

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY EUROSCEPTICISM IN TURKEY: A SURVEY STUDY ON IR STUDENTS

TÜRKİYE’DE TARİHİ VE GÜNCEL AVRUPA ŞÜPHECİLİĞİ: ULUSLARARASI İLİŐKİLER ÖĐRENCİLERİNE YÖNELİK ANKET ÇALIŐMASI

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Abstract

In recent years, there has been a growing academic interest in understanding the extent and determinants of Euroscepticism among the non-Europeans. As a concept about mistrust in the EU, the level of Euroscepticism can give valuable data about the socio-political structure of a society and its very perception of Europe. Moreover, the dynamics of the relationship between Europe and the given country can be better understood. To this end, this paper aims to find the roots of Euroscepticism and trace the patterns of it among the International Relations (IR) students in Turkey via online survey. Through analysing the tendencies of answers, we believe that both the reasons of the students’ support for the EU and their basic concerns can be understood with a broad range of reasons. In fact, several focal points of scepticism can be observed around political, cultural and national concerns as our survey results are examined closely. We hope that this survey analysis is not only a contribution to better comprehend relations between Turkey and the EU, but also helping us, the IR scholars, to learn more about the characteristics of our students and their perception of Europe.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, survey, Turkey, European Union.

Öz

Avrupalı olmayanların Avrupa şüpheciliğinin sınırlarını ve belirleyenlerini anlamaya yönelik akademik ilgi son yıllarda giderek artmaktadır. Avrupa Birliđi’ne duyulan güvensizlik kavramı olarak Avrupa şüpheciliğinin seviyesi, toplumun sosyo-politik yapısı ve Avrupa algısı açısından önemli bilgiler verir. Ayrıca, bir ülkenin Avrupa ile ilişkisinin dinamiklerinin daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlar. Bu amaca ulaşmak için bu çalışma; Avrupa şüpheciliğinin köklerini bulmayı ve Türkiye’deki Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) öğrencileri arasında var olan izlerini çevirim içi anket ile sürmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Verilen cevaplardaki eğilimlerin analizi sonucunda hem öğrencilerin Avrupa Birliđi’ni destekleme nedenlerinin hem de bu konudaki

temel kaygılarının çeşitli sebeplerinin anlaşılacağı inancındayız. Anket sonuçlarımız yakından incelendiğinde politik, kültürel ve milli kaygılar açısından çeşitli şüpheli noktalar gözlenmektedir. Bu anket analizinin, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki ilişkilerinin daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağladığı gibi Uİ bilim insanlarının öğrencilerin karakteristiğini ve Avrupa algısını anlamlarına yönelik bir katkı sunmasını umarız.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Avrupa şüpheliği, anket, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği.*

1. INTRODUCTION

'Eurocepticism' is the object of many studies mainly dealing with the problems between the EU and the countries which are members or on the way to become one. Moreover, the scholarly interest in this phenomenon is growing as the concept, and also the process of Europeanization is being challenged internally and externally. Not only the European countries but also the non-European countries might develop a degree of suspicion towards the EU and its project in terms of their own socio-political structure. This article deals with Eurocepticism in Turkey, which has not only a history of long standing with Europe, but also a prolonged process of accession to the EU. All in all, the complex relationship with Europe has created multi-dimensional Eurocepticism among Turkish citizens to be analyzed.

Generally, we can define Eurocepticism as a general suspicion or reluctance of people, bureaucrats or governments about European integration. Several definitions can be found in literature which are mainly around similar outlines. Taggart and Szczerbiak offered a widely accepted definition of Euoscepticism, defining it as, 'the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration' (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001) Different classifications can also be put forward for Eurocepticism. According to Catharina Sørensen, Eurocepticism can be classified under several fears about the EU mainly based upon economy, sovereignty, politics and may also focus on the inadequacy of EU institutions (Sørensen 2008). Moreover, classifications can be extended like Riishøj did in his research paper about Polish and Czech Eurocepticisms. For him, Eurocepticism can be put into several contexts based on scepticisms concerning identity, cleavage, policy, institutional, national interest, experience, party, Atlantic and practice (Riishøj 2010). Above these dimensions of Eurocepticism, Taggart and Szczerbiak believe that it can be understood also as 'hard' or 'soft' in terms of its tone. Hard scepticism is a total rejection of the idea of Europe because of mainly being against the idea of Europe, which are mainly pursued by the anti-establishment parties in Europe. Soft scepticism formulates a limited opposition mainly concerning specific policies of the EU clashing with their 'national interests'. Unlike the hard sceptics, soft scepticism does not offer rejection, exclusion or isolation of the EU, but it keeps a critical stance at the policy level (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001). In other words, soft scepticism is an expression of 'Yes, but...' to the EU, says Riishøj (2010).

