

Candidate Selection Methods of the Turkish Political Parties in 2011 and 2015 General Elections¹

2011 ve 2015 Genel Seçimlerinde Türkiye'deki Siyasi Partilerin Aday Seçim Yöntemleri

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Abstract

This study aims to assess the extent to which competition, inclusive participation and high representation within Turkish mainstream political parties are realized in the nomination of candidates. To attain this objective, candidate selection methods used by AKP (Justice and Development Party), CHP (Republican People's Party), and MHP (Nationalist Action Party), which competed in the general elections on June 12, 2011, and June 7, 2015, are going to be analyzed. Candidate selection methods and their results are going to be discussed in the light of concepts of participation, competition, and representation. The concept of participation is going to be considered on the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of the electorate. The impact of inclusiveness and exclusiveness of electorates on competition and representation concepts will be measured. The concept of competition is going to be measured by winning indices of new candidates against incumbents. The concept of representation is going to be measured by winning indices of women and young candidates. The dataset is composed of candidates placed in the parliamentary seats previously won by these parties. Candidates selected by the CHP through primary elections in which party members participated produced the most competitive results. When the representation of women and youth is taken into account, it is seen that the candidate selection methods used by the parties do not have a clear advantage over each other.

Keywords: Candidate selection, democracy within parties, participation, representation, competition.

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Özet

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki ana akım siyasi partilerin aday belirleme süreçlerinde rekabetin, kapsayıcı katılımın ve yüksek temsilin ne ölçüde gerçekleştiğini değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaca ulaşmak için 12 Haziran 2011 ve 7 Haziran 2015 genel seçimlerinde yarışan AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) ve MHP'nin (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) aday belirleme yöntemleri analiz edilecektir. Bu partilerin kullandıkları aday belirleme yöntemleri katılım, rekabet ve temsil kavramları üzerinden sonuçları tartışılacaktır. Katılım kavramı, seçicilerin kapsayıcılığı ve dışlayıcılığı üzerinden ele alınacaktır. Seçicilerin kapsayıcılığı ve dışlayıcılığının rekabet ve temsil kavramları üzerindeki etkisi ölçülecektir. Rekabet kavramı, mevcut adaylara karşı yeni adayların kazanma oranı ile ve temsil kavramı ise kadın ve genç aday kazanma oranları ile ölçülecektir. Veri seti bahsi geçen partilerin daha önce kazandıkları milletvekili sandalyelerine yerleştirilen adaylardan oluşturulmuştur. CHP'nin parti üyelerinin katıldığı ön seçimler ile belirlediği adaylar en rekabetçi sonucu üretmiştir. Kadın ve genç temsili dikkate alındığında partilerin kullandığı aday belirleme yöntemlerinin birbirine net bir üstünlüğü olmadığı görülmektedir.

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1. Introduction

Modern representative democracies have been facing weakening party voter linkages. This tendency has resulted from a transformation of political parties since the 1970s. Katz and Mair (1995) point out that political parties in the industrialized societies turned into cartel parties after 1975. They argue that today's political parties have experienced a significant transformation resulting from their relations with the state. In this process, political parties have reached a level that prevents them from fulfilling their classical functions (Katz and Mair, 1995). As a theoretical model, the cartel party covers the organizational transformation process of political parties with their interaction with civil society and the state. This model is an analytical tool to explain state-party interaction created a homogeneous organizational structure in mainstream parties. According to Katz (1996), the most important factor in the formation of cartel parties is the introduction of state aid. Political parties are supported by the state because they are seen as indispensable elements of democracy. It was the government parties that benefited the most from state aid. This situation has decreased loyalty of political parties to grassroots members (Katz, 1996, pp. 120-121). By adding two extra dimensions to state aid, van Biezen and Kopecky (2014) suggest a framework for the definition of the party-state linkages in a three-dimensional way: the dependence of the parties on the state, the management of the parties by the state, and the seizure of the state by the parties. The first dimension refers to the financial dependence of the parties on the state, the second dimension mentions the state's regulation of party activities and organizations, and the third dimension explains to the expansion of party patronage in appointments to the state (van Biezen and Kopecky, 2014).

