

ORIENTATIONS AND ORIENTALISM THE GOVERNOR SIR RONALD STORRS

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The main idea of this article came to my mind while studying *Orientalisms*, the book of the first Civilian Governor of Jerusalem Sir Ronald Storrs. As I was reading his text I found myself surprised by all his Orientalist preoccupations. Before looking for potential links between the British Imperial rule in Palestine and Orientalism, we need to define what Orientalism is. The second section will analyse the background of Sir Ronald Storrs, and the third will examine his perception of Zionism. The fourth section focuses on Storrs' perspectives of the Arabs in order to highlight his Orientalism, and the final section concludes by analysing the interaction between Orientalism and Imperialism.

I

The hypothesis which will guide the theoretical exploration of this article is that "Orientalism" is an inherent practice of Western imperialism. To develop this hypothesis, I shall start by examining the phenomenon of Orientalism.

In the last three decades we saw a shift from materialist to cultural analyses of imperialism. Since 1978 when Edward Said published his *magnus opus*, *Orientalism*, many universities around the world have established courses to study the phenomenon of Orientalism. In particular, Said's *Orientalism*, elaborating on Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony and on Michel Foucault's theorisation of discourse and relationship between knowledge and power, revolutionised the study of the whole region of the Middle East

and shaped new fields of studies as post-colonial theory. Said's book is one of the most controversial scholarly books of the last decades, sparking intense debate and disagreement.

Orientalism explores the preconceived notion of the "West" for the "East". The central argument of Orientalism is that the way the "West" acquired the knowledge for the "East" is not innocent or objective but rather the result of a process that reflects certain interests, i.e. imperial interests. Specifically, Said argues that the way the "West" looks at the Middle East is through a lens that distorts the actual reality of those places and those people. It calls this lens through which "West" viewed "East", Orientalism. Therefore, Orientalism is a framework that the "West" uses to understand the unfamiliar "East" and at the same time to make it appear different and threatening. Said's work made a significant contribution on this general process of stereotyping.

Orientalism, the theory and the practice of representing "the Orient", is a controversial and a problematic concept. It is real but at the same time also an artificial construction. Nevertheless, the historical notion of the "Orient" originally referred to countries lying east of the Mediterranean, and most probably to the east of the Roman Empire. Recently, the term "Middle East" came into prominence in place of the "Orient" because of the region's location as viewed from the capital of the British Empire, London. Since the 19th century the region has been defined and moulded by the British Empire.

According to Said, the Orient has helped to define Europe as a contrasting image, idea, personality and experience (Said 2003: 1-2). Orientalism interprets the civilisation, the people and the localities. Said maintains the Orientalist tradition of Western writing was founded by Homer. It is indeed a very interesting fact that Sir Ronald Storrs was reading Homer's *Odyssey* every morning before taking his breakfast. Actually, he uses some passages from the original text in his *Orientalisms*.

Orientalism creates a stereotypical image according to which the "West" is seen as being essentially rational, developed, humane, superior and authentic, while the "East" is seen as being irrational, aberrant, backward, crude, inferior and inauthentic. These stereotypes contribute to the construction of a hegemonic system designed to dominate the Orient and thus promote Western imperialism. Therefore Western imperialism still uses Orientalism as a significant instrument.

Said argued that Orientalism is directly linked with Imperialism. In particular, he located the construction of Orientalism within the history of Imperial conquest, as empires spread across the globe. More specifically, the British Empire conquered the Middle East not only militarily but also ideologically.

Like all empires, Britain operated the all time classic "divide et impera" strategy in Palestine in order to maintain her rule. The Romans first applied this strategy in order to maintain their empire. Actually, the word empire derives from the word *imperium*, the function of command militarily but also ideologically in a society. The idea that West and East are fundamentally different from one another is favourable to Western imperialist interests and strategies.

The main problem for the British Empire was how to understand the natives that it encountered in order to subdue and rule them more easily. Using large abstract categories to explain different people has been going on as long as there have been empires. The difference with Orientalism is that it makes this general process more formal and makes it appear to be objective knowledge.

