Statist Political Tradition of Turkey in Retrospective

Şenol DURGUN*

Bu makale Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesinde önemli bir yere sahip olan devletçi geleneği tartışmaya açmaktadır. Makalenin amacı; Türkiye'de demokratikleşme meselesini açıklayabilmek için, toplumda kutsal devlet anlayışını derinlemesine yerleştiren devletçi geleneği incelemek ve tarihsel bir bakış açısından bu geleneğin devamının nasıl sağlandığını ortaya koymaktır. Bu amaçla makale iki kısıma bölünmüştür. Birinci kısım Osmanlı devlet geleneğini tarihsel kaynakları, temel kurumları ve yeniden üretilme biçimleri açısından irdelemektedir. İkinci kısım ise, önceki kısımda çizilen çerçeve ışığında Cumhuriyet dönemi devletçi geleneğini devamlılık ve değişme bağlamında analiz etmektedir.

INTRODUCTION

A state structure and a state-society relationship equivalent to those in the modern developed countries have not yet be formed in Turkey, which has been aching for modernization approximately for a period more than two centuries. Considering the present situation, the state appears as a separate existence from the society, i.e. it stands in front of us as searching assurances for its very own existence against the society and finding itself in struggle with the social basis on which it stands. The maintenance of this situation, which is hardly seen in democratized countries, but in countries not fully democratized such as ours, can be explained by the fact of the incompetence of political actors. The countries with far little democratic experience than ours have overcome similar problems respectively in a shorter time and reached a context of democratization at a certain level. The statist structure and tradition positioning its existence in a powerful way and pending over the society like the sword of Democles did not come out or see its institutionalization with the Republic. Historically, its source lies in various empires have contact with for a long time or established by the Turks. According to the statist notion, the state includes the basis for legitimacy within itself. Therefore, there is no justifying principle other than the state itself, and the state is legitimate because it is the state. Its existence and effectiveness is the final canon impossible to be questioned. The state is the creator of all values as the essential precondition of any virtue. Its permanency is deemed as the most sacred of all duties, because the

* Yrd.Doç.Dr., Gazi Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi.

permanency of the state is the precondition of all moral behaviors. Thus, it is not subjected to the principles rendering these behaviors meaningful (Sancar, 1997: 48-49). Those which are relatively innocent among these methods founded on this belief are the limitation of human rights even in the "ordinary" periods with the excuse of "the protection of the public order, national security, public benefit and morality". It is repeatedly focussed on the claim that the articles in the constitution cannot be interpreted in a way of damaging statism. The statism here means an integrated political world in which any dynamic within the society is liable to the inspection and observation of the state; in which any social development is evaluated according to the rule that the state gets higher benefits and; in which no autonomous legitimacy of any other social formation out of the state is recognized. The political world authorized by the state may in appearance adopt the democratic institutions. Even the society may support these institutions with resolution. However, it cannot be assumed that they have legitimacy over everything, especially, over the private interests of state. The anxiety about the permanency of the state is deemed superior to any social or human inquietude (İnsel, 1990: 3). As the democratization policies and efforts fill a short period of time within the long history of Turks, a conversion according to the axis of modernity in a society with a long history may not be easily expected, due to this deeply rooted old notion. Assuming that the state is structured within the modern criteria, it is rather difficult to argue that the state would promptly approach the society accordingly and change its mode of relations with it. It is this very important problem that the society continuously has to face. However, it should be stressed that the statist notion keeps its influence among not only the state officers or employers, but the people. This notion, founding the determining target of the political action and its legitimacy not on the society, but the state, considers the state as a target and a moral power on its own. In such a case, it becomes impossible to have doubts about the wisdom of the state. In an environment where all social behaviors capable of forming a democratic functioning, the guardianship of the state for all is preferred. The statist tradition seeks for an absolute hegemony over the society as it refuses the legitimacy of any conflict or differentiation unauthorized by the state. It perceives the society only from an abstract point of nationality and can only imagine socialization under its own supervision. Accordingly, an important driving force of the problem comes from the attempts of those who have the state power, but face today that they are not any longer able to survive in the same fashion for silencing any endeavor aiming at the transformation of politics. The notion of "sacred state" preserves its strong existence in spite of modernization efforts going on for over two centuries.

INHERITANCE FROM THE PRE-OTTOMAN PERIOD

The roots of the statist notion are as old as the appearance of Turks in the world politics, going back far beyond the ages. Some elements of this tradition have reached our time from the ancient Asian states. Their transmission from the Central Asia especially into the Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey owed mostly to the Anatolian Seljuks. The Ottoman passed the inheritance onto the new state since the constituting agents of the Republic were former Ottoman statesmen. More or less, the same statist tradition was an integral component of their political viewpoint.

Three main roots supporting the statist tradition inherited by the Ottomans from the Anatolian Seljuks can be identified. They significantly distinguish the Ottoman Empire from the empires of the Western World, such as the Roman Empire, in many ways, e.g., especially in terms of concepts of hegemony and politics, of state structure, social structure, and their institutions and their features. These are: (a) the ancient Turkish political tradition; (b) the political tradition of classical Islam and; (c) the political tradition of the Byzantium Empire.

This order also represents the cultural spheres where Turks came into contact in accordance with the geographical areas they moved into. Indeed, Turks as the establishing element of the Ottoman state traveled throughout the history from their homeland the Central Asia to the Middle East, to the Islamic lands bearing the inheritance of the ancient empires after the adaptation of Islam, and finally conquered Anatolia. They had relations with the Byzantium Empire and eventually became its inheritor. During all this historical adventure, it was completely natural to become the inheritor of already existing states or political traditions and concepts. Besides, it was inevitable for the practice. For it was necessary for the state to dominate and make the people already living in the conquered land familiar with the new governing power without totally separating them from their practiced way of living, and therefore to justify their power. This was a common manner of all Turkish states in history. The oldest among all these political traditions and hegemony concepts was doubtlessly the concepts of Turks themselves (Ocak 1998: 74). The concepts of state and hegemony come from the oldest periods before Turks accepted Islam as their religion. However, this very tradition clearly included the influences of neighboring political cultures, including India, China and Iran, as far as they melted these in their own experience. The ancient Turkish political tradition composes of three main typical points. They are: (a) hegemony and power in the ancient Turkish political tradition are based upon a divine origin; (b) this hegemony is directed to a universal target and; (c) it is based on a custom (örf) constituting of old traditions coming from and processing through the history, which is called rule (töre).