The cartelization of political parties has affected the internal power relations that emerge in the formation of political elites. Political elites for elected positions are determined through methods of candidate selection indicating the intra-party power relations. Early discussions on candidate selection process reflect its importance in intra-party relations. Schattschneider (1942) argues that the nature of the party is determined by the nature of the candidate selection process. He states that the candidate selection method determines the owner of the party. Therefore, intra-party power relations can be observed in candidate selection processes. Katz (2001) points out the changing nature of candidate selection processes in the cartel party structure. He argues that candidate selection methods have also transformed into tools to protect cartel framework. Party elites can also use these methods to manipulate their supporters. Inclusive candidate selection methods are also directed to arbitrate the power of party elites (Katz, 2001).

Skeptical views on inclusive candidate selection methods are criticized by some scholars. Webb (2002) points out that although party elites hold the veto power in nominating candidates and exercise considerable autonomy in determining party policy, rank-and-file party members (and in some cases

even non-member supporters) play an essential role in electing legislative candidates and legitimizing the electoral program. Lawson (1988) argues that the voters are linked to electoral systems and governments through candidates of political parties. The intra-party democracy mechanisms enable the legislature to be more sensitive to public discussions and general elections. Party organizations with open channels of communication influence negotiations between civil society and the public sphere (Teorell, 1999), making the state's deliberative organs more porous (Habermas, 1996). The intra-party democracy will ensure that leaving the party in the free elections is integrated with a voice in the party organization (Ware, 1979). One of the instruments to provide this framework is participation in the candidate selection method. Inclusive candidate selection methods provide mechanisms for such changes and renewals. Views on inclusive candidate selection methods are based on limited empirical work which focuses on developed countries where political parties have faced challenges from new social movements. Field and Siavelis (2008, p. 622) argue that the development of the candidate nomination and politician training literature in new democracies will broaden our horizons in the candidate selection processes, as well as researching the different phases of democratic development investigating the cultural, political and institutional contexts by covering more cases. Therefore, the results of the countries or parties using inclusive methods should be revealed and evaluated in comparison with other methods. New empirical work on countries where electoral politics preserves legitimacy can produce new insights into understanding participatory mechanisms. Turkey is one of the countries where electoral politics is still the main political participation mechanism. According to TURKSTAT (n.d.), the average voter turnout rate of general elections in Turkey, between 2002 and 2015 is 82.61 percent. This rate is considerably higher than the average rate of the European Union countries, which is 68.25 percent in this period (IDEA, 2022). Given the significance attached to electoral politics, this study aims to assess the extent to which competition, inclusive participation, and high representation opportunities within political parties are realized in the nomination of candidates. Within this study's scope, it will be argued that participatory candidate selection mechanisms will produce higher democratic results in terms of competition and representation. Candidate selection methods of the main Turkish political parties, Justice and Development Party (AKP), Republican People's Party (CHP) and National Movement Party (MHP) will be evaluated in the 2011 and 2015 general elections to test this argument. In those elections, the CHP used primary as a participatory candidate selection method, which provides some data to compare other methods. Also, selected elections are the last elections before adopting the presidential system in 2017, the 2018 amendments to the law on parliamentary elections and the electoral law that allow parties to form electoral alliances.

2. Political Parties in the Turkish Parliament and their Candidate Selection Methods

The cartel party phenomenon that had emerged with indefinite borders between the state and the political parties has also observed in Turkey. In her article assessing the level of cartelization of parties in Turkey, Ayan-Musil (2018) argues that the AKP, which has developed the most intensive relations with the state, shows a high level of cartelization as it conducts fully professional election campaigns and its decision-makers are party executives. On the other hand, the CHP and the MHP show a medium level of cartelization tendency based on these indicators. However, in order to understand the level of cartelization of parties in Turkey, Ayan-Musil's study deals with the relations of political parties with the state only within the framework of state financial aid. In order to reveal the level of cartelization and how parties maintain this situation, other dimensions of parties' relations with the state should also be addressed. The three-dimensional framework of van Biezen and Kopecky (2014) provides multifaceted

relations of political parties with the state to understand the tendency to the cartelisation of Turkish political parties.