II

In recent years there has been a resurgence of academic interest in British rule in Palestine. Among the numerous historical works on Mandatory Palestine, studies dealing with the role of its first Civilian Governor of Jerusalem Sir Ronald Storrs are relatively scarce in comparison with those dealing with general political questions. There is no study of Storrs' strategies of forming an

"Orient", or of creating a Palestine that reflects the contradictions of Imperial ideology.

Said describes Sir Ronald Storrs as an Orientalist-cum-Imperial agent (Said, 2003: 196). According to Said, Storrs Orientalism was self-created out of the intensely personal encounter with the Arabs and expressed general contempt for official knowledge held about the Orient (Said 2003: 237). Said continues by arguing that Storrs expressed the traditional Western hostility to and fear of the Orient. Storrs' view refined and gave a personal twist to the academic style of modern Orientalism with its repertoire of grand generalisation tendentious "science" from which there was no appeal and reductive formulae. He recommended policy in Jerusalem on the basis of such generalisations (Said, 2003: 238).

Let us now turn our attention to Storrs' apprenticeship. Storrs was born during the Victorian era of the British Empire in the end of the 19th century. His father was a curate, a high-ranking Anglican clergy man who later became Dean of Rochester. He was educated at Charterhouse and Pembroke College at Cambridge. In 1903 he graduated with first class honours in Classical Tripos. At Cambridge he was taught Arabic by Edward Granville Browne, a British Orientalist Professor of Arabic (Bosworth, 2001: 84). Browne was famous for his enthusiasm for communicating the subject to his students and undoubtedly influenced Storrs to adopt an orientalist approach to Islamic studies.

After his graduation from Cambridge, Storrs taught Latin and Greek, and the Old Testament, to a young pupil (Storrs, 1937: 18). He considered these three courses as an overall summary of civilisation. He says: "I teach their boy Francis, Latin and Greek, and the Old Testament and, apparently, a general conspectus of civilisation" (Storrs, 1937: 18). In this way, Storrs equates civilisation with the Western Greek, Roman and Christian heritage. To my mind, Storrs' confidence in the truth of the Old Testament does not necessarily reflect a personal theological conservatism, as some have implied, but it feeds on the centrality of the Western Christian identity. Indeed, in the last third of the eighteenth

century when what Said regarded as "Modern Orientalism" began, a higher education meant above all the study of Greek and Latin.

The following year after his graduation, Storrs served in Egyptian Customs staying there for five years. In 1909 he became Oriental Secretary to the Cairo Residency, then in 1917 was appointed as the War Cabinet Secretariat. From 1917 to 1920 he was Military Governor of Jerusalem. The military regime lasted for two and a half years, and so in 1920 he became the first Civil Governor (later styled District Commissioner) of Jerusalem. He held his office until 1926 when he became Governor of Cyprus. The 1931 revolt in Cyprus ended with the burning of his governmental house, and the loss of all the archives and memoirs that he had kept until then. That is why *Orientalisms* is based upon the letters he sent to his family. After Cyprus he held the office of Governor of Northern Rhodesia from 1932 till 1934. He was a very good friend of T.E. Lawrence. Wasserstein characterises him as a humane, civilised, and clever man, but a man whom you cannot completely trust. Storrs liked to declare himself as "anima naturaliter Levantina" (echoing the remark made of Plato that he was "anima naturaliter Christian") (Wasserstein, 1991: 248). In 1937 he published his *Memoirs* putting on the cover of the book the symbol of his Pro-Jerusalem Society. The symbol is a combination of the Arab crescent, the Star of David, and the Christian Cross.

I am willing to suggest that, raised within a religious family, educated with classical studies, but also living during the "glorious" Victorian era of the British Empire, that is where Storrs acquired his Orientalist interpretation of the Arab people and culture. The socio-economic context of the Victorian period made the British regard themselves as the centre of the world and the greatest empire of all the time. In his own *Memoirs* of 1937, Storrs expressed the traditional Western stereotypical image of the Orient. Storrs' *Orientalisms* is an exceptional product of his imperialism experience. It was within the Victorian era that the discourse of imperialism and Orientalism reigned.

