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## “STATE” CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA: A DECADES-BACK HISTORICAL REMINDER

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### Abstract

Corporatism as an ideology has a relatively long history. In its modern forms, however, as a particular ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the state, in particular with reference to its variety as regards, generally defined, antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian states, preeminently in Latin America, it has emerged and developed mainly through the second half of the twentieth century. This paper will basically dwell on historical, theoretical, and institutional examination and evaluation of that variety of modern corporatism, which has come to be labelled, almost unanimously, as “state” corporatism, concluding with a critical assessment. This reminder, made through the mentioned studies emphasized, will reveal the rich literature on corporatism and analyze the points underlying the definition of “scattered intellectual kitchen.” As a dimension of the analysis in question, it will focus on different corporatist samples and discuss the corporatist model in Latin America with its aspects and orientations within the framework of these samples.

**Keywords:** *Corporatism, State, Authoritarianism, Latin America, Interest Representation*

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# LATİN AMERİKA'DA “DEVLET KORPORATİZMİ”: ONLARCA YIL GERİYE UZANAN BİR HATIRLATMA

## Özet

Bir ülkede toplumun önde gelen sivil çıkar gruplaşmalarını devlet/iktidar “karar-verme” yapılanmasına -değişen mekanizmalarla katılımını sağlamak üzere- bağlayan, kavramsal-kurumsal bir siyasal yapı biçimi anlamında modern “korporatizm” özellikle 20. yüzyılın son çeyreğinde, başlıca iki ayırdedici türüyle, bir yandan “liberal” bir yandan da “otoriter” siyasal sistemlerin incelenmesinde bir süre hayli rağbet gören bir model olmuştur. İşte bu yazıda, ikinci türüne örnek olarak, Latin Amerika bağlamında 1970’lerde mevcut siyasal sistemleri açıklamada siyaset bilimi çalışmalarında üzerinde bir hayli kalem oynatılmış bulunan “devlet korporatizmi”, söz konusu çalışmaların kayda değer örneklerine atıfla, konuya ilk defa aşına olacak okuyucuya tanıtıcı bir usluapta, yeniden hatırlatılacaktır. Üzerinde durulan önemli çalışmalar vasıtası ile yapılan bu hatırlatma korporatizme dair zengin literatürü ortaya koyarken, “dağınık entelektüel mutfak” tanımlamasının altında yatan noktalar analiz edilecektir. Söz konusu analizin önemli bir boyutu olarak farklı korporatist örneklemelerin üzerinde durulmakta ve bu örneklemeler çerçevesinde Latin Amerika’da korporatist model yön ve yönelimleri ile tartışılacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Korporatizm, Devlet, Otoriteryanizm, Latin Amerika, Çıkar Temsili*

## Introduction

The concept of corporatism, whose origins date back to the 13th century, is the subject of analysis involving many different states with its intellectual approaches and application forms. With the emphasis on diversity in its conceptual dimensions, corporatism, which is the subject of the definition of a "scattered intellectual kitchen," has a rich literature network including regime types, different political systems, forms of dominant ideologies, levels of political mobilization, and changing public sphere scopes. The study, which primarily aims to present the network in question and the intellectual accumulation offered by this network, includes direct quotations from authors who stand out with their critical studies on corporatism. At this point, the purpose of direct citation is to present the author's text directly to the reader while conducting the discussion on corporatism through primary sources. In this sense, the study provides the reader with analyzing intellectual debates on corporatism from primary sources.

After these discussions on the theoretical framework, the study touches on the forms of application of corporatism by states. In these examples, which focus on Scandinavian, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Great Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands, the ways and methods of applying the corporatist model, including liberal corporatism, are briefly mentioned. The aim of considering these examples is to refer to the corporatist forms of Latin America, which differ from the underlined model in the conspicuous examples of corporatism. The study primarily deals with these differentiating trends with the literature on Latin America and then discusses their prominent features in terms of application ways and methods. In this discussion, where Latin America stands under the heading of "decoupling from the liberal corporatist model" stands out as a critical point. However, the study aims to present rich literature on corporatism to the reader with academic studies and examples reflected in the field.

