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The Understanding of Democracy as a Measure of Integration: An Examination of the Change in Integration Discourse Around the Democracy Debate Based on the Case of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany

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Abstract
This article discusses the intensified debate about people of Turkish origin in Germany in the context of speculations about deviating understandings of democracy among the Turkish diasporas. Based on the thesis that a change in German integration discourse from measurable material achievements of the migrant community to immaterial aspects of adaptation with regard to norms and values is taking place, an argument for a discourse-theoretical perception of this debate is developed, whereby existing forms of the negatively connoted foreign construction of the community of Turkish origin are discussed.

Keywords
Integration, Germany, Democracy, Turkish Diaspora

Introduction
In the course of cross-border political debates in the German-Turkish context, public discussion about the integration status of people of Turkish origin in the Federal Republic of Germany have intensified in recent years. From the Bundestag’s Armenia Resolution on June 2, 2016, to the public discussion surrounding various rallies of diaspora members in reaction to the attempted coup on July 15 of the same year, to the dispute over political mobilization efforts within the German-Turkish community in the context of external voting in the elections in Turkey, a discursive constellation emerged that was characterized by an increasing interweaving of domestic and foreign policy references. In addition to already familiar topics surrounding the Turkish diaspora in Germany, such as the import of social conflicts and questions of loyalty, the discussion increasingly focused

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1 In the lead-up to a large-scale rally against the attempted coup in Turkey, the then Minister President of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hannelore Kraft, addressed the demonstration participants with the following words: “Do not carry a domestic conflict in Turkey into your adopted home of North Rhine-Westphalia, into your families, your circles of friends and also not into your hearts” (Spiegel-Online, 2016, translation by the author).

2 Following the same rally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made the following statement: “We expect those
on a point that had hardly seemed significant in the previous integration discourse: the understanding of democracy among people of Turkish origin.

Probably the most important event for this process of discursive change was the voting behavior of Turkish citizens in Germany, who were entitled to vote in the 2017 constitutional referendum, introducing the presidential system in Turkey, and the 2018 Turkish parliamentary and presidential elections, in favor of the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP). In view of the problematization of the JDP’s style of government, which was described as increasingly authoritarian within German public debates, these results were interpreted as an indication of the growing social disintegration of parts of the Turkish origin community in the country (Adar, 2020). Starting from this, a political debate built up around the theme of a ‘deviant’ understanding of democracy on the part of people of Turkish origin. For example, in the run-up to the 2017 referendum, migration researcher Ruud Koopmans posited that “significant parts of the Turkish population in Europe have never arrived in democracy” and suggested that more willingness to assimilate should be demanded from “Turks abroad”¹ (Welt, 2017). In this process the discussion seemed to come to a head, especially in attributions to the JDP electorate in Germany. Among others, the then chairman of the Green Party, Cem Özdemir, for example criticized that JDP voters in Germany not only supported an autocratic regime, but also openly rejected liberal democracy through their voting behavior (Zeit-Online, 2018). Thus, from this point on, it could be seen that in this and similar media discourse, with openly cross-border references, a primary framing of integration policy took place. The resulting conflation between integration success and ascribed perceptions of democracy thus advanced not only to a central topic within integration discourse, but also, conversely, the attitude of people of Turkish origin toward the basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany and the adaptation of the democratic values that go along with it, became an object of interest.

From a sociopolitical point of view, the intertwining of the integration question with the topic of democracy was and still is undoubtedly explosive. First, the attribution of a deviating democratic conception requires a normative starting point. In the context of the Federal Republic of Germany, this can certainly be established through the minimal consensus of the liberal democratic basic order (Freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung) (Thiel, 2016), but the proof of a deviation only becomes apparent when an active violation (e.g., an anti-constitutional activity) can be registered. The attribution of an anti-democratic attitude thus represents a heavy allegation, which implies not only the potentiality of hostile acts to the constitution but an imminent threat to social peace.

¹ Of Turkish origin who have lived in Germany for a long time to develop a high degree of loyalty to our country” (Zeit-Online, 2016a, translation by the author).

³ Translation by the author.
Second, this creates a strong shift within the already negatively connoted (Öztürk, 2021) integration discourse around people of Turkish origin. As a result, for example, previously effective materially-verifiable aspects for measuring integration success, such as language acquisition and social participation, become less important while immaterial aspects, such as adaptation to norms and values, which can hardly be measured, become a determining factor. In this context, previous achievements of material integration not only suffer a massive devaluation, but the idea that parts of the Turkish diaspora are distancing themselves from the basic democratic consensus also constructs a discursive threat scenario that calls the entirety of previous integration policy efforts into question.

First of all, however, it must be acknowledged that this discursive process was and still is largely based on ascriptions by others e.g. discursive actors of the German context towards a sometimes highly generalized Turkish diaspora. The resulting change within integration discourse, on the other hand, has a demonstrable influence on the societal perception of this same ‘group’. It is important to note at this point that there is a lack of reliable qualitative studies on the understanding of democracy within the Turkish community in Germany. However, it is evident that the current focus on the concept of democracy within integration policy debates results from the conflation of various discursive processes that already exist and have solidified.