Edward Said identifies Orientalism as a "distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical and philological texts" (Said, 2003: 12). What is extremely significant about Storrs *Orientalisms* is that Storrs' text did not merely describe the Orient world he imagines, but also contributed to the formulation of colonial law and the justification of its suspension during conditions of emergency or threat to the sovereignty of the colonial state. Mandatory Palestine was the place where the tensions between Arabs and Jews were played out. The main argument of this article is that it was through the discourse of Orientalism that Storrs negotiated such tensions.

Storrs, influenced by, and himself influencing, British colonialist policies in the Middle East, has accepted and propagated certain superficial and absurd generalisations about such policies which reflect and tend to justify European domination. In his *Orientalisms*, Sir Ronald Storrs wrote a critical account of Arab civilisation, which in his view was much in need of redemption by European honour and intelligence. In *Orientalisms* and his policies as a Governor of Jerusalem, Storrs shows many of the British preconceptions and prejudices against Arabs. These include an exaggerated respect for classical Western texts and an over-emphasis on the significance of oriental despotism.

III

Undoubtedly, there is not one history of Palestine; there are at least two, one written from the Jewish perspective and the other from the Palestinian one. As E H Carr points out there is no history, only interpretations of selected events. It is commonly believed that history is the property of the winners. That is true, generally, in terms of nation and of class. In the case of Palestine the Jewish version of events during the British Mandate era has dominated the Western relevant literature.

Therefore, there are two contrasting claims with regard to the relationship between Sir Ronald Storrs and the Zionists. The first is that Storrs and the Zionists were always closely allied however antagonistic they appeared. The British rule systematically

endorsed Zionist aspirations (Segev, 2000). On the other hand it is claimed is that Storrs held an anti-Zionist position on the central issues relating to Palestine (Miller, 2000: 118).

In his *Orientations* Storrs has a special chapter dedicated to Zionism. Storrs was aware that the Zionists considered him an anti-Zionist during his service as a Governor of Jerusalem (Miller, 2000: 123). However, this anti-Zionist appeal was only ostensible. According to Professor Kirk, Sir Ronald Storrs had a sincere sympathy for Zionism (Kirk, 1948: 153). Storrs described Zionism as a divine enterprise using the Hebrew word *Shekhina* (Segev, 2000: 91). He believed that he had been chosen to discharge the moral and political debt to the Jews as the latter had contributed their genius to the world (Segev, 2000: 91).

Storrs' intention was to appear as a friend of both Arabs and Jews and an impartial expert on Palestine. However, according to the Greek Philosopher Aristotle, friendship presupposes a real equality of some kind. After his time in office, his desire was to be seen as a neutral figure in the Palestine debate. Nevertheless, in various instances Storrs had come out from behind his veneer of objectivity and admitted his true position. He had always been an ambiguous figure. He was seen by the Zionists as the "evil genius" of Sir Herbert Samuel, and was often criticised by them as an anti-Zionist. He wrote that "from the beginning we encountered a critical Zionist press, which soon developed into pan-Jewish hostility. We were inefficient, ill-educated; strongly pro-Arab, violently anti-Zionist, even anti-Jewish" (Storrs, 1937: 381).

Storrs supported the Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s. He considered it an act of salvation and historic justice (Segev, 2000: 90). He described the British Military Administration as the "ostensibly directing party" in the issue (Storrs, 1937: 380). He wanted it to appear that he could not do anything to prevent or stop it.

It is of paramount importance to explore the attitude of Storrs towards the Jewish National Home. In their Mandate for Palestine,

the British implemented the provisions of the 1917 Balfour Declaration calling for the establishment of a Jewish national home. With that the British promised rights of some kind in the Palestinian Arabs' country to the Jewish people. As Arnold Toynbee outlines it, the British took it upon themselves to give away something that was not theirs to give (Toynbee, 1964: 639). Whereas the Declaration formed the basis of government policy. According to Hallinan, Storrs acknowledged the significance of the establishment of a Jewish national home for the British Empire. Using an analogy from the Irish partition, Storrs stated that a "Jewish home will form for England a little loyal Jewish Ulster in a sea of potentially hostile Arabism" (Hallinan, 2005).