However, we should not forget that countries inside Europe and outside of Europe can have different types of Eurocepticism. As the European countries might develop scepticism about

the success of the EU as an institution, its policies or the clash of national interests with it, non-Europeans' Euro-scepticism can be more radical than the Europeans. 'Hard' scepticism can be experienced in forms of identity-based issues which sees Europe as a threat or the 'other' from which the genuine culture or social structure should be kept away. This kind of 'hard' scepticism is, obviously, more than what Taggart and Szczerbiak's model which does not offer being totally out of Europe. On the other hand, 'soft' scepticism of the European countries does not show a big difference from the non-Europeans, as both of them question not the EU in principle, but its policies. We believe that Taggart and Szczerbiak's distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' scepticism can be applied to Turkish Euro-scepticism, as long as we keep in mind the nuance about the 'hard' scepticism in Turkey around some identity concerns protecting itself against the EU. Within this context, the hard and soft scepticism in Turkey can be seen either as 'hard' concerns around identity perceptions and othering Europe in general, or as 'soft' concerns around policy-oriented reasons which are more or less open for change over time. It is important to elaborate more on the different types of Euro-scepticisms in Turkey, in order to see the potential of solutions and the tendency of society for cooperation with the EU. Different focuses, dimensions or tones of Euroscepticism can be found in many countries. It may emerge in different forms, depending on the country's socio-economic features, political developments or, most importantly the history of its relations with European countries. Although it is not easy to define all types of Euroscepticism under two titles, its methodology can give an idea about the level of the suspicion and reluctance in one country about being a part of Europe. Different dynamics, experiences or facts are important in the formation of different types of Euroscepticism.

There has been a great interest and numerous studies on Euroscepticism and its valuation in different countries, including both European and non-European. In this paper, we aimed contributing to understanding the case of Turkey with a so-far neglected aspect; the young generation or more specifically, IR students.

We analysed their reasons of support and the lack thereof, their expectations to the EU and their future projections. One of the most striking findings is the significant difference between level of scepticism in Turkey as such and among the students. The latter are more supportive of the EU than other citizens. There might be several reasons for this difference between the general tendency in Turkish society and among IR students. The primary causes are family backgrounds, easy access to communication tools, social lives and university education. Moreover, the subject of the concerns is observed mainly around policy-based issues open for reconsideration depending on the possibility of change in relations.

First, we shortly discuss the background of Euroscepticism in Turkey going back to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Within this context, the religious and nationalist grounds of concerns about the Europeans and the Europeanization among the Turkish society can be understood with their identity-based references. Islamists' clear opposition to European influence triggered the rhetoric of protecting the Muslim way of life and identity against the Christian world. This kind of scepticism can be seen as the strict or 'hard' form of Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001) which can be difficult or almost impossible to

change. The young Republican Turkey's effort to keep Anatolia against the European forces is also important in understanding the Euroscepticism in the historical context. The paranoia about losing the territories to Europe has never been erased from the public memory since the 1920s. This kind of odd relations with Europe has still marks on the perception of the Turks about the membership into the EU and the reliability of the Europeans. Accordingly, the level of Euroscepticism in Turkey is high in different survey datasets.

Before we go into details of our survey, in order to understand Euroscepticism in Turkey, we need to give the history of the relations and its evolution in time. As the longest pending candidate for membership, Turkey is an intriguing case to analyse as it has a long history with Europe and modernization. It has never been accepted as a European power, but still has never been outside. Different than many other non-European countries, even the pillars of its national identity are standing upon its relations with Europe. Europeanization and Euroscepticism could grow together as two sides of the same coin, which brings Turkey as an interesting country to work on. In order to understand this complexity, we need to see the roots of Europe perception starting from the Ottoman Empire and continued in modern Turkey.

