

Cyprus Peace Operation in The Perspective of Responsibility to Protect

Koruma Sorumluluğu Açısından Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı

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ABSTRACT	ÖZ
<p>The use of military intervention against Humanitarian Crises during the Cold War was a concept that was limited in world politics and international law. Today, despite the theoretical and legal debates, sometimes by UN Security Council resolutions and sometimes by exceeding the only legitimate authorized institution of the use of force, states implement their responsibility to protect against third-party countries. Studies on the responsibility to protect, covering the history and theory of international relations, call the Cyprus Peace Operation a controversial example of humanitarian intervention in terms of the international community's reaction and the operation's legitimacy. Therefore, it will be examined within the framework of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in international political theory. In the 1990s, the International Relations literature defined humanitarian intervention as limiting the sovereignty of states against global atrocities. After the 2005 Earth Summit, R2P, third-party action against humanitarian crises, becomes a normative order-forming phenomenon. The phenomenon will allow us to examine the 1974 peace movement within the context of its responsibility to protect it. Discussions on the Cyprus Peace Operation under the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be used as the study's research method in the Parliamentary Budget Discussions.</p>	<p>Soğuk Savaş döneminde İnsani Krizlere karşı askeri müdahalenin kullanılması, dünya siyaseti ve uluslararası hukuk alanında sınırlı olarak kullanılan bir kavramdı. Bugün, teorik ve yasal tartışmalara rağmen, bazen BM Güvenlik Konseyi kararları ile bazen de güç kullanımının tek meşru yetkili kurumunu aşarak, devletler üçüncü taraf ülkelere karşı koruma sorumluluğunu uygulanmaktadır. Küresel insani krizlere yönelik müdahaleler, barış ve güvenliği sağlamak yetkisinin ötesine geçmiştir; bir çatışma yönetim modelini oluşturmaktadır. Koruma sorumluluğu üzerine yapılan, uluslararası ilişkiler tarihi ve teoriyi kapsayan çalışmalar, Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı'nı uluslararası toplumun tepkisi ve hareketin meşruiyeti açısından insani müdahalenin tartışılmalı bir örneği olarak adlandırmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu örneği uluslararası siyaset teorisinde koruma sorumluluğu çerçevesinde incelemeye çalışılacaktır. Uluslararası ilişkiler literatürü 90'lı yıllarda insani müdahaleyi, insan hakları ihlallerine karşı devletlerin egemenliğinin sınırlandırılması olarak tanımlamıştır. 2005 Dünya Zirvesi'nden sonra, Koruma Sorumluluğu insani krizlere karşı üçüncü taraf eylemi, normatif düzen oluşturan bir olgu haline gelir. Bu yönetim modelinin, savunmaları ve eleştirileri, 1974 barış hareketini koruma sorumluluğu kapsamında incelememize olanak tanıyacaktır. TBMM Bütçe görüşmelerinde Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanlığı altında Kıbrıs Barış harekâtı üzerine tartışmalar, çalışmanın araştırma yöntemi olarak kullanılacaktır.</p>
<p>Keywords</p> <p>Responsibility to Protect, Humanitarian Intervention, Cyprus, Turkish Foreign Policy, Security</p>	<p>Anahtar Kelimeler</p> <p>Koruma Sorumluluğu, İnsani Müdahale, Kıbrıs, Türk Dış Politikası, Güvenlik</p>

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1. Introduction

Responsibility to protect (R2P) is an evaluated concept debated historically from a legal and political perspective. From the 1990's military interventions that entered wars, ethnic conflicts, and regional conflicts for providing or constructing human rights, security, and safety (recently providing human security) were discussed under humanitarian intervention and evolved into responsibility to protect at the global governance level.

Relying on political theory, Weber's use of legitimate violence, which has been analyzed as a state privilege, has created a new challenge in international law and politics regarding limiting a state's sovereignty in global politics. The broad spectrum of scholars debated R2P as a norm with no consensus on which kind of norm it is. While designing our research question, we have asked whether the 1974 Cyprus intervention legitimized itself by humanitarian values and did this with to R2P framework according to decision-makers; or is it creating a moral hazard while looking out for strategic means in the Mediterranean. First, we will evaluate the literature and look at Turkish parliament discussions to understand if our constructed framework is valuable.

