



Furthering Global Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: NATO and its Global Partners in Afghanistan

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Abstract: *Terrorism is undoubtedly one of the most important security problems threatening the whole world. The increase in the ability of terrorists to access to technological opportunities and capabilities, and their capacity to act almost anywhere aggravate the situation. For this reason, the counter-terrorism (CT) is of great importance for countries and international organizations, and they strive to increase their deterrence and strengthen their defense positions against terrorism. However, not only countries but also international organizations cannot overcome this struggle alone. This situation makes it necessary to act jointly. Due to its contribution to the three main tasks of the alliance, collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security, the CT is always one of the top priorities of NATO. In this context, NATO has made significant progress in the field of CT, including political principles (2012), a military concept (MC) updated in 2015 and about to be approved in 2020, education and training plan (2015) and action plans (2014, 2017, 2018, 2019). Furthermore, NATO has established various partnerships with other international organizations to increase the effectiveness of CT activities. This study aims to examine*

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NATO's CT partnerships with other international organizations including the UN and the EU and partner countries, such as Australia and Japan in the Afghanistan case in order to answer how NATO can contribute more to global cooperation on Counter-Terrorism.

Keywords: NATO, Counter Terrorism, Afghanistan, EU, UN

1. Introduction

'Terrorism' has traditionally defied definitions and shifted in meaning over time. It once had positive connotations during the French Revolution and with the establishment of the New World, colonies sought to distance themselves from tyrannical Kings and Monarchies in Europe.³ However, the absence of a broadly-agreed global understanding rather than definition of terrorism only increases the risks. There are so many definitions of terrorism⁴ in history and literature, in multitudinous different contexts.⁵ Each is bound up in the complexities of its time and place, political backdrop and socio-national sensitivities, differences are therefore to be expected.

Terrorism as a significant global issue is a highly complex phenomenon. It remains a global threat with lasting impacts on the masses in the world today. It not only undermines international peace and security, but destroys communities and destabilizes regions. No country in the world is immune to terrorism. Fighting terrorism is a complex task because terrorists cannot be defined exclusively in terms of religion or ethnicity; they often have irregular forms of warfare and the ability to attack in different parts of the world.

Since terrorism is a transnational threat, there is a need for international cooperation for dealing with it effectively. International Organizations including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nation (UN), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have different structures, capacities, strategies and partnerships in various stages in fighting terrorism. The use of military force in fighting terrorism has a significant

³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (Columbia University Press, 2006), p.3.

⁴ See, for example, Alex Peter Schmid, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, (Taylor & Francis, 2011), p. 39., Anthony Richards, *Conceptualizing Terrorism*, (Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 51., Sebastian Wojciechowski, "Why is it So Difficult to Define Terrorism," *Polish Political Science Year Book* 38 (2009), p. 2.

⁵ Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, p. 413.

advantage in terms of deterrence. In this context, NATO, with its unique experience and great military capabilities, differs from other international cooperation and organizations, such as the Global Coalition Against Daesh, and the League of Arab States (LAS). However, since the partnerships between NATO and other international organizations in the fight against terrorism are no longer sufficient, it is necessary to reorganize these partnerships through incorporating other regional agencies, state and non-state actors plus emerging powers into this partnership.

This study will utilize the case study approach (CSA) as the primary research method. This will provide an overview of the main methodological features of the study - its planning, analysis, interpretation and reporting methods. CSA is used to create a multidimensional understanding by examining a complex subject in depth against the context of real life.⁶ It can also provide detailed information on which gaps exist in policies subjected to analysis here, or the features favoring one implementation strategy over another. Thus, the data emerging during the study can help add to or revise our understanding of policies or strategies.⁷ CSA method may differ from the researcher's epistemological perspective. They may have a critical, interpretive or positivist approach. We preferred to approach with a positivist perspective and to evaluate matters objectively. Therefore, it is believed by the authors that with such an approach, we can contribute to the sustainability and enhanced effectiveness of key partnerships.

Many of the studies conducted in this field⁸ focuses on how partnerships between NATO and other international organizations are formed in the fight against terrorism, what stages they have gone through, and what results have been achieved. However, this study sets out to examine partnerships established by NATO in the global fight against terrorism with other international organizations including the UN and the EU and partner countries, such as Australia and Japan in the Afghanistan case in order to answer how NATO can contribute more to global cooperation on Counter-Terrorism. In this way, the advantageous and

⁶ Sarah Crowe et. al., "The Case Study Approach," *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 11(1) (2011), p. 8.

