



Article Info/Makale Bilgisi

✓Received/Geliş:31.01.2023 ✓Accepted/Kabul:04.05.2023

DOI:10.30794/pausbed.1245632

Research Article/Araştırma Makalesi

Ozdemir, S. (2023). "The Effect of The United States Presidential Policy on Türkiye-Iran Relations in 1970s", *Pamukkale University Journal of Social Sciences Institute*, Issue 57, Denizli, pp. 317-331.

THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL POLICY ON TÜRKİYE-İRAN RELATIONS IN 1970s

Seçil OZDEMİR*

Abstract

American Presidential Doctrines play a crucial role in international politics by providing a general strategy for the United States' (U.S.) allies to follow. The U.S. international policies, like those of all states, are complex and broad-based. However, Presidential Doctrines reveal a basic strategic framework.

This study examined the events that occurred in the axis of Iran-Türkiye-Northern Iraq from President Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter's administration and analyzed the main outline of the American presidential doctrines that focused on the 1970s.

The focus of this study is on the 1970s, during which the United States' policies toward the Middle East had a significant impact on the mutual relations of regional actors. Adopting a comprehensive approach, this study examines the specific issues of poppy cultivation, the Cyprus Issue, and the embargo crisis, which led to a crisis between Turkey and the U.S. in the 1970s. Additionally, this study analyzes U.S. policies aimed at maintaining the balance in Northern Iraq and Iran during this time.

In this study, it was determined that the international crises of the 1970s engendered a significant level of mistrust between regional countries, specifically in relation to the United States, as well as among various regional actors. During this time, the United States implemented a policy of supporting the Northern Iraq region and Kurdish elements in order to create a balance of power between Iran and Türkiye. This policy had the consequence of increasing feelings of insecurity among neighboring countries, but also created opportunities for non-regional actors to devise new strategies.

Keywords: *Türkiye, Iran, Northern Iraq, Presidential Policies.*

AMERİKAN BAŞKANLIK DOKTRİNLERİ'NİN TÜRKİYE-İRAN İLİŞKİLERİNE ETKİSİ: 1970'Lİ YILLAR

Öz

Amerikan Başkanlık Doktrinleri uluslararası politikada takip edilecek genel bir strateji sunduğu fikriyle önemli bir yer tutar. Tüm devletler gibi ABD'nin uluslararası politikaları çok yönlü ve geniş çerçevelidir. Buna karşın başkanlık doktrinleri temel bir strateji çerçevesi ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu çalışmada Amerikan başkanlık doktrinlerinin temelleri açıklanmış, Richard Nixon döneminden Jimmy Carter dönemine İran-Türkiye- Kuzey Irak ekseninde gelişen olaylar analiz edilmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın odak noktası, ABD'nin Ortadoğu'ya yönelik politikalarının bölgesel aktörlerin karşılıklı ilişkilerinde önemli bir etkiye sahip olduğu 1970'li yıllardır. Kapsamlı bir yaklaşım ile çalışmada, 1970'lerde Türkiye ile ABD arasında krize yol açan

*Ph.D , Department of History, Bartın University, BARTIN.
e-mail: sozdemir@bartin.edu.tr (<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0488-1314>)

haşhaş ekimi, Kıbrıs Sorunu ve ambargo krizi konuları incelenmiştir. Buna ek olarak, ABD'nin bu dönemde Kuzey Irak ve İran'da dengeleri sağlamaya yönelik politikaları değerlendirilmiştir.

Çalışmada, 1970'li yıllarda yaşanan uluslararası krizlerin bölge ülkeleriyle-ABD arasında olduğu gibi bölgesel aktörler arasında da güvensizliğe sebep olduğu ortaya konulmuştur. ABD'nin 1970'li yıllarda İran ve Türkiye ilişkilerini dengelemek için yeni bir aktör arayışında Kuzey Irak bölgesi ve buradaki Kürt unsurları desteklediği süreç gelişmiştir. Bu durumun sınır komşuları arasındaki güvensizlik atmosferini geliştirirken bölge dışı aktörlere yeni stratejiler geliştirme imkanı sunduğu sonucu ortaya çıkmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Türkiye, İran, Kuzey Irak, Başkanlık Politikaları.*

INTRODUCTION

Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the United States, believed that the U.S. had a mission to bring peace to the world. However, Wilson's attempts to convince Congress to approve the U.S. entry into the League of Nations after World War I was unsuccessful. Many members of Congress believed the United States did not have the right to be actively involved in world affairs. They also considered the geography of Europe and Russia, after the Bolshevik Revolution, poisonous. But with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. entered World War II as a matter of principled necessity (Gültekin, 2008: 128), a move that was a departure from the isolationist strategy that had been adopted with the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. Wilsonianism was not slain by isolationists until it was resurrected by Franklin Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor. (McDougall, 2009)¹

The U.S. victory in World War II reinforced the belief that the country had a special mission in the eyes of the American people and the world. Since then, U.S. presidents have declared their policies as doctrines, which serve as the basic framework for their foreign policy. These doctrines do not cover every aspect of a president's term, but rather highlight a key feature of their presidency. They are based on a particular worldview and often focus on national security concerns and the use of force. Presidential doctrines include a philosophy or worldview, a strategy, and a statement outlining the principles and values that guide them (Murray, 2013: 148).

The policies of Middle East countries are increasingly interlinked, not only with each other but with super-powers as well.

The policies of Iran and Türkiye, both of which are at the hub of the region, are strongly affected by domestic political issues and, at the same time, well situated to influence the international policy. According to Chubin, Türkiye and Iran's interests are broadly similar in terms of their need to harmonize diplomacy and action. (Chubin, 1974: 173) So, despite the ongoing rivalry tradition, a main pillar of the relationship between these countries' diplomacy.

This research examines the implementation of American presidential doctrines as they affect the Middle East, starting from Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter. It also discusses the effect of their presidential doctrines had on Iran-Türkiye relations and Northern Iraq situation, in the 1970s.

This study aims to answer the following questions:

What is the meaning of American Presidential Doctrine and what did it offer to the Middle East after World War II?

Did the United States' foreign policy towards Turkey and Iran contribute to the increase in regional and bilateral rivalry between these states during the 1970s?

Did the U.S.'s regional policies lead to destabilization in Iran-Türkiye relations?

1. Recent History of the Presidential Policy

Presidential ideologies provide a crucial analytical perspective on how governments operate. The president's foreign policy goals and those of the U.S. foreign policy are emphasized in American presidential doctrines (Paterson, 2018: 14).

