

RECONFIGURATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER MODELS: CONCEPTUAL AND STRUCTURAL-SYSTEMS APPROACHES

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ABSTRACT

In this article, two blocks of problems were highlighted: the definition of the categorical-ideational apparatus and the conceptual-theoretical foundations of structural-systemic research of international relations and the analysis of the evolution of international systems in the conditions of structural transformations and international order in the context of changing configuration types after the end of the Cold War. International relations in the post-Cold War period have two stages in their evolution, through the alternation of stages of cooperation and conflict, and the structure of the post-bipolar international system until the events of September 11, 2001 was uni-polycentric, later becoming polycentric.

Keywords: International Relations, International/World Order, International System, The Post-War Period, Conflict.

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INTRODUCTION

The actuality of the topics approached is determined by the need to elucidate the structural-systemic foundations of research of the international relations approached systemically and to analyze the changes that occurred after the end of the Cold War with an impact on the world order model and the structure of the international system in the process of reconfiguration.

The methodology of scientific investigations is based on interdisciplinary research in proper methodological and multidisciplinary epistemological aspects, including some praxiological valences, by non-contradictory application of the agent-structure binomial, both component parts being system-forming.

We have scientifically substantiated the research methodology of international systems through the "agent-system structure" binomial. This methodology assumes that in the process of building a new type of international system, the determining factor rests both the structure, approached in a neorealist sense, and international actors, especially the great powers and, eventually, the overpowers.

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Working Hypotheses

The scientific hypothesis we substantiate is that international relations, including in the post–Cold War period, evolve through the alternation of conflict (total or relative) and cooperation (relative): in the post-Cold War conditions the cooperation period was between 1989/1991-2014/2015, and the conflict period started in 2014/2015.

The Cold War ended peacefully, without a generally accepted winner, who could set the conditions for the building of the international/world order model. This situation generated difficulties in researching and understanding the processes on the world stage.

Approaches of The International Order and World Order Concepts

International relations are expressed in the alternation of periods of conflict and cooperation, they do not essentially present a "natural state" or a "state of war", but contain a certain minimum of unity and organization, which indicates the existence of a higher or lower level of order in the international arena. Referring, in general, to the order in social life, H. Bull calls it "a model that leads to a particular result, an arrangement that promotes certain goals or values" (Bull 1998: 2), whereas St. Hoffmann proposes another definition of the social order, including the norms, principles, and processes that ensure the satisfaction of the fundamental needs of social groups" (Hoffmann 1999: 75).

In this context of ideas, we determine that two approaches to the concepts of order and World Order have been outlined, even if the differences are little noticeable, especially in the context of the use of several notions in genetic connection: H. Bull treats order in world politics as a state of affairs, being pursued the confirmation of the fundamental characteristics of the grotian tradition in the research of International Relations, in the sense of identifying the ideas of strengthening the elements of "international society" within each international system. According to St. Hoffmann, the world order represents, rather, a value and a goal, but with little chance of achievement because of the defining features of the international environment. We do not share H. Bull's views, regarded the international society as built on "common interests and values coming from a common culture or civilization" because we consider the idea of J.-J. Rousseau founded on the impossibility of the existence of a "general society" of mankind: the historical examples proposed as arguments prove to be, rather, tendencies to establish empires on some territories that contain homogeneous elements of some civilizations, while the contemporary world, even despite the deepening of the cultural-social dimension of globalization, is still characterized, according to A. Torkunov, through cultural pluralism, not to mention S. Huntington's predictions on the "clash

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of civilizations". International society, according to H. Bull's assumptions, by its essence, presents an attempt by states to regulate conflicts and cooperate without a government to lead them, and it is not at all groundless the idea of S. Guzzini, who likens the international system described by the English analyst to a singular society in its own way, "comparable rather to some primitive societies explored by anthropologists" (Guzzini 2000: 95). Although H. Bull dissociated himself from political realism, R. Little argues, a little convincingly in our opinion, because the arguments are not enough, that both the English School in the field and classical realism accepted the idea of international society, both steps recognizing that there are constant regulations of international behavior by a predetermined body of norms, given that in the conditions of the Cold War a "new balance of power" appears. The value of international society, according to A. Vincent lies in introducing order into the anarchic world by directing international behavior towards compliance with normative principles, and H. Morgenthau proposes the balance of power as a way of correcting and controlling the behavior of actors, in which the force of moral norms coexists and the defeat of destructive, violent tendencies by coercive means, given that domestic morality cannot be elevated to the international norm. We specify, however, that "international society" remains a concept that is not accepted in academic environments other than the English one, even if A. Linklater attempted to accommodate him to postwar conditions by relating to the principles of state sovereignty, aiming to identify new forms of "postwar citizenship" that are becoming more evident in contemporary world politics.

