



Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi



Published by
<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/atdd>

Spring 2023 / 10-1
<https://doi.org/10.46868/atdd>

Turkish-Soviet Russia Relations (1919-1922)

Girayalp Karakuş*
ORCID:0000-0001-6240-5490

Abstract

In this study, the extent to which Turkey-Soviet Russia relations tended to develop and to tension in the 1919-1922 period and the reasons for these changes were emphasized. Weapons ammunition, financial aid, and attempts to organize a Soviet-type regime in Turkey are also discussed. It was a period when the relations between the New Soviet Russia and Turkey started with the 1917 revolution. However, due to various reasons, Turkey could not create an atmosphere of complete trust in its relations with Soviet Russia. Therefore, there was no principle of eternal friendship and eternal enmity; since interest was the primary concept in relations between States. Developments, such as the biased attitude of Soviet Russia towards the Armenian issue and the foreign commissioner of Soviet Russia, Chicherin's request Bekir Sami Bey to leave Van, Bitlis and its environs to the Soviet Russia, created an atmosphere of distrust between the Ankara Government and the deputies. In the secret session of the parliament, Hasan Fehmi Bey, the deputy of Gümüşhane, made the following statement that clearly expressed this issue: "What the tsarist thought? yesterday, the politics of today's Soviet Russia are also thinking the same thing". However, in this environment of conflicting trust, Turkey managed to improve its relations with Soviet Russia. There were developments in the relationship of mutual interest between the two countries.

Keywords: Moscow Treaty, Chicherin, Atatürk, Soviet Russia, Armanian Issue

Received Date: 21/12/2022

Accepted Date: 20/03/2023

*Assistant professor Amasya University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of History, Amasya-Turkey, girayalp71@gmail.com

You can refer to this article as follows:

KARAKUŞ, G., "Turkish-Soviet Russia Relations (1919-1922)", *Academic Journal of History and Idea*, Vol. 10, Issue 1, 2022, p. 1-17.

Türk-Sovyet Rusyası İlişkileri (1919-1922)

Girayalp Karakuş*
ORCID:0000-0001-6240-5490

Öz

Bu çalışmada 1919-1922 döneminde Türkiye-Sovyet Rusya ilişkilerinin ne derece gelişme ve gerginleşme eğilimi gösterdiği ve bu değişikliklerin sebepleri üzerinde durulmuştur. Silah mühimmatı, mali yardım ve Türkiye'de Sovyet tipi bir rejim kurma girişimleri de tartışılıyor. Yeni Sovyet Rusya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin 1917 devrimi ile başladığı bir dönemdi. Ancak Türkiye, çeşitli nedenlerle Sovyet Rusya ile ilişkilerinde tam bir güven ortamı oluşturamamıştır. Bu nedenle, devletler arasındaki ilişkilerde menfaat birincil kavram olduğu için, ebedi dostluk ve ebedi düşmanlık ilkesi yoktu. Sovyet Rusya'nın Ermeni meselesine karşı önyargılı tavrı ve Sovyet Rusya'nın dışişleri komiseri Çiçerin'in Bekir Sami Bey'den Van, Bitlis ve çevresini Sovyet Rusya'ya bırakmasını istemesi gibi gelişmeler, Ankara Hükümeti ile milletvekilleri arasında bir güvensizlik ortamı yarattı. Gümüşhane Milletvekili Hasan Fehmi Bey, TBMM'nin gizli oturumunda bu konuyu açıkça dile getiren şu açıklamayı yaptı: "Çarlığın dün ne düşünüyor ise bugünkü Sovyet Rusya'nın siyaseti de aynı şeyi düşünüyor." Her ne kadar bu çelişkili güven ortamında Türkiye, Sovyet Rusya ile ilişkilerini iyiye götürmeyi başarmıştır. İki ülke arasındaki karşılıklı çıkar ilişkisinde gelişmeler yaşandı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Moskova Antlaşması, Çiçerin, Atatürk, Sovyet Rusyası, Ermeni Meselesi

Gönderme Tarihi: 21/12/2022

Kabul Tarihi:20/03/2023

*Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Girayalp Karakuş, Amasya Üniversitesi, Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi, Tarih Bölümü, Amasya-Türkiye, girayalp71@gmail.com

Bu makaleyi şu şekilde kaynak gösterebilirsiniz:

KARAKUŞ, G., " Turkish-Soviet Russia Relations (1919-1922)", *Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi*, C. 10, S. 1, 2023, s. 1-17.

