

REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE EU-AFRICA RELATIONSHIP*

Bahar Dilşa KAVALA** 

Abstract

Since the first moves of decolonization, African countries have not overcome the negative effects of colonization and are still facing underdevelopment, poverty gap, and low share in world trade. The interregional relationship established with the European countries after independence does not seem to fulfill the development promises the European Economic Community made at the beginning. With many regional economic communities and conflicting trade rules, regional integration in Africa is so complex that it is described as a spaghetti bowl, in line with Bhagwati's definition. In addition, all the delays and discussions surrounding the Economic Partnership Agreements and the uncertainties regarding the future of the relations experienced before the signing of the post-Cotonou Agreement in April 2021, have also strained the interregional relationship with the EU. The article aims to discuss Africa's development and regional integration problems by blending the Moral Economy approach and the Historical Discourse Analysis method. This article discusses the current development and regional integration problems in Africa from a moral economy approach, combining it with Discourse Historical Analysis. It considers regional integration as one of the norms that the moral economy of the EU-Africa interregional relationship has been based on and explores its construction within this moral economy from a historical perspective. The main concern of this article is to investigate the construction of the regional integration norm in parallel to the development co-operation discourse and to explain its role in obscuring the impact of EU development co-operation on the current development and regional integration process in Africa, as well as the problems in the EU-Africa interregional relationship itself.

Keywords: *Regional Integration, Moral Economy, Development Co-operation, ACP Group, Africa.*

* This article is based on the author's PhD thesis titled "The Moral Economy of the EU-Africa Relations: The Case of Regional Integration in Africa", which is to be defended at the Institute of European Studies, Marmara University, in 2022.

** Senior PhD Student, Marmara University, Institute of European Studies, Department of European Studies and International Relations, e-mail: bahardilsa@gmail.com, ORCID ID: 0000-0001-7291-4256.

AB-AFRİKA İLİŞKİSİNİN MORAL EKONOMİSİ İŞİĞINDA AFRİKA'DA BÖLGESEL BÜTÜNLEŞME

Öz

İlk Dekolonizasyon hareketlerinden bu yana Afrika ülkeleri kolonileşmenin olumsuz etkilerini aşamamıştır ve hala azgelişmişlik, yoksulluk açığı ve dünya ticaretinden düşük pay alma gibi sorunlarla boğuşmaktadır. Bağımsızlık sonrası Avrupa ülkeleri ile kurulan bölgeler arası ilişki, Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun başlangıçta sunduğu kalkınma vaatlerini yerine getirmiş gibi görünmemektedir. Afrika'da bölgesel bütünleşme, çok sayıda bölgesel ekonomik topluluğun varlığı ve çatışan ticaret kuralları ile öyle karmaşık bir görüntü sergilemektedir ki Bhagwati'nin tanımı doğrultusunda spagetti kâsesi olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra Ekonomik Ortaklık Anlaşmaları'nı saran tüm gecikme ve tartışmalar ile Nisan 2021'de Cotonou Sonrası Anlaşma'nın imzalanmasına kadar yaşanan ilişkilerin geleceğine dair belirsizlikler, AB ile bölgelerarası ilişkiyi de sıkıntıya sokmuştur. Bu makale, Afrika'daki kalkınma ve bölgesel bütünleşme sorunlarını Ahlaki Ekonomi yaklaşımı ve Tarihsel Söylem Analizi yöntemini harmanlayarak tartışmaktadır. Makale, bölgesel bütünleşmeyi AB-Afrika bölgelerarası ilişkisinin ahlaki ekonomisinin dayandığı temel normlardan biri olarak kabul etmekte ve tarihsel bir perspektiften bu normun nasıl inşa edildiğini araştırmaktadır. Bu makalenin temel meselesi, bölgesel bütünleşme normunun kalkınma iş birliği söylemine paralel inşa sürecini araştırarak bu inşanın AB kalkınma iş birliğinin Afrika'daki kalkınma ve bölgesel bütünleşme süreci ile AB-Afrika bölgelerarası ilişkilerinin bizzat kendisine olan etkisini perdelemekteki rolünü ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Bölgesel Bütünleşme, Moral Ekonomi, Kalkınma İş Birliği, Afrika Karayip ve Pasifik Ülkeleri Grubu, Afrika.*

Introduction

Despite all the bilateral and multilateral aid and development programs, and the “Africa rising”¹ narrative of the 2000s, African countries are still coping with the development problems after half a decade since their independence. Among thirty-two nations which are identified as having low human development, twenty-seven are from Africa², which is also among the most unequal continent in the world, following Latin America (Ravallion and Chen,

¹ The title of the conference organized in Mozambique by the IMF in 2014 (Ross, 2014).

² United Nations (UN) Human Development Index.

2012). The poverty gap has widened compared to other developing regions such as South Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific, and the economic growth experienced by some African countries in recent years has not been enough to overcome income deprivation which exceeds other developing regions (ADB, 2015: 28). Trade levels among eight regional economic communities in Africa are still low compared to other regional communities³ (UNCTAD, 2019: 21), as well as its share in the world trade as a continent⁴ (World Bank, 2019).

The neoliberal turn in the European integration process in the 1970s has translated into the neoliberal stance in the relationship of the European Union (EU)⁵ with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). Regional co-operation and integration have entered into the text of the Lomé II Agreement, and it has been supported to achieve African countries' economic growth and integration with world trade, as well as their development. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, which were considered as the building blocks of the African Economic Community established in 1991 (Organization of African Unity, 1991) have been both financially and discursively supported by the EU. Yet, there are fourteen RECs in Africa⁶ at different integration stages, imposing overlapping memberships and conflicting trade rules on African countries. The regional integration endeavours are so far from achieving preferential trade integration in the way to economic growth and development that the current complex overlapping regional arrangements are described as a spaghetti bowl, which was first used by Bhagwati (1995: 4) to describe the proliferation of PTAs. Not even the conclusion of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement in March 2018, in keeping with the Agenda 2063 of the African Union, aiming to achieve a single market with free movement of goods, services, investments, and people, is free from

³ The share of intraregional trade among eight regional economic communities in Africa is 14.8% and the share of intraregional exports in total exports is 16.6% in 2017, as against 68.1% in Europe, 59.4% in Asia and 55% in America (UNCTAD, 2019).

⁴ In 2018, the share of Africa in world imports is 2.86, and its share in world export is 2.94% (World Bank, 2019).