1.1 Westernization Process of the Ottoman Empire and the Origin of Euroscepticism

Turkey's encounter with Europe has been a history full of contradictions, puzzles and problems. In fact, understanding this process is also understanding the evolution of Turkish society and state, including the transformation from empire to nation-state. Since the 18th century, the relations with Europe has always been on the agenda of the state elites, especially in the form of modernization, development and secularization in the Ottoman Empire. As the glorious days of the Empire seemed to end with military defeats, economic problems and political movements, among the statesmen and the intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire the necessity of change and modernization was widely accepted as the only solution. Starting with the military reforms, social, political and cultural aspects of life were all opened to be influenced by European norms and modernity. For the Ottoman bureaucracy 'To catch up with the European powers' had become an aim in itself.

As appetite for Europe increased among intellectuals, bureaucrats and elites, however, during this very early process of Europeanization a counter feeling critical of this development was planted. The feelings of the Ottoman people for the Europeans were torn between hate and envy. In fact, this process of 'renewing' the Empire became also an identity-constitution (Dağı 2005). The fear about the erosion of culture or deformation of social norms with the impact of modernization and secularization became widespread among the conservatives (İnalçık 1995: 28). Religious conservatism was pioneering in this respect, which is sceptical about idealizing the western way of life and fear of losing the Islamic values and culture. The West was pictured as the source of all problems in the Muslim world. According to the Islamists, indignity, degeneration and depravation were all related with the western way of thinking.

However, the necessity of modern science, medicine or technicality was obvious and the Islamic civilization looked far from being an answer on its own. That is why, making a

distinction between westernization and modernization has always been popular among the Islamists, whereas the former was perceived as enslavement of the civilization to the distorted and evil characteristics of the West, the latter means scientific development (Dağı 2005). The formula was clear: to take the good aspects of the West (material) and to stay away from the bad aspects of the west (moral). In other words, while the science and technology of the west were acceptable, the cultural values and social norms were rejected. This irony had its impact also on the Turkish nationalists at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The issue has been called the dilemma of Turkish westernization process torn between: culture (hars), common social norms, and civilization (medeniyet), modernization (Kadiođlu 200: 39).

As the Ottoman Empire was about to come to an end, another development contributed to Euroscepticism in Turkish society. The Treaty of S vres, which was signed between the Ottoman sultan at the point of dethroned and the Allies of the WWI on May 11, 1920, triggered the deep distrust of the Turks towards the Europeans. Next to its severe financial and military implications, S vres Treaty was mainly about partitioning the Ottoman territories between the Allies. The treaty was replaced by another one in 1923 by the new Ankara government, but its impact on Turkish psychology is profound, demonstrated by anxiety of seeing the western countries as the potential dividers and/or imperialistic powers. The belief in Europeans' secret plans about partitioning the territories still plays a role among nationalists, and is known in the literature as 'the S vres Syndrome' (Robbins 2000: 225; Hale 2000: 225). Hakan Yılmaz defines the syndrome as the spatiotemporal continuation of the Crusades in terms of its basic narration about the split between the Christian and Muslim worlds. In fact, the idea behind the syndrome downplays centuries-long relations with the Europeans on the basis of seeing the Turks as the barbarians who conquered the Christian lands and whom should be kicked out of those holy lands, as soon as possible (Yılmaz 2009). Even after almost a century, this paranoia or 'sovereignist' concerns (Karatař 2008) still exists in Turkish public memory. For instance, according to a 2006 survey, 72 % of Turkish citizens believe that there are still some countries who want to divide Turkey (TRT 2007).

In this context, Euroscepticism in Turkey has partly, if not mostly, been fuelled by this timeless mistrust between the parties. However, it should be kept in minds that the earlier stages of EU candidacy show a relatively positive development in Turkey. In year 2000, in Turkey the perception of the EU was at a very high level (řenyuva 2006). Ironically, the level of Euroenthusiasm in Turkey was increasing until the beginning of the negotiation talks in 2004 and then it started to go down, which could be defined as the secession incline of the Turkey as it gets closer (Dedeođlu 2011). The very process of westernization of Turkish society, starting in the Ottoman times and continuing with lots of ups and down, has reached another turn with the complexity of Turkey-EU relations. Within this complexity of orientations, it is intriguing to understand the position of the youngsters, mainly the ones that we know better – our students.