186 The researches based on historical proofs show that having a divinely rooted Sovereign (*Hakan*) was not a characteristic special to a certain Turkish clan or state in a certain time or place. It was not only *Hakan* as a person who had a divine origin, such as in the Roman context, but also the rank represented by *Hakan* was divine, therefore, sacred. This explains why the state was also perceived as sacred. This concept was nearly similarly existed in the old Chinese concept of hegemony (Ocak 1998: 75). The same concept of Turks also significantly appeared in the Ottoman practice, but it was melted with Islamic terminology.

The very natural result of this divine concept of hegemony was the notion of "world hegemony" (*cihan hakimiyeti*). This claim existed in nearly all Turkish states that left important traces in the history. It was symbolized in the Ottoman state as the ideal of "Scarlet Apple" (*Kızıl Elma*).

In the ancient Turkish political tradition, the legitimate authority for setting rule (*töre*) of *Hakan* comes from his divine origin. Because, the divine authority is granted to the great emperors retaining divine support, i.e., to those bearing the name *Hakan*. The emperors without this title could not establish rules. The rule in the Turkish tradition could not be thought separately from the notion of "hegemony granted by God". Therefore, a *Hakan*, especially the founder of a state, should definitely establish a *töre* in order to affirm his status (İnalcık, 2000: 21). The existing traditions and beliefs get vitalized only via the rules set by *Hakan*. This tradition continued in the states founded by the Turks, including the Ottoman Empire (Hassan, 2001: 179). It is said that nobody could be a *Hakan* unless God commands and the state exists. If he could, it is possible to make him step-down. This shows that *Hakan* has a sacred characteristic, i.e., a charismatic aspect, but not a extraordinary or godly identity (Türkdoğan, 1996: 188). This rule setting would later become one of the significant basis of the traditional law (*örfi hukuk*) in the Ottoman Empire. The notion of hegemony based on a divine origin was described by Mehmet the Conqueror as "one person, one emperor in the world", and constituted the state policy. In our opinion, here is the place where the roots of statist character, pressing even the Islamic elements, should be looked for (Ocak, 1998: 76).

Secondly, the Ottomans inherited the political tradition of classical Islam. The term "Islamic" in this tradition distinguishing the Ottomans from its counterparts is neither related to the theoretical aspect of Islam as religion nor to the political applications of the Prophet and the Four Caliphs. This term rather refers to the Islamic political theory formed in the classical age of Islamic history by the adaptation of the political traditions existing within the domination spheres of states of Umayyad and Abbasid and; also to the tradition developed in a parallel manner. In the Islamic political tradition, it is easy to trace the effects of the Eastern Roman, Sassani, and even ancient Indian political concepts. Although the core material of this synthesis is Islam itself, this is a highly different concept from the Islamic political perception formed in the period of the Prophet.

The political tradition of classical Islam constitutes of a rich classical literature brought into existence in a very large geography within the domain of Islam in different times. The literature receives attention by stressing mind, reason and knowledge, which are the characteristics of Indian-Iranian political tradition, instead of generosity and *töre*, the very elements of the ancient Turkish political tradition. **187** The basic philosophy of the political tradition of classical Islam is based upon the ancient concept of politics originated from India in accordance with the Islamic concept of justice. This appears in the Ottoman political thought as the "Cycle of Justice" (*Daire-i Adliye*)[1]. Its principles determine the codes of relations between the society and the state. However, the state superior and great, meeting the needs of various groups in the society was important for the interests of the state. The state, in every opportunity, in each declaration and via numerous symbolic implementations would expand the ideals included in the Cycle of Justice as the guarantees for protecting its subject. The general belief was that justice was the main factor balancing absolute authority (Barkey, 1999: 29). In a lifetime exceeding six hundred years, it could not be possible for a state to preserve the same model of structure. However, acting fairly towards the subject people with disregard of their race or religion had always been the dominant instinct. Its resource was the Muslim Arabic political (classical Islamic) tradition consisting of the ancient Turkish, Indian-Iranian and ancient Greek (Byzantium) political thoughts, which were kept together under the umbrella of Islam (Göyünç, 1999: 92). The Ottomans became the inheritors of this tradition mostly due to the Anatolian Seljuks. Their "just" approach to the subject people as long as they fully obeyed the central power and paid their taxes and; respectively the fair tax system need to be evaluated in this framework (Ocak, 1998: 77).

Lastly, the Ottomans had also been impressed by the Byzantium political tradition and the people of Byzantium, with which they were in relation in both war and peace during the foundation period. It is possible to take the starting point of this relation as back as when the Ottomans were only a small border principality. However, the significant effects of Byzantium on the Ottomans doubtlessly came out after Mehmet II conquered Istanbul. The effects can be traced in *tımar* policy, the Palace organization, and most importantly in the concepts of power and hegemony. It is necessary to stress that Byzantium had its crucial imprint in the subjection of the *ulema* through the central bureaucracy and thus in taking the religion under the control of the state. It is impossible to disregard the role of the concept of Byzantium *imperium* (indivisible absolute authority) in the formation of classical type of the "Ottoman Sultan" (Ocak 1998: 78).

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(1) The context of the Cycle of Justice can be summarized as that: "the world needs justice to survive; justice is provided by the state; the state needs an Emperor; the Emperor cannot act without an army; the army needs treasure; the treasure is provided by the subject and; the subject prospers only with the guidance of a just Emperor" (Ocak, 1998: 77). For the same matter, see also İnalcık, (1990: 31).

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FOUNDING COMPONENTS OF THE OTTOMAN STATISM AND
THE REFLECTION OF POLITICAL TRADITIONS

The Ottoman statism, that was later to constitute largely the statist perception of the Republic, attached a great importance to those three components complying with and indicating its position. They were: (1) the State (*Devlet-i Aliyye*); (2) the Social Order (*Nizam-ı Alem*) and; (3) the Political Power (*Saltanat-ı Seniyye*). They were the indispensable basic properties of the political system, supported the concept of sacred state and made it widely being accepted.

1. The State (*Devlet-i Aliyye*)

Beside the state, its representative (*Sultan*) was attached divinity due to the equivalence of state-religion or Sultanate-Islam in the Ottoman Empire. The unity of the state and religion, i.e. Islam obtaining an institutional structure as an instrument of politics, was adopted by the Ottomans in the fourteenth century by fusing it with the old Turkish political concept. This institutionalization after the Ottoman Empire obtained a complete central structure found its real place officially in the formulation of "the religion of the state" (*din-ü devlet*) and "the property of the nation" (*mülk-ü millet*). The inclusion of *ᵉeyhülislam* as the head of *ulema* class and of the fetwa institution within the central bureaucracy in the classical period eventually made the *ulema* a part of the state. Therefore, the *ulema* could not constitute a separate authority neither religiously nor scholarly from the central power. Therefore, the Ottoman state was able to prevent the religion from becoming an edge of opposition both by transforming Islam into the pioneering force of its official ideology and controlling it by the dependant *ulema* (Alkan, 1999: 133). It should be remembered that the term *mülk* did not mean the lands or wealth of the state, but sovereignty, authority, hegemony, and the right to rule and to power. This unity provided the ruler with a divinity, which had already had its root in the pre-Islamic period. However, this is not to say that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state. In the final analysis, the state ideology constructing its *reason d'être* with an Islamic language would focus upon the function attributed to the state.