On this basis, the main purpose of this paper is to initiate a multi-layered academic discussion around the question of the significance of ascribed democratic perceptions vis-à-vis the community of people of Turkish origin within German integration discourse. Of central importance for this access is the imbalance between the practices of host-society mechanisms of foreign ascription and forms of diaspora-migrant self-ascription. Based on this, the debate to be initiated is not only about the discursive change within the German integration debate, but also about the question of whether and to what extent a supposed deviant understanding of democracy, in the sense of a substantive understanding, within the Turkish diaspora in Germany can be captured from a qualitative research perspective in political science.

In order to clarify these questions, the study is based on a constructivist discourse theoretical approach, following the work of Michel Foucault, in whose understanding discourse have a subject and collective constitutive function as carriers of knowledge formations and regimes. In this sense, the change in practices of foreign construction in the host society towards migrant communities is to be understood under temporal and spatial contextualities and path dependencies, which will be concretized in the course

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4 It should be noted that there are some recent approaches in survey research that aim to explore migrants’ perceptions of democracy in Germany in the context of post-migrant discourse. One example is the project ‘Social Conflicts and Dynamics of Party Competition in Times of Migration and Integration,’ funded by the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs.
of this work using the case of the integration political reception of the new Turkish diaspora policy within German societal discourse. A subsequent consideration is opened up by the significance of the aspect of discursive embedding. Thus, in the case at hand, the assumption is at the forefront that members of the Turkish community in Germany not only have points of reference in the discourse of their host and home societies, but also possess a specific transnational discursive embedding due to their diaspora qualities (Söylemez, 2022), which can have a demonstrable influence on their understandings of democracy. Since the combination of discourse-theoretical considerations to be outlined here has no direct reference point in the literature, the present contribution is intended as a mainly theoretical discussion to stimulate further considerations in migration and diaspora research.

A constructivist view on the sociopolitical functionality of discourses

“Anything said is said by an observer”, this sentence by the Chilean neurobiologists Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela (1980, p. 8), can be seen as the central guiding formula of constructivist thinking. As simple as this statement may appear at first glance, it conceals a profound negation of any objectively ascertainable reality. It is this negation of the order of things, the natural or the universal, (Pörksen & von Foersters 2011), which gives constructivism a special status within the various currents of philosophy. In view of this, the statement can also be understood as a shift of epistemological interest from an ontological what-question, to an epistemological how-question. If this is to be illustrated by the already given example of the observer, it is no longer what the observer sees that is of interest, but how he sees it, because it is only through his process of observation that he constructs what he thinks he sees. Martinsen appropriately points out this perception dependency as follows: “The linchpin of constructivist thinking is the credo that statements about reality are always made from the perspective of an observer” (2014, p. 4). Based on this, it should be noted that constructivism, despite different varieties, shares a common basic epistemological conviction, which is based on two axioms. First, that what is experienced as reality is not a passive image of reality, but the result of an active cognitive effort (von Ameln, 2004). Second, that no statement can be made about an assured correspondence between objective and subjective reality, since there are no instruments that reach beyond one’s own possibility of cognition (Ibid). This basic principle leads to a front position of constructivism against realism as well as idealism and opens up as a ‘third way’ in epistemological philosophy.

The works of the French social philosopher Michel Foucault can also be assigned to the school of thought of constructivism. Martinsen (2014), for example, treats Foucault’s

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5 Translation by the author.
work on various social practices under the label of “practice-oriented constructivism” (p. 3). Probably the most important point of access to Foucault’s work is the concept of discourse. Through the analysis of discourse, as forms of public speech, Foucault is able to materialize epochal transformation processes and to describe the social change inherent in them. From a theoretical perspective, however, the introduction of the concept of discourse and its specific use also represents a practical solution to one of the basic problems of constructivist thought. The negation of any ontology and the reference to the fact that perceived reality is shaped by highly subjective processes leads to the question to what extent socially binding structures, or collective knowledge, can emerge in such a radically contingent environment.

Foucault’s understanding of discourse, however, goes beyond a conglomeration of linguistic artifacts. In this case, a conceptual differentiation is required first: In political theory there is no uniform use of the concept of discourse. For example, in the German-speaking world in particular, there is a certain Habermasian hegemony with regard to this term. In this perception, discourse is an arena of communicative action (Biebricher, 2005) and serves to produce a form of cognitivism (Lumer, 1997). Foucault, on the other hand, defines discourse as an all-encompassing “linguistically produced context of meaning that forces a certain conception, which in turn has as its basis and produces certain power structures and interests at the same time” (Foucault, 1991, p. 32). The effective power that Foucault ascribes to discourse thus not only exceeds Habermas’s idealist definition, it makes discourse a central label of his poststructuralist thought. In this respect, Foucault also emphasizes the social-constructive relationship between language and reality, so that discourse, in contrast to Saussure’s structuralist view, for example, are primarily manifestations of the circulation of valid knowledge (Keller, 2011).