Introduction

The interests of Turkey and Tsarist Russia clashed on every issue, and this generally resulted in war. This environment of war, which lasted for centuries, also revealed a serious hostility. This competitive conflict has also affected normal relationships. Indeed, it is correct to define the history of States as the era of warring states. Even today, what we call the Modern Age, we see that wars are still going on. It can be stated that these wars happen because of the unbridled ambition motivation of human nature. After the collapse of Tsarist Russia, it seems that the efforts to develop friendly relations with the New Soviet Russia accelerated during the National Struggle. There were many reasons for these efforts. The most important reason for these efforts was the necessity of making an alliance against Western imperialism. The Entente Powers had attempted to establish regional states consisting of small states in Anatolia and then to rule with the colonial mentality by taking them under their influence. With the development of Soviet Russian-Turkish relations, it became clear that this difficult process would fail. The relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union had developed in line with a mutual interest. With the declaration of Soviet Russia that it recognized Turkey's National Pact; it would start to produce correct results in favor of Turkey. The development of Turkish-Soviet relations during the War of Independence began when Atatürk secretly sent Halil Pasha to Russia in September 1919. Russia responded to this by sending Eliava, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Armies, to Anatolia. Russia recognized the National Struggle and declared that it would assist Turkey against the imperialist powers. However, while Atatürk valued cooperation with the Soviets against the West, he thought that socialism was not suitable for the structure of Turkish society; because Atatürk argued that the working class in Turkey was not enough. After Atatürk founded an official Communist Party, he wanted to keep the communist movements under control. The socialist movements were put under pressure after the National Struggle was won. Therefore, Turkish-Soviet relations have always been based on distrust. Despite all this, the two countries acted as strategic partners against the Westerners.

1-Tsarist Russia-Turkey Competition - Relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia after 1917

Among the reasons for the participation of Tsarist Russia in the First World War, the issue of Istanbul and the Straits is of priority. The issue was brought to the agenda in the negotiations with the Allied Powers, and Russia stated that it was determined to insist on this

issue. France and England responded positively in return for the protection of their rights in some regions in Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The development that worried Russia was the 1915 Dardanelles war. It was the concern that a victorious England would not come out of there again.¹ Evaluating this attitude of Russia well, Germany showed its move by offering the Straits to Russia.² This proposal of Germany is aimed at deepening the disagreements between the allied states. Thereupon, Germany handed a note to France and England on March 4, 1915. Upon the threat that Istanbul and Marmara will remain under the auspices of the Russians, France and England declared on April 10, 1915 that they accepted these requests of Russia.³ Russia was one of Turkey's fiercest enemies. He never held back in dominating the Black Sea and the Straits. Russia had expansionist ambitions in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Thus, it intended to surround the Ottoman Empire. The majority of the North Caucasus, which Brzezinski described as the "Eurasian Balkans", were of the Muslim faith. This ethnically mixed place consisted of seven republics. After the Russian tsarism, it continued to be under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Caucasian peoples, who formed a political union for the first time in the century-long war against the Russian Tsarist invasion, continued their struggle due to the weapons and ammunition sent by the Ottoman state under the leadership of Imam Shamil.⁴ The Turkish Khanates were prevented from the Crimean War of 1853-1856 with the help of France and England. Otherwise, Batumi and western Georgia and the remaining parts in the hands of the Turks would fall into the hands of Russia.⁵ With the Orthodox Christianity belief of the Russians and Missionary work of the Byzantine Greeks, the Caucasus converted to Christianity. It gained a religious character with the clergy being of Greek origin. After a while, it gained a political character, and then economic reasons came to the fore. The "Oriental Question", which started and continued in the 18th-19th centuries, formed the backbone of Russian politics.⁶ Tsarist Russia then embarked on a series of campaigns in Turkestan, adding many independent and semi-independent Khanates to the Moscow empire. The Russian Tsardom broke off contact with the Central Asian Turkish communities that surrounded the Ottoman state when it seized the Turkish Khanates one by one and took over the interiors of the North Caucasus. Tsarist Russia, which wanted to reach the shores of the Caspian Sea in a short time by capturing the Kazan Khanate, and which wanted to reach the Siberian Khanate in 1569 and reach China,

¹Ergün Aybars, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, Volume.1, Ercan Kitap Evi, İzmir 2000, p. 57.

²Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, "Boğazlar Sorununun Bir Evresi", *Belleten*, Volume.7, Number. 28, 1943, p. 212-213.

³E. Aybars, *Ibid.*, s. 57.

⁴Orhan Gafarlı, *Avrasya Çıkmazı*, Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, Ankara 2015, p. 64.

⁵Karl Krüger, *Kemalist Türkiye ve Orta Doğu*, Altın Kitaplar Basım Evi, İstanbul 1981, p. 92.

⁶Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara 1990, p. 2.