The Ottoman state also related its sacredness to some worldly realities. For example, the plenteousness of wealth and soldiers, collecting fair taxes, governing the subject with fair laws and most importantly maintaining the reign of Islam. They necessitated the existence of the state and enforced its sacredness. Therefore, it was assumed that "the supreme Ottoman State" (*Devlet-i Aliyye*)[2] qualified by the virtues listed above and endorsed by divine will would be immortal. Accordingly, the concept of state, eternity and continuance (*devlet, ebed and müddet*) arose from here (Ocak, 1998: 83). This is why the Ottoman elite did not hesitate to name their

(2) For the discussions about the Ottoman state naming itself, see Neuman, Christopher K.; "Devletin Adı Yok- Bir Amblemin Okunması", Cogito- Osmanlılar Özel Sayısı, Sayı: 12, Yaz 1999.

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system as "the supreme state, eternity and continuance" (*Devlet-i Aliyye-i ebed-müddet*). For they believed that their system basing upon this framework and evolving through centuries included in itself the mechanisms that prevented the economy from both expansion and recession or dispersion (Genç, 2000: 95-86). Though the Ottomans were not able to stay eternal, it is easy to grasp the substantial weight of belief in being eternal only if they obeyed the social order (*nizam-ı alem*). The persistent use of the term "state, eternity and continuance" by the Ottomans is the indicator of this strong belief. It was highly strong that even the Republic born in the changing atmosphere of modern world could not escape it and assumed that it would be eternal (*ilelebet payidar*). Being eternal also means preserving its relative power forever. Otherwise it is not possible to be so under the continuos damage of enemies and time. Therefore it seems natural to define "state-eternity-continuance" with not only contemporary terms but also a terminology symbolizing a time resistant power. Accordingly, the Ottoman state anxiously avoided from attaching a worldly name to itself and chose to be identified as *Devlet-i Aliyye*. The attributed superiority had linked the Ottoman order to the divine order. The secret of eternity was sought in a worldly power originated from a divine source (Mahçupyan, 2000: 175).

2. Social Order (*Nizam-ı Alem*)

The concept of state, eternity and continuance gave birth to another concept that greatly determined the place of state in the Ottoman statist notion and constituted the source of justification. This was the social order (*nizam-ı alem*), by which the eternity of state would only be possible. Therefore, the essential function of the Ottoman State was to maintain the social order, i.e. governing the subject people fairly and keep them in harmony with each other. This was the paramount concern. Accordingly, disturbing the social order was identified as the greatest crime. This is why the Ottoman Empire promptly intervened in cases when the social order had been disturbed or was about to be upset. The state violently suppressed any attempt by any person or group, for any reason, that could compete with, disturb or ruin the central authority. The Ottoman central power acted so in order to protect and secure its own existence. The infamous rule for the execution of fellow princes (*kardeº katli*) according to the Laws of Mehmet II (*kanunname*) should be interpreted within this framework of social order. Mehmet II shortly after his accession to the throne had his younger brother Ahmed executed just as his ancestors had had. It is remarkable that he included this old procedure in his laws and had the religiously support of *ulema* in the name of protecting Muslim people from anarchy (İnalcık, 2000: 35). The execution of brothers for political reasons was justified from the point of becoming a world state (Ayan, 1999; 174). This indicates the destroying superiority and ruthlessness of the state, revealing itself in even murdering the royal

members in order to protect the state and social order when considered necessary, and the noncompetitive nature of the state in the Ottoman state ideology. This is why, the state opted for the terms the supreme state[3] or the Ottoman supreme state (*Devlet-i Aliyye* or *Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye*). This meant supreme forever and eternal (Ocak 1998: 84).

The superiority of the state was constructed against not only the members of royal family, but also the religion and human rights. Although the official ideology of the Ottoman state was based on belief displayed in each stage of its long history, the state itself was a subject of belief as much as religion and therefore sacred. This fact arose from the strong integration of the state with religion. No other state in the Islamic world had gone that far, including the Abbasid. Expressed schematically, the sphere of state was not separate from that of religion, but one in which the former completely encompassed the latter. In other words, the official Ottoman ideology meant a concept in which the state and the religion, or politics and Islam indispensably integrated with each other. The Ottoman official ideology found its basis in this association. Thus, it is possible to formulate this fact as "everything was for the state, so was the religion" (Ocak, 1998: 73). The Ottoman state did not give a role to Islam of integrating various ethnic and religious groups within its body, despite of its prevalent Islamic identity. Contrarily, this role was put upon "recognizing and obeying the Ottoman hegemony by paying taxes". Protecting and assuring the differences between different ethnic and religious groups (*millets*) was a central function of the state. However, the state adopted an attitude of not arranging the relations between different *millets*, but controlling them. Therefore, it was able to present itself as the representative of not only the Muslim *millet*, but all ethnic and religious groups, and above all, as the crossroad point. The meaning of the prototype Ottoman identity lies here. As a result of this perception, the state named itself as not the state of Islam (*Devlet-i İslamiyye*), but the supreme Ottoman state (*Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniyye*). This term is the one used in the diplomatic documents. This is, Islam was not positioned out of the state or dominated it, rather it was under the strict control of the state and made dependent upon it. Islam did not have self-reliant material tools to utilize its spiritual power in this system. The institution of Caliphate did not change this situation, yet it even gave more sacred nature to the authority of *Sultan* (Ocak, 1998: 95, 105). The Ottoman state was not only the owner of land, but also everyone and everything living on it, with some exceptions. Beyond some limits recognized by the state, there was no guarantee for owning property or fortune. The state had the right to confiscate movable or immovable goods believed to be excessive or earned by "deceitful" ways, no matter

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(3) The Ottoman used this name until the nineteenth century. Accordingly, the terms Devlet-i Aliyye or "state, eternity, and continuance" had often been appeared in the official documents. Yet, upon the dispersion in the Balkans after the uprising of both Serbs and Greeks, the term Ottoman gained importance in order to indicate the compassing nature of the state and to gather different ethnic groups around the royal family. The terms Ottoman and the Ottoman state (Devlet-i Osmaniyye) took place and defined for the first time in the article 8 of Act of 1876 (Kanun-i Esasi) (Göyünç, 1999: 88).