¹Also see: McDougall states that "Pearl Harbor established Wilsonianism as the sixth tradition of U.S. foreign policy." Walter A. McDougall, Back to Bedrock: The Eight Traditions of American Statecraft, Foreign Affairs, Mar. - Apr., 1997, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1997), pp. 134-146

The political dominance of the United States differed from that of previous global powers. This situation has served to the formation of different foreign policy syntheses of the United States. The Wilsonian idealism during the Cold War created a trend in foreign policy called global meliorism (Gültekin, 2008: 128), the belief that the world tends to improve and that humans can aid its betterment (Merriam-Webster Dictionary : Meliorism, 2021). In the formation of this synthesis, which is also called soft imperialism, the influence and pressures from the outside world had an effect. After World War II, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of an anti-communist ideology in the U.S. foreign policy that was structured to counter the Soviet threat. The aim was to create an environment that would protect the American system at the global level and at the same time counter the expansionist threat of the Soviet Union. To accomplish this, they increased military aid to areas that were vulnerable to the Soviet threat and took civil defense measures. Psychological warfare was also an important tool of this policy (Gültekin, 2008: 128).

The U.S. presidential elections are of great interest not only in the United States but also in other countries, as they provide insight into the potential policies that the next president may pursue. The outcome of U.S. presidential elections usually has a significant impact on the direction of U.S. involvement in world affairs, as well as on the competition between the candidates for the White House. The new president can be expected to take the initiative in creating a new foreign policy or continuing with even greater vigor and determination the existing policies. World War II was a turning point in American foreign policy, and post-war presidential policies have followed one another. The strategy of the U.S. to control communism in Europe through the Truman Doctrine was followed in 1957 by Dwight Eisenhower's plan to contain communism in the Middle East. (Onder, 2020: 32).

Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a country could request American economic assistance and/or military aid if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism" (The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957). The Eisenhower administration saw Iran as a key country in the northern region, which stretched from Türkiye to Afghanistan and separated the USSR from the oil-rich Persian Gulf (Alvandi, 2014: 375).

President Kennedy, in a message to Congress, stated that the U.S. is not against any person, nation, or system except as it opposes freedom. He also mentioned that he is not promoting a new military doctrine, but instead promoting the freedom doctrine. (www.jfklibrary.org, 1961). Kennedy's policies focused mostly on Latin America; his successor, Lyndon Johnson, focused on the northern tier countries Türkiye, Iran and Pakistan. Since the 1950s, the United States had relied on its strong relationships with Türkiye, Iran, and Pakistan to prevent the Soviet Union from advancing south towards the Persian Gulf. During the Nixon Administration, the United States focused on strengthening Iran's role as a regional balance power by providing the Shah with advanced weaponry (Mann, 2013: 100).

1.1. During the Richard Nixon Presidency: Northern Iraq-Türkiye-Iran

After World War II, the United States became actively involved in Middle Eastern politics. The Truman Doctrine, issued on March 12, 1947, is generally regarded as the turning point in Türkiye – the U.S. relations. Despite this positive start, during the Lyndon Johnson administration, relations became tense as a result of President Johnson's famous letter. During this period, Turkish-American relations deteriorated, leading Türkiye to develop economic relations with the USSR (Armaogu, 1995: 1190). However, the late 1960s marked a new era with the U.S. decision to withdraw from Vietnam, the start of negotiations with China, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the USSR. During his presidency, Richard Nixon said in an interview with Time magazine,

"We need balance of power to maintain peace, a strong and healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, and Japan each balancing the other, not playing against each other, an even balance. We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been balance of power" (Donovan & Grunwald, 1972).

In this context, The United States supported Kurdish forces in Iraq as a counterbalance to the country's relations with the Soviet Union, but in 1975, the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein signed the Algiers Agreement and the Shah abruptly ended Iran's support for the Kurdish rebellion. This led to thousands of Kurds fleeing to Iran, but some were returned to Iraq. The Kurdish question became a border issue and the United States was criticized for abruptly cutting off support and supplies to the Kurds, leaving them at the mercy of Saddam. When asked to justify this betrayal, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger replied "covert action should not be confused with missionary work." (Schorr, 1991); (Schorr, 1996) During this time, the Shah of Iran raised oil prices, and Türkiye-U.S. relations grew tense because of Cyprus and embargoes crises. In such periods, the priority of U.S. policymakers is to maintain regional stability.

According to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, "Peace was derived from a certain balance of power and what diplomacy was supposed to sustain was not peace per se but this balance" (Zaracostas, 1981, p. 101) The U.S. foreign policy was to proceed on the path of negotiation and diplomacy in international problems during the Nixon presidency, but as a result of Türkiye's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and its lifting the ban on poppy cultivation, Turkish-U.S. relations entered a problematic period that would last until the Reagan era. The United States imposed an arms embargo on Türkiye from February 5, 1975 to 1978 (Armaoğlu, 1995: 1190). Türkiye closed most American facilities in response to the embargo, including bases considered vital for gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union. The Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit warned that their commitment to NATO would be reduced if the embargo continued. (Goshko, 1978).

At the same time, Iran-U.S. relations centered around the Shah's increasing military aspirations and his strengthening of the Iranian army. The Shah's comparison of expectations for aid to Iran with aid to Türkiye drew the attention of U.S. officials. Just as yet in 1949 in an Iran's Ambassador' (Wiley) telegram report this issue was stated. Wiley warned the government about the Shah's request for military and economic aid: "Our aid to Türkiye, both military and economic . . . has become an obsession with Iranian leaders. Iran, in the opinion of Iranians, is more exposed, more vulnerable, and from a strategic point of view, more important." Wiley also warned that U.S. aid "would stiffen the Iranian's spine by making it clear we consider Iran in the same category as Türkiye in so far as eligibility for assistance is concerned (1945-1953, Harry S. Truman. , 1977: 515)."

1.1.2. Nixon Doctrine: Iran

Nixon's foreign policy marked the beginning of a new era in American strategy. According to Nixon, other countries should have understood that the United States' capacity to serve as the world's policeman would diminish over time. To ensure that the United States would respond if necessary, recipients of military weapons had to meet two requirements: First, the governments of the region must work together to withstand the threat on their own, and if that failed, a collective demand for U.S. assistance was required. *Hence, Nations that had no great power could therefore indulge in the luxury of criticizing others; those with power bore the responsibility of decision-making.* The regional alliance served as a buffer between a distant great power and a present threat. The big power would only become involved if the protection proved insufficient (Nixon, 1967).