⁷ Ibid, p. 6.

⁸ There are the following studies in this field; Juliette Bird, "NATO's role in Counter-Terrorism," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9(2) (2015), David Scott Yost, *NATO and International Organizations* (NATO Defense College 2007), Kent J. Kill and Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Explaining International Organizations: NATO and the United Nations: Debates and Trends in Institutional Coordination," *Journal of International Organizations Studies* 2(1) (2011), Christian Kaunert, and Ori Wertman. "Counter-Terrorism Cooperation," in *NATO and the EU: The Essential Partners* (Lindstrom Gustav and Tardy Thierry, eds, NATO Defense College, 2019).

disadvantageous aspects of NATO in combating terrorism policy have been identified and made more contribution to the academic field by making inferences about how it contributes more to global fight against terrorism.

In this study, NATO's counter-terrorism (CT) operations in Afghanistan are chosen as a test case for analyzing NATO's global cooperation for fighting terrorism. Upon analysis, it is seen that NATO has acted in partnership with other international organizations such as the UN, EU and Global Coalition, and partner countries, such as Australia and Japan in its operations. Despite success of these partnerships, they faced many strains and difficulties and thus cannot be called as a model partnership. In the light of deficiencies detected, the study aims to make a contributory value not only to NATO but also other international and regional organizations in the field of CT in the context of comprehensive security and cooperative security approaches. This study will shed light on the possible policies to be implemented by NATO in future CT partnership initiatives. In the first part of the article, a brief history of NATO's CT strategy will be discussed. Second, NATO's CT cooperation with partners will be examined. Next, NATO's CT Strategy in Afghanistan that revealed the problems NATO faced during its partnership with other actors during its Afghanistan mission will be analyzed as the case study. And the study will end with a conclusion part.

2. The History of the NATO's Counter Terrorism Strategy

Before examining NATO's CT policy, it is useful to understand how NATO defines terrorism and CT. NATO defines terrorism as "...the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve a political, religious or ideological objective (AAP-6)."⁹

NATO's definition of CT:

*"...offensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism, to include Counter-Force activities and containment by military forces and civil agencies."*¹⁰

NATO as a collective defense organization was established primarily in response to a traditional external military threat. However, it had to face a series of questions

⁹ "NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism," NATO, available at <https://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism-annex.htm> (accessed 24 April 2020).

¹⁰ Ibid.

about its future when the Cold War ended. As the security gap that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall began to threaten NATO's long-term future, both decision makers and academics began to explore ways to ensure the survival of the organization. The solution in this regard was the fight against terrorism, which was decided to be implemented in a format compatible with NATO's concept.¹¹

In fact, international terrorism was not a phenomenon that had just emerged in the shadow of September 11, 2001 and was never on the agenda of NATO. However, the fight against terrorism was not included in NATO's priority policy at a time when it was discussed not only as a kind of passive political partner of Russia, but also an active military participant of NATO.¹² The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as one of the risks affecting NATO's long-term security, and paragraph 24 of concept emphasizes that "the security interests of the Alliance may be affected by other wider risks, such as terrorist acts, sabotage and organized crime".¹³

For the first time in its history, based on Article 5¹⁴ of the Washington Treaty, NATO has started actively combating terrorism on US soil in response to the September 11 attacks.¹⁵ This intervention was limited to providing AWACS intelligence and deploying ships in the Eastern Mediterranean¹⁶ to intervene in suspected terrorist activities in the early October 2001 at the request of US officials.¹⁷ The US did not make NATO the most important factor in response to this incident and decided to fight terrorism through coalition-of-willing when the attacks were found to be originating from Afghanistan. According to Michael Rühle, "September 11" was the catalyst for the most radical changes in NATO history, rather than the end of NATO.¹⁸

¹¹ David Brown, "The War on Terrorism Would Not Be Possible without NATO': A Critique," *Contemporary Security Policy* 25(3) (2004), p. 411.

¹² Ibid. p. 412.

¹³ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, (accessed 28 April 2020).

¹⁴ Article 5; "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forth with, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.", "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 28 April 2020).

¹⁵ "Countering Terrorism," OSCE, available at <https://www.osce.org/countering-terrorism> (accessed 11 May 2020).