On the basis of his historical-comparative work on processes of knowledge production in different historical epochs of the Occident, Foucault finally states that “our knowledge of the world is discursively mediated” (Kammler et al. 2008, p. 234). Jäger (2007) later clarifies these remarks by describing discourses as a “flow of ‘knowledge’ or social knowledge stocks through time” (p. 23). As a network of typifiable statements in a temporal-spatial context, discourses have a subject- and reality-constitutive effect (Jäger, 2013). Through this process, discourse not only creates perceptual schemata, it also specifies possible patterns of interaction in the context of constructed reality. Jäger and Jäger (2007) describe this process as follows: “It is not reality that is reflected in consciousness, but consciousness that relates to reality, insofar as discourses provide the application specifications or knowledge for the shaping of reality and, beyond that, the further reality

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6 Translation by the author.
7 Translation by the author.
The reference to the application specifications to be derived illustrates that discourse does not constitute a narrative of an objectively comprehensible reality, but can have a ‘life of their own’ vis-à-vis reality (Ibid). The process of subjectification of the human being through the mediation of objectification presuppositions within discourse (Foucault, 2005) therefore not only turns the understanding of the subject as the originator of structures, institutions, and social relations on its head, it illustrates that the perception of social reality can also be determined by the aspect of discursive embeddedness (Söylemez, 2022). Thus, while discourse remains “little more than the reflection of a truth that arises from its own eyes” (Foucault, 1991, p. 32), its implications are material.

The role and function of discourse becomes particularly clear when considering the relation between subject and object. Foucault (1982) himself describes the importance of this debate by saying: “I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomenon of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transformed human beings into subjects” (p. 777). This focus on the subject can be understood as a continuation of the work of his teacher, the philosopher and representative of Critical Theory, Louis Althusser. Althusser devoted himself to the study of ideology and ideological state apparatuses and in this context treated the process of the individual, as producer of the materiality of discourse, towards the subject as carrier of ideology and the social contexts in which he finds himself (2014). This conception of the subject according to Althusser undoubtedly represents the basis for Foucault’s further engagement with this topic. The consideration of the subject, as an individual situated in relations of dependency, which understands itself and appears as a subject at all through processes of adaptation to its environment and to the resulting structures, is a contrary understanding to the classical concept of the subject, which understands it as the “originator of structures, institutions, and social relations” (Nonhoff & Gronau, 2012, p. 113). Thus, it is primarily not a question of what the subject is, but rather which procedures allow the subject to emerge in the first place. In view of this central role of the sociopolitical functionality.
of discourse, in which they do not merely reflect reality but rather can be understood as material reality sui generis (Jäger & Maier, 2009), it is inevitable for the satisfaction of the epistemological interest of the present study to deal with the knowledge-producing processes of discourse in Germany surrounding the Turkish diaspora and, in the further course, the question of how knowledge formations about democracy can develop a material impact within the diaspora itself.

In this regard, the first question is in which contexts Turkish diaspora are objectified as a group in German public discourse. As mentioned at the outset, it is clear that there are a number of discursive processes surrounding people of Turkish origin, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. An important framing of these forms of debate, however, is provided by the integration discourse. In this context, Turkish migrants and their descendants are not only framed in terms of their sociopolitical participation in Germany, but specific demands are also placed on this group, which means that this discourse as an advisor of applications for action has an important everyday life implication. In view of the fundamental question of the change in the content of the discourse of integration from a material to an immaterial practice of measurement, the aim is to locate these moments of change and to reveal their inherent sociopolitical function.

**The continuity of negative perception patterns in the German integration discourse**

Germany is not only home to the world’s largest Turkish diaspora, but over three million Turks and people of Turkish origin which represent the country’s largest non-autochthonous population group (Schührer, 2018). Most of them immigrated within the framework of recruitment agreements from 1961 onwards while 78% of persons with a Turkish migrant background have been living in Germany for at least 20 years (Hanrath, 2011). Meanwhile, the social participation of members of this group, as well as their close ties to each other and to their old homeland, are factors that allow the German-Turkish relationship to grow beyond the simple sterility of interstate relations. In view of this, it is not surprising that within Germany’s domestic political context, the discourse on the integration of people of Turkish origin is closely related to the general perception of the success of immigrant integration (Sauer & Halm 2018). Besides the quantity of people of Turkish origin residing in Germany, are qualitative characteristics, such as differences in religion, language and culture compared to the general population that are also of great importance for this development (Esser, 1986). Thus, in the example of the Turkish community in Germany, not only do a large number of mostly negatively connoted characteristics of foreignness accumulate, but at the same time interpretative practices that can already be described as manifest can be found, which construct people who are read as ‘Turkish’ in a sweeping manner as a collective (sometimes homogenized) group (Uslucan et al., 2023).
Despite the temporary overlap of integration discourse around people of Turkish origin with debates on the social integration of Muslims, defined primarily as a religious social group (Pickel & Pickel, 2018; Sauer & Halm, 2018), it is apparent that national categories continue to play an important role in perceptions of integration policy. In the case of people of Turkish origin, this is characterized by an important historical component. Therefore, in retrospect, it can be seen that the public debate - for example, the discourse about the integration of Turkish people in Germany in a Foucauldian understanding - is highly polarized, both academically and in terms of general discourse. Beginning with the Esser-Elwert controversy in the 1980s concerning multiculturalism vs. assimilation understandings of ‘integration’ (Kortmann, 2015), to the continuing media reporting on criminality, social misbehavior, and ghettoization (Jäger, 2000) of migrants from Turkey and political debates based on it, the ‘Turkish migrant’ developed in the public perception of Germany into the collective symbol of a person who is essentially hard to integrate into German society.12

For a long time, these forms of negative perceptions of people of Turkish origin have been discursively linked to severe deficits of this group in ‘core areas’ of integration, for example such as language acquisition and labor market placement, which was readily taken up and continued by the media and political actors. One example of this in the recent past was a study by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development on the integration of various migrant groups. The report, in which the group of people of Turkish origin were described as “by far” the “worst integrated” social group in the German capital (Woellert et al., 2009, p. 7), made high media waves shortly after its publication. The German weekly news magazine Der Spiegel, referring to parts of the study, reported: “Things turned out differently, the Turks stayed, but their inner attitude, it seems, did not change. They set themselves up in ghettos, they did not make contact with Germans, and this also made it difficult for their children to find their way into the new society”13 (Spiegel-Online, 2009).