With the title of theoretical-methodological specification we note that we will approach the concept of order in world politics in the sense of *state of affairs, including and reflecting different types and levels of relations between international and transnational actors in their totality*. It is important to note also that in particular the theoretical constructions substantiated by H. Bull, but also to a lesser extent those proposed by St. Hoffmann, who highly appreciated the scientific relevance of the results obtained by the English researcher, are considered reference, although none of them, but no other specialists in the field have succeeded or have not set out to carry out an explicit and all-encompassing analysis of the connection between the concepts of order in social life and order in international/world politics approached both in general aspect and in concrete-historical plan. Even in the post-Cold War period, based on this background of ideas, scientific elaborations turn out to be nothing but developments, diversification. P. de Senarclens referring exclusively to the international order, it gives primacy to the common diplomatic and legal culture, given that "in order to realize their ambitions, states do not resort exclusively to aggression, but

accept negotiations and undergo procedures for the settlement of disputes, seek to identify mutually acceptable means of valuing common objectives and assume different obligations arising from custom, treaties and recommendations of international fora" (de Senarclens 1992: 105). We consider that the relationship between "order in social life" and "order in world politics", in the latter case taking into account the spatial-temporal limits, is expressed through the common goals of both people organized in society of different character, as well as of states and other non-state actors towards survival and security, welfare and development.

It should be noted that "order in World Politics" finds expression through two phrases: H. Bull, followed by St. Hoffmann distinguishes between the "international order", associated with the interstate order, and the "world order", which is of broader content, includes the former and refers, in the English researcher's view, to "humanity as a whole". Other scholars are less concerned with academic rigors and randomly use the terms either "international order" (P. de Senarclens) or "world order" (T. Knutsen, J. Ruggie), meaning "Interstate order" in both cases. The phrase "international order", in our opinion, no longer adequately corresponds to the complex realities of post-Cold War international relations, because other actors than states are present, not as mere extras, and some features of medievalism or using other terms, of the prewestphalic system are increasingly evident. A. Bogaturov expresses the opinion that the "world order" in the contemporary world is not of universal character, being narrower than the "international order", but, at the same time, he admits the prospects of planetary expansion of new actors. He defines three approaches in the interpretation of order - *realistic*: which emphasizes the correlation between the potentials of the main actors within the system; *social constructivist*: which shows interest in the rules of behavior of states and rulers, conceived in the dynamics of development and interactions; *institutionalist*: rely on regulatory instruments, whose basis is built by international institutions, designed as mechanisms for ensuring international cooperation, having an impact on the behavior of states in the interest of the international community.

R. Gilpin notes that the systemic order in international relations is determined, above all, by the presence of rules of behavior, the change of which can cause the modification of one type of order with another. J. Ikenberry, like L. Miller conceives order not as a "state", but in the spirit of the "mode of action" in the adoption of decisions within the existing hierarchy in international relations, the hierarchy itself embodies a certain level of order. He proposes a binary analytical model, which implies the correlation of two elements, ideas, and institutions, on the one hand, and on the other, the potential of the state-hegemon, and on its basis defines three types (of international order in the history of international relations) - balanced, hegemonic and constitutional. J. Ikenberry

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credits the idea that it is essential the presence of generally accepted rules and principles by which actors lead in mutual relations, the order founded exclusively on the ratio of force is considered "unconstitutional", while "constitutionality" is expressed in the activity of organizations and other interstate institutions whose major objectives consist in "ensuring more equitable representation of the interests of less powerful countries in the adoption of international decisions of significance". N. Kosolapov argues that "the world order is nothing more than a period well identified in time and positioned in the physical and international-political spaces during which the composition of the system-forming subjects, the configuration of the relations and interdependence they establish, the limits and possibilities established for the other participants in the system of international relations remain unchanged (Kosolapov 1998: 1-84). The analytical superiority of this definition, considers F. Voytolovsky, consists in the possibility of treating the world order as "a stage that is characterized by a relative state of stabilization within the system of international relations, on the duration of which the system itself has not yet stabilized" (Voytolovsky).

With the title of definition of the phrase "world order" we propose the following: the world order is expressed by *the totality of models of economic, social and demographic, political, geopolitical and military, cultural-civilizational, ecological and information-technological interaction and interdependence between actors of international and transnational relations within the framework of the global international system*. By the phrase "world politics" we mean *the work of actors of international and Transnational Relations on the world arena*. L. Jensen and L. Miller rightly believes that world politics focuses on the contemporary global situation, given that not only nation-states, but also other actors prove to be able to influence communication on the world arena, and international politics refers exclusively to Interstate realities (Jensen & Miller 1997: 5-6). Concept world order practically lost its philosophical, ethical-legal significance and became operational for the description of international relations, which went beyond the strict "state-centrist" framework.

We will specify that the post-Cold War world order was formed in a decentralized, linear, and synergetic environment, because the expansion of the number of participants in the collective decision-making process at the international level, even in conditions of polarity, undermined to a certain extent the traditional hierarchical structure of governance, with national States and international governmental organizations retaining the status of the most important international actors, being followed by transnational corporations and international non-governmental organizations.