According to Tibawi, Storrs in 1918 spontaneously stated that he was "a convinced Zionist" (Tibawi, 1977: 268). Immediately after he took the office of the Military Governor of Jerusalem, he arranged for official announcements to be published in Hebrew, hitherto unrecognised in Palestine, as well as in Arabic, English and French (Tibawi 1977: 269). Thus the Jews had been given special treatment as they were constantly receiving special privileges in contrast to other minorities such as the Christian one (McTaque, 1983: 48).

Soon after his arrival in Jerusalem, Storrs was joined by Ernest T Richmond whom he knew from his office time in Egypt. Richmond had been responsible for the religious institution of *Waqf* in Cairo. Zionists consider Richmond as an opponent to Zionism and to the Balfour Declaration. Richmond collaborated with Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, the Mufti of Jerusalem. One very interesting thing was the insistence of Weizmann to purchase the Western Wall from the *Waqf* in order to strengthen the Zionists (Segev, 2000: 71). Ronald Storrs supported and helped the Zionists to accomplish the transfer of the Wall to the Jews, but was afraid of the Arab reaction (Segev, 2000: 72). Eventually the Zionists did not achieve their goal.

Another crucial aspect that it is also important to emphasise is the relationship of Sir Ronald Storrs with the Zionist Commission. In

1918 the Zionist Commission under Chaim Weizmann arrived to Palestine. Storrs regretted the Commission's arrival "from a sense of previousness, of inopportunity" (Storrs, 1937: 360). Nevertheless, he supported the Zionist Commission's efforts to cultivate local Arab leaders upon its arrival in Palestine (Wasserstein, 1991: 29). He organised an official reception and a dinner in honour of the Commission, along with the attendance of important and influential Jerusalem Arabs. According to Wasserstein, Storrs called upon Weizmann to clear away "misconceptions and misapprehensions which were rife concerning the aims of Zionist policy" (Wasserstein, 1991: 29).

On 2 November 1918 Storrs supported and approved the celebration of the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. He delivered a speech at the meeting organised by the Zionist Commission in Jerusalem and attended the parade (Wasserstein, 1991: 31). At the end of the meeting there were some scuffles near the Jaffa Gate of Jerusalem, where a group of high school students seized a Zionist banner. In his official report Storrs described the protesters as "two or three ragamuffins of the lowest class, one a Muslim and one a Christian" (Wasserstein, 1991: 31). Two young protesters were arrested and sent to prison. Storrs described what followed (Wasserstein, 1991: 32):

The sequel to yesterday's events occurred this morning, when a deputation of all Christian and Muslim sects headed by the mayor marched singing to these headquarters. Hearing a crowd outside my door I found myself confronted by the mayor who, amid a well-disciplined silence, informed me that he had come to protest against the assumption that Palestine was to be handed over to any one of the three religions practised by its inhabitants. At the conclusion of his speech he handed me written protestations. I attach a copy of the protest handed to myself, of which, though Mr. Balfour's Declaration is undoubtedly the object, the occasion was furnished by yesterday's proceedings, but for which this public animadversion upon the policy of His Majesty's Government by the united Christians and Muslims of Jerusalem would most certainly not have been evoked

Storrs reported the incident and evaluated it as minor and concluded that "there was nothing anti-Jewish or organised in this scuffle, though there is certainly a very strong anti-Zionist feeling prevalent" (McTague, 1983: 54).

The story behind his potential appointment as Chief Administrator of Palestine is equally interesting. In July 1919 General Money and General Clayton left their offices in OETA (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration). For the post of Chief Administrator Storrs was the most probable successor since had served as acting Chief Administrator replacing Money. In spite of this Zionists did not trust him. So Storrs made a big effort to cultivate them (Wasserstein, 1991: 49). He often insisted that he was a "sioniste convaincu" (Wasserstein, 1991: 49-50). In his attempt to gain the support of the Zionists, he used the names of friends among the Egyptian Sephardi aristocracy who were supposed to share a pro-Zionist position (Storrs, 1945: 330). According to McTague, Zionists regarded Storrs as anathema (McTague, 1983: 86). Leon Simon of the Zionist Commission commented in his diary: "Storrs himself, though he professes strong Jewish sympathies, is currently believed to be a bit anti-Semitic. Certainly he is very friendly with the Arabs. Personally, I don't think he is anti-Semitic, but I do not expect much good from him" (Wasserstein, 1991: 49-50). Edwin Samuel, the District Officer under Storrs and son of Herbert Samuel, considered him "thoroughly unscrupulous. Nothing he said could be wholly trusted" (Samuel, 1970: 52). There were rumours that Storrs would be the next Chief Administrator; even Money agitated for Storrs' appointment. Still Zionist influence of British Policy prevented Storrs' appointment. Eventually, due to Zionist disagreement, Storrs was not appointed Chief Administrator. This story shows not only how great the influence of the Zionists on the British was but also the Storrs' great effort to establish himself as a Zionist.