## Conceptual Framework

Corporatism as an ideology has a long history. Broadly speaking, its origins can even be stretched back to the thirteenth century, when early representative assemblies began to play a role in the governance of some European countries (Wolfe, 1974: 323-25). Its modern roots, however, should be found in the versions of the nineteenth-century social and political thought, with their reaction against the newly-emerged individualistic, competitive, conflict-ridden social and political structures. That reaction has made fashionable "the quest for organic concepts of society, or organic solutions." (Newton, 1974: 36) Accordingly, many corporatist theorists have commonly put an emphasis on unity, or better to say, on class harmony, their shared notion being that "class harmony and organic unity were essential to society and could be secured if the various functional groups –especially those of capital and labor- were imbued with a conception of mutual rights and obligations." (Panitch, 1977: 61) To put it differently; here,

"Society is seen as consisting of diverse elements unified into one body, forming one Corpus, hence the word Corporatism. These elements are united because they are reciprocally interdependent, each performs tasks which the other requires." (Marsh & Grant, 1977: 195)

Though the above notion of unity is crucial in corporatist thought, there is however some sort of 'disunity', i.e., a considerable variation in conceptual dimensions of corporatist theory. In the beginnings of the twentieth century, in particular, "there was no single coherent corporatist doctrine, nor any dominant corporatist doctrinaire. Corporatism was, rather, an untidy intellectual kitchen." (Newton, 1974: 36) As an eminent scholar has literally described so well:

"The army of corporatists is so disparate that one is led to think the word, corporation, itself is like a label placed on a whole batch of bottles which are then distributed among diverse producers each of whom fills them with the drink of his choice. The consumer has to look carefully." (Schmitter, 1974: 88)

Notwithstanding how 'disparate', as a matter of fact, when 'looking carefully', one can easily see the distinction: Schmitter's hitherto best-elaborated definition of 'corporatism' as

"A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports." (1974: 93-94)

The definition is distinct; for, defined as such, i.e., "as a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state" (Schmitter, 1974: 86), as well as "a concrete, observable, general system of interest representation," it will certainly be, in Schmitter's own words, "compatible with several different regime-types, i.e., with different party systems, varieties of ruling ideology, levels of political mobilization, varying scopes of public policy etc." (1974: 86, 92) Schmitter's analytical definition, in short, provides us "useful reference points for assessing the weighing of pluralist and corporatist structures in different contexts" (Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1979: 270). For, defined as such, corporatism will be one of several configurations of interest representation, hence, "a heuristic and logico-analytical construct composed of a considerable variety of theoretically or hypothetically interrelated components" (Schmitter, 1974: 94).

What is more, such an elaboration on corporatism has paved the way, to Schmitter, for another conspicuous conceptual contribution: the construction of two differing sub-types: one is "societal", the other "state" corporatism. He seems to have originally found this key distinction in the most classical work on corporatism by one of its earliest theorists, Mihail Manoilescu's *Le Siècle du Corporatisme*, as labeled 'corporatisme pur' and 'corporatisme subordonné', respectively. Having reiterated, expanded and discussed at some length, these two sub-types were also labeled as 'corporativismo de associação' and 'corporativismo de Estado', by Portuguese students of corporatism (Schmitter, 1974: 102-103). Besides, several other scholars specialized on modern corporatism are also observed to have distinguished between these two types, with differing labelings; to name only a few: those of an emi-

ment scholar, Winkler, as “state-dominated corporatism” and “institutionalized pluralism” (1976: 100-101); the schematization by a sociologist, Lehmbuch, as “liberal” and “statist” corporatisms, as well as the classification by another specialist, Kvatik, as “corporate” and “statist” pluralisms (see, Almond, 1983: 249-50).

In such a key distinction, societal corporatism can be observed as “a system of relatively autonomous associations whose activity and support for government constitute a major source of political legitimacy,” while state corporatism is “characterized by government penetration and control over interest associations.” (Bailey, 1977: 263) Stated differently, these two sub-types may well be differentiated in accordance with the acquisition by associations of corporatist patterns, “whether imposed by the state or grown out of the efforts of private interests to institutionalize their relationships with the state.” (Metcalfé and McQuillan, 1979: 270) Viewed statically, the sub-types in question share structural features; yet, when viewed in action, they are the products of considerably different political, social, and economic settings, hence the vehicles for varying relations of power and influence—as concisely explicated by Schmitter himself:

“Societal corporatism is found imbedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial units; open, competitive electoral processes and party systems; ideologically varied, coalitionally based executive authorities—even with highly ‘layered’ or ‘pillared’ political subcultures. State corporatism tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinate to central bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed. Societal corporatism appears to be the concomitant, if not eluctable, component of the post-liberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state; state corporatism seems to be a defining element of, if not structural necessity for, the antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neo-mercantilist state.” (1974: 105)

The primary sources on corporatism also necessitate mentioning the way the concept is applied by states. At this point, different examples of corporatism will be mentioned in the following section.