2. RESEARCH DESIGN

We aim to understand the level of Euroscepticism among the International Relations students in Turkey by conducting a survey. We believe that as scholars of International Relations, one of the primary tasks is to educate students. Yet, education is not a one-way communication. The inclusion of students into teaching and learning process is an important aspect of higher education. It is not only about students understand what the teacher says, but also teachers understand what students say. An efficient education can be built upon a fruitful dialogue between both ends of the conversation.

There is no doubt that all IR departments offer several courses about Europe to hundreds of IR students every semester. In fact, learning about Europe is an important part of teaching IR in Turkey. Both the number of students studying this topic and the literature about Turkey-Europe relations grow immensely. This growth in number and in potential, would constitute a great challenge for the instructors teaching courses about Europe. In order to process a well-organized and efficient class, not only the reading material or teaching techniques, but also the characteristics of students should be understood better. Students are the audience or target groups, who come to classes with more or less their own knowledge, belief or stereotypes about Europe. They are no blank pages for us to fill in. On the contrary, our job, most of the time, is to change or redefine what is already there and, unfortunately, not always in forms of unbiased information. Hence, next to the question of ‘what to teach?’, we should also ask ‘whom to teach?’, in order to educate more equipped students to graduate from IR departments.

To this extent, this survey aims to analyse our students’ ideas about Europe and their level of Euroscepticism. By learning more about their concerns, we can reconsider the techniques of teaching Europe. As scholars of a highly ‘political’ department, knowing the political views of our students will contribute to our teaching and learning skills. Next to its pedagogical insight, this survey would also give us an idea about the main tendencies among the students that we are preparing as bureaucrats, politicians or scholars to-be. Learning their suspicions about Europe would also shed a light on the future of relations between Turkey and Europe within the context of the upcoming problems, underlying fears and potentials of solutions.

Since we believe that Euroscepticism is not a monolithic concept, but a multifaceted and complex phenomena; our questions are formulated in order to understand the different levels of concerns. Hence, after analysing the history of Euroscepticism in Turkey and identifying the social, political and cultural framework of Turkish society, we come up with four main concerns that are behind the scepticism of the students.

The first concern is the ‘religious’ factor. The questions asking their opinions about the incompatibility between Islam and Christianity, their worries about immorality or gender relations are assumed to generate data about the weight of students’ religious concerns in their Euroscepticism. The second concern is about ‘cultural’ issues, is partly similar with the religious concerns, since they both underlines conservatism. Cultural concerns are mainly

thought as related with cultural degeneration, weakening traditions, deconstructing family coherence or unwanted freedom of pre-marriage sex, which could all be seen within the context of conservation of social norms and institutions. The third concern is about 'nationalist' concerns. Sensitivity about national unity, independence or Atatürk can be regarded as the nationalist dimension of Euroscepticism. The fourth concern is 'political'. Those students include those who perceive Europe as an unreliable ally for Turkey, are critical of European politics towards Turkey and those who accuse the Europeans of being the exploiting power in international politics.

Without doubt, these concern groups are not mutually exclusive. There may be certain overlaps or intersections between these concerns, as well as some stimulation power on each other. For instance, nationalist oriented Euroscepticism can have some cultural or political notes in itself. A religious person who sees the EU as a 'Christian club' would be against the membership of Turkey because of its political double-standards. Obviously, we do not want to group students into four strict groups according to their source of scepticism. We only would like to see the tendencies of the students on several bases, which will help us to know our students better and be more target oriented in our teachings.

3. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

We conducted our survey online by using Survey Monkey and the online questionnaire was sent directly to IR students and the responses were anonymous. Our survey questions were derived from various strands within the broader literature in addition to the existing Eurobarometer questions. This design allowed us to learn the IR students' opinions toward the EU and Europe in a multidimensional fashion. We sent an invitation e-mail to the heads of each IR department in Turkey for them to share the online questionnaire link with their students. The survey completion rate is 10.6% and a response rate that is consistent with the trend of e-mail survey studies (Sheehan 2001). A random stratified sample comprised 402 IR students aged 19-26 who use the Internet was surveyed throughout March-May 2015.

