in the regions. Within this framework, the process called the “Arab Spring”, which started in 2011 and soon affected many Middle Eastern and North African countries can be submitted as a tangible example of this conceptualization.

These developments proved that the large-scale security problems of Libya cannot be resolved within the national borders. In this context, international and regional organizations such as the African Union and Arab League have also sought to reposition themselves against developing and expanding security problems within their area of responsibility. However, considering the current regional dynamics and the stage in which the Libyan crisis has evolved with the effects of the ongoing international rivalry, it is observed that the African Union (AU) and the Arab League could not ensure the desired security in their respective regions. The main purpose of this study is to examine, the efficiency of the regional organizations in solving security problems in the North Africa region within the context of the Libyan crisis. Accordingly, the answers to questions of why they failed to fulfill their responsibilities and could not provide the desired security conditions in their respective regions will be presented.

### **The Importance of Regional Organisations for Regional Security and Order**

The most common and oldest mechanism to deal with security problems in the international arena is to form alliances between states or organizations. Especially states with insufficient resources or unsuitable geographies need alliances to overcome the security problems they face around their immediate surroundings. Geographically determined borders form the basis of the security policies of states as an object of their sovereignty. However, it is also a reality that the current borders, which have been determined mostly as a result of wars throughout history, do not always coincide with the physical, cultural and economical geographies of the countries, and eventually, new areas of geopolitical disputes and conflicts have emerged. In this manner, to overcome these challenges and to prevent potential conflict areas, countries need alliances and to create their security policies in harmony with these alliances. It is an indisputable fact that regional organizations

both in Africa and the Middle East region have also been established in accordance with this purpose.

Considering the present conditions of the African countries, and the ongoing wars in many of the Middle East countries such as Yemen, Syria, and Libya, regional organizations are seen as a way of salvation that brings them together, preserves their state characteristics, ensures their security, and integrates them into the international system at least in a theoretical way. However, the difficulty that the regional organizations, especially the AU and the Arab League are facing today is not only internal security problems but also the fact that international competition finding ground and exacerbating existing problems in both Africa and also the Middle East region. It can be argued that the current conflicts and related security problems stand out as the biggest obstacle to the development of both regions collectively. Within this direction, the role of collective security formations such as the AU and the Arab League are also becoming extremely important for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

On the other hand, as it derives from the social structure of both the African continent and also the Middle East region, the regional organizations aspire to be a regional cooperation ground for member states and pursue a more constructive policy before military intervention. Accordingly, the bilateral cooperation they have developed with other regional and international organizations such as the UN, NATO, and EU can be considered as an indicator of these efforts to increase their institutional problem-solving capacity. The best examples in this regard are the peacekeeping missions the AU carried out in coordination with the UN in the 2004 Darfur, 2011 Sudan, and Somalia crises under the name of the African Union Sudanese military mission AMIS and Somalia military mission AMISOM. These missions have special importance in terms of being the first crises in which regional organizations assigned military missions in cooperation with the international community (G. O'Neil and Cassis, 2005). The other specific example is the support of the Arab League to the UN Security Council decision regarding the no-fly zone over Libya to facilitate international intervention and NATO operations during the Libyan crisis.

### **The Evolution of the Libyan Crisis and the Involvement of Regional Organizations**

Although the Arab Spring, started as peaceful street demonstrations, it turned out from mass public protests to bloody civil wars in a very short period of time. In this respect, undoubtedly, Libya was also one of the deeply affected countries in this series of events that ravaged almost the entire region. Following the spread of the protests all over the country, which was already formed from the union of tribes and where the modern state order did not work properly, Libya entered a

