

## ATTITUDES OF PALESTINIAN ARABS TOWARDS JEWISH ZIONISM DURING AND AFTER THE REIGN OF SULTAN ABDULHAMID II

Murat GÖKMEN\*

**ABSTRACT:** *With the end of the Ottoman Empire in Bayt al-Maqdis a new page in history was being turned, ending centuries of peace in the Holy Land. This study concentrates on Palestinian Arabs and their attitudes towards Jewish Zionist settlement and their land purchase activities in Palestine, particularly under the British occupation. There are two divergent ideas concerning Palestinian and Jewish Zionists relations. While some scholars claim that Arab Muslims were passive and submissive towards Jewish Zionists and they did not put forward reactionary attitude towards Jewish Zionists and they even further state that those Arabs sold their lands to them willingly and earned huge sums of profit and hence they were contented with Zionist settlement. However, contrary to this claim evidence shows Arab Palestinians helped and supported the Ottomans against Jewish Zionism in restricting Zionist settlement and land purchase activities in Palestine. In this respect, this study argues that Palestinian Arab Muslims from the outset foresaw expansionist Zionists and put forward their resistance in different means. They clearly did their best to stop the Zionist influx and thus altered the attitude of the British Mandate. Therefore, throughout the study it can be clearly seen that even after the end of the Ottoman rule in the region, Palestinian Arabs tried their best to preserve their presence and status in Palestine against the British and Jewish Zionists.*

**KEYWORDS:** Palestine, Sultan Abdulhamid II, Ottoman Arabs, Jewish Zionists, British Mandate.



### INTRODUCTION

The British Empire, as a colonial superpower of the 19th century strove to dominate most of the world's rich resources. Therefore, Britain conducted its foreign policy on the principle of expanding its borders with colonies. The reason for this was to accomplish dominance in the world against France and Russia, the

\* Lecturer, Düzce University and Master student of Quds Studies, Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBU), Türkiye, [muratgokmen@duzce.edu.tr](mailto:muratgokmen@duzce.edu.tr), ORCID: 0000-0002-0797-8226.

two prominent rivals for Britain, by trying to secure its colonial route to India (Kamel, 2015: 9- 23). Since India was one of the most lucrative colonial countries, the British Empire built its ‘Middle East’ policies on maintaining and securing routes to India and took strict precautions to secure the way there (Vardağlı, 2021: 67, Kamel 2015: 9). Since Palestine was geographically at the crossroads, it was important for Britain to get control of the land and secure its colonial way to India (Vardağlı, 2021: 67).

There have been quite a few countries in the world that are strategically, historically, and geographically important residential centres such as: Syria and Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula, where many of the prophets as such as Abraham, Moses, David, Suleiman, Zacharia, Isaac, Joseph, Lot, Aaron, Jacob, John the Baptist, and Jesus (El-Awaisi, 1998) proclaimed their holy messages, and where the Prophet Muhammed ascended to heaven in service to humankind by spreading science, philosophy and literature against ignorance and barbarism (Nijmeh, 2011: 166, Çetinkaya, 2018: 102-103).

As for its historical importance, the region has witnessed quite many invasions throughout its history. A more recent example of this is Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt and control of the country in a very short time (Kayyali, 1978: 13). This was when British interest towards the region started to formulate (El-Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020: 1). Britain began to view the French invasion as a threat to its colonies in India and thus became even more interested in Palestine (Cole, 2007: 12).

At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Britain was making its conquest not through military means but through finance and diplomacy (Kocabaş, 1995: 213). Since the Ottoman Empire was at a crossroads of colonisation and trade due to its geographical location, coloniser countries such as Britain and France were keenly interested in Ottoman domestic and foreign policies. As one of the most important colonial power of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Britain had a strong interest in the Ottoman Empire simply because of its geographical location, as it did not want its route to India, which again was one of the most fertile colonies, to be threatened by France or Russia (Kayyali, 1978: 13). Sultan Abdulhamid II well recognised the displeasure of Britain and its hostile policy that entailed denying aid and military support for the Ottoman state during the 1854 Sahne War and saw Russia as a reliable ally against Britain. He expressed this with his own words as follows: *"We shall always behave toward Great Britain as a friend. But we will know its aims, ideas, and policies"* (Tansu, 1970: 9). The foreign policy that Sultan Abdulhamid II pursued was important for the consolidation of multicultural life within the Ottoman Empire. Because the consulates interfered in the internal politics of the empire and aimed to avoid the isolation of his foreign policy in the world (Davey, 2001). For this reason, he adhered great importance to negotiations and mutual respect with other states in the world, whether they had their borders with the Empire or not (Özcan, 2019; Kızıltoprak, 2011). Britain on the other hand was developing strategies to embed its policies and increase its presence in the region (Tibawi, 1978: 13). After Napoleon’s invasion, Muhammad Ali of Egypt with his