The Shah presented himself as the ideal ally of the Nixon Doctrine, using the U.S.'s impasse in Vietnam. While the U.S.'s policy focused on Vietnam, it also implemented a twin pillar policy to ensure its security in the Gulf. Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two main actors in the Gulf, counter-balanced each other by this strategy. Evaluating this process, Kissinger stated, "In the middle of the Vietnam War, it was not possible to assign any American forces to the Indian Ocean. Fortunately, Iran was willing to play that role (R.K.Ramazani, 2013: 56)."

The late 1960s were a trying time for the world order. Under the Nixon Doctrine, Iran became as an important regional actor for the United States policy, aiding to preserve stability in the Middle East and South Asia. American containment policy on Persian Gulf contributed to Iran military capabilities. After the British withdrawal from the Gulf, Iran preserved U.S.' benefits and that provided Iran to become strong military power in the Persian Gulf in 1970s (Alvandi, 2014: 376). For that reason, the Shah's armament efforts, which was tried to be limited in the Kennedy and Johnson periods, increased rapidly, starting in the Nixon era (Alikhani, 2000: 15); (Özdemir, 2022: 159).

In this process, the U.S. continued to support Iran, as it was particularly interested in keeping the Shah regime strong. One of the United States' most reliable partners in the area was Iran. The Shah's appetite for more and newer military hardware was the main point of contention between the two nations (history.state.gov, 1973).

Nixon's attitude facilitated the Shah's plans. The Shah began negotiating for a bigger portion of oil profits in the 1970s. The Shah advocated for a "purchase-and-sale" pact in which Iran would have complete operational control of all consortium facilities. This attitude worried policy experts in the United States. The issue was that as soon as one nation or organization agreed to a framework, another raised the bargaining option, necessitating further negotiations at a higher level (FRUS, 1969–1976).

Kuniholm (1990) stated about this process that the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan destroyed the United States' "twin pillar" policy (p. 205).

1.2. Gerald Ford Administration: Iran-Türkiye

The Ford administration continued Nixon's foreign policy goals and supported Iran's role in the Gulf. During a visit to Iran in October 1974, Henry Kissinger conveyed President Ford's expectations that Iran should increase its own power, cooperate with neighboring countries in the Gulf, and develop its presence in the Indian Ocean. (Department of State, Briefing Paper, 1974: 2); (Özdemir, 2022: 163)."

To summarize, by the late 1970s, the domestic political situations in Türkiye and Iran were having an impact on US policy in the Middle East as well as the relationships between regional actors. This influence continued throughout the 1980s and beyond.

Türkiye and Iran are important actors in maintaining regional stability, and their relationship can have far-reaching implications for actors inside and outside the Middle East. During the Shah's reign, his aspirations to become a dominant economic and military power were primarily focused on the Persian Gulf, which alleviated Türkiye's concerns regarding Iran's intentions. (Calabrese, 1998: 77). From the very beginning of the 1970s the two countries described each other as neighbors with whom they maintained friendly relations, unless they experienced a direct crisis (Çetinsaya, Türkiye- İran ilişkileri, 1997: 509); (Calabrese, 1998: 77). Despite the friendship rhetoric of the two states, their historical rivalry underlay the dynamics of their relations. The history of the bilateral relationship between Türkiye and Iran, as described by (Sinkaya, 2019), has been characterized by a delicate balance between friendship and intense competition (p.10).

Türkiye-Iran relations are also shaped regional tensions and by each country's economic framework and military security. During the 1970s, among the most significant issues that affected regional tensions and therefore Türkiye-Iran relations were the following: (a) the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which changed the regional balance (b) opium control, (c) Türkiye's intervention in Cyprus, and (d) the United States embargo on Türkiye in the 1970s. These also caused tense relations between Türkiye and the United States. The SALT agreement process and the Vietnam issue, however, affected relations between the U.S. and Iran in a positive way. All these issues were reflected in the relations between Iran and Türkiye. Such as Kissinger (Kissinger, 1979) commented that "no country can be expected to run grave risks if its interests and obligations have come to be at total variance with each other(p.1056)." Because every aspect of Iran and Türkiye's foreign policy conditions are related to each other's, the interests and obligations of Türkiye and Iran cannot be totally different.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 heightened the importance of Türkiye's role in the region. One of the U.S. official report in 1980 noted that Türkiye, as a valuable NATO ally, occupies a crucial position on the alliance's southern flank, provides access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, and shares the longest land border with the Soviet Union. The recent instability in Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan emphasized the strategic significance of Türkiye's location. (report), 1982: 3). Regardless, the 1970s turned out to be very challenging years for Türkiye's foreign policy.

Carter's presidency began in 1977, and his foreign policy aim was to reverse the fixation with containment that had dominated American foreign policy for so long. According to Carter, fear of communism led to support for any dictator who embraced U.S. policy and adopted the misguided and erroneous beliefs and techniques of

U.S. adversaries, occasionally renouncing U.S. ideals for theirs. Carter argued, America should not fear from new world. He said that "It is a new world, and we should help to shape it (Gaddis, 1992: 343.)."

2. Main Issue for Northern Iraq in 1970s

Iraq's population and social structure could be seen as a reflection of the Middle East, with each domestic actor having links to ethnic and religious groups in neighbouring country. For example, the Kurds in Northern Iraq have ties to Kurds in Syria, Türkiye, and Iran, while Shiite Arabs have connections to Shiites in other countries such as Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Sunni Arabs have connections to Arab Sunnis in Syria and Jordan, as well as Islamic trends in the Arab world. Additionally, Turkmens have connections to Türkiye. In this respect, while the developments in Iraq affect the neighbours, it seems inevitable that the policies to be followed by the neighbours will directly affect Iraq. (Çetinsaya & Özhan, 2009, p.20).

Before Iraq emerged as an independent state, there was a longstanding Safavi-Ottoman rivalry over Baghdad and the Kurdish tribes in the region. "The Kurdish people, have complicated the relations of all the modern states whose borders they overlap the USSR, Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Department of State, 1972)." After World War II, Iraqi Kurds, with the support of the USSR, established the Republic of Mahabat in northwestern Iran. This formation, which also included the executive of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, was an important step toward political legitimacy, but it was abolished by Iran within a year (Tüysüzoğlu, 2015, p. 79-80). Barzani was exiled in the USSR, but he returned to Iraq shortly after the 1958 coup. In 1961, he declared himself the leader of the Iraqi Kurdish tribes, and his forces received supplies from Iran. The Shah supported Barzani with the aim of preventing the unrest from spreading to Iran's own Kurdish population. (Department of State, 1972).