⁵ To avoid any confusion, the term "European Union (EU)" is used throughout this text also to mean European Economic Community (EEC) or European Community/Communities (EC). The terms EEC and EC are only mentioned when there is utmost necessity.

⁶ Eight RECs recognized officially by AU: Community of Sahel-Saharan States, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, East African Community, Economic Community of Central African States, Economic Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Southern Africa Development Community, Arab Maghreb Union (African Union, n/a). There are also six more RECs in the continent with different sizes and importance: Central African Economic and Monetary Community, Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, Indian Ocean Commission, Mano River Union, Southern African Customs Union, West African Economic and Monetary Union (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, n/a).

the shadow of obstacles for successful implementation such as political hesitations, the concerns about the potential revenue losses, delays in ratification and ongoing border closures.

Not only the intra-African integration but also African countries' integration with European markets have also met with obstacles in the Cotonou era⁷. The negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) intended by the Cotonou Agreement, with externally created sub-regional groupings, have been criticized by several analysts. Hurt (2003: 173) claimed that this caused tension among African countries by complicating their co-operation because of already overlapping regional arrangements. Borrmann, Busse and Neuhaus (2005: 171) pointed to the weakening of the negotiation power of ACP countries. Dur and De Bievre (2007: 90) argued that this meant dividing ACP countries and undermining ACP as a region (cf., Slocum-Bradley, 2007: 644). This, also led to resistance among some African countries to the conclusion of the agreements based on their impact on their development and regional integration and delayed the whole negotiation process.⁸

The Economic Partnership Agreements' impact on the development of ACP countries, including trade, revenue, budget, and welfare effects has been widely studied by scholars from different perspectives.⁹ The resistance from African countries to the EPAs has also been studied in relation to the EU's development co-operation discourse. Hurt, Lee and Lorenz-Carl (2013) explored the normative basis of the African countries' negotiation strategy during the EPA

⁷ Note that the Cotonou Agreement will remain in force until 30 November 2021, if the post-Cotonou Agreement does not enter into force before that date. (European Commission, 2020).

⁸ As of April 2021, among the five sub-Saharan African sub-regional negotiation groups, there is no single group whose members have all signed and ratified the EPAs. 30 out of 49 sub-Saharan African countries have signed the EPA, 15 out of 30 have ratified. Interim EPAs are being implemented with 14 ratifying countries from four negotiation regions: Cameroun, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Comoros, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini (European Commission, n/a). Those countries that have not ratified an EPA with the EU continue to benefit from trade preferences either under GSP or under Everything But Arms (EBA). This situation further complicates the signature and ratification of the EPAs with the rest of the sub-Saharan countries. While Gabon and Equatorial Guinea as upper-middle income countries, do not benefit from any preferential treatment under GSP or EBA. Kenya cannot apply an interim EPA with the EU since the EPA must be signed and ratified by all EAC members beforehand (for further information see. Mold, 2018).

⁹ Borrmann, Grossmann and Koopmann, 2006; Busse and Großmann, 2007; Busse, Borrmann, Großmann, 2004; Bussolo, 1999; Fontagné, Laborde and Mitaritonna, 2011; Gavin, 2007; Jallab et al., 2005; Keck and Piermartini, 2008; McKay et al., 2000; Milner, Morrissey and McKay, 2005; Morrissey and Zgou, 2007.

process. They revealed that African countries had recourse to the European “development partnership” discourse to mimetically challenge the EU to fulfil its promises (Hurt, Lee and Lorenz-Carl, 2013). Langan (2016) has also analyzed the moral dimensions of the economic relationship between the EU and Africa to explain the ongoing development problems. He explored the linkage between the “pro-poor” moral norms associated with the EU aid concessions in Africa with the free-market policies and discursive legitimizations used to maintain the asymmetric power relations between the African countries and the EU (Langan, 2016).

Similar to Langan (2016), this article discusses the role of discourse in Africa’s current regional integration problems within the dynamics of the moral economy of its relationship with the EU. Different from Langan (2016), it aims to reveal the reproduction of development problems in Africa by specifically focusing on regional integration as a constructed and compromised norm of this relationship. When it comes to the promotion of regional integration in Africa in its relationship with the EU, scholars have either focused on the internal dynamics and problems in Africa (Mistry, 2000; Clapham, 2001; Asante, 2016; Akokpari, 2008) or the EU’s material or ideational diffusion of regional integration through external incentives such as positive conditionality or capacity-building (Söderbaum, 2007: 199; Börzel and Risse, 2009) or socialization of local actors and the emulation of the EU ideas and norms by local actors due to their superiority or appropriateness (Lenz, 2013: 216). Diffusion theory does not say much about the content of the regional integration itself intended for Africa and cannot explain the gap between the intention of achieving regional integration in Africa and the failure to do so, except for limitations to the EU’s ideational diffusions (Lenz, 2013: 218). Unlike the diffusion theory, the moral economy approach helps explore regional integration as a norm constructed, compromised and re-compromised, within the EU-Africa relationship, which helps to reveal the power relations behind this construction and explain the gap between the intention and outcome.

This article takes into consideration the suggestion of Langan (2016) to use critical discourse analysis to overcome the shortcomings of the moral economy approach to explain how the norms are embedded in the economic structures, disseminated, and reconfigured against the institutional changes. In this regard, the article uses the Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA) to explore the construction of the regional integration norm within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship, its interplay with the current regional integration efforts and problems in Africa, and to explain the tensions and obstructions in the contractual relationship between the EU and Africa.

The main argument of this article is that the EU’s construction of the regional integration norm in parallel with the development cooperation

discourse disguises the negative impact of EU policies on the development and regional integration processes in Africa and on the EU-Africa interregional relations itself. The time frame of the article is March 1957 (the signing of the Rome Treaty)-December 2020 (when the parties reached a political deal on the post-Cotonou Agreement¹⁰). The article first briefly explains the theoretical framework and the method used in the study. Then it reveals the results of the discourse historical analysis applied to the selected data which identified three discourse topics related to the construction of the regional integration norm within the EU-Africa moral economy as follows: First, because of the Special Relationship, it is Europe's responsibility/duty to help Africa region, which is economically inferior and in need of Europe's help. The second discourse identified is that the policies aiming for the development of Africa should be coordinated and implemented on a regional level. And the third discourse topic is that the Economic Partnership Agreements will help to rationalize the investment environment and regional integration in Africa.