İbrahim made use of the void in power in the region rebelled against Ottoman Empire and declared its independence (Cole, 2007: 56). Britain took its first important step and opened the first western consulate in Bayt al-Maqdis in 1838 to keep abreast of events in Palestine (Schölch, 2006: 10). The second step Britain took was to find a community in the region, that it can claim to protect, to serve its interests (Tellioglu, 2018: 16; Mazza, 2009: 21). In this respect, the Jews were the best option for them to direct and protect the British presence in the region because there were some already settled there (Tolan et al, 2013: 351). As a result, Britain opened its consulate as the first of its kind in the holy city, which paved the way for European countries and Russia to open their consulates there too (Eren, 2008: 41). This was an irrevocable measure that allowed many countries to open their consulates to get first-hand information from the region (Mazza, 2009: 14).

Britain, from the day it established its consulate in the region had a tendency to increase its influence and even established a limited Protestant presence and church, but from the outset concentrated on the Jews and tried to increase its status in the region in constant rivalry between France and Russia who were also trying to increase their visibility and authority (Erkan, 2015: 40-41; Hirschfeld, 1986: 264). Those Christians in this regard can be accepted to be the forefathers of Christian Zionism which would open the path for Jewish Zionism in the future while weakening and engraving the seeds of decay of Ottoman Empire and increase Jewish and Christian populations against Muslim dominance in the region (Hirschfeld, 1986: 263-279, Makdisi, 2013: 257).

Britain's support for the Jews was in a way so not to lose them to France and Russia who had a foothold with Catholics and Orthodox Christians, accordingly Britain was also trying to gain a foothold through its support for the Jewish population, which it achieved through its consulate (El-Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020: 23-24, Vereté, 1970: 341-342). It in return attempted to gain the trust of the Jewish community in Palestine, where it acted as the protector of Jewish Palestinians under the authority of the Ottoman Empire (Mazza, 2009: 55; Al-Barghouti, 2013: 73). Politically and religiously, the Jews were the most suitable, having already ties and presence in the region whose Judo-Christian heritage is shared. This together with their already ongoing ties in Europe motivated Britain to support Jew and then Jewish Zionism in the region (El-Awaisi 2019: 14). The second motivation for British authorities to support Jewish presence in the region was a religious one; to convert the Jews and help them return to Palestine in preparation for the Second Coming of Christ (El-Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020: 2).

In this regard, Britain supported the Jewish Zionists as part of its foreign policy and helped the Zionists who were looking for an opportunity to settle in Palestine. Being their protector gave Britain a 'trustworthy' community that could hold power and ensure the welfare of the route to India. At a later stage, the Jewish Zionists, who were sycophantic and wanted to cooperate with any power that supported their presence in Palestine, were sympathetic to the British and supported British policies against the Ottoman Empire (El-Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020: 2-3).

Although the Jewish Zionists did not side with the British against the French, they were all united against the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly, although the British Empire did not get along well with the Jews in its country, it openly and unconditionally supported the Jewish Zionists in their settlement and land acquisition activities in Palestine, which continued until the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 (Salhi, 2011: 259).

### BRITISH INTEREST IN PALESTINE

The Ottoman Empire under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II pursued a prudent foreign policy toward Britain, the superpower, and the richest colonial empire of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. After supporting the Ottoman Empire to gain control over lost territory from Muhammad Ali of Egypt, it betrayed in a sense Muhammad Ali who allowed the establishment of the British consulate in Jerusalem. This way, it strengthened its authority in the region and earned the gratitude of the Ottomans. Even later Sultan Abdulhamid II naturally had to be careful not to offend Britain for its help (Sultan Abdulhamid, 1975: 143-144; Yasamee, 2011: 41). Aware of the fact that the Ottomans were indebted to them, Britain sought to dominate the geography and strengthen its authority in the region by supporting Jewish settlement and its land purchases in Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem (Kudüs-i Şerif Mutassarrıflığı), which laid the foundation for a Zionist client state in the province that worked on behalf of British interests and eliminated Ottoman authority in the region (Kushner, 1986: 310; El-Awaisi & Yiğit, 2020: 3). The Jewish Zionists had two important unrelenting desires, namely the increase of the Jewish population and the acquisition of land in Palestine, which was facilitated by the British Empire both economically and politically (Buzpinar, 2019). In this regard, Britain openly supported the Jewish Zionists against the Ottoman Empire, changed the demographic structure, and overpopulated the region without regard for the region's inhabitants, which consisted of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish citizens who did not support Zionism (OFM, 332/17, 3309/178).

