<u>RESEARCH ARTICLE</u>

Antagonistic Clericalization and Ethnicization of Sociopolitical Consciousness in the Balkans and the post-Wars Religious Education

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Abstract

No considerable research focused on ethnopolitical behavior in Western Balkans related to observed phenomena. Thus, issues regarding the sociopolitical and educational processes of clerical-ethnonational exist. Furthermore, its social and psychological dimensions and peace stalemate are crucial points. Therefore, the paper will highlight several critical categorical concepts (ethnonationalism, clerical domination, segregation, education, conflict, and peace dynamics). Finally, by suggesting individualism over collectivism, the study points to ethical, sociopolitical, and psychological awareness as a totality of relations between autonomous citizens. I argue that clericalization and ethnicization are adopted by ethnonational political behavior, empowered by the Balkan connection to religious identities. Political behavior and clerical and ethnic ideologies strengthen support for religious antagonism, fascism, and historical revisionism, "dividing" peoples into ethnoreligious homogenous territories and adversely shaping new generations. Post-socialist Balkan societies are intensely marked by religion, specifically external manifest, associating religious identities and Clergy with political preferences. This entanglement is the groundwork of long-lasting despondency; religions are reduced principally to ethnicity-nation and subsequent power. All-binding inclusive ethnicization in Bosnia and Herzegovina-B&H infiltrates religious dimensions, including material and non-material cultures. The clerical education consequence points to the religious State of anti-secular internal disintegration of the genuine faith. Invoking man's ethnic-clerical consciousness entails unsatisfactory results due to Balkan's historical prevailing violence than would be obtained by the statutory prohibition of religious education. The B&H ethnoreligious-educational segregation reproduces ethnopolitical

ideologists, preventing the next generation's socio-moral development and simulating the ethnoreligious hybrid conflicts. Nations cannot be clerical-political apparatus morally. The dominance and exclusivity of collectivist logics of ethnically and confessionally complex societies oppose the spirit of necessary susceptibility. Ethically, sociopolitically, and psychologically, one must gain society's self-awareness as a totality of relations between autonomous and equal individuals-citizens to generate clerical and ethnicization immunity.

Keywords: Clericalization & Ethnicization, Balkans & former Yugoslavia, Social consciousness, Religious education, Peace & Conflict

Introduction

The crisis of democracy in Southeast Europe is visible to everyone, and "the idea of the liberal-democratic consensus no longer exists." (Bieber & Kmezic, 2017) A mutual process with Clergy instrumentalizes the ethnoreligious patterns. Religious leaders give political discourses, and politicians speak the religious language. The voting practices in former Yugoslav countries show the clerical-ethnic collective behavioral rehearsal and ethnonational contingency more than any current empirical study. Thus, the euphuism ethnopolitics lasted for almost thirty years after the wars. Religion can strongly influence which political party a person votes for and even who campaigns for, while on the religious side, political views can play an essential role in religious conversion - in other words, people often change religions or denominations to find one. Appropriate to his political beliefs. However, ethnonationalism and democracy are mutually exclusive concepts due to their opposing action within one community. With the values propagated by democracy and prioritizing unity, respect, and acceptance of others and differences, nationalism degrades and imposes one value or Nation as dominant. Many of the symptoms that European democracies are experiencing have been developing, expressed, and consolidating for years in Southeast Europe.

Collective psychology is individuals' mental and emotional states and processes when aggregated in such groups as audiences, crowds, mobs, and social movements. People are conscious of an inward psychological fact, awareness of an external state, and presence. Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) events and processes and its exemplary environment are repeatedly from different ideological, axiological, and psychological levels. It is a matter of cunning Exploitation of nations and peoples to benefit newly formed and firmly established national elites. Only through rigid Balkans ethnopolitical control of consciousness can a well-grown socioeconomic crisis successfully prolong its survival on the wealthy political scene despite the existential difficulties of a well-grown socioeconomic crisis. The culture of fear and constant fabrication of dangers (a stimulant) that threaten the alleged survival of an ethnic/national/confessional group creates a psychosis of fear and uncertainty of defensive internal cohesiveness. It discerns the dangers of peoples' existence from that group. It is rapidly transferred from one religious group (Nation) to another in which the same processes occur, creating a chain of "imaginary" interethnic threats.

According to Integrated threat theory, ingroup members unfamiliar with the outgroup experience threats more than those who know each other. Thus, national identity is an essential component of integrated threat theory. (Hadzic, 2021) B&H, after the devastating war, B&H is a country of constant secessionism campaigns, xenophobia, and hybrid ethnopolitical conflicts.

In the former Yugoslavia (presently seven countries), the four most represented religions are: the most numerous being Islam, then Orthodoxy, followed by Catholicism, and in the last place Judaism. A specific (extremely negative) characteristic of the post-Yugoslav space is that religions are identified with nations (and ethnicity). Religious identity was built before national identity. Hence the view that religious identity is the core of national identity. (Cvitkovic, 2011) Nenad Miscevic anoints "vicious" nationalism in the Balkans. "Nationalism that explicitly rejects universalization" and the right to exist, and its exclusivity makes it extreme - and unhealthy - both for such nationalism and its neighbor. (Miscevic, 2006) National and identity policies and the interests of regional ethnopolitics have discontinued the Yugoslav inter-cultural existence of the states' citizens.

The pure homogenous ethnoreligious territories occurred after the Yugoslav wars. Collective affiliation in such a psychological condition becomes a divine and metaphysical category, above which no one can be ready to sacrifice everything, even the lives of those who do not want to be part of intoxicated and insane patriotism. It is not only the case with national identities and love for the "only and eternal homeland" but also with many other human affiliations. However, unlike other identities requiring exclusive loyalty, national identity does not recognize competition, let alone opposition. (Bauman, 2010) The same matrix is associated with the religious identities of people in this region who emphasize their religion as the only accurate one and, at the same time, disparage other religions. In religious and national terms, the Balkan historical space is so structured that it provides numerous and diverse opportunities for conducting religious institutions. In times of social crisis, both "religious and national" are more strongly present on the public scene, often in its most conservative forms.

The contradictions between the proclaimed value basis of the political system and the dominant values in the real social life of the post-socialist Yugoslav countries also influenced the changes in the sphere of education. Thus, for example, new program-political commitments and normative regulation of educational activity are obtained in clerical education, "formally" on the principles of liberal-democratic doctrine. Unlike the socialist model, the basic directions of changes in the education system start not more from the collectivity (working class in Yugoslavia communism) but the individual or ethnoreligious collectivity within the autonomy of education as basic parameters shaping the current education system. The public education system was practically the only school system in the country. It was systemically "locked" from any religious impact. Several institutions were outside that system where religion was taught, such as religious schools for Catholic and Orthodox priests and Muslim clerics. Religious instruction for children was held in parishes and maktebs (Kuttabs).[1] However, religious instruction was carefully controlled. It was naturally expected that religion would soon vanish from private life and socialist culture in the way it was expelled from public spheres. Younger generations have believed such a development is a matter of time. However, circumstances changed dramatically in the late 1980s. After the Yugoslav wars, confessional or denominational religious education has become part of

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[1] Mekteb, in Arabic Kuttab, means school. The term mekteb in the Bosnian language represents a primary Islamic religious school.

primary and secondary school curricula.