¹⁶ This deployment continues under the name of Operation Active Endeavor and covers the entire Mediterranean.

¹⁷ Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn, eds., *Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond* (Routledge, 2004), p. 259, p. 260.

¹⁸ Michael Rühle, "NATO Ten Years After: Learning the Lessons," (NATO Review Magazine, 2016).

NATO's CT-related activities encompass three main 'spheres'- Documentation (texts, academic studies, training and publications), Organizational activities plus practical or Operational activities. Organizational work streams to some extent overlap with the Operational – the joint exercises, training schools and Centres of Excellence (CoEs) such as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EoD) and Consequence Management School in Iceland.

Examples illustrating each follow below.

2.1. Documentations of NATO's CT-Related Activities

It is of great importance that international organizations which were established to ensure the security of their members and carry out their policies in almost every field within certain concepts. The fight against terrorism is one of the most important issues to be evaluated in this context. There are three main documents framing NATO's fight against terrorism. These documents are:

- 2002 Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (MC-472): According to this text, member nation states retain primary responsibility for defence of their populations and infrastructure. Military Options continuum encompasses defensive measures and consequence management, 'traditional' offensive measures, and cooperation.¹⁹
- 2010 Lisbon Strategic Concept: It has three vital principal tasks: Collective Defense, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security.²⁰
- 2012 Chicago Summit and NATO's Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines: They take the same stream of thought, stating that "...in defining NATO's overarching approach to terrorism, allies recognize that most CT tools remain primarily with national civilian and legal authorities." Despite the burgeoning growth of terrorism as a global phenomenon, most responsibility (and capability) for countering it remains at national or sub-national level.²¹

¹⁹ "Final Decision on MC 0472/1 MC Concept For Counter-Terrorism," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/topics_pdf/20160905_160905-mc-concept-ct.pdf (accessed 12 May 2020).

²⁰ "NATO Adopts New Strategic Concept," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68172.htm#:~:text=The%20new%20Strategic%20Concept%20urges,missile%20attacks%20and%20cyber%20attacks.&text=It%20also%20keeps%20the%20door,in%20NATO%20to%20European%20democracies (accessed 12 May 2020).

²¹ "NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism, Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87905.htm? (accessed 12 May 2020).

These guidelines, which were framed during the 2012 Chicago Summit, focused on the three themes of Awareness, Capabilities and Engagement to cultivate a holistic and integrated approach to countering terror. These are expanded in detail below;

Awareness, including consultations, enhanced intelligence and information sharing. It also includes establishing networks of Subject Matter Experts and academics / practitioners in relevant fields. This also includes the sharing of methods, experience and best practice, thus reducing 'trial and error' duplication in the application and development of methods and concepts.

Capabilities, including effective intelligence (both its gathering, use, dissemination and application) and effective engagement. This also extends to Force Protection and CBRN Defence, in which certain member states possess substantial experience.

Engagement, defined as liaison and outreach with partner states and other international institutions to encourage common point of view of the terrorist threat, via boosted consultations and practical collaboration via existing mechanisms. This includes leveraging the experience of others (again reducing duplication in time and cost of 'failed experiments') plus contributing to global efforts against terrorism.

"The Policy Guidelines on CT codify a set of definitions and end-states, with the aim of CT being '...putting an end to terrorist attacks', i.e deterrence and denial of opportunities to terrorists to execute attacks. It goes on to state '...take action against terrorists themselves' (direct action and suppression, disruption of structures, networks and funding). It adds '...protect(ing) people and property against attacks' plus preparation for recovery (resilience), an area where some member states had significant experience stemming from the Second World War. The text hinted at pertinent current issues by adding prevention '... (of people) becoming terrorists' plus discouraging support for terrorism. These presages the current day focus on media, censorship debates, counter-messaging and civil liberties".²²

22 Ibid.

2.2. Organizational Structure of NATO`s CT Discipline

Organizational Structure of NATO`s CT typically involves building teams, schools and centers of excellence. These include the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit and Inauguration of Center of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (2005), Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) projects plus the Emerging Security Challenges Division (2010). The latter body focuses on CT, Energy Security, Cyber Defence and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.²³

In addition to new initiatives in Civil Emergency planning and Crisis management, the Defense Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) has driven practical initiatives such as Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) training with Iraqi forces and establishing a civilian Crisis Management Center with Mauritania.²⁴