Protecting the welfare of the Suez Canal was the second most important reason for Britain's close involvement in Palestine from 1869 onward because preserving the status of the Suez Canal was of paramount importance in the face of possible threats or attacks from France and Russia. The Ottoman Empire and its welfare meant a great deal to Britain when it came to protecting the Suez Canal (Vital, 1975: 310). Sultan Abdulhamid II was aware of British policy in the region and hence approached Britain cautiously and carefully, knowing that Britain would not hesitate to colonise Ottoman territories if given the chance to do so (Yasamee, 2011: 44). The Sultan, being well aware of the British and Russian interests and their constant policy in increasing their visibility and power reach, reacted to this attitude causally and with vigilance. For this reason Sultan Abdulhamid II considered Britain one of the biggest threats whose policy was to divide the country into small states and cooperate with the Jewish Zionists for their settlement and land acquisition in Palestine (Sultan Abdülhamid, 1975: 143-144; Yasamee, 2011: 41).

The Ottoman Empire's attitude towards the Arabs and the Muslim population was based on Islamic unification with the sole aim of waging war against the enemy of Islam under the banner of jihad (Kızıltoprak, 2011; Özcan, 2019). In this regard, the Sultan, as the Caliph of Islam, strove to unite Muslims in the world under the common identity nurtured by Islam (Tauber, 1993: 111-113). Since this could be partially achieved, the Arabs living in the Ottoman Empire felt neither inferior nor superior, but were moderate citizens loyal to the empire (Buzpinar, 1996; Fischel & Kark 2008). Sultan Abdulhamid II considered Islam as one of the components of the state that unites Muslim and non-Muslim populations; therefore, he paid great attention to the Arab population and tried to honour them by referring them as 'noble people' (*kavm-i necib*) as often as possible during his reign, since he knew that the Arab population was the key figure representing Islam and Ottoman policy in the region (Deringil, 1991; Çetinsaya, 2016). At the same time, the Arab population did not have a political problem with the Ottomans; they did not have reason to rebel against them (Çetinsaya, 2016). Besides this, the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdulhamid II had made great efforts to strengthen and support the Arab population against the Jewish Zionists; to increase their presence and become the advocate of their voice (Akarlı, 1979: 75). Sultan Abdulhamid II considered the Arab provinces first and gave them top priority in terms of their expectations and needs (Fischel & Kark, 2008; Kushner 1986; Grossman, 2012). He paid high salaries to the governors of the Arab provinces, and the governors appointed there were qualified and experienced. The content of the Arab provinces was important to Sultan Abdulhamid II (Akarlı, 1986: 179). Jewish Zionism, according to Jewish Zionists, is an attempt to 'return' and 'gather together' ideologically which was expected to be practiced by the Zionists from all around the world to Palestine in order to found a Zionist state (Y.PRK.MYD. 24/14). Jewish Zionism aimed to unite the Jews from all around the world in Palestine and further the idea that Palestine as a territory belongs to them granted by God and therefore, they have the divine right and permit to be the authority in the region (Erkan, 2015: 100). For many scholars this divine right grants Jews to settle and purchase land in Palestine, where they desire to reunify Jews in their 'homeland' (Schölch, 2006: 54). The forerunner of Jewish Zionism in other words political Zionism, Theodore Herzl after the Dreyfus affairs in France in which a Jewish lieutenant was accused of sharing military secrecy and dwelling this accusation to his religious identity, became quite the adherent supporter of uniting the Jews of the world in Palestine which would later evolve to be called political or Jewish Zionism (Herzl, 1960: 1702: Ör, 2012: 73). For Herzl, Palestine was a place for Jews to reunite in the world and recreate their national identity and state (Herzl, 1989: 156; Netanyahu, 2007: 14). For Öke (1982: 62), the Jewish Zionist movement peaked with Herzl and his initiatives.

### THE ATTITUDE OF PALESTINIAN ARABS TOWARDS JEWISH ZIONISM

Sultan Abdulhamid II not only developed relations with non-Muslims in the region and in the world but also showed close interest to the Arab population in

Palestinian region and extended his inclusive policy particularly legitimising and preserving the Arab population and their status in Bayt al-Maqdis as the inhabitants of the region. Besides respecting Ottoman Christians and Jews living all together in the region, in order to illustrate the importance the Sultan attached towards the Arab population in Palestine, he established a special school in Istanbul reserved for the children of Arab tribe leaders (Buzpinar, 2016: 38). The Sultan, in this regard did not only pay close interest to the children of Arab tribes but he also hired Arabs besides Ottoman Christians and Jews as his advisors or for important positions in the state so as to increase their attachment to the empire (Inalcık, 1982: 946–951). In this regard Arabs cannot be said to be neutral, they also, by supporting the Sultan and his policies, strengthened his position and authority in the region against Jewish Zionists (BOA.A.AMD. 34/57-1-1).