The phenomenon of religious/ethnic violent and non-violent interchangeability adopted by national political unethical behavior has adverse consequences on the post-Yugoslav social behavior and reconciliation process; religions should be a moral peace-building agency. The multiethnic/multireligious socialist Yugoslav society has been violently transformed into influential ethical and clerical cultures, producing antagonistic ethnonational societies sustaining pastoralism as potent identity manifestations of the social capital. War-period visual violence and emotions influenced violent behavior and policy within the discourse "our vs. their sacred ethnic land," creating an unbearable ease of creating fear and motivating violent antagonism and war crimes. The postwar antagonistic media rhetoric, visual antagonism, and abuse of faith adversely impact peaceful coexistence. Ethnic, religious, ideological, and political contextual factors are challenging to generate in post-conflict, divided Balkan societies. Fear of others, religiously distinct, is a category that's difficult to determine and prevent. Western-Balkan societies possess victimological and political mythical conventions, honoring ethnoreligious war victories, defeats, and agonies, maintaining hostility and revenge discourse. Historically, religions were misused to justify violence and maintain non-violence, unethical sociopolitical order, and negative peace. The ideologies of religious superiority intertwine with intensely dominant national perceptions, so belonging to the Serb, Croat, or Bosniak people is equated with Orthodoxy, Catholicism, or Islam. This entanglement is the groundwork for despondency and a hostile peace climate. Current clerical and ethnopolitical policies lead further away from conflict transformation, directing toward the renewal of monotheistic spirituality, cognition, and violence. Political involvement affects "authentic" religion. We should engage in all-inclusive theological and consensus approaches to demonstrate that religions are peace-building agencies, retrieving and revitalizing authentic morality criteria. Religious sentiments mobilize people more rapidly than other identities. (Hadzic, 2023)

National, ethnic, and religious ideologizing educational programs carry out mental mutilation of children (e.g., Bosnian discriminational model and phenomena - "Two schools under one roof"). (Hadzic, 2022) Once ideologically directed Russian language learning this way, regardless of the public duration of the "destroyers" of communism, structurally, it remains against the background of the aggressively attacked communist ideological-educational matrix of producing "people of a special kind." Because never and nowhere is "education of consciousness," "mass consciousness," and they did not take their manipulation more seriously than in communist countries." (Grimm and Amstrong, 1982) The only unquestionable property is that one exists as a spirit or consciousness. It significantly impacts society and is the most common opinion today. Man consists of mind (soul) and matter (body). Descartes proposed that consciousness resides within an immaterial domain he called the realm of thought, in contrast to the domain of material things, which he called the realm of extension. (Alanen, 2003)

Filip David, a Serbian writer of Jewish origin, argued that the South Slavic peoples suffer from two manias: they are sick of mania of persecution and greatness while constantly living in fear, fed by hatred and deception. In this specific form of social psychopathology, two seemingly incompatible concepts merge the mania of greatness and persecution. Nevertheless, unfortunately, many politicians, and people of science and spirit, feed these two forms of madness with Mephistopheles' persistence. Moreover, myths filled the horror of existential emptiness. Civilization has been declared responsible for decadence, disease, and perversion. (David, 2019) The most famous Serbian myth of the Kosovo battle of 1389 was resurrected as part of the

nationalist revival in Serbia in the later 1980s—the different ends to which it was put during the violent struggles of the 1990s. Cultivated through centuries of Ottoman rule, the myth decreased in importance during the communist period. However, it re-emerged in Serbia in the 1980s as a powerful mobilizing tool, often juxtaposed with Serbs' supposed "genocide" at the hands of Albanians in the autonomous province. This view was also congruent with the general political climate, which favored keeping the dispersed Serbian populations in one State as had been the case in Socialist Yugoslavia. (Kaser and Halpern, 1998) The wide-ranging sexcentenary celebrations in 1989 displayed the newly found (and short-lived) unity between Church, State, and different nationalist traditions in Serbia, marked by a famous speech by Slobodan Milosević on the site of the medieval battle. During the first half of 1989, specific political folklore was invented. It was congruent with the well-established idea of the Serbs as a unique and martyred people, most notably manifested in their defeat in Kosovo. While propagated from above, this idea found resonance among the general population. Serbian troops withdrew from Kosovo, ending the decade-long domination over the province. However, despite the end of Serb rule, the Kosovo myth remained relevant in Serbian political discourse. (Bieber, 2011)

The current ethnonational politics in (e.g., B&H) insists on religious education with the influence of religious organizations. According to Hans Enzensberger, "Exploitation is not only an economic fact but also a fact of consciousness. "Who is the master, and who is the servant, is decided not only based on who has capital, factories, and weapons but - the further, the clearer - who has the consciousness of others." (Enzensberger, 1982) However, Exploitation, formality, and compulsion damage the faith and should be avoided. "If you convince people that Dragan is a "Serbian/Orthodox," Ahmed a "Bosniak/Muslim," and Josip and Marija a "Croat/Catholic" names; cause them to honor ignoramuses, lawbreakers, national idols without credibility; value his/her "Islamism," "Catholicism," "Orthodoxy" - "Bosniacism," "Croaticism" and "Serbianism"; it is pure lobotomy of the "masses" as communist would say or "peoples opium." (Youtube-Saggitarius 1969, 2022)

Dayton's Peace Accords' constitutional and political system is one of the most complex public administrations globally. The Dayton Accords system is a "sacred letter" of most political elites, preserving the status quo and lacking qualitative changes, maintaining political-interest structures and hybrid ethnopolitical conflicts. It is utterly independent of differences in their proclaimed political-ideological goals. At any point in any political process in B&H institutions concerning any issue or problem, politics can face a wall of "vital national interest" as absolute inviolability. This "holy" practice paralyzes politics and deprives it of meaning and purpose. The threefold ethnonational values protection (i.e., Bosniaks-Muslims, Serbs-Orthodox, Croats-Catholics in B&H) is like a non-aggression pact. A social contract indicates the totalization of exclusivity, abolishing politics between inclusion and exclusion. (Hadzic, 2020) The protection of the vital national interest is based on an ethnoreligious framework. The so-called mechanism within the House of Peoples of the B&H Parliament should ensure that no decision "of vital national interest" is taken against the interests of any constituent people. The hypocrisy of the so-called "protection of vital national interest" is an unquestionable axiom of local ethnic oligarchy, critical protagonists of local ethnopolitics. (Bajtal, 2016)

Moreover, these are structurally manipulative and nepotistic ethnopolitical and ethnoreligious processes. The idiom "protection of vital national interests" demonstrates the

institutionalization of post-war ethnoreligious conflict. In a "constitutively" manner, the ethnopolitical and ethnoreligious arrangement is reduced to a struggle over three homogenous ethnoreligious territories. Consequently, there is no civic unity or mutual human solidarity based on organic elements "from below" through existential-interest connections within the civic value framework. On the contrary, particularly in B&H, there is an inhuman, daily political unity on the scene, achieved by the Clergy and ethnic manipulation "from above." (Bajtal, 2018) Besim Spahic, one of the most influential theorists in the field of political marketing in the region, stated: "No one in B&H quotes a Hadith, which says that the Prophet Muhammed a.s. said that the most significant human virtue is courage, which consists in publicly opposing a powerful and evil ruler; that is, if Allah has given you to know and see further than others, he has obliged you ten times more to spread that knowledge, for if you do not do this, you will be stamped with a glowing seal and you will burn in the fiercest fire of hell." He further notes: "We have always fought at the expense of others. And, never, after the collapse of the Kingdom of Bosnia, for the Homeland of all its citizens? (…) Islamized Bosnians for the Turkish Empire, Catholics for Austria-Hungary and Croatia, and Serb Bosniaks for Serbia. In the last war, mostly Bosniaks (who do not have a reserve homeland) fought for a whole B&H (but what kind)? We should notice the "Islamic Declaration" and today's political power of the Islamic Community in B&H." (Spahic, 2012) The "Islamic Declaration, Program for the Islamization of Muslims and Muslim peoples» (published in 1970, written 1966-1970) is a political-religious program published by the later President of the B&H Presidency, Alija Izetbegović. Although the author was from Yugoslavia, the declaration is aimed at all Muslims in the world - ardently advocating that they should organize their states as Islam dictates and not according to models created in Europe. Furthermore, they should resort to revolutions because the mere coming to power of an Islamist party cannot establish a society in line with the demands of Islam. Izetbegović writes in the Islamic Declaration: "Islamic revival cannot begin without religion, but it cannot be successfully continued and completed without a political revolution (...) (Izetbegovic, 1990)