Furthermore, one anecdote that helps to raise an issue when assessing Storrs as an Orientalist is related to the cultural activities and organisation that he established in Jerusalem. He believed that "in time of stress and forced inactivity, interest and information

are necessary for thinking men" (Storrs, 1937: 332). Thus he founded the Jerusalem School of Music. He states that three quarters of the professors and the ninety percent of the pupils were Jews but he wanted others to participate, such as Christians. Moreover, he founded a Chess Club with himself as the President, a Jewish Treasurer, Latin Catholic Secretary, and Muslim Members of Committee (Storrs, 1937: 332). Storrs stated that in the tournament organised by the Chess Club the "first four prizes were won by Jews, and the fifth by the Military Governor" (Storrs, 1937: 332). What is important about all these cultural activities is that the reader of Storrs' text gets the impression that Arabs were not capable of or not interested in cultural activities. In fact, Storrs showed a sound and genuine interest in Hebrew culture, conversing with Afad Ha'am and Chaim Nachman Bialik, the prominent Hebrew poet (Segev, 2000: 91). The peer "civilisation" that could cooperate with the superior culture of the West was only the Jewish one. The Arabs are self-excluded as they have been presented as persons without cultural interests.

IV

In the relevant literature there are accusations of discrimination against the Arab community by showing preference to the Jewish community. During the First World War, Storrs undertook several diplomatic missions to al-Hijaz, where he was introduced to T E Lawrence, and was involved in the events leading to the Arab Revolt. Lawrence, the other Orientalist-cum-Imperial agent, considered Storrs "the most brilliant Englishman in the Near East". Storrs was involved in the British arrangements with Husain. Storrs wrote about the Arabs of Hijaz expressing his Orientalist generalisations that "The Arabs, as you are doubtless aware, are naked, unarmed, and more esurient than the Greek himself; further they have not one *bobbo* to their name" (Storrs, 1937: 180).

Storrs liked to look deep inside human nature, always with the Orientalist preoccupation. His opinion of the Egyptian nationalist leaders, Mustafa Kamel (Storrs, 1937: 81) and Sad Zaghlul (Storrs, 1937: 120), is somewhat coloured by the views of an official of

imperial England. In particular, he writes of Kamel, one of the leaders of the Egyptian Nationalists, that he was a "charlatan, discreditable in his private life and bak-shished up to the eyes by all parties" (Storrs, 1937: 81-82). Of Sad Zaghlul, Storrs maintains that if he had left Cairo, the history of modern Egypt would be different and probably better (Storrs, 1937: 120). Also, Storrs used the code words "the Persian Mystic" for Husain Ruhi on Hijaz (Storrs, 1937: 179).

Storrs' stereotypical belief was that Orientals are all the same, no matter where they are in Palestine, in Egypt, or even throughout the whole region of Levant. They are basically the same in essence. This is the way Storrs perceived the Arabs from Egypt and the Arabs in Palestine. Storrs' facile generalisations about Arabs are apparent in his text. So, his Orientalism develops a kind of image of a timeless Orient as if the Orient, unlike the West, does not develop, staying the same. Said suggests that "Orientalism assumed an unchanging Orient" (Said, 2003: 96). Indeed, Storrs regarded the Arab culture as fossilised and incapable of further development.

During his time in office, the Arabs, unlike the Zionists, were isolated in a direct interaction with the mandate officials in Palestine (Smith, 2004: 117). The Arabs were primarily concerned about the Zionist component in Britain's mandatory role. The Orientalist approach of the British is apparent in Storrs' paternalism towards the Arabs and his attempts to assist them to develop political resource. That paternalism, when the British had to "protect" the Arabs, illustrated the Orientalist approach of the superior British and the inferior Arabs and attempted to deny them any freedom or responsibility. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the Arabs had a great disadvantage over the Zionists because of the influence of the latter in the British mandatory government and especially on Sir Ronald Storrs.