Firstly, state aid is the largest financial source of the AKP, the CHP, and the MHP. **Table 1** shows the portion of state aid in the total revenues of these parties. The financial control of the parties is carried out by the Constitutional Court. With the amendment made to the constitution in 1995, state aid has become a constitutional norm in Turkey. Until 2014, political parties that received more than 7 percent of the votes in general elections were eligible for state aid. In 2014, Law No. 6529 was amended to lower the threshold for state aid to 3 percent. Since the HDP and its predecessor parties ran independent candidates in elections prior to 2014 and other parties received less than 3 percent of the vote, only AKP, CHP and MHP benefited from state aid. All of the state aid, which were given to the parties between 2007 and 2015, were transferred to those three parties. According to the Law No. 2820, political parties that can benefit from state aid are paid three times in the year in which the parliamentary general election will be held, and twice in the year of the general election of local administrations. These three parties financing their political activities mostly with these funds have benefited a significant advantage from state aid in election campaigns over other parties out of the cartel. The mainstream parties used state aid to maintain their interests and to protect their cartel positions by preventing new parties from becoming stronger and more competitive in the electoral arena.

Table 1 shows the ratio of state aid to the three major parties to their total revenues. Since 2007, MHP's state aid has accounted for more than two-thirds of its total revenues. Considering the average rates of the three parties, it is possible to say that state aid has exceeded half of the total revenues since 2007, except for 2008, and even reached two-thirds in the 2007, 2011 and 2015 general elections. In election years, the ratio is nearly 60 percent for the CHP and 55-60 percent for the AKP. In Europe, the state contributes between 59.5% and 71.6% of the total revenue of parties in advanced democracies, compared to 68.8% to 78.4% in new democracies (van Biezen and Kopecký, 2014: p. 172). Mainstream political parties in Turkey have benefited from state aid at a similar rate to developed countries in Europe.

Table 1. Total Revenues and State Aids of the Political Parties

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
AKP	%63	%44	%58.4	%41.4	%59.7	%54.6	%44.8	%57.4	%54.9
CHP	%59.8	%29	%38.9	%53.1	%60	%53.7	%39.6	%68	%58.8
MHP	%71.6	%54.2	%64.9	%69.6	%75	%69.2	%69.7	%72	%73.1
Average	%64.8	%42.4	%54	%54.7	%64.9	%59.1	%51.3	%65.8	%62.2

Source: Decisions of Constitutional Court on Financial Audit of Political Parties

Secondly, political parties have faced comprehensive legislation in Turkey since the 1961 Constitution and its subsequent reforms. The 1961 and 1982 Constitutions contain provisions that allow for the dissolution of political parties by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that their activities do not comply with the constitution. The political party law numbered 648, first adopted in 1965, is one of the early examples of the parties' specific law in Europe. After the 1980 military coup, all the parties were closed with the Law No. 2533. The new law numbered 2820 was adopted in 1982, which brought intense regulations for political parties in the process of re-establishing the political architecture. In this context,

it can be said that the parties in Turkey are subject to constitutional and party-specific legal regulations at an early stage when compared with the European parties.

Van Biezen and Borz (2012) develops an index to analyze the regulation on political parties. Party regulation index is calculated with regulation categories of political parties in a single country with the total number of regulatory categories for parties in constitution. Van Biezen and Borz (2012) define these categories as democratic principles, rights and freedoms, activity and behavior, identity and programme, extra-parliamentary party, electoral party, parliamentary party, governmental party, public resources, judicial oversight and secondary regulation for political parties which implies the further laws for regulation. In this index, 1 indicates that political parties are subject to the highest level of legal regulation, while 0 indicates that political parties are not subject to legal regulation. Party regulation index is 1, meaning that Turkish political parties have been regulated in all categories. Within the scope of the 1982 Constitution, there are 17 articles regulating political parties and 43 sentences under these articles. Compared with the political parties in Europe, Turkey is one of the countries with the most intense constitutionalization for political parties (Çınar, 2022, p. 194).

Lastly, it is possible to say that the party patronage activity in state appointments, the third dimension of the cartel parties' formation, also has been experienced in Turkey. According to International Transparency Organization's (2022) data, political parties in Turkey were identified as the area with the highest level of corruption in 2003 and 2013. In an index where 5 indicates the highest corruption value, an average value of 3.8 indicates that political parties are considered highly corrupt institutions in this period. Özkanan and Erdem (2015) emphasize in their qualitative study that the most common type of favoritism is political favoritism. The patronage capability of the big parties is used for their supporters in both central and local administrations. Considering the three-dimensional framework of van Biezen and Kopecky, it is seen that the AKP, the CHP, and the MHP have characteristics of the cartel party type. These parties want to keep the new parties out of the cartel by employing deprivation from state financial aid, legal regulations, and party patronage tools.