rapid disintegration process and turned into a battleground of local groups fighting for their own interests. After all, the Libyan leader Gaddafi's choice of using disproportionate force to regain control in the country both paved the way for the NATO military intervention and also accelerated the collapse of the whole country. At the same time, the inclusion of the opposition forces controlled by General Haftar in the Libyan equation as of 2014, and their fight against the National Transitional Government, which is recognized as the official representative by the United Nations Security Council, has also caused the ongoing crisis to deepen and become multidimensional. As Fraihat (2016, p.24) asserts that the state of war between those who carried out the Revolution (Jaysh al-Thuwar) and the supporters of the old regime (Azlam) also reflects the political division and sharp polarization reciprocally between the state and Libyan society. As a result, since Libya is located in North Africa and is a member of the AU at the same time, the African Union has been involved in the solution process of the Libyan crisis as a regional organization and has taken mediating initiatives accordingly.

As part of these mediation initiatives that began with the February 2011 movement, the African Union sent a high-level delegation, including President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, President Amadou Toumani Toure of Mali, President Mohamed Waled Abdulaziz of Mauritania and President Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo, to present a roadmap for the resolution of the Libyan crisis. The roadmap included a ceasefire, the start of negotiations on a transitional process without any reference to Gaddafi's departure, an immediate cessation of hostilities, and the cooperation of Libyan authorities in delivering humanitarian aid.

Likewise, as an Arab country, Libya was a member of the Arab League as well. The Arab League also intervened in the Libyan crisis and made diplomatic attempts in the same direction. In this context, the Arab League's decision to declare a "no-fly zone in Libya" and its application to the United Nations Security Council paved the way for intervention in Libya. In this framework, as regional organizations, how successful and effective both the AU and Arab League were in the Libyan crisis and also the effects of their initiatives on international relations based on the region's own dynamics were analyzed comparatively.

### **The African Union and its Effectiveness during the Libya Crisis**

As an umbrella organization for the African continent, the African Union aspires to maintain its foundational purposes such as strengthening solidarity and cooperation among Africans as well as defending the territorial integrity of African countries. However, recent developments in North Africa and especially in the Libyan crisis show that as a regional organization, it has not been able to develop an effective initiative to integrate with the international community and provide a problem-solving capacity. In light of the above mentioned information, it can

be considered that asking the question of why the AU was incapable and unsuccessful in crisis management situations, especially in North Africa, and lastly in the Libyan crisis since 2011, will contribute to the analysis made on this issue. When the ongoing developments are analyzed in chronological order, it is seen that the AU lags behind the international community for some reasons, and has difficulty in producing an effective solution for the crisis management of the Libyan civil war.

The demonstrations, which started in Benghazi on February 15, 2011, soon spread to other cities and turned into a nationwide uprising against the Qaddafi regime. As a result, the regime resorted to mercilessly violent precautions by trying to control the countrywide demonstrations. In the meantime, it was claimed by Human Rights Watch and others that by 20 February at least 233 people were killed during the protests. (World Report, 2011). Besides, the International Criminal Court (ICC) had also estimated that 500 to 700 civilians were killed in February. (Simon and Farquhar, 2011).

By the end of February 22, 2011, it was clear that the regime was willing to use all kinds of violence in order to stay in power. As a response to these grave circumstances and human rights violations, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an immediate cessation from Libyan authorities. On the same day, the Arab League banned Libya from attending meetings because of its use of excessive force against civilians. The AU has also followed the same path and called for an immediate end to repression and violence in Libya. (Adams, 2012). AU's intervention in the Libyan crisis continued with the subsequent 22 February PSC Communique, which was issued for declaring the decision to "urgently dispatch a mission of Council to Libya to assess the situation on the ground." (African Union Peace and Security Council Communique, 2011, p.1). However, contrary to the officially published statement, a fact-finding mission was not dispatched to Libya urgently. Delays in the issuance of visas by the Libyan authorities and lack of mutual coordination have prevented the Mission's immediate deployment to the region. Undoubtedly, it is a fact that this was the first major mistake, which paved the way for the institutional marginalization of the AU by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the Libyan crisis. In other words, it may have made it infeasible for the UNSC to ignore the AU if the fact-finding mission had been established on the ground immediately.