Turkistan, India via Siberia, and Iran via the Caucasus, approached its political goals.⁷ The "Astrakhan Expedition", the first Turkish-Russian war in history, started in 1569 when Tsar Ivan the Terrible captured Astrakhan and the roads of the pilgrims and merchants from Turkistan were closed. In the past, Russia was uncomfortable with Turkey's sitting on a strategic waterway, and this time it was taken over by the West and used as an element of pressure. From 1919 to 1922, the Straits were temporarily in the hands of a third party. The fifth article of the treaty signed between Turkey and Soviet Russia in Moscow on 16 March 1921 had the following phrase: "While finalizing the international status of the Black Sea and the straits and presenting it to a special conference attended by the delegates of the countries bordering the Black Sea, it is imperative that the decisions of this conference do not harm Turkey's sovereignty."⁸ With the collapse of Tsarist Russia in October 1917, Lenin and his friends, who carried out the Revolution, declared the meaninglessness of the First World War, which was an imperialist nature, and announced that they had withdrawn from the war. This was seen as a positive and good development all over the world. It was received with great joy in Ottoman society; but the war continued at full speed. In addition, the Bolshevik leaders disclosed the secret treaties made by the Russian Tsardom with the Western imperialist states. The publication of the book called "The Yellow Book", which included the secret agreements made with France and England, was a pleasing situation, because we were also freed from the threat of an eternal enemy defying Western imperialism.

Soviet Russia approached Turkey, which started a national resistance movement against Western imperialism, with ideological sympathy. Soviet Russia knew very well the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Turkey. In fact, Soviet Russia was also wondering what the government system to be established in Turkey would be. With the policy of Mustafa Kemal and his friends getting closer to Soviet Russia, there was an intimidation to the Allied Powers and the need for assistance from the other side. In the relations developed, there was a situation that was in the interests of both parties. Soviet Russia was trying to arouse sympathy by giving the world a peaceful, liberal, non-imperialist image. Another issue was that, in geopolitical terms, Soviet Russia was considering Turkey as a buffer state against the allied powers. The basis of the relationship was the idea of "the enemy of my enemy" as an alliance against

⁷Nadir Devlet, *Rusya Türklerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi,(1905-1917)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 2014, p. 8.

⁸Arnold J.Toynbee-Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *Türkiye Devleti'nin Yeniden Doğuşu*, Örgün Yayın Evi, İstanbul 2017, p. 337-338.

imperialism. After the Sivas congress, Mustafa Kemal had the idea of getting weapons, ammunition and financial aid to contact Soviet Russia. Halil Pasha (Kut), the uncle of Enver Pasha, was chosen for this job, and some help came in the first months of 1920 with his great efforts.⁹ In his statement published on November 20, 1917, Lenin, The President of Soviet Russia, stated that: "Istanbul had to remain in the hands of Muslim Turks, Turkey should not be divided and the lands in the hands of Armenia had to be taken." On 22 December 1917, in line with the decisions taken in the Polish town of Brest-Litovsk, on March 3, 1918, Tsarist Russia announced that it was withdrawing from the Ottoman lands occupied by Russia. With this declaration, they declared that they gave Kars, Ardahan and Batum back to Turkey.¹⁰ After this agreement, the developments took a different turn, and attempts were made to change the demographic structure of the Turkish provinces held by the Armenians. At the same time, they were persecuting Muslim Turkish and Kurdish citizens. Russia was against the Ankara Government's initiation of an operation against the Armenian Army. As it can be understood, it was known that different policies could be encountered when interest came before rational thought in relations between states, and friendships had the potential to turn into conflicting policies.

Although the decisions and ideas in this declaration remained in writing with the Brest-Litovsky Peace, they influenced the subsequent Turkish-Soviet diplomacy. On March 14, 1918, while giving information about the Brest-Litovsk negotiations at the IV Congress of Soviets, Chicherin stated that the article on Ardahan, Kars and Batum was "nothing but an implicit expression of annexation". In this way, Soviet Russia actually accepted the cession of these territories to Turkey.¹¹

2-The Turkish Government's Tensions Between Soviet Russia and Armenia (1919-1922)

The attempts of the British to implement the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres and their invasion attempts since September 1920 had raised serious concerns. Mustafa Kemal and his friends brought up the initiation of official negotiations with Soviet Russia. There was a situation in which the state of war continued. With the opening of the parliament, it was decided

⁹A. M. Şamsutdinov, *Mondros'tan Lozan'a Türkiye Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşı Tarihi 1918-1923*, Doğan Kitapçılık, İstanbul 1999, p. 188.

¹⁰Y. H. Bayur, *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹¹Enis Şahin, *Trabzon ve Batum Konferansları ve Antlaşmaları (1917-1918)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 2002, p. 252.

