



## BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

The Paris Meetings of the Allies on the Armistice of Mudanya, 6-7 October 1922

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### ABSTRACT

The Mudanya Armistice has without doubt a prominent place in the history of the Turkish National Struggle. Thus, there have been many studies and publications to this date which have dealt with all aspects of the armistice. It is for this reason that the current study will not deal with the armistice itself. Rather, as stated in the title, the study will look at Allies' meetings in Paris on the Armistice of Mudanya on 6-7 October. More specifically, it will investigate how the British, French, and Italian statesmen (such as Lord Curzon, Poincaré, and Kont Sforza) evaluated the armistice.

The conference between the Allies generals and Ismet Pasha commenced at Mudanya on 3 October. The conference had for its main object to obtain the cessation of hostilities between Nationalist Turkey and Greece and fix a line in Eastern Thrace behind which the Greek army was to be invited to retire. However, on the third day a deadlock was reached owing mainly to the demand of the Turks that Eastern Thrace should be restored to Turkey in full sovereignty previous to the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. Ismet Pasha had demanded that the whole of Eastern Thrace should be handed over to the Turks at once, and that all Allied officers, missions, and contingents should be immediately withdrawn. He had threatened to set his troops in motion if these demands were not at once conceded. Here the French general, who up till then had acted in accord with his Allies, had suddenly announced that he had instructions from the French Government to agree to the Turkish demands. The meeting had accordingly broken up, and the generals had returned to İstanbul in order to obtain instruction from their governments. The British Government had instructed General Harington not to return or resume negotiations until the matter was cleared up.

On 6 October, Lord Curzon immediately went to Paris to discuss the matter with the French Prime Minister, Poincaré. If the Turks' claim were upheld, and if the French Government supported General Charpy, Curzon argued, it would render all co-operations between the Allied Governments. Poincaré replied that General Charpy had no orders but only latitude to avoid war. He also added that France would in no event go to war with Turkey. Lord Curzon insisted upon respect for the neutral zones. For this reason, a clause in regard to them had been inserted in the convention and was a matter of concern to all three governments.

The convention in its final form was signed in the early morning of the 11 October, after a session which lasted almost without interruption for about twelve hours.

**Keywords:** Lord Curzon, Poincaré, Signor Galli, Armistice of Mudanya, Mudanya, Paris, Britain, France, Italy, Turkey.

### KAPALI KAPILAR ARDINDA

Mudanya Mütarekesi Üzerine Mütteliklerin Paris Toplantıları, 6-7 October 1922

### ÖZ

Hiç şüphesiz Mudanya Mütarekesi Türk Milli Mücadele tarihinde önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu sebeple hakkında bugüne kadar birçok araştırma ve yayın yapılmış ve bu

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yayınlarında mütareke bütün yönleriyle ele alınmıştır. Dolayısıyla biz bu çalışmamızda Mudanya Mütarekesini ele almayı başlığımızda da belirttiğimiz gibi Mudanya Mütarekesi üzerine Müttefiklerin 6-7 Ekim'de Paris'te yapmış oldukları toplantılar üzerinde duracağız. Daha spesifik olarak İngiliz, Fransız ve İtalyan devlet adamlarının (Lord Curzon, Poincaré ve Signor Galli gibi) mütarekeyi nasıl değerlendirdikleri irdelenecektir.

Müttefik generalleri ile İsmet Paşa arasındaki konferans, 3 Ekim 1922'de Mudanya'da başladı. Konferansın ana amacı, Milliyetçi Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki düşmanlıkların durdurulmasını sağlamak ve Doğu Trakya'da Yunan ordusunun arkasına çekileceği bir hat belirlemektir. Ancak üçüncü gün, esas olarak Türklerin, Barış Antlaşması'nın yürürlüğe girmesinden önce Doğu Trakya'nın tam egemenlik içinde Türkiye'ye geri verilmesi talebi nedeniyle bir çıkmaza girildi. İsmet Paşa, Doğu Trakya'nın tamamının bir an önce Türklerle teslim edilmesini ve tüm Müttefik subay, misyon ve birliklerinin derhal geri çekilmesini istedi. Eğer bu talepleri hemen kabul edilmezse birliklerini harekete geçirmekle tehdit etti. O zamana kadar müttefikleriyle uyum içinde hareket eden Fransız generali, burada, birdenbire, Fransız Hükümeti'nden Türk taleplerini kabul etmesi yönünde talimat aldığını açıkladı. Toplantı bunun üzerine dağıldı ve generaller hükümetlerinden talimat almak için İstanbul'a döndüler. İngiliz Hükümeti, General Harington'a mesele çözülene kadar müzakerelere dönmemesi veya yeniden başlamaması talimatını vermiştir.

6 Ekim'de Lord Curzon, konuyu Fransa Başbakanı Poincaré ile görüşmek üzere hemen Paris'e gitti. Curzon, Türklerin iddiası kabul edilirse ve Fransız Hükümeti General Charpy'yi desteklerse, Müttefik Hükümetler arasındaki tüm iş birliğinin yıkılacağını savundu. Poincaré, General Charpy'nin emir almadığını, sadece savaştan kaçınmak için hoşgörülü olduğunu söyledi. Fransa'nın Türkiye ile hiçbir şekilde savaşa girmeyeceğini de sözlerine ekledi. Lord Curzon, tarafsız bölgelere saygı gösterilmesi konusunda ısrar etti. Bu nedenle, anlaşmaya bunlarla ilgili bir madde eklenmiş ve her üç hükümeti de ilgilendiren bir konu olmuştur.

Nihayet mütareke, 11 Ekim 1922 sabahı erken saatlerde, neredeyse kesintisiz olarak yaklaşık on iki saat süren bir toplantının ardından, son şekliyle imzalandı.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Lord Curzon, Poincaré, Signor Galli, Mudanya Mütarekesi, Mudanya, Paris, İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya, Türkiye.

### Introduction

The aim of the conference between the Allied generals and Ismet Pasha was to bring an end to the hostilities between Nationalist Turkey and Greece by fixing a line in Eastern Thrace behind which the Greek army would remain. Although only military representatives were to participate in the conference, the unofficial Nationalist agent, Hamid Bey, attended as a principle Turkish representative and other Nationalist politicians were present in the background. Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner in İstanbul, remarks that "the ubiquitous" Franklin-Bouillon, while not actually present in the conference room, attempted to take on the role of mediator between the Allied generals and the Turks. He continues to state that "this personage seems to be devoted to the Turkish cause" and that his behaviour was "a source of embarrassment" to the Allied generals, "for there is no doubt that he encouraged the Turks to believe that the Allies were prepared to go farther in the way of concessions than is really the case." According to Rumbold, from the very outset the Turks tried to "inveigle" the Allied generals into discussing political issues and it soon became clear that they had no intention of yielding a single point. He continues to remark that Ismet

Pasha's deafness caused some problems, and that he "became more arrogant as the conference proceeded." (FO371/7903/E11136/27/44, Eyyupoğlu, 2002).

Rumbold remarked that the atmosphere at the conference resembled that of "the bazaar combined with a coffee-house", which made negotiations difficult. To clarify this point, he wrote that Ismet Pasha replied to any point to which he did not approve by saying it was a specific matter that required consultation with Ankara. General Mazarakis and the Greek representatives arrived on 4 October, and appeared to make a good impression on the Allied generals. Although the Greek mission had met with the Allied generals on frequent occasions, they had not yet met the Turks. (FO371/7903/E11136/27/44, Akkılıç, 2008).

Negotiations came to a deadlock on the third day due to the Turks' demand that Eastern Thrace be given back to Turkish sovereignty in its entirety before the Peace Treaty went into force. In the event of the concession to such a demand, Rumbold claims that there would have been no guarantee for the protection of the non-Turkish population. Recognising that discussion of this demand was precluded by their terms of reference, they decided to return to İstanbul to receive instructions from their governments by means of the respective High Commissions. Thus, on the night of 5 October, Rumbold held a preliminary meeting with General Harington and Admiral Brock, followed by a full meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and generals with their staff. (FO 371/7903/E11136/27/44, Oğuzoğlu, 2007).

Rumbold reported that at this meeting of Allied High Commissioners, he had stated that the three or four points that had caused the deadlock at Mudanya were beyond the proposals in the Allied telegram dated 23 September. He emphasised in particular the Turkish demand that Eastern Thrace be restored to their control before the implementation of the Peace Treaty, stressing that he considered this a matter to be referred to Lord Curzon, and that he had refused to give General Harington instructions to accept this demand. He also pointed out that he had made this statement early on in the proceedings, because he thought his colleagues would urge him to give way. This conviction, as he remarked, "was speedily realised." (FO 371/7903/E11136/27/44).