The second important initiative of the AU on the Libyan crisis was the 10 March PSC Communique to restore the Libyan situation. In this context, a roadmap was declared in this declaration by pledging the following objectives;

- First, the protection of civilians and cessation of hostilities,
- Second, humanitarian assistance to affected populations,
- Third, the initiation of political dialogue between the Libyan parties to reach an agreement for ending the crisis,

- Fourth, the establishment and management of an inclusive transitional period,
- Fifth is the adoption and implementation of political reforms to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people. (AU Communique, 2011, p.2).

Accordingly, the PSC established an AU high-level Ad Hoc Committee for Libya comprising five heads of state and government together with the chairperson of the commission to assess the situation on the ground. (AU, 2011). However, the previous efforts of the AU, and also the Ad Hoc Committee were ignored by the international community by activating NATO military intervention force under the name of protection of civilians and preventing human rights violations in Libya. For this purpose, on 26 February (just 10 days after the start of the crisis in Libya), acting under Chapter VII, the UN SC passed the resolution 1970, which effectively seized the initiative from the AU, and precluded it from being the premier organization to deal with the Libyan crisis. (Kasaija, 2013). Right after that the resolution 1973 was declared by UNSC to activate the NATO military intervention force and impose a no-fly zone over Libya on the grounds that maintaining international peace and security. Admittedly, this decision was in conformity with the longstanding call by the Arab League and also the votes of the two heavyweight countries of Africa (Nigeria and South Africa) in favor of the resolution. (Kasaija, 2013). The rapid action of the UN and NATO on the Libyan crisis is the most important reason for the African Union to stay in the background.

In addition, the weak institutional structure of the AU has caused failure in the solution of the regional problems, in particular the Libyan crisis. According to the 2011 Africa Briefing report, there were significant discrepancies between the AU's written capacity on paper and the manifestation of crisis resolution capability in real-case scenarios. (Afd, 2011). Although the AU has the authority for military intervention and has formed five brigade-size military intervention units as a standby force within its member states, the desired result has not been achieved due to technical inadequacies, economic reasons, and slowness in decision-making mechanisms.

Besides, it could not give up its non-interference policy and respect for the independence of its member states because of the social, political, and cultural reasons specific to the African continent. Gaddafi's influence within the organization can be shown as another primary reason why the AU has chosen the non-interference and mediation method as the institutional policy in the first place. However, the reluctance of the Government of National Accord for a solution plan, which includes Gaddafi's presence caused to fail the AU's mediation policy. Thus, the problem remained unresolved, causing the current situation to worsen in Libya. In other words, the most important reason why the AU could not take effective initiative militarily and politically in the Libyan crisis was Gaddafi's (hence Libya's) position as the founding member and one of the largest economic donors of the organization. In this regard, the key influential donors can be stated as Algeria,

Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa and each of whom was contributing 75 percent of the then AU budget (International Colloquium Report, 2012). Considering the fact that the AU is highly dependent on the international community economically and politically, and its own resources are insufficient to provide independent initiatives, it has become difficult for the AU to make decisions in more than one problematic area simultaneously, because of the ongoing problems such as civil wars, famine, migration, and terrorism in many of the countries of Africa.