Rationale and Purpose of the Study

No considerable research on ethnopolitical behavior in Western Balkans related to observed phenomena was carried out. Thus, issues regarding the sociopolitical and educational processes of clerical-ethnonational exist. Furthermore, its social and psychological dimensions and peace stalemate are crucial points. Therefore, the paper will highlight several critical categorical concepts (ethnonationalism, clerical domination, segregation, education, conflict, and peace dynamics). This paper determines these phenomena as a spectrum of sociopolitical coercion and competition affecting peace-building, healthy social capital, Enlightenment, and individual identities. This research indicates that post-conflict Western Balkans have ongoing religious and ethnic nationalism issues, affecting the region's stability, youth enlightenment, healthy relations, and social capital. Political behavior and clerical and ethnic ideologies strengthen support for religious antagonism, fascism, and historical revisionism, "dividing" peoples into ethnoreligious homogenous territories and adversely shaping new generations. Finally, by suggesting individualism over collectivism, the study points to ethical, sociopolitical, and psychological awareness as a totality of relations between autonomous citizens.

The theoretical and topical analytical concept of religious nationalism became "adaptable" when the fallacies of secularization theory and desecularization of the world were acknowledged. Moreover, Samuel Huntington's theory of the "clash of civilizations" is topical and actual even today - especially in Balkan - the Western Balkan region. Religious nationalism and ethnic nationalism are comprehensive phenomena in the globalized world's contemporary social and political processes. Nevertheless, some regions remained overwhelmed by ethnoreligious nationalism and collective identities, particularly those fragile societies, including post-socialist countries.

The reflection of B&H (the most critical Western Balkan country related to observed phenomena) statehood and social capital is questioned. There are persistent sociopolitical issues and secessionist processes. The year 2021/2022 in B&H was profoundly divided and faced the most significant political crisis since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. It included war rhetorics, army appearances, a total blockade of state institutions, and absolute country collapse. The crisis condition and hybrid conflict persisted in B&H, fearing minor or significant consequences and escalation. The EU blamed the genocide denial law for the B&H crisis. The current holder of the high representative's office in B&H, German Christian Schmidt, confirmed that he supported new legislation explicitly even-handed over denying genocide. "The High Representative's primary focus is on the apparent need to create the basis for a parliamentary legislative process through a broad social discussion involving social and religious stakeholders. However, it is the conventional form of a politicized subject in the Western Balkans." (The Guardian, 2022)

Ethnic-religious quasi-states materialize in that condition of sociopolitical climate and awareness. It could transition into abolishing the one guaranteed continuity- independent and complete B&H. The ethnicization and clericalization of the B&H soil began in the design of joint criminal enterprises and was carried out by parastate projects of Herceg-Bosna[2] and Republika Srpska (RS)[3]. It strongly defended the preservation of the achieved effects. Moreover, through intensive geopolitical and religious interventions throughout its history, from the beginning of the 20th century, B&H has been under pressure from the neighboring Serbian or Croatian ethnonational ideologies. However, all people in B&H were Bošnjani[4] historically, from the state independence of (medieval) B&H, Ottoman Empire, until Austro-Hungarian rule. Until the end of the 19th century, B&H Catholics and Orthodox did not call themselves "Croats" or "Serbs." Based on several authentic historical data, the so-called "Serbo-Croat" political factor in a national sense had no significant influence on events in B&H. Nevertheless, at the end of the 19th century, that situation changed, and Bosnian Catholics and Bosnian Orthodox began evolving into the "Croats" and the "Serbs." Since then, the Bosnian people have been divided, and since then, all the conflicts within B&H and its people have started, which has never happened before in the entire Bosnian history. Bosnians (Bosniaks) of all religions fought for Bosnia, not against it. Nada Klaic, a Croat historian in the book "Bosnia in Middle Ages," stated: "As for Bosnia, the problem of its political

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[2] The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was an unknown geopolitical entity and proto-state in B&H. Its administration was sanctioned in the International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia in Hague (ICTY) as a joint criminal enterprise committed crimes against humanity.

[3] The Republic of Srpska is one of the two entities of B&H, the other being the Federation of B&H. Acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide against the non-Serb populations profoundly reduced the numbers of other groups. Its founding and prominent political and military leaders were sanctioned in the Hague Tribunal (ICTY).

[4] Meaning Bosnians. It is the archaic name originating from the Middle Ages for inhabitants of Bosnia. The name is used and can be found in Bosnian written monuments from that period, appearing in Venetian sources as earliest as the 12th century.

development is rarely posed as an exclusively scientific problem. "It should be admitted that the birth of the medieval Bosnian state should attract special attention, not only because it seems to be the oldest among its neighbors, but also because the Croatian or Serbian formula could never be applied to Bosnia," the historian wrote. Nada Klaić clearly and loudly said that B&H, as a country, is older than Croatia and Serbia. She ironically polemicized with Serbian and Croatian historians in her works, revealing their lack of foundation and attempts at historical spoofs. (Klaic, 1994) Besides, during his lifetime, Fr. Antun Knezevic, a Bosnian Catholic and Franciscan was known as a fierce opponent of the strife of the Bosnian Catholics on the one hand and the strife of the Bosnian Orthodox on the other. He firmly believed that all Bosnians were Bosniaks, regardless of their religion, and that they were neither Serbs nor Croats. He claimed that no Serbs and Croats were in B&H before the third quarter of the 19th century. The only identity he recognized above Bosniak was Illyrian, that is, Yugoslav; in that sense, he was a member of the Illyrian movement. His works were intriguing, enticing titles such as "Speech of Pope Gojko Mirošević to his Bosniak and Herzegovinian," "Speech of Hodža Bosnian to Hadži Muje Mejović," "Tears of Bosniaks over the tomb of their king in Jajce," "Bloody Book," "Again about the grave" Bosnian," "A Short History of the Bosnian King," "The Fall of Bosnia," and "Varica." He also noted: "We (Bosnians) always remained Bosniaks like our great-grandfathers and nothing else. So let our brothers, who have lived in B&H for centuries, look around the country, wishing they were Serbs or Croats. Let them carefully study and comprehend this". In his belief and works, he was not alone. He carried such teachings directly from his mentor, a Bosnian Catholic and Franciscan, Ivan Franjo Jukić. Likewise, the Franciscans in Bosnia have adopted the Bosnian (Bosniak) identity since at least the 17th century (if not always) and passed it down through the generations. Since we are talking about Catholics, it can be said that there were no Croats in Bosnia before the end of the 19th century. (Telegraf, 2018)

Throughout the Middle Ages, the B&H Franciscans spread Catholicism among the Bosniaks of the Bogumil faith. Ilija Garasanin, the father of Serbian nationalism, spoke about Bosniaks as one of three different faiths in 1844, "the need for brotherhood between Bosniaks and Serbs and other Slavs." In Ilija Garasanin's "Nacertanije" (1844), often called Chetnik's[5] "Bible," he calls the people of B&H Bosniaks - regardless of their religious affiliation. When he talks about the program of "Serbization of Bosniaks," he says: This should be done to convert Bosniaks and other Slavs (...) "Several young Bosniaks are accepted into the Serbian civil service so that they (...) can be trained and prepared for such officials who could put into practice what they learned in Serbia later in their Homeland. (Garasanin, 1991) Besides, the irony of historicizing the religious view of B&H is that the medieval B&H state gave refuge to many of those who fled religious persecution in the West. It also turns out that there were fewer wars in the Balkans than in Europe by the early-modern era.