This workstream encompasses Education, Training (COEs, NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) and The NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ)) and Exercises. It is noteworthy throughout that the guidelines emphasize training, mentoring and outreach, capacity building with partner entities, knowledge sharing plus jointly in technical innovation, over 'direct action' and kinetic suppression of terrorist threats. Even the Special Operations Forces Community (NATO SOF HQ, Belgium) whilst having a field-deployable element, primarily builds up bodies of knowledge such as a SOF database and a tactical Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) laboratory enabling forensic analysis of improvised explosive devices, lethally effective in the past against even advanced NATO Land Systems (Bradley, Warrior, Stryker AFVs etc.).²⁵

The continuing change in the strategic environment directly affects the transformation of NATO. NATO, which has undergone different transformation processes since its establishment, has faced much more security problems compared to the past. In the face of unlimited threats such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, as needed NATO must always be ready to be able to deploy and sustain forces in very remote areas, as in Afghanistan.²⁶ However,

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "Science for Peace and Security," NATO, available at <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/78209.htm> accessed 01 February 2021).

²⁵ "Special Operations Forces," NATO, available at <https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics105950.htm?selectedLocale=en> (accessed 18 May 2020).

²⁶ "Güvenlik İçin Birlikte Çalışmak: NATO," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120118_nato_security_turk.pdf (accessed 24 April 2020).

the breadth of the area requires NATO to create new security concepts and act in partnership with other international organizations. With the new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO has undertaken Cooperative Security (CS) as a new core task in addition to existing collective defense and crisis management. Fundamentally, this new task aims to increase cohesion and cooperation with other international organizations in order to cope with new multidimensional threats.²⁷

2.3. CT Centered Operations of NATO

NATO has conducted several operations within the framework of its global fight against terrorism in the post-9/11 era, including Operations Eagle Assist (OEA), Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

- **Operation Eagle Assist:** Immediately after the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of its Charter for the first time in its history and sent Air Warning and Control System (AWACS) air assets to improve the US organic air surveillance capability. 7 NATO AWACS patrolled the skies over the US on a constant basis (in similar fashion to the SAC standing nuclear bombers over the North Pole of the 1960s). The operation, to which 830 soldiers from 13 NATO countries contributed, terminated on 16 May 2002.²⁸ NATO's response to the September 11 attacks can be considered as one of the most important steps taken by the Alliance within the scope of the common defence strategy.
- **Operation Active Endeavor:** It was launched on 7 October 2001 to deter, defend, block and protect against terrorist activities in the Mediterranean, immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and ended in October 2016. The aim of the operation, which was launched to support the USA right after September 11, was to deter and disrupt terrorist activities in the Mediterranean. NATO's Standing Naval Forces were deployed to patrol the eastern Mediterranean region as part of an effort to monitor maritime

²⁷ "Cooperative Security as NATO's Core Task," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77718.htm?selectedLocale=en#:~:text=Cooperative%20security%20%E2%80%93%20a%20network%20of,to%20prepare%20for%20NATO%20membership. (accessed 22 May 2020).

²⁸ Kathleen T. Rhem, "Rumsfeld Thanks NATO as AWACS Planes Head Home," available at <https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/9868/rumsfeld%3A-nato-awacs-to-return-home-%28may-3%29.html> (accessed 28 May 2020).

traffic to detect and deter trafficking and terrorist activity. This primarily took the form of inspecting cargoes and seizing weapons or weaponizable / dual-use materials in the Mediterranean. With its contribution to the OEM, NATO once again demonstrated its solidarity and determination in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, this initiative is of great importance for NATO to implement its common defence strategy.²⁹

- **International Security Assistance Force:** Albeit not a CT operation *per se*, this NATO-led operation in Afghanistan came about as a result of a terrorist threat and existed in a CT threat environment. It had direct relevance to global fight against terrorism. It aided the Afghan government in expanding and exerting its authority, and upholding security to prevent the country from becoming a refuge for international terrorism. Established under a UN mandate in 2001 at the request of the Afghan authorities, the ISAF was commanded by NATO from August 2003 to December 2014. It evolved into Operation 'Resolute Support Mission (RSM)' in 2014.³⁰
- **Resolute Support Mission:** RSM, a NATO-led non-war mission, which was launched on January 1, 2015, following the completion of the ISAF mission. The main purpose of this mission, which was established upon the call of the Afghan government and in accordance with the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 2189 of 2014, is to ensure that Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) take the responsibility of providing full security across the country. It has been training, advising, and contributing a large quantity of financial support to the ANSF and institutions. At the NATO Summit held in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018, RSM allies and partners pledged to continue to provide military assistance and financial support to the Afghan security forces until 2024. RSM currently operates in Afghanistan with at least 12,000 troops from 38 NATO Allies and partners.³¹ Given the technical, military and economic assistance provided by the ANSF, it would not be wrong to say that the RSM contributed indirectly, not directly, to NATO's CT mission in Afghanistan.