It is common in particularly online surveys that the users who wish to get through as quickly as possible have a tendency towards selecting the first answer that appears at the top, although another answer might be more suitable for them. To eliminate first-answer bias in multiple choice questions of this survey, the order of choices were randomly changed for each and every respondent as suggested by Warner (1965).

It is known that some questions are biased due to implicit assumptions made in wording of them. For instance, 'How concerned are you about the ongoing membership negotiation between Turkey and the EU?' causes a bias in a direction of concern since it assumes that the respondents should be concerned about this issue (Sterngold, Warland and Hermann 1994). To remove bias, we used a filter question. Students were firstly asked whether or not they were concerned with this issue. And then, the next question is asked to those that were concerned to specify their concern. Consequently, significantly fewer subjects have shown their concerns than the former approach. For the questions of evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of

Table 1: List of Respondents to Survey

Name of University	# of Respondents	(%)
Ege University	145	36.1
TOBB University of Economics & Technology	44	10.9
Ankara University	43	10.7
Karabuk University	29	7.2
Istanbul Bilgi University	29	7.2
Nigde University	28	7.0
Istanbul Sehir University	26	6.5
Yildirim Beyazit University	14	3.5
Eskisehir Osmangazi University	13	3.2
Middle East Technical University	10	2.5
Yasar University	8	2.0
Erciyes University	4	1.0
Cankiri Karatekin University	4	1.0
Izmir University	3	0.7
Mugla Sitki Kocman University	1	0.2
Akdeniz University	1	0.2
Total	402	100.0

* In additional analyses, we have employed weighted sampling to see if the results are affected by the imbalances in the response rates of different universities. Since there were no significant changes in results occurred, unweighted sampling has been used throughout the study.

the EU membership, we added 'none of the above' category in order to get more accurate responses than if that response option was not included as stated by Tull and Hawkins (1993: 379).

Towards the end of our survey, we included questions in the form of ordinal scales to collect additional information and comprehend the thoughts of respondents better. Although there is no single number of points for an ordinal scale that is universally applied, Cox (1980) suggests the use of five to nine points. Since there is evidence that as the number of points increase, the results become more reliable (Churchill and Peter 1984), we designed a rating scale with ten points.

The questionnaire included a selfcompletion section for students to express their comments and evaluate the survey at the end. With this section, we wanted to avoid forcing the students to choose one response category from several to see what the respondents' answers would reveal. It became more evident that a significant part of students has pessimistic opinion about the future of membership negotiations.

Our survey sample is mostly the residents of the metropol (68%), who can be considered as coming from middle class families with an average salary between 2000 to 4000 TL (45%). In the survey, although we tried to understand the level of Euroscepticism, we asked the questions under the heading of ‘Perception of Europe’ in order to avoid any positive or negative influence on the student. In this context, we asked 41 questions. 14 questions are about age, gender, family income, identity perceptions, political opinions and the international experience. The remaining 27 questions generally focused on their perception of Europe, the reasons of their scepticism or enthusiasm and their future projections with or without Europe. The extent of support for Turkey’s EU membership is shown below in Table 1.

Table 2: Do you support Turkey’s membership of the EU?

Yes	48.9%
No	27.5%
Undecided	23.6%

As we can see from the distribution of answers, 48.9% of the participants express their support for Turkey’s membership, 27.5% do not prefer membership and 23.6% are undecided. Similar question which asks their vote for a hypothetical referendum about Turkey’s EU membership, our respondents exhibited a similar attitude as can be seen in Table 2.

Table 3: If there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the Turkey's membership of the EU, would you personally vote for or against membership?

For	50.6%
Against	29.2%
Undecided	10.2%

Since it is the first of its kind in its coverage of IR students, we cannot compare our results with any other survey data for a similar sample, but we believe that it might be a relevant comparison if we use the recent results of Eurobarometer in November 2012.

Table 4: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Union is ...?’

	A good thing	A bad thing	Neither good nor bad	Don't know
Eurobarometer	36%	33%	19%	12%
IR Students	49%	21%	25%	6%




Figure 1: Comparison of IR Students' responses with Eurobarometer results

According to the survey, the proportion of Euro-sceptics in the Eurobarometer sample is 33%, which is considerably higher than our results for IR students. Students seemed to be less sceptical, or more enthusiastic, about the EU, which is a remarkable finding.