Iran and Israel played significant roles in strengthening the relations between the Iraqi Kurds and the United States. Israel had considered establishing ties with non-Arab Middle Eastern countries as a crucial aspect of its foreign policy since the 1950s. After the fall of Abdülkerim Kasım, Israel extended its support to the Kurdish movement in Northern Iraq, but its influence on the Kurds was limited compared to Iran. Iran's support for the Kurdish movement aimed to keep Baghdad occupied with the Kurdish issue, rather than helping the Kurds gain independence. (Erkmen, 2008, p.82). After the overthrow of King Faisal II of Iraq in the 1958 coup, Barzani was allowed to return to Iraq. Barzani's return marked the beginning of the Kurdish political movement in the region. Barzani did not find a serious response to his efforts to engage Kurdish groups in Syria and Türkiye for political goals in these years, but he did not give up. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was established, illegally, in 1963 in Türkiye-Silopi, a town in southeastern Türkiye. When Barzani's association with the Naqshbandi sect of Islam began to disturb the USSR, alternative organizations emerged, supported by the Soviet Union, who considered an Islamic movement as a threat to their own interests. In addition, if a Kurdish organization that had close ties with the Soviet Union was established in Türkiye, it might have rivalled the KDP and served the long-term goals of the Soviet Union without disturbing either Iraq or the Arabs. More importantly, it was considered necessary to use groups with a Marxist tradition against the influence of the United States, namely the Barzani influence. This approach was also effective in shaping the PKK organization that threatened the borders of Türkiye in the late 1970s. (Özcan, 1999); (Ozdemir, 2020: 77).

It is difficult to separate the Kurdish movement that emerged in Iraq, a neighbor of both Iran and Türkiye, from border issues. Since the mid-1970s, the activities of the PKK (*Partiyi Kargeran Kurdistan*) in Türkiye and the KDPI in Iran have been common concerns of these countries. Thus, Iraq borders became a common concern for both countries (report), 1982: 3). Therefore, Kurdish elements and actions became part of the regional policies of Iran, Turkey and the USA in the 1970s.

Saddam and Barzani met in March 1970 and agreed to Kurdish autonomy within Iraq. According to the 12-article agreement between Saddam and Barzani, the Iraqi Kurds were to have an autonomous region within four years from the signing of the agreement in March 1970. but implementation was delayed until 1974 (Gibson, 2019). In reality, this agreement functioned as a four-year ceasefire. In the meantime, issues such as autonomy would be negotiated, and a new constitution would be written. The four-year period was seen as a recovery period for both sides. Following the March 1970 accord, the conflict in Northern Iraq came to an end, albeit for only a short time (Erkmen, 2008: 80); in 1971, Iraqi agents tried to assassinate Barzani, who was then the

head of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) (A Chronology of U.S – Kurdish History). This incident convinced the Iraqi Kurds that Saddam was not to be trusted. On the other hand, Saddam's contacts with Moscow and the agreements signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union in 1971 and 1972 had raised concerns for both Nixon and M. Riza Shah. The Nixon administration concluded that the Soviet-Iraqi threat to Western interests was significant enough to justify supporting the Kurds. (Gibson, 2019).

About that time, a young reformist faction emerged from among the Kurds. Its spokesman was Jalal Talabani, who had supported Barzani during the conflict but opposed him in peace times. Saddam Hussein supported Talabani's efforts to oppose Barzani, who was a prominent figure among the Kurds, but Barzani avoided inciting the Kurds in neighboring countries. In a 1972 report, American analyst Charlotte Morehouse stated that if the Soviet Union choose to play the Kurdish card, could use the Kurds in Iran and, to a lesser extent, Türkiye (Department of State, 1972).

On the other hand, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) has declared its aim to achieve self-determination for the Kurds in Iran, to resist the political, economic, military and cultural influences of imperialism and to establish a socialist society adapted to the specific conditions of the country. However, this approach has caused concern in Iran and increased tensions between Iran and Iraq (Bruinessen, 1986).

2.1. Algiers Agreement (Iran-Iraq Border Issues)

In 1972, the Kurds, preparing for a new war, received arms and financial aid from the U.S., as well as contributions from Iran and Israel. In 1973, the Iraqi government asked a group of Peshmerga fighters to go to the Arab-Israeli war, but tensions arose between the parties when the Kurds refused. As expected with the implementation of the 1970 agreement, problems arose in 1974, and clashes between the Iraqi government and the Kurds erupted again. The Kurds, who resisted the Iraqi government with the support of Iran and the U.S., suffered a heavy defeat in 1975. The reason for this defeat was that Iran withdrew its support from the Kurdish movement after Iran and Iraq signed an agreement on March 7, 1975 -the Algiers Agreement-according to whose terms Iraq renounced its claims on the Shatt al-Arab. Following these developments, the Kurdish movement in Iraq did not recover until the mid-1980s (Erkmen, 2008: 80).

The Algiers Agreement succeeded in controlling the tensions between Iraq and Iran for several years. The Shah of Iran was concerned that any conflict on the Iraq-Iran border involving the Kurdish movement could lead to international involvement and bring the issue before the United Nations Security Council. This concern led the Shah to agree with Iraq regarding the Kurds (history.state.gov, 1975). Also according to the Algiers Agreement, Iraq agreed to move the maritime boundary between the two countries to the thalweg of the Shatt-al-Arab, on condition that Iran's withdraw its support for the Iraqi Kurds (Foreign policy 1968-80). Under the terms of the same accord, the Shah also agreed to close his border to the Kurds, which effectively killed the revolt; it collapsed within a fortnight (C.Pelletiere, 1992: 9). With Iran closing the borders, the Kurds in the region were left to Saddam's initiative. Two Iraqi peshmergas who visited the American embassy in Tehran in March 1975, the challenges faced by the Kurds post-peace were summarized as follows: The majority of Peshmerga fighters would seek refuge in Iran, as reports had surfaced that those who had attempted to surrender near Zozak Mountain had been met with gunfire. Additionally, there were allegations that Iraqi forces were detaining surrendered Kurds in concentration camps. As a result, many Kurds saw no other option but to flee to Iran, despite their lack of trust in the country. They believed that Iran had withdrawn its support in terms of munitions, supplies, and artillery, leaving the Kurds to their fate, and potentially pushing them back across the border when no longer providing assistance (Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975). One of the CIA reports explained the accord's effect to the Kurds with these words: "both governments gained important advantages from the accord; Iraq's rebellious Kurds were the big losers (National Security Archive, 1975: 2)."