These negatively connoted patterns of perception and the debate about the non-integration of Turkish people, due to a supposed “inner attitude,” received a certain boost shortly afterwards with the publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s controversial book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” (Germany is abolishing itself) in 2010. The book, which sold 1.5 million copies, was based on the thesis that the failure of Muslims to assimilate in Germany threatened public order and that the country was about to be Islamized. In particular, Sarrazin targeted people of Turkish origin in Germany, to whom he not only attributed common racist prejudices, but also ascribed an inability to integrate (Holtz

12 The decisive factor here is that the majority of discursive processes deliberately did not reflect on these negative developments in the light of their economic and social causes, but rather culturalized them.

13 Translation by the author.
The resulting overall discursive focus in the form of a cumulation between a collectivist foreign construction of people of Turkish origin and an inability to integrate attributed to them thus emerged from a strategic combination of several discursive strands which demonstrably influenced the perception of migrants in general and the Turkish diaspora in particular. In this context, we must deliberately speak of a strategic momentum, since other studies with a far more positive outcome on the integration status of people of Turkish origin published in the aftermath did not receive nearly the same attention respectively or have the same societal impact. For example, Hans’ (2019) study supports the fact that younger generations of the Turkish diaspora in particular have demonstrably caught up in the often-problematized core areas of integration such as education, social placement and contacts with the host society. Furthermore, people of Turkish origin have in general achieved demonstrable success in cognitive, economic and interactional integration over the past 20 years (Sauer, 2016). Meanwhile, these processes are also underpinned by the group’s self-perception. As the Emnid Research Institute found in its 2016 representative survey for the University of Münster, young German Turks in particular saw themselves “well integrated” while the study equally showed that members of this group felt less recognition of their achievements (Zeit-Online, 2016b). This also ties in with Arkılıç’s (2022) remark that the integration discourse in Germany towards persons with a Turkish migration background is characterized by a particularly excluding functionality.

With reference to Foucault (1979), the different weighting of these knowledge formations with regard to the integration of people of Turkish origin in the context of the overall societal discourse of the Federal Republic of Germany can be explained by the strategic nature of (sometimes contradictory) discourse in the sense of tactical blocks in the field of social/political power relations. In this respect, discursive knowledge formations can be deliberately reproduced and circulated by various actors in order to achieve, from their own perspective, a functional construction of knowledge. Whether and to what extent the intensification of negative stereotypes regarding people of Turkish origin in this context represents a dispositive function from the point of view of media actors is of secondary importance concerning the impact of this discursive concatenation on the fundamental comprehension or the change of that very comprehension of successful integration. It is clear that the continuity of negative attributions and homogenizing foreign constructions of the Turkish diaspora, especially in media, not only represents a contrary or counterproductive image to established understandings of successful immigrant integration policy, which is to be understood in equal parts as the provision of opportunities for participation in society and the recognition of such participation (Schu, 2016; Uslucan & Yalçın, 2012). By referring to the immanence of an ‘inner attitude’ as the reason for the failure of integration, the aforementioned shift away from the valuation of material integration to the dominance of an understanding around immaterial integration is
also taking place. At the latest since 2008, one cross-border reference appears to be particularly concise when it comes to explaining the disintegration attributed to members of the Turkish diaspora, especially in light of the ascription of a growing distancing from the democratic status quo in Germany. What is meant here is the new Turkish diaspora policy, or rather the domestic discursive treatment of it in Germany. Based on this and in reference to the situation of the increasing consolidation of democracy within the integration framework in the German-Turkish context, it seems a fruitful approach to discuss the structural-discursive changes within the German integration debate using the reception of new Turkish diaspora politics as an example.

**Cross-border discourse as domestic policy drivers:**
**The new Turkish diaspora policy as a discursive trigger**

In retrospect, it can be said that probably the most important impetus for a renewed intensification of the integration issue in the example of the Turkish community in Germany in the recent past and the following rise of discussions on the immaterial integration of this group were of a cross-border political nature. At the latest after a public appearance by the then prime minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Cologne on February 8, 2008, the government in Ankara pushed for a strategic change in its diaspora policies. The speech by Erdoğan, which gained a relatively high profile due to accusations of assimilation against the German government, thereby formulated two central demands on members of the Turkish diaspora, which in the following years were to be the starting point for the increasing convergence of questions of integration and the perception of democracy: first, the acquisition of language skills and the active demand for sociopolitical participation opportunities, and second, the maintenance and strengthening of cultural and social ties to Turkey. While Erdoğan’s wish to learn the language (a fundamental demand of German integration policy since the 1980s) may have seemed unproblematic, the demand for opportunities to participate in the context of the host society and the simultaneous strengthening of references to origin may have raised eyebrows in Berlin. Meanwhile, Ankara created facts within a very short period of time: In 2008 and 2012, Turkey enacted external voting legislation and electoral registration for voters residing abroad (Anaz & Köse, 2021). In 2010, diaspora agencies as public institutions were established, including the Presidency for Turks Abroad. In 2014, for the first time in the history of the republic, Turkish citizens residing outside Turkey were given the opportunity to cast their ballots at consular missions.