In Turkey, 20 MPs are required to form a group in the parliament. There were four groups after the 2011 and 2015 general elections. As the main actors in Turkish politics, the AKP, the CHP, the MHP and the HDP formed party groups in the Turkish parliament. The HDP, which established a group in the Turkish Grand National Assembly after the June 7, 2015 general elections, could not participate in the 2011 elections as it was founded in 2012. Due to the 10 percent national threshold in general elections, which was reduced to 7 percent with the amendment made in the parliamentary election law in 2022, most of the HDP politicians entered the 2007 and 2011 elections as independent candidates. They gathered under former political parties of the HDP. As the candidate has been evaluated on the list in the study, it is beyond the research scope to be entered with independent candidates in two successive elections. That is why the results of the HDP's and its predecessor parties' candidate selection method for the 2011 and 2015 elections were excluded from the dataset. Within this study's scope, three parties in the parliament, the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, on 12 June 2011 and 7 June 2015 General Elections will be considered. Due to Turkey's 10 percent national electoral threshold, parties less likely to pass the threshold are excluded from the dataset. Their consideration of the dataset might cause deviations in the study. In the period analyzed, the votes of the parties that failed to enter parliament remained below the national electoral threshold and these parties were excluded from parliamentary politics. None of the minor parties has received enough votes to approximate the electoral threshold.

Hazan and Rahat (2010) suggest that units of analysis in candidate selection processes are methods implemented by the political parties. According to the bylaws of the AKP, CHP and MHP, parliamentary candidates are determined through central nomination, primary elections, organizational polls and central polls. The formal and publicly visible methods are primary elections and candidate polls. Methods such as central polling and central nomination are processes in which parties conduct the candidate nomination process internally within the context of informal relations. The correspondence and interviews conducted within the scope of this study show that methods other than primary elections in the candidate selection process are conducted by the party headquarters in a closed manner to the public. For these methods, it can be said that it is the person or group who makes the final decision on the parliamentary lists determines the candidates.

The AKP determined the candidates by a nominating committee. A commission presided over by the party leader finalized the list. The list was decided by unanimity. As seen from the candidate selection process of the AKP, it adopted the nominating committee method, which is an exclusive method in terms of selectors' participation. Although the AKP collected the views of party staff and supporters through opinion polls, the effects of these views were uncertain, since the nominating committee made final decisions. The AKP's nominating committee is an exclusionary method in terms of the criterion of selectors.

The CHP determined the candidates by two methods, which are examined separately. Firstly, the CHP determined some candidates in the 2011 and 2015 elections by the party council, composed of 60 people elected in the party's congress. Secondly, in the 2011 elections, the CHP announced primaries in the 29 constituencies. In the 2015 elections, the CHP determined candidates in the 56 constituencies through primaries. There is no requirement like regular fee-paying for selectors in primaries. In terms of inclusiveness of participation, the primary of CHP is an inclusive candidate selection method. The other method, the party council method, an example of candidate selection with the party's headquarters, is exclusive.

The candidate list of the MHP was determined by the party leader in the 2011 and 2015 elections. The party leader might have considered many requests while making this decision. Although opinions of the central party commission and the local units gathered, he finalized the list. The party leader is the selector for the candidate selection method in the MHP. In terms of the participation of the selectors, the MHP has the most exclusive candidate selection method.

In Turkish politics, three big parties have formed a party cartel and they are dominant actors. Although the three big parties showed some homogeneous characteristics originating from the cartel party system, they used different candidate selection methods in terms of participation. Candidate selection methods of mainstream Turkish political parties can be classified from the most inclusive to the least inclusive method as the primaries of the CHP, the party council of the CHP, the AKP nominating committee, and party leader of the MHP.