to send Bekir Sami as the Deputy Foreign Minister to Moscow with a delegation for official diplomatic negotiations. In addition, Mustafa Kemal sent a message to Lenin by letter. After a while, an answer came with the signature of Chicherin, the deputy foreign affairs, commissar of the Soviet Russia. The Soviet Russia declared that they would recognize the national borders and would support the military operation and suggested the establishment of Consulates as soon as possible.¹² On January 13, 1918, a manifesto signed by Lenin and Stalin was published. According to this declaration, Turkish Armenians wanted Armenian militias to be established and armed for the security of the Armenians after the withdrawal of the Russians.¹³ Under these developments, Lenin received the Turkish delegation in Moscow. He put forward a positive approach to helping Turkey. However, he did not hide Russia's intentions on Armenia and Georgia. In the report he sent to Ankara, Bekir Sami Bey stated that the Russians wanted to overthrow the Armenian government at any moment.¹⁴ Mustafa Kemal's letter to Lenin, dated April 26, also demanded a joint struggle against imperialism and announced the national policies of the pact. These principles were as follows: A- Declaration of Turkey's Independence, B- Joining the undisputed Turkish territory to the Turkish state, C- Proclamation of Arabia and Syria as independent states, D- Giving all mixed-populated regions the right to self-determination, E- Giving the rights granted to national minorities in European states within a liberal structure to minorities within the borders of Turkish states under the Presidency of the Turkish National Assembly, F- Taking the issue of the Straits to a conference between the littoral states on the Black Sea, G- Destroying any foreign sphere of influence.¹⁵ With the signing of the friendship treaty in Moscow, the Ankara Government accepted to recognize the Bolshevik government. The issue of prisoner extradition would be settled in a short time with an additional agreement regarding those who wanted to immigrate from Russia to Turkey.¹⁶ Upon the report sent by Bekir Sami to Ankara, Mustafa Kemal and his friends understood that the time had come for an operation on Armenia. Mustafa Kemal sent a delegation under the chairmanship of Rauf Orbay on 13 August 1920 in order to reach an agreement with Soviet Russia on Armenia again, and no positive response was received in the negotiations. The Soviet Russian foreign affairs commissioner, Chicherin, brought up the issue of Armenia, and the Turkish delegation declared that Armenians were not a majority anywhere in Anatolia.

¹²Fethi Karaduman, *Çöküş ve Doğu Atatürk Devrimi, Osmanlı'dan Çağdaş Türkiye Cumhuriyetine*, Gunizi Yayıncılık, İstanbul 2006, p. 499.

¹³Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Alkim Yayınevi, İstanbul 2012, p. 340.

¹⁴Yusuf Sarıay, "Milli Mücadelede Türk-Sovyet Münasebetleri", *Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, Volume. 1, Number. 1, 2000, p. 207.

¹⁵A. M. Şamsutdinov, *Ibid.*, p. 188.

¹⁶Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, Temel Yayınları, İstanbul 2002, p. 77.

Thereupon, Chicherin suggested that the Turkish Armenians who had been pressed or exiled to Anatolia or who had taken refuge in the Caucasus should be united with the Revan Republic and settled in a region, and that the Muslim people there should be settled in other parts of Anatolia.¹⁷ The policies of Soviet Russia seemed to have changed direction after the revolution. The delegation headed by Rauf Orbay went to the Moscow Conference to discuss the Armenian issue again. There was no positive response there either. Thereupon, the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly) met in August 1920 and rejected the Treaty of Sèvres and did not accept the granting of land to the Armenians.¹⁸ Upon these developments, Chicherin changed his mind about giving land to Armenia. On the other hand, Lenin started to give positive messages towards Turkey. He also suggested holding a referendum on the land issue in the regions of interest to both sides, and Russia's mediation in the resolution of the border issues between Turkey, Armenia and Iran. Accepting these proposals in principle, Mustafa Kemal made a counter-proposal and declared that Russia would recognize its rights over Azerbaijan in return for the operation to take back the Turkish Provinces in the East from the Armenians.¹⁹ It was clearly understood that Soviet Russia was negotiating to give a piece of Turkish territory to Armenia for aid to Turkey. In the meantime, the Allied Powers had formed a barrier between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in order to keep the Baku oil, to block the way to Iraq and Iran and to prevent their aid to Anatolia. In the telegram they sent to Lord Curzon on January 3, 1920, they stated the function of the embankment. Mustafa Kemal thought that the demolition of this embankment, which threatened the Soviets, would contribute to the smooth arrival of aid from Soviet Russia and the success of the National Struggle. Mustafa Kemal was going to say the following on this subject: "We consider the Great Wall of the Caucasus a project that will destroy Turkey once and for all. We have to take all kinds of risks to prevent this Great Wall from being made by the Allied Powers."²⁰ In August 1920, Mustafa Kemal made a speech at the secret assembly session: "Today's Russian politics is deceiving the Islamic world with its good intentions. It aims to be a satellite state in order to prevent the spread of the Turkish sphere of influence, to present the Turkish National Movement against the West as its own work, and to establish communism in Turkey."²¹ With this speech, Mustafa Kemal clearly explained the true intention of Soviet Russia. After this stage, the order to start the operation against the

¹⁷Also See: Stefanos Yerasimos, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1917-1923)*, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul 2000.

¹⁸Sadi Borak, *Atatürk'ün Gizli Oturumlarındaki Konuşmaları*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul 1997, p. 317.

¹⁹Also See: Lord Kinross, *Bir Millet'in Yeniden Doğuşu*, Altın Kitaplar, İstanbul 2018.

²⁰Y. Sarıay, *Ibid.*, p. 200-218; *Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri*, Kaynak yayınları, İstanbul 1999, p. 390.

²¹S. Borak, *Ibid.*, p. 317.