German political actors reacted to these developments with great skepticism. As early as 2007, the then Integration Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, Armin Laschet, criticized that the implementation of voting rights for Turkish citizens in Germany could be “harmful in terms of integration policy” (Aydın, 2014, p. 7). The possibility of an “externally controlled penetration” of the Turkish community and influence on domestic
political affairs in the Federal Republic, or the instrumentalization of the Turkish community in the sense of the JDP government, was thus perceived as a serious domestic political challenge (Öktem, 2014, p. 7). Despite sporadic criticism, Germany’s reactions to Ankara’s advances were initially limited. This changed abruptly when bilateral relations between the two countries began to deteriorate in 2016. In this process the fears about the extraterritorial influence on the diaspora experienced a certain materialization when the Turkish president, in the run-up to the 2017 German federal elections, called on members of the diaspora in Germany who were eligible to vote not to give their votes to “anti-Turkish” parties (Der Tagesspiegel, 2017). The direct, albeit only discursive, intervention of the Turkish government in processes of German domestic politics not only led to the peak of diplomatic tensions between the two countries. In this context, then-Foreign Minister Gabriel addressed the people of Turkey with the following words: “I call on all people in Germany to oppose this attempt [...] what Erdoğan wants to destroy in Turkey: freedom, the rule of law and democracy”\(^{14}\) (FAZ.net, 2017).

The inclusion of the concept of ‘democracy’ or the targeted intention of an anti-democratic development in Turkey and its possible impact on the local diaspora seemed all the more interesting because the JDP was considered a bearer of democratic hope in large parts of the German discourse landscape until 2013 at the latest. For example, following the 2010 constitutional referendum, the newspaper Die Zeit ran the headline “In Turkey, democracy is winning. [...] The country is moving closer to Europe”\(^{15}\) (2010). In this context, partly following the narrative of “Muslim Democracy” (Cesari, 2014; Nasr, 2005), the JDP not only received a special form of international recognition, especially within German discourse, but promises such as strengthening civil liberties and limiting the military’s powers were also seen as important steps toward overcoming structural weaknesses in the Turkish democratic model. This perception was also complemented on October 19, 2019, when German President Christian Wulff became the first head of state to address Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, encouraging those present to proceed along the path of recent democratic constitutional changes (Bundespräsidialamt, 2010). When the ballot boxes in 2017 set up once again for a constitutional referendum, the former triumph of Turkish democracy under the JDP, in the German media coverage now reversed into the eventual “death of the Turkish republic”\(^{16}\) (Zeit-Online, 2017).

Thus, from a discursive perspective, two ruptures occurred in the course of the subsequent bilateral tensions between the two states. First, a public discussion about the domestic implications of Turkish diaspora policy was established, in which already existing

\(^{14}\) Translation by the author.

\(^{15}\) Translation by the author.

\(^{16}\) Translation by the author.
negative connotations with regard to the diaspora’s ties to its origin were addressed. Central to this were narratives about how the Turkish diaspora has always acted as a Trojan horse (Aydn, 2014) or Ankara’s fifth column (Tibi, 2017), or could be ‘activated’ as such at any time. The fact that this perception, like the construction of a homogeneous diaspora on the part of Ankara (Söylemez, 2021), was largely a discursive construction and is not only evident in the failure to recognize many of the groups that came to Germany in the second wave of migration in the 1980s via the route of political asylum and who generally have a rather critical, left-wing or left-liberal position and are explicitly not supporters of the JDP (Uslucan et al., 2023) but also in the assumption that political orientation toward origin in general would be related to tendential deviant understanding of democracy. Thus, at least in large sections of the media, active participation in extra-territorial elections in general and voting for the JDP in particular was framed as an indicator for desintegration. One of the most striking examples of this argumentation logic is probably a commentary from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in reaction of the elections results in 2017: “If hundreds of thousands of foreigners and immigrants are alienated from liberal and secular democracy, it is not because they landed years ago as ‘guest workers’ in a society that did not yet want to see itself as an immigration society. [...] It is simply the way it is when Germany becomes a country of immigration: The founding ideas of the Federal Republic are at stake” (FAZ.net, 2018).

Although German-Turkish relations have stabilized as of 2019 and the diplomatic controversies seem to have been overcome, the public reception of the episode in German-Turkish relations outlined above highlights two important aspects regarding the implications for German integration discourse. First, despite the 60-year history of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, generalized foreign constructions and the attribution of a fundamental (political) orientation toward their origin still seem to be valid components of the public perception in Germany. It should be noted that the merging of domestic and foreign policy discourse strands around political developments in Turkey and the integration of people of Turkish origin in Germany, in particular, has led to perceptual practices around equating broad parts of the Turkish diaspora with Ankara’s political positions. Even if such a generalizing conflation does not take place, it can at least be seen that the political actions of the Turkish diaspora in Germany are repeatedly contrasted with political developments in Turkey. While the methodological-nationalist perception of people of Turkish origin applied here is not surprising, given the longstanding negation of the immigration-social character of the Federal Republic and the ethnic-cultural national understanding inherent here (Sezgin, 2010), it is interesting to note that specific threat scenarios are derived from ascribed ‘ties of origin’.