who was the owner. The state tried hard to keep a strict control over land, labour and capital until the Reformation period (*Tanzimat*). This was a central intention of the state (Genç, 2000: 87). In other words, economic activities were commanded by political concerns. It strictly inspected economic activities; created, controlled and manipulated cities and; limited the organized commercial and political activities[4] when considered necessary for the benefit of the state (Barkey, 1999: 43). Thus, social order for the Ottomans meant both an absolute reference point and an agenda for action. Change could be supported only if it would result in strengthening the existing order. Otherwise, any change was to be categorically wrong and harmful. It was doubtless that any social activity to disturb the receptive balance would expect to be intervened and violently suppressed by the state. This is, the concept of social order had a function of justifying the implementations of the state before the society (Mahçupyan, 2000: 174). Briefly, the politics (*siyaset-i sultani*) and restrictions of Sultan (*yasağ-i padişahi*) were the indicators of power, that was to arrange the apparent world (*alem-i zahir*) commanding its orders and that encompassed those which had been visual, known and performed (Hassan, 2001: 171).

3. Political Power (*Saltanat-ı Seniyye*)

Sultan in the Ottoman official ideology was the highest authority who in his personality represented the unity of religion and state. He occupied the highest rank as the head of political authority and of the institutionalized religion via *°eyhülislam* and; as the representative of Islam and Muslims with his Caliph-*Sultan* quality. Despite of all of his religious identities, he mostly stood for a worldly authority donated with traditional (*örfi*) authorization (Ocak, 1998: 85). As a result, *Sultans* always preserved their features recognizing no any other higher authority sharing power. Turkish emperors constructed the authority of state above all (İnalcık, 2000: 29). Thus, the Ottoman politics had always strictly stuck to this traditional consideration of maintaining everyone where they stood in the advantage of social peace and order. For this purpose, *Sultans* as the first thing realized the establishment of absolutism. They accomplished this by removing any piece of aristocracy in the conquered lands; by assigning only the palace-educated men to administrative positions and; by employing the *ulema* in their service. The values *Sultan* had to protect were security and social order based upon justice. That constituted the Ottoman notion of government (İnalcık, 1990: 31).

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(4) The most notable feature of the Ottoman society was the lack of "civil society" in Western terms. The state integrated various professional, religious or ethnic groups into its central administration by undermining mediator structures providing society with autonomy. The lack of private property was one of the most important aspect of this relationship. Intermediate structures similar to "united structures with autonomous sphere" "constituted the institutional basis for civil society in the West". Civil society can be reached by owning groups which both compass and limit the state. Though, civil society managed to develop the in West, the Ottoman Empire never experienced that. One of the most important progresses generating from this institutional basis in Europe was the appearance of relatively strong and autonomous cities contributing to the development of the West. The actors in the Ottoman story were different (Barkey, 1999: 42-43).

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Since Mehmet II, the Ottoman *Sultans* accumulated three qualities in their personality: (a) being a *Hakan* as a heir to Oğuz Khan; (b) being a Muslim emperor as the *sultan* of classical Islam and eventually; (c) being an emperor of East Rome, by having the title of the conqueror of Istanbul, according with the Byzantium tradition. This is, the three political traditions represented in the Sultanate provided it with the needed justification (Ocak, 1998: 85; Hassan, 2001:164). Embodying the Islamic tradition and that of the ancient Turkish politics in the Ottoman Empire meant having a combatant power directed to worldly domination (*kelimetullah*), constructing all military, economic and political substructures in accordance with this dominant ideology and legitimating and making that permanent by the legal, upper structure. Islam, to an extent, went together hand in hand with *örfi* rules, but it also took into consideration the religious aspect of cultural tradition away from Islam. The concept of one-headed state of the Ottoman, which directly affected administrative implementations in e.g., preventing internal rebellions or providing the continuity of state, was not only valid then for the whole world, but was also a reflection of the Asiatic concept of state (Ayan, 1999: 174). The Ottoman *Sultans* used some titles indicating this structure. They especially wished to be legitimately recognized by all Turkish components in Anatolia by the use of titles *Khan* and *Hakan*. In decrees, on epitaphs or coins, the titles *Khan* and *Hakan* were often employed together along with the title *Sultan,* as the *Sultan ül Bereyn* and *Hakanü'l Bahreyn* (the Sultan of two lands, Anatolia and Rumelia and the sovereign of two seas, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea) (Hassan, 2001: 167). These titles used in various periods also explain the concepts of state and sovereignty and indicate the developmental periods of the state. The titles *khan, sultan* and emperor reflect the aforementioned traditions (the ancient Turkish, Islamic and Byzantium). Surely, new ones were added onto the list as the country and power of emperor had broadened, or their more sophisticated and original expressions were started to be used (İnalcık, 2000: 34).

The titles *Sultan, Khan* and *Hakan,* were ones binding the Ottoman *Sultans* to the classical tradition of Islam and legitimating them within this tradition. They were all especially used in correspondence (*name-i hümayun*s) with Muslim emperors and appeared on coins and epitaphs. The title emperor was usually used for few of the Ottoman *Sultans* not by themselves but by Greek and Western historians (Ocak 1998: 86). Although, the word passed onto the Ottomans via the Western world, historically it belonged to a common inheritance and had a claim of being universal. Since the first identified empire was the Roman Empire, it has discussed that the Ottoman Empire sustained a Roman ideology as it contained some Byzantium/Greek traditions and institutions (Ayan, 1999: 175). Yet, it was not a Western society, especially in its imperial age. The Ottoman Empire, just like Russia, was the inheritor of Byzantium and had the *Sultans* such as Mehmet II and

Süleyman the Magnificent, who consciously initiated the notion of being empire (Neuman, 1999: 275).