As in all the colonies of the Empire, the British established all kinds of "democratic" bodies, trying to divide the Arabs and the Jews in a disproportionate way. In general, these bodies were

supported by the Jewish minority and rejected by the Arab majority. The reason is obvious. Despite the fact that the Arabs constituted the vast majority of the population, the percentage of their representation in governmental posts was smaller than their percentage of the total population. Storrs attributed this reality to the more traditional educational experience of the Arabs.

Moreover, the "Advisory Council" that was intended to boost a feeling of participation in the government consisted of twenty members of whom seven were British officials, four Muslims, three Christians and three Jews. Therefore the Muslims were in a minority position on the Council, even though they were the vast majority of the whole population. The "Third Palestine Arab Congress", that was held in Haifa in December 13, 1920, condemned the Advisory Council as "a false attempt to show that there exists in Palestine a council with legislative powers representing the population" (Kayyali, 1970: 131-132).

The inclusion of the Arabs in governmental posts with low status was designed to "emasculate Arab nationalist opposition to the mandatory system" while excluding them from positions from which they might be able to exert influence against that system (Smith, 2004: 177). Hence never an Arab was nominated to be head of a government department. This policy was backed by Storrs. But British paternalism toward the Arabs contained an inherent assumption of their own superiority and a clear unwillingness to collaborate with the Arabs in government on an equal basis. The only case when a qualified Arab was appointed in a high profile post was when he was qualified and at the same time he would cost less than a British official (Smith, 2004: 117). Arab salaries were lower than those of Jews (Smith, 2004: 117). The reasons behind these psychological and economic disadvantages that the Arabs were experiencing can be traced mainly to the Orientalist stereotypes of the British.

Storrs was against Arab independence (Tibawi, 1977: 49). He liked to appear as a friend of Arabs, advertising his friendship with Abdullah and the Sharif of Makkah but of course, as Tibawi

pointed out, Storrs' sentiments towards Arabs were always coloured by British interests (Tibawi, 1977: 321). Storrs was ignorant of Arabic political terms (Tibawi, 1977: 49). According to Hanna, he clearly attempted to discourage Abdullah's ambitions for Arab independence (Hanna, 1942: 17). Storrs believed that British did not promise Palestine. Thus he wrote that (Storrs, 1927: 398):

Palestine was excluded from the promises made to the Arabs before those British [military] operations which gave freedom to so large a proportion of the Arab people.

Despite his ten years' residence in Egypt and also the course he had attended at Cambridge, his Arabic was inadequate. In his *Orientalisms* the classical Arabic expressions he uses are wrongly translated or transliterated. The only word in the book reproduced in Arabic characters is misspelled (Storrs, 1937: 157). Storrs boasts that it was he who suggested the Arabic *himayah* to be the equivalent of "protectorate" and takes the trouble to have it printed in Arabic characters but misspelled (Tibawi, 1977: 69).

Moreover, his poor knowledge of Arabic caused an absurdity in 1915. Under his supervision the correspondence between Sharif Hussain and McMahon was translated and some terms were deciphered inadequately. That caused great confusion (Tibawi, 1977:86). It was exactly what Edwin Samuel, the son of Sir Herbert Samuel, wrote about Storrs: "Although he was quite a good linguist, Storrs pretended that he knew far more than he actually did" (Samuel, 1970, 52).

One of the accusations brought against the British Mandate in Palestine and especially Sir Ronald Storrs was that it frequently showed favouritism towards the Jews. There are many events that illustrate that Storrs held double standards towards Arabs and Jews. For instance, as already mentioned above, Storrs permitted a Zionist demonstration on the first anniversary of the Balfour declaration, but according to his own report, he threatened with arrest and jail Arab leaders who announced their intention to hold a counter-demonstration (Tibawi, 1977: 308).