Combining Moral Economy Approach and the Discourse Historical Analysis

The moral economy approach offers a useful framework for assessing the dialectical relationship between the dominant interests of power and the normative ideas and the embedding of norms in the economic structures. The roots of the concept could be found in the old debate between society and markets, beginning with Aristotle and proceeding with the Scottish Enlightenment or Marx's critique of political economy (cf. Sayer, 2000, 2004). The discussion was on whether economics, with its own rules, is autonomous from society or whether any moral function pertains thereto or subordinated to it with a moral function (Sayer, 2000).

Thompson (1971) first used the term "moral economy" to analyze the rioters' actions during the food price protests in the 18th century. According to him, moral judgments about obligations and rights were at the core of the riots. The rioters were protesting the illegitimate practices in milling, baking, and marketing, in the belief that they were defending their traditional rights under threat (Thompson, 1971: 78). The use of the concept has continued with the application to the study of colonialism and anti-capitalist protest movements in the 1970s (Scott, 1976). In the 2000s, the term was reintroduced in political science and sociology studies dealing with the rights and responsibilities of citizens concerning public institutions and policies (Mettler and Soss, 2004;

¹⁰ The EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) reached a political deal on a new agreement to succeed the Cotonou Agreement on 3 December 2020 (European Commission, 2020). The post-Cotonou agreement was initialled on 15 April 2021 (European Council/Council of the European Union, 2021).

Svallfors, 2006; Mau, 2004). The approach was also used in numerous case studies, such as Egyptian labour's collective action (Posusney, 1993), anti-state labour protests in Algeria (Alexander, 2002), economic practices in Kyrgyzstan (Sanghera and Satybaldieva, 2009), or food systems in Nigeria (Lyon and Porter, 2009). The moral economy concept has further evolved recently even with application to the Occupy Wall Street movement (Tabb, 2014).

Sayer (2000; 2004; 2007; 2015) explained the moral economy approach as one that tries to fill the critical standpoint gap in political economy¹¹. All economic practices and institutions including production, consumption, and exchange are constituted by a compromise over the controversies about the rights and responsibilities of the parties. After being settled, these normative disputes are forgotten and do not require any further legitimations. Political economy analyzes the behaviours of the actors resulting from these norms once established either by power or argument. The moral economy approach offers to discover and question the legitimations behind the norms, by analyzing the moral content and justifications of the economic activities and their ethical implications for the beneficiaries.

This article combines the moral economy approach with DHA to reveal the construction of the norms of the moral economy between the EU and Africa and their evolution in a historical perspective and the interplay between this moral construction and the current development and regional integration problems in Africa. Although the DHA is an approach within social constructivism, which is interested in the social construction of discourse through linguistic and other semiotic practices, it also deals with the "real" consequences of these discourses within social structures through conciliation and reproduction of ideologies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016). This makes it compatible with the social constructivist stance of the moral economy approach in unravelling the ideological struggle behind the discourse on regional integration in Africa and calling for transformation towards fewer developmental problems.

The data analyzed in this article are selected based on representativity and typicality criteria. The period covers the signature of the Treaty of Rome and the ongoing negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements. For the DHA applied here, 224 issues of the Courier Magazine¹² were scrutinized. In addition to that, 75 speeches by the officials of the EU and official EU

¹¹ Note that the following information given in this paragraph is a summary of Sayer's (2000; 2004; 2007; 2015) work.

¹² The Courier Magazine was first published by the DG Overseas Development of the EEC in 1963, whose readers were the peoples of the associated overseas countries, especially those who once had education or internship in European countries and were supposed to be the future decision and policymakers.

documents and agreement texts were analyzed. Authors/speakers, audience, and occasion of the texts, as well as their topics have been the criteria for typicality. The texts whose authors/speakers are high-level representatives of the European institutions in the EU-Africa relationship such as the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, or the ACP/EU Council of Ministers and which were produced on the occasion of high-level visits or gatherings during the milestones of the bilateral relationship such as the negotiation of conclusion of interregional agreements or bilateral economic summits were selected for analysis. The documents or reports issued by European institutions about the bilateral economic relationship or regional integration in Africa were also considered typical for the purpose of this study.

After identifying the content of a specific discourse, the DHA analyses five groups of discursive strategies, being nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization and intensification or mitigation. This article employs the DHA to reveal the discursive strategies in relation to the construction of the regional integration norm within the EU-Africa moral economy. It investigates the discursive construction and qualification of social actors of the EU-Africa moral economy and the regional integration phenomenon, as well as the argumentation strategies for validity claims used to establish and maintain power in the relationship to construct the regional integration norm in specific ways. The excerpts included in the paper are selected from those which typically display the binary constructions of the EU and Africa (such as the EU as the helper and Africa as in need of help), and the most typical *topoi* used for the construction of unequal power relationship and regional integration norm.

As a result, three discourse topics related to the construction of the regional integration norm within the EU-Africa moral economy were identified as follows:

-Because of the Special Relationship, it is Europe's responsibility/duty to help the Africa region, which is economically inferior and in need of Europe's help.

-Policies aiming for the development of Africa should be coordinated and implemented on a regional level.

-Economic Partnership Agreements will help to rationalize the investment environment and regional integration in Africa.

Those discourse topics are explained below in relation to the broader historical context and how they helped to construct a specific regional integration norm within the EU-Africa relationship. The typical examples of the discursive strategies adopted in the sample data to achieve this construction are also given in addition to the examination of the linguistic means.

Africa in Need of Europe's Help

The discourse historical analysis applied to the sample texts displayed the discursive construction of Africa as a “region” that is linked to Europe with a “special relationship” following the independence of former colonies. This article claims that “region-building” has been one of the main norms of the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. It served the management of the relations with the former colonies constructed as a region and the continuation of a hegemonic relationship between Europe and Africa.

This construction has its roots in the Eurafrika ideology of the interwar period. The European unification project, which was associated with the pamphlet “Paneuropa” published by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1923, was closely linked with African colonization. Africa’s joint exploitation was so crucial that even Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that “the African problem thus brings us back to Europe. Africa cannot be made available if Europe does not unite” (as cited in Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 449). This linkage between Africa and unified Europe was translated into a new geopolitical bloc, called Eurafrika, and was serving to continue the European presence in Africa, keeping the economic and strategic gains in face of increasing autonomy and self-government demands from the colonies (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011: 458).