Saddam's forces defeated the Kurds, destroyed many villages, rounded up Barzani's followers, and imposed his own rule on the region. This marked the tragic end of the American intervention to support the Kurds and the beginning of an ongoing, complicated relationship between the United States and the Kurds. Thousands of Kurds in Iraq lost their lives after the United States, Iran, and Israel withdrew their support in 1975. (Gibson, 2019).

In 1976, information from Major Salman Yasin, a political guidance officer of the Arbil command and former political guidance officer of the Iraqi Air Force, indicates that the center of Kurdish activity had shifted to Haj Omran in Iraq, where remaining followers of Talabani in Iran could join the Kurdish resistance. This suggests that the Kurdish partisans were not crossing the sealed Turkish border or coming from Iran (The U.S. National Archives, 1976).

On the other hand, during the Iran revolution, Paul Henze, a CIA specialist, blamed the Soviet Union for provoking the Kurds in Iran. Iranian Kurds would give the Soviets leverage with any Iranian government. He advice to the administration: When we find the Soviets meddling, we should expose their maneuvering so that the Kurds know they are being used as pawns. According to Henze, Kurds could destabilize Türkiye as well (National Security Council, 1979). For the same reason Turkish leaders were welcome after the 1975 accord (National Security Archive, 1975: 2). U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (The U.S. National Archive, 1975) indicated that "The Shah is concerned about Iraq's provocation of Kurds against Iran, and he is furious at Türkiye for opening the borders(p.2)".

3. The Jimmy Carter Administration (1977-1981)

3.1. The Opium Poppy Ban and the Cyprus Issue

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War had caused a confidence crisis for the United States in the Gulf. Similarly, the opium poppy ban and the Cyprus crisis severely damaged Türkiye's trust in its relationship with the United States. In July 1974, Representative Lester Wolff introduced a bill in Congress to cut off aid to Türkiye unless the opium poppy ban was reintroduced. After the Cyprus intervention began on August 2, 1974, Congress cancelled all American aid to Türkiye. As a result of this embargo, Türkiye's trust in the United States was severely damaged (Campany, 1986: 26). However, as Oren stated, Türkiye "never doubted America's sincere friendship for Türkiye," and Turkish authorities believed that the U.S. remained "the only great power with no ulterior motive toward them (Oren, 2007)." In the 1970s, embargoes and controlling policy shattered this traditional trust. At the start of the embargo, the terrorist organization EOKA burned down the American embassy in Cyprus and killed the American ambassador, leading to a temporary suspension of the embargo until December 10th. However, Türkiye felt it had been left alone in its just cause (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1974: 61) Türkiye's feelings of isolation were not lifted by the end of the arms embargo, the resumption of American aid, or President Carter's promise to help to solve Türkiye's financial issues. (Andelman, 1979: 9).

3.2. Shah's Attitude

The crisis in Cyprus had caused Türkiye to become increasingly isolated in the international arena, resulting in the imposition of international sanctions in 1974. Despite this, Iran did not align with Türkiye. However, the Shah believed that this tension could be leveraged to enhance Iran's regional significance. Mohammad Reza Shah sought to capitalize on this negative atmosphere as an opportunity to augment Iran's regional role (Kayaoğlu, 2014: 465). Nevertheless, the Shah frequently stated in international forums that Iran fully and unconditionally supported Türkiye. When asked about Iran's position on the arms embargo imposed on Türkiye, the Shah expressed hope for the improvement of relations between the United States and Türkiye (Milliyet, Korutürk'ün İran Gezisi, 1975a: 6).

The Shah met with U.S. Ambassador Richard Helms on July 23, 1974. He expressed his concern that Türkiye's invasion of Cyprus might set an example for Iraq to launch a similar action toward Iran. It should be taken into account that, during the same period, Iran occupied the Abu Musa and Bronze Islands. The Shah explained, however, that Iran's armament policy based on the fact that no one had helped the victims in the Arab-Israeli War or in Cyprus. Therefore, he emphasized that Iran should have its own weapons to repel any threat (Kayaoğlu, 2014: 465); (Özdemir, 2022).

Another important point of Iran-Türkiye relations is that both parties were members of CENTO (*Central Treaty Organization*), and the weakening political order was likely to harm both sides. Iranian authorities did not want Türkiye, which often functioned as a communication line between the West and Iran, to fall into chaos. The fact

that the roads to Europe pass through Türkiye was important for Iran, but the Shah believed that maintaining stability in Türkiye was the responsibility of the United States, rather than Iran. In 1975, the Shah warned the U.S. that if Türkiye fell into chaos, it might turn to countries like Libya, which would not serve the common interests of both the U.S. and Iran. As a matter of fact, Türkiye turned to Western countries to resolve the embargo issue. On June 17, 1975, the coalition government of Türkiye's JP- NSP-NMP (AP-MSP-MHP) announced that if the U.S. Congress did not lift the embargo, Türkiye would cancel the Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States and close the U.S. bases that were operating in its territory. After this statement, U.S. President Gerald Ford stated to Congress that the embargoes were pushing Türkiye closer to the USSR. He emphasized the need for Türkiye to remain an ally of the U.S. and the importance of protecting its bases in Türkiye. Despite this rhetoric, when it became clear that lifting the embargo against Türkiye was out of the question, Türkiye suspended the Defense and Cooperation Agreement with the United States on July 25, 1975 and closed nearly thirty U.S. bases in Türkiye. This action precipitated political chaos in Türkiye, and when the fighting broke out between the political right and left, factions spilled onto the streets, the Shah became concerned about Iran's own political structure (Kayaoğlu, 2014: 465).

During the visit of Turkish President Fahri Korutürk to Tehran, the Shah of Iran, in a press conference, made a statement asserting that the transportation of Iranian oil through Türkiye would be safer (Milliyet, Korutürk'ün İran Gezisi, 1975a: 6). In his statement, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel pointed out that the embargo process was unfriendly and inconsistent with both bilateral and NATO agreements. Demirel emphasized that "Türkiye does not need anyone who does not need himself (Milliyet, 1975b: 6)."

The embargos affected the Nationalist Front Government's (AP/JP-MSP/NSP-MHP/NMP coalition) change in foreign policy in 1975. Türkiye's goal with this change was to form a circle of friendship and cooperation with its neighbors. As a result of the new understanding of foreign policy, Türkiye first turned its attention to its neighbor, Iran (Alkan, 2020: 276). Finally, the Shah stated that the embargoes against Türkiye should be lifted; however, the Turkish administration found these efforts insufficient. This crisis increased Iran's value to the United States because when Türkiye closed the U.S. bases, it needed its bases in Iran to observe the USSR. After the Iranian Revolution, this atmosphere changed, however. The relations between Iran and the U.S. came to a breaking point with the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and the U.S. lost control of its observation stations on the Iranian borders. Türkiye, on the other hand, tried to maintain its regional role by keeping its relations with both sides in balance (Kayaoğlu, 2014: 465).