The Islamic nature of the reign gained another basis by shifting of the Caliphate to the Ottomans in the first quarter of sixteenth century. Starting with Yavuz Selim, the Ottoman *Sultans* were to be called as *Hadımü'l-Haremeyni'ş-Şerifeyn*. This reinforced their place within the Islamic world along with being considered as the protector of Islam and the heirs to the Caliphate. *Sultan,* as being Caliph too, was the final authority in deciding the place of religion in worldly matters. Although the right to be caliph for the Ottoman *sultans* was disputable in terms of religion, being so was especially important in preventing the rise of another caliph or religious authority in the Ottoman dominated lands (İnsel, 1990: 34). As a result, the Ottoman *sultans* obtained much more sacredness and respectable position as being Caliph-*Sultan* and more responsibility before the Islamic law. The *sultan* now being the protector of Islam became the shelter of the world *(padişah-ı alem-penah)*. Thus, he was the master of social order in the Islamic world and that of Pax Ottomanica in the Western Christian world (İnalcık, 1999: 35). The unity of religion favoring the state and a notion of state supported by the religion created a harmony that had no equivalent in the West. This harmony meant both a world of consistency and peace yearned for, and a still and resistant mental state. As the religion was eternal and unchanging, so was the state. Since attempts for changing the religion meant to disobey the rules of God, the same was also valid for changing the qualities of the state. This referred to the sacredness of the state. The sacred state integrated and unified the statist ideology within its body. In other words, having provided legitimacy from the religion, the state identified itself and its relations in terms of its own interests. The state itself was the realizator, inspector, bearer and protector of social harmony. The functioning of the state as an entity, free of human weaknesses, donated it with qualities of competence and eternity assuring social order. Each period of the Ottoman history was dominated by a belief that there would always be a benefit in the implementations of state; that its doings could never be completely understood by mortals and; so that questioning the state would be meaningless. Besides maintaining social order, the state was also a part of it. This is why, the state became "an eternal existence" as long as it was purified from human faults. This kind of properties brought the state closer to divine might and gave it sacredness. It was a logical necessity for an eternal state, which know what was good and bad for society, to concentrate authority in a center and to form an indispensable power structure. Furthermore, common attitudes in the society contributed to this model and created a concept of state that is the most excellent and hardly reachable thing making everything around dependant upon its mercy. In conclusion, the society related its continuity and order to those of the state, and believed that its life was a grant and attribution by *sultan*, thus, by the state.

EFFORTS FOR CHANGE IN THE STATIST STRUCTURE AND THE REPUBLICAN STATISM

By the sixteenth century, the classical Ottoman functioning had to realize some changes, however, occurring problems had many times been overcome in the meantime and the state had to discover new means to command the society for its own benefit. This meant being in crisis for the state. Especially, the seventeenth century exposed the significant effects of the crisis. Despite some threats to the central authority experienced in this period, the state neither totally lost its monopoly, nor they caused a shift in terms of replacing the royal family. New methods of ruling and merging with the center were put into action. The state was obliged to adjust its various institutions to new conditions, though it never lost its grip over the society. The state, whose internal and external existence became dependent on new conditions, had to face serious changes. Yet, the state officers were more interested in daily problems than in a general shift in governing principle, centralization or inspection policies. They took the most convenient decision in terms of dominating and controlling the center and rural places under the pressure of both external and internal circumstances. The greater targets related to the state formation had not generally experienced much change. What was unstable was the endeavors, changing from period to period and from region to region, for realizing them. The state followed policies offering temporary solutions and dealing with the crisis (Barkey, 1999: 59, 61).

Since the Ottomans had faced several defeats in wars with the European powers, the statesmen (not the society) developed interest in Europe. Yet, there is discussion on when such interest first took place. Going beyond Ahmet III, its initial concrete result was in the military with Selim III. Under the influence of renewal dynamic of the West, it was clear that change was inevitable. It was not easy for a state strongly believing in the existence of a solid harmony and claiming to have based its social structure upon it to accept such shift. Thus, a new context was added to the framework of political traditions aforementioned. This new period was called Europenization, whose effect is still a significant subject of discussion. Starting with the military, it was expanded to social, political, and administrative spheres. What is to be underlined here is that these efforts were initiated by not the society, but the state. There was a problem, yet, it was not such kind that the society could comprehend, realize or solve. The prominent position and power of the state, despite all, required that steps for catching up with the world had to be taken by the state. Thus, it put first itself then the society into a process of change through *de facto* undertakings called "reforms" (Mahçupyan, 2000: 188). It is important to keep in mind that these reforms did not base upon an "aristocratic" or "bourgeois" structure as the inherited traditions or statism never let to such a formation. That is why the Ottoman reformism was bureaucratic, as was that of the Republic (Akyol, 1999:

213). That was a consequence of classical political tradition. This is because of this tradition the expression "father state" in public slang was used and the role of child to people (the children of country) was attributed (Tachau, 1999: 90). They are still in usage. This naming also reflects a governing philosophy. In other words, both a competent concept of authority under the leadership of *sultan*, and the perception of **195** state as a protector correspond to the expectations of society for receiving material help from the state. That is why " the elder's business is not got into", "the elder know better what to do" and "their wisdom is not questioned".

Accordingly, in the last periods of the Ottomans, the discussions about change and policies geared for the state to recover its power took place at the level of state. For the parties engaged in change, their objective was to find contributors or support not in the society, but in the state. The basic struggle of those categorized simply as "Westernists" and "Traditionalists" was to take control of the bureaucracy. This also meant gaining the control of the state. Therefore, the issues about change, society and state were all invested within the state.

As harmony in the Ottoman system meant basically the adaptation of oneself to the requirements of the state, no change was permitted without the approval of state. The only way of justifying any change was that it must be performed by the state. Change was always considered as a fact starting within the state and then expanding across the society. Change first caused conflicts within the state and then between the state and the groups having lost their old position. The state, once perceived as a power providing harmony, gradually became an existence disturbing it. However, the sacralization of state as a unique value independent of people produced a kind of opposition directed against the existing owners of state, while preserving statism. Changes in the Ottoman period were mostly matters of insignificance, despite of causing some differences in the statist structure. The fact that reforms could not immediately put into action was related to the competition of two rival groups, the "Westernist" and the "Traditionalist" within the state structure. As a result, the Ottoman modernization was identified as being a slow one by the Westernists. Yet, as they dominated the state power by the Independence War, modernization activities gained a much more radical movement. Although, the Republican period presented some laws and institutions as novel, most of them were inherited from the Ottomans. For example, constitutional activities, the foundation of a parliament, political parties, etc. entered into the Turkish political life before the Republic.