## Conspicuous Examples of Corporatism\*

### i) *Scandinavian Model*

In the Scandinavian polities economic sectors, e.g., labor, employers, farming, fishing etc., are well-organized, and within each sector a centralized/bureaucratized network of interest

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groups serves as the primary means for the improvement of sector interests; most of them moreover have the position or power to develop, and even implement, policies which are exceedingly important for them in many issue areas.

ia) *Swedish case*

In the Swedish model, to which theorists of the new corporatism frequently refer, comprehensive and/or widespread agreements between peak labor and management associations have become the primary instrument of economic planning, and collective bargaining over the relevant economic issues has been highly developed, since the "Saltsjöbaden agreement" of 1938. In accordance with this, the state appears not to interfere the just-mentioned collaboration formally. However, information coming from the government on the economic situation as well as on desirable outcomes is taken into consideration in the process of bargaining (Lehmbruch, 1977: 107-08; Anderson, 1977: 150-51). Justification for that specific bargaining approach concerning economic (especially incomes) policies rests on two facts: first of all, it is generated by a process of deliberation among functional associations; on the other hand, it meets certain explicit criteria of public purpose, such as full employment and equal pay for equal work.

A more multi-partite form of corporatism is also seen as established in Sweden. There, some theorists draw attention to the fact that various interest organizations are integrated into the "Royal commissions" by a process called 'remiss-ytranden'. In accordance with this, major organized associations are invited to give their own opinions as soon as an issue is initiated. It should not be forgotten, however, that this practice largely takes place at the formulation phase of policy-making; it does not inevitably mean that those organizations also have definite influence in the implementation phase (Nedelmann and Meier, 1977: 47 ff.).

ib) *Norway's pattern*

In Norway the new corporatism appears to take a distinguishable form. Monopolization of distinct issue areas by the networks of interest groups is widely recognized; it is obviously seen that the articulation, modification, and even formation of several public policies have been increasingly left to a functional elite, namely, the leadership cadres of those groups. The interaction between the government and those groups is realized in an extensive network of committees, since that network is regarded as "the central decision-making arena which works with a 'technicalized' procedure." The corporate arrangement in the Norwegian model is largely institutionalized through the just-mentioned pattern (Kvavik, 1974: 115-16).

Under a closer look into the above model, the incorporation of all recognized interests is seen to have been achieved in more than one way: 1) "Remiss" system: as in the case of Sweden, it is that of submission by an organization a written evaluation in response to the invitation by a pertinent administrative department; the written response mentioned here is about a certain policy issue put forward newly. This system thus helps, in effect, to incorporate almost all the relevant organizations in to the decision-making process. 2) Committees: Access to policy-making by many a group is indeed provided by means of direct participation in specified administrative committees which formulate important policies. 3) Delegation of public responsibility to private organizations: This particular practice

is common in farming and fishing; e.g., in the case of the former, an organization called 'Landbruketsentralforbund' implements the details of the contract between the government and the association which represents the farming sector (Kvavik, 1974: passim).

The development of the above model in Norway in time, has in fact brought about some noticeable changes. Concisely put, these are: a) the lessening of interest group activity directly in connection with political parties and the legislature; b) the change in organizational and leadership structure, i.e., the increasing salience of technically-trained bureaucratic representatives as the spokesmen of relevant organizations (Kvavik, 1974: 99-102). Broadly speaking, 'travelling' beyond the borders of Norway, such changes turn out to be the inevitable consequences of the new corporatist experiment in industrial democratic countries.

ic) *Danish version*

In the Danish political system, "public committees" are to be seen as the prominent establishment for integrating interest groups with the state. Three interrelated aspects pertaining to those committees are worth-noticing: 1) First of all, these committees help interest groups to incorporate into the corporatist mechanism whenever issues concerned with the groups are to be decided; 2) integration here means that of actors; a lot of different actors from within interest groups as well as administrative and political bodies come together and bargain with each other regularly by way of those committees; 3) committees are set up for almost every area of public policy-making; thus, the groups incorporated have occasion to participate in all phases of policy-making (Johansen and Kristensen, 1978: 8-9).

Another noticeable feature of the Danish model is that, though the main focus of the corporatist structure is again on the functional representation of private interests, several other categories of interests also play an important role in the process, such as 'local interests' (of municipalities and/or counties) and 'institutional interests' (through representation of public institutions like hospitals, universities, social welfare agencies etc.). In addition to the representatives of the above-mentioned interests, bureaucrats from the central civil service, politicians from parties and/or parliament, and the relevant experts are the major membership categories in the committees in question (Johansen and Kristensen, 1978: 13).