Even in the years after 1917, when the Ottoman Empire lost its authority in the region, the Arabs, Christians, and Jews of the Ottoman Empire showed remarkable resistance to the Jewish Zionists and Zionism which confirmed that the policy that the Sultan used was correct (Jacobson & Naor, 2016; Brooman 1989; Tauber 1993). The Arabs strongly protested the presence of the Zionists and their activities to increase the number of Jews in Palestine. Allenby openly showed his discontent and rejection of the Jewish Zionists, stating that they would fight to death but would not allow Jewish Zionists to settle and overpopulate the land (Akarlı, 1986: 81; Mazza, 2009: 171). Along with Allenby and his statements, Aref al-Aref, the editor of the popular nationalist newspaper Suriya al-Janubiya (Southern Syria) in 1919, expressed his anti-Zionist stance in a very harsh way, saying that if we as Arabs do nothing against the Jewish Zionists, they will kill us all or expel us from our land (Mazza, 2009, 172; Morris, 2001: 95). The Arab resistance to Jewish Zionism and Zionists deserved the highest praise, since these Arabs, without having any power in their hands, continued their resistance which strengthened the Sultan's authority and the application of the restrictions against Jewish settlement and land purchasing in order to prevent Palestine to be the home of Jewish Zionists (Tauber, 1993). The reaction and resistance of the Arabs and their persistent resistance towards Jewish Zionists was becoming stronger each day in that even after Sultan Abdulhamid II they preserved their stable and strong attitude towards Jewish Zionist settlement and land purchasing activities and showed their discontent by directly stating their ideas and discontent towards the Sultan and later on to the directing office of the Mandate (Cronin, 2017). One of the best examples of the voices protesting Jewish Zionism and the establishment of a state in Palestine is the account of Musa Kazim al-Husayni who openly protested Zionism within his lines as follows: "*Palestine is our land, the Jews are our dogs!*" Pictures of Faisal I were also exhibited and he was hailed as the King of Syria and Palestine (Segev, 2001: 128). Most Arabs were loyal to the Ottoman Empire until there was nothing left for them to be loyal to (Memiş, 2018; Inalcık, 1982; Akarlı, 1986). Only then, according to Dawn (1993), did Arabism develop beyond the realm of ideology. What brought Arabism to the

centre of the political arena was the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the imposition of European control over its Arabic-speaking parts. Nonetheless at this time, Arab nationalism was intentionally being supported by Britain against the Ottoman Empire so as to separate them from the Ottoman Empire (Abdou, 1947: 353-507; Dawn, 1993: 382).

Nonetheless, by the virtue of Islam those Palestinian Arabs did not rebel against their state and openly stated their discontent with the Jewish Zionists. In this regard Arab Palestinians behaved according to their faith as stated in the Qur'an which advises people to obey the prophet, caliphs and leaders (Quran 4:59). By obeying the advices of Qur'an and preserving the virtue of being Muslim, Arabs of Palestine obeyed and respected Sultan and his caliphate, even those of Ottoman Christians and Jews by trusting the Caliph of Islam and Sultan of the Empire not seeing any threat and only welcoming attitude, good will and deed and peaceful conditions did not act against Sultan Abdulhamid II as the Sultan already with his words and attitudes showed his stance against racism, xenophobia and discrimination among the people living within the Empire particularly in Bayt al-Maqdis and Palestine (Abdou, 1947: 353, 507; Dawn, 1993: 382). Sultan's attitude in this regard gave his policies credibility onto which Ottoman Arabs, Christians and Jews also respected and they preserved a respectful atmosphere among themselves (Davey, 2001; Şiyat, 2017: 153-167). In this regard, both the Sultan and Arabs in the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem strictly obeyed and practiced the ability and capacity of Islam to unite them, rejoicing in dignity, pride and honour among nations (Alkan, 2018: 205-237). Abdou (1947: 384) supports the idea that returning to the norms and truths of Islam and its teachings will help Muslims revive and unite on the ground. For him, Muslims, and by extension, the entire world can only find and promote peace and serenity when Muslims unite on the ground of Islam. Otherwise, for him, the instruments of struggle against the Jewish Zionists are useless and cannot bring about change in the Muslim geography. He believes that the struggle of Muslims among themselves and with the Jewish Zionists will have no benefit and no consequences in the long run if they do not live the life that Islam proposes to them. Thus, uniting the Muslim world under the banner of the Ottoman Empire and supporting Sultan Abdulhamid II was the only legitimate reason to unite against Zionism. Adib Ishaq (1909: 102-454) confirms the scholars' statements and emphasises the unification of the Muslim world and for him, the French Revolution was one of the most important reasons that promoted Arabism and Arab nationalism and led to the partition. He supports the idea that the Arabs, like other nations that triggered nationalism, should return to their norms, and culture and return to their cultural, national and religious identity in order to form a unity against the Jewish Zionists and for the future of Muslims in Palestine and the region.