A preliminary conclusion demonstrates that the world order is associated with "a model" of interactions within international systems that occur in a time frame, the ways of structuring the relations between international/transnational actors and the processes that take place determining both their defining features and peculiarities. According to T. Knutsen's assumption, the dynamics of competitions and rivalries attribute to the world order "a fluid and changeable character" because "in the system capabilities are unevenly distributed". It is important to note that the notion of system or, in terms used by St. Hoffmann, the "idea of systems" has been extensively explored in the theoretical-methodological, historical and typological plan, but in the vast majority of cases the relationship between world order and international systems is not defined and investigated, the cause being, we consider, other content imprinted on the concept of world order than the one we advance. We specify lapidary that D. Easton is one of the researchers who has subjected the fundamental analysis of the political system, Ph. Braillard investigated the connection between social systems and international systems, G. Modelski and, R. Rosecrance studied the history of international systems, K. Waltz and M. Kaplan elaborated on the concept of structure, and system changes are elucidated by R. Aron and R. Gilpin (Juc 2011: 75). B. Buzan and R. Little is of another opinion, noting that "the international system remains a vague concept and almost invariably described, in one-dimensional terms, the theoretical concerns being channeled on the wesfalic model" (Buzan & Little 2009: 19).

Types of The International System Structures

The dimensions of the world order relative to international systems are expressed by two types of structures:

1. Polarity - associating with the horizontal dimension, defines the relationships between the main actors within the system, regimenting both the classical types of structures (unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity), as well as the hybrid ones;

2. Stratification - refers to the vertical functionality of the relations between the actors and the heterogeneous character of the asymmetric relations, especially between the great powers, which form the "center" of the system, and the other states, positioned at the "semi-periphery" and at its "periphery".

K. Waltz believes that "a structural change practically turns out to be a revolution" produced in the ordering principle of the system or "a change in the distribution of capabilities between its units" (Waltz 2006: 108, 141). Referring to these assumptions, J. Ruggie is of the opinion that the theory of K. Waltz ignores the differences between systems made up of different

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types of units, and R. Keohane rates it as "so general that it hardly passes the difficult tests that she herself sets" for such a theoretical construction. M. Kaplan, on the contrary, argued that the changes are driven by the behavior of actors, with states being "disruptive sources outside the system". R. Rosecrance also called states "a disruptive source" either "to a greater extent, if their elites are revolutionary and have no secure control over a large number of available resources" or "to a lesser extent if their elites are conservative and possess secure control over a limited amount of resources".

In an attempt to explain the change in international systems of states, R. Gilpin elaborated on The Theory of rational choice, based on some hypotheses of the microeconomic theory of rational choice, by which he defines three types of changes: interaction – which refers to the change of interstate relations within a certain framework of the balance of power; systemic-refers to the general governance of the system, the number of great powers and the change in the identity of the dominant powers, changes occur through a war within the system, erupted as a result of challenges to the existing power distribution or attempts to maintain IT; system change – provides for the fundamental transformation of the actors and nature of the system. Cyclical change within the international system is determined by Five Principles: an international system is stable, that is, it is in equilibrium, if no state considers the change profitable; a state will seek to change the international system if the expected benefits outweigh the supposed costs; a state will seek to change the international system through territorial expansion, political expansion, or economic expansion until the marginal costs of future change are equal to or greater than the expected benefits; once a balance is reached between the costs and benefits of future change and expansion is achieved, the economic costs of maintaining the status quo tend to increase faster than the economic capacity to support it; if the imbalance within the international system is not overcome, the system will change and a New Balance will be established, which will reflect the redistribution of power (Griffiths 2003: 35-36). R. Gilpin argues that historically international systems have been structured in three ways: an imperial or hegemonic control structure, in which a single state dominates the system; a bipolar control structure, in which the international system is controlled by two powerful states; a balance of power structure, in which three or more states regulate each other's activities.

Therefore, according to the theoretical construction of R. Gilpin, the international system being centered since 1648 on nation states, is practically subject to systemic change, its stability or instability depending on the existence of a political and economic hegemon, such as Britain was in the nineteenth century or turn out to be the United States of America after 1945. The main mechanism for achieving change was the "hegemonic war", or in terms of R. Aron's "general war",

ultimately determines the state or states that will dominate and govern the system, the motivational factors of change being a territorial, social-demographic or technological-military character. The authority of the power-hegemon is decreasing as the costs of domination begin to outweigh the advantages, and opponents will not hesitate to challenge it, causing instability and imbalance, which are remedied by war. Referring from a security perspective to the same subject of the decline of hegemonic powers, especially in the contemporary period, order that reflects on stability, B. Buzan mentions that they are eroding due to "long-term economic self-exhaustion through export inflation, transfer of capital and technologies, increasing structural rigidity in the economic plan as a result of sociopolitical demands from the experience of power and success, as well as disproportionate costs, especially of a military character, which burden the hegemon's economy in relations with its rivals" (Buzan 1984: 621).