As to which policy areas are the most appropriate for the incorporation of groups by the committees, the corporatist practice in Denmark is widely observed in relation with first of all in the areas involving 'specific regulation' (namely, those of agriculture, labor, commerce and so on) and secondly in the policy areas dealing with public services. Since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, the committee system specific to the Danish model has grown concomitantly with the growth of the public sector, depending in the meantime on the increasing influence by that sector on the members of the organizations as well as the economy in general (Johansen and Kristensen, 1978: 16-20).

ii) *The case in West Germany*

In the liberal democratic Western part of Germany, before the 1990 reunion, concentration on (the state and interest groups) cooperation concerning income policies began in 1964 by the creation of a 'Council of Economic Experts', which would present the government opinions upon the macro-economic issues in general. The Council soon began to plead for

a concertation by establishing "a relationship of trust" among autonomous groups. Eventually, since the early 1970s, 'Konzertierte Aktion' has been evolved into the pattern of regular meeting, several times a year, with various economic organizations and presided by the Federal Minister of Economy. There, the role of government is an active and leading one, the organizational representation of interests is broadened. By comparison, the Aktion seems to lack some aspects of the typical new corporatist mechanism; besides, influence of the groups is not high enough, in that it does not reach much the stage of decision-making. The Aktion is actually perceived more as an instrument of the government. Despite its deficiencies as such, however, it has in practice been apparently useful for crisis management. Apart from the practice by the Aktion, corporatism manifests also an embryonic variety in the field of labor relations: the long-applied pattern of worker-management collaboration at industry-level decision-making, namely, 'codetermination', has its roots in the tradition of German political thought (Lehmbruch, 1977: 104-07).

In Germany, on the other hand, there exists an interesting institutional practice in the Parliament of the free state of Bavaria. In that bi-cameral parliament, the lower chamber, Landtag, elects the minister-president and approves his cabinet. Despite its strong position, however, Landtag is to share its legislative authority with the Senate. It is this Senate which is constituted in a corporate fashion in such a form that varying functional (social, economic, cultural, even religious) interests emitted out of the Bavarian society thus receive opportunity to be represented. Each senator is in fact elected by his/her organization as a spokesman of each group of interest. Through its diffuse composition, the Senate provides a balance of group interests in an informal sense. The major legislative rights of the Senate members are those of initiation, consultation, review, and/or investigation through hearings. In the process of turning a bill into a law, accordingly, they offer expert advice in the form of recommendations for the perfection of the legislation. The Bavarian Senate, in conclusion, serves as an effort to adapt a 'mode of representation' (originating in the past of the country) to the needs of a modern, heterogeneous society. It assertedly stands as a token for the recognition of the need to institutionalize the participation of diffuse groups in the political process, or of the increasing role of functional representation in the post-industrial western societal milieu (Wolfe, 1974: 330-35, 338-40).

### iii) *Great Britain's Distinction*

The case of Great Britain has some distinction for a relatively substantial debate exists as to whether it obviously has the new corporatist structure or not. Nonetheless, despite the adversarial nature of party politics in Britain, it is observed that both the Labor and the Conservative governments have found themselves compelled to adopt corporatist solutions, following the end of the World War II, for in the period followed social integration and unity among several interests were exceedingly needed. Accordingly, concentration on indicative planning in particular has involved the major interest groups in tripartite discussion through a new body set up in the beginning of the 1960s, to be called as NEDC (National Economic Development Council). It is this emergent 'tripartism' at the national level between the government and the peak industrial associations -TUC (Trade Unions Congress) and CBI (Confederation of British Industry)- in the evolution of economic and industrial policy that might be asserted to have been a close identity with the new corporatist model (1). It should be added, however, that the British tripartism does not approximate the close and regular collaboration in all phases of economic policy-making as is in that of



the typical new corporatism. The British government has at times concluded agreements with the TUC and CBI to restrain wage and price increases in return for specific policy concessions; yet such concertation has turned out to be short-run responses to particular crises and relevant policy problems. It has not been transformed into a well-institutionalized system of economic management. Therefore, the British government is seen to have often preferred to deal with the two sides of the industry separately, rather than together, as in the case of the Social Contract (2).

It is contended, by way of conclusion, that defensively strong but undisciplined and fragmented trade unions –as in the case of Britain- can hamper the functioning development of corporatist processes. The rationale for this argument is the fact that there exist severe ‘intra-class’ obstacles to the establishment of viable corporatist structures, for the successful institutionalization of new corporatism involves the prevalence of disciplined and hierarchically-structured unions (3).

#### iv) *Austria's Difference*

The case of Austria presents a noticeable example which has considerably been described as having “a prototype of neo-corporatism, [earlier] after having been a prototype of ideologically fragmented political system.” (Lehmbruch, 1977: 112-13)

Since the ends of 1940s a process of organizational concertation has emerged within Austria. Motivational residues from a period of intense segmentation and hostility among rival subcultures have indeed given way to viable corporatist practices. The relevant elaborate system which has been working regularly, namely, ‘Sozialpartnerschaft’, is of salience for political coordination as it has agreedly contributed to successful public policies (Lehmbruch, 1983: 158-60).