Armenian Army was given to Kazım Karabekir Pasha. The Armenian forces, who wanted to take advantage of the Allied Powers and the Greek occupation, started a large-scale operation on September 24, 1920. The 15th Corps under the command of Kazım Karabekir stopped the Armenian attacks, and the Armenians had to retreat. He also took back the places in the Armenian occupation. Armenians had to ask for peace. Oltu, Sarıkamış and Kars were re-joined the Turkish Territories with the "Gyumri Treaty" on 3 December 1920. At the same time, Armenia had to admit that it did not recognize Sevres. For the first time in the period of national struggle, the Turkish Army had won a victory. In the following period, Soviet Russia took action to seize the whole of Armenia. By invading Armenia, they established a Soviet republic there. Later, they entered Georgia and occupied it and established a Soviet republic there. Ardahan and Artvin were thus joined to Turkish lands.²² The borders between Turkey and Soviet Russia were drawn by signing the Moscow Treaty on March 16, 1921.²³

However, it should be noted that during the negotiations on the Moscow Treaty, Chicherin had turned his face to the West, not to the East. Therefore, he did not want to participate in the negotiations. We understand this information from the talks between Frunze and Atatürk. Chicherin was always the troublemaker in the Moscow negotiations.²⁴

3-Determination of Turkish-Soviet Borders - 16 March 1921, Moscow Friendship Treaty

In October 1920, a delegation of Soviet diplomats came to Ankara and opened the Soviet embassy. It was decided that the conference to be held in Baku in February 1921 would be held in Moscow upon the request of the Russians and with the acceptance of the Turkish Government. On behalf of the Turkish Government, Minister of Economy Yusuf Kemal, Minister of Education Rıza Nur, and Ali Fuat Pasha, who was Turkish ambassador to Moscow, were among the attendees of the meeting. As a result of the negotiations, it was decided to sign a friendship treaty in Moscow on March 16, 1921. The Moscow friendship treaty also annulled all agreements made by Tsarist Russia during the Ottoman period. The borders between Soviet Russia and Turkey were determined by this agreement. Another striking feature of this treaty was that the national borders of the national pact were drawn in the east, which strengthened Turkey's stance against the West. The abolition of the capitulations at the Lausanne conference

²²Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, *Atatürk Anadolu'da (1919-1921)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basım Evi, Ankara 1959, p. 89.

²³İsmail Soysal, "Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin 75 yıllık Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi", *Yeni Türkiye Dergisi*, 2, 1998, p. 1361-1367.

²⁴İsmayıl Musa, "Azerbaycan ve Rus Kaynaklarına Göre 1921 Moskova-Kars Antlaşmaları ve Kuzey Azerbaycan'ın Toprak Bütünlüğü Meseleleri", *Belleten*, Volume. 66, Number. 2, 2002, p. 517-530.

to be held with the West was also beneficial. Within Soviet Russia, this agreement was legally and politically binding.²⁵ The principles of the Moscow treaty were determined as follows:

- 1- If one of the two parties do not recognize the interstate treaty, the other will not either. For example, Soviet Russia will not recognize the Treaty of Sevres.
- 2- The Soviets accepted the National Pact declared by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The border drawn by the Treaty of Gyumri, as the Northeast borders, was accepted with minor changes.
- 3- The South Caucasus was undertaking to make the necessary attempts for the Soviets to accept the articles included in the agreement as belonging to their republics.
- 4- Neither side would recognize the treaties made between the Ottoman state and Tsarist Russia.
- 5- The Soviets agreed to the Abolition of the Capitulations.
- 6- Both Governments shall prohibit the work of organizations working in their own countries at the expense of the other.
- 7- Agreements that will serve to develop mutual relations and regulate economic, financial, and other issues will be possible.²⁶

With the 13 October 1921 Kars agreement and the acceptance of the Moscow agreement text, the Ankara Government accepted the South Caucasus republics that accepted the National Pact, and three more republics. Thus, the eastern borders were determined with the Treaty of Moscow and the Treaty of Kars, and a political agreement was reached with the neighboring states.²⁷ Mustafa Kemal and his friends had taken their necessary relations with Soviet Russia in line with a strategy they had determined from the beginning.

Talat Pasha, who had to go abroad after the loss of the First World War, made important contributions to the development of relations with the Soviets during the National Struggle. He reported the information and documents he had obtained in Berlin to Mustafa Kemal by letter. He made important contributions by using his activities in Berlin and his good relations with the Bolsheviks and England.²⁸ Soviet-Russian relations were supported with political support as well as arms and money. Halil Pasha returned from Russia with 100 thousand worth of gold bullion and handed it over to Kazım Karabekir Pasha. In September 1920, the first shipment of

²⁵Anıl Çeçen, *Kemalizm*, Cumhuriyet Kitaplığı, İstanbul 1999, p. 56-57.

²⁶A. Çeçen, *Ibid.*, p. 56-57.

²⁷Afet İnan, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Türk Devrimi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1977, p. 88.