2. Literature

Humanitarianism became an essential part of global politics in the 1990s and affected third-party interventions to international human rights abuses by introducing the concept of R2P. ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) was the first organization that used the concept and drew the legal framework in 2001. After that, the concept entered the 2005 World Summit Outcome document and made the concept globally a norm and a type of security governance, especially in providing human security (Bilgin Aytac, 2017). Responsibility to Protect has been adopted by Un Political discourse and evolved into an international ethical norm (Ercan, 2014).

Humanity basing on the desire to assist the wounded and suffering without discrimination, recognizing common humanity and that 'our enemies are men. The principle of impartiality derives from the willingness to help without discrimination except based on needs, prioritizing the most urgent cases of distress. The principle of neutrality bound Red Cross workers from taking sides in a conflict or engaging in political or social controversies (Chandler, 2001).

Chandler describes the main principle of humanitarianism, which is influenced directly by the emerging human rights regime that determined all global politics after the '70s. Though it has thoroughly emerged in the Western world and used to re-structure the so-called failed states or Third World, the challenges have come in these senses, especially in the 90s.

Holbrook mentions the Cyprus intervention as an example of the humanitarian interventions of the Cold War.

“Between 1945, and 1990 there were a number of interventions in sovereign states by countries acting without Western backing. In 1970, breaches of sovereignty occurred due to: India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974; Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975; Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia in 1978; and Tanzania's intervention in Uganda in 1979” (2002: 138).

Turkmen is one of the primary authors focusing on 1974 in humanitarian intervention and the R2P concept. She analyzes the normative reasoning of the military intervention underlining the Treaty of Guarantee in Cyprus, though emphasizing that the idea was not used in that period. She also highlights the importance of humanitarian consequences during the cold war (2005: 68-69).

Kosovo's 1999 NATO bombing became a vital example and an exception to the equal state sovereignty system that the UN system has recognized. 1994 Haiti intervention has shown us an example of enlarging the understanding of protecting peace and security principles. With Security Council 940 Resolution, international armed forces were formed to overthrow the military government (Hehir, 2008).

Wheeler added a different perspective by analyzing Security Council Resolution 688 for constructing safe havens for the plight of the Kurds in 1991 that countries like China and India made strong references to Article 2(7) and claimed the necessity of Iraq's use of force breaching to international peace and security. Otherwise, this would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states (Wheeler, 2000).

For the Iraqi no-fly zones, Holbrook also mentions the new features of the humanitarian intervention excepted by the Western countries; *'coercive action, the absence of indigenous consent, and a declared humanitarian objective.'* (Holbrook, 2002)

The post-Cold War period brought a limitation to world politics with normative implications. Defending human rights regimes against state sovereignty was ruled under 'the R2P. For scholars, the limit of sovereignty has been debatable. First, some theories idealize individual rights and obligate legal and coercive intervention, and others concern much more with sovereign equality between states comprising the people on their territory in terms of democratization and insecurity questions.

From the concept of just war to R2P, all the historical evaluation process has shown us also that these values that legitimize the use of force have closely interlinked with the security approaches of the actors. Furthermore, the limitation of the use of force is directly related to the increasing influence of society and individual contribution to world politics.

In this study, we want to look at Cyprus Peace Movement in 1974 from this perspective. Though the concept of humanitarian intervention or R2P was not yet used in those years, Turkish foreign policy has intensely used the language of humanitarianism in discussing the issue. We had the opportunity to observe the Foreign Ministry Budget discussions in the Turkish Parliament before and after the intervention, which also demonstrated internal debates at the beginning of the political crises and the outcomes of the Turkish foreign policy role in the Cyprus issue. The article's research question is: *"how do foreign policy decision-makers try to interpret the Cyprus peace movement as a legitimate intervention to the island under humanitarian values? "*

3. Methods

In this paper, we aim to evaluate Cyprus Peace Intervention in 1974 through the concept of R2P. We are aware of the challenge since the concept was not defined at that period. However, Turkish foreign policy has assertively used the language of humanitarianism in the discussions. The

Turkish Foreign Ministry Budget talks are a crucial part of the Turkish Parliament discussions that comprise all the annual major foreign policy issues; they reflect the domestic policy's influence while overseeing the foreign policy decisions. We chose the years before the intervention in 1972, 73; 1974,76,78 after it.¹ The status of Cyprus was discussed in the Turkish Parliament during that years.