One more event that illustrates Storrs' sentiments and policies towards the Arabs is the Conference of the General Assembly of Palestine. In the beginning of 1919 the Assembly met in Jerusalem. Ronald Storrs who was acting as Chief Administrator (while the Chief Administrator Money was on leave) initially refused to issue the delegates with travel permits. He issued them after Allenby's order to do so, but he still had some objections. So he used his power over Arab mayors and officials and prohibited them from participating in the Assembly. He also intrigued for a British mandate and excluded the Sharif of Makkah (Tibawi, 1977: 355-56).

The next year, following the San Remo Conference of April 1920 when the League of Nations gave mandatory rights to the British in Palestine, violent riots broke out. These events were quite unexpected by the British authorities. Sir Ronald Storrs' reaction was to dismiss Musā Kazim al-Ḥusaynī as mayor, while the British police arrested 'Arif al-'Arif and Zeev Jabotinsky (Mattar, 1988: 17). It is interesting that it was Storrs that invented the title of Grand Mufti as an adaptation of the French title Grand Rabbīn, in itself a translation of the Ottoman title Maham-Pasi.

The riots of 1920 show that Storrs played a precarious balancing game antagonising both Arabs and Jews. After the riots the Municipality of Jerusalem was disturbed. Storrs ruptured his relations with the Ḥusaynī family because he intervened in internal Arab community affairs and balances. For many generations, the offices of mayor and of mufti in Jerusalem had been held by members of the Ḥusaynī family. In 1917 the Office of Mayor of Jerusalem was held by Musā Kazim Pasha and that of Mufti, by Kemal Effendi Ḥusaynī. After the riots, Storrs dismissed Musā Kazim, blaming him for the Nationalist demonstrations. Then, Storrs appointed as Mayor of Jerusalem Raghed Bey Nashashibi who from the rival political family. Eventually when Kemal Ḥusaynī, the Mufti of Jerusalem, died the following year the Nashashibi family took the office (Sidebotham, 1937). Moreover, Storrs took the opportunity to reorganise the Municipal Council. The six members now consisted of two Muslims one of whom had

to be the Mayor, two Christians and two Jews. Storrs also created two deputy mayors, one a Christian and the other a Jew (Storrs, 1945: 331- 334). Thus Arab power could be checked and balanced. It was a typical "divide and rule" policy that the Empire applied.

V

As a general conclusion, Storrs could be characterised as an Orientalist. Ronald Storrs was one of the key figures in the shaping of British policy in the Mandatory Palestine. The major scene of his activity was Palestine. In 1917 he became the Military Governor of Jerusalem and later its first civil governor. He stayed in the Holy City until 1926. Storrs contrasted Muslim society and civilisation with that of the West and showed what the former lacked. In particular, Storrs was concerned to emphasise the absence of humanism in classic Muslim societies and to relate the reasons for this to the religious essence of Islam.

Edward Said's disturbing and important *Orientalism* was a study of how westerners represent the Orient as Other, a process of creation that reflects configurations of power, authority, and the unconscious structures of cultural dominion. The Orientalist discourse assigns to the Oriental people and culture certain stereotypes: despotic when in a position of power; sly and obsequious when in subservient positions. Orientalism is a full-fledged discourse and the knowledge is produced under unequal relations of power i.e. Imperialism.

To sum up, Storrs' narration of the events as both witness and participant reflects his Orientalist lens. According to Edward Said Orientalism highlighted the lens through which the "West" is viewing the "East". And Storrs through this same lens governed the Holy City of Jerusalem. His book *Orientalisms* has been considered as documentary work for the British policy in the Mandate. His Arabic was not good although that he wanted it to appear that it was, and he frequently quoted classical literature. He saw his position as a governor as a privilege and an honour. He paraded himself as a Lover of Jerusalem. He characteristically wrote that "there is no promotion after Jerusalem". He often

wanted to demonstrate his love of the world of the East, its cultures and religions. But he also had a great affinity to Zion, and the Zionist dream. Overall it is extremely important to be aware of his Orientalism since he contributed also to the shaping of the British policy in the Mandatory Palestine.

Lastly, think about this. If you recognise that we live at a time when Orientalism is still used as a tool in the practice of Imperialism; when Near East politics can be still characterised by Orientalism; when history is constructed in a tricky way, then awareness of this Orientalism is the first important step towards a better future.

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