Palestinian Arabs were very much aware of the Zionist plan that they openly supported the Ottoman Empire and showed their discontent. One of the pillars of the protest was initiated by Ruhi al-Khalidi who was a Palestinian born diplomat

serving the Empire. Al-Khalidi's words in an interview from 1 November 1909 to Hebrew newspaper HaZvi mirrors the reasons why Jewish Zionists purchased land and aimed to settle in Palestine (cited in Mandel, 1976: 77):

But to establish Jewish colonies is another question. The Jews have the financial capacity. They will be able to buy many tracts of land, and displace the Arab farmers from their land and their father's heritage. However, we did not conquer this land from you. We conquered it from the Byzantines, who ruled it then. We do not owe anything to the Jews. The Jews were not here when we conquered the country.

The Arabs in Palestine showed their constant discontent against the British Mandate in Palestine even after the Ottomans, and between 1936-1939 with small but consistent protests (Swedenburg, 1993: 466). Although these rebellions were not as strong militarily, the attitude of the Arabs towards colonialism was important because it confirmed the discontent of the Arabs towards the Jewish Zionists and the British Mandate power in Palestine (Swedenburg, 1993: 466). These uprisings, however, were not the first nor the last. When the first British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, took the first step in 1920 and brought 16,500 Jews to Palestine, the Palestinian Arabs protested massively against this decision in 1921 and eventually reduced the number of Jews to be admitted to Palestine (Brooman, 1989: 7).

Arabs vehemently expressed their opposition and disapproval towards Jewish Zionism and its proponents in every possible manner within the confines of their strength and influence (Dawn, 1993; Jacobson & Naor, 2016). The Arabs' unease from the first day of Jewish Zionism and their insistence on rejecting the Zionist presence in Palestine was reflected in a report of the King Crane Commission in August 1919 (Brooman, 1989: 6). The Palestinian Arabs were not just peasants and backward people as the Jewish Zionists claimed; however, they were well aware of the negative discourse the Jewish Zionists were trying to spread in the region that depicted them as inferior (Swedenburg, 1993: 466). The Muslim Arabs were not the only ones who did not support the Zionists in the region; Christian Arabs opposed the Zionist presence in Palestine as well (Grossman, 2012). The Jewish Zionist threat was recognised by both Muslim and Christian Arabs in the region, and they worked together against the common enemy as the threat grew day by day (Mazza, 2009: 68). The situation in Palestine was so contentious that the loyalty of the people was the most important quality sought for therefore the loyalty of the Arabs towards Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Empire was of utmost importance. They showed their loyalty towards the Sultan and the empire without hesitation, which confirmed the trust that the Arabs felt towards the Sultan (Swedenburg, 1993: 471).

## CONCLUSION

Overall, history has demonstrated that Sultan Abdulhamid II took proactive measures and effectively delayed the Zionist objective of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, well before the onset of Jewish Zionists' immigration activities



and land acquisitions. The statements of Sultan Abdulhamid II, long before the Jewish Zionists flourished, shed light on the hardship and danger the organisation posed to the Ottoman Empire. Before developing their networking activities to direct Jews of the world towards Palestine for settlement and land purchasing activities he stated (Sultan Abdülhamid, 1975: 61-77):

The Zionists do not only aim to do farming there but also, they want to settle their government and demand to elect their representatives and so forth. I very well see the meaning of their ambitious plans. However, if Zionists think that we will accept their initiatives they are just thinking simply. However, I value and appreciate the presence of Jews living within our Empire who submit their services against all odds, I am equally the enemy of those who are willing to settle in Palestine and for those of whom have plans for Palestine. We must forget the idea of allowing Jewish immigration into Palestine. Otherwise, as they would in due course muster all the power in their hands wherever they settle, we would sign the death warrant of our religious brothers.

Despite the successful policies and practices that Sultan Abdulhamid II introduced and applied to stop the Zionist expansionists both physically and psychologically, the Palestinians had to endure the Jewish Zionists and their policies because their "death sentence" had already been signed by the British Mandate, which supported the Jewish Zionists in the region against the Palestinians.

From 1516 to 1918, the Ottoman Empire provided a haven of tranquillity for its entire populace, as well as for individuals hailing from various nations. Unlike in Eastern Europe and Russia, within Ottoman borders Jews could trade, move freely, and buy land without restrictions. They lived freely under the Ottoman state unless they had organic or inorganic ties to separatist groups (Bussow, 2011: 98). The Constitutional Law of 1839 and the Hatt-ı Humayun of 1856, the Land Law of 1858 and a law of 1867 were all confirmations of multicultural life and the will to continue it for the future (Fischel & Kark, 2008: 359; Karpas, 2001: 58-64). However, the promotion of multicultural life was not for the purpose of gaining worldly advantage but was rather related to the spirit of Islam. For this reason, even in times of bankruptcy, decay, and colonialist and Zionist threats, the Ottoman state promoted multiculturalism; the empire under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II emphasised inclusive policies toward its subjects. However, it was necessary to distinguish Jewish Zionists from Jews. The Sultan was aware of this and distinguished between them as Jewish subjects were already living peacefully in the Ottoman lands. However, the Ottoman Empire's attitude towards the different ethnicities and religions was neither supported nor practiced by the British Mandate, so the Palestinians were left completely alone in their homeland, which prevented them from developing and realising their legitimate right to have their own state. British support can be seen very well in the demographic trends in Palestine.