St. Hoffmann evaluating the theory of R. Gilpin, who argued that for a certain type of international economic order to function, the hegemon state must stabilize monetary relations and International Trade, ensure the redistribution of capital through external assistance, and have a mechanism for sanctioning actors who abuse the system (Miroiu 2006: 274-275), concludes that this "provides a better exposure of the international economic system than of the political one", whereas in R. Keohane, the theory "does not reflect well the rise of hegemonic unity and does not clarify why some opponents rather than others arise". At the same time, aiming to contribute to the elaboration of a theory of hegemonic stability, R. Keohane points out that "the hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, contribute to a large extent to the development of strong international regimes, the rules of which are relatively precise and well assimilated. It is to be expected, in the sense elucidated by the ideas, stated the American researcher in the early 80s of the twentieth century, that the decline of hegemonic power structures foreshadows the decline of the strength of the corresponding international economic regimes" (Guzzini 2000: 271). In turn, trying to define the novelty of content in the theory of R. Keohane, but is marked by the realities of Cold War conditions, d. Snidal expresses the opinion that this is not limited to the statement, according to which "the main actors can impose a regime in international politics, but to the meaning that it imprints on collective action and the conclusion that hegemony is beneficial in a broad sense".

R. Cox approaches hegemony in a neo-Marxist spirit, in the sense grounded by A. Gramsci, as a unit of structure and superstructure, that is, power based on domination overproduction is expressed through an ideology that incorporates the compromise, or consensus between the dominant groups and the dominant groups. R. Cox believes that hegemony at global level cannot be realistically equated with simple domination, because realism only perpetuates the supremacy of

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the two major players over the rest of the world, but, at the same time, it cannot be treated either in neoliberal terms, as a public good to pursue, since neoliberal institutionalism only proclaims the interests of hegemonies, proposing to the whole world that it is in the interests of everyone, although in the case of poorly developed states the find out to their detriment. Both theories are aimed at legitimizing the domination of the powerful, and its annihilation can be achieved only by a joint effort of the actors located in the periphery of the world system, having high chances of success in the conditions of the inevitable crises of capitalism (Griffiths 2003: 196).

I. Wallerstein, as opposed to R. Gilpin or G. Modelski believes that structural changes occur not horizontally, but vertically, especially through the expansion of the capitalist market, considering not "a single power that dominates the system in a certain period of time, but a structure in the form of three concentric circles, determined by the fundamental economic connections that give way to the control exercised over the system by a power-hegemon" (Miroiu 2006: 17). The triadic structure defined by J. Wallerstein, which turns out to be a rather complex one, comprises: the center – includes two categories of major powers: states that manifest interests on a global scale and have the necessary potential to support them and states that hold great influence on the formation and compliance with the rules of functioning of international systems, through certain economic arrangements; the semi – districts-consist of three categories of states: the former Central Powers, which are in a clearly descending situation, but continue to hold an important share in the system, the emerging powers, which aim above all to increase their share in international relations and sub-regional, whose interests and capacities do not go beyond the sub-regional framework, aiming to—and strengthen the weight and presence of the sub-region; the peripheries-encompass states with underdeveloped economies and very low military capabilities, their security depending, to a large extent, on the international arrangements of the major powers.

We will briefly emphasize that the sharing of "center", "semi-series" and "periphery" is defined on the basis of the periodization of the evolution of the world system, the trends of sovereign states towards a certain type of structure are traced. B. Buzan and R. Little believes that I. Wallerstein developed a solid theoretical model, but it unfounded ignores the politico-military sector of a world system, the costs of eliminating this sector being very high. We note that the historical periodization of the world system elaborated by J. Wallerstein is a member of the board of trustees of the University of California, Berkeley, and the board of trustees of the University of California, Berkeley. Hoffmann, "a schema developed based on particular analyses of events".

An important aspect regarding polarity is to determine the influence of power distribution within the international system on its stability, the opinions of researchers varying according to the number of Poles, approached in part or in combinations. Since the systemic stabilization of international relations present the foundation for the edification of the world order, investigations are focused on determining which structures most effectively ensure balance and stability, whether they are identical or different. It is important to note that the vast majority of scientific elaborations are anchored on quantitativist typologies, even if some researchers, such as A. Wendt generally rejects this methodology, considering it, in a constructivist spirit, to be unfounded because attempts to infer models of stability and peace by analyzing the different distribution of power between state entities prove to be inadequate in historical aspect in the absence of theoretical examination of the way in which some state actors understand the nature and identity of threats from other entities of the same type, because "they act on the socially constituted meanings that objects have for them" (Griffiths 2003: 329). However, although they consider that the best mechanism for studying international stability is not the variable number of great powers because such static analysis proves to be an obstacle to focusing attention on more significant processes of interaction between states, the modernists K. Deutsch and D. Singer by applying sophisticated mathematical techniques comes to the conclusion that the multipolar system composed of at least five great powers is historically more stable than systems that include fewer major actors (Griffiths 2003: 290). Within the multipolar order, a relatively equal distribution of power among the major actors is attested, and therefore, it is impossible for one to prevail over the others, orders that should narrow the range of violent options and guarantee the stability of the international system. At the same time, K. Deutsch believes that this type of international system proves to be prone to internal structural instability, driven by the concentration of forces in the format of a coalition in the ratio not of three to two, but of four to one.