A solid geopolitical influence on former Yugoslav states is related to the perception of Balkan nations' clerical and national identity links (frequently questionable) with an external geopolitical, economic, or moral sponsor, making them better positioned. Besim Spahic stated: "We (former Yugoslav peoples) have proved that we enjoy the masochism of voluptuous ignorance and irresponsibility in the state of "begging" and "orphanhood" and guardianship over us, in the expectation that others, based on a religious and national basis, oblige us. Moreover, there are numerous examples of clerical processes: the return of monasteries and church estates in Croatia,

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[5] Chetnik is an expression used to denote members of the Serbian nationalist-chauvinist movement of Greater Serbia ideology.

Slovenian forests mainly belonging to the church (the famous wood processing sector), or B&H mosques and masjids belonging to various madhhabs and not B&H Hanafi Muslims." (Spahic, 2012) The most crucial moment in history was whose external patron was more powerful. B&H is the most critical former Yugoslavia multiethnic discourse (some call it a "small" Yugoslavia). At the beginning of the 20th century, "pro domo" typical units of Bosniaks-Muslims (or solely Muslims in a national description), Serbs-Orthodox, and Croats-Catholics were created. In post-Dayton (Peace Accords) B&H, where the population is predominantly Orthodox and Catholic, those areas are characterized by Serbian or Croatian national/religious awareness. Uninterruptedly, national flags of other countries (Croatian, Serbian, Russian, and occasionally Turkish and Saudi Arabia) and religious symbols exist.

The social capital in B&H has intriguing characteristics, ethnic and religious division, violent and non-violent behavioral patterns, and profound antagonism. It is a country of sociopolitical and behavioral idiocy, integrating elements of psychosocial pathological abhorrence towards B&H (a country they live and belong to historically and currently and have its citizenship). For example, when the B&H national teams play internationally, Bosnian Serbs and Croats do not support B&H, especially when it plays against Serbia and Croatia. Antagonism, the low pole of agreeableness, references traits related to immorality, combativeness, grandiosity, callousness, and distrustfulness. On the one hand, neuroticism is core to understanding internalizing disorders' intense distress and suffering. On the other, antagonism is core to understanding the impairment and suffering (to the individual and society at large) that comes with externalizing disorders. (Lynam and Miller, 2019)

At the same time, in addition to not supporting (e.g.) when the Croatian national football team played against Turkey in Vienna, Austria, the same day, B&H national football team played against Portugal in B&H city Zenica. Those on the eastern Bosniak side of Mostar (a city excessively divided between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks) hoisted Turkish flags. Those on the western side hoisted Croatian flags. It raised riots and extreme violence. (Youtube – Bljesak.info, 2008). Moreover, such violent conflicts are regular in Mostar when local football clubs, Velez (Bosniak side of Mostar) and Zrinjski (Bosnian Croat side), play. It is also common in any B&H city when two sports clubs from different ethnoreligious entities or Cantons play and regularly demonstrate fascism, xenophobia, Genocide denial, the honor of war crimes convicts, and symbols of religious hostility. One well-known catchphrase often shown at the sports Stadiums in several former Yugoslav countries is "Noz, Zica, Srebrenica ("The Knife, The Barbed Wire, Srebrenica"). It is a Serbian chauvinist hatred motto that praises and honors the Srebrenica genocide of Bosniaks during the B&H war. It rhymes in Bosnian-Serbo-Croatian. It can be heard at football matches and in papers supporting war criminals, such as B&H Serb general Ratko Mladić, Karadzic, and others. Periodically "Biće repriza!" ("There Will Be a Repetition!") is added to the motto, celebrating the mass killings and threatening a future genocide. (Wagner, 2008)

Furthermore, Mostar is present with constant sociopolitical divisions and antagonistic media narratives (divided B&H city between Bosniaks/Muslims on the right side and B&H Croats/Catholics on the western side of river Neretva). For example, the favorite Croatian media portal from abroad, "Fenix Vijesti," published the text "Provocation in Mostar: Old Bridge in the Colors of the Turkish Flag." (Fenix, 2019) The Old Bridge was illuminated with the Turkish flag. However, the Anadolu Agency, edition for Western Balkans (AA) published a text: "Old Bridge in Mostar in the colors of the Turkish flag and under the guard of democracy. In this way, a clear message was sent from Mostar to the whole world about the evil that befell Turkey. (Simovic, 2019).

Method

The paper presents a theoretical and conceptual examination of observed phenomena, meta-analysis and an in- depth literature review, and various video and audio data examinations. The study involved general scientific methodologies, analytical, descriptive, content analysis, and discourse analysis methods. Analytical and descriptive parts add to comprehension for foreign readers unfamiliar with this Balkan phenomenon. Examinations involved critical reasoning and evaluating facts and information relative to the research being conducted. In addition, the ethnonational and religious issues require interdisciplinary deconstruction into peace, conflict dynamics, educational governance, and social and political psychology.

Examinations involved critical thinking skills and the evaluation of facts and information relative to the research being conducted. Analytical and descriptive parts add to comprehension for foreign readers unfamiliar with this Balkan phenomenon. In addition, the ethnonational and religious issues require interdisciplinary deconstruction into peace, conflict dynamics, educational governance, and social and political psychology. However, to reduce any bias regarding the regional and local national, ethnic, and religious identity sentiments, research of foreign authors is widely covered in theoretical and empirical frameworks. Findings on the Transition to Provincial and Central Organization Managers

The duties and responsibilities of the education administrators in the provincial organization are regulated in the "Ministry of National Education Provincial and District Directorates of National Education Regulations" (2012). Accordingly, national education directors are responsible for effectively and efficiently managing the ministry's education policies and plans in accordance with the legislation in the provinces and districts where they are located. Provincial deputy directors of national education act on behalf of the provincial director of national education by ensuring harmony between services. Branch managers, on the other hand, are obliged to carry out the duties under their responsibility and to fulfill the duties assigned by the director of national education (Art.6). Education specialist, branch manager, working in the central organization of the Ministry, The duties and responsibilities of education managers at the level of department head and general manager are specified in the "Ministry of National Education, General Directorate of Human Resources Working Directive". Accordingly, training specialists are responsible for informing their supervisors about issues related to their areas of duty, giving courses and seminars to employees, following up and reporting on scientific developments with research, review, development studies. Branch managers in charge of the central organization manage the business and operations of the branch and prepare reports on the work of the branch. Heads of departments are responsible for determining and implementing policies and strategies related to their departments within the framework of their powers. General managers, on the other hand, determine the policies and strategies of the general directorate they are responsible for and provide organization accordingly. Positions such as the district directorate of national education, deputy director of national education and provincial directorate of national education in the provincial organization, as well as the head of the department in the central organization of the ministry and positions above are positions appointed at the discretion of the president or minister. Career For the educational specialty defined as a profession, they must be successful in the KPSS Group A Field Knowledge exam and the assistant specialist recruitment exam to be held by the

Ministry of National Education. The staff of the branch directorate is a position that can be appointed by succeeding in the competition exam held by the Ministry of National Education, except for exceptional cases. All of the expressed cadres are cadres in the general administrative services class (DMK).