Arabs in Palestine just like Sultan Abdulhamid II worked hard to stop the Jewish Zionists and their settlement policies and took precautionary measures against them during the British Mandate period. In the 1930s, the educated middle

class in Palestine, as in the rest of the Arab world, experienced an upsurge in independent political organising. A new generation of revolutionary nationalists issued slogans for socioeconomic justice and Arab unity and developed new forms of political organisation (Khoury, 1983: 219–20). Palestinian activists founded a variety of organisations such as the Young Men's Muslim Association, the Arab Youth Conference, the Arab Scouts (independent of the international Baden Powell movement) and the Istiqlal movement (linked to the Sharifian government in Damascus) (Kayyali, 1978: 167–168). Led by sections of the educated middle class and disaffected descendants of prestigious families, it turned to educated professionals and salaried officials: lawyers, doctors, teachers, and government employees (Yasin, 2019: 125–126, Swedenburg, 1993: 484). Unlike other Palestinian parties founded in the 1930s, the Istiqlal movement was organised around a political program rather than based on family or clan loyalties. It was thus the first (with the exception of the Communists) to appeal to and construct a new and modern form of subjectivity. It also distinguished itself by focusing its political actions on resistance to the British Mandate government, rather than directing them exclusively at the Jewish community (Yasin, 2019: 484). The Arabs, as a distinct ethnic group, fought against the Jewish Zionists, who were another distinct ethnic and religious group (Mazza, 2009: 6).

Overall, the Palestinian Arab population across various age groups, occupations, and genders, demonstrated their opposition to Jewish Zionism and the Jewish Zionists. They voiced their discontent to the British authorities through legitimate channels. However, since the Jewish Zionists had strong alliance with the British authorities, their support was to a large extent unconditional without openly expelling the Palestinians from now Mandate territory. When the time came for the establishment of a free, independent state for the Arabs, the British authorities acted negligently and approved the British Empire's full support for Zionism and Zionists in the establishment of a Jewish Zionist state (Farsakh, 2013: 42). The Palestinian Arabs did their best to stop the Zionist influx by publicising the Jewish Zionist invasion of Palestine throughout the world, rallying international support, and holding protests on the ground to gain the support of the world and the British Mandate. Therefore, the Arabs did not voluntarily accept the Zionist settlement and land acquisition and openly showed their resistance (Alam, 2009: 72).

The Palestinians did not leave Palestine voluntarily on the advice of their leaders and never hesitated to show their protest and discontent to the Jewish Zionists and the British Mandate authorities both during the occupation and after it (Alam, 2009: 72). However, since the British Mandate power was closely tied to the Jewish Zionists politically and financially, and the Palestinian Arabs had no financial and political power backing them at the time, this partially affected the attitude of the British towards the Palestinians. The British Mandate power's support for Jewish Zionists was so strong. However, as mentioned earlier in the study, the Palestinian Arabs succeeded in bringing to the attention of the world