M. Haas believes that mono polarity is distinguished by the highest degree of stability, bipolarity is associated with long wars, given that some actors try to change the "distribution of resources", and within multipolarity there are a large number of conflicts, but which most of the time do not cause cardinal changes in the system. Multipolarity is more stable than bipolarity, "stability" being conceived as preserving the number of centers of force, and "instability" is determined by the number of wars that take place within the international system. P. Hassner, on the contrary, believes that a large number of centers of force risk becoming, rather, a source of unpredictable events and uncontrolled disorder than of restraint, stressing in the bipolar world the nuclear balance between superpowers has been established. E. Mansfield and J. Ikenberry,

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especially the latter, also believes that the unipolar order proves to be the most effective form of ensuring stability in the international system due to the power -hegemon's ability to prevail over any coalition and intervene in conflicts generating instability by inhibiting bellicose moods (Ikenberry 2001: 22-24). In the same order of ideas D. Wilkinson argues that "the unipolar system most effectively ensures internal stability and can last for many decades, the unipolar configuration has internal factors that regulate themselves" (Wilkinson 1999: 141).

Change and Stability of International Systems.

Arguing that "smaller" is more preferable than "small", K. Waltz expresses the belief that smaller international systems are more stable and their members prove to be able to a greater extent to manage affairs for their mutual benefit, stable systems being "self-reinforcing because understanding the behavior of others, concluding agreements with them and keeping in check their compliance becomes much easier to achieve through continuous experience". In the conditions of the bipolar system the interdependence is low, the alliance leaders make up the strategies starting from their own calculations regarding the interests, being free to follow the strategic line drawn, which is directed, with predilection, towards facing the main adversary. The superpowers must face each other, the main constraints being caused not so much by the actions of their own associates, but by the actions of the global adversary. In the multipolar world, dangers are diffusely distributed, responsibilities are unclear, and interdependence is high because states often pool resources to serve their interests. Within the multipolar system the powers depend on each other, "difficulties arise especially when some states threaten others, while the alignments prove to be uncertain" (Waltz 2006: 225).

J. Mearsheimer argues that in the conditions of Anarchy and security dilemma the major actors seek to maximize their relative power in relation to their competitors, aiming to establish their hegemony. He defines the international structure by two criteria: the distribution of capacities, present either in sight or latent from the system, and the gap between the first two states. Based on the first criterion, multipolar and bipolar international systems are distinguished, and according to the second – balanced and unbalanced systems. As a result of combining these criteria, the researcher identified four types of systems: balanced multipolar, unbalanced multipolar, balanced bipolar and unbalanced bipolar, stating that only the first three meet correspondingly in reality. Multipolar systems turn out to be more unstable and therefore more prone to war than bipolar ones, the causes being the following: the greater number of important actors increases the opportunities

for war, as more conflict situations arise; power asymmetries, giving priority to transferring responsibility over counterbalance, which makes it difficult to prevent war; increases the risk of miscalculations regarding relative power, but also the determination of states to realize their interests. The unbalanced multipolarity is much more prone to war than the balanced one, given that there is a tendency of the potential hegemon to force the obtaining of regional hegemony and, respectively, the increased degree of fear at the level of the other states, which can inspire them to adopt the policies of the regional riskier (Guzzini 2000: 132-133). Ch. Kupchan submitted the analysis of the construction of J. Mearsheimer, identified some contradictions between theoretical prescriptions, such as the United States ' acquisition of continental hegemony for the nineteenth purpose, which was not achieved either by war or by the lack of counterbalance from other states in the "new world".

Researching exclusively only interstate relations in the strategic-diplomatic field, R. Aron defines by the phrase "configuration of force ratios" two types of systems, and the binomial "homogeneity/heterogeneity" is applied to determine the ways to ensure their balance and stability. The system of multipolar equilibrium is the result of the compromise between the natural state and the domination of laws: states recognize the mutual right to existence, tend to keep the balance, and show a certain degree of solidarity. The bipolar equilibrium system is distinguished by a higher level of heterogeneity, states are divided into three groups: Alliance leaders, States affiliated in coalitions, and states not engaged in conflicts. In this sense, the bipolar system does not prove to be more unstable and affected by wars than the multipolar system, but rather it can provoke a global war because each local conflict shakes the international system. Still, R. Aron deliberately does not specify the type of system that would be more stable: making use of the category of the balance of forces as a defining instrument of scientific investigation and unjustifiably overestimating, in our opinion, the share of local conflicts in international relations in the bipolar world (international relations are characterized as "multiplicity of decision centers and, on this basis, the increasing risk of war" (Aron 1984: 28). The researcher considers, like M. Kaplan or St. Hoffmann, that the type of bipolar structure turns out to be more unstable compared to multipolarity. "Within bipolar systems, mentions St. Hoffmann, (compared to the multipolar structure – n. n.) rather prevails the dialectic of hostilitie (Hoffmann 1999: 81). The common idea shared by these three leading researchers is that it is not so much the numerical aspect in ensuring the stability of the system that matters as the relations between the poles, although naturally, there cannot be any differences that come from defining the role of the structure: according to R. Aron, the way of establishing the poles of the international system turns out to be much more relevant than their number, while M. Kaplan