The African countries were first described as the “non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom” in the Treaty of Rome (Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 1957, Article 131), AASM (the Associated African States and Madagascar) in the Yaoundé Convention (1963 and 1969) and then called as the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) as a geographic region during the Lomé period. As a continuation of the *mission civilisatrice* discourse, Africa has been predicated as an “economically inferior” entity, through the binary oppositions between Europe and Africa, such as “rich/privileged vs. poor”, “developed vs. underdeveloped/developing”, “have states vs. have-nots”, “strong vs. weak”. The excerpt below taken from the speech of Director-General of the European Economic Community, Directorate General of Overseas Countries and Territories, Helmut Allardt, given on the occasion of Africa Day in 1959 is a typical example of the description of the “Africans” in “need for European help”:

If this Association is to lead to anything really sensible, then we must see in it much more than can be reflected in a recital of technical provisions – we must see in it something which I should like to describe in a French term as a new form of the “*présence européenne*” in Africa. As I see it, this term has nothing, really nothing whatever, in common with the old ideas of colonialism, and is not intended to make that out-moded concept

respectable by internationalizing it. It simply gives expression to something that the Africans themselves have stressed often enough: the need for European help in Africa by lending technical, financial and moral support in order thus to come to fruitful co-operation. (European Economic Community Commission, 1959: 26)

In the excerpt above, Africans' need for Europe's help is justified and intensified by a fallacious argument to people (*argumentum ad populum*), claiming that it has been stressed "often enough" by Africans themselves. This dichotomic construction of Africa and Europe served to maintain the power relationship between the weaker party in need of help and the stronger one. This relationship has been qualified as "special", whose specialty was justified by this dichotomic construction and the *topos* of history. This special relationship implied the responsibility of Europe towards African countries, which was translated into European development aid policy, as the continuation of the power relationship of the *mission civilisatrice* period.

Being more fortunate than others, we are aware that we bear greater responsibilities. These, to be sure, extend to all the developing peoples and, although we have endeavoured to take this into account in our initiatives within the major international organizations and the very structure of our two Yaoundé association conventions, we none the less feel that we have special responsibilities towards the African and Malagasy peoples. The ties and the memories which bind us to them, over and above political links that are now no more and definitely belong to the past, have created between us a special attachment which we still feel. This being so, we have been happy to create with them – quite apart from bilateral aid schemes, which are still worth while and whose concrete results are to be seen everywhere in Africa and here in Yaoundé too – an association of a Community nature marking the solidarity which Europe as a whole, with its increased resources, feels towards this great continent. (Commission of the European Communities, 1969: 2-3)

This excerpt taken from the address of the President of the Commission of the European Communities, Jean Rey, during the signing of the second Yaoundé Convention in 1969 is the typical example of the construction of Europe, as a homogenous entity by the use of deictic pronouns "we" and "us", who is tied to African and Malagasy peoples with "ties and memories". The *topos* of history which draw on the colonial past of some of the European Community members are used to establish the truth of the claim that there exists a special tie between Africa and Europe, which brings a special responsibility of Europe to help Africa, which is also named as "solidarity". This solidarity "binding Europe and the overseas countries" was also endorsed in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome and explicitly linked with the "desire to ensure the development of their prosperity" (Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 1957, Preamble, para. 7).

The desire to support the development of former colonies in the name of “solidarity” has shaped Europe’s development co-operation with Africa as a “region”. The “disunited Africa” after the independence was called to unite, to maintain their integration established during the colonization period, to become a partner “on the same footing” with the “united Europe”, which was in a superior position.

My second idea affects you, because you are the only ones capable of providing us with one of the essential conditions for the establishment of co-operation between partners on the same footing, if not between equals. At the moment, there is too great a discrepancy between united Europe and disunited Africa. Now that the states of Africa have their political independence, they must join forces and work for unity in order to ensure their economic independence. (European Economic Community Commission, 1963:9)

The excerpt above, taken from an address by M. Heinrich Hendus, the Director-General for Overseas Development, displays the use of the qualification “disunited Africa” as a claim of truth regarding Africa’s economic inferiority and dependence on Europe, without mentioning the structural causes for the continuation of this economic dependency. This manifests the use of the discourse related to Africa’s construction as a “region” as a condition to the continuation of the “special relationship” and the “solidarity” with African countries. Africa’s inferior construction as a region in need of Europe’s help has become one of the main norms in negotiation with which the moral economy of the EU-Africa was established. It helped the EU’s superior self-positioning in the relationship to impose particular policies upon African countries.

Policies Coordinated and Implemented on a Regional Level

Following the independence of former colonies in Africa, the region-building norm has been both the motive and the tool of imposing different European external policies. The analysis of the sample texts indicates the use of words “regional” “programming”, “coordination”, “co-operation” and “integration” to shape the development efforts of the African countries in line with this norm.

The development co-operation based upon “solidarity” was first used to advocate the policy of import substitution industrialization for the development of African countries. Although the method for import substitution industrialization is the production of foreign industrial products locally by subsidizing vital industries, under a state-led planning economy, African countries were directed towards consolidation of markets at the regional level. The following excerpt is taken from the address of Henri Rochereau, the Member of the Commission of the European Economic Community in

Tananarive, in 1969 is a typical text manifesting the discursive strategies used to promote the regional co-operation for the sake of industrial development:

A first fundamental obstacle [to industrialization] - Mr. Dewulf insisted on this - is constituted by the narrowness of the markets. Indeed, in the [Associated African and Malagasy States - AAMS] the national framework, simply, cannot provide a sufficient and sound basis for industrialization on a larger scale. It is true that a certain number of industrial projects can be carried out, under economic conditions, depending on the national market alone. However, this number will necessarily be limited and we can affirm that by following this path, industrialization will not go very far: it will stop at the latest when the first stage of industrialization, which I call a "simple" stage, is completed, then it will be a question of moving on to more demanding industries from the technical point of view and, consequently, more expensive, for which the national market will rarely constitute a sufficient outlet. And even in the case where an industrial project is at the limit feasible on the national level, its profitability will generally be greater if it is designed, from the outset, according to a plurinational market thus meeting the imperatives of scale with regard to manufacturing resulting from technological progress. Under these conditions, the leaders of the AAMS are faced with a capital choice: to push for concerted industrialization at the regional level.¹³ (Rochereau, 1969: 10-11)

The argument on the stages of industrialization is not based on scientific facts but rather on the opinion of Rochereau who says, "which I call a 'simple' stage". Positioning himself as an implied authority, the speaker uses the most common argumentative fallacy, *ad verecundiam fallacy* (argument from authority), encountered in the sample texts, promoting the best development policies for African countries. This brings us to the contradiction between this legitimation and the outcome, which was the ongoing underdevelopment of African countries despite all the support for import substitution industrialization at the regional level.