4. Cyprus peace Movement and its reflections on 1970's Turkish Foreign Policy

Cyprus's intervention in 1974 and its historical background are crossroads of Turkish foreign policy. It is one of the important events that affected the internal-domestic politics of the Turkish government at the most vivid time of the Cold War. Cyprus Policy has influenced every political issue in the period, from Greece to American relations, from NATO to European Economic Community.

Cyprus' crisis interlinks with the humanitarian values during the Cold war since Turkey was not only perceived as a strategic port in the East Mediterranean policy but as a minority issue. Scholars looked to the 1974 intervention as one of the significant examples of the Cold War and the UN Peacekeeping force founded in 1964, reasoning the tensions between two communities, which would shift into ethnic conflict. Erkem highlights mutual ethnic nationalism in the Cyprus crisis seeking its roots back to British colonial rule and analyzing the consociational democracy 1960 constitution on the island (2016).

The conflict fired by the Greek and Turkish domestic politics during the Cold War, which these two countries are significant allies and centerpiece of NATO from its foundation in the two-bloc system.

1959 Zurich -London agreements have created the principles of the 1960 Constitution of Independent Cyprus Republic. Starting one year later, Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper announced that the Greek community violated the two agreements, and Turkish Cypriots fixed proportional communal representations were underestimated.

Greek Cypriot President Makarios violated Zurich and London agreements and the Constitution in a one-sided action. EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston -National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) started to use violence against Turkish residences and mosques.

In 1972, because of the Makarios's tension with Grivas (founder of EOKA) he proliferated the armament on the island. Czechoslovakian weapons imported to Cyprus created a threat to Turkish foreign policy decision-makers and increased anxiety on the humanitarian level. Violent attacks on minority economic limitations confronted with the violations of the constitutional agreements have also created distress in Turkish foreign policy decision-makers.

UN involvement in Cyprus has occurred before and after the intervention; Turkey's previous hesitation in staying outside the Non-Aligned Movement created a negative role in the UN General Assembly voting against the Turkish side of the Cyprus issue. Especially the Second intervention condemned by the UN in 1974. Greece demonstrated micro-nationalist behaviors against the

¹ All the Turkish -English translations of the talks are made by the author.

Turkish minority in Trachea and Greek islands like Rhodes and Crete. They discriminated against the Turkish community in the educational curriculum, neglecting the economic contribution of the community. Greece shows this competitive and discriminative appearance in the continental shelf, territorial air space, and proliferation of Greek islands.

Cyprus has been seen as a crucial port in East Mediterranean and an assurance for state interests. The Cyprus issue has also stimulated conflict with NATO during the détente period, challenged the relations with the USA, and reflected in domestic policy as socialist and anti-imperialist trends.

In the 1970s, federative solutions in Cyprus were discussed by all parties, especially by CHP (Republican Peoples Party.) Despite the controversial structure of internal politics, Cyprus became a unifying issue for the political parties against the Greek Cypriots' enosis will. After the Cyprus intervention, this issue was used by mainstream political parties CHP and AP (Justice Party) both ways in internal politics. Cyprus's success of Prime Minister Ecevit courage him to end the coalition and his will of single party power in subsequent elections. Still, it never happened and ended with the Nationalist Front coalition.

From 1970 to 1974, negotiations between the two communities brought hope; however, increasing violence against the Turkish community created a shortcut for Turkish intervention on the island.

Haluk Ülman declared the federative idea of Cyprus in the Ecevit-Erbakan government (6 months before the intervention).

“Turkey's thesis is not a regional federative claim requiring a territorial division or a plan necessitating a migrant exchange. The suggested plan was a functional federation, giving the Turkish community autonomy and a fair political representation. In other terms the coalition will be divided, not the territories” (TBMM, 1974: 627).

Turkey comprehends the tension in the internal policy of Greece with the challenges between Makarios and the military junta. Speculation was terminating the independency of Cyprus. However, Makarios became the unwilling leader of the "junta" with its Soviet relations. The tension would increase by excluding the Makarios from the conflict and bringing influential EOKA leaders to Greek Cypriot leadership. Regional federative wills of the CHP (Republican Peoples Party) could transform into annexation ideas, stimulating violence between two communities. In the Parliament talks, opposition to the violation of Treaties about Cyprus created an anti-NATO attitude, majorly from the leftist deputies.