The cooperation/collaboration thus established from 1948 onward with trade unions and business organizations with a view to arranging wages and prices, was later turned into a more formal and/or institutionalized one, with the establishment of ‘Paritätische Kommission’ (Joint Commission on wages and prices) in 1957. Within its structure organized labor is seen to have been granted the same number of seats as business and agriculture together have been. In the formal conventions of the Kommission, as a rule, Federal Chancellor (or, the Minister of the Interior) has presided over; at times certain other ministers have also attended. Nonetheless, characteristically since the end of the then-coalition government in 1966, those official representatives have been sitting as advisors only, not being dominant over its actual functioning. Since that time, as a matter of fact, several important decisions by the Kommission have been made without even actual participation of the governmental members. This is such a considerably important point that indicates obviously to the increase in the autonomy by the relevant interest groups in the bargaining process as well as to the decrease in the role of the state (Lehmbruch, 1977: 101-04).

#### v) *Salience of the Model in the Netherlands*

It is not incorrect indeed to say that relatively the most salient institutionalization of the new corporatist pattern can be found in the Netherlands. In 1945 “the Foundation of Labor” was first created, with the agreement by the respective organizations of labor and em-

ployers, as a private institution, recognized by the government. Its designated task would be giving expert opinions on all problems related with industrial relations, including primarily wage policies. As a more concrete step in the process of corporatist structuring, in 1950, ‘Sociaal Economische Raad’ (the Social Economic Council) was established by law. This is in fact a tripartite board comprising 15 representatives from labor, 15 from employers, and the remaining 15 nominated by the Crown (notably, several economic experts, directors of Central Planbureau and Central Bank). This institution, which has worked in a regular manner since its establishment, principally serves as an advisory body to the government on matters of economic policy, in particular, on macro-economic decisions, in addition to its functioning for the adjustment of diverging interests successfully (Lehmbruch, 1977: 95, 108-09).

## State Corporatism in Latin America: Theoretical and Historical Appearance

In what follows the above-summarized theoretical introduction, it will be in appropriate order to dwell upon the framework, in practice, of ‘state corporatism in Latin American politics.

To begin with its historical background, corporate tradition in Latin America takes its roots from the periods of rule under Spain and Portugal. Thus, the political-cultural origins of the Iberic-Latin corporate tradition lie in the older Roman period. In that:

“The Roman practice of a patrimonial state apparatus that regulated the entire process of economic and political life through control and manipulation of the various corporate groups was transferred to the new world via Spain and Portugal. The new world turned out to be very similar to the old world with regard to societal structure and function.” (Landry, 1976: 71)

From the age of the Roman Empire to first the Spanish and Portuguese colonial times and then to the post-independence period in Latin America, corporatist thought has remained alive by adapting itself to newer demands from the ever-changing socio-economic environment. No matter when and how, corporatism has continued to reflect roots from its Romanic and Catholic past. The old power bases are indeed in decline due to the socio-economic changes through the twentieth century. The Church, the landowners, the old caudillos have been replaced in this region by the new ones, comprising the educated professionals, organized labor and peasants, mass-based political parties, more professionalized and development-oriented militaries, the new Church and the like. Nevertheless, the political system –having proven to be rather flexible– has allowed the old groups to gradually fade and the new ones to be slowly incorporated without radically altering the distinct Latin American system. Accordingly, in spite of all the socio-economic changes of the century, “the traditional organic-corporate-elitist-patrimonial order in the Iberic-Latin nations remains remarkably strong and viable. With one or two exceptions, it is probably still the dominant mode throughout the countries of this culture area.” (Wiarda, 1973: 231)

The above explanation on the origins and development of Latin American corporatism is held by several specialists on the subject –again, Howard J. Wiarda taking the lead- whose approach may well be called as “organicist- historico-cultural”. According to that approach, development in Latin America does not resemble the one observed in Western Europe and North America; it rather involves the adaptation of an old order to several new forces/ conditions. Thus, it is not a process of innovation but of assimilation and reorganization. Latin American systems, accordingly, have evolved through more or less distinctive developmental patterns as is succinctly put by the same Wiarda himself:

“Because of their distinct background and antecedents, as well as their later pattern of socio-cultural evolution, the Latin American nations merit separate treatment and interpretation. Their developmental processes are unique and poorly understood; they seldom find expression in our studies of the history of political thought or in the literature on social and political development. Indeed, it is likely that in Latin America we are looking at a ‘Fourth World of Development’, one that corresponds neither to the earlier capitalist or socialist models, nor to the ‘new nation’ model of Africa and Asia. Latin America has evolved its own way of trying to manage the major challenges of modern times...” (4)

When it comes to the conceptualization on ‘state corporatism’, several leading scholars dwelling on the subject, such as P. Schmitter, H. J. Wiarda, K. Mericle, G. O’Donnell, R. Kaufman, J. M. Malloy, A. A. Stepan, have all developed largely analytical definitions. Regardless of the use of differing vocabulary and expression, in those definitions corporatism is commonly treated “as an approach to organizing state-society relations,” or, “as a type of interest representation based on non-competing, officially sanctioned, state-supervised groups.” (Collier and Collier, 1977: 493) Amidst the just-mentioned variety on the characterization of state corporatism, however, “a distinction might be drawn between a cultural emphasis, approaching in some cases a form of cultural determinism, and a structural one. While the conceptualizations to be found in both approaches share some traits, the assumptions and methodologies associated with them are significantly different.” (Bailey, 1977: 261)

Linn Hammergren, in addition, makes the above-noted distinction somewhat broader; in his view, “definitions of corporatism vary from those focusing solely on structural characteristics to others which include attitudinal variables, or even specify a total view of society and the political order.” (1977: 445)

At this point, one might call the above-mentioned two-dimensional conceptualization, for the sake of brevity, as ‘culturalist’ and ‘structuralist’ approaches, respectively. Beginning with the former, one can observe that the existing authoritarian-corporatist patterns in most part of Latin America, as briefly mentioned earlier, are essentially the reemergence of the traditional essence of an Iberic-Latin culture. As Wiarda concisely puts:

"'Corporatism' refers to a system in which the political culture and institutions reflect a historic, hierarchical, authoritarian, and organic view of man and society. In the corporative system the government controls and directs all associations and societal interests, holding not only the power to grant or withhold recognition (without which the group's very existence remains unlegitimated), but also access to official funds and favors, without which any group or interest is unlikely to succeed or even survive. As emphasized in this context, 'corporatism' means not only some of the formal corporative experiments of the 1920s and 1930s., but implies more fundamentally an older tradition and mode of behavior and organization whose roots lie deep in Iberian history." (1974d: 275-76)

Beyond the above more general reference, to explicate a more specific 'culturalist' formulation, Wiarda –who appears to be an outstanding proponent of culturalist approach- suggests elsewhere a two-part definition:

"...a system of authority and interest representation derived chiefly (though not exclusively) from Catholic social thought, stressing functional representation, the integration of labor and capital into a vast web of hierarchically ordered, 'harmonious', monopolistic, and functionally determined units (or corporations), and guided and directed by the state... (and) a far longer cultural historic tradition stretching back to the origins of the Iberic-Latin systems and embodying a dominant form of socio-political organizations that is similarly hierarchical, elitist, authoritarian, bureaucratic, Catholic, patrimonialist, and corporatist to its core." (5)

As to the structuralist approach, its concentration comes out to be on the non-ideological nature of the corporative model in which interest associations are dependent upon government authorities for the maintenance of group identity and access to public policy-making. Moreover, the 'state corporatism' of this type is considered as a specific alternative to both liberal-capitalism and socialism, as a source of legitimation of political power. Thus, this alternative envisions "the monopolization of interest representation by non-competing, officially sanctioned functional organizations, which are supervised by agents of the state bureaucracy;" accordingly, concisely put, the state corporatist systems are "vertically segmented societies, encapsulating individuals within a network of legally defined guilds and corporations which derive their legitimacy from, and are integrated by, a single bureaucratic center." (6)

In concluding this analytical treatment of corporatism in Latin America, it will be of great interest to cite Collier and Collier's attempt at a definitional synthesis. Viewing the available definitions as pointed to "three specific types of mechanisms used in regulating state-group relations: structuring, subsidy, and control", they elaborate the following definition to be employed as a synthesis:

“A system of interest representation is defined corporative to the extent that it is characterized by a pattern of state structuring of representation that produces a system of officially sanctioned, noncompetitive interest associations which are organized into legally prescribed functional groupings; to the extent that thesis associations are subsidized by the state; and to the extent that there is explicit state control over the leadership, demand-making, and internal governance of these associations.” (1977: 493)

In a culturalist perspective, as far as the functioning of the corporative model is concerned, the state and society in the Iberic-Latin context are thought of as an organic whole. Accordingly, the corporatist framework refers to a system in which the political culture and institutions reflect a historic hierarchical, organic, corporative view of society and polity. Metaphorically speaking,