3. Method and Measures

In the examined elections, a proportional representation system, consisting of 85 constituencies and 550 seats was implemented as an election system in Turkey. The closed list makes candidate selection an utterly separate process since the electorate does not have the opportunity to make any changes during the voting. When the results of candidate determination methods are examined, democratization

will be evaluated on the concepts of participation, competition, and representation. The concept of participation, the independent variable, will be addressed based on the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of the selectors. As in studies of Bille (2001), Pennings and Hazan (2001), Rahat and Hazan (2001), it will be argued that the method of determining candidates with inclusive selectors is more democratic than other methods. Effects on participation will be examined on the concepts of competition and representation. Indices of non-incumbent winning, non-incumbent ranking and vote concentration developed by Hazan and Rahat (2010) will be used to measure the concept of competition as a dependent variable. The other dependent variable, representation, will be measured by gender and age criteria. It can be assumed that a party's seats won in a constituency in the previous elections would be safe. Each party wants to increase the number of present deputies. When measuring dependent variables, candidates will be asked to settle in these safe seats. These seats are the safest places for parties. Candidates placed in these seats provide sufficient ground to see the results of the candidate selection method used by a party. When competition is measured, the seats of those who cannot be candidates for the same party due to death, resignation from the party, assigned duties such as becoming a mayor, and limits of party regulations will be removed from the safe seats. The same situation is not the case for representation. Someone with the same demographic characteristics can be placed in the safe seats of an incumbent MP. Therefore, considering the representation variable, all seats won by parties in the previous elections will be considered as safe seats. Early elections were held on 1 November 2015 excluded from the scope of the study. The CHP and the MHP made minor changes in their candidate lists. AKP renewed most of its candidate list. The inclusion of parties that make very limited changes in the data pool will deviate the results from the general trend. For example, the competitive index of the MHP, which keeps the previous candidate list, will be 0. In addition, since there was a concise period between the two elections, the parties determined their candidates only from the headquarters of the party. This created a phenomenon that is not very meaningful to measure.

The winning index of non-incumbents measures the new candidates' success in competition with MPs in the previous term. Candidate selection methods that allow the selection of different people are more competitive. The non-incumbents ranking index compares the positions of new candidates and incumbents on the MP list in a constituency. In the indices to be measured between 0 and 1, 1 indicates that all former MPs change, while 0 indicates that all former MPs remain. The vote concentration index measures whether votes are concentrated among certain individuals in a party that nominates candidates through a voting system. In voting-based candidate nomination methods, the concentration of votes on certain individuals indicates weak competitiveness. The distribution of votes among individuals without concentrating on certain individuals indicates more competitive methods. For example, in a constituency where 500 voters have the right to cast 5 votes, if the top 5 candidates receive 1000 of these votes, the vote concentration index is $1000/500 \times 5 = 0.4$. An index closer to 1 indicates a weakly competitive voting, with votes concentrated on candidates at the top of the list, while an index closer to 0 indicates a more competitive voting.

The concept of representation will be evaluated in light of gender and age criteria. As in the competition indices, it is shown in these indices that 1 stands for the complete representation of the groups examined, and 0 indicates that these groups are not represented in the safe seats. When the representation concept is measured, the ranking indices of women and young people on the MP lists will also be calculated. It will be argued that the candidate selection method, which allows more women and younger candidates to be listed in electable positions, provides high representation. According to

Global Parliamentary Report (2012), the average age of world parliaments is 53. In Turkey, the average age in the 2007 elections was 54.3. The average age of the members of the parliament at the end of the 2011 elections was 51.6, while it was 49.79 in the 2015 elections. The age of election was 25 before it was lowered to 18 in 2017. Although the election age is low, senior parliamentarians have formed the Turkish parliament. Within the study's scope, people under the age of 40 are considered young candidates. At the end of the discussion, the methods used in Turkey will be compared with a study in Israel (Hazan et al. 2008) using the same indices to evaluate the candidate selection methods of political parties in different countries in terms of competition and representation. Among the parties analyzed, only the CHP has gender and youth quotas in its statute. However, CHP does not apply these quotas for parliamentary elections. Therefore, the data set is not subject to the bias that may be caused by the quota implementation.

Primary and secondary sources were used in the study. Primary sources consist of correspondences with political party staff, party statutes and regulations, party decisions, decisions of the election board, and relevant statutory regulations ruling the candidate selection processes. Secondary sources are composed of newspaper reports and records of the Turkish parliament.