The conflict fired by the Greek and Turkish domestic politics during the Cold War, which these two countries are significant allies and centerpiece of NATO from its foundation in the two-bloc system. CHP Deputy Haluk Ülman answered these doubts in Cyprus by claiming the strategic importance of the humanitarian issue:

"Cyprus's strategic meaning for Turkey never loses importance, depending on the time limit. There are not any legal powers in the world that can take the Treaties from our hands. Also, there cannot be any government that would behave hesitantly to the situation threatening Cypriot Turks' lives and prosperities” (TBMM, 1972: 521).

1973 in the elections' hot atmosphere, CHP strengthened its aspects in Cyprus. Istanbul Deputy Necdet Uğur asserts the advantage of the positive outcome of the mutual communal negotiations and emphasizes Cyprus issue as a national interest concept is a requirement according to the new conditions of the world for Greece and Turkey (TBMM, 1973: 514).

Ecevit-MSP government, Foreign Affairs Minister Turan Güneş explained the functional federative system by blaming the previous Menderes government (in 1950's).

"After Second World War, in the '50s, when Greek Cypriots started a War against the British government, Turkey behaved carelessly, in two blocs" dimensions and had forgotten more than one hundred thousand Turkish society and supported the un-existence of the Cyprus problem. When he woke from this negligence, it was too late for the issue, and there was no chance in case of acceding 1960 order. It is well known that this order has not been successful, and the island has been under Greek dominance since 1964. Furthermore, some Turkish foreign policymakers started to adopt a unitary system since they lacked information about the system serving the Greek aspects to radically change the 1960s Constitutional order. For a long time, Greeks tended and demonstrated the federative system as a dividing step for the island. By no means does the Ecevit government ever wants to share the island, and he respects Cyprus's independence and territorial unity and sees the federative system as the guarantee. Enosis is the real threat, and enosis can only be hindered by a federative system that provides the existence of Turkish society on the island" (TBMM, 1974: 627).

The circumstances were more controversial a few days before the intervention and after, according to the previous terms. First, the military Greek junta intervention in Cyprus had created a suitable platform for Ecevit to use the public support behind him in the intervention decision. Nikos Sampson's confiscation to the Makarios government meant the end of independent Cyprus and the end of fair representation chance of the minority rights. The military government in Cyprus changed the state's name to the Cyprus Helen Republic. The governance of the EOKA would certainly continue aggression toward Turkish Cypriot's life and their prosperities on the island.

When the Cyprus crisis erupted with the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios at the behest of the Athens junta, the Turkish reaction was uncertain. On the day of the coup, the Turkish press announced Archbishop's fall. A national Security Council meeting in Ankara on the night of July 15 decided to put into operation Article 4 of the 1960 Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee (Cumhuriyet, 1974 July 16: 5). Makarios's leadership played a two-way role from the beginning of the Cyprus issue. His nationalist manners and religious part over Greek Cypriots made the case unsolvable. His return to Cyprus relied on Turkish intervention, and the collapse of EOKA and military power in the Cyprus government, Makarios continued its unitary state wills that rejected the federative system in Cyprus. Still, Turkey's strong-minded aspects over the situation also Makarios would play a role in integrating the idea to recognize Cypriot Turks in their territories till his death.

Turkey searched for Great Britain's support for the intervention, but they remained silent. With the first intervention, Turkey quickly took control of the Northern part with significant military success. To the general opinion of the scholars and foreign policy officials, there is no alternative for any Turkish government not to intervene in Cyprus, depending on public pressure. Turkey also found

a chance in Geneva to discuss its federative demands. The junta ended in Greece with the intervention, and Karamanlis took the government. The Karamanlis government would reject these demands, ending with the second intervention in the North part of Cyprus. The second intervention had created mainly the legitimacy conflict in the International area. The two-way negotiations have not started until the National Front coalition after the resignation of Ecevit. However, the issue would be taken to the UN General Assembly several times after nine years with the Greek parts.