“The corporate structure resembled the human body, with the brain being the center and coordinating agent of all the various parts, and each major organ and component part representing a different group. For the body to function, all the parts must work in harmony with and at the direction of the brain. Thus, the government must serve as the brain and all groups must harmoniously work together, or the socio-economic structure will fail to function properly. Only the government knows that the common good is something more than the sum of the good of all the individual parts of society.” (Landry, 1976: 72)

In a structuralist perspective, on the other hand, corporatism should be understood as a certain mode of interrelationships between the state and society, or better to say, “as a set of structures which link society with the state.” (O’Donnell, 1977: 47) Stated differently, the corporatist structure is a certain way of organizing the relationship between the state and major interests in the society that it rules. Accordingly, in the Latin American corporatist system the state plays obviously an active positive role in defining legitimate interests, recognizing corporatist groups, and determining rules of the game. In fact, the central point in this state corporatism is that “the state is stronger than civil society”, whereas in Western European regimes “civil society is stronger than the state”. Therefore, writers on this type of corporatism, by and large, have located an authoritarian administrative state at the center of the Latin American political system (Malloy, 1977: 480; Schwartzman, 1977: 92; Hambergren, 1977: 447; Mericle, 1977: 303-04).

As to the group structure, state corporatism appears to certainly have “a coherent and operationally definable group theory of politics that is opposed to other group theories”, differing in particular from that in the pluralist model (Malloy, 1974: 55-56). Within this context, the key idea is that interest articulation is directed through hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized (or created) by the state and retaining, in turn, a certain degree of internal autonomy. This autonomy allows for some variety in organization, yet “the emphasis on hierarchy, exclusive membership, and vertical channelling of communications suggests a concentration of power at the top as well as a tendency toward unique position in the political system for each group member. There is little expectation of any downward diffusion of political power, especially one which would weaken members’

attachments to the corporate groups." (Hammergren, 1977: 452) Consequently, the overall picture is one of the convergence of political power at the center and top of corporations. This situation discourages the emergence of autonomous intermediate power positions. While new vertical positions may be created over time, they nevertheless are modeled on this basic pattern, by virtue of the strong power elite control within this model. For, "in the corporative system, the government controls and directs all associations, holding the power not only to grant or withhold juridical recognition but also access to official funds and favors without which any sector is unlikely to succeed or survive." (Wiarda, 1973: 222)

The aforesaid idea that 'the state is stronger than society' connotes to say that "the group which controls the state apparatus is able to impose its will upon other, private sectors of society, thanks to its control of extractive resources, military manpower, or communication networks." (Schwartzman, 1977: 92) It is almost obvious, in that respect, that one of the key features in Latin American corporatism is 'the power elite control of socio-economic and political structures'. As a matter of fact, Latin American political elites have used the introduction of corporative structures as a means of winning and consolidating political power; decisions have usually been made "by a cadre of elite group representatives, linked by formal and informal ties to the administrative hierarchy and centering, ideally, in a single individual who personifies the national values, knows the general will." (Wiarda, 1973: 224)

Within a culturalist framework, then, what follows the above explanation is that:

"The corporative structure tends to serve the interests of the dominant elites by subordinating the rising social forces to the authority of the elite-dominated central state apparatus. The characteristically Iberic-Latin model of development seeks to preserve as much as possible of the traditional order by structuring the participation of these new power contenders under its control and direction." (Wiarda, 1973: 233-34)

The noticeable reference to 'power contenders' just made above will make it apposite, if not necessary, to shortly specify a salient view from that perspective by a distinguished student of Latin American politics, C. W. Anderson, who appears to have developed a formulation, which merits due attention as it explains functioning of the state corporatist political processes through 'power contending' among elites in particular, briefly as follows:

"The problem of Latin American politics is that of finding some formula for creating agreement between power contenders whose power capabilities are neither comparable... nor compatible... One may say that the most persistent political phenomenon in Latin America is the effort of contenders for power to demonstrate a power capability sufficient to be recognized by other power contenders, and that the political process consists of manipulation and negotiation among power contenders reciprocally recognizing each other's power capability... New contenders are admitted to the political system when they fulfill two conditions in the eyes of existing power contenders. First, they must demonstrate possession of a power capability sufficient to pose a threat to existing contenders. Second, they must be perceived by other contenders as willing to abide by the rules of the game, to permit existing contenders to continue to exist and operate in the political system." (1974: 249ff.)