4. Results and Discussion

When the nomination methods of the mainstream political parties in Turkey are examined, striking results emerge. In the light of the available data, a limited evaluation can be made by considering the two elections. However, it should be noted that this assessment is specific to Turkey and covers the last two general elections, so it will not allow a generalization beyond Turkey. These results may inspire further research concerning the previous periods of Turkey as well as the countries, other than Western democracies. Candidate selection methods of the AKP, the CHP, and the MHP, which form a party cartel as the main actors of Turkey's party politics, can be analyzed comparatively. **Table 2** shows the competition index, while **Table 3** and **Table 4** show the representation index for the candidate selection methods of all parties.

Table 2. Non-Incumbent Winning Index and Non-Incumbent Ranking Index

Party	Candidate Selection Method	SNW ¹ (2011)	NWI ² (2011)	NRI ³ (2011)	SNW (2015)	NWI (2015)	NRI (2015)	SNW (Cumulative)	NWI (Cumulative)	NRI (Cumulative)
AKP	Nominating commission	196/331	0.59	0.46	132/243	0.54	0.40	328/574	0.57	0.44
CHP	Party Council	58/81	0.71	0.68	21/45	0.46	0.42	79/126	0.62	0.59
CHP	Primary	19/20	0.71	0.92	59/79	0.74	0.71	78/99	0.78	0.74
MHP	Party Leader	31/69	0.44	0.35	24/52	0.46	0.41	55/121	0.45	0.37

¹ Safe seats won by non-incumbents

² Non-incumbents winning index

³ Non-incumbents ranking index

Table 3. Women Winning Index and Women Ranking Index

Party	Candidate Selection Method	WNW ¹ (2011)	WWI ² (2011)	WRI ³ (2011)	WNW (2015)	WWI (2015)	WRI (2015)	WNW (Cumulative)	WWI (Cumulative)	WRI (Cumulative)
AKP	Nominating commission	47/341	0.13	0.14	54/326	0.16	0.17	101/667	0.15	0.16
CHP	Party Council	15/91	0.16	0.20	10/50	0.20	0.31	25/141	0.17	0.23
CHP	Primary	03/21	0.14	0.32	11/85	0.12	0.16	14/106	0.13	0.18
MHP	Party Leader	5/71	0.07	0.06	3/53	0.05	0.05	3/124	0.02	0.02

¹ Safe seats won by women candidates

² Women candidates winning index

³ Women candidates ranking index

Table 4. Youth Winning Index and Youth Ranking Index

Party	Candidate Selection Method	YNW ¹ (2011)	YWI ² (2011)	YRI ³ (2011)	YNW (2015)	YWI (2015)	YRI (2015)	YNW (Cumulative)	YWI (Cumulative)	YRI (Cumulative)
AKP	Nominating commission	58/341	0.17	0.12	45/326	0.13	0.12	103/667	0.15	0.12
CHP	Party Council	3/91	0.03	0.02	4/50	0.08	0.11	7/141	0.04	0.05
CHP	Primary	2/20	0.09	0.07	13/85	0.15	0.10	15/106	0.13	0.10
MHP	Party Leader	0/71	0	0	3/53	0.05	0.05	3/124	0.02	0.02

¹ Safe seats won by youth candidates

² Youth candidates winning index

³ Youth candidates ranking index

The MHP, which used the most exclusionary method, was the party with the lowest competition and representation. The leader of the MHP determined the whole shape of MP lists. The party's method was allowed a limited change determined by the party leader in terms of both competition and representation. Using an exclusionary method, the AKP was a relatively competitive party. New people were welcomed into the party. Party candidates were determined by a small commission lacking participatory mechanisms. Even if the party collected the opinions of party supporters at all levels of the party organization, the party executives who finalized decisions on candidate lists might neutralize the requests that might arise from the party supporters at certain stages of the candidate selection process. When the party's method is examined in terms of young and female candidates, it is seen that the representation of these groups is constantly low. It seems that the ruling elite limited the representation of these groups. The existing power relations are aimed to be sustained by the limitation of the representation of young and female candidates to a certain extent. At this point, it can be said that the nomination committee of the AKP implement an implicit quota for women. Results of the AKP's candidate selection process show the limited representation capacity of the exclusive nominating committee. The nominating committee can neutralize the demands of party supporters and give further power to the party elite to sustain the party's cartel character.