The continuation of development problems resulted in discussions on the efficiency of development co-operation in the 1980s. In parallel to the neoliberal turn in the European integration process, the import substitution industrialization policies yielded market-driven liberalization via structural adjustment programs. While the region-building in Africa has been a norm in the moral economy of Europe and Africa interregional relations, manifested by support to regional co-operation in the policy implementation, the analysis of the sample data from the 1980s displayed the introduction of the "regional integration" phrase in the texts in line with this shift towards structural

¹³ This excerpt is translated from French by the author.

adjustment discourse. Regional integration discourse has been used in connection with implementing structural adjustment policies. The excerpt from the Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission below exemplifies the interdiscursive linkage between the regional integration and structural adjustment, which was advocating for the harmonization of trade policies and investment incentives at the regional level:

This analysis has shown that economic integration and structural adjustment policies are closely linked. Thus, while interaction between them may create a momentum which encourages integration, it can also hamper it. It is advisable to create a synergy between these policies which favours integration. The first step towards convergence is to harmonise macroeconomic and sectoral policies at regional level in order to minimise spillover effects that are damaging to domestic policies (and minimise the transfer of the costs of adjustment to neighbouring countries) and ensure that adjustment and integration policies are mutually reinforcing, though without allowing the pace to be dictated by the slowest reformer. (Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission, 1993: 69)

Both the regional integration and the structural adjustment discourses were legitimized by the objectives of development and integration into the world economy. And the regional integration was deemed as a first stage for integrating into the world economy through structural reforms (Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission, 1993: 70). The language used in the moral economy which implies a close interdiscursivity with the development discourse has obscured the discussions about the impact of neoliberal economic policies on developing countries.

It has been claimed that the EU's promoting and diffusing its own regional integration model has been a foreign policy objective, motivated by the desire for self-reproduction and legitimizing its role in international affairs (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 22; Haastrup, 2013: 786). Although regional integration has been both discursively and financially supported in Africa, the model intended for Africa was different from the EU's own integration model. The analysis of the sample texts reveals a distinction made between the types of regionalization, as the excerpt from the speech of Edgar Pisani, Member of the Commission responsible for development, in 1983, during the opening of the meeting of the Sahel Club exhibits below:

[...]when we talk about regionalization, I think we have to know that this word covers two absolutely different realities. There are regionalizations whose ambition is political, aiming to constitute polyvalent and omnivalent political structures among the States which are gathered in a region of entities of the European Economic Community type. And then there is a regional approach which is an approach to problems that are

dealt with as such in their geographical dimension.¹⁴ (European Communities, 1983: 4)

Based on this distinction between European community type regionalization, which means an entity with omnipotent political structures, and problem-oriented, geography-based regionalization, this article claims that it was the functional co-operation between African countries, based on geography which was supported by the EU in Africa. The regionalization for Africa suggested the co-operation between African countries in certain problematized and securitized areas such as migration, environment, conflict, or policy areas serving to achieve liberalization through market integration for achieving integration of African economies to world markets in general and European markets in particular. The moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship has supported this type of regionalization in Africa which resulted in the rise of the number of regional organizations in Africa, having different objectives and functions and competing for Europe's financial support. This increase in the number of organizations led to concerns and discourse about the efficiency of development aid in the nineties and the need for rationalization of regionalization in Africa. The excerpt from the European Parliament demonstrates the discursive selection of certain organizations based on subjective criteria such as "the purpose of the paper" or "the most important ones":

As the number of organizations is so great that it poses problems, even for experts, only the most important can be considered here [...] Efforts were made to select the 'most important' organizations from among the vast number. The criterion for the importance of the organizations was how well known they were. (European Parliament, 1996: 7-9)

The same type of organizations increasingly found a place in EU documents and others were eliminated. Differentiating between regional organizations and channelling support to specific types of organizations, large, multi-purpose, and thus, looser co-operation arrangements, with a certain degree of transfer of sovereignty, aiming to achieve scale economies, played a role in the current outlook of the complex regional organizations map in Africa, and regional integration problems, with overlapping memberships and complicated trade transactions. While the EU's development policy was legitimated by the discourse on supporting regional integration in Africa, the outcome has not proved this motive. Neither the development nor regional integration level in African countries has not reached this objective. Instead of ensuring regional integration in Africa, the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship served for the integration of Africa with the European markets.

¹⁴ This excerpt is translated from French by the author.

Economic Partnership Agreements to Rationalize the Investment Environment and Regional Integration in Africa

In the aftermath of the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, one might see the discursive change in the definition of the relationship between the EU and Africa, from the “donor-recipient” to “contractual”, from “special relationship based on aid” to “strategic partnership in trade and investments”, as it is exemplified by the following sample text, taken from the speech of Poul Nielson, European Commissioner for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, at the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement Signing Ceremony: “We are moving beyond the donor/beneficiary relationship towards a contractual partnership” (Nielson, 2000). This change in the nomination of the relationship went parallel with the change in the description of Africa from a “region in need of Europe’s help” to “rising” and “owner of its own challenges” in the moral economy.