the injustices done to them by the invading Jewish Zionists in the region. Since they had neither military and economic power nor the support of a powerful country after the Second World War, they had to deal with the Jewish Zionists and their organised, networked invasion activities in Palestine all by themselves (Mazza, 2009: 69). Although Palestinians did not accept and resisted their colonisation, and with all the support given to Zionists, Bayt al-Maqdis and Palestine was ethnically cleansed of its population and Palestinian lands were taken by force in 1948, leaving them with only 22% of mandate Palestine.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdou, M. (1947). 'Abduh's Al-Islam Wa al-Nasraniyyat Ma' Al'ilm wa al-Madaniyyat (Islam and Christianity Compared with Respect to Science and Civilization) Rida, M.R., (Ed.). al-Manar, 136711.
- Akarlı E.D. (1986). "Abdülhamid II's Attempt to Integrate Arabs into the Ottoman System". *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period Political, Social and Economic Transformation*. Kushner, D. (Ed.). Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, pp. 74–92.
- Akarlı, E. D. (1979). "Abdülhamid's Islamic Policy in the Arab Provinces". *Türk-Arab İlişkileri: Geçmişte, Bugün ve Gelecekte*. Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi.
- Alam, M. S. (2009). *Israeli Exceptionalism: The Destabilizing Logic of Zionism*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Alkan, N. (2018). "Sultan II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Diplomasisi". M. A. Yalçınkaya & U. Kurtaran (Eds.), *Altınordu Yayınları*. Altınordu Yayınları, pp. 205–237.
- Brooman, J. (1989). *Conflict in Palestine: Jews, Arabs and the Middle East since 1900*. Longman.
- Bussow, J. (2011). *Hamidian Palestine: Politics and Society in the District of Jerusalem 1872-1908*. Brill.
- Buzpınar, Ş. T. (1996). "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882". *Die Welt Des Islams*, 36 (1): 59–89.
- Buzpınar, T. (2016). *Hilafet ve Saltanat: II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Halifelik ve Araplar*. Alfa Yayıncılık.
- Buzpınar, T. 2018. "Sultan Abdülhamid Döneminde İngiliz Hıristiyan Siyonistler". Kala, M. E., Olçum, A., Salik, N., Nar, M. (Eds.). *Sultan Abdulhamid ve Dönemi*. Eğitim-Bir-Sen Yayınları, pp.117-128.
- Buzpınar, Ş.T. (2019). "A Reassessment of Anti-Ottoman Placards in Syria, 1878-1881". Ş.T.Buzpınar & G. Çetinsaya (Eds.). *Abdülhamid II and His Legacy: Studies in Honour of F.A.K. Yasamee*. The Isis Press, pp. 99–126.
- Cole, J. (2007). *Napoleon's Egypt- Invading the Middle East*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cronin, D. 2017. *Balfour's Shadow: A Century of British Support for Zionism and Israel*. Pluto Press.
- Çetinsaya, G. (2016). "II. Abdülhamid'in İç Politikası- Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi". *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XLVII: 353–409.
- Çetinkaya, B.A. (2018). "Hükümdar Peygamberler Şehri, Dinlerin Merkezi Kudüs". *Eskiyeini*, no. 36 (May): 99–113. <https://dergipark.org.tr/pub/eskiyeini/issue/37339/432100>.
- Davey, R. (2001). *The Sultan and His Subjects*. Gorgias Press.
- Dawn, C.E. (1993). "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology". Hourani, A., Khoury, P.S., Wilson, M.C. (Eds.). *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*. University of California Press, pp.373–91.

- Deringil, S. (1991). "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)". *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 23(3): 345-359.
- El-Awaisi, A. F. (1998). "The Significance of Jerusalem in Islam: An Islamic Reference". *Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies*, 1 (2): 47-71.
- El-Awaisi, K. (2019). "The Origins of the Idea of Establishing a Zionist Client-State in IslamicJerusalem". *Journal of Al-Tamaddun*, 14(1), 13-26.
- El-Awaisi, K., & Yiğit, E. (2020). "Early Foreign Penetration in the Holy Land during the Late Ottoman Period: The Role of Britain". *Journal of IslamicJerusalem*, 20(1): 1-18.
- Eren, E. (2008). *Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Paşa İsyanı ve Mısır Meselesi*. [Unpublished Master dissertation]. T.C. Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi.
- Erkan, A. (2015). *Osmanlıların Son Döneminde (1840-1920) Filistin'de Yabancılar ile Yahudilerin Toprak Mülkiyeti*. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. T.C. Marmara Üniversitesi.
- Farsakh, L. (2013). "Colonial Occupation and Development in the West Bank and Gaza: Understanding the Palestinian Economy Through the Work of Yusuf Sayigh". Davis, R., Kırık, M., (Eds.). *Palestine and Palestinians in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, pp.35-59.
- Fischel, R. S., & Kark, R. (2008). "Sultan Abdülhamid II and Palestine: Private Lands and Imperial Policy". *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 39: 129-166.
- Grossman, D. 2012. "Arab Population in Palestine During the Ottoman Era: Perceptions and Reality". *Themes in Israeli Geography*, 80 (79): 136-53.
- Herzl, T. (1960). *The Complete Dairies*. Patai, R. (Ed.). Zohn, H., (Trans.). Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff.
- Hirschfeld, Y. (1986). "Some Findings on Prussian and Ottoman Policies in Palestine During the 1840s Based on the Writing of Dr. Gustov E Schultz, the First Prussian Vice- Consul to Jerusalem 1842-1851". D. Kushner (Ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period Political, Social and Economic Transformation*. Yad Izhak Ben Zvi Press (pp. 263-279).
- Ishaq, A. (1909). *Al- Durar [The Pearls]*. Al-Matba'ah al-Adabiyah.
- Jacobson, A., & Naor, M. (2016). *Oriental Neighbors: Middle Eastern Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine*. Brandeis University Press.
- Kamel, L. (2015). *Imperial Perceptions of Palestine: British Influence and Power in Late Ottoman Times*. I.B. Tauris.
- Karpat, K H. (2001). *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. Oxford University Press.
- Kayyali, A. W. A. (1978). *Palestine: The Modern History*. Third World Centre for Research and Publishing.
- Khoury, P. S. (1983). "Islamic Revivalism and the Crisis of the Secular State in the Arab World: An Historical Reappraisal". *Arab Resources: The Transformation of a Society*, pp.213-236.
- Kocabaş, S. (1995). *Sultan II. Abdülhamid: Şahsiyeti ve Politikası*. Vatan Yayınları.
- Kızıltoprak, S. (2011). *II. Abdülhamid Han'ın Dış Politikası ve Taşöz Operasyonu*. S. Gülen, (Ed.). Yitik Hazine Yayınları.
- Kushner, D. (1986). "The 'Foreign Relations' of the Governors of Jerusalem Toward the End of the Ottoman Period". Kushner, D., (Ed.). *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period Political, Social and Economic Transformation*. Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press: 309-319.
- Makdisi, S. (2013). "One State: The Realistic Solution". R. Davis & M. Kırık (Eds.). *Palestine and the Palestinians in the 21<sup>th</sup> Century* Indiana University Press, pp. 251-270.
- Mandel, N. J. (1976). *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I*. University of California Press.
- Mazza, R. (2009). *Jerusalem from the Ottomans to the British*. I.B. Tauris Publishers.