Rumbold asked the French High Commissioner directly whether or not they would be ready to hand over Eastern Thrace to Turkey before the implementation of the Peace Treaty, as Franklin-Bouillon had stated. In his words "the French High Commissioner, who was visibly embarrassed, took refuge behind Franklin-Bouillon, and implied that the French Government would not in the last resort object to this new Turkish demand." In response, Rumbold remarked that Franklin-Bouillon's role at Mudanya had been harmful ("*néfaste*"), to which the French General did not seem to take offence. (FO 371/7903/E11136/27/44).

Rumbold believed that the French High Commissioner was aware of the "unfortunate" role that his country was playing at that moment when he "earnestly appealed" to him for the maintenance of the *Entente*, which he saw as being endangered by the crisis in the region. Rumbold stated that the French High Commissioner had argued emphatically that the *Entente* was "the only sheet-anchor" in Europe at that time. In Rumbold's opinion, the aim of the High Commissioner was

either to urge him to instruct General Harington to accept the Turkish demands on the three or four points which were still in dispute; or to recommend that Lord Curzon yield on these points. Rumbold stated that he was adamant in his position that he would do no such thing, and he emphasised that the British Government had already gone to great lengths in the line of the Allied Governments to offer a solution to the Near Eastern question in accordance with the Kemalist wishes. He also underlined that the Paris Agreement had been signed by all three Powers only twelve days previously, and now he was already being asked to accept demands which lay outside it. He stated categorically that the British Government was not prepared to cross certain limits. (FO 371/7903/E11136/27/44).

When the Italian High Commissioner addressed the meeting, he argued that these three or four points were not worth risking going to war about, and that they should be conceded. According to Rumbold, it was clear from the outset that he would be willing to surrender. Marquis Garroni went on to state that in the event of war with the Turks, the world would attribute the blame to the Allied High Commissioners for their unwillingness to make concessions which were relatively insignificant given the issues under discussion. At this point Rumbold protested, stating that any war would be the fault of the Turks, who were being "intractable." He believed that the worst way to deal with the Turks would be to yield to their demands, stating that the more they obtained, the more they would ask for. He remarked that he "should not be surprised if they demanded the immediate evacuation of İstanbul by the Allied Forces." He also said that "the attitude of my colleagues was, in fact, deplorable and produced the worst impression." (FO 371/7903/E11136/27/44).

The Ankara Government's reply to the Allied telegram of 23 September was given to the High Commissioners on the afternoon of the 5th instant. Ismet Pasha also received it at a similar time in Mudanya. The Allied generals found "a better atmosphere" on their return to the town on the following day. Ismet Pasha expressed his gratitude for the despatch of inter-Allied commissions to Eastern Thrace. Negotiations with the Nationalist general slowed down because General Harington was awaiting instructions from the British Cabinet while Lord Curzon was in Paris. These instructions arrived early in the morning of 8 October and were immediately forwarded to the British General. Another delay occurred because neither the French nor the Italian High Commissioners received instructions from their respective generals until late that afternoon. On arrival of these instructions, Rumbold called a meeting with his colleagues and the Allied generals to discuss and compare the instructions. (FO 371/7903/E11136/27/44, Pehlivanoğlu, 2002).

On finding that the French instructions differed from those of Lord Curzon on two points, Rumbold informed his colleagues at the meeting that he must refer once more to Lord Curzon. Again, his colleagues tried to persuade him to adopt the French version in preference to that of Lord Curzon. Marquis Garroni stated that they had conceded so much so far anyway that there was little point in arguing over what he saw as two minor points. Rumbold agreed that they had already made a substantial number of concessions and remarked that the Marquis was obviously willing to surrender in order to reach a solution. Rumbold pointed out that throughout these meetings, the High Commissioners and the Allied generals constantly referred to the "*amour-propre*"

(“self-respect”) of the Turks and the necessity to avoid offence of this self-respect. Rumbold retorted that they must not forget that the Allied countries also had their “*amour-propre*.” (FO 371/7903/E11136/27/44).

In summary, at this stage Rumbold informed his colleagues that he must await the instructions of Lord Curzon. He concluded by stating that an armistice convention had been drawn up for the Turks to sign in accordance with the most recent instructions of Lord Curzon as a result of the Paris meeting. In the event that the Turks did not sign it, he believed that it would be “clear to the world that they are intractable and under the influence of their extremists.” (FO 371/7903/E11136/27/44).

The text of a final protocol was prepared by the Allied generals and presented to Ismet Pasha on 9 October with the statement that this was their last word and the limit to their concessions. Rumbold noted that Ismet Pasha, while impressed at the Allied unity, expressed his reservations over certain points in the protocol and expressed surprise that the French and Italian generals had led him to believe that they would agree to less. Thus, he requested an adjournment to the following day on order for him to consult his government. (FO 371/7905/E11498/27/44).

General Harington returned to İstanbul on the night of 9 October. Rumbold summoned a meeting of the high commissioners on 10 October to discuss what should be done in the event that the Turks refused to sign the protocol.

Before this meeting, Rumbold met with General Harington and Admiral Brock to discuss the measures to be taken should Ismet Pasha’s instructions be undesirable to them. He noted that General Harington believed that, militarily, it would not be possible to delay any further. This was because the Kemalist forces were encroaching on the neutral zone of Izmit, which was putting his troops in danger. Despite a number of verbal and written promises, the Nationalist forces were advancing and getting between General Harington’s advance posts and the Bosphorus. The three men decided that if Ismet Pasha refused to sign the protocol, then General Harington would present Ismet Pasha with a written ultimatum stating in effect that if the Turks had not withdrawn from these neutral zones within thirty-six hours, then “all the necessary measures would to taken to expel them by force.” At the same time as this ultimatum, Admiral Brock was to issue a proclamation to clear the Bosphorus of Turkish craft, which would be concentrated in the Golden Horn. (FO 371/7905/E11498/27/44, Kayabal, 2011).

At the subsequent meeting of the High Commissioners, Rumbold’s French and Italian counterparts once more strongly advised him to concede to any further demands of the Kemalists. General Pellé anticipated that the Ankara Government would insist on the immediate surrender of Karaağaç. It was the French opinion that being a suburb of Edirne, it would be “illogical and inconvenient” to see it as separate from the city, particularly as Veniselos had led Poincaré to understand that he was ready to restore the 1914 frontier to Turkey. Rumbold declared to the French that he had no knowledge of this statement of Veniselos, and that he was bound instead to the decisions made in Paris on 7 October, which stated clearly that Karaağaç was to remain under Allied occupation until the declaration of peace. General Harington had added that he had strictly followed the instructions when drawing up the protocol, and that the French and

Italian generals had agreed to notify Ismet Pasha that this was the final word of the Allies. (FO 371/7905/E11498/27/44).

General Pellé then asked what was to be done in the event that the Turks refused to sign the protocol or insisted on further modifications. He wanted to know if this would mean that the Mudanya conference would break up, or if the generals would refer back to their High Commissioners. In his opinion they should do the latter, since the draft convention was the result of decisions taken by their respective governments. In this way, the High Commissioners could refer in turn to their respective governments if they saw the points of dispute to be significant enough. In his opinion, his instructions stated that no irrevocable action should be taken without consulting his government. (FO 371/7905/E11498/27/44, Yanardağ, ss. 66-81).

Rumbold's response to General Pellé was to state that he could not accept the responsibility for agreeing to anything which might prolong the Mudanya Conference and thus put British troops in danger. He emphasised that the Paris agreement had particularly insisted on respect of the neutral zones, that a clause for this very reason had been inserted in the convention, and that this was a matter which concerned all three governments. General Harington also brought up that fact that prolonging the current military situation would be impossible. He mentioned that he had a number of important decisions that he had to take within a few hours, and he wanted to know for sure whether or not he could depend on French and Italian troops being sent to help him defend the neutral zones, which, he pointed out, the three Allied ministers had insisted should be respected in Paris. General Pellé stated that he had received a telegram from Poincaré in Paris informing him that France would not go to war with Turkey under any circumstances, and he said that he had made this clear to Lord Curzon. The Italian High Commissioner said that he was obliged to associate his own Government to this declaration of policy. (FO 371/7905/E11498/27/44).