Given the relatively higher support for the EU, we inquired the underlying causes of this support and the concerns of the sceptics. As a result, we delve into the respondent's beliefs about the membership benefits at Table 4.

Table 5 What would be the advantages of Turkey's EU membership?*

Will have the right to free movement within Europe.	44.1%
The standard of life will rise.	36.3%
Will be more respect for human rights.	31.3%
More free and democratic political environment will occur.	29.7%
Turkey's international prestige will increase.	29.3%
Will have more educational opportunities.	28.1%
Economic growth will increase	24.2%
Will have more social rights.	24.2%
Job opportunities will increase.	20.7%
Will be more gender equality.	10.9%
None of the above	3.5%

* Multiple selection up to three was possible.

As we can see from this table, most of the students think that membership to the Union would bring Turkish citizen 'free movement within Europe', 'wealth', 'freedom' and 'democracy', all of which can be considered as mostly expected for us about the survey results. What is unexpected comes with the other question about the respondents' beliefs on the disadvantages of the EU membership as we show in Table 5.

As we can see in the responses, the popular concerns of the whole group are focused mainly on 'interference in domestic politics', 'cultural degradation', 'exploitation system' and 'moral codes'.

Since we would like to see the differences of concerns between the supporters and non-supporters, their answers can be evaluated separately.

Table 6 :What would be the disadvantages of Turkey's EU membership?

Domestic politics will be interfered.	41.0%
Cultural degradation will occur.	35.2%
Turkey will become a part of exploitation system.	25.4%
Moral codes will be negatively affected.	19.9%
National independence will be damaged.	16.4%
Will be the end of national currency, Turkish Lira.	14.8%
Eliminate territorial integrity will be removed.	7.4%
Economy will be worsen.	7.0%
Freedom of worship will be restricted.	4.3%
None of the above	15.2%

* Multiple selection up to three was possible.

Table 7: The disadvantages mostly selected by EU membership supporters

Domestic politics will be interfered.	21.3%
Cultural degradation will occur.	19.7%
Moral codes will be negatively affected.	11.8%
Will be the end of national currency, Turkish Lira.	11.2%

Table 8: The disadvantages mostly selected by EU membership non-supporters

Domestic politics will be interfered.	23.7%
Cultural degradation will occur.	19.7%
Turkey will become a part of exploitation system.	17.6%
National independence will be damaged.	11.8%
Moral codes will be negatively affected.	10.8%

As can be seen from the results, the pro-membership respondents are mainly concerned about interference in domestic politics and cultural degradation. Interestingly their concerns exhibit similar patterns with the non-supporters. Yet, the non-supporters main concerns are mainly around interference into domestic politics, cultural degradation and the risk of Turkey being a part of exploitation system. We interpret these results as an indicator of the main tendency among the students for the political, cultural and nationalist reason, in the order of popularity. What is surprising to us is the almost non-existence of the religious concerns. As a crosscheck, we can look closer to the students who identified themselves as 'Muslims' and their support for the EU. The results support our point: religious identity has no discernible effect on the perceptions for the EU membership. Only 2.3% of those students totally agree with the statement that a Muslim country can never be an EU member. In the same way, these responses indicate that religion is not relevant in their perception of the EU membership.

In another question, we delve into the main belief of students on the EU's treatment of Turkey on a just/unjust basis. We find evidence in separate questions and in student comments for the belief of an unjust treatment by the EU during the Turkey's negotiation process. For a question directed to the non-supporters of the EU asking on what conditions they would change their opinion, a vast majority of them chose 'if there will be no double standard'. This tendency among the sceptics, shows the potential of reconciliation among the students. Despite their positive attitude in general, their hope for membership seems much lower. They expressed a lack of hope for membership, at least in the short term.

Table 9 : When will Turkey be a member of the EU?

In 1-5 years	0.9%
In 5-10 years	17.6%
In 10-20 years	42.5%
Turkey will never be a member.	39.1%

We also evaluate the role of information source about the EU and analyze the effect of EU related courses they enroll. We do so to understand the impact of these courses on perceptions of the EU.

Table 10: Have you ever taken any courses related to Europe?

Yes	61.5%
No	38.5%

Table 11: How did the courses related to Europe have an impact on you?

n a positive way	33.8%
n a negative way	19.2%
n neither positive nor negative way	46.9%

Table 12 :What are your sources of information on the EU?