²⁸Y. Sarıay, *Ibid.*, p. 206.

weapons was made from Trabzon, and Yusuf Kemal Bey brought gold worth one million (Rubles) to Turkey. Aid was promised to increase.²⁹ After a while, Soviet Russia's aid was cut due to some misunderstanding. Mustafa Kemal's meeting with the Soviet Russian ambassador was positive, doubts and misunderstanding were cleared. The event was as follows: The Soviet Russian government was suspicious of the Ankara agreement signed on 20 October 1920 between Turkey and France. Explaining the suspected issue, Russian Ambassador Natsaranas stated that France put pressure on Turkey to cut relations between Russia and Turkey, that they stipulated the old administration in the Caucasus should come to power again, and that they took a word on this issue. Mustafa Kemal Pasha stated that France did not come with such an agreement, that it was not possible for them to come with such an offer, and that if they had made such an offer, the Turks would not accept it. He even showed the text of the agreement, documents, and the originals of the letters to the Ambassador.³⁰ Uncertainties cause changing policies on suspicion in relations between states and the emergence of irrational behaviors. After the doubts were cleared, the aid was resumed. In this period, the applied Soviet policy started a process originating from its own economy. While monetary aid increased, arms aid decreased. While arms aid increased, monetary aid decreased.³¹ Mustafa Kemal Pasha's success in problem solving was important in terms of showing that he was quite perfect. "Now our army is freed from the danger of being shot in the back."³² Solving the problems with Soviet Russia was a relief in terms of relieving concerns. It was time for Mustafa Kemal and his friends to start a movement against the occupation force of the Greek army, the armed power of Western imperialism. On 12 December 1922, General Frunze came to Ankara with a large delegation and made important contributions to the development of Soviet Russia-Turkey relations. An additional agreement, similar to the Moscow agreement, was reached with Turkish Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk. According to this agreement, on January 2, 1922, Ukraine would accept any agreement signed between the Ankara Government and the Soviet Caucasian Republics. The Ankara Government would accept Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state.³³ General Frunze had provided Soviet assistance to send weapons and ammunition to equip the Three Divisions.³⁴ Frunze's friendly approach to the Turkish Government, and his

²⁹Yavuz Arslan, "Milli Mücadele Dönemi Türk Sovyet İlişkisi", 14-15 Mayıs 2010 Çalıştay Bildirisi, Ankara 2011, p. 311.

³⁰ Y. Arslan, *Ibid.*, p. 303.

³¹Also See: Osman Okyar, *Milli Mücadele Dönemi Sovyet-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Mustafa Kemal*, İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul 1998.

³²Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, *Vatan Hizmetinde*, Bahar Matbaası, İstanbul 1967, p. 230.

³³Salahi R. Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*. Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1987, p. 190.

³⁴S. R. Sonyel, *Ibid.*, p. 190.

financial and weapon aid contributed significantly to political and military developments. On 17 December 1920, one and a half million gold rubles were brought from Russia by Lieutenant Bekir Sami. Apart from these, Russia donated fifty thousand gold (Ruble) for military schools and industrial facilities in Erzurum by the deputy of the Allied Republics Council in Gyumri.³⁵ Azerbaijan also donated one hundred thousand Ottoman gold on behalf of the Republic of Councils, and in 1921, 1922, Russian aid was provided in parts.³⁶ Such aid came from Russia throughout the process. Another issue was the situation regarding the financial aid from Russia. The Historical Archive researches on the statements made in 1972, on the outcome of the aid collected to be sent to the Government of Turkey in 1920, were of such a nature to confirm the President of the Republic of Bukhara, Osman Kocaoğlu. It was stated that one hundred million gold rubles were sent to Russia by the Republic of Bukhara on the condition that it be delivered to the Turkish Grand National Assembly.³⁷ But the Russians did not send this money. According to the market rate at that time, one ruble was 59 (Turkish penny). According to this rate, the amount of aid is 100 million x 59 kuruş = 59 million. In three years, the monetary aid provided by Russia did not exceed 11,028,012 TL. In this situation, it was understood that 47.971.988 TL of 59 Million TL was not sent.³⁸ The total number of weapons, ammunition and equipment from Russia between 18 September 1921 and 14 June 1922 was as follows in the General Staff ATASE archive records: 43,374 Infantry Rifles, 56,044 chests of infantry bullets, 18th Chest of Russian infantry bullet factory tools, 318 heavy and light machine guns, 81 cannons, 13 Russian bomb cannons, 159.043 various cannonballs, 40 chests of French grenades, 83 boxes of British grenades, 200 pieces of Russian Grenades, 60 pieces of Cavalry swords, 10 Chests of Smokeless Gunpowder, 48 Chests of infantry shell casings, 8 Chests of Russian infantry bullet capsules, and 104 Chests of infantry bullets.³⁹ Six million five hundred thousand of the annual 10 million gold ruble aid that Russia would give to Turkey had arrived. Three million 500 thousand gold rubles were confiscated by the Russian Economy Minister. According to the data of the General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies, it is seen that the promised money was not completely sent by Soviet Russia.⁴⁰ Even if it wasn't as much money and weapons as it was exaggerated, it was an important aid in the difficult conditions of

³⁵Erol Mütercimler, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Denizden Gelen Yardımlar*, Yaprak Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1992.