When the policy documents are examined, it is seen that the first decision on the subject was taken at the 11th National Education Council in 1982. Here, the fields of education specialization are education management and inspectorship, as well as educational planning, educational guidance, program development, special education, educational technology, nutrition education, public education, expressed as assessment, evaluation and orientation. In addition, detailed models regarding the pre-service and in-service training of the mentioned training experts and the competencies they should have are also included. The employment conditions of the relevant specialists are listed as being a graduate of a master's degree, working as a teacher or assistant educational specialist for a certain period of time, and being selected by a predetermined method of criteria. In addition, it was emphasized that it is necessary to establish a career system that includes promotion and remuneration situations for educational professionals. The employment conditions of the relevant specialists are listed as being a graduate of a master's degree, working as a teacher or assistant educational specialist for a certain period of time, and being selected by a predetermined method of criteria. In addition, it was emphasized that it is necessary to establish a career system that includes promotion and remuneration situations for educational professionals. In the 16th Council in 1999, it was stated that legal arrangements should be made for the "National Education Academy" to become operational in order to train the areas of expertise needed by the central organization within the profession and to develop their careers. In the 18th Council in 2010, it was stated that arrangements should be made for the employment of specialists in the central and provincial organizations, physical education and sports related units. The last council where the subject took place was the 19th in 2014. It was stated that a fair career system should be established that allows horizontal and vertical transition between education expertise, provincial and district administration, central and provincial branch directorates and department Decisions on the qualification base to include all management positions. In the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of National Education 2015- 2019, "The adequacy of the appointment and promotion system based on career and merit was highlighted as a weakness. In the strategic plan, it is stated that qualifications will be determined for executive positions in the central and provincial structures and that a holistic career system will be developed and appointments and promotions will be carried out within this system.

When the practices implemented in the appointment of education managers in the central and provincial organizations are examined, it is seen that until 1999, the appointments to these positions were carried out according to the general criteria specified in the Civil Servants Law No. 657. This situation has also caused many problems in practice (Çetin and Yalçın, 2002). In 1999, the "Ministry of National Education Executive Appointment, Evaluation, Promotion and Relocation Regulation" was issued, and in this regulation, criteria and qualifications for many positions from the school directorate to the undersecretariat were stated. In this regulation, various titles and cadres in the central and provincial organizations have been graded and the general and special conditions necessary for promotion to these positions have been determined. According to this, conditions such as being a teacher with a higher education degree, being successful in the exam to be held at the end of the education prescribed for the task to be assigned, being successful in computer education courses, being successful in the foreign language exam held at that time for the upper echelons in the central and provincial organization have been sought for those who will

be appointed to the management postIn 2013, the "Regulation on the Appointment of the Ministry of National Education Personnel by Promotion, Change of Title and Relocation" was published and the conditions to be sought for those who will be appointed to the positions of provincial deputy director of national education and district national education directorate were determined. According to the regulation, in order to be appointed to these positions, the conditions are required to have served in the directorate of the educational institution for at least four years or the branch directorate for at least two years by winning a written exam. In 2020, the regulation was amended and the requirement to have won a written exam was abolished.

One of the policies discussed in the transition to managerial positions in the provincial and central organizations is the policy for women education managers. The policy regarding the application of positive discrimination in the appointment of female personnel to the education administration staff was implemented for the first time in the "Regulation on the Appointment of Managers to Educational Institutions of the Ministry of National Education" published in 2014. According to this; only a female school principal can be appointed to schools where all students are girls, while at least one of the deputy directors of the educational institution where there are female boarding students must be a woman. In addition, if there are three or more assistant principal norms in coeducational schools, it is stated that at least one female assistant principal will be appointed to these assistant principal positions. Minister of National Education Mahmut Ozer stated in a statement in 2022 that the weight of female personnel in the educational community is 59 percent. in addition, he stated that they will ensure that at least one of the provincial assistant directors of national education in 81 provinces will be a woman, and they will also increase the representation rate of women in school and branch directorates (Özgenç, 2022).

Research Design

The evaluated quantitative and qualitative data relates to official references, legislations, books, research papers, international reports accessed through databases, policy reports from international NGOs and media narratives, and various video and audio formats, including "grey literature. Thus, the study presents a theoretical and conceptual examination of observed phenomena, an in-depth literature review and meta-analysis, and various video and audio data reviews.

Research Instruments and Processes

The study included an in-depth literature review, meta-analysis descriptive method, and qualitative data analysis techniques: content analysis and discourse analysis.

Discussion

Circumstances changed exceptionally in the late 1980s regarding religious education or religion itself. After the Yugoslav wars, confessional or denominational religious education has become part of primary and secondary school curricula. Religious education is a compulsory elective subject in Serbia, and it is represented in the curricula for primary and secondary schools for one hour per week. According to official data, more than half of students in Serbia attend religious courses, and high school students are more interested in clerical education than

elementary school students. (Hadzic, 2022) In Croatia and B&H, it is a voluntary elective subject. However, at the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) request, religious education could be compulsory in B&H, Republika Srpska (RS) Entity high schools - (Orthodox). (Veselinovic, 2018)

In Republika Srpska (RS), a grade in religious education is valued the same as a grade in, for example, mathematics or physics.

In primary schools, the subject is called Society, Culture, Religion, and in secondary schools, the Culture of Religion. Grades from both subjects, like the Republic of Srpska (RS) Entity, incorporate GPA in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H) entity. For example, a Sarajevo Canton (Bosniaks/Muslim majority). Catholic school religious education is integrated into the general educational goals of the modern Croatian democratic school. According to its goals and contents, it is grafted into the entirety of the Croatian (Republic of Croatia) educational system. It comprises Bosnian (B&H) Croats. (Hadzic, 2022) The doctrine of compulsory religious education provokes controversies since it is already being studied as an elective subject in primary school in most countries in former Yugoslavia. A comprehensive legal framework followed in 2003 and 2004, B&H Parliament embraced the Framework Law on Religious Freedom/Position of churches and religious communities. B&H has signed similar basic agreements with the Catholic and Serbian Orthodox Churches. Consequently, religious education in Croatia and other Western Balkans acquired a sound-accepted subject (Kuburic & Moe, 2006).

The current ethnonational politics insists on religious education with the influence of religious organizations. According to Hans Enzensberger, "Exploitation is not only an economic fact but also a fact of consciousness. "Who is the master, and who is the servant, is decided not only based on who has capital, factories, and weapons but - the further, the clearer - who has the consciousness of others." (Enzensberger, 1982) However, Exploitation, formality, and compulsion damage the faith and should be avoided. "If you convince people that Dragan is a "Serbian/Orthodox," Ahmed a "Bosniak/Muslim," and Josip and Marija a "Croat/Catholic" names; cause them to honor ignoramuses, lawbreakers, national idols without credibility; value his/her "Islamism," "Catholicism," "Orthodoxy" - "Bosniacism," "Croaticism" and "Serbianism"; it is pure lobotomy of the "masses" as communist would say or "peoples opium." (Youtube-Saggitarius 1969, 2022)

Political projects were started by war, and segregation among ethnic groups continues only through education, within the discriminated educational phenomenon of "Two schools under one roof" in B&H. "There are those borders, we do not agree, and we do not want to be in touch," says a high school student from Mostar, adding that he was never on the Old Bridge[6] out of fear because, as he says, "someone will recognize that he is a Croat and get into a fight." Four students express such an opinion in the exact first sentence. The same student states that he can recognize a "Muslim" crossing the bridge by "speech, movement, clothing, facial texture, and darker skin." (Perspektiva, 2015) This approach's most crucial feature creates a discourse of "naturalness," supported by a particular nation's different, primarily pseudo-scientific or mythopoetic narratives. Naturalness discourse aims to devalue alternative discursive patterns as "utopian" or "abnormal." It is a kind of naturalistic delusion of the dominant ethnopolitical discourse." (Hadzic, 2020)

By content and discourse analysis of numerous ethnopolitical power abuse and criminal affair (2020), in the "secret" audio, the religious words were spoken by political actors: "If God (Allah)

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[6] Unesco's 16th-century Ottoman bridge (rebuilt after the Croatian army destroyed it) in Mostar in B&H crosses the river Neretva and connects its two parts.

gives "- 3 times, "Hairli"[7] - 3 times, "There will be Hair"[8] - 2 times, "God gives Nafaka,"[9] and harsh swearing language. The political concept of a "partocracy" is presented in nine minutes, including internal party elections defrauding with an inclusive clerical paradigm. Moreover, one of the objectives is the illegitimate government employment of a graduate Islamic pedagogue[10], one of the affair actor's wives. Asim Sarajlic, Bosniak SDA party deputy president, stated: "I am the SDA party general staff manager and "first" to President Bakir Izetbegovic. "God Willing," as soon as the government is established, we will get into that story." (Youtube- Cazin.net, 2020). The sociopolitical reality manifests the clerical and intoxicated ethnonational leaders' criminal power ordinariness of unethical and amoral materiality - defective democracy. Many Bosniaks considered that the SDA party liberated the Bosniak people from stigmatization and political (identity) captivity[11] and returned historical national names, language, and State. Party's well-known post-war slogan was "In our country, our religion/faith. "Based on the above, the current legal-political doctrine of the most authoritative Bosniak party is significantly undemocratic, nepotistic, illegitimate, unethical, and amoral.