17 Translation by the author.
Second, the concept of democracy has now become inescapably woven into the discourse of integration and, thus, into the public understanding of social cohesion. However, this has not happened within a dialog process but through mechanisms of foreign construction. In this respect, the discourse contextualities in Germany are not only once again characterized by a special form of impermeability for migrant groups, but also underline the eclectic imbalance between mechanisms of foreign and self-attribution in migration/integration discourse. This is particularly evident in the fact that this mode of conducting the debate, despite its focus on a possible ‘deviant’ understanding of democracy on the part of the Turkish diaspora, has made absolutely no contribution to the question of its content. On this basis, it is now necessary to detach from mechanisms of attribution to foreigners within the German integration discourse and to explore the extent to which a substantive understanding of democracy in the diaspora can be developed through the interplay between host, origin, and transnational ties.

**A Discourse-Theoretical approach: The perception of democracy under transnational conditions**

Whether and to what extent Ankara’s new diaspora policy serves the instrumentalization of the Turkish community is currently the subject of broad-based domestic and foreign policy debates in Germany. One aspect that is hardly considered in the debate is that the impact of the diaspora policy efforts of Turkish parties, above all the JDP, is to a decisive extent also due to previous failures of Turkish and German policies regarding the wishes and expectations of the Turkish diaspora in Germany (Söylemez, 2021). In this respect, a causality between the endorsement of Turkish foreign policies and resulting disintegration in the German context cannot be immediately identified (Halm & Sauer, 2018). Rather, the results of a survey on migrant representation conducted by the Center for Turkish Studies in Essen among people of Turkish origin in North Rhine-Westphalia, where a third of the Turkish expatriate community in Germany resides, indicate that in recent times, the sense of representation of interests by institutions has generally increased. However, this includes German, Turkish, and transnational actors, such as governments, as well as non-governmental migrant organizations, by which members of the diaspora now most often feel represented (Sauer, 2016). This situation not only indicates that members of the Turkish diaspora have political references in both host and home social contexts, but also that they can construct discursive references in transnational settings. From a discourse-theoretical perspective, this observation allows us to determine the influence of discursively-mediated knowledge formations on the members of the diaspora and makes it possible to assess the influences of different knowledge sources on the diaspora’s internal construction of an understanding of democracy.

Before delving into this aspect in more detail, it is necessary to formulate two central assumptions. First (1), I assume in a Foucauldian-constructivist sense that the
understanding of democracy results from a construction process that is primarily subjective in nature but takes shape through collective references. In this respect, not only does democracy thrive on discourse, but our perception of democracy is also the result of discursive processes. This leads us to the second (2) assumption: I assume, as I will show in the following, that our knowledge about democracy is mediated by discourse in society as a whole. If we want to concretize this in our case study, we can assume that people with a permanent center of life in Germany are initially directly subject to the influence of the discourse of society as a whole, and their perception of democracy is thus determined by the hegemonic knowledge formations of this specific national context. This also includes members of the Turkish diaspora with permanent residence in Germany. However, since the transnational turn in migration research (Clarke, 2013), it should be noted that migrants and people with migrant family histories can also have transnational references and thus connectivity to various social discourses of different national contextualities. Transnationality in this respect is first to be understood as “processes of consolidation of relatively permanent social relations, social networks, and social spaces that are locally anchored in different national societies and do not have a single center” (Pries, 2013, p. 891). From a social sciences perspective, this process in the migration context results in the emergence of transnational densification of social fields and spaces at the level of (primarily) non-state actors, which are characterized by a variety of simultaneous entanglements in contexts of origin and reception (Faist, 2000). In this context, Pries mentions that people of Turkish origin have a variety of social relationships that link the society of origin and the society of settlement (Pries, 2010). Before undertaking a precise investigation of how concrete knowledge formations about democracy can possibly be conveyed to members of the Turkish diaspora via transnational discourse contexts, it is first necessary to undertake a discourse-theoretical reception of the concept of transnationality.

The question that arises here is to what extent conceptions of reality are constituted by individuals or groups who live within transnational contexts. Following Pries’ explanations of transnationalism, these are individuals who, locally anchored in different national societies and, for example, national discourse, constitute relatively durable and dense social relations, social networks, or social spaces (Pries, 2010). Based on Foucault’s fundamentally practice-oriented understanding of discourse presented in the introductory theory section of this paper, people of Turkish origin thus formally represent subjects of a German social discourse, but they also have transnational references via their ties to Turkey. In addition, they may be involved in diaspora-specific mixed discourses. Pries notes, for example, that in the case of transmigration, socio-cultural practices of the society of arrival and the society of origin are mixed in diaspora communities, and new forms

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of socialization can emerge from this (Pries, 2003). From a sociological perspective, the main interest with regard to the reference of contexts of origin and reception is the resource potential that can be derived from this with regard to participation and integrative processes. From a discourse-theoretical perspective, on the other hand, it becomes apparent that the state of knowledge, in this case, of the Turkish diaspora, is nourished by several, partly overlapping discourses in society as a whole and in specific groups, and in this respect, this also applies to the understanding of democracy.