Mainly two main subjects would be discussed in General Assembly; one was the remaining Turkish troops on the island, and the second was the Greek refugees that had moved from its places during the intervention. Greek governors of Cyprus that had excluded Turkish representatives since 1964 started to talk about respect for the island's independence; undermining the systematic will of the unification with Greece - enosis - that had been severally rejected by Greece too in the UN General Assembly negotiations. Also, Greece accused Turkey of not conciliating in the multi-communal negotiations. Resolution 3212 of the General Assembly asserts, "Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personal from the republic of Cyprus" (Sönmezoğlu, 1994: 179).

Foreign Minister Turan Güneş signed the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, the opposition had used this attempt as a step back in Cyprus issue. In 1975 MGP leader Feyzioğlu claimed that the functional federative was buried, and Greece's will to take the issue to the UN's field and the acceptance of the Turkish withdrawal was a mistake (TBMM, 1975, p: 446). Ecevit's coalition with MSP had shown multidimensional foreign policy aims, which would also continue with National Front coalitions. However anti-American and leftist influences, for the first time, significantly influenced Turkish foreign policy on the Cyprus issue. Starting from the harsh opposition to Johnson's letter to Ecevit's election interest using Cyprus issue served a suitable atmosphere.

Turkey supported the withdrawal of the Turkish troop depending on a solution that the Turkish Cypriots could accept with the continuing decisiveness of the Turkish Government-National Front against the UN resolution. Turkey's signature on the UN resolution, supported by CHP, is the step to accepting fair representation of Turkish Cypriots in international platform (Öymen, 2005: 257)

Especially in 1975, for the indictment of Feyzioğlu in the Parliament, Haluk Ülman answered the critics with; "Turkey is not a foreign military power that has to withdraw from the island" (TBMM, 1975: 446), emphasizing its guarantee role.

In a way, that was the denial of the UN Resolution with public pressure. It is essential to note the Kissinger-Ecevit talk after the intervention that asserts: "Turkey had implemented the American policies in Cyprus for ten years, and now, Turkey has the initiative" (Öymen, 2005: 452)

Formation of Federative North Cyprus in 1975, references on the Cyprus issue in the budget discussion were based on the economic development of the Northern Part and the rightfulness of Turkey in the intervention against the American embargo and the pressures from Europe. After the formation of the two *de facto* states in Cyprus (Cyprus, the issue became more controversial between the two parties, CHP (Republican People's Party) and AP (Justice Party), similar to all internal cases. About the Cyprus question, when CHP blames National Front Coalitions for being

undemocratic and self-reacted, CHP coalitions are accused by AP be party based minded and neglecting the national interest of Turkey and the Cyprus minority.

AP accused CHP of blocking the legal way of the issue in the international field by signing the UN resolution. Despite the military success, Ecevit was accused of using Cyprus as a vehicle for internal politics, which is quite right concerning Ecevit's decision to end the coalition and the intention of early elections. (TBMM, 1975: 450)

Turan Feyzioğlu has drawn attention to humanitarian values. Highlighted the legitimacy of Turkish troops' existence and insisted that the Turkish soldiers remain in the, to provide refuge for Turkish Cypriots on the north of the island.

"Turkish soldiers did not go to the island for invasion. However, until a political solution is found, the Turkish soldiers and the security of Turkish Cypriots are to the required extent. Until you wake up, staying on the island means the attacks and massacres will not be repeated, it is a necessity" (TBMM, 1975: 446).

The Sadi Irmak government (November 17, 1974 – March 31, 1975) had released the political prisoners from the Turkish Cypriots. For all governments, the existence of the Turkish troops is vital for the security of the Cypriots and the public's support of internal policies by motivating nationalist feelings. Turkish power on the island was perceived as the guarantee of security in the Middle East as an essential base in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the two societies" disbelief and antagonism toward each other made it impossible for them to form a state concerning both societies and equity in representation. Turkey's claim to solve the problem in bilateral negotiations responded by Greece as carrying the issue to Hague Tribunal. Especially with the suitable environment of the American sanction Greece and Makarios wanted to pressure Turkey on both issues.