The introduction of reciprocity in trade preferences and new issues, such as investment codes, competition policies, environment, and standards were the essence of this discursive shift in the definition of the relationship. The *topos* of external constraint and challenge, which was the WTO compliance has been used in the argumentation schemes to justify the change. Liberalizing trade regimes and securing investment environments were offered as the way to integrate African economies into world markets as a solution to their development problems. The excerpt below taken from a message of Edgar Pisani, Commissioner for Development demonstrates the change in the discourse from stimulating industrialization in ACP via development aid to stimulating and securing European private investments as an objective of European development policy:

Official development aid, to which the Community brings its contribution, is not the whole story. One of its major functions is to attract and support private initiatives, and in this regard the new Convention maintains its innovative character by seeking to stimulate the European private sector and to get it involved more deeply in ACP economies. It hopes to do this by stressing the need to protect European investments and by defining clearly the framework of a more active involvement of the private sector in areas of mutual interest, for example, fishing, maritime transport, mining, energy and industry. (Pisani, 1985: 15)

Improving investment environments in ACP countries to increase their global competitiveness was supposed to be achieved through regional arrangements. The EU’s help through Economic Partnership Agreements was offered as the best way to achieve this as shown in the excerpt from the Open

Letter to Anti-Poverty Campaigners from EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson and EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel below:

No question in Europe's development and trade policy is more pressing than how we can use trade to help African, Caribbean and Pacific countries build stronger economies that can contribute to poverty reduction and break their dependence on trade preferences and basic commodity trade. The key is to give greater confidence and more opportunities to local businesses, attract new investment and build strong regional markets. These will in turn strengthen their capacity to compete in global markets. The Economic Partnership Agreements that the EU is currently negotiating with the ACP regions are designed to help do all these things. They will take a trading relationship based on dependency and turn it into one based on economic diversification and growing economies. (European Commission, 2007)

The blocking in the negotiations for the introduction of these wider issues into the multilateral trading system and the financial constraints on the development aid urged the EU to impose the negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreements to ACP countries, to accelerate their integration into the European markets. The negotiations were forced to be conducted with ACP sub-regions, which were artificially established and different than the existing regional economic communities in Africa. Differentiating ACP countries based on their level of development served to justify the introduction of non-reciprocal preferences and the establishment of these artificial sub-regions to negotiate separate trade arrangements with ACP countries.

The sample text below from the speech by Peter Mandelson, European Commissioner for Trade at the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in 2005, in Bamako demonstrates typically the discursive construction of the negotiating sub-regions as distinct and homogenous entities, which did not correspond to the existing regional entities, using argumentation based on a faulty generalization:

Tariff liberalisation on the ACP side will be progressive, and we are prepared to take a *very* pragmatic and flexible approach. I don't believe the standard WTO criteria apply to a North – South agreement such as this, and I'm quite prepared to defend this view should anyone wish me to do so [...] The exact terms should, however, be negotiated region by region as part of an overall package, and based on needs rather than doctrine. The EPAs will be tailor-made to each region, to build on existing strengths while taking into account areas of weakness. Safeguard mechanisms for vulnerable sectors, to take just one important example, will clearly be part of the package.¹⁵ (European Commission, 2005)

¹⁵ Emphasis original.

This nomination strategy ignored the discussions on the already complex regionalization process in Africa, with overlapping memberships hampering trade integration at the regional level. This resulted in the deterioration of the solidarity among the ACP members during the negotiations and resistance from some African countries that caused the delay in the negotiation and ratification schedule for the EPAs. The EPAs were also criticized by scholars and some NGOs for posing a risk of division to the unity of the ACP group and increasing the economic disparities among them resulting from establishing different trade regimes (Karl, 2002). Artificially creating sub-regional groups for negotiation purposes represents a deviation from the region-building norm within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship, which constructed Africa as a 'region' in its dealings with the EU since the beginning.

In parallel to the problems in the EPA negotiations, a pan-africanist approach has been adopted in the EU's relations with Africa in the recent period, to "improve overall coherence and effectiveness" (European Commission, 2004). The analyzed data shows the change in the description of Africa from a "region in need of Europe's help" to "rising" and "owner of its own challenges". The "continent-to-continent" relationship is being emphasized within the "strategic partnership" discourse (Council of the European Union, 2007: 3) and there is an increasing support to pan-African continental integration compared to sub-regional, loose, multi-purpose organizations to ease Africa's integration with Europe as a "Euro-African economic area" (European Commission, 2010). African Union has been addressed as the leader and the owner of the challenges in Africa and as the counterpart of the EU in the new strategic partnership discourse. This move could be interpreted as an attempt to restore harmony in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship (Keat, 2004). However, it has also a negative outcome on the regionalization efforts in Africa, by creating differences and power struggle among the ACP group and the African Union for being considered as the legitimate counterpart of the EU in the negotiations of the Post-Cotonou new agreement (ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors, 2021).

This article explains the tension and resistance among African countries during the EPA negotiations by this deviation from the regional integration norm, which was central in the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship. As it is claimed in the first section, Africa has been constructed as a region connected to a unified Europe in connection with the Eurafrika discourse in the early period of the relationship. The EU's support for region-building in Africa has discursively shaped the "special relationship" based on solidarity and aid between Africa and the EU since the early days of the independence period. Following the signature of the Cotonou agreement, the EPA negotiations represent a shift from considering Africa as a region in its dealings with the EU

towards artificially created sub-regions for negotiation purposes to better cope with the change towards reciprocity principle and implement further policies for market integration with the EU. This encountered resistance from some of the African countries and delayed the ongoing negotiations of the EPAs. In accordance with the moral economy approach, the deviation from the regional integration norm as constructed and compromised within the EU-Africa relationship explains this resistance to restore harmony in the moral economy (Keat, 2004). The recent emphasis on the “continent-to-continent” relationship and support to regional integration on the continental level could be read as such an attempt to restore the regional integration norm within the moral economy of the EU-Africa relationship.

Conclusion

This article adopted the moral economy approach which is interested in the motives behind the economic activities and whether the outcomes conform with these motives. While the development of African countries and their regional integration have been the main motives of European development co-operation in the post-independence period, this moral justification was not reciprocated with the outcome. The underdevelopment and regional integration problems still exist in Africa, which hosts various regional economic organizations with overlapping memberships, which are more integrated with Europe than among themselves.

Applying a discourse historical analysis to identify the construction of regional integration norm in the moral economy of EU-Africa relations, this study showed that the region-building has been the main norm in this relationship and served the construction of the EU’s identity through the construction of Africa as a “region”, with qualities changing in time. It identified three discourse topics related to this construction which also helped to shape and apply European development policy towards Africa. The first identified topic was the special relationship between Europe and Africa. The special relationship discourse served to legitimize European development co-operation policy towards African countries in the aftermath of their independence, as a responsibility/duty of Europe towards its former colonies which were constructed as a region economically inferior and in need of Europe’s help.

The second discourse topic related to regional integration was the coordination and implementation of development programs and policies in Africa on a regional basis. The analysis showed that regional integration meant nothing more than regional programming, co-operation, or collaboration between African countries for the implementation of the different policy tools of development co-operation. It was first import-substitution industrialization

and then the structural adjustment programs for market-driven liberalization which were promoted by supporting regionalization in Africa.