The Republican state, however, presents itself officially as a "new state" and claims that it is "very different from the past", it has, in fact, no significant difference in terms of statist structure and perception. Just like in Ottomans, two of the founding factors of the statist structure (state and social order) have continued to preserve their importance and influence in the new era. The essential difference between the Ottomans and the Republic in terms of statist quality showed itself in the filling of gap generated by the termination of *Sultanate*. With the Republic, it

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was the civil bureaucracy until the 1960s and, since then has been the military bureaucracy that filled the gap. The military bureaucracy has stepped forward through the National Security Council (NSC) founded just after 1960 and pending over politics like the sword of Democles. Besides, we have here again a top-down approach in the state and society relations. Many observers and historians have discussed that the Republic of Turkey represents a political continuity with the Ottomans despite of having a cultural cut off. This is to say that the Republican state adopted the view and the mentality concerning the society from the Ottoman state. The state has created a different ideological myth from the past, but that did not result in producing a mental shift in politics. What can be said for the relatively short history of the Republic is that the state-society relations and generally the political tradition have not followed a parallel path with the cultural breakage, but has continuity with the past. Even, contrarily to all claims, it can be concluded that the state still tries to protect its own legitimacy before the society, since the modern state, despite of all changes, has attached itself to social order as firmly as the Ottoman state. Consequently, not only new bases have been produced to prove the absoluteness and accuracy of the new order, but also it has been asserted that the Republic would last forever. So that, social requests having an aim in modifying the existing system could be declared illegal by the statist forces However, it may be thought that the state has been cleared off from its religious bound, it is still considered as sacred and great.[5] It is fetishized through turning it into a totem (Mahçupyan, 2000: 236). The Ottoman ideology with its elements about the continuity of the unity and the wholeness of the state and religion (*Din ü devlet),* the indivisibility of state power, the supply of peace and security within the borders (*nizam-ı alem*), displays a content adopted eagerly by not only the Republican state, but also any structure claiming to become a state. Moreover, although, the Republic has overturned the *Sultanate* and the Caliphate, it replaced the institution of *ᵃeyhülislam* with the Directorate of Religious Affairs and put it under the state control. This represented a choice in accordance with the favour of the Reformation bureaucrats (Alkan, 1999: 134). Kemalists, who stuck firmly to the bureaucracy in order to preserve their unity, progressed in the way to Westernization due to policies formed in the center and realized by bureaucrats. The leaders believed in the accuracy of their choices and did not wish the reluctant masses to ruin them. Their attitudes were closely similar to those of the Ottoman administration (Turan, 1999:

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(5) Here some examples from some political elite: "State is a magnificent institution. When the subject is state, one should not talk "recklessly". No matter what is the subject, go for it without hesitation, but do not peck the state (Süleyman Demirel, the ninth President of the Republic); Some groups criticize prolonged traditions of the state by even weakening the state" (the former Education Minister, Mehmet Sağlam), "The state is so enormous that it cannot get smaller. As there is no evidence, I cannot blame the state. The State is great, supreme and divine. I can never blame the state. If it is proven, one can talk about the responsibility of individuals; but the state cannot be guilty (Yekta Güngör Özden, the former President of the Constitutional Court); the former Home Minister, Mehmet Ağar, mentioned once that, relating to its role in the "Susurluk Affair", he did his duty "within the framework determined by the state". For more detailed information see Sancar (2000: 63-64). As seen above, the rule of law gets only the second place for high-ranked personalities owing to their statist mentality.

135). The Ottomans used the religion to justify their political activities. Islam was something, maybe the only thing, shared between the state and the society. The society in theory could resist to an official considered to be "wrong and unjust" with reference to Islam and have him step down. Therefore, Islam did not only draw the frame of the relations among social actors, but it also created a space for freedom in **197** terms of state-society relationship (Mahçupyan, 1986: 285). In the Republic, however, secularism has tried to replace the place of religion, constituting the new source for legitimacy. Surely, this attitude has weakened the justifying aspect of the state-society relationship. The former unity of the religion and the state has left its place to a different coalition. Yet, this has not changed much of its nature in terms of being feed by the state ideology, i.e. of being insensitive to social requests. Statism, besieged by the religion in the Ottoman world, has created its own rationality in the Republic and contributed to the state independent of and above the society. On the one hand, the state monopolized political power in a limited institutional frame and ideologically determined the "legitimate" cultural identity from the top. On the other hand, it expanded political power into the economic field, directed the social surplus into the center, and therefore, created an informal mechanism of distributing it. As social actors became dependent upon this mechanism and even opposing parts aimed to benefit from it, the state both ideologically and politically strengthened its position. This resulted in a history of a society being continuously subjected to taming by the state. Its method has been control and suppression. The modern Turkey has experienced this by passing from a communal structure, *Sultanate,* to a strict statism and passive citizenship. Around the new order defined as "modern and contemporary" it has been stuck to another stagnant model (Mahçupyan, 2000: 208-209).

When changes brought about by laws did not offer visual benefits for masses in a short period of time, the policies implemented were subjects to opposition. Instead of reevaluating them, bureaucrats preferred to apply the use of force. To them, large masses of peasants were ignorant, backward, uncivilized and reactionary and, thus, they could not be let to take a part in the process of political decision-making (Turan, 1999: 153). Those who agreed with the state were considered progressive and received benefits, though reactionaries who were thought to be harmful to social progress were pressurized. The Republic, just like its predecessor, dealt with modernization from a "bureaucratic" point of view by putting "its own priorities" first and leaving the society behind. It acted normatively, i.e., in a political-value-laden way, and wished to shape the society according to its preferred way of life. Those who opposed the official view of state were called "perverted (*zındık*), unbeliever (*mülhid*) and evil (*kötü*)" in the Ottomans and; "reactionary (*mürteci*), backward (*geri*) and having foreign connections (*kökü dışarda*)" in the Republic in order to be blamed. The behaviours of social actors out of the official ideology are evaluated in terms of having "malice" intentions. That is why this deep distrust

towards social movements and dynamics has created a suspicious temper, even paranoia within the state. Some real internal and external threats have fed this paranoia to a considerable extent (Akyol, 1999: 236). The result has been the strengthening of authoritative features of the state.

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Kemalism, affected by authoritative reasoning, positions the state out of and above the society and believes that it is legitimate to shape the society in accordance with the state discretion. In the essence of this legitimacy lies the fact that the state as just being a state knows what is good and right not just for the society of today or of this place, but for all. The state is qualified with having the monopoly of truth. Thus, Kemalism reduces the society to the nation, the nation to the state and, therefore, clarifies the way for imposing a strict and coercive policy upon the society. The means of this policy are clearing the public field from unproved social claims and associating it with the state. The ideal world of Kemalism is based on an image of totally homogenized society "progressing" according to the "rational and scientific" preferences of the state, obeying to the hierarchy of the state and living in harmony away from any conflict or discrimination (Mahçupyan, 2000: 247). That is why statism had an authoritative and totalitarian attitude at the beginning of the Republic. This authoritative character, unified under the one-party regime, showed a tendency desiring to be involved in each field of the society, from culture to arts, from politics to economy. That was also seen necessary. The reason for it was the fear that the existence of an autonomous field could interrupt the project in the action. In this respect, just as in the Ottomans, it is wished that all fields should be under the control of the state, or any change or force arising in the society should be in close contact with it. Otherwise, they would be evaluated as immediate and uncontrolled "events" and subjected to a convenient "procedure".