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argues that international politics, in general, is dominated by subsystems, which erode easily. Consider that R. Aron exaggerated to a certain extent the disruptive influence of subregional conflicts on the stability of bipolar systems, this estimate being relevant in the case of bipolarity described by Thucydides. Actually, K. Waltz noted quite correctly that in the contemporary bipolar world, third parties, including with the status of great powers, have not been able to "disastrously distort the balance" between superpowers, the low global weight of the Non-Alignment Movement confirming the rightness of this idea.

Neither St. Hoffmann did not openly nominate the most stable type of international system, alongside R. Aron pointed to the multipolar equilibrium, which "effectively worked" following the Treaties of Westphalia, even though it was "troubled... by numerous limited wars, but these rarely affected the civilian population". The contemporary bipolar system was characterized by heterogeneity in values and several levels of competition and rivalry, being composed of the center that included the camps of superpowers and the inhomogeneous periphery, fragmented into subsystems according to the degree of presence and influence of the two major actors. The change of international systems was succeeded by "the intercession of General wars, which... were not always inevitable" (Hoffmann 1999: 111). Elaborating the concept of the stakes of conflict as an analysis tool that includes the structure of the system and the state of the technology of conflict, he distinguishes between stable systems and revolutionary systems: the stakes of conflict in a stable system are limited, and the relations between actors are characterized by moderation in scale and means, while the revolutionary system is extremely unstable because moderation disappears and in addition, there is a revolution in the technology of conflict or a transformation of the structure of the world. The distinctions between stable systems and revolutionary systems are determined by the impact of the binomial "acceptance and agreement/non-acceptance and disagreement" on the values and rules of competition between actors, especially between the main protagonists. Stable or "moderate" systems are characterized by multipolarity in the distribution of power and homogeneity in the purposes and means used by states, while revolutionary systems prove to be bipolar in the distribution of power and heterogeneous in the qualities of actors. In an attempt to identify the peculiarities of the "bipolar world political system", St. Hoffmann considers it to be both "revolutionary and moderate", citing the possibility of "assured mutual destruction". This "inconsistency" was called by K. Waltz is a "disheartening blur" of position, but it is no less true that he himself believed that "nuclear weaponry makes the bipolar world moderate, "even though,

according to H. Mouritzen, who makes several comments on waltzing theory, considers it important in the context of his theory, although secondary in relation to the distribution of capabilities.

According to H. Kissinger, the international system is composed of elements in interconnection and, at the same time, in uninterrupted motion, but its trajectories are determined only by the characteristics of the basic units. Although "the world order reflects trends towards permanence", the type of this depends on the aspirations of the actors "who configure it" and as the components of the international system transform their character, "the period of upheavals inevitably occurs" (Kissinger 1997: 734-735). The researcher and the politician distinguish between the legitimate international order and the revolutionary international order, in the first case this arrangement is accepted by all the great powers and tends to stability and peace, while in the second, one or more major actors reject it, in the sense that they refuse to deal with other states according to the pre-established rules and the aspirations to instability and war become apparent. "The legitimate order does not at all cancel the possibility of conflicts, but essentially reduces their proportions, wars occur only if they are carried out in the name of maintaining the existing structure", while the revolutionary order arises in circumstances in which one or more major actors seek to modify the structure of the international system as a whole: "the distinguishing feature of revolutionary power is that nothing can appease it except absolute security, that is, the destruction of the opponent, which is considered to be satisfactory guarantee: the desire of one power to be in absolute security means for the others absolute insecurity".

Reflecting, according to H. Kissinger, the tradition of Wilsonian internationalism in dealing with international relations and disarmament, H. Morgenthau argues that "a lasting peace established on the basis of a stable balance of power is built in relation to a common moral framework, which expresses the commitment of all interested nations to respect some elementary moral principles, among which is the preservation of the balance of power": disarmament contributes to the establishment of the international order and the defense of World Peace by improving the political situation, by easing tensions and the resulting mutual trust in the interests of the states involved (Morgenthau 2007: 435-438).