³⁶E. Mütercimler, *Ibid.*, p. 113-114.

³⁷Genel Kurmay ATESE Başkanlığı Arşivi, *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, 1975, p. 172-173.

³⁸Yalçın Durmuş, Azmi Süslü ve diğerleri, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, Volume.I. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara 2000, p. 342.

³⁹Genel Kurmay ATESE, *Ibid.*, p. 408.

⁴⁰Selda Kılıç, "İstiklal Harbinde Sovyetler Birliğinden Gelen Yardımlar", *DTCF Dergisi*, Volume. 56, Number. 1, 2016, p. 124-143.

the national struggle. The situation of the Russian economy in terms of money was also not good at all. The most important contribution of Russia was that it stood by Turkey against the West.

4-Soviet Russia's Attempts to Export Ideology (1920-1922)

It has been observed that the attempts of Soviet Russia to spread its ideological system in Turkey accelerated since 1920, especially by taking advantage of the Turkish Communists. In 1920, the Turkish Communist Party started its activities. The expenses of this organization were also covered by Soviet Russia. Mustafa Kemal had to keep good relations with Soviet Russia. There was also the concern of being invaded by Western imperialism on one side and by Soviet Russia on the other. Therefore, he had to establish his policy well and balance it with Soviet Russia. In the report of the French intelligence dated 20 August 1920, it was stated that a committee consisting of three Russians and thirteen Turks was organized in Istanbul and opened branches in various parts of Anatolia.⁴¹ During this time, the communist movement began to gather supporters, especially among the irregular gang leaders who joined the Turkish Revolutionaries (National Forces: Kuvayi Milliye). For this reason, the efforts of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to transfer the national militia to the regular army as soon as possible gained speed. The chiefs of the irregular militias had raised objections to the transition to the regular army. With the end of Tsarist Russia with the 1917 revolution, a group of Turkish intellectuals and left-wing unionists was formed. Mustafa Kemal went to an organization under the name of the Green Army (Yeşil Ordu) as of 1920 in order to control this situation. Hakkı Behiç, who had also served as the Minister of Finance, was appointed as the general secretary. Hakkı Behiç was a former communist. On September 6, 1920, they published a newspaper called "Yeni Dünya". The unit consisting of 300 soldiers and 5 lieutenants from Circassian Ethem's troops was called the "Bolshevik Battalion"⁴² This act was a separate source of unrest when it behaved uncontrollably. They had meetings with Kara Vasıf Bey, the head of the police station, and these meetings were reported to Kara Vasıf Bey, Ali Fuat Pasha, and then to Mustafa Kemal Pasha.⁴³ Kara Vasıf Bey later sent a representative to Russia on behalf of the Karakol Association and Baha Said Bey signed an agreement with the Bolsheviks in Baku on January 11, 1921. When Mustafa Kemal learned about this situation, he reacted very harshly and warned Kara Vasıf. Mustafa Kemal, who sent a telegram to Kazım Karabekir, asked him to inform the

⁴¹Çağatay Benhür, "1920'li yıllarda Türkiye Sovyet ilişkileri: Kronolojik Bir Çalışma", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume.24, Number. 24, 2008, p. 277-313,

⁴²Cemal Şener, *Çerkes Ethem*, Ant Yayınları, İstanbul 1990, p. 107.

⁴³Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Milli Mücadele Hatıraları*, Temel Yayınları, İstanbul 2010, p. 39-115.

authorities in Baku that Baha Said Bey in Baku did not have an official title and authority.⁴⁴ Mustafa Kemal realized that the Green Army community was starting to be harmful. Circassian Ethem's headquarters in Gediz was raided. Circassian Ethem fled to the Greeks; In this way, other gangs were distributed and order was ensured. Mustafa Kemal had Green Army formed a communist party to replace the army. By bringing Hakki Behiç as the Chairman of the party, the party was brought under control and ensured that relations with Soviet Russia were not deteriorated.

⁴⁴Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1988, p. 39-40.

Conclusion

It may not be correct to use the concept of absolute truth in historical science. It is important that the data obtained from official sources and documents guide the understanding of historical events. However, finding the cause of historical events is among the aims of the science of history. As Bismarck said in his speech to the northern German parliament in 1869, we "cannot make history". Accordingly, no leader can make history. History flows and matures in its own facts. The role that history has assigned to you is to take the precaution of possible risks to the extent of your power and intervention. The Turkish National Struggle is also a process that passes through difficulties and contains many dangers. Turkey, which was the target of Western Imperialism, was also in danger of being invaded by Russia. History has revealed a new historical event within its own development dynamics. This historical event is the Bolshevik Russian revolution of 1917. This event, which completely changed world politics, also had a feature that changed the fate of Turkish History. Soviet Russia, a fierce enemy of Western imperialism, had become an important ally of Turkey, which was in the grip of Western imperialism. Soviet Russia, which was the first to recognize the national borders of Turkey's national pact, was actually defying the West. At this point, the developing and maturing Turkish-Soviet Russian relationship became compulsory. The two new state and government systems that were established had to introduce themselves to the world and have them accepted. They had to challenge Western imperialism. According to the historical conditions of that period, it had to be so, and the state leaders did what was necessary.