It is possible to recognize this attitude of the Ottomans in the Republic with some alterations. Considering the appearance of political differentiation, it is not surprising that it was first a result of inter elite conflict, rather than of some progresses in the society, e.g., the conflict between İnönü and Bayar. This differentiation, later to be called as left-right conflict, in fact, would cause an inaccurate differentiation according to the modern literature of politics, in respect of that in the West. However, this was a state-approved differentiation. With regard to what all these mean for Turkey, we come across quite a pessimistic picture. In a country where politics is framed on the basis of friend-foe discrimination and where talking about politics requires a indefinite concept of "foe", an "extraordinary" atmosphere would always dominate the scene as an "enemy" would always be present. Even the periods of time spent under extraordinary regimes declared in Turkey show that the political life bears a mark of "extraordinary" state of affairs. Both that and the indicative role of the concept of "foe" in the definition of politics have caused that the borders between ordinary and extraordinary situations are unclear and almost invisible. The most important consequence bond to the

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extraordinary situation in the state mentality is disregarding "the rule of law" and "legality" in the advantage of "order" and "final references of legitimacy". In this respect, one may talk about policies by which the state is able to create autonomous fields. It is not possible to say that this is conducted totally "in spite of the society". Contrarily, there is a considerable exchange between the state and an important part of the society to provide its reproduction in both mind and reality. This part of the society is mobilized by the state to "frighten and destroy the enemy" when necessary, even by disobeying the most essentials of universal principles and the necessities of legal setting. Breaking the laws is justified "in the name of the state and for the sake of the state". In this context "the interests of the state" are the final reference points for legitimacy. The function of laws is an unimportant detail that can be disrespected when necessary (Sancar, 2000: 96-97). Because of this tendency in politics, political parties function in a hostile environment as they try to survive within the boundaries determined by the state and are supposed to leave their essential social preferences to the direction of bureaucracy. Therefore, the parties in the defend of statism, secularism and nationalism cannot possibly be called "leftist" as the term implies in the Western sense. Similarly, the case of so-called "rightist" parties representing a side of opposition in a sense to the bureaucracy and acquiring, to an extent, an autonomous manner of treatment, has led to an attitude that regards them as unauthorized formations against the state. The result is the reaffirmation of vicious circle in a rigid manner, i.e., the statist structure as in its history. This is valid for not only a certain part but all in the Turkish political scale.[6] The statist attitude

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[6] The statist character will better be understood with regard to some political developments in the Republican history. In the beginning, the statist essence considered the Islamic part as the principal danger for the policies undertaken. Especially, during the one-party regime, the religious groups were primarily dealt with, although, other parts of the political scale also illustrated their opposition. For example, renown poet Nazım Hikmet was obliged to flee the country and lost his citizenship. The struggle with the religious part was intensive especially during the time of the National Chief, İnönü, such as the brotherhood organizations of Süleymancılık, Nurculuk and Ticani, and the group of the Struggle of Big East under the leadership of Necip Fazıl, etc.. Similarly, these years also experienced clashes with Turanism. By the years of multi-party regime, the primary group to be opposed to for the statist essence was different. It was the Democrat party, which identified itself as liberal. It arose as a rival force within the circles of the state. Yet, it saw its end with the military takeover in 1960. Hence, an elected Prime Minister and his ministers hanged for the first time in the Turkish political life. But this event was reflected to the public opinion as an action of the left. The years between 1960-1980 were ones when the Turkish political life experienced more fragmentation and entered into chaos. In this period, leftist groups were the competitors to the statist essence. There was no need to change the style of combat, but a new target, the leftists, to be dealt with arrived in the scene. So the means for preventing the leftist groups by the statists were not belated. The statist action against the leftist movements, increasing both locally and globally especially in the 1960s, resulted in hanging of three leftist activists (Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan). These executions are still subjects of a dispute from a legal point of view. Similarly, they were presented to the society as the revenge of the rightists against the leftists in reply to the previous acts. Yet, there had been no execution by the right or left in the country. For the statist essence, all represented dangers to be politically eliminated. The society was subjected to a different presentation each time. By the military coup in 1980, the leftists were also tamed. As in parallel with the increasing role of religion in the global scale, religious politics started to reappear on stage after the 1980s and Islamists became more effective than other groups. The arrows again turned to religious groups. The so-called "postmodern military coup" on 28 February 1998 meant their re-suppression. This is, the Turkish political structure has recovered its "order" and "peace" from the view of the statist groups.

As understood so far, political struggle in the Republican period has not been among various political factions, but between the state and them. The statist essence continuously attempts to preserve politics for itself as it has declared itself as the guarantor of modernity. In doing so, it presents any social or political event as being undertaken against the integrity and unity of the state with the society. It tries to vindicate its illegal and anti-democratic attitudes and applications in the name of "protecting unity and integrity and providing peace and order".

has always been afraid of unplanned developments and treated them with suspicion. What has been quite adequate for it is controlling or eliminating them if possible. That is the reason why the state has wished all political organizations to be in close touch with itself. This means security for those accepting that deal. Otherwise, they should expect hostile, even illegal and illegitimate treatments. As a result, being leftist, rightist, Islamist or nationalist, etc., is only acceptable as long as statist attitude is approved and contributed to. Those refuse to be statist are considered as harmful and therefore have no right to exist. Accordingly, in societies where authoritarianism is the dominant feature of politics, political parties are unable to stand on their own feet, but have to lean on the state. In such cases when state is unable to keep up with social developments, they lose their ability of representation and become meaningless. A big field of political decision-making is laid on before persons or establishments rightly addressing to the state. One who climbs on the hierarchy in accordance with the recommendation of his/her protector is smoothly included in the decision-making circles effective on each unit of the state and the society. Briefly, real politics takes place within the state. As expressed above, factions leading to today's political parties are formed inside the state. Therefore, politics is perceived as a struggle in the inner circles of the state away from the society, which is supposed to obey whoever is the winner. This is, it is the state at where what is "public" should only be discussed and decided upon. This tradition has resulted in its identification with the state. Turkish society is completely remained foreign to a concept of public where social actors encounter each other at their own discretion (Mahçupyan, 2000: 274). The Republican politics, which is supposed to open and expand public sphere in the advantage of society, has unified "public" with the state and subjected social life to its norms. This is, the active force that feeds politics is the state itself. If we talk about pluralism that can only mean a statist pluralism and democratization. In other words, it is not possible to speak of a process of democratization in which social requests are reflected in the political area. Political actors and parties acting in accordance with their social basis are not welcomed. They are supposed to be state-centered and composing of such personalities conforming statism, as certain social norms brought about by the state, at the same time, impose a specific life style and morality. Those who adopt them can receive considerable material reward and secure political carriers.