By analyzing numerous media narratives in the B&H, we have the existence of maxims like: "Croatian waters," "Serbian forests," "Bosniak Academy of Arts and Sciences,"; "Serbian and Croatian post offices," and "Serbian New Year" (Karabegovic, 2017) (and not Serbian, but Orthodox). Moreover, the media often denotes Nation and religion within the ambiguity of etymology and the semantics of nations and religion. Thus, we have uncritical, thoughtless idioms: "the Muslim side, Muslim government, Muslim-Croat federation, Muslim-majority municipalities, Muslim intellectuals." (Srna, 2020)

This total cleric-ethnicization of public consciousness enabled the most comprehensive open support for any unethical practices committed in the name of the "people." For example, the media conveniently declared that "three juveniles of Roma ethnicity killed Mrs. Spasojevic of Serbian nationality." Therefore, the crime should be given a religious, national, racial, and even segregation dimension. They write: "A priest killed out of greed committed by two Bosniak and one Croat juvenile," Criminal of Croatian nationality," "Serbian nationality," "Orthodox," and so on. (e.g., Aljazeera, 2013) It leads to clerical ethnicization, immorality, and legal anomalies. The ontology of journalism as a profession should advocate for the public interest, the interest of citizens, and a profession that educates citizens about civic culture. Instead, it permanently educates religious-national tribes that Srebrenica[12], Kazani[13], and others, keeping its assemblies in fear and obedience. It has contaminated the consciousness of young generations. It represents Goebbels' propaganda,

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[7] Arabic - Honest; good, valid; happy.

[8] Arabic - Good, goodness; benefit, happiness; a good deed, a public building built by an individual as his gift to the community; endowment.

[9] Arabic - Nafaka is everything a person uses, whether halal or haram, beautiful or ugly.

[10] Following the European Bologna Process, the Faculty of Islaamic Sciences in Sarajevo established three study cycles from 2013 to 2014. The first cycle of studies has three programs: Islamic theology, Islamic religious education, and religious pedagogy; Study programs for imams.

[11] Historical term "Bosniak" was banned, identifying them as Muslims. In communism, often due to the most mundane political function, they were forced to prove the party's loyalty by giving their children "international names" - Serbian or Croatian.

[12] Srebrenica genocide was the July 1995 genocide of more than 8,300 Bosniak Muslim men and boys in and around the town of Srebrenica during the B&H war.

[13] The Kazani pit killings refer to the mass murder of predominantly ethnic Serbs living inside besieged Sarajevo by the forces of Mušan Topalović, commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade in the Army of the Republic of B&H during the B&H war.

Stalin's political upbringing, and elements that produce aggression and frustration. The media are the "first pastor" in a culture of fear and assist in the Balkans' virtual and on-ground antagonistic reality. "The mind reigns, and the power of the stake rolls," which is correct according to God's and secular logic. (Spahic, 2012)

In B&H, where the population is predominantly B&H Serb and Croat, bordering countries are characterized by Serbian/Orthodox or Croatian/Catholic awareness. Uninterruptedly, national flags of other countries (Croatian, Serbian, Russian, and occasionally Turkish and Saudi Arabia) and religious symbols exist. The reflection of B&H statehood (persistent sociopolitical issues and secessionism strategy) is questioned. Ethnic-religious quasi-states materialize in that condition of sociopolitical climate and awareness. It could transition into abolishing the one guaranteed continuity- independent and entire B&H.

The culture of fear and constant fabrication of dangers (a stimulant) that threaten the alleged survival of an ethnic/national/confessional group creates a psychosis of fear and uncertainty of defensive internal cohesiveness. It discerns the dangers of peoples' existence from that group. It is rapidly transferred from one religious group (Nation) to another in which the same processes occur, creating a chain of "imaginary" interethnic threats. (Hadzic, 2021)

Ethnoreligiously segregated education in B&H demonstrates the power of ethnopolitics. Moreover, ethnoreligious collectivism rises above individualism and does not liberate the human capacity to build a democratic society. The inclusive education movement should build a democratic, inclusive, multiethnic, and multireligious society. Educational diversity inclusion is the intention for both a moral and ethical society. Educational segregation and discrimination create, intensify, and rationalize ethnoreligious disputes. The change of education from a cognitively segregated ethnopolitical matrix to a school organized according to the measure of "human enlightenment" is long-term and the most critical path in order not only to provide a good ground for educational inclusion, satisfying the students' needs but the future of multicultural moral and ethical society. It reflects in brought up and educated non-xenophobes individuals-personalities in fragile post-conflict Balkan societies. Any form of segregation cannot be abolished without changing the Constitution so that every other solution will produce additional intricacies. Affirmative indications of the adverse effects of B&H educational policies, ethnopolitical ideologies, philosophies, and ethnopolitical nonobjective party interests are required. Those policies obstruct critical peace and conflict transformation processes and potential initiatives to establish peace, conflict resolution, and non-violence. Peace education and inter-ethnic communication can reduce disagreement sentiments ("enemy") between ethnoreligious groups maintained by ethnopolitical separation propaganda. The B&H should establish an educational model in public schools that prevents indoctrination. Thus, it violates the right of parents to educate their children to follow their own religious or philosophical beliefs.

Moreover, it instills understanding, tolerance, and respect for a pluralistic society and enlightens students on the principle of religious freedom as one of the fundamental elements of freedom and democracy. In such an education model, religious education could promote tolerance and understanding between individuals, groups, and nations by transmitting knowledge. Thus, the values relating to religious tendencies are inclusive so that individuals understand that they are part of the same community and discover to create their own identity in harmony and carefulness correlated to different identities and "others." (Hadzic, 2022)

Furthermore, the Bosniak political elite, led by the SDA party and its leader Bakir

Izetbegovic[14], is sympathetic to Turkish politics. It misguides territorial identity - centuries of cultural polyphony of the Homeland - where civil and modern society is subordinated to religious sentiments. Although a negligible, practically non-existent Turkish diaspora in B&H, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held a principal pre-election rally for the Western European Turkish diaspora in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, 2018. Western European countries (Germany and many others) rejected it. Izetbegovic called on Turkish voters to support Erdogan in the June 24th elections, stressing strong ties between B&H and Turkey. "You now have a man sent to you by God (i.e., Allah). His name is Recep Tayyip Erdogan." Izetbegovic shouted. (The Bosnian Times, 2018) Much rhetoric in the relations between B&H and Turkey is related to many unfounded historical memories. Turkey was quite indifferent to the position of Muslims in Versailles and Yugoslavia. The narrative of the Turkish care for their descendants is a myth. Bosniaks are not ethnic Turks but South Slavs with more proximity to Slovenes, Macedonians, Croats, and Serbs than Ottomans.