²⁹ "Operation Active Endeavour (Archived)," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm, (accessed 13 June 2020).

³⁰ "NATO and Afghanistan," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm (accessed 11 July 2020).

³¹ "Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm (19 Jan 2021).

2.4. NATO's Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with Partners

The increase in the number of benign and malign non-state actors and problems such as corruption and social and economic inequality lead to a significant weakening of the effectiveness of states and institutions. Some malicious non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, human traffickers, and pirates, now engage in terrorist operations with their partners almost all over the world, and increasingly challenge governments through displaying state-like qualities.³² Complex relationships between/among ... create governance challenges, and these challenges can become unmanageable for governments or organizations without cooperation. The difficulty of addressing such complex issues is driving governments and institutions to adopt new comprehensive approaches and to make more efforts to increase the effectiveness of their cooperation.

Instability along the borders of NATO and the risks of the rise in the terrorist group's influence and violence in these areas create discomfort for European NATO Allies.³³ Moreover, NATO is also worried about the increasing number of weak and fragile states in strategically significant regions. In this context, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, which become the center of instability, extremism and terrorism, are within the scope of NATO.³⁴ However, the wideness of the field and the versatility of the threat require NATO to act in partnership with other international organizations. It would be appropriate to evaluate NATO's comprehensive approach on CT in this respect.

NATO currently continues to cooperate with partners such as the UN, EU and OSCE in many areas. These efforts will consolidate military-military dialogue and help develop confidence and security measures. Therefore, all relevant actors should be identified and directly involved in the process to create an effective cooperation framework.³⁵

When analyzed in terms of assistance to the international and regional organizations on CT, NATO has undoubtedly assumed an important leadership role on CT, with its significant experience and powerful capacities. Guidelines end with a paragraph on assumptions for possible future operations:

³² "NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis Report 2017," NATO, available at https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/171004_sfa_2017_report_hr.pdf (accessed 11 July 2020).

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24, p. 28.

“NATO will maintain flexibility as how to counter terrorism, playing a leading or supporting role as required. Allies’ capabilities represent an essential component of a potential response to terrorism. Collective defense remains subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).”³⁶

However, NATO’s powers and resources are not infinite. Therefore, in order to combat terrorism, it needs partnerships. However, another inextricable issue is that NATO is an alliance requiring unanimous agreement of members to take a decision. Building partnerships in CT involves acceding to the demands of partners.

3. NATO’s Counter Terrorism Strategy in Afghanistan

Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the mainland USA, NATO invoked the Article 5 collective defense clause of the Treaty for the first time in its history and then decided to deploy its forces and assets to support the global war on terrorism (GWOT). This unique decision not only reinforced the coherence and determination within the Alliance, but also ended serious debates about the future of the transatlantic alliance before this event.³⁷ Soon after, NATO joined to ISAF and carried out its first “out of area operation”³⁸ in August 2003.³⁹

ISAF’s primary objectives were to help the nascent Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and rebuild Afghanistan following decades of conflict. Its deployment was based on a mandate conferred by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510.⁴⁰ In the Resolution 1386, it was emphasized that the Afghan people have the right to live freely and determine their own administration, and it was stated that all countries have a duty at this stage. In this context, it was decided to establish the

³⁶ “NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism,” NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87905.htm? (accessed 19 July 2020).

³⁷ NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy seems to be oscillating between the War Model (WM) response and the Expanded Criminal Justice Model (ECJM). This oscillation is due to the European subscription to the ECJM, leaning towards the criminal justice model (CJM). While the core members such as France and Germany subscribe to the CJM model, the new members lean towards the US approach. This non-convergence is leading to frictions at three levels: between the United States and the Europeans; between the East Europeans and the West Europeans and between France and Germany on the one hand and the United Kingdom on the other, Prasad P. Rane, “NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Afghanistan,” *Strategic Analysis* 31(1) (2007), p. 85, p. 86.