The two different methods used by the CHP were more inclusive than the methods of other parties. However, they produced quite different results. The CHP's candidate selection with the party council allowed limited participation, but it was more inclusive than the methods of other parties. The party council allowed making room for newcomers while setting candidates. This ratio was relatively high in 2011. However, in 2015, the placement of the incumbent party elite decreased the competition rate of this method. There was a relatively stable rate for female candidates determined by the CHP party council in the representation aspect. It can be said that this method of candidate selection has achieved a certain level of female representation. As the AKP, it can be said that the CHP's party council also implemented an implicit quota for women. The CHP's female candidates nominated by the party council also appear to have been hit by a glass ceiling. It seems that the method was failed in the representation of young candidates.

Candidates determined by the CHP's primaries in which party members participated produced the most competitive result among all methods used by the three parties. The high competitive results in 2011 show the party members' desire for primaries as an intra-party democracy mechanism for the first time after a long period. Despite a decline in 2015 compared to 2011, the primaries produced very competitive results in 2015. Although the high rate of change in the 2011 elections can be related to the shift of a long-standing party leader, MPs also changed the considerably increased number in 2015. The vote concentration index of the primaries was 0.47 and 0.46, respectively for 2011 and 2015, demonstrating that votes were moderately dispersed among candidates. The primaries were not successful in representation. However, if the CHP's primaries are compared to other methods, they have produced close results on women's representation with the nominating committee of the AKP and the party council of the CHP. Regarding the youth representation, it produced better results than the CHP's party council and was close to the method of the AKP.

In a similar study conducted in Israel (Hazan et al. 2008), the competitive indexes for the nominating committee are 0.181 for the non-incumbent index, and 0.131 for the non-incumbent ranking index. These indices for party delegates are 0.251 and 0.148, respectively. In the primary elections in which party

members participated, this rate was 0.242 and 0.166, respectively. When compared to the methods used in Israel, it can be said that all candidate nomination methods of political parties in Turkey are more competitive than those in Israel. Similar to Turkey, primary elections in Israel have come to the fore in competitiveness compared to other methods. The fact that all indices in Turkey are very high compared to those in Israel shows that the candidate selection methods of parties in Turkey are open to manipulations. The indices of women's representation in Israel show that the nomination committee produces results of 0.105, party delegates 0.085 and party members 0.095. In this respect, it is possible to say that the nominating committee, party council and primaries in Turkey produced a more representative results for women. Compared to the results of women's representation produced by the primaries in Israel, CHP's primaries, which achieved an average index of 0.18 in two elections, show that a participatory method can produce optimistic results in women's representation in Turkey.

5. Conclusion

The cartel party theory claims that inclusive participation in candidate selection processes is open to manipulation. Primaries are seen as a means for party elites to regain legitimacy from their base. It is assumed that members will not be able to produce competitive and representative results (Hazan et al. 2008). This study on political parties in Turkey shows that results are opposite to expectations of Hopkin (2001), Rahat and Hazan (2001) Katz (2001), who contend that competition and representation will decrease if participation increases.

As a democratic subsystem, there are certain institutional limits for political parties to conduct internal party processes through democratic mechanisms with the concepts of participation, competition, and representation. From the competition aspect, primaries have the capacity to make a significant transformation within the party. Party members have shown that they have adopted primaries as a negotiating mechanism to contribute to their party's politics. The high level of competition in primaries has created results that is the opposite of those views stating that the party members produce low competition. From the representation aspect, if primaries are compared to other methods, they have produced close results on women's representation with the nominating committee of the AKP and the party council of the CHP. Regarding youth representation, it produces better results than the CHP's party council and is close to the nominating committee of the AKP. The party leader method of the MHP produced the lowest competition, and representation is out of this comparison. There has not been a candidate nomination method that maximizes all three concepts at the same time. However, it is also possible to say that the available data shows that democratic candidate nomination mechanisms do not produce results that are completely parallel to the oligarchic tendencies of the party administration, which Michels (1968) defines as the Iron Law of Oligarchy. This study shows that the use of participatory nomination methods can go beyond the oligarchic tendencies of party elites and make political parties more responsive to grassroots demands and more accountable to their grassroots. The development of intra-party democracy and participatory political culture have the potential to pave the way for the development of a democratic system.

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