Another fact that answers the question of why the AU was unsuccessful in the Libyan crisis is that many of the African countries, including Libya, were members of the Arab League as well. This situation gave the opportunity to Arab League to take the initiative and intervene in the Libyan crisis without any impediment. As a result, even though it was not related to the security of the North Africa region geographically, and also the membership of Libya was suspended on 22 February 2011 following the outbreak of the Libyan Civil War, the Arab League took part in the process actively. Accordingly, influential actors with interests in the region, such as European countries and the United States, preferred to establish a dialogue with the Arab League instead of the AU as the interlocutor in the resolution of the crisis to preserve their current gains in the region. Within the scope of this analysis, it is seen that as a leading international organization, the UN also addressed the Arab League as the legitimate interlocutor throughout the Libyan crisis by pacifying the AU diplomatically and taking the decision of an immediate military operation under the name of humanitarian intervention in the region. One of the most important reasons why the UNSC decided in this way was the passive approach of the AU as a regional organization in the Libyan crisis. In this regard, it can be argued that the AU's consideration of the Libyan crisis as part of the Arab Spring rather than an African issue and the lack of interplay on important regional issues accordingly have weakened its credibility in the international arena. Subsequently, all the international initiatives including NATO military intervention were taken by the leading actors to shape the ongoing process in this direction.

Consequently, it can be argued that although organizational structures are constituted with the support of the international community to ensure the integrity and security of their respective regions, the events such as ethnic conflicts, migrations, terrorism, and lastly the Arab Spring offered the opposite projections that these structures would fail eventually. Within this framework, it is seen that as one of the most important of these structures, the African Union has also become incapable of establishing security in the African region. Accordingly, as Turan (2010) states that the issues such as lack of communication and coordination between member states, the inadequacy of their economic and technical capacity, and insufficient consensus and reconciliation on vital issues, appear to be the biggest obstacles for the AU in the near future.



## **The Arab League and its Effectiveness during the Libya Crisis**

Emphasizing the importance of regionalization and regional organizations, Fawcett (2004, p.434) argues that for today's modern world system, the success or failure of regionalism on the security level has increasingly come to be measured with reference to the ability of regional groups to act as security providers inside and outside their respective areas, to contribute to what has been called an 'evolving architecture of regionalization'. For an extended definition, he emphasizes the fact that some states and cultures may reflect different forms and compositions of regionalization, as in the case of Islamic countries. According to him, in comparison with the level of powerful formations and partnerships of the international institutions such as the UN, NATO, and the EU, regionalism remains a work that is still in progress in other parts of the world as in the case of Arab League in the MENA region. In light of this analysis, it is seen that the Arab League is far from its goals of increasing solidarity and cooperation among its member states and enhancing regional security as specified in its foundational principles. This problematique of the Arab League became more evident and conspicuous, especially in the events of the Arab Spring, which affected many countries in the region and overthrew the regimes one after another. In this context, the Libyan crisis is becoming a tangible example to draw attention to the ineffectiveness of the Arab League as a regional organization.

The forty-two years of Muammar Gaddafi's regime collapsed in Libya under the influence of the third front of Arab revolts after Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. Afterward, by spreading its effects in the entire Middle East region, and also North Africa the Arab Spring had a wide impact on global politics as well. Within this framework, it is seen that there is no effective initiative of the Arab League as a regional organization for the solution of these large-scale social movements in the region and the restoration of collective social peace and tranquility. Instead, following the popular uprisings, it has sought to adapt to the current conditions and has developed policies guided by influential regional countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Undoubtedly, the Arab League is the oldest international organization of which all Arab states in the region are members. On the other hand, despite its extensive history, the organization has not been able to achieve concrete success in terms of institutional functionality and coherent action compared to the examples in the West. From this point of view, the Arab League has not been able to have an influence in international politics and has often failed to adopt a common position on regional crises. As a result, the Union's policies in the Libyan crisis have also developed in this direction, and Libya was disintegrated due to civil war and remains the center of regional and international struggle. The country has slid into serious political instability and civil turmoil ever since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. After the start of the multi-sided

civil war which was also called the second Libyan civil war, Libya has been divided into two parts as the eastern and western governments since 2014 (Stephen, 2014). In this regard, the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is accepted as the legitimate authority by the UN and the international community, controls the west of the country, including the capital Tripoli. On the other side, the Libyan National Army (LNA), which is led by the opposition groups and mixed with the local militia and legionnaire military forces, controls the oil-rich eastern part of the country. As for constitutional legitimacy, the existence of the GNA was unanimously accepted by the UN SC and was recognized as the sole legitimate Government of Libya in 2015. In its official declaration, the UN SC stressed that ‘‘All member states were requested to work with Libyan authorities and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to develop a ‘‘co-ordinated package’’ of support to build Government capacity’’ (United Nations Security Council/12185, 2015).