The Cyprus issue will be softened from time to time with the bilateral negotiations of Greece and Turkey. For example, in March 1975, the negotiation affected the relations of two societies on the island, and on April 23, 1975, Vienna became a platform for mutual communal negotiations in the new dimensions of the island. In this frame, Makarios

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Communal negotiations in the new dimensions of the island. In this frame, Makarios turned to Cyprus (As the president of the Cyprus Republic) on December 7, 1974 and took the Greek Cypriots" leadership from Karamanlis. Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş's agreement on the federative republic's main principles would be the negotiation's subject, and till the death of Makarios, these negotiations continued positively. After Kiprianu's leadership (the president of Cyprus Republic) and negative opinion towards Turkish Cypriots changed the ongoing negotiations. In 1978, Greek Cypriots demonstrated harsh policies against Turkish Cypriots again. At Security Council, Rauf Denktaş's speech had been hindered by Greek Cypriot delegations; Kiprianu's did not want to talk with Denktaş in one of the UN meetings and only wanted to talk with Ecevit as a representative of the Turks at issue (Gönlübol, 1996: 579).

When we look at the reactions in the parliament every political party gives resolute speeches and ideas about Cyprus. Mainly economic exclusion of the North part started to be determined in the speeches. Sadi Irmak government (non-partisan government) formed after the elections had succeeded in getting some of the middle eastern countries to support Cyprus issues like Libya, Iran, and Pakistan, some of which are the close allies in the western block and the CENTO process for Turkey. These relations were always supported by conservative MSP (National Salvation Party), the second part of the coalition that decided on Peace Intervention in 1974. MSP's critics of CHP was about its exploitation of the issue in internal politics and her diplomatic failures. However, CHP deputy Haluk Ülman replied to these critics more strictly by determining its security role.

"Cyprus is a problem not only for the existence and security of Turkish Cypriots but also Turkey in the region " (TBMM, 1975: 456).

CHP reasoning this claim in the "enosis will of Greece that meant the will of changing East Mediterranean balance, to its advantage." Also, this opposition continued after the Nationalist Front government reduced CHP's popularity in Cyprus. During the minority government of Ecevit, AP (Justice Party) Deputy Adnan Celal Yardımcı emphasized CHP's (republican People's Party) attitude in Cyprus and accused Ecevit of deadlocking the process by signing the UN agreement (TBMM, 1978: 648)

The delay in oil research in the Aegean Sea had created a suspicious scene in the international arena for continental shelf conflict; created two different views in the Parliament. CHP supported accepting the issue in the Hague Tribunal after negotiating with the two Prime Ministers of the two countries; National Front was totally against the idea and wanted the issue to be solved only with Greece. Greece carried the issue to UN Security Council (1975) and the Hague tribunal (1976). Both would not be successful in the international arena, and the issue would be solved mutually in Bern 1976, with Turkey's strong claim of 12 miles from Greece being a reason for war depending on the Hague Tribunal decision in the advantage of Turkey.²

The importance of internal conflicts increased its effects on international relations, which the Greek politicians also used during the '70s. MSP Zonguldak deputy Mehmet Zeki Okur emphasized the Greek First Delegate of European Commission Stavropoulos's words: "Turkey has added Continental shelf issue to Cyprus we do not have a problem like that first of all Turkish government has to look in their internal conflict" (TBMM, 1976: 249). He emphasized the importance of internal peace in the foreign policy-making process. With all parties, the Federative claims of Cyprus were highlighted more decisively at the end of the 70s.

In 1976 CHP Deputy Hasan Esat Işık claimed important points about Turkish Greek relations. "Cyprus is a crucial problem for us in an international society, but this does not mean that an Aegean crisis is less crucial; Turkish Greek relations collapsed with this event."

² This resolution is based on Greek asserts about Turkish petrol prospects in the Aegean Sea, assuming the SISMİK-I investigation ship had created irreversible harm on the continental shelf of Greece. Hague Tribunal disagreed with this assertion and gave a decision against Greece, which forced Greece to negotiate in Bern.

Işık had emphasized the importance of the Aegean Sea control in sea and air with the mutual agreements. However, this also accused the National Front government of being silent in the armament of twelve islands and the management of NATO bases in the Greek islands in order of Turkish national interests (TBMM, 1976: 251).