³⁸ The term “out-of-area” is used here to indicate that the relevant institution carried out a military operation far from the expected place of departure.

³⁹ The United States has preferred NATO to perform the role of a second line of defence, given its members’ divide and uncertainty over the approach towards terrorism.

⁴⁰ “Resolutions Archive,” United Nation Security Council Resolution, available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/> (accessed 21 May 2020).

ISAF for 6 months to help the ATA.⁴¹ Between August 2003 and December 2014, different countries⁴² participated in ISAF. The mission gifted the US a significant mean of exerting moral and political leverage on allies and partners.⁴³ The UNSC also mandated ISAF to work closely with the Afghan Security Forces, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative and the coalition for OAE.⁴⁴

NATO's mission in Afghanistan had three priorities: continued ISAF expansion, perfecting the coordination mechanisms between NATO/ISAF and other international organizations and missions operating in Afghanistan.⁴⁵ The scope and scale of NATO's Afghanistan involvement has grown steadily since December 2005, with a revised operational plan. This plan aimed at helping the Afghan Government to practice its power and authority throughout the country.⁴⁶ Subsequently, NATO took over ISAF's command from the US-led coalition on July 31, 2006. In the light of these developments, it was observed that significant changes happened in the character of NATO's CT strategy. For example, there was transformation from 'NATO in support' to 'NATO in the lead'.⁴⁷

NATO assumed full command of the UN-mandated ISAF mission in the late 2006 and was formally requested to remain by the Afghan Government, reinforcing its legitimacy yet further. This brought almost all foreign forces under NATO command with the exception of modest-sized US elements.⁴⁸ NATO assumed further new

⁴¹ "Resolution 1386 The Situation in Afghanistan," United Nation Security Council Resolution, available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1386> (accessed 21 May 2020).

⁴² All NATO member states, plus 11 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) nations (Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Macedonia, Switzerland, Sweden, Ukraine), and 15 Non-NATO and non-EAPC nations (Australia, Bahrain, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Tonga, United Arab Emirate), "Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures," NATO, available at <https://rs.nato.int/rsm/newsroom/key-facts-and-figures#:~:text=The%20Resolute%20Support%20Mission%20currently,and%20Laghman%20in%20the%20east>. (accessed 29 May 2020).

⁴³ "Operations and Missions: Past and Present," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm (accessed 22 October 2020).

⁴⁴ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1707 (2006)," United Nations, available at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1707\(2006\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1707(2006)) (accessed 22 May 2020).

⁴⁵ James Pardew and Christopher Bennett, "NATO's Evolving Operations," NATO Review, 2006).

⁴⁶ "Revised Operational Plan for NATO's Expanding Mission in Afghanistan," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/revised-operational-plan-nato-s-expanding-mission-afghanistan> (accessed 23 May 2020).

⁴⁷ The NATO's Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism addresses two roles for NATO's involvement in counter-terrorist operations – NATO in the lead and NATO in support. This concept was approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in permanent session and subsequently endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit on November 21, 2002., available at "NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism".

⁴⁸ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and US Policy*, (Nova Science Publication, 2008), p. 31.

responsibilities in the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and state-building field. Core tasks included physical reconstruction of Afghanistan and support to the Afghan government in establishing law and order as well as cultivating a functioning democracy.⁴⁹

NATO's primary goal in Afghanistan has been "to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country and ensure that the country will never again be a safe haven for terrorists".⁵⁰ In the light of this objective, NATO, as part of its CT strategy based on a military concept, has adopted a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism in the ISAF mission and carried out various operations using both soft and hard power, such as military power, public diplomacy, and reconstruction experts. These operations aiming to reduce the activities of terrorists are part of NATO's CT strategy based on a military concept. NATO's CT strategy in Afghanistan started as support and evolved into leadership.⁵¹ NATO has supported the military components of the 24 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)⁵² in northern, western and southern Afghanistan, which played an important role in the entire ISAF-NATO mission.⁵³ NATO has also taken the lead in CT operations in Afghanistan, using strengthened command, control and intelligence structures, while providing on-the-ground support to its allies, coalition and other international organizations with all its assets and capabilities. In the context of NATO's cooperative security, the NAC worked closely with non-NATO countries at ISAF, providing them with political direction and coordination. The Allied Joint Force Command (AJFC), headquartered in Brunssum, the Netherlands, assumed operational responsibility for the management, training, deployment and maintenance of ISAF.⁵⁴

ISAF completed its mission in December 2014, the US air power in the country was gradually reduced and the PRTs and the majority of the 800 bases under

⁴⁹ Hubertus Hoffmann, "Afghanistan: A new Grand Strategy for NATO, EU and the U.S.," *World Security Network*, available at <http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Broader-Middle-East/hubertus-hoffmann/Afghanistan-A-new-Grand-Strategy-for-NATO-EU-and-the-U.S> (accessed 01 June 2020).