**Cross-border transfer of discursive content and the aspect of discursive embedding**

From the theoretical work outlined here, it can be deduced that members of the Turkish diaspora in Germany initially have a multi-layered discursive embedding, i.e. they move within the sphere of influence of discursive processes in the context of reception and origin. This in turn leads to two central questions: First, (1) how can this discursive multiple embedding be understood in practice, or rather, which functional logics does it follow? Second, (2) to what extent are discursive knowledge formations about the concept of democracy, e.g. divergent understandings of democracy, communicated to the diaspora from different sources and how do they manifest themselves?

First of all, it should be noted that spatial mobility between two societies is certainly an important aspect. In the specific case of the Turkish diaspora, it can be seen that aspects of commuter migration between the two societies have been restricted, at the latest with the recruitment stop in 1973, where the freedom of movement of permanent border crossings between the two countries has been severely limited. Thus, from this point on, spatial migration between the two contexts is mainly limited to the obligatory ‘home visit’ of former guest workers during the summer school vacations. From a discourse-theoretical perspective, however, it should be mentioned that a short-term stay cannot constitute a sufficient reason for discursive embedding since the aspect of continuity, in the sense of a permanent embedding in the national discourse, is not given here (Mortensen, 2014). In addition, the process of cross-generational social integration demonstrably reduces the immediate spatial ties to the society of origin, that is, the density of visits home or the quality. For the discourse to develop its subject-constitutive effect, an awareness of the specific codes of the respective social discourse must develop in the individual. That is, the individual must be able to comprehend the logic of the field of sayability (Foucault, 1991). This means that we can only speak of transnational embedding if individuals are permanently under the influence of several national or transnational social discourses. One possibility for the simultaneous and constant influence of several nationally different social discourses is through the use of various cross-border communication channels. Communication networks used by the Turkish diaspora in the Federal Republic play an important role here and have a connection to discourse of the homeland.
If one wants to concretize these processes using the example of dealing with the genuine Turkish discourse, which also carries knowledge content related to the democracy question, the following communication networks come into question as carriers of discourse content relevant to democracy: (1) Genuine Turkish communication networks (e.g., TV, print, WWW, personal contacts in Turkey), (2) genuine German communication networks, and (3) intra-diasporic communication networks (e.g., diaspora (online) newspapers, social media groups). Hepp et al. (2011) mention that members of the Turkish community tend to use media in a bicultural and ethno-oriented way compared to other migrant groups in Germany. This results not only in a local reference (place of living) but also in a strong communicative orientation toward the country of origin. For the Turkish diaspora, it can be concluded that the formation of origin-oriented communication networks is of particular importance in this context. This finding is also reflected in the consumption of Turkish-language media by the Turkish diaspora (Güntürk, 2000). Here, communication networks with a direct connection to Turkey emerge as an important carrier of discursive content. For example, the use of Turkish TV and print media continues to predominate among people of Turkish origin, despite declining trends in generational comparison (Müller, 2005). The fact that this form of media consumption, along with the associated absorption of discursive knowledge formations, is also reflected in the discursive participation behavior of diaspora members can be observed at the meso level.

A striking example of this is the political positioning and communication strategies of associations of the Turkish diaspora in the course of cross-border political debates in the German-Turkish context, which show that political-discursive contexts from Turkey are certainly perceived by the diaspora in Germany and woven into their specific communication behavior. For example, the study on claim-making by Turkish migrant associations in the course of the Armenia debate around the 2017 Bundestag resolution points out that origin-contextual narratives are taken up by collective actors of the diaspora and reproduced in host society debates (Halm & Söylemez, 2017). It is interesting to note that the discursive contributions of the Turkish associations do not necessarily appear compatible with the overall German debate on this topic due to their proximity to the discourse of the society of origin, and therefore the discursive input of the diaspora actors is hardly heard in the reception context (Ibid). However, it is also quite observable that the discourse reception of transnational debates differs from the perception of host society domestic debates. Another study on this aspect shows that, for example, in relation to the discussion of domestic political debates in the host context, e.g. in connection with racist acts of violence, modes of reception come to light that are neither directly detectable in contexts of origin nor in host contexts. For example, various Turkish migrant organizations, of different religious and political persuasions, show that they make use of diaspora-internal knowledge formations in their political assessment of the Hanau attack in
2020, which have a very community-specific and selective perception of racist violence. Thus, a narrative is sketched that, beginning with the arson attacks in the 1990s in Mölln and Solingen against Turkish families, through the murder series by the National Socialist Underground (NSU), to Hanau, represents a narrative of targeted violence against people from Turkey. This particular form of concatenation of racist attacks is neither a fundamental model in the discussion of racist violence in Germany, nor does such a stringent narrative exist in Turkey with regard to the racist persecution of Turkish diaspora (Söylemez, 2022).