CHP's accusation of the National Front* (Milliyetçi Cephe) government in Cyprus depends on several events in this period. One is the Denктаş declaration of non-alignment, which the National Front government left alone Denктаş in this situation. The other was based on the failure to provide support in Cyprus issues from the third-world countries. The short-term CHP government would continue support-providing policies in 1979 through negotiations with Yugoslavia, India, and the Brezhnev government in Soviet Russia. These would also fail despite the Ecevit government's lively scene reflected in the Turkish daily press. In this process, only CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) countries like Iran and Pakistan would be the only supporters of the Cyprus issue by Turkey in the international arena. Mutually AP accused CHP of the early armistice in Peace Intervention and Ecevit's decision to reopen closed bases after the end of the American military sanction and accused the Ecevit government of sacrificing in Cyprus issue.

Looking at CHP's aspects in the Cyprus issue, especially in Greek-Turkish relations, we can see a general balance between Venizelos and Atatürk after the Turkish Independence War. The American sanction changed this balance to the disadvantage of Turkey, which would continue with Greece's membership in the EEC (European Economic Community), and nowadays with the EU. The petrol crises and the economic instability Turkey had passed created considerable tension in the Parliament because of the significant ideological differences or expectations. Still, because of the instability in the governments depending on weak coalitions, political parties entered into endless conflicts, especially between AP and CHP. This situation created the power of the conservative and nationalist parties like MSP and MHP (National Movement Party) further from their representative power in elections that would also affect foreign policy decisions, chiefly in National Front coalitions. This claim formed different discourses on common issues. Depending on this, DP (Democratic Party) interpreted Vienna Negotiations and criticized the government's policies. Greek Cypriots demands a polycentric control system and Greek regions by making a territorial bargain with Turkish Cypriots, providing a bi-regional federal state in the country. Cyprus needed a revisionist foreign policy; nevertheless, the Foreign Minister of National Front Sabri Çağlayangil tried to continue the island's status quo; there were no standard government policies on the issue, which had also reflected in the Aegean issue with Greece. The National Front was against the continental shelf issue being carried to Hague Tribunal. However, there is no single movement for petrol prospects while Greece maintains oil from Tassos Island (TBMM, 1976: 264). Çağlayangil had given responses to these critics by referring to internal instability (TBMM, 1976: 274).

* National Front Governments were the coalition governments that are built for opposing CHP (Republican Peoples Party) lead governments, first in (1975-1977) and second in 1977 (From April to December).

Therefore, this was the appropriate criticism for its period because of the Cyprus issue's internal influence. When we look at the domestic political environment, Turkey never experienced a stabilized political atmosphere. National Front government, with its conservative parts, became more powerful in the streets, especially the nationalists.

Greece postponed the issue till the 1980s without any acceptations or rejections. This fact also increased the tension in the Parliament parties accused each other of the failure: A de facto state, which is not recognized by any other country except Turkey and is economically excluded."

"Consequently, the Turkish military intervention of 20 July 1974 prevented the Turkish Cypriots from being decimated and the island from being annexed to Greece" (Türkmen, 2005: 80).

According to Turkmen, Turkey has seen the Treaty of Guarantee as solid; it doesn't use the principle "of right to act" Article 51 of the UN Charter (2005). In addition, when we evaluate the cases in Cyprus, Cambodia, and East Pakistan, the lack of support from Western countries does not prevent third-party countries from intervening in neighboring countries due to humanitarian concerns.

5. Conclusion/Discussion/Suggestions

Turkey's intervention in Cyprus within the principles of responsibility to protect (R2P) is an ambitious thesis, and readers can even see it as an adaptation of theory to practice. However, in the R2P literature, although Cyprus did not receive the support of western politics, it provided the conditions that were embraced for humanitarian reasons, and that brought the end of the conflict for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In our study, we tried to emphasize Turkish foreign policy decision-makers' challenges in balancing strategic ambitions with humanitarian values. We must underline that Turkey also drew the most independent non-Western foreign policy in that term (compared to previous ones), which was challenged by Cold War alliances.

In both cases, nation-states still preserve their roles in the international system by integrating themselves into more economically and politically liberal structures in a more institutional aspect. Despite the sovereignty of the Westphalian state system, which was strictly preserved during the Cold War, states can quickly intervene with collective values or interests. Security perceptions have been changed clearly, and these changes have affected the idea of war. War can be distinguished from its effects on civilians and military operations used for political aims. Also, the Cyprus crisis still preserves the de facto situation of the island's north. Still, it stimulates the tension between the two communities and the foreign policies of Greece and Turkey.

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