Hence, Rumbold announced that Britain would have to act alone, and General Harington and Admiral Brock explained what their plan of action would be if the Turkish reply regarding the neutral zones was unsatisfactory. General Pellé and Marquis Garroni made no objections, and Rumbold interpreted this as a sign of relief that any grounds for a potential breakdown in the Conference would be based on the respect of the neutral zones, where none of their respective troops would be affected. In fact, in such a situation, both their governments could decline all responsibility. He also believed that it was because of his own military identity that General Pellé understood General Harington's concerns about further delays and thus paid heed to the latter's "forbearance and patience" which he had shown throughout the discussions. (FO 371/7905/E11498/27/44).

After the conclusion of this meeting, General Harington returned to Mudanya, and the final form of the convention was signed early in the morning of 11 October, after a 12-hour long session. The Greek military delegates abstained from signing the protocol, because their instructions required that they did not accept any arrangement which did not treat the borders of Eastern Thrace as being those of 1915. However, three days later on 14 October, the Greek government did adhere to the convention by means of a written declaration handed to the three Allied Commissioners who in turn

communicated it to Hamid Bey, the representative of the Ankara government in İstanbul.

### **1. The First Meeting**

Lord Curzon said that a grave situation had arisen and that recent events at Mudanya seemed to the British Government to render desirable an immediate conversation. He regretted the trouble, to which Poincaré had been put at this late hour, but the issues raised were profoundly serious and immediate decisions were necessary. The conference would remember that it was only a fortnight since representatives of the three Powers had made an agreement calculated to bring peace in the Middle East, to maintain Allied solidarity and to end the lamentable series of events which had taken place there. Lord Curzon had made, on behalf of the British Government, substantial concessions with a view to arriving at peace. He had then regarded and still regarded the Paris Agreement as pivotal, a point to be adhered to as the sole guarantee for the execution of the objects in view. Since that date, as far as the British Government were responsible, everything had been conducted in scrupulous accord, both as regards the substance of the agreement and the order in which the various stages should be taken. He regarded the agreement, therefore, as guiding and continuing to guide the action of the British Government in the troublous times which might still be ahead. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

When the meeting at Mudanya had been agreed upon, it was decided that it should be a meeting of Allied generals whose business it would be to lay down the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw. The Greeks also had been invited to attend. As far as the British Government knew, no one else was to be invited to take part; and he had therefore been somewhat surprised when İsmet Pasha had appeared accompanied by Hamid Bey, who apparently was actually taking part in the conference. Lord Curzon had also heard that Franklin-Bouillon was at Mudanya, though not actually in the conference; and he was not sure that the latter's influence had proved very pacific. The Allied generals had discussed the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw, but the Greek representatives had arrived late, and other questions had been discussed, although decisions in these matters could only be taken at referendum to the High Commissioners and the Allied Governments. At every point, questions of vital importance had been raised by the Turks, and there had been constant objections and references to Ankara. Yet the three generals, acting in accord, had been able to draw up a draft, protocol, or convention to be put before the Turks as a basis of possible agreement. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré said that the French Government had not received this document. Lord Curzon said he would explain it and show how far the spirit of conciliation had been carried. The convention had been handed to the Turks on the second day of the conference. The following were its principal features:

Hostilities were to cease at once. The line of withdrawal was to be the Maritza up to the Bulgarian frontier. A special convention was to be concluded for the supervision of the railway on the right bank of the Maritza by a Greek and Turkish Commission. (The Turkish general had said that he interpreted "Edirne" as including Karaağaç and the forts on the right bank, which must be evacuated by the Greeks and

ceded to Ankara at once.) The draft protocol also provided that the complete evacuation by the Greeks was to be begun at once and conducted in fifteen days. The Greek civil administration was to retire, and civil powers were to be handed to the Allies, who would at once begin to transmit them to the Turks and complete the operation in thirty days. The Ankara officials, who were to be placed in charge, were to be accompanied by a limited gendarmerie to secure order. All this was to be done under the supervision of Allied Missions in the principal centres, where their presence would be a guarantee against excesses. Allied contingents were to be placed east of the Maritza to keep order and support the missions which had already been sent out from İstanbul. These contingents would amount to seven battalions. The date of the retirement of the missions and the contingents was to be decided by agreement between the Allies and the Turks. This convention was to be submitted for immediate approval. Until the execution of the Treaty of Peace, the Greek Government was to guarantee the lives and good treatment of the hostages in its hands, and the Turks on their part were not to molest the inhabitants of Eastern Thrace for any previous acts. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

The conference would agree that this document had been drawn up in a spirit of liberal and generous concession, going beyond the Paris proposals and showing an extreme desire to meet Ankara. In the course of discussions on the draft convention the representatives of Ankara had advanced further claims. These could not be accepted for they lay entirely outside the scope of the Paris note. The claims were four in number:

1. That the gendarmerie now to be introduced into Thrace should be unlimited. This was absolutely impossible, because the Kemalists would then introduce an army under the thin disguise of another name. It was, moreover, quite inconsistent with the Paris note.

2. That in reoccupying Edirne the Kemalists should also occupy Karaağaç and the forts on the right bank of the Maritza. This might be held to be riot unreasonable, but it was a matter to be considered by the Peace Conference and not by the generals.

3. That after the signature of the convention the Kemalists should have the right to continue military operations until ratification by the Allied Governments. This was both unreasonable and impracticable.

4. That the Allied missions, which had already started from İstanbul, should be withdrawn immediately after the Greek evacuation. This would be tantamount to saying that there should be no protection for Christians. These and other such preposterous claims had, of course, to be resisted. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

The draft convention had been agreed to by the three Allied generals. But on 5 October Ismet Pasha had demanded that the whole of Eastern Thrace should be handed over to the Turks at once, and that all Allied officers, missions, and contingents should be immediately withdrawn. He had threatened to set his troops in motion if these demands were not at once conceded. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Here the French general, who up till then had acted in accord with his Allies, had suddenly announced that he had instructions from the French Government to



agree to the Turkish demands. The meeting had accordingly broken up, and the generals had returned to İstanbul to consult the High Commissions. The British Government had instructed General Harington not to return or resume negotiations until the matter was cleared up. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon did not know what explanation Poincaré would be good enough to favour him with about these alleged orders to the French generals, but he hoped that he might at once point out that the Turkish demands were utterly inconsistent with the Paris Agreement. They anticipated the agreement of the Greeks, ignored the Peace Conference and destroyed all provision for minorities; if the Kemalists were now allowed to establish themselves fully in Eastern Thrace they would be able to exact what terms they wished for Western Thrace or for anything else, because they would already be in full possession, whereas the Allied aim was to attach conditions to such possession. If this claim were upheld, and if the French Government supported General Charpy, it would render all co-operation between the Allied Governments well-nigh impossible and the situation even more dangerous and disquieting than it now was. Poincaré had, he believed, seen Veniselos. Lord Curzon had also seen him three days ago, and had informed Count Saint-Aulaire of the conversation. Lord Curzon had advised Veniselos to accept the Allied line of withdrawal. Veniselos had, of course, found the advice unpalatable, but two days later he had returned and said that he had advised the Greek Government to acquiesce, provided that there were guarantees for the Christian population in the shape of Allied contingents pending the Peace Conference. Whether the Greek Government had accepted this advice Lord Curzon did not know. But dearly when the Greeks were showing this good disposition, this was not the moment for the surprising attitude apparently adopted by some of the Allied representatives at Mudanya. Poincaré might ask what, in the view of the British Government, should be done? Lord Curzon thought the answer was clear. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

The Kemalists' demands with regard to the possession of Eastern Thrace without delay or withdrawal should be firmly rejected. The four additional claims, which were part of the same proposal, should also be rejected or at least referred to the Peace Conference. Finally, it was essential that, if the Greek army would withdraw, the Allies should make themselves responsible for order and security in the interval between now and the Peace Conference by sending in Allied missions and contingents, while allowing the Turks to set up a civil administration with a strictly restricted gendarmerie. This was the least that the Allies could do unless they tore up the Paris note that night. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Ismet Pasha had announced his intention to advance at two o'clock that day unless these conditions were granted. If he had done so it would be he who had torn up the Paris note. In such case the whole position would have to be reconsidered, but for the moment Lord Curzon would assume that this was bluff and that the Turks were not so foolish as to execute the threat; and he would hope that the situation still allowed the Allies to act together under the Paris note. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré said that he associated himself with the hope expressed by Lord Curzon. He trusted that the irreparable had not occurred, but he feared that Mustafa

Kemal was already carrying out his threat. The seriousness of that threat had been the reason General Charpy had given way. He wished also to protest against any suggestion that Franklin-Bouillon was not inspired by a friendly spirit. Franklin-Bouillon was animated by the best intentions in the world, and had done all he could. He had gone to Mudanya in the spirit of peacemaker; he had gone without instructions from the French Government, and had acted on his own initiative. The case was not the same as when he went to İzmir; he had been officially sent there. Before leaving İzmir, he had sent home a Kemalist draft indicating their present claims. The French Government were therefore prepared for them and for this threat. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré's own opinion was to stand by the Paris note. When he had seen Lord Hardinge, the latter had asked him to join in the British instructions to İstanbul, he had replied that he would join, as far as these instructions were capable of realisation and could be reconciled with the possibilities of the case.