Based on this, it can be stated that the specific discursive embedding of the Turkish diaspora has a demonstrable effect on the perception of social events and processes by its members. A discourse-analytical examination of these processes reveals that, at least at the meso level, knowledge formations in the host society and in the society of origin can play just as important a role as diaspora-internal community, which in turn form their own specific context for discursive positioning behavior. Thus, it can be strongly assumed that the understanding of democracy within the diaspora is influenced by precisely these contextual conditions. Yet, if one considers the discourse outlined at the outset regarding the possible deviation in the understandings of democracy within the group of people of Turkish origin in Germany, it becomes clear that the debate is based far less on concrete models of democracy than on a foreign construction that intends to suggest a deviation in the understanding of democracy. How this concrete form of deviation can be materialized remains open. This, in turn, leads to a much more critical questioning of the meaning of ‘democracy’ in integration discourse and the political functionality of attributing a deviant understanding of democracy to the foreign construction of people of Turkish origin in Germany.

**Conclusion: The question of discursive foreign and self-construction**

The preceding theoretical view of the field not only shows that members of the Turkish diaspora have access to knowledge formations from various national and transnational sources, but also that there is a significant imbalance between foreign and ‘migrant’ self-attribution in the discourse on the possible deviation of the understanding of democracy of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. Thus, the debate about the understanding of democracy within the Turkish community is decisively dominated by processes of foreign attribution, while the self-descriptions of the community receive little or no access to the field of overall societal discourse. At the same time, intensive debates at the level of Turkish migrant associations show that processes of debate and reflection do take place, and that clear discursive and political positions are taken. Two fundamental problems result from this situation, which are, first, of a socio-political and secondly, of an epistemological nature.
First of all, with regard to the socio-political problem, the intertwining of democracy and integration is a development that will sooner or later have to take place in immigration societies. Not least, global developments in recent years, such as the emergence of anti-racist protest movements like Black Lives Matter in the United States, or different initiatives to clarify the NSU murders in Germany, have shown that Western societies, in light of migration and changing demographics, must not only deal more decisively with questions of minority rights but also with questions of the extent to which migrant (or migrantized) perspectives are heard in overall societal debates. In the case of Germany, it can be observed that, at the latest since the emergence of the multiculturalism debate in the 1990s, social discourse on the recognition of social diversity have intensified (Eckardt, 2007). Probably the most recent development in this field is the current debate about the post-migrant character of the Federal Republic, in the context of which central concepts, such as homeland and identity are being discussed anew (Foroutan, 2016). This perception was framed not least from the political side, among other things, by an address of the Federal President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in honor of the 60th anniversary of the recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey: “Since you [e.g., the immigrants from Turkey] came here, we have changed. The meaning of the word ‘German’ has changed” (Bundespräsidialamt, 2021). In view of this, there is fertile ground for the emergence of new discussions about the concept of democracy and the possible understanding of a post-migrant democracy, in which people of Turkish origin, as the largest non-autochthonous group in Germany, should naturally have a right to participate. The political reality, however, presents a different picture. The massive imbalance between discursive opportunities for participation, coupled with negatively connotated attribution practices, not only impedes discursive access opportunities for members of migrant communities in general, but also contributes to the perpetuation of negative perceptions. As outlined above, despite their demonstrable material integration successes, members of the Turkish diaspora still represent a problematic group from an integration policy perspective. The discursive recourse to the democracy question in the context of integration, in the sense of a reweighing of material aspects of integration measurement to immaterial aspects, makes it possible to construct new negative perceptions or to maintain attribution practices that already have fundamentally negative connotations. In light of the already existing imbalance between foreign and self-attribution practices, this also opens up new possibilities for the political instrumentalization of integration discourse, which can be used to perpetuate already existing prejudices against the Turkish diaspora. It should be clear, however, that the construction of the diaspora as incapable of democracy or anti-democratic is a far stronger means of delegitimizing this group than objections such as lack of language skills.

From an epistemological perspective, the current political debates about the ‘democratic’ integration of the Turkish diaspora do not contribute to the discussion of
community-internal democracy discourse. Instead, they serve to perpetuate negative foreign constructions of the Turkish diaspora, portraying them as having not yet arrived in democracy. This discourse provides a basis for the application of possible repressive political measures. Whether and to what extent this legitimation framework is based on objective truths is irrelevant insofar as the implications of this perception can be material. But what should an insight-oriented discussion in this field look like? First of all, it is important to ensure aspects of discursive participation. As the understanding of successful integration is underpinned by participation and recognition practices, these must be promoted to the same extent. In other words, sensitivities must be created for the discursive multiple embedding of the Turkish diaspora. The reception of democracy-relevant contributions from the Turkish community is an important data material in this context, which must be considered in transnational discourse contexts that are internal to the societies of reception and origin. An operationalized discourse-analytical approach is likely to be an important methodological approach here. This perspective should be developed in particular with regard to the Turkish election year 2023. There is no question that in this context the discourse about people of Turkish origin in Germany will intensify once again. As before, the focus will be on the voting behavior of the Turkish diaspora, and the final election results will have a demonstrable influence on the social perception practices of Turkish people in Germany. Thus, in the current temporal period, it seems all the more important to develop a multi-layered perception of these developments, reflecting on different forms of attribution in national, international, and transnational contexts. In this respect, I hope that the discussion presented here, including theoretical aspects, will encourage more in-depth research into this topic area and, in particular, into the development of integration discourse and its implications for the diaspora.

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