Being a process and a state, the world order is limited to certain arrangements within the international system, determined by the structure of the system and by the features of the international environment: it is a process because it manifests itself through the historical succession of different configurations of international relations; it is a state, because it is expressed in the form of common interests and values, encompassing the totality of the actors who through their actions

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and interactions form the structure. The "international order" reflected the character of international relations under the conditions of "State-centrism", being synonymous with interstate relations, while the "world order" is an expression of increasing their degree of complexity, expressed through decentralization and multiplication of the number of actors, through the expansion of processes arising from the amplification of globalization and informatization. The end of the bipolar world has called into question several theoretical assertions considered axiomatic in the past, such as "system change occurs through the war" and has caused controversy regarding the type of structure of the international system and the configuration of the world order in the process of rebuilding. We consider it necessary to specify that the hybrid system structures gradually gained ground, replacing the classical ones, of strict and rigid character, being applied, with a predilection, in order to shed light on the features of the post-Cold War international system.

The Post-Cold War International System (1989/1991-2002)

Conclusion bipolar conflagration and the transition to the new configuration of the world order occurred peacefully and were not institutionalized by treaties. Thus, if the Westphalia arrangements basically totaled the 30 Years ' War and traced the parameters of the multipolar international order model, and after the Second World War favorable circumstances were created for the institutionalization and consolidation of bipolarity due to the genetic conflict between the two systems, the post-Cold War situation began absolutely in another framework and in other conditions. In the post-bipolar period, the decentralization of International Relations takes place through the emergence or updating of some factors generating conflict, the presence of rebel states (asystemic or failed), the expansion of the "nuclear club", the increase of the share of non-state actors, with a predilection of international governmental organizations and terrorist movements, the expansion, deepening and diversification of globalization, the appearance on the political map of several state entities. The difficulties derived from the novelty and complexity of the announced problems were amplified by epistemological and methodological deficiencies, in the sense that due to the horizontal structural-systemic asymmetry, the balance of forces principle did not work, the anarchy of the international environment became more pronounced, and the Pole "left" the Strictly geopolitical framework, an increasing share returning to the geoeconomic dimension. Globalization and computerization favored the erosion of state sovereignty, demolishing to some extent the "state-centrism" of international relations, the political-ideological basis of the global conflict was collapsed and gave way to theoretical constructions.

Therefore, the end of the Cold War deeply disturbed the environments of politicians and circles of specialists in the field of international relations, the bullying was conditioned by several factors, including: some aspects of international relations that were considered to have remained nothing but the object of history, returned unannounced to the World arena in New conditions, updating their potential and marking their character and evolution; some new problems and circumstances appeared, Unknown or little known in the past, but which amplified, complicating the explanation and understanding of policies and processes on the world arena due to its impact.

The formation of the world order after the end of the Cold War turned out to be a complex and multi-faceted process, which found expression in several elaborations and global scenarios proposed by different scientific schools, opinion leaders, and representatives of various cultures and religions. Even if the opportunity is expressed to identify more constructive and less violent forms of interaction of international actors, many models bear the imprint of the conflicting logic between the poles, the latter receiving, along with the traditional treatment, in a realistic spirit, another dimension, drawn either from the reflection of new realities or from intellectual speculation. The fact is that polarity remains the basic problem of the configuration of the world order and the structure of the international system, the pole being approached in a geopolitical sense, but also from a broader perspective, including geoeconomic, geo-religious and other aspects, which in their entirety or in part, impresses this concept a new content. We will mention that the "pole" interpreted in a narrow, geopolitical sense only fully reflects the realities of the contemporary world, especially since it has a much higher conceptual and organizational status in attempts to explain and understand the content of post-Cold War international relations.

We consider that the world order and, implicitly, the post - Cold War international system of the first period (1989/1991-2014/2015) was not by its configuration and, respectively, by structure, neither monopolar, bipolar, nor multipolar char, because the pole, through its character, represents a distinct and determining point, towards which other actors, with less weight, gravitate for different reasons: Interest, fear, imposition, tradition, conviction or authority. The world in the last decade of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the Twenty-First Century gradually became a polycentric one, in the sense that several power centers (North American Free Trade Association, Asian - Pacific Economic Cooperation, European Union) were crystallized and present, each including a certain number of states brought together in different forms. These arrangements do not exclude, but on the contrary, presuppose the existence of different structural hierarchies within the international system, all the more so that depending on the changing force

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ratios, different positions are constantly produced, roles redistribution, and reconfiguration of spheres of influence. The structure could not be of a unipolar type because not all states recognized the American hegemony, challenging it frequently and with varying intensity, such as the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, China, India, South African Republic) or the declared asystemic States (Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea) and therefore, not all actors gravitated towards the United States of America, which, despite the world supremacy held and the status of the main power, rather proved to be the first among equals in a select club, the applied degree of influence, even if sometimes exaggerated, it was in line with the assumed responsibilities and announced exigencies. The structure was not bipolar because there was no second pole, although we admit the presence of the first and in addition, we did not attest to the multi-factual conflict between superpowers, rivalries between major powers being expressed also through economic competition, and by competition in the field of top technologies. The type of structure was not multipolar, because several distinct poles were not formed that would have counterbalanced each other, there was no involvement in capturing adherents and expanding spheres of influence, and the relations between major powers were anchored on different forms and mechanisms of cooperation and conflict. Although it can still be applied as a tool for scientific research and description of World processes in full swing, polarity in its classical form did not correspond to the realities founded on hierarchies of the postwar Cold War period above invoked.