General Charpy had not had orders; he had only had an authorisation with wide latitude to use his judgment on the spot. If the instructions could not be realised, he was to try to harmonise them with Turkish claims. Signor Galli said that the Italian representative had instructions to acquiesce in three out of the four points, but not in the immediate Turkish possession of Thrace. Poincaré said General Mombelli had entirely adhered to the French point of view. Lord Curzon said that General Mombelli might have been overruled, but first had adopted the same attitude as General Harington. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré repeated that General Charpy had no orders but only latitude to avoid war. The general thought that point had been reached, and Poincaré did not hesitate to say that, if these concessions were necessary to avoid war, we must resign ourselves to them. Lord Curzon said that he could see no difference between instructions and this "authorisation." Poincaré repeated that General Charpy's action had been necessary to avoid war. Lord Curzon replied that he understood this contention, but did Poincaré realise where this course was leading him? General Charpy had consented to something entirely inconsistent with the Paris note. Poincaré asserted emphatically that there was no inconsistency. He asked leave to read the Paris note to prove this; and did so with some signs of irritation. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon said he must wholly disagree with Poincaré's assertion. Did the Paris note contemplate the immediate handing over of Thrace to the Turks? Poincaré then read his instructions to General Charpy, and added that it was dangerous to propose anything immutable. General Charpy was to support the British, placate the Turks and refer home any case of difficulty. Lord Curzon enquired if General Charpy had done so. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré responded to the negative. But communication took thirty-six hours. General Charpy had thought himself empowered to accept the Turkish claims in order to avoid war. The British Government did not agree; but let them realise that, if war broke out, it would be against Russia and Bulgaria as well as Turkey. Was the British Government ready for that? The French Government would not contemplate it, or have it at any price. What did the Turks claim after all? Only that the Allies were not to remain when the Turkish gendarmerie and civil authorities were installed. Lord Curzon

said that the demand was for an unlimited gendarmerie. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré said that even the Greeks did not oppose this demand. He had seen Veniselos, who had said that he would not object to a return to the frontiers of 1914. There was, therefore, no difficulty in regard to Karaağaç. Veniselos only asked for Allied troops for a month in order to enable such Greeks as wished to be evacuated, and Veniselos now asked for nothing more in regard to the protection of minorities. After one month, he said, let Turkey do as it pleased. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré then read a telegram from General Pellé saying that the Patriarch of Edirne and the local Greeks did not wish any resistance to be made in regard to the retrocession of Thrace. There was, therefore, no case for a stiff attitude on the part of the Allies. In any event, being at İstanbul, at Çanakkale and Gelibolu, the Allies would still be masters of the situation, and have their hands full of levers at the Peace Conference. But even now the Turks might be marching; he had been told that their advance was imminent. Poincaré then read snatches of corrupt telegrams which did not appear to bear out this statement. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon replied that Poincaré had assured him of his fidelity to the Paris note, and had also defended Franklin-Bouillon as a peacemaker. Lord Curzon could give evidence in a very opposite sense, but he had no desire to rest his argument on personalities. He was dealing with far larger issues. What General Charpy's instructions really amounted to was that, if the Kemalists threatened or bluffed, General Charpy was authorised to separate himself from the Allies and make concessions inconsistent with the Paris note. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon was at a loss to understand how such an attitude could be defended. It was due to General Charpy's sole initial action that the Mudanya Conference had broken up. Poincaré defended General Charpy, repeating that the general had to consider that war might result from refusal, a war in which Russia and Bulgaria would join. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon said that on this showing the Allies must invariably give way to any Turkish demand, no matter how outrageous, if it were coupled with a threat. He could accept no such proposition, and he could not picture the reception that the British Government would give to such an idea. Poincaré had urged that the action was not inconsistent with the Paris note. Lord Curzon would also read the Paris note which stipulated for the full protection of Christian minorities, and that pending this, the Kemalists were not to cross with troops to Europe. But if the Turks were to be in immediate occupation, how would it be possible to protect minorities? The crossing in itself, moreover, would be an infringement of the agreement. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

As for Veniselos, Lord Curzon was greatly surprised to hear Poincaré's statement. Veniselos must have gone much further than when Lord Curzon had seen him. Veniselos had then said nothing in regard to territory west of the Maritza, nor of the retention of Allied troops for one month only. To Lord Curzon, Veniselos had

pleaded for an hour on behalf of the minorities in Thrace, or indeed the majorities as he claimed them to be. Veniselos had said he was considering the evacuation of the whole Christian population. Counting İstanbul with Eastern Thrace, this would amount to over a million souls. How would this be possible in a month? Transport was deficient, and there were in reality few destinations to which these unfortunate people could be directed, even supposing that they were willing to pluck up their own roots from the soil on which they had grown. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré had seemed to suggest that this was a matter of small relative importance. Was it? The protection of minorities was part of the Paris note. Were they going to tear up that part? If so, would not more of it be gone next week? And the next stage would be that it would go altogether.

Poincaré's statement was the most serious that Lord Curzon had ever heard him make. Lord Curzon had come to Paris to appeal to the Paris note, but it seemed to be gone or going. He had come to appeal for adherence to the draft convention of the Allied generals, but General Charpy had thrown it over in a fit of terror. The Turk had held up his sword, and all Allied conditions were to vanish. If that were indeed the case, he would have to tell the conference what view his Government would take of so grave a situation. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

But Lord Curzon was still wondering whether he had not misunderstood Poincaré, and he would still ask for a clear answer whether his first propositions were accepted or rejected. In the latter event the whole position must be reconsidered. He would, moreover, ask whether Poincaré was really prepared to concede the four Turkish points, and finally he would enquire what Poincaré proposed to do at Mudanya. The British Government were not prepared to make, and would not make, these concessions. Were Generals Charpy and Mombelli to be allowed to break the Allied front? Was the conference to be suspended? And if Mustafa Kemal attacked again what would Poincaré propose to do? The Paris note spoke of the respect of the neutral zones, but Poincaré thought Mustafa Kemal might already have attacked if so, what course was Poincaré going to adopt? (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré retorted that if the Turks advanced, he would do nothing. Let there be no doubt about that. He would do nothing in any circumstances French troops should never fire a shot in the East. He had said that before. France could not fight in the East, and would not. If concessions must be made, it would make them reluctantly. Lord Curzon said that this seemed to be a most humiliating position, and he could not conceive that any Great Power should adopt it. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré replied heatedly that there was no question of humiliation. He needed no lessons from anyone and would take none. He represented France, and France required no lessons. He wished to make it clear finally that he would tolerate no criticism of any word or action of his. Moreover, matters were not as Lord Curzon represented them. The three generals had at first drafted together a project giving entire satisfaction to the Turks. It was General Harington who had gone back on them. Again, he repeated that he had not given General Charpy any liberty inconsistent with the Paris note, but only as regards provisional measures. Lord Curzon's expression seeming to convey some incredulity, Poincaré declared that Lord Curzon was laughing

at him, and that, as he tolerated no criticism, he would tolerate no smiles. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon pointed out that the Allied generals were only authorised to draw a line of evacuation. Poincaré claimed that it had never been laid down that the Allies should undertake the burden of supervision in Thrace. Ways and means must therefore be left to the generals. At this point Poincaré was fumbling for arguments, and became somewhat incoherent. The following passages are reported as far as he could be understood:

Thrace was the property of Turkey, and it was only natural and in conformity with the law to return property, even when it was territory, immediately to its possessor *de facto*. The *de jure* possession would be regulated by the peace. During the provisional period, the Turks only asked for the progressive transfer to them of the civil administration. This was necessary precisely in order to prevent the passage of troops and renewed warfare. Here Poincaré drew an obscure analogy with the French re-entry into the possession of Alsace-Lorraine. He proceeded to say that the Allies could attain what they desired by staying at İstanbul and Gelibolu; but even so, if they could only attain what they wanted by war, France would not stay. Reverting to Veniselos, Poincaré read a telegram saying that Veniselos had urged his Government to retire behind the Maritza, and had accepted the idea of a Turkish administration within a month. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Signor Galli interpolated that the Italian Government had coupled their instructions to General Mombelli with some observations. They had thought the danger so pressing that the Thracian regime would have to be dealt with to some extent by the generals. The Italian Government would also not oppose Mustafa Kemal with arms, even if his force were small. Between General Mombelli's first and second attitudes the situation had become more dangerous, he had therefore joined the French. Signor Galli asked whether the conflict could not somehow be avoided without loss of prestige. The Italian Government would agree to anything to avoid a fight. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré said that those were the principles of the French Government. The Turks were not bluffing; they would attack. Lord Curzon replied that was just what General Charpy's attitude was calculated to encourage. Poincaré had begun by answering Lord Curzon's last question; what would the French Government do if the Turks attacked the neutral zones? For the British part they should defend Çanakkale. What about İzmit? Poincaré had said definitely that he would do nothing. Why then had they put into the Paris note that the Kemalists were not to send troops to the neutral zones or cross the Straits? Poincaré replied that the penalty for that would be that the Allies should not press the Greeks to withdraw. He had never said that the French would fight about it. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon pointed out that it might now be hoped that the Greeks would withdraw; but a Turkish attack would ruin the prospect of this peaceful solution. And the French Government would do nothing. Poincaré argued that, when the generals drew the line, they had no alternative but to prepare the installation of a Turkish administration, and that territory automatically reverts to a quondam possessor. Why

then, after full discussion at the last conference, had the duties of the generals been clearly limited? Poincaré need only look at the agreement to verify this. Moreover, this was not a question only of civil administration; that had been conceded by the protocol of the three Allied generals. What the Turks now asked was immediate occupation, the transport of unlimited gendarmerie, the cession of Karaağaç, the continuance of military operations, and the withdrawal of any Allied contingents. Once again, Lord Curzon asked, did Poincaré agree to the four points? Veniselos had agreed to something quite different—the evacuation of the Greek army and population in a month under provisional Allied administration. Ankara and Charpy proposed something quite different. What did Poincaré accept or refuse? (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Once again, this was not a question of civil administration: Ankara now demanded that Eastern Thrace should be taken out of Allied hands altogether? Did Poincaré agree? Lord Curzon could get no reply. Poincaré asserted that he had never heard of the four points or of the draft protocol. He understood that the Turks asked only for the introduction of Turkish gendarmerie, not for military occupation. The latter the Allies would refuse. The only real difficulty was that of the civil administration. But were not the Allies agreed upon that? (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Curzon said that his information was evidently fuller than that of the French Government. General Harington asked for specific instructions on a number of points unconnected with civil administration. Lord Curzon quoted General Harington's telegram, and asked for the views of the French Government. He referred Poincaré, to the generals' protocol: if General Charpy had confined himself to the point of civil administration, the conference would not have broken up. What had split it was the point of full and immediate Turkish possession of Thrace. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré said that the Allies were agreed upon Greek evacuation, and they were also agreed in regard to the civil administration. Only the British Government held out on this point. Generals Charpy and Mombelli had acted rightly in yielding. Lord Curzon pointed out that, beyond drawing the line of evacuation, the generals had only the right to make suggestions. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré then argued that there was really no difference between the Allies, but only a misunderstanding. He read a telegram from General Pellé, who had taken Franklin-Bouillon to give explanations to Sir H. Rumbold. Lord Curzon read out General Harington's telegrams, which proved that there was more than a misunderstanding. But time was passing; it was already past 2 a.m., and he still could not get a clear answer. Would the French Government tell him later that morning, if not that night, what exactly they were prepared to accept or refuse? (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon had explained the real nature of the Turkish demands. What attitude did Poincaré adopt in regard to Allied officers, missions, and contingents? Poincaré replied that the Turks accepted them, but they would not have them after the Turkish Administration was installed. Lord Curzon retorted that this was really too transparent. The Turks asked that their possession should be immediate; in other words, the Allied contingents would disappear before birth, or even before conception.

What did Poincaré really mean? Would he formulate the exact conditions of the Allied role in Thrace as he understood them? (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré said he would draft something, but if the Turks did not like it, he would not stand to it. He would do anything to avoid war, but added that the Allies were in reality very close to an agreement. Lord Curzon said he was glad to hear it, and he would be still more encouraged if Poincaré would be precise. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré repeated that he would produce something, but nothing rigid. The important thing was to avoid war. He then produced another soothing telegram from Franklin-Bouillon to Mustafa Kemal, and added that Veniselos did not object to the cession of Karaağaç.

Lord Curzon enquired if the Allies were really to go beyond the original Turkish demands. For his part, he could not do so. Even if Veniselos had given way as regards the territory west of the Maritza, he doubted whether the Greek Government would do so.

Poincaré said he had not discussed the matter at great length with Veniselos. His suggestion had been that the Greeks should leave Karaağaç and that Allied troops should be put in. Lord Curzon enquired whether the French Government would send troops, and Poincaré replied in the affirmative, as did also Signor Galli. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon explained that the British Government could only provide troops for Thrace if they were not at war, i.e., if Mustafa Kemal did not cross the neutral zones. In that case, the British forces might all be needed at Çanakkale and Gelibolu. Poincaré said that French troops might be sent to Thrace first. Lord Curzon enquired what contingents the French Government could provide locally. Poincaré answered that there were eight or nine battalions handy, and only partly coloured. Lord Curzon asked Signor Galli how many troops the Italian Government could dispose of. Signor Galli, after some hesitation, replied, 2,000; but he added, if it was only a question of peaceful sojourn at Karaağaç, the Italian Government might perhaps contribute more troops from home. Poincaré assured Signor Galli that there was no danger in regard to Karaağaç. The Turks had indeed asked for Allied troops on the right bank of the Maritza. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Lord Curzon said he must revert again to what he had already pointed out, and ask a last time for their attention. Let them as practical and humane men face the facts. The evacuation of the Greek population could not be carried but in a month. There was nowhere to send them; and the İzmir refugees were already starving. It had been suggested that the populations of Eastern and Western Thrace could be exchanged. That might sound like, but it was not really, a solution. A peasant population could not be lightly transplanted. The time allowance should be liberal, and in any case if the Allies were not there to supervise the partial attempt there would be excesses. There should also be more security for the remnants when the transportable portion had gone. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44).

Poincaré replied that was not possible. Moreover, he was not anxious on this score. He had received information of atrocities by the Greeks, but of none by the Turks. The latter might get excited in Asia, but they would behave in Europe. He was, however, quite ready to send French troops to Thrace from İstanbul. Lord Curzon said that the three flags should be shown. It was finally arranged that Poincaré should formulate his views as to the conditions under which the evacuation of Thrace should be conducted. (TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44. The conference adjourned at 3 a.m. until 9 that morning).