Paradoxically, instead of contributing to the healthy completion of the transition process and the establishment of social peace in the region, some regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, and international actors such as France and Russia ignored the UN Security Council decision by giving their support to opposition groups. Thus, the fuses of the civil war that would continue for years between the Libyan GNA forces and Opposition groups and tear the entire country apart had been ignited. Ironically, it is also seen that as a regional organization, which should contribute to the establishment of security and peace in accordance with its legislation, the Arab League took the opposite direction and supported the opposition groups by taking sides with Saudi Arabia and the UAE throughout this process. The concerns of the member countries within the League about being influenced by the wave of change and popular movements in the region can be shown as one of the most important reasons behind this policy change. In addition, the fact that the Arab League has been moving on the axis of these countries, including Egypt since the Al-Sisi era, is due to their influence in the League and that decisions are taken in line with their interests. Admittedly, the League banned Libya from attending its meetings on 22 February 2011 and also called for a ‘‘no-fly zone’’ over Libya on 12 March in line with the international reactions against the grave human rights violations committed by Libyan authorities at the beginning. But, as the former Egyptian diplomat Ambassador Hasan Haridi stated that the Arab League was also one of the victims of the Arab Spring eventually (Abdulkhakim, 2020). Besides, it is seen that there are also sharp disagreements among the member states on regional security issues. For instance, during the Arab Spring, in March 2011, the Arab League institutionally supported the decision of the UNSC (No Fly Zone over Libya) in Libyan airspace. However, this stance has left Libya open to NATO military air operations. As a result, some of the member states such as Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania did not approve of this decision and stood against it (Kasaija, 2013).

The other reason for the failure of the Arab League as a regional organization is the clarification of the “Penalty” against its member states for failing to comply with the decisions taken by the union itself. According to the foundational charter of the union, it is declared that “decisions reached by a majority shall bind only those (states) that accept them.” (Charter of the League, 1945). As a result, it is seen that giving priority to respecting the sovereignty and interests of the member states in the Founding Charter of the League comes to the fore as one of the biggest obstacles against collective action institutionally. In addition, the Arab League is exposed to criticism locally as well, for the reasons such as its indifference against the developments that took place in the region, its weak administration, and the inability of its member states to act in unity. In this context, it can be considered that the Arab Spring offered an opportunity to improve the current situation of the League for itself. In this sense, its support for the no-fly zone implementation, and the suspension of the membership of Libya can be considered as positive developments that occurred in this direction. However, considering its non-objective political stance within the process, instead of being a regional organization working for the integration and stability of the region, it is seen that the Arab League produces policies like an intergovernmental forum that serves the interests of some member states, which are hegemonic in the Arab world, and takes decisions accordingly. Today, the Libyan civil war has turned into a global crisis with the extensive attacks of the opposition leader Haftar against the National Transitional Government, which was recognized by the UN SC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan state. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt openly give their support to opposition leader Haftar in the Libyan civil war, contrary to the 2015, UN SC resolution (Ataman and Karaduman, 2020). In such a situation, which has become controversial in terms of international legislation, the silence of the Arab League as a regional organization confirms the justification of this argument.