The protection of the vital national interest in former Yugoslavia (particularly in B&H) is based on an ethnoreligious framework. The so- called mechanism within the House of Peoples of the B&H Parliament should ensure that no decision "of vital national interest" is taken against the interests of any constituent people. The hypocrisy of the so-called "protection of vital national interest" is an unquestionable axiom of local ethnic oligarchy, critical protagonists of local ethnopolitics. (Bajtal, 2016) Moreover, these are structurally manipulative and nepotistic ethnopolitical and ethnoreligious processes. The idiom "protection of vital national interests" demonstrates the institutionalization of post-war ethnoreligious conflict. In a "constitutively" manner, the ethnopolitical and ethnoreligious arrangement is reduced to a struggle over three homogenous ethnoreligious territories. (Hadzic, 2021)

Consequently, there is no civic unity or mutual human solidarity based on organic elements "from below" through existential-interest connections within the civic value framework. On the contrary, particularly in B&H, there is an inhuman, daily political unity on the scene, achieved by the Clergy and ethnic manipulation "from above." (Bajtal, 2018) Besim Spahic stated: "No one in B&H quotes a Hadith, which says that the Prophet Muhammed a.s. said that the most significant human virtue is courage, which consists in publicly opposing a powerful and evil ruler; that is, if Allah has given you to know and see further than others, he has obliged you ten times more to spread that knowledge, for if you do not do this, you will be stamped with a glowing seal and you will burn in the fiercest fire of hell." (Spahic, 2012)

In the former Yugoslav countries, religious leaders often become active politicians (or dominant political leaders), as is the case with Muslim religious leaders. The former Grand Mufti[15] of the B&H Islamic community, Mustafa Cerić, and Serbian Sandžak Mufti Muamer Zukorlić were candidates for the B&H and Serbian Presidency. Zukorlić was a member of the Serbian Parliament and a candidate for the Serbian Presidency. However, given that overall ethnic policies are often practiced as clerical policies, it conveys sociopolitical volatility - uncertainty about the impact of religious influences on future sociopolitical processes. The media numerously reported on the Sandzak Mufti polygamy and authoritative luxury lifestyle. At the same time, when Zukorlic was

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[14] He is a Bosnian politician who served as the 6th Bosniak member of the Presidency of B&H from 2010 to 2018. He is the president of the most potent Bosniak party, SDA, and a national House of Peoples member. He is the son of the first and only president of the Republic of B&H, Alija Izetbegovic.
[15] The Mufti is the chief religious superior in a particular area, called the Muftiluk.

Sandzak Mufti in Novi Pazar[16], his service included private bodyguards, an exorbitant vehicle fleet, and a private university. (Markovic, 2016)

Moreover, religious polygamy conflicts with Bosniak's historical/cultural traditions. A 2013 Pew Research Center study shows Bosniaks are among the world's most liberal and tolerant Muslims. For example, unlike most Pakistani and Egyptian Muslims surveyed, Bosniaks respondents did not believe that adulterers must be stoned and apostates executed. (Pew Research Center, 2013) The case of Bosniaks is particularly instructive. It can show how attitudes towards Islam can develop over time and how its adherents, with the help of progressiveness, can accept modernity without abandoning their religious identity. Nevertheless, Islam is intensely politicized in secular and non-secular positions in contemporary Balkans. In 2010, Zukorlic, Mufti, and Politicians were shown in the Serbian daily newspaper "Blic" in the uniform of a Christian priest with a cross on his head. He announced that he would seek compensation of one hundred million euros, while the Islamic Community Parliament called for a boycott of the sale and distribution of "Blic" in Sandzak. Islamic Community supported Zukorlic and not only joined the request for criminal responsibility of the perpetrator of the insult and compensation of one hundred million euros but also stated that it symbolizes the continuation of "genocidal politics." Orientalist Rade Božović is convinced that it should be taken into account that criticism of societies dominated by the influence of religion is often conducted from positions that can be called secular fundamentalism. To clarify, he refers to research in Islamic areas in the region and states that it is dominated by: "One strong respect, devotion, at least formal, to religion. That must be taken into account." (Teodorovic, 2010)

Moreover, it was the continuation of the election campaign and Mufti Zukorlic's political career started, and he introduced himself as the leading representative of the Sandzak Bosniaks. "Mufti Zurkorlić never ran away from promotion and publicity. He does not miss a single opportunity where he will advertise to the maximum," stated Semiha Kačar from the Sandzak Human Rights Committee. Balkan collectivist pattern identifies cultural-ethnic and institutional-political identity in which the political community identifies with the national or ethnic-religious community. The process of a nation-state constitution is expressed by the aspiration to create territories with clearly defined borders. Ethnically homogeneous people formed the core of the states. In establishing a nation-state, ethnicity has been given an essential political role. (Hobsbawm and Kertzer, 1992) As an instrument of a new form of social integration of individuals based on standard (kinship) origin and long life together in one area, the idea of ethnos emphasized the value of tradition and those contents of life which long-term survival confirmed as values and signs of joint group affiliation (religion, language, history, customs and the like). The apostrophe of the idea of collectivity (values by which belonging to a group was recognized and expressed) and tradition resulted in the proclaimed ideas of individual freedoms being replaced by ideas. In post-Yugoslav political life, ethnocracy replaces democracy, special ethnopolitical totalitarianism replaces national (state) political orientation, and ethnopolitics, biopolitics, and populism grow unstoppably against democratic politics. Due to new national-state theoretical inadequacy (i.e., nationalism as an ideology), religion is an instrument of socialization and legitimization of new national-political state subjects. As a form of political power, politicized religions are, psychologically speaking, unconscious non-faith, whether accepted or rejected by believers, which the "actor" necessarily instrumentalizes. (Hadzic, 2020) In the political verbal discourse and daily overemphasized oath to God, their call to faith, we have religious ed the

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[16] The city in Serbia and the cultural center of the Bosniaks in Serbia and the region of Sandžak.

sphere of public space and media speech: from religious greetings to religious-verbal Orthodoxy, even in the banalest communicative context, including the criminogenic one (numerous documented political and economic abuse of power affairs). (Bajtal, 2010)

Ethnonationalism in the former Yugoslavia is associated with the politically unpleasant notion of ethnicity. As noted, nationalism is defended by strengthening its borders with other national entities and identities. Filipović argued that robust clericalization is a determinant of the national consciousness of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The clerical-sacral is mixed with the political and profane to nationalize - Bosnian - masses, initially Orthodox and Catholic, and finally, as a point of resistance and realization of aspirations. Moreover, as support for the third way, Muslims as a reaction to a lousy position between conflicts between two savage nationalisms - Croatian and Serbian. (Filipovic, 2012) The recent coup activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) under Russia, Montenegro, and B&H are traditional clerical behavior and process. Dramatic television reports from the Serbian Orthodox Church's September 5, 2021 operation in Montenegro, which imposed an identity on Montenegro that half the Nation does not accept, have revived fears of a repeat of the 1990s across the region.

Moreover, in 2015, Serbia rehabilitated Draža Mihailović and restored his civil rights, which were taken away from him during the communist regime in 1946. Will the Serbian Patriarchate plan the next clerical-nationalist landing? (Perica, 2021) It can be called a clerical landing in Montenegro. When the state power puts itself in the service of a (para)ecclesiastical organization in this way, it is clericalism. However, when it does so in the interest of another state, it is quisling action. A political people with a collective political will is a nation, and in the liberal world, the principle applies: The Nation is the State. Therefore, the Montenegrin State, which would only be a part of the unified national space of the "Serbian world," would not be a state but an autonomous province. It is what the ideologues of the "Serbian World" openly tell their fellow citizens, Montenegrin constitutionalists and sovereignists (whether they belong to the Montenegrin national corpus or national minorities, whether they are Orthodox, Catholic, or Muslim by religion). With the warning that there are only a few hundred thousand of them, what will happen when finding themselves against 7 million (meaning, all members of the Serbian State - national - world - galactic corps). (Gjenero, 2021) Serbian Patriarch Irinej spoke about the Serbian Court's decision to rehabilitate Mihajlovic, stating that he would like the epilogue of Mihailovic's rehabilitation to be, at the same time, the reconciliation of the Serbian people and that there would be no more ideological divisions between Tito partisans and Chetniks. (Glavonjic and Mihajlovic, 2015)

Subordination of the individual to the national community, i.e., the leader, is a psychological form of political behavior marked by an obsessive preoccupation with unification. Regardless of moral and legal constraints, the cult of unification abandons democratic autonomies with violence or non-violence. Thus, the outcome is the formation of ethnoreligious, threatening collectivity (tribal identity) and the decline of the community. Helmut Schmidt's (2007) presentation, "On the Ethos of Politicians," can be a productive stimulus to reflect on the challenges of Western Balkan ethos. Schmidt's appeal to conscience as the supreme instance, the commitment to peace, reason, and tolerance, and the open contempt of politicians who mix religion with politics. (Schmidt, 2007) In essence, however, it is a rounded, conceived construct of an enlightened, conscientious conception of politics and a demonstration of the essence of the idea of the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, everything is reminiscent of the antagonistic and destructive annulment of political pluralism and the collectivist reduction of the individual to leaders' will, recognizable in the power of the all-binding total clericalization ethnicization.