- Memiş, Ş. E. (2018). "Between Ottomanization and Local Networks: Appointment Registers as Archival Sources for Waqf Studies". Dalachanês, A., Lemire, V., (Eds.). *The Case of Jerusalem's Maghariba Neighborhood*. Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840-1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City. Brill: 75-99.
- Morris, B. (2001). *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*. Vintage Books.
- Netanyahu, B. (2012). *The Founding Fathers of Zionism*. Gefen Publishing.
- Nijmeh, Hajjar. (2011). "Between Patriotism and Nationalism: Ameen Rihani's Vision for Lebanon and Syria". *The Origin of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity*. Routledge.
- Öke, M. K. (1982). *Siyonizm ve Filistin Sorunu (1880-1914)*. Üçdal Neşriyat.
- Ör, Ç. B. (2020). "Dreyfus Davası". *International Journal of Social and Economic Sciences*, 10(2): 142-156.
- Özcan, A. (2019). "Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in Dış Siyaseti ve Uygulamaları". Kala, M. E., Olçum, A., Salik, N., Nar, M. (Eds.). *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Dönemi: Siyaset-İktisat-Dış Politika-Kültür-Eğitim*. İzü Yayınları: 115-126.
- Salhi, M. (2011). "Faysal: The First King of Syria". A. Beshara (Ed.). *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity*. Routledge, pp. 255-287.
- Schölch, A. (2006). *Palestine in Transformation, 1856-1882 Studies in Social, Economic and Political Development*. Gerrity, M. C. (Ed.), Young, W.C., (Trans.). Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Segev, T. (2001). *One Palestine, Complete: The Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate*. Henry Holt.
- Sultan Abdülhamid II. (1975). *Siyasi Hatıratım*. Dergah Yayınları.
- Swedenburg, T. (1993). "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt". Hourani, A., Houry, P. S. *From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology*. University of California Press.
- Şiyat, H. A. (2017). "Arapların Hafızasındaki Sultan II. Abdülhamid Portresi: Gerçekle Hayal Arasında". F. Gün & H. İ. Erbay (Eds.), *Sultan Abdülhamid Han ve Dönemi*. TBMM Milli Saraylar Yayını, pp. 153-167.
- Tansu, N. S. (1970). *Madalyonun Ters Avlonyalı Cemalettin Paşa'nın Hatıraları*. Gür Kitapevi.
- Tauber, El. (1993). *The Emergence of the Arab Movement*. Frank Cass.
- Tellioğlu, Ö. (2018). *Filistine Musevi Göçü ve Siyonizm* (2nd ed.). İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları.
- Tibawi, A. L. (1978). *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine*. Luzac & Company Ltd.
- Tolan, J, Gilles V., & Laurens, H. (2013). *Europe and the Islamic World: A History*. Todd, M, J. (Trans.). Princeton University Press.
- Vardağlı, E.T. (2021). "The Impacts of Lausanne Treaty on British Colonialism". *Journal of Anglo-Turkish Relations*, 2 (2):67-87.
- Vereté, M. (1970). Why Was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem. *The English Historical Review*, 85: 316-45.
- Vital, D. (1975). *The Origins of Zionism*. Oxford University Press.
- Yasin, M. A. M. (2019). "XIX. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarisında Siyonistlerin Filistin'e Yerleşmelerinin Engellenmesi". *Journal of Islamicjerusalem Studies*, 19(3): 317-334.
- Zeine, Z. (2011). "The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: With a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East". Beshara, A. (Ed.). *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers and Identity*. Routledge.

**Other Sources**

*Tewfik to Tewfik Pasha*, (31.11.1903 CE). The Ottoman Foreign Ministry Achieves (OFM). 332 /17, no: 3309/178. Berlin.

**Bab-ı Asafi Amedi Defterleri (BOA.A.AMD.)**

Defter: 34/ Hüküm: 57-1-1.

**Yıldız Yaveran ve Maiyyet-I Seniyye Erkan-ı Harbiye Dairesi (Y..PRK.MYD).**

(10.06.1901 AD). Defter: 24. Hüküm: 14.