"Turkish modernization" has defined the state as the sole political actor to democratize and reform the society. It can be argued that all efforts geared for democratization have, in fact, aimed to maintain an unchanged state-society relationship and had an image of stagnant society. Hence, the legitimacy of state has become dependent upon itself. This is, any decision is "legitimate" if it is taken by the state. If the existence of the state is considered under threat, the rule of law can easily be put aside in "precautions" to be taken. The authority to determine whether such threat exists or not belongs to the National Security Council, that represents the

core of the state and gathers all statist qualities within itself. Deciding that there exists a threat also means to declare that an "extraordinary" situation has been entered into. In brief, "Turkish modernization" meant only a change once in both the structures of state and society, and the owners of the state as the actors of this change realized a reform for enlarging their space of movement. As if the request for and **201** the possibility of change terminated as soon as transforming the empire into a Republic and the perception of a religious legitimacy to a secular one, the Republican regime assumed that it recaptured an "eternal and endless" and "correct" social model. It returned to the principal of social order of the Ottomans in a different ideological framework with a modern appearance. The basic act of politics was once more decided as controlling social change and protecting the state power against the society. As a consequence, it is accredited that the state making laws "for the state and in the name of state" can violate them, though, it should also obey them. On the one hand, the state does not hesitate from breaking the laws "when necessary"; on the other hand, it requests a strict application of laws violating human rights. Yet, with regard to citizens, "the state" violating easily the laws becomes a firm operator of them and their repressive techniques without concession. Since "law is law and whatever it commands should be done". It even tries to legitimatize "illegal proceedings" in terms of the "requirements of the laws".

CONCLUSION

Turkish modernization was not doubtlessly based on a strong intellectual preparation, such as in the West. We can also understand this situation from the evaluations of statesmen in the process of modernization. These changes, first defined as becoming French (Ottoman), were generally named Europenization in both the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the first period of the Republic. In a country having no strong theoretical background and intelligentsia, it took the name of Americanization as close relations developed with the USA with the beginning of multi-party regime. In the 1960s, the source of inspiration was not a specific country or continent anymore. The term "Westernization" as a more inclusive definition was mostly qualified until the 1980s. The real definition however was given after 1980 when the world started to discuss postmodernism. In other words, at a time when the period of two centuries was barely understood, the world began to talk about globalization. In such time, the state-oriented, authoritarian elite was extremely uncomfortable with autonomous social development. A similar discomfort shows itself also today. The Republican state, just like the Ottoman state, wishes to control every inch of social body. It becomes, therefore, impossible for it to adopt itself to global changes as needed.

As understood from above, the state means everything for the Turkish political tradition. Everything is determined by the state and for the state. Its existence means

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those of social order and society. If it does not exist none of these can exists. That is why its authorization is necessary for any development to be experienced. The essential has been always the state. Therefore, one can only talk about a nation of the state, but not a state of the nation. Similarly, it is difficult to talk about a settled official ideology. There is only a point of view changeably determined according to circumstances. The purpose is about providing the permanency of the state. The Republican period represents a direct continuity with the Ottoman past in terms of the position of state and its definition for itself. What is different is that the source of legitimacy is not contextualized out of the state, but in its own ideology. This approach broke one's perception about the unity of ordinary person with the state on the mental level in the Ottoman past, and put the individual and the state in conflict. Accordingly, as there was no settled pattern during the Republican history, it was not the official ideology but always the statist discourse that has altered under the influence of circumstancial waves. The one that is not changed is the statist essence. The tradition of strong state is firmly attached to. Therefore, any opposition is treated with suspicion, as it is believed that it weakens the authority and performance of the state. The principal of accepting the political legitimacy of "other", a requirement of democratization and pluralism, does not find place in this authoritative political attitude. Because not only the thoughts, but also the purposes and mentality of other are evil. The state always wants to face a weak society. In other words, the owner of the state is not the society itself, but a group separating itself from the society. As it is implied from time to time, the state has "secret owners". Since the statist tradition makes the society dependent upon the state, these "owners of the state" also become the owners of the society. As a result, the society is accountable for reshaping itself according to the requirements of the state. In case of conflict, the liability belongs to the society. For example, when a shift occurred within the state in 1920s, it required the society to change as well mostly in cultural terms. As this requirement was not adequately responded, the society was faced severe punishment. Today, while the state stays still, the society keeps changing. This time, however, the state tries to punish the society since it changes at its own discretion. What is wanted is that the society should act according to the needs of state. Social movements opposing to the framework determined by the state have always been found threatening for the existence of state. Therefore, having a stagnant society is preferred. In other words, forces monopolizing the state power have continuously attempted to maintain a society with a monotonous military order and integrity where all differences are diminished. Since the state is considered as the sole agent of protecting unity and integrity, it is blessed and accepted as a supreme existence. Therefore, the statist attitude has always viciously treated any formation or potential situation out of the state control. The acting field of everything (individual, group, party, the institutions of civil society, etc.) can only exist by leaning on the state. Otherwise, there is no guarantee for right to exist. With

regard to the point reached today, one may talk about a statist sort of pluralism and democratization, but not one that let social requests be reflected in the political field and organized. The boundaries of imagining a social order where pluralism is reproduced are designed by the boundaries of the essential structures of legal discourse formed by the existing state and its reflection in our minds. Democracy **203** does not, though, refers to only a technique of political decision-making, but also a commitment to the principle that the hegemony of one group over the rest should be prevented. This means that those who desire to follow an alternative path other than the one imposed by the dominants may realize their ends.

Briefly, Turkish political culture includes various traditions of its predecessors. According to the old political tradition and that of the Ottomans, the state is the essential institution of the legal and legitimate authority. Those who legally hold this authority in their hands bear the responsibility of protecting social order and increasing general prosperity. What this implies is that the order provided by the state should be consistent and stagnant. Besides, there should be a natural differentiation between those who govern and those who are governed. The candidates for the governing class separates themselves from the society and let themselves become dependent on the economic and political booty provided by the state. Consequently, they spent a considerable effort for not becoming an ordinary member of the society again. Accordingly, the state turns to be a mechanism that is not designed to meet social requests, but to shape the society in parallel to its requirements. In other words, the state performs as an agent of the owners of the state, who label themselves as "the state".

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