Last but not least, one of the biggest reasons why the Arab League was unsuccessful and ineffective in the Libyan crisis is the result of the country’s demographic and social structure. In this context, it should be noted that 85 percent of the Arab population in Libya is tribal-centered and that their political relations are generally based on these social and cultural ties. Accordingly, it can be argued that tribal ties play a primary role in the distribution of political power as well. In this sense, when the roots of the crisis are examined, it is seen that the basis of the demonstrations in Libya is not a movement of the masses who want to establish a democratic system, rather than the goal and policy of tribes that have been systematically oppressed and excluded for years and aspire to establish their own power in the country. (Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2022). The prominent ones of these tribes, which are the basic components of the social structure in Libya can be listed as; Warfalla, Gaddadfa, Magarha, Tarhuna, Zuwayyah, Tuareg, Berbers, Banu Sulaym, Ubeyde, Braada, El Avakir., Bara’sa and the other western

and eastern tribes. In general, Libya has up to 140 tribes, but only 30 have any particular significance in the societal order. (Reuters, 2011). In light of the information presented above, it can be argued that taking into account the cooperation over intertribal blood feuds and power struggles will also provide positive projections for the establishment of Libya's order in the long run. In addition, considering that the majority of the member states of the Arab League are also tribal states and have different cultural values and interests in the region, it does not seem possible for the League to develop an effective initiative politically at the point of making a joint decision to restore the security in Libya again. In addition, this situation can also be presented as another explanation of how Arab nationalism, which awoke after the Second World War, remained as a failed Project because of these tribal and sectarian disagreements in Arab society.

Consequently, while defining the region in the literature of international relations, it is seen that the interconnection of more than one state and their movements as a union have been emphasized by IR scholars. In this regard, Joseph Nye (1968) defines the region as a group of states linked together by both a geographical relationship and a degree of mutual interdependence. Hereby, the importance of the concept of regionalism emerges, in which states and non-state actors cooperate with each other on a particular region and coordinate a common strategy accordingly. For this purpose, as Fawcett (2004) states that the aim of regionalism is to pursue and promote common goals in one or more issue areas. However, considering its current position, one of the most important reasons why the Arab League failed in the Libyan crisis and could not contribute to regional security is that it is far from this conceptualization as a regional organization.

## **Conclusion**

As generally accepted in the literature, the security concept has evolved from national to collective security understanding with the increase of interdependencies and uncertainties in the globalized world order. This newly formed understanding provides the states with the opportunity to find more effective solutions to their security problems through the involvement of regional and international organizations. Within this framework, it is not possible to exclude the regional organizations of both Africa and the Middle East and also their institutional structures from this conceptualization. In addition to this, although organizational structures are established to ensure the integrity and security of both regions, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, terrorism, ideological rivalry, famine, and irregular migrations present unfavorable projections about whether regional organizations will be successful in the near future. In the final analysis, since they are in a very important position for the integration of their respective regions with the rest of the world, it is important to note that both the African Union and also the Arab League should

develop their problem-solving capacity, strengthen the necessary institutional structure in conflict resolution, and gather power centers of the international system in their own structure. As the regional institutions that carry the future of their communities on their shoulders, the biggest obstacle in front of them seems to be the issue of ensuring security and a peaceful environment not only in Libya but also throughout their respective regions. Also, it is seen that as a country that has a strategic location in the North Africa region, Libya will maintain its geopolitical importance and remain one of the centers of global competition, unless there is a radical change in the international conditions and the positioning of the regional organizations as the entities responsible for the regional security. In other words, the geopolitics of Libya, which constitutes a strategic bridge connecting the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, seems to be equally important for global and regional powers seeking to realize their own agendas by taking advantage of the power vacuum that emerged in the Arab Spring conjuncture.

In addition to the aforementioned points, in today's world, where the speed and dimension of change have reached an unprecedented acceleration in human history, many threats and processes such as epidemics, economic crises, terrorism, civil wars, and migrations deeply affect the North African region and its war-torn countries such as Libya. Moreover, differentiations in threat perceptions in the international context due to these new challenges also lead to changes in the behavior of societies and international actors. In this context, regional organizations should be one of the most concrete examples of this change in the new international conjuncture. Accordingly, they must undergo a process of transformation and become responsive to increasing security needs and changes in their respective regions.

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