Dayton's Peace Accords political system in B&H became the "sacred letter" of political elites, preserving the status quo and lacking qualitative changes, maintaining political-interest structures and hybrid conflicts. It is utterly independent of differences in their proclaimed political-ideological goals. At any point in any political process in B&H institutions concerning any issue or problem, politics can face a wall of "vital national interest" as absolute inviolability. This "holy" practice paralyzes politics and deprives it of meaning and purpose. The threefold ethnonational values protection (i.e., Muslims/Orthodox/Catholics) is like a non-aggression pact, as a social contract implies the totalization of exclusivity, abolishing politics between inclusion and exclusion. This mechanism of Dayton's irrational "defense," as a rationalized derivative of its initial denial, is called reactive formation in psychology. Phenomenologically and psychoanalytically, reactive formation is a unique, specific form of repression. There is also the phenomenon of reactive formation on reactive formation, and disguise gives rise to others. Psychology, as phenomenology and ontology of the spirit, in its essence, is an "unmasking" science. It shows precisely the masked side of civilizational and existentially destructive activities of powerful ethnopolitical elites. (Bajtal, 2010)

Without political ambitions and motives, guided only by the improvement of working conditions and quality of life, numerous civic associations gather around universal civilizational values that lead to civic emancipation and moral uprightness of the individual, i.e., a transformation of the individual from a mere subject to a civic conscious individual. It, among other things, leads to a fairer redistribution of budget resources, dictating the emergence of a "welfare state." More precisely, civic emancipation expands the social space of legitimate action of citizens, which the professional literature calls "self-organization of society." Modern civil society has it, and most post-Yugoslav countries do not. Consequently, there is no civic unity or mutual human solidarity based on organic elements "from below" through existential-interest connections within the civic value framework. On the contrary, there is an inhuman, daily political unity on the scene, achieved by the Clergy and ethnic manipulation "from above." (Bajtal, 2018)

There is no proof of religious superiority on such an understanding of one's faith, and thus no need to exterminate other religions. If we include the ethical paradigm, ethics differs from morality because it is an individual choice. Non-religious ethics, unlike religious ethics, have a completely different starting point. It starts from human thinking that tries to determine and describe what is good. Within the framework of non-religious ethics, a man tries to give himself an answer to the question of what is excellent or good action. In doing so, man relies on his abilities, strength (reason and conscience), and knowledge of nature and history. Ethics are universal decision-making tools that may be used by a person of any religious persuasion, including atheists. Religious ethics know the answers to non-religious ethics: purely human answers to what is good. Religious ethics are the moral principles that guide religions and set the norm for acceptable behavior. Religious ethics does not abolish the accomplishments of non-religious ethics but strengthens and establishes the best of them by faith. At the same time, religion is an influential educator with its universal values. However, for too many believers, the hope of heaven and fear of hell forces them to be good. Therefore, many could be more genuinely ethical. In this way, every inquisition, crusade, or jihad justifies the suspicion they refute. The superior behavioral practice carries his understanding only by slandering those he does not consider members of their race or religion.

Conclusion & Recommendations

Results

The multiethnic and multireligious Yugoslav paradigm and being were abolished. It produced societies maintaining nationalism and provincialism, making a recognizable sign of the identity of the sociopolitical capital. Fear of others, religiously distinct, is a behavior that's difficult to determine and prevent, particularly in former Yugoslavia's fragile societies. The Balkans' journalism approach and ontology reinforce ethnoreligious nationalism. Post-socialist Balkan societies are intensely marked by religion, specifically external manifest, associating religious identities and Clergy with political preferences. The Nation and the political community and a force expressed in its sovereignty- should be based on equality, legalism, and democracy. The religious superiority matrix intertwines with intense dominant national perceptions, so belonging to the Serb, Croat, and Bosniak people is equated with the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Islam. This entanglement is the groundwork of long-lasting despondency; religions are reduced principally to ethnicity-nation and subsequent power. All-binding inclusive ethnicization in B&H infiltrates religious dimensions, including material (resources, schools) and non-material (symbols, norms, language, institutions) cultures. The clerical ethnonationalism consequence points to the religious State of anti-secular internal disintegration of the genuine faith. Political behavior and clerical-ethnical ideologies strengthen support for religious antagonism, fascism, and historical revisionism, further "dividing" peoples into ethnoreligious homogenous territories. When the national political illegalities degenerate, with the traditional ethnoreligious election behavioral practice decline, more consequential initiatives within liberalism and the rule of law forces can originate. Within acknowledging moral and political obligation, religious identity identifies with ethnicity, and commitment to a particular religion benefits ethnopolitics. Moreover, linking democracy and ethnonationalism is problematic because they are ideologies of conflicting values - ethnonationalism occasionally negates democracy and human rights.

One should "reverse" sociopolitical advantages and "restrain "the material to serve social capital. Nations cannot be clerical-political apparatus morally. Invoking man's ethnic-clerical consciousness entails unsatisfactory results due to Balkan's historical prevailing violence than would be obtained by the statutory prohibition of religious education. The clerical-political leaders must formulate a reconciliation-based society reinforcing the rule of law, historical correctness, religious tolerance, equality, and equity. The dominance and exclusivity of collectivist logics of ethnically and confessionally complex societies oppose the spirit of necessary susceptibility. Thus, ethically, sociopolitically, and psychologically, one must gain society's self-awareness as a totality of relations between autonomous and equal individuals-citizens to generate clerical and ethnicization immunity.

Nevertheless, the culture of fear and hybrid conflict, nominal or significant, has been present in B&H since the Dayton Peace Accords. The educational segregation phenomena show obtrusive indoctrination with elements that produce antagonism, resulting in inevitable violence based on historical contingencies. The B&H ethnoreligious-educational segregation reproduces ethnopolitical ideologists, preventing the next generation's socio-moral development and simulating the ethnoreligious hybrid conflicts – positive peace stalemate.

Regardless of confession, Balkan citizens must act against fascism and religious xenophobia, and religious identity must be separated from political preferences. Freedom is understood as collective freedom, and nationalism is the absolutization of the national idea confirmed as the essential means of legitimizing social and political order. The imperatives of authentic democratic transition make this process almost utopian in a post-conflict society of opposing ethnoreligious nationalism without a basic consensus on the very nature of the political community. Nevertheless, ethnonationalism equates with ethnoreligious conflict, xenophobia, chauvinism, and fascism. Western Balkans requires an open society characterized by reliance on the rule of law, anti-political populism, a diverse and vibrant civil society, and respect for ethnoreligious minorities.

Ethics

There is no degree of the potential severity of harm in the study, and it is proportionate to the potential benefits of the research. Therefore, this study does not pose a high risk of harm that requires careful consideration by the researcher and any ethics committee.

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Conflict of Interest

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