## Conclusion

Based upon the reminder so far made in this paper on first conceptual dimension and then some examples in brief with reference to 'state corporatism' in Latin America, one can conclude that, albeit in varied form(ulation)s, the corporative model does reasonably highlight certain features of modes of interest representation within the context of Latin American political systems, distinguishable from several other ones –especially from that so-called liberal variety of corporatism in Western political systems. Corporatism in the former, specifically put, may well be considered as a system of non-pluralist group representation.

As a matter of fact, historically viewed, the coming of a series of military regimes in several Latin American countries has made authoritarian-corporatist models of politics useful tools for our understanding of the nature and direction of political change in this region of the world. Accordingly, when associated with such authoritarian regimes, corporatist features come out to have operated not only as a means of control but also as a channel of communication between the state organs and social groups. Thus, the state corporatist model has indeed been a useful analytical tool, for the followers of both culturalist and structuralist approaches, to a great extent to be employed in their effort to explain Latin American politics.

At this point, however, one last word in the sense of a critical evaluation on the very employment/application of this model on Latin American context, as is crystallized in the view by two students of Latin American politics, should not go unheeded; in that, in S.D. Baretta and H. E. Douglass's view, three related fallacies endanger the already developed literature on (state) corporatism: i) the tendency to counterpose corporatism –as the true, normative pattern which organizes the relationship between state and society in Latin America- to democratic pluralism (it is of importance, to their view, that corporatism, treated as such, cannot account for regime changes); ii) the fallacy of uniqueness (it is not wrong at all to use corporatism as an attempt to answer the question of how Latin America may be differentiated from the USA and Europe, yet –to their view again- this might in the meantime too easily lead us to the extreme point of assuming that there is something absolutely singular in the political development of Latin America); iii) the fallacy of immutability of cultural patterns (when taken at this level, lastly in their view, there is a tendency to think about corporatism as a constant pattern, which in turn implies theoretical and political dangers) (1977: 513-16).

Notwithstanding the fact that they might at first sight point to a degree of deficiency in the field of corporatist literature with particular reference to Latin America, as is held by again the above-cited students of corporatism, as a matter of fact, "the criticisms contained in each of the three fallacies are largely directed against the use of the term corporatism. Labels tend to focus attention on themselves and away from the realities for which they stand." (Baretta and Douglass, 1977: 515) Accordingly, by way of conclusion, one can still hold –in a somewhat culturalist tendency- that the corporatist model itself (having been observed as resurgent in the Iberic-Latin world by the last quarter of the last century, and one form or another of its organization being experienced in several countries of that world –in differing degrees in Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Argentine, as well as Spain and Portugal) is still useful as an explanatory tool in making sense of that world's tradition and socio-political structures –if heuristic up to a certain point and providing answers only to certain questions, as is admitted as well by Wiarda, probably the leading culturalist (1974a: 32).

## Endnotes

- (1) Beloff and Peele, 1980: 215-17. Professor Beer qualifies that kind of practices, which came out of the rising organized interests in the twentieth-century Britain, as "quasi-corporatism" (see, Carpenter, 1976: 14).
- (2) Metcalfe and McQuillan, 1979: 272 ff. For a relevant information about the Social Contract (between the government and labor) see A. Cox, 1981: 79-81 and 85. As an additional note for more elaboration: Lehmbruch considers such a bilateral separate bargaining between the government and individual groups as "an embryonic variety of liberal corporatism" (1977: 95). Incidentally, in Marsh and Grant's opinion, there are differences in emphasis between the tripartite relationship in Britain and the typical new corporatism; in that "tripartism might best be viewed as a sub-type of liberal corporatism." (1977: 196).
- (3) In this regard, Cox and Hayward largely examine the shortcomings in Britain's establishing a well-institutionalized new corporatist structure (1983: 221-29).
- (4) 1974b: 7. The above summarized culturalist explanation of the Iberic-Latin tradition as well as of the origins and maintenance-cum-change of Latin American corporatist structures in keeping with that tradition is observed to have been made well in the same author's several other writings: 1974a: 3-33; 1974c: 199-229; 1974d: 269-92; 1978: 3-37. For some other explanations along this line, see also: Pike, 1974: 132-39; Newton, 1974: 40-49; Landry, 1976: 71-77.
- (5) 1974a: 6. It should be additionally noted, at this point, that according to this approach "corporatism is not to be equated with fascism, nor are the Latin experiments to this direction to be considered as merely the less developed versions of the fascist model... Rather, this model is a complex and varied form, distinct from both liberalism and totalitarianism with a long tradition of its own." (pp. 9-11)
- (6) Kaufman, 1977: 111. For additional opinions which see corporatism as an alternative model, see also: Malloy, 1977: 480, and 1974: 54; Schwartzman, 1977: 91-92; Wiarda, 1974a: 31-32.



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