References

- ARMAOĞLU, F., *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul 2012.
- ARNOLD, J. T -KIRKWOOD, P. K., *Türkiye Devletinin Yeniden Doğuşu*, Örgün Yayın Evi, İstanbul 2017.
- ARSLAN, Y., “Millî Mücadele Dönemi Türk-Sovyet İlişkisi”, 14-15 Mayıs 2010 Çalıştay Bildirisi, Ankara 2011.
- Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul 1999.
- AYBARS, E., *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, Volume.1. Ercan Kitap Evi, İzmir 2000.
- BAYUR, Y. H., “Boğazlar Sorununun Bir Evresi”, *Belleten*, Volume.7, Number. 28, 1943, p. 89-217.
- BENHÜR, Ç., “1920’li yıllarda Türkiye Sovyet ilişkileri: Kronolojik Bir Çalışma”, *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume.24, Number. 24, 2008, s. 277-313,
- BIYIKLIOĞLU, T., *Atatürk Anadolu’da (1919-1921)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basım Evi, Ankara 1959.
- BORAK, S., *Atatürk'ün Gizli Oturumlarındaki Konuşmaları*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul 1997.
- CEBESÖY, A. F., *Moskova Hatıraları*, Temel Yayınları, İstanbul 2002.
- CEBESÖY., A. F., *Milli Mücadele Hatıraları*, Temel Yayınları, İstanbul 2010.
- ÇEÇEN, A., *Kemalizm*, Cumhuriyet Kitaplığı, İstanbul 1999.
- DEVLET, N., *Rusya Türklerinin Milli Mücadele Tarihi,(1905-1917)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları , Ankara 2014.
- DURMUŞ, Y.-SÜSLÜ, A. And Others, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, I. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2000.
- GAFARLI, O., *Avrasya Çıkmazı*, Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, Ankara 2015.
- Genel Kurmay ATESE Başkanlığı Arşivi, *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, 1975.
- İNAN, A., *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Türk Devrimi*, T.T.K Basımevi, Ankara 1977.
- KARADUMAN, F., *Çöküş ve Doğuş Atatürk Devrimi, Osmanlı’dan Çağdaş Türkiye Cumhuriyetine*, Gunizi Yayıncılık, İstanbul 2006.
- KILIÇ, S., “İstiklal Harbinde Sovyetler Birliğinden Gelen Yardımlar”, *DTCF Dergisi*, Volume. 56, Number. 1, 2016, p. 124-143.
- KINROSS, L., *Bir Milletten Yeniden Doğuşu*, Altın Kitaplar, İstanbul 2018.
- KRÜGER, K., *Kemalist Türkiye ve Orta Doğu*, Altın Kitaplar Basım Evi, İstanbul 1981.
- KURAT, A. N., *Türkiye ve Rusya*, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara 1990.

- MUSA, İ., “Azerbaycan ve Rus Kaynaklarına Göre 1921 Moskova-Kars Antlaşmaları ve Kuzey Azerbaycan'ın Toprak Bütünlüğü Meseleleri”, *Belleten*, Volume. 66, Number. 2, 2002, p. 517-530.
- MÜTERCİMLER, E., *Kurtuluş Savaşında Denizden Gelen Yardımlar*, Yaprak Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1992
- OKYAR, O., *Milli Mücadele Dönemi Sovyet-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Mustafa Kemal*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul 1998.
- SARINAY, Y., ‘Milli Mücadelede Türk-Sovyet Münasebetleri’, *Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, Volume. 1, Number. 1, 2000, p. 200-218.
- SONYEL, S. R., *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1987.
- SOYSAL, İ., “Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin 75 yıllık Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi”, *Yeni Türkiye Dergisi*, (2), 1998, p. 1361-1367.
- ŞAHİN, E., *Trabzon ve Batum Konferansları ve Antlaşmaları (1917-1918)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 2002.
- ŞAMSUTDİNOV, A. M., *Mondros'tan Lozan'a Türkiye Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşı Tarihi 1918-1923*, Doğan Kitapçılık, İstanbul 1999.
- ŞENER, C., *Çerkes Ethem*, Ant Yayınları, İstanbul 1990.
- TENGİRŞENK, Y. K., *Vatan Hizmetinde*, Bahar Matbaası, İstanbul 1967.
- TEVETOĞLU, F., *Milli Mücadele Yıllarındaki Kuruluşlar*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1988.
- YERASİMOS, S., *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1917-1923)*, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul 2000.