The third discourse topic identified within this study was the EPA's help to rationalize the investment environment and regional integration in Africa. Even the EPAs which were strongly claimed to support the regional integration in Africa served the integration of African economies with European markets rather than integration among themselves. They did more harm to the African regional integration than enhancing it, by dividing the ACP group into sub-regions instead of maintaining the relationship with Africa as one "region".

From a moral economy perspective, this article claims that regional integration has been one of the main norms of the EU-Africa economic relationship since the independence of the former colonies. The analysis from a historical perspective showed the construction of this norm by building Africa as a region that will help to implement specific development policies, with the African market integration with Europe being the main motive. Regional integration norm has been so fundamental that a deviation from it during the negotiations of the EPAs by splitting Africa into artificial sub-regions can explain from the moral economy approach, the strong resistance among African countries, which caused long delays in the negotiations for the first time in the history of the post-independence economic relationship.

References:

- ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors (2021) “Decision No 3/2021 of the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors of 26 November 2021 to amend Decision No 3/2019 of the ACP EU Committee of Ambassadors to adopt transitional measures pursuant to Article 95(4) of the ACP EU Partnership Agreement”, <<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-2105-2021-INIT/en/pdf>>, (5 January 2021).
- ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (n/a) “Home”, <https://www.euro-parl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/94_01/020_00_01_en.htm>, (29 April 2021).
- ADB (2015) “African Development Report 2015”, African Development Bank, <<https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/african-development-report-2015-growth-poverty-and-inequality-nexus-overcoming-barriers-to-sustainable-development-89715>>, (5 March, 2020).
- African Union (n/a) “Regional Economic Communities (RECs)”, <<https://au.int/en/organs/recs>>, (29 April 2021).
- Akokpari, J. (2008) “Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa”, in J. Akokpari, A. Ndinga-Muvumba and T. Muriithi (eds.), *The African Union and Its Institutions*, (Auckland Park: Fanele), pp. 85-110.
- Alexander, C. (2002) “The Architecture of Militancy: Workers and the State in Algeria, 1970-1990”, *Comparative Politics*, 34(3): 315-335.
- Asante, S. K. B. (2016) “The Political Economy of Africa’s Region-Building and Regional Integration”, in D. H. Levine and D. Nagar (ed.), *Region-Building in Africa*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 127-140.
- Bhagwati, J. (1995) “U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs”, *Discussion Paper Series 726*, Columbia University, New York.
- Borrmann, A., Busse, M. and Neuhaus, S. (2005) “EU/ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Impact, Options and Prerequisites”, *Intereconomics*, 40(3): 169-176.
- Borrmann, A., Großmann, H. and Koopmann, G. (2006) “The WTO Compatibility of the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and the ACP Countries”, *Intereconomics*, 41: 115–120.
- Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2009) “Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration”, *KFG Working Paper 7*, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin.
- Busse, M., Borrmann, A. and Großmann, H. (2004) “The Impact of ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreements on ECOWAS Countries: An Empirical Analysis of the Trade and Budget Effects”, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=601083>, (29 April 2021).

- Busse, M. and Großmann, H. (2007) “The trade and fiscal impact of EU/ACP economic partnership agreements on West African countries”, *The Journal of Development Studies*, 43(5): 787-811.
- Bussolo, M. (1999) “Regional or Multilateral Agreements? An Evaluation of Southern-Africa Trade Policy Scenarios”, Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Clapham, C. (2001) “The Changing World of Regional Integration in Africa”, in C. Clapham, G. Mills, A. Morner and E. Sidiropoulos (ed.), *Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Comparative International Perspectives*, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs), pp. 59-69.
- Commission of the European Communities (1969) “Address by M. Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the European Communities, at the signing of the second Yaoundé Convention, Yaoundé, 29 July <<http://aei.pitt.edu/12877/>>, (13 April 2017).
- Council of the European Union (2007) “The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy”, 16344/07, 9 December 2007, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf>, (10 December 2018).
- Directorate-General for Development at the EC Commission (1993) “Economic integration and structural adjustment and their interdependence”, *The Courier*, 142, 67-70.
- Dur, A. and De Bievre, D. (2007) “Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in European Trade Policy”, *Journal of Public Policy*, 27(1): 79-101.
- European Commission (n/a) “Economic Partnerships”, <https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/economic-partnerships_en>, (29 April 2021).
- European Commission (2020) “Post-Cotonou: Negotiators reach a political deal on a new EU/Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Partnership Agreement”, Press Release, Brussels, 3 December <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2291>, (25 April 2021).
- European Commission (2010) “José Manuel Durão Barroso President of the European Commission – Opening speech by President Barroso at the Africa-EU Summit: ‘The EU and Africa: consolidating our strategic partnership’ Opening Session, Africa-EU Summit Tripoli, 29th November 2010”, SPEECH/10/697, 29 November, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_10_697>, (7 March 2019).
- European Commission (2007) “An Open Letter to Anti-Poverty Campaigners from EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson and EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel”, Brussels, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/september/tradoc_136108.pdf>, (5 April 2017).

- European Commission (2005) Peter Mandelson - European Commissioner for Trade Economic Partnership Agreements: progressive trade policy into practice ACP – EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly Bamako, Mali, 19 April 2005”, Speech, 20 April, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_05_241>, (11 November 2016).
- European Commission (2004) “Romano Prodi President of the European Commission – Address at extraordinary African Union Summit in Sirte - Lybia African Union Summit Sirte Libya, 27 February 2004”, SPEECH/04/104, 27 February, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_04_104>, (14 May 2018).
- European Communities (1983) “Club du Sahel – Discours de M. Edgard Pisani prononce a l'ouverture de la Reunion du 26 octobre 1983”, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/12058/>>, (14 April 2017).
- European Council/Council of the European Union (2021) “Cotonou Agreement”, <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cotonou-agreement/>>, (25 October 2021).
- European Economic Community Commission, (1959) “The Tasks and the Aims of the European Economic Community in Africa”, Lecture by the Director-General of the European Economic Community, Directorate General of Overseas Countries and Territories, Dr. Allardt given on the occasion of Africa Day at the German Industries Fair, Hanover, 30 April, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/14911/>>, (14 March 2018).
- European Economic Community Commission (1963) “Africa and the Common Market”, Address by M. Heinrich Hendus, Director General for Overseas Development, to the meeting of ambassadors of the Congo Republic at Leopoldville on 25 January 1963, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/14268/>>, (17 March 2018).
- European Parliament (1996) “Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa”, External Economic Relations Series W-13, <<http://aei.pitt.edu/5543/>>, (5 March 2018).
- Fontagné, L., Debucquet, D. L. and Mitaritonna, C. (2011) “An Impact Study of the Economic Partnership Agreements in the Six ACP Regions”, *Journal of African Economies*, (20)2: 179-216.
- Gavin, B. (2007) “The EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements What Impact on Development?”, *IIS Discussion Paper 224*, The Institute for International Integration Studies, Ireland.
- Haastrup, T. (2013) “EU as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism as External Relations Practice in EU-Africa Relations”, *Journal of European Integration*, 35(7): 785-800.