In 1978, President Carter lifted the arms embargo on Türkiye as a crucial step to strengthen the southern flank of NATO and the reopening of US military installations in Türkiye. It was done by amending the fiscal 1979 military aid bill to allow Türkiye to purchase \$175 million worth of U.S. arms and equipment annually. (Özdemir, 2022); (Kayaoğlu, 2014: 465)

In response, internal unrest increased in Türkiye as a result of the embargoes. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit accused the United States and other allies of delaying a \$1-billion aid plan that President Carter had proposed (Andelman, 1979: 9).

With regard to the effect of the embargoes on Türkiye-United States relations, S. Demirel said that they "seriously damaged traditional and friendly Turkish-American relations." And, Between the two side diplomacy process intensified in 1977, and gave the results after 1980 (history.state.gov, 2014: 282). The Turkish Ambassador, Esenbel, perceived the agreement as a means to rectify the disruption in Turkish-American relations caused by the actions of the U.S. Congress in late 1974. He believed it served as a means to reestablish and strengthen political and security ties between the two countries. (history.state.gov, 2014: 277).

In the 1970s, international crises highlighted the regional importance of both actors. Thoughts such as Cho Chou En Lai's desire for Iran and Türkiye to be supported more against Soviet influence and protection of the northern tier also illustrated this importance (The U.S. National Archive, 1975). The crises of the 1970s showed that when either Iran or Türkiye ran into difficulties with the dominant powers, the other side tended to assess the situation to identify opportunities to advance its own interests.

3.3. Carter Doctrine

Before Jimmy Carter became president in 1976, many Americans saw him as a symbol of hope for restoring honesty, morality, and optimism in the White House and the country after the Vietnam War and Watergate (Rosati, 1993, p. 459). The United States' relations with the Soviet Union were strained, as President Nixon's 'linkage' strategy had failed and the Senate did not ratify the SALT Accords (Hook & Spanier, 2018: 129). In this context, the Carter Doctrine, announced by President Carter, marked a shift in American foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region. It emphasized the strategic importance of the Gulf for the United States and declared that the U.S. would take responsibility for its defense. In order to achieve this, the Carter administration began to establish a security framework in the Gulf and Southwest Asia, which included the strengthening of regional capabilities and the development of facilities for the Rapid Deployment Force (later known as the Central Command). This represented a departure from the Nixon Doctrine, which had focused on supporting regional allies to maintain stability in the region (Kuniholm, 1990: 205).

The Carter Doctrine, announced in January 1980, articulated the United States' commitment to the defense of the Persian Gulf region. It emphasized that any external attempt to exert control over the area would be considered a threat to the vital interests of the U.S. and that the country would employ all necessary means, including military force, to counter such a threat. This doctrine echoes key principles established during the early stages of the Cold War, such as the Truman Doctrine (Jentleson, 2000: 167,177-78).

3.4. Iran-Türkiye & The United States: End of the 1970s.

Carter had warned the Shah about human rights violations in Iran and international reactions to SAVAK's practices in the first years of his presidential era. On the other hand, he also cautioned him about ongoing arms sales to Iran, noting that Iran's growing importance in the SALT process was a key issue in the shaping of Iran-U.S. relations. During the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Iran became a valuable location for American intelligence-gathering on Soviet missile tests over the Russian territory. This collaboration was dependent on the attitude of the Shah of Iran. Despite having achieved a strong military presence in the Persian Gulf region by 1975, the Shah did not decrease Iran's program of purchasing American weaponry. Iranian nationalist and religious groups opposed the strong ties with the United States, and by the mid-1970s, some in the U.S. government began to question the relationship between the U.S. and the Shah. The Shah became more assertive in his relations with the United States, even threatening to seek support from European or Soviet countries if his demands were not met (Moens, 1991: 214). *This approach of the Shah and his increasing contacts with Germany and France in the 1970s, as Hunter (Hunter, 2010) noted, reached such dimensions as to make the United States uncomfortable* (p. 35). However, after the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam, the tendency of U.S. policy was that problems in developing countries could be separated from the competition between the great powers (Hook & Spanier, 2018: 129). Following the tensions between Türkiye and the United States in the mid-1970s, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made it clear that the problems of the developing countries could not be isolated from world politics. The U.S. lost control of the satellites on the borders of the Soviet Union with the Iranian Revolution, reducing its ability to monitor the Soviets, and Iran's new anti-Western administration brought Türkiye's role in the region to the fore. Despite this, some American experts believed that the facilities in Turkey could never compensate for the loss of those in Iran. This was a delicate time for Turkish-American relations, as Türkiye's strategic position was vital to American interests (Andelman, 1979: 9). The ban on opium and the Cyprus crisis strained Türkiye's relations with the United States, which caused Washington to turn to Iran as its primary regional ally. However, following the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States lifted its arms embargo on Turkey and had to rely on Turkey's strategic role in deterring Soviet intervention in Southwest Asia under the Carter Doctrine (Alvandi, 2014: 377).

The embargoes imposed on Türkiye were lifted in 1978, and military assistance to Turkey increased following the 1980 Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement. According to the report released in the first year of the agreement, the United States improved its military operations and interests in Türkiye, owing to its assistance in meeting Türkiye's security needs, its access to military facilities, and the proposed military construction. The report also pointed out that, militarily, Türkiye lagged behind other NATO allies and was struggling with obsolescent

equipment. Its military had weakened to the point where it had difficulty fulfilling its NATO responsibilities. As a result, Türkiye was obliged to rely on the United States and other NATO allies for economic and military assistance (report), 1982: 5). The effect of the embargo continued in Türkiye during the first years of the Carter era. Then the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the military coup in Turkey in 1980, at which point the need for political stability in both countries became clear.

Before the Carter Administration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had expressed concerns that the Shah of Iran had been given a blank check and that arms sales to Iran were out of control. In September 1976, the committee released a report warning that any efforts by the United States to decrease arms sales or assistance would be seen as a sign of diminishing support for the Shah, which could potentially encourage his enemies. As a result, the Carter Administration did not significantly reduce arms sales to Iran. When the Shah was removed from power in 1979, many of the systems had not been delivered, and orders totaling \$9 billion, pending through 1981, were all approved by Carter. Therefore, the cancellation of the F-16 fighters was more of a symbolic move rather than a practical one (Sale, 1980: 80-83).