## **2. The Second Meeting**

Poincaré said he had nothing new to report, except a telegram from Rome to the effect that Generals Charpy and Mombelli had accepted a period of fifteen days for the evacuation of Thrace and the withdrawal of Allied contingents. Lord Curzon replied that he could not accept this. The conference was faced with another remarkable performance. Generals Charpy and Mombelli had again broken away from General Harington and had made another concession on their own initiative. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré said the telegram had only come from Rome, and that there was a chance it was not authentic. Had General Harington referred to his Government in the matter? Lord Curzon said that he would if necessary refer to his Government, but must state plainly that he would never advise his Government to accept, all the less as he had said at the earlier meeting, that even thirty days were really too short a period, and he had only agreed to that because Poincaré had advocated thirty days on Venizelos's own suggestion. Poincaré was expected to instruct General Charpy to act in the sense of the agreement reached at the previous meeting. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré said he would give no instructions but only advice to General Charpy, to whom he must leave full discretion. Personally, he remained of the opinion already expressed as regards the period of thirty days; but, if Generals Charpy and Mombelli had accepted fifteen days, he could not go back on an undertaking given to the Turks. The point at issue was whether troops should be withdrawn when the administration was established. He did not mind saying that personally he thought fifteen days insufficient. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon repeated that he had said even thirty days were not enough for the uprooting of this large population. The thing was a physical impossibility. How could a civil administration be imported and installed in a fortnight? Such things did not spring from the soil. Moreover, order had to be maintained; a gendarmerie could not at once be properly organised; Allied occupation was absolutely necessary. The conference had discussed its composition earlier that morning, but if all Allied supervision were to be withdrawn in fifteen days the thing would be a joke. For his part he would associate himself with no such idea, and, if it were persisted in, the Mudanya Conference would be at an end. The responsibility for that would not be Great Britain's; and if war followed, the responsibility would not be Great Britain's; and if British troops had then to retire from İzmit and İstanbul, the responsibility would not be Great Britain's. The blame in this case would not lie on the British Government who here and now disclaimed it. But did the President of the Council really seriously say that he could not send orders



to his own representative? Would not Poincaré be surprised if Lord Curzon were to say the same about General Harington? As far as Lord Curzon knew this was the first time that the head of a Government had ever taken such a line; and again, as Lord Curzon had said earlier, it would mean that the Allies must accept whatever General Charpy said after Kemal had threatened. Such a decision would be too derogatory for Lord Curzon to in any way be a party to it. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré retorted that there was nothing derogatory in General Charpy's decision; in any case France was the best and only judge of that, and needed and would take no lessons from anyone. He had said that he would not give orders without knowing the situation. Such information he would only take from his own representatives and not from any foreigner. It would not be the first time in history that such a course had been adopted. If it were a novelty, he would be proud of it, but reiterated that he would accept no criticism. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon said the point was that Poincaré, as he had already admitted, had not received information. Generals Charpy and Mombelli continually ceded without reference. For his part Lord Curzon was prepared to assume the responsibility of giving orders, but not in that sense. Signor Galli suggested that perhaps the two generals had only accepted fifteen days *ad referendum*, and as between themselves. Poincaré said no. If they had agreed definitely, as he thought, there could be no going back on it. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon pointed out that this again meant that the Allies must always yield to the Turks. It was the thin end of the wedge: the month would become fifteen days and then a week, and then nothing. General Charpy had instructions to give way on anything to avoid war. Lord Curzon did not criticise Poincaré's instructions, but they meant the breakdown of the Mudanya Conference and of common action. He thought it had been arranged that Poincaré would submit instructions to be sent to General Charpy, and Lord Curzon had hoped to have been, able to send them to his Government, and to recommend that similar ones be sent to General Harington. But the situation had apparently again changed. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré said that he had perhaps explained himself badly. A period fifteen days was a regrettable innovation, and perhaps it had not really been accepted; but if such were the case, he could not go back on it without putting France in a bad light in Turkish eyes. If fifteen days had not been promised, he would stand out for thirty days; if a promise had been made, he would not accept an increase. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon emphasised, that there was another aspect of the matter. He referred to Veniselos. Lord Curzon had understood that Veniselos's willingness to recommend withdrawal depended on the adoption of a period of thirty days. If that period were now to be reduced, Veniselos would be relieved of his promise, and the Greeks might refuse to withdraw. Poincaré said he had made no arrangement with Veniselos. He would not do such a thing without consulting his Allies. He was not even clear what thirty days meant. Did they run from the date of evacuation, or from the signature of the Mudanya Conference? (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon replied that he understood the matter thus: A provisional administration with Allied officers and contingents was to be set up and would remain for a month during which arrangements for the departure of the Greeks and the installation of the Turks would proceed. In practice this would work out at more than a month. Personally, he had been astonished that Veniselos had agreed to a month. If fifteen days were now substituted, everything would go by the board, and the result would be chaos. The period of fifteen days was not a practical proposition for practical men. The concession made by the two generals was obviously impossible; it was surrender to an unjustified Kemalist demand, and in no wise compatible with the Paris note. To adopt this proposal would lead to disaster. Was the conference, he asked, to break down over a difference between a month and a fortnight? (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré said that if fifteen days had been promised by two out of the three generals, the promise must be observed. Lord Curzon replied that such decisions could only be reached by unanimity. After further discussions, the following formula was proposed:

*“The three Allied Governments agree to accept that the Greek troops should be invited to withdraw as soon as possible west of the Maritza. The Allied Governments will ensure, with the aid of a provisional Allied occupation, the installation in Eastern Thrace of the Turkish administration and the Turkish gendarmerie. This installation must take place within a period not exceeding one month from the evacuation of the Greek troops. At the end of this period, the Allied troops will only continue to occupy for the duration of the conference certain points on the right bank of the Maritza and the places where they are at the moment.”* (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon said it must be clear that the last words of the formula covered Chatalja, İstanbul, İzmit, Gelibolu and Çanakkale. Poincaré assented.

Lord Curzon said that he must have time to examine the draft more closely, and if necessary to propose modifications. Suppose the administration were set up with Allied officers and contingents in the country; at the expiry of the month would the Allies be absolutely pledged to withdraw? He would like to see a little more elasticity. The moment for departure might be ill-chosen. He agreed to the spirit of the formula and thanked Poincaré for his assistance, but the draft seemed somewhat too rigid. Lord Curzon would be reluctant to be committed to withdrawal whatever might be happening at the moment. If disturbances were just then arising, withdrawal might have disastrous consequences. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré said that the object of the conference was to avoid a Turkish attack. If the present crisis could be smoothed over an amicable extension might be arranged later. Lord Curzon asked if the words *“à partir de l'évacuation”* *“from evacuation”* meant after the completion of the Greek evacuation. He would prefer to substitute *“après”* *“after”* instead of *“à partir de”* *“from”* in order to make this clear, for he must insist on this point. Poincaré accepted the substitution of the word *“après.”* He claimed again, however, that if two out of the three generals were committed to a period of fifteen days, he also considered himself committed. In any case if the Allies were at

Karaağaç and Chatalja, they were masters of Thrace. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon enquired how one could be master of anything if one would not do anything in any circumstances. Poincaré replied that that was not precisely what he had said or intended. Police work was different to war. Policemen shot in the streets of Paris, but that was not a Parisian war. French troops would be prepared to maintain order but not to make war. In regard to the formula, he would prefer the expression "*in the shortest possible delay not exceeding one month.*" (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon claimed that his Government would only send General Harington back to Mudanya with definite instructions and even so perhaps reluctantly. General Harington was awaiting instructions now. The British Government would certainly not authorise General Harington to resume discussions at Mudanya on any conditions less than those that Lord Curzon had proposed. The other fantastic Turkish demands must be rejected. Poincaré suggested that if unanimity on the period of fifteen days was not attainable, all that could be done was to say that the British Government refused, and to try to persuade the Turks to accept a month in order to ensure unanimity. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon declared that this would be creating a most invidious position for the British Government. Hitherto the Allied representatives had proceeded in common accord; Lord Curzon would never agree to two of them overruling the third. A united front must be preserved; there must either be concord or no agreement at all. It was not contended, he presumed, that Generals Charpy and Mombelli should have the right to commit three Governments. What would the French and Italian Governments say if General Harington had gone behind their backs? (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré said he supposed the Turks knew that two of the generals had accepted fifteen days, but also that the British Government had not yet even been clearly instructed to accept one month. Could they not be frank with the Turks and say that three governments, after consultation, proposed one month? Lord Curzon said this might be acceptable if Generals Charpy and Mombelli were clearly instructed accordingly. Poincaré replied that that was of course understood. Lord Curzon said in that case he would agree. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Signor Galli urged that if the Turks stood out for fifteen days it would not be worthwhile to wreck the conference for so small a difference. Lord Curzon replied that in such a case a reference would be necessary to their respective Governments, and that he knew what his own Government would say. He would further like to emphasise the fact that there must and could be no deviation from the Paris note in regard to the evacuation of Greek troops as conditional upon the Kemalist engagement in respect of the neutral zones. General Harington would be bound to insist on the strict application of this clause of the Paris note. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré replied that he had heard of no difficulties on this point, but that there had been some suggestion of a restricted zone. Lord Curzon answered that there might be a slight variation in the Çanakkale zone if it were judged desirable for practical

purposes. He however was contending for a principal Mustafa Kemal was adopting a very menacing attitude in regard to the İzmit zone. Poincaré interrupted to contend that the Turks were entitled to continue their concentration during the Mudanya Conference, inasmuch as British reinforcements continued. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon pointed out that the real contingency to be considered was that of Mustafa Kemal trying to cross the neutral zones. Poincaré declared that France would never make war. He had already said so frankly. Lord Curzon answered that if Mustafa Kemal violated the İzmit zone, and if Great Britain were deserted by her Allies, the British Government would withdraw from İzmit, and if necessary, from İstanbul, and would wash their hands of the matter. The French and Italian Governments must bear the entire responsibility. In his turn he said so frankly. Poincaré said that the French troops would go out with the British. Lord Curzon presumed that Poincaré had fully considered the consequences. Poincaré said he had done so. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Lord Curzon concluded by saying that he must consult his Government, but before he left, he would like to have a few words about other points arising in connection with the Ankara note, i.e., in regard to the date and place of, and the participants in the eventual Peace Conference. Lord Curzon was not now empowered to make any final decision, but it might be helpful if Poincaré and Signor Galli would say what was in their minds. İzmir was of course unacceptable. Again, were the Soviet Government, Georgia, and the Ukraine to be admitted? (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

Poincaré asked if it were really necessary to answer the Ankara note except as to the place of the conference. The date need not now be specified. As to Soviet participation, Franklin Bouillon had told him that the Turks would not insist: the point had only been put in as a sop to Soviet pretensions.