Internet	87.9%
Printed media (newspapers, magazines, books, etc.)	76.6%
Courses related to Europe	68.0%
TV / Radio	56.6%

* Multiple selection was possible.

These answers show that the courses about the EU are only the third source for them to learn about the EU, after the internet and printed media. The influence of these courses on their Europe perception is not seen as a clear positive or negative answer, which can be a result of

two very opposite reasons. This is either the result of impartiality of teaching in Turkey or the indifference of the students for these courses. We keep our hopes for the former as the latter is also in our minds as something to consider for a better dialogue between the teachers and the students. It is clear that this topic deserves more analysis which can be done with another survey in the future.

Lastly, we address two questions as a concluding remark: the questions about Erasmus applications and the applicants' projections about the EU membership of Turkey.

Table 13: Will you or did you apply for Erasmus student exchange programme?

Yes, I will/ Yes, I did.	74.9%
No, I won't.	25.1%

As we can see in the tables, there is a visible enthusiasm among the students to go to Europe with Erasmus program above all concerns or scepticism. Their curiosity about Europe is remarkable. It is also interesting to see in the other question that the expectation of the students for Turkey's membership is rather low, which shows a lack of hope for the successful completion of the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU.

4. CONCLUSION

In this research paper, we inquired the reasons of Euroscepticism among the IR students in Turkey. Firstly, we briefly discussed the background of Euroscepticism in Turkey going back to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. In order to understand the 'hard' form of Euroscepticism, we questioned the Islamists' strict concerns highlighting the protection of religious identity. The young Republican Turkey's effort to keep Anatolia against the European forces is also important in understanding the historical context of Euroscepticism. Since 1920s, the paranoia about losing the territories to Europe has never been erased from the public memory. This kind of odd relations with Europe has still marks on the perception of the Turks about the membership to the EU and the reliability of the Europeans. Accordingly, the level of Euroscepticism in Turkey is high in different survey datasets.

In our research, we focused on IR students in Turkey and surveyed their Euroscepticism. We analysed their reasons of support or the lack thereof, as well as their expectations about the EU and their future projections. One of the first striking results is the noticeable difference between the scepticism levels of overall Turkey and our students. The latter are more supportive for the EU than the rest of Turkish citizens. There might be several reasons for this difference between the general tendency among Turkish society and the IR students we surveyed. Their family backgrounds, easy access to communication tools, social lives and university education are noticeable among many other possible reasons.

Another result that we find interesting is the focal spots of Euroscepticism among the students. We tried to analyse these concerns around three groups: political, national and cultural. These concerns are far from being mutually exclusive because most of these concerns overlap with one another. One can define oneself with nationalist ideas and also attachments to customs and traditions. As in all social sciences, to observe and analyse human behaviour is not an easy task. That is why, we focused on different concern groups under several questions, some of which allow them multiple choice answers. Doing so allowed us to cross-validate the reliability of the concern tendencies. We observe a meaningful consistency of the answers across different question. For example, students who are reluctant about the EU because of their nationalist concerns gave consistent answers. The same can be said for the other concern groups, as well.

We realize that the overwhelming concern of the students are mainly about political issues, such as the distrust to the fairness of the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, Europeans' possible intervention into Turkish domestic politics or the belief about the Union as a tool of capitalist exploitation. In fact, the possible benefits of the membership or the expectations from the EU are predominantly referring to the freedom of movement, visa exemption or international political prestige. Given those data, we believe that the political concerns are more often the reasons of Euroscepticism among the IR students. Students do not show 'hard' sceptical reaction which might be based on identity formulations. Instead, the major part of the students focuses on more practical and policy-oriented reasons, which are relatively easy to change with a sound political relationship between Turkey and the EU. After political reasons, national and cultural concerns are the basis of their negative perception of Europe. Cultural deprivation and moral weakening are the main cultural concerns which are frequently emphasized by the students. Nationalist concerns are also important in their minds, which can be defined as the fear of losing independence, territory or national values.

In general, we observe the political problems between Turkey and the EU as the main reason of Euroscepticism among the IR students in Turkey. However, they show a high level of interest and desire to go and see the European countries. Compared to country-wide surveys, IR students do not have a high level of Euroscepticism, which at least clears the clouds in the horizon.

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