- Hansen, P. and Jonsson, S. (2011) "Bringing Africa as a Dowry to Europe", *Interventions*, 13(3): 443-463.
- Hurt, S. R. (2003) "Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention", *Third World Quarterly*, 24(1): 161-176.
- Hurt, S.R., Lee, D. and Lorenz-Carl, U. (2013) "The Argumentative Dimension to the EU-Africa EPAs", *International Negotiation*, 18: 67-87.
- Jallab, M. S., Karingi, S., Oulmane, N., Perez, R., Lang, R. and Ben Hammouda, H. (2005) "Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements", *United ATPC Work in Progress 10*, African Trade Policy Centre, New York.
- Karl, K. (2002) "Economic Partnership Agreements: hopes, fears and challenges", *The Courier*, 195, 21-24.
- Keat, R. (2004) "Every Economy is a Moral Economy", paper presented at the Annual Conference of the UK Political Studies Association at Lincoln University, 6-8 April, <<http://www.russellkeat.net/admin/papers/39.pdf>>, (16 November 2016).
- Keck, A. and Piermartini, R. (2008) "The Impact of Economic Partnership Agreements in Countries of the Southern African Development Community", *Journal of African Economies*, 17(1): 85-130.
- Langan, M. (2016) *The Moral Economy of EU Association with Africa*, (New York: Routledge).
- Lenz, T. (2013) "EU normative power and regionalism: ideational diffusion and its limits", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(2): 211-228.
- Lyon, F. and Porter, G. (2009) "Market Institutions, Trust and Norms: Exploring Moral Economies in Nigerian Food Systems", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 33(5): 903-920.
- Mau, S. (2004) "Welfare Regimes and the Norms of Social Exchange", *Current Sociology*, 52(1): 53-74.
- McKay, A., Milner, C. and Morrissey, O. (2000) "The Trade and Welfare Effects of a Regional Economic Partnership Agreement", *CREDIT Research Paper 00/08*, University of Nottingham, Nottingham.
- Mettler, S. and Soss, J. (2004) "The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics", *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(1): 55-73.
- Milner, C., Morrissey, O. and McKay, A. (2005) "Some Simple Analytics of the Trade and Welfare Effects of Economic Partnership Agreements", *Journal of African Economies*, 14(3): 327-358.

- Mistry, P. (2000) "Africa's Record of Regional Cooperation and Integration", *African Affairs*, 99(397): 553-573.
- Mold, A. (2018) "The Consequences of Brexit for Africa: The Case of the East African Community", *Journal of African Trade*, 5(1): 1-17
- Morrissey, O. and Zgovu, E. (2007) "The impact of economic partnership agreements on ACP agriculture imports and welfare", *CREDIT Research Paper 07/09*, University of Nottingham, Nottingham.
- Nielson, P. (2000) "Speech of the European Commissioner for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, at the First EU-Africa Summit held in Cairo on 3-4 April 2000", *The Courier*, 180: 12.
- Organization of African Unity (1991) "Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community", <<https://au.int/en/treaties/treaty-establishing-african-economic-community>>, (29 April 2021).
- Pisani, E. (1985) "A message from Edgar Pisani, Commissioner for Development", *The Courier*, 89, 15.
- Posusney, M. P. (1993) "Irrational Workers: The Moral Economy of Labor Protest in Egypt", *World Politics*, 46(1): 83-120.
- Ravallion, M. and Chen, S. (2012) "Monitoring Inequality", *World Bank Blog*, <<http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/monitoring-inequality>>, (17 March 2018).
- Rochereau, H. (1969) Address by the Member of the Commission of the European Economic Community, Tananarive, *The Courier*, 21, 9-12.
- Ross, D. C. (2014) "Mozambique rising: building a new tomorrow", International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
- Sanghera, B. and Satybaldieva, E. (2009) "Moral sentiments and economic practices in Kyrgyzstan: the reflexive embedding of a moral economy", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 33(5): 921-935.
- Sayer, A. (2000) "Moral economy and Political Economy", *Studies in Political Economy*, 61(1): 79-104.
- Sayer, A. (2004) "Moral Economy", *Online-Paper*, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, <<https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/resources/sociology-online-papers/papers/sayer-moral-economy.pdf>> (25 April 2021)
- Sayer, A. (2007) "Moral Economy as Critique", *New Political Economy*, 12(2): 261-270.
- Sayer, A. (2015) "Time for Moral Economy?", *Geoforum*, 65: 291-293.
- Scott, J. (1976) *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*, (United States: Yale University Press).

- Slocum-Bradley, N. (2007) “Constructing and De-constructing the ACP Group: Actors, Strategies and Consequences for Development”, *Geopolitics*, 12(4): 635-655.
- Söderbaum, F. (2007) “African Regionalism and EU-African Interregionalism”, in M. Teld, *European Union and New Regionalism*, 2nd edn., (Great Britain: Ashgate), pp. 185-202.
- Svallfors, S. (2006) *Moral Economy of Class*, (California: Stanford University Press).
- Tabb, W. K. (2014) “The wider context of austerity urbanism”, *City*, 18(2): 87-100.
- Thompson, E. P. (1971) “The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century”, *Past & Present*, 50: 76-136.
- Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957), <https://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html>, (10 May 2020)
- UNCTAD (2019) “Economic Development in Africa Report 2019: Made in Africa-Rules of Origin for Enhanced Intra-African Trade”, United Nations, New York.
- Wodak, R. and Meyer. M. (2016) “Critical Discourse Studies: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology”, in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (ed.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, (SAGE Publications, Kindle Edition), pp. 139-585.
- World Bank (2019) “World Integrated Trade Solution - WITS Data”, <<https://wits.worldbank.org/>>, (10 December 2019).