Lord Curzon said that the Allies should come to an understanding in these matters, not necessarily for communication anyhow as yet to Ankara. Poincaré said he did not like the idea of Taormina which had been suggested as a meeting place. İzmir of course was impossible. Why should not the conference be held at Prinkipo? Lord Curzon expressed doubts as to the desirability of a conference on Turkish territory. In such an event, for instance, who would convoke the conference and who would preside? Poincaré suggested that the presidency might be held in rotation, but he would at present sooner not consider that point. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44).

### **3. The Third Meeting**

Lord Curzon began by saying that he had asked leave to study the draft drawn up at the previous meeting. It seemed capable of improvement. The changes he had to propose would be in strict accord with its principle. It might be made clearer that, in the interval of one month after the evacuation of the Greek troops, the presence of Allied officers and contingents was intended to maintain order. The morning's draft seemed to suggest that public security was less the object of occupation than the speedy introduction of a Turkish regime. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

This brought Lord Curzon to the question of minorities. He had seen Veniselos since the last meeting. On this point Veniselos had the gravest fears, and must have given an incorrect impression when he saw Poincaré. Veniselos had said that he was advising his Government to withdraw, although they had already been highly tried by a series of concessions. But Veniselos felt that the only security for the Greek population would be, firstly, a distinct period for the evacuation of Greek troops, and, secondly, a clear month under Allied supervision during which the evacuation of the inhabitants might be peaceably effected; otherwise the moment the Allied troops departed the peasants would be persecuted in every conceivable way, and their existence rendered intolerable, even if there were no massacres. The doubtful words were those beginning, *“The Allied Governments will ensure”*, which had the implication already alluded to, viz., that the Allies would be in Thrace less to keep order than to install the Turks. A more precise drafting would be preferable. He suggested the following:

*“In the territories thus evacuated, the Allied Governments will ensure, with the aid of a provisional inter-Allied occupation, the maintenance of order and public security during the thirty days after the evacuation of the Greek troops, which will be necessary for the installation in Eastern Thrace of the Turkish administration and the Turkish Gendarmerie.”* (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

The British Government would find this easier of acceptance. Poincaré said that he could not accept this text. He had shown the previous draft to the French Cabinet, who had accepted it. He would not, however, object to the following formula:

*“In the territories thus evacuated, the Allied Governments will ensure, by means of provisional inter-Allied occupation, the maintenance of order and public security until the establishment in Eastern Thrace of Turkish civil administration and gendarmerie. This establishment shall take place, ...”* (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Lord Curzon's suggestion to him was incompatible with the spirit of the previous draft as establishing a minimum of thirty days. The French view was that that period was a maximum with possible reductions, and the French Government had not felt able to go beyond the first text. Lord Curzon said that he would accept Poincaré's amendment, but he would remind him that the morning's text had not been accepted by the British Government, to whom it had merely been referred. Poincaré reverted to the point that the French and Italian generals might wish to abridge the period of thirty days. Lord Curzon replied that such a decision could not be taken by a majority but only by unanimity, and that he should instruct General Harington to insist on a full month. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Signor Galli read a telegram from his Government saying that, as regards the four Turkish conditions, Italy agreed with France. He suggested that the three Allied generals might in agreement contemplate a delay of less than thirty days. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Lord Curzon repeated that there could not be unanimity on such a suggestion, as General Harington would be told not to be unanimous. He deprecated the idea, because it might lead the Turks to press again for only fifteen days. The French and Italian Governments could, of course, say what they wished to their own generals, but

nothing of the sort should be said to the Turks, who would only be encouraged to think that they could squeeze yet further concessions from the Allies. Moreover, the proposal would only bring about disagreement between the generals and end by throwing the sole responsibility on General Harington. Lord Curzon would not make the position of the British Government or its representative more difficult than necessary. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Signor Galli again pressed his proposal, and was supported by Poincaré, who urged that it offered the Turks a premium on good behaviour. The two generals would probably not press for abridgment. The proposal was a means of preventing the Turks from breaking off on some point of detail. Could it not be said that the generals might have latitude for abridgment? (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Lord Curzon asked why it was necessary to talk at all about a shorter period. A month was really insufficient. He had agreed to a month, but that was a minimum, and even now he was not sure that his Government would consent. Poincaré agreed to drop the subject, the more readily, he added, in that he considered the text as it already stood to admit of the possibility of a time reduction. Lord Curzon said that he would submit the final text to his Government. Meanwhile he would like to revert to the last note of the Ankara Government. It raised the questions:

1. İzmir as a meeting-place.
  2. 20 October as the date.
  3. The participation of Russia, Georgia, and the Ukraine.
  4. It was very vague on the subject of the Straits.
  5. It was ambiguous about admission to the League of Nations.
  6. It raised the question of the evacuation of İstanbul.
- (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

It seemed to Lord Curzon unnecessary to reply on the last three points, but on the first three the Allies should come to an understanding. He reminded the meeting, however, that he had not yet had an opportunity of discussing the matter with his own Government. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

The freedom of the Straits was a most critical issue, but there were States interested in it that had no concern with the rest of the treaty. The freedom of the Straits might have to be discussed by all the interested parties, but the drawing up of a new Treaty of Peace should in any case be restricted to the Powers who had been, and in fact were, at war with Turkey. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Poincaré thanked Lord Curzon, and said he was glad to have this talk with a view to smoothing various susceptibilities. There were other difficult points, for instance, Bulgaria's economic access to the Aegean-all being agreed, of course, that there should be no territorial access. Such access was servitude on Greece, as the freedom of the Straits was servitude on Turkey. Poincaré agreed with what Lord Curzon had said on the latter point: the rest of treaty certainly did not concern the Powers not at war with Turkey. He suggested that the conference might examine the

questions relating to the conclusion of peace and reserve for another meeting the question of the Straits, after having obtained from Turkey in advance precise engagements to satisfy the Allies. He recalled that in 1856 when the Treaty of Paris had been signed, the Straits were the subject of a special convention. A new convention might be elaborated by all the Powers concerned; in any case, as regards de facto Governments, the rights of the countries that they represented should be reserved. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