In our view, at least in a future environment, no great power will be able to individually become a distinct pole because it will not meet all the parameters that would ensure its status, except for the United States, which, broadly speaking, meets all the requirements. However, the events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerability of the United States of America and thus the relatively increased degree of insecurity, especially since under the conditions of bipolarity the superpowers were not subjected to attacks in such a direct manner. The other major powers, actually or potentially nominated in this capacity, face different handicaps that they will not be able to overcome progressively, but only alleviate, in the best case, these being political-military and cultural-civilizational (Japan), social and political-ideological (China), geo religious and social (India), geo linguistic and socio-economic (Brazil), geopolitical, cultural-civilizational and economic (Russian Federation), institutional-integrationist within the European Union (Germany and France) (Juc 2010: 187), and the situation of Great Britain are to be clarified in a medium-term after leaving the European Union.

The complex processes of reconfiguring the world order model and transforming the structure of the post-Cold War international system were broadly completed by 2014 and so the first period has practically ended. The time that has elapsed since the end of the Cold War spanned only two decades and did not include the average lifetime of a generation, an indicator used as a conventional chronological unit for researching the development of international processes, a priority for the analysis of international politics.

The reorganization of the international system turned out to be a rather dynamic process, resulting in the re-establishment of world power structures and the formation of major centers, conceived as actors or institutions that by their behavior and will shape and direct power to multiple sectors of the international system. The major centers of power practically became, using the term used by S. Strange, "non-territorial Empires" due to the Constitution of the "civilization of world affairs", international relations remained, according to R. Cline, an arena of "hegemonism of the great powers". Under the conditions of polycentrism, the hierarchy was gradually attenuated, but the balance of power was not returned: international relations being a space of cooperation and conflict, is characterized by a relatively high degree of heterogeneity due to diversification through decentralization and expansion of the list of international actors and global interdependence, amplified by Trans nationalization and the information revolution. The post-Cold War world order was formed in a decentralized, linear, and synergetic environment, given the expansion of the number of participants in the collective decision-making process at the international level, even in conditions of polarity and stratification. The National States and international governmental organizations continue to hold the status of the most important and influential international actors, while in the list of transnational actors the positions of leaders belong to transnational corporations and terrorist movements.

Alternation of Periods of Cooperation And Conflict in The Post-Bipolar Period

In the context of the events in Ukraine (2014 and 2022) and in Syria (starting in 2015) the world order model is subject to attempts to be changed, given that a major player in international relations, the Russian Federation, a system-trainer, questions the configuration established (by World Order) and consolidated at the beginning of the XXI century. The structure of the international system in the last decade of the twentieth century was eminently uni-polycentric, while after the events of September 11, 2001, when the superpower practically openly acknowledged its vulnerability, it appealed to solidarity, including by reference to art. V of The Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949, on the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, expressly called for

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expanding the number of those responsible for the fate of the world. This reasoning, but also because of the strengthening of the potential of major players in the World arena, fully justifies us to support the structure received polycentric format. The relations between the major international actors are carried out horizontally not on the basis of the principle of balance of forces, this being realized at the level of subsystems, but of the relative hierarchy, which turns out to be much more pronounced vertically, in the relations between the "center" and the "periphery", since the sharing on the North-South global axis remained only a metaphor, becoming history, and giving way to the division on the South-South coordinate. Both the "center" and the "periphery" of the international system practically "diluted" in geopolitical, geoeconomic, and institutional aspects, the eventuality of the global conflict theoretically substantiated by K. Ohmae or by A. and H. Toffler were substantially reduced. The "geometric configuration of the international system has undergone substantial transformations, changes determined by the resizing of the positions of certain elements of the structure since the agent-structure relations are interrelated.

CONCLUSIONS

We note that under the conditions of the global hierarchy, the management of the world order is ensured by the major players, in the context that sectoral hegemony is carried out not only by the states but, mainly, by their commercial-economic associations, multinational corporations, and global financial markets, with the specification that the first two occupy only certain segments of the economy, while the influence of the latter is truly global. Ensuring international security and maintaining peace continues to be the cause of major actors and political-military alliances: contrary to several assumptions, the role of the political-military factor has not lost relevance, but on the contrary, it has revived. Currently, we return mostly to the classical foundations of the approach of international relations, but which are applied in the context of new realities.

Scientific Research Perspectives of the World Order

The post-Cold War period was largely completed by the Russian Federation's act of aggression against Ukraine. After the end of the active phase of the armed conflict in Ukraine, humanity will enter in the second edition of the cold war, and the ideas supported in this article will serve as a source of reference and comparative analysis for new scientific developments.

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