After the Iranian Revolution, Paul Henze suggested that the Kurds could be used by the Soviet Union to influence the Tehran government, and that measures should be taken to prevent this, including disclosing Soviet actions in this direction if necessary. He also stressed the importance of taking measures to protect the overall structure of Iran (National Security Council, 1979).

The eight-year Iran-Iraq war overshadowed the economic and diplomatic relations between the parties throughout the 1980s. The war exacerbated the problems at the borders. It was possible to resolve border problems through diplomacy, but terrorism events became the dominant regional problem.

(To provide a different perspective on the media's portrayal of regional actors and the approach of the superpowers during this period, *additional document 1* offers a caricatured media image.)

Conclusion

The American Presidential Doctrines have been a fundamental tool in shaping the United States' international strategy since World War II. These doctrines summarize the policies of almost all U.S. presidents and allow American leaders to communicate their primary objectives to cooperating countries that align with their policies. U.S. policies towards the Middle East are also shaped by these doctrines, influencing the policies of regional actors.


During the Cold War, regional actors in the Middle East sought to exploit the U.S.-Soviet rivalry to advance their interests. The United States maintained its balance of power by analyzing the historical competitive perceptions of regional actors. U.S. support for Iran's military buildup in the 1970s was part of a larger project to maintain the balance of power in the Gulf. However, this support contributed to a lack of trust among regional actors and fueled rivalries. Examples of this approach to crises include the Cyprus issue and the Shah of Iran's use of the process to obtain more arms assistance. On the other hand, this process also led to the emergence of new actors for the United States and accelerated the integration of Kurdish elements in northern Iraq in regional balances. However, the most significant long-term outcome of this process for Iraq, Türkiye, and Iran has been the threat to border security.

This process also led to the emergence of new actors and accelerated the integration of Kurdish elements in northern Iraq into the regional balance, but the addition of non-state actors to this dynamic led to a shift towards a more complex strategy. This shift created uncertainty and tensions between the countries of the region, particularly in the area of border security, and damaged the multidimensional relations between the parties. The emergence of a chaotic period in which terrorism and regional actors are evaluated in the same perspective has had negative long-term consequences that have affected the relations of all regional powers.

In the 1970s, Turkey's regional role was overshadowed by the overlapping interests of the United States and Iran. Despite the Shah of Iran's attempts to exploit Turkey's crises on the international stage, the 1979 revolution in Iran and the 1980 military intervention in Turkey highlighted the importance of political stability for both

countries. The US authorities had also realized, based on their historical experience with Iran and Turkey, that maintaining stable diplomatic relations was crucial to maintaining the balance of power in the region.

Document 1



(Eslami, 1359)

Acknowledgements: This research was conducted by the author(s) during their postdoctoral research at The Johns Hopkins University with the support of the TÜBİTAK 2219 Postdoctoral Research Fellowship.

REFERENCES

- A Chronology of U.S – Kurdish History*, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/kurds/cron.html>.
- Alikhani, H. (2000). *Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy*, I.B.Tauris.
- Alkan, S. (2020). "Fahri Korutürk'ün İran Gezisi Çerçevesinde Türkiye-İran İlişkilerinin Ulusal Basında Temsili", *Troyacademy*, 5(2), 273-294.
- Alvandi, R. (2014). "Iran and the Cold War", *Iranian Studies*, 47(3), s. 373-378.
- Andelman, D. A. (1979, March 19). "Türkiye's Relations With U.S. Still Tense", *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/19/archives/Türkiyes-relations-with-us-still-tense-despite-lifting-of-arms.html>. (Accessed: 24.03.2021).
- Armaoğlu, F. (1995). *20. Yüzyıl Dünya Tarihi*, Alkım Yay.
- Bruinessen, M. V. (1986, July/August). "Major Kurdish Organizations in Iran", *Middle East Report* 141 : <https://merip.org/1986/07/major-kurdish-organizations-in-iran/>. (Accessed: 14.07.2021).
- C.Pelletiere, S. (1992). *The Iran-Iraq War : chaos in a vacuum*, London: Praeger.
- Calabrese, J. (1998). "Türkiye and Iran: limits of a stable relationship", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, May, 25(1), 75-94.
- Company, R. J. (1986). *Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period*, Praeger.
- Chubin, S. (1974). "Iran: Between the Arab West and the Asian East", *Survival*, 16(4), 172-182.
- Çetinkaya, G. (1997). "Türkiye- İran İlişkileri", *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç* (s. 507-514). Ankara: TTK.
- Çetinkaya, G., & ÖZHAN, T. (2009). *"İşgalin 6. Yılında Irak"*, Ocak , Rapor No: IV. Ankara: Seta Yay.
- Donovan, H., & Grunwald, H. (1972, January 3). "The Nation: An Interview with the President: The Jury Is Out", *Time*.
- Erkmen, S. (2008). "1945–1989 Yılları Arasında ABD'nin Kuzey Irak Politikası", *Akademik Orta Doğu*, 3(1). Emniyet-i Eslami, (1359, 3 /5).
- Foreign policy 1968–80*. (n.d.). <https://www.britannica.com/place/Iraq/Foreign-policy-1968-80>.
- Frus. (1969–1976). *Energy crisis, 1969–1974, Volume XXXVI*.
- Gaddis, J. L. (1992). *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, Oxford Univ. Press.
- Gibson, B. R. (2019, October 14). The Secret Origins of the U.S.-Kurdish Relationship Explain Today's Disaster. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/14/us-kurdish-relationship-history-syria-Türkiye-betrayal-kissinger/>. (Accessed: 24.03.2021).
- Goshko, J. M. (1978, August 2). "Hill Lifts Embargo On Arms to Türkiye", *The Washington Post*.
- Gültekin, S. (2008). "Amerikan Dış Politikasının Kökenleri ve Amerikan Dış Politik Kültürü" , Cilt 5, Sayı 19. *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Güz 5(19), 119-144.
- history.state.gov. (1973, January 18). *Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1964–1968, IRAN*. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v22/summary>. (Accessed: 12.07.2021).
- history.state.gov (Dü.). (1975, February 19). *Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington*. Foreign Relations Of The United States 1969–1976, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d103>.
- history.state.gov. (2014). 1977-1980, Volume XXI, 1977-1980 Jimmy Carter Vol. XXI, Cyprus; Türkiye; Greece. (D. Zierler, & A. M. Howard, Derleyiciler) United States Government Printing Office.
- Hook , S. W., & Spanier, J. W. (2018). *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, CQ Press.
- Hunter, S. T. (2010). *Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order*, Oxford: Praeger.
- Jentleson, B. W. (2000). *American foreign policy : the dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, W. W. Norton & Company, U.S.A.