As to the date, 20 October was too soon, but any long delay should be avoided: it was advisable to strike while the iron was hot. As to the place of meeting, he agreed with Lord Curzon that İzmir was impossible, but it would be difficult to get the Turks to consent to any conference outside their own territory. He suggested Prinkipo. In that case the presidency of the conference could be held in rotation. Anyhow, this was a detail which could easily be solved. It was just as well that peace should not be made under the auspices of any one Power. Fie and France, for instance, were not proud of the Treaty of Sevres. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Lord Curzon pointed out that Prinkipo would be highly inconvenient. The delegates would have to go to and from İstanbul daily in a rough sea, losing at least an hour morning and evening. Lord Hardinge suggested İstanbul or Scutari, which would be easy of access and much better accommodation. Poincaré preferred Scutari to İstanbul and Prinkipo to Scutari. He did not think the Turks would come to a conference under Allied cannon. Lord Curzon said that he must consult the Government. Signor Galli remarked that he had no instructions, but that Lord Curzon's views seemed to him reasonable, and he would transmit them to his Government. Lord Curzon suggested as a possible date the first week in November. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Signor Galli emphasised the necessity of choosing a spot of easy access. Signor Schanzer would have desired that the conference be held in Italy, but Signor Galli would communicate to him the suggestions advanced at this conference, and he did not doubt that his Government would take full account of it, and that Italy would renounce the honour of holding the conference on her soil. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Poincaré said that, in his views, the suggestion of Lord Curzon as to the separation of the conference into two parts was ingenious and valuable. Lord Curzon said there was another point. If Georgia claimed admission to the Straits Conference as a Black Sea State, Azerbaijan might claim also on account of the vital necessity to her of her oil exports. Poincaré suggested that the question of participation might be left for the moment and that as regards the date and place of the conference the High Commissioners should be authorised to tell the Turks that it should be held at Scutari as soon as possible after 1 November. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Lord Curzon said that he would discuss this with his Government and send Poincaré an answer by Lord Hardinge as soon as possible. The British Government would, of course, have to consider very carefully the manner in which the freedom of the Straits should be dealt with. Poincaré asked if the Government of Ankara could be told that the details of the freedom of the Straits would not be treated by the main

conference. In that case, participation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia would not immediately arise. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Lord Curzon repeated that he must consult his Government, and raised the further question of the status of the delegates who should represent their Governments. There had been a suggestion that the High Commissioners might act at the preliminary stages, and Poincaré had thought that the plenipotentiaries might attend either at the beginning or at the end, or both. The discussion might well be long one and, as far as Lord Curzon himself was concerned, he would find it exceedingly difficult to go to such a distance as İstanbul; indeed, his official and parliamentary duties would make it well-nigh impossible, and, of course, he could not be continually going back and forth. France would presumably be in same case. Poincaré might not be able to go himself and would wish to be represented by a Minister of some rank. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Poincaré replied that, from the constitutional point of view, there was no difficulty. Treaties were negotiated in the name of the President of the Republic, and the Government could name any representative-Minister, diplomatist or general. From the moment he was invested with the requisite authority he represented France. On Lord Curzon referring to the position of Barthou at Genoa, Poincaré added that Barthou was not a plenipotentiary. He had only a letter from Poincaré, but not full powers. It would be necessary for a plenipotentiary to be present at the Peace Conference. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Lord Curzon said that he also was not discussing any constitutional difficulty; he only wished to know what type of representatives the Allies should select. Were High Commissioners sufficient, or did the French contemplate sending a Minister? Poincaré replied that special representatives should, he thought, be sent, probably political personages accompanied by experts, who might even in certain questions function as plenipotentiaries. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

Lord Curzon said he understood Poincaré also to adhere to the view that the participants in the main conference should be confined to those decided upon at the time of the last meeting in Paris. Poincaré replied in the affirmative, but added that he would like to say that the Straits would form the subject of special deliberation. (TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44).

### **Conclusion**

The meeting between the Allied generals and İsmet Pasha started on 3 October in Mudanya. The purpose of the conference was to end the war between Turkey and Greece, to establish a ceasefire and to determine a line in Eastern Thrace from which the Greek army would withdraw. However, on the third day of the conference, that is, on October 5, was interrupted by the demand of the Turkish side that Eastern Thrace is left to Turkish sovereignty before the Peace Treaty came into force.

İsmet Pasha demanded that all of Eastern Thrace be handed over to the Ankara Government as soon as possible and that all allied officers, missions and troops should be withdrawn immediately. He also stated that if these demands were not accepted immediately, he would mobilize his troops. Until then, that is, until 5



October, the French General Charpy, who had been acting in concert with his Allies, suddenly announced that he had received instructions from his Government to accept the Turkish demands. Thereupon, the meeting broke up and the generals returned to Istanbul to receive instructions from their government. The British Government instructed General Harington not to return to Mudanya and not start negotiations until the issue was resolved.

On October 6, Lord Curzon immediately went to Paris to discuss the matter with French President Poincaré. Three separate meetings were held in Paris between 6/7 October 1922. The first meeting was held on 6 October at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lord Curzon, Poincaré and Galli, the Italian ambassador to Paris, attended the meeting. The meeting started at 23.00 and lasted until 03.00 in the morning.

Curzon was the first to speak. He summarized the developments after the 23 September 1922 note and talked about the Mudanya conference. He stated that if the French government accepts the Turks' request, all cooperation between the allies will be disrupted. He complained about the attitude of Franklin Bouillon in the armistice negotiations. And he talked about his new project, which is planned to be presented to the Ankara Government.

Poincaré, on the other hand, said that General Charpy did not take orders, only tolerating to avoid war. He added that France would not go to war with Turkey in any way. He defended Bouillon by listing his initiatives before the Ankara Government. He said that France did not want war, that if war broke out, Russia, an ally of Turkey, could join the war and that Greece agreed to the 1914 border. The Italian representative, Galli, also stated that his government would not oppose the Turks at all costs. There were fierce discussions and no agreement was reached. The meeting was adjourned until 9:00 am.

The second meeting began at 9:00 am on 7 October at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Poincaré gave the keynote address. He announced that General Charpy had agreed to a fifteen-day deadline for withdrawal. Curzon did not accept this deadline. And there was no agreement on this. However, the three allied governments had a common view that the Greek troops should withdraw to the west of the Maritza River as soon as possible. Places evacuated by Greek troops were to be temporarily controlled (about a month) by allied troops. The purpose of this was to allow the Turkish civil administration and the Turkish gendarme to settle in the region. However, the Allied forces would continue to occupy certain points and centres on the right arm of the Maritza River during the peace conference.

Lord Curzon, in this project; he objected, claiming that Çanakkale, Gallipoli, Izmit, Istanbul and Çatalca did not pass. And he wanted these places to be included in the project. Which Poincaré admitted. Later, the number of Turkish gendarmes to be transferred to Thrace came to the fore. It was agreed that the number was limited in this regard. However, after the evacuation of Eastern Thrace by the Greeks, no agreement could be reached on the delivery time to the Turks. Poincaré proposed that the Greek troops evacuate Eastern Thrace within fifteen days and that the Allies hand over the region to the Ankara Government within fifteen days after the expiry of this

period. Galli also approved this proposal. Curzon insisted that the period be at least one month. Thereupon, the talks were suspended until 14:00.

At the third and last meeting, which started at 14.00 on October 7, a consensus was reached on the issues discussed. However, at this meeting, when Poincaré insisted on 15 days, Curzon threatened to withdraw General Harington from the talks. Poincaré then had to step back. According to the final formula prepared; (a) The Greek army will withdraw to the west of the Maritza River as soon as possible, (b) The regions where the Greek army has withdrawn will be occupied by the allied forces for a period of one month after the withdrawal is completed, in order to ensure public security (i.e. minorities), (c) At the end of this period, the said regions would be handed over to the Turkish administration and the Turkish gendarmerie, whose numbers would be limited, (d) In return, Turkish troops would respect the neutral zone, that is, they would not enter.

Thus, at the end of the negotiations held in Paris on 6/7 October 1922, a compromise was reached between the parties to overcome the crisis. In particular, the constructive attitude of France and Italy was very effective in this regard. Immediately after the talks, Curzon departed for London. Poincaré presented the decisions taken to the council of ministers. It was agreed by a large majority that the necessary instructions be given to General Charpy. The Italian government took the same decision.

However, the British government accepted the decisions taken and put forward some conditions. Accordingly, the Turks would accept the neutral zone and immediately withdraw from the area; before the peace treaty, the number of gendarmes to be deployed to Eastern Thrace would be limited. This number would be too small to endanger the allied presence in the region and would be determined by the generals. The 15-day evacuation and 30-day delivery time agreed by the Allies would depend on ensuring the security of minorities in the region. If the Turks could not provide the necessary security for the minorities, the allies would not withdraw from the region.

As a result, at the end, on 6-7 October in Paris, the British, French, and Italian governments agreed that they had to insist upon respect for the neutral zones. At the meeting, Lord Curzon said that Mustafa Kemal was adopting a very menacing attitude in regard to the İzmit zone. Poincaré interrupted to contend that the Turks were entitled to continue their concentration during the Mudanya Conference, in as much as British reinforcements continued. Then Lord Curzon pointed out that the real contingency to be considered was that of Mustafa Kemal trying to cross the neutral zones. Poincaré declared that France would never make war. Lord Curzon answered that if Mustafa Kemal violated the İzmit zone, and if Great Britain were deserted by its Allies, the British government would withdraw from İzmit, and if necessary, from İstanbul, and would wash their hands of the matter. The French and Italian governments must bear the entire responsibility.

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