- Kayaoğlu, B. (2014). "The Limits of Turkish–Iranian Cooperation, 1974–80", *Iranian Studies*, 47(3), 463–478. doi: doi:10.1080/00210862.2014.880634.
- Kissinger, H. (1979). *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Kuniholm, B. (1990). "Rules of the Game: The Geopolitics of U.S. Policy Options in Southwest Asia", *Neither East nor West Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States*, (Ed. N. R. Keddie, & M. J. Gasiorowski).
- Mann, J. (2013). Brzezinski And Iraq: The Makings Of A Dove. Charles Gati içinde, *The Strategy And Statecraft Of Zbigniew Brzezinski*, JHU Press.
- McDougall, W. A. (2009, July). "U.S. Foreign Policy Traditions And The Middle East", 14(17). <https://www.fpri.org/article/2009/07/u-s-foreign-policy-traditions-and-the-middle-east/>.
- Memorandum (1979, Feb 1979). *from Paul B. Henze for Zbigniew Brzezinski regarding the political ambitions of the Kurds in both Iran and Turkey*. [.link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349151603/USDD?u=balt85423&sid=bookmark-USDD&xid=d64fd416&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349151603/USDD?u=balt85423&sid=bookmark-USDD&xid=d64fd416&pg=1).
- Merriam-Webster Dictionary : "Meliorism", (2021, April 16). <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meliorism>.
- Milliyet. (1975a). Korutürk'ün İran Gezisi.
- Milliyet. (1975b). Demirel'in Basın Toplantısı.
- Moens, A. (1991, p. 214). "President Carter's Advisers and the Fall of the Shah", *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer 106(2), 211-237. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2152227>.
- Murray, D. (2013). "Military Action But Not As We Know It: Libya, Syria, And The Making Of An Obama Doctrine", *Contemporary Politics*, 19(2), 146-166. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2013.785827>.
- Nixon, R. M. (1967, October). "Asia After Vietnam", *Foreign Affairs*, 46(1), pp. 113-125.
- Onder, E. (2020). "Within The Framework of the Presidents, Us New Concept of Security and Cold Peace", *Stratejik ve Sosyal Arastirmalar Dergisi*, 4(1).
- Oren, M. (2007). *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present Year*, W. W. Norton & Company.
- Ozdemir, S. (2020, p. 77). "Iran-Iraq War: Effect on Terrorism on Turkey's Borders", *Gazi Akademik Bakis*, 26(13), 49-77.
- Özcan, N. A. (1999). *PKK Tarihi ideolojisi*, ASAM.
- Özdemir, S. (2022). *İran Devrim Süreci: İran-ABD İlişkilerinin Seyri 1945-1989*, Ankara: ATAM.
- Paterson, P. (2018). "Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy", *Perry Center Occasional Paper*. https://www.williamjperrycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication_associated_files/Origins%20of%20US%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf.
- R.K.Ramazani. (2013, p. 56). *Independence Without Freedom Iran's Foreign Policy*, University of Virginia Press.
- Rosati, J. A. (1993). "Jimmy Carter, a Man before His Time? The Emergence and Collapse of the First Post-Cold War Presidency", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 23(3), 459–76. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551107>.
- Sale, R. (1980). "Carter and Iran: From Idealism to Disaster", *The Washington Quarterly*, 3(4), 75-87. doi:DOI: 10.1080/01636608009451479.
- Schorr, D. (1991, April 7). "1975 Background To Betrayal", *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/04/07/1975-background-to-betrayal/aa973065-ea5e-4270-8cf9-02361307073c/>.
- Schorr, D. (1996, October 18). "Telling It Like It Is: Kissinger and the Kurds", *The Christian Science Monitor*. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1996/1018/101896.opin.column.1.html>.
- Sinkaya, B. (2019). *Türkiye-Iran Relations After the JDP*. Istanbul: IFEA.
- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi. (1974). <https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/t13/c013/tbmm13013005.pdf>.

- The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957.* (ND). history.state.gov: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/eisenhower-doctrine> .
- The U.S. National Archives. (1975). Central Foreign Policy Files, *Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Beirut, Geneva, and USUN(Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1969–1976, Volume Xxvii,*). Tahran.
- The U.S. National Archive. (1976, November 2). Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, London, and Moscow. Baghdad: National Archives.
- The U.S. National Security Archive. (1975, Feb. 8). Department of State. *Memorandum of Conversation*.
- The U.S. National Security Archive. (1974, March 11). Department of State, Briefing Paper.
- The U.S. National Security Archive (1972). *The Kurds of Iraq: Renewed Insurgency?* Document Number: RNAS-10, May 31, 1972. Department of State.
- The U.S. National Security Archive. (1982, August 11). The Defense And Economic Cooperation Agreement- U.S. Interests And Turkish Needs. *REPORT BY THE Comptroller General OF THE UNITED STATES*. DTIC. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA118125.pdf>.
- The U.S. National Security Archive. (1977). 1945-1953, Harry S. Truman. *Telegram The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State*, . Iran.
- The U.S. National Security Archive (1975, May 1). *The Implication of The Iran-Iraq Agreement(DCI/NIO, 1039-75)*.
- Tüysüzoğlu, G. (2015). “Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi: Rantçı Devlet Yaklaşımı Çerçevesinde Bir Değerlendirme” , *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 12(47), 73-98.
- www.jfklibrary.org. (1961, May 25). *President John F. Kennedy Delivered in person before a joint session of Congress*. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/united-states-congress-special-message-19610525> .
- Zaracostas, J. (1981, p. 101). *The International Implications Of The 1974 Cyprus Crisis*, Australian National University, MA Thesis.

Beyan ve Açıklamalar (Disclosure Statements)

1. Bu çalışmanın yazarları, araştırma ve yayın etiği ilkelerine uyduklarını kabul etmektedirler (The authors of this article confirm that their work complies with the principles of research and publication ethics).
2. Yazarlar tarafından herhangi bir çıkar çatışması beyan edilmemiştir (No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors).
3. Bu çalışma, intihal tarama programı kullanılarak intihal taramasından geçirilmiştir (This article was screened for potential plagiarism using a plagiarism screening program).