⁵⁰ "NATO and Afghanistan," NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm (accessed 11 July 2020).

⁵¹ Rane, "NATO's Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Afghanistan", p. 81.

⁵² Provincial Development Teams (PRTs), established in November 2002 by US, are small inter-agency organizations promoting governance, security and reconstruction in problematic areas of Afghanistan. These teams, which later came under the control of NATO, conducted several activities in many areas, such as controlling of the narcotics trade, disarming of militants, preventing of corruption, and building of the economic infrastructure. Paul Gallis, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," *Connections* 6(3) (2007), p. 14.

⁵³ Rane, "NATO's Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Afghanistan", p. 82.

⁵⁴ Rane, "NATO's Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Afghanistan", p. 80, p. 81.

ISAF control were handed over ANDSF and Afghan institutions throughout 2014.⁵⁵ Respectively, the RSM began its mission in 2015. However, at that time, Afghans were seriously concerned about the Taliban would regain power after the withdrawal of US and international forces from Afghanistan, just as ISIS regained power when the US pulled out of Iraq. Unfortunately, the Afghans were right to worry and Taliban started to capture large parts of provinces, such as Helmand Province, Konduz City, and Kandahar since 2015.⁵⁶ According to the BBC, the Taliban has overtly taken control across 70% of Afghanistan in 2018.⁵⁷ In parallel with these developments, it has been inevitable for the US and the Taliban to reach an agreement. After many setbacks a final peace agreement was signed between the US and the Taliban on 29 February 2020, and a pre-agreement for peace was signed between the Afghan government and the Taliban representatives towards the end of 2020. However, despite all these agreements, the security environment in Afghanistan still remains fragile. Moreover, the statements of US officials related to the withdrawal of all US troops from Afghanistan in May 2021 has increased concerns that the country would fall back into an impasse.⁵⁸ Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg drew attention to this very issue in his press release on 9 December 2020, and stated that NATO would not have any option other than peace in Afghanistan and would continue to provide support to Afghan national security forces both financial and capacity building. Stoltenberg said “we will stay in Afghanistan for as long as necessary, to ensure the country never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorists”.⁵⁹

3.1. The problems NATO has Encountered in Cooperation with Other Actors in the ISAF

Undoubtedly, CT exists in a continuum of politics, religion, culture and society, and indeed the armed forces and international organizations are no exception. Naturally,

⁵⁵ Katzman, Kenneth, and Clayton Thomas, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy”, *Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service* (2017), p. 26.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ “Why is There A War in Afghanistan? The Short, Medium and Long Story,” *BBC*, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49192495> (accessed 28 January 2021).

⁵⁸ Mehdi-Jalaluddin Hakimi, and Stephanie Ashe, “The U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the Afghan Peace Process,” <https://law.stanford.edu/2020/12/07/the-u-s-taliban-agreement-and-the-afghan-peace-process/> (accessed 22 January 2021).

⁵⁹ Amy McCullough and Rachel S. Cohen, “NATO Secretary General: We Will Stay in Afghanistan As Long as Necessary”, *Air Force Magazine*, available at <https://www.airforcemag.com/nato-secretary-general-we-will-stay-in-afghanistan-as-long-as-necessary/> (accessed 21 January 2021).

there are many reasons why NATO could not achieve the desired success in the CT operations during the ISAF's command. It would be completely unfair to describe this task as an example of failure when evaluated from the perspective of NATO. Some of the flaws in the process arise not only from NATO itself, but also from other actors operating in the field and partnerships that cannot be established with them.

NATO's lackluster results in Afghanistan arguably stem from a lack of mass and substance, given the sheer size of Afghanistan, and the cautious pace of gradually increasing involvement. The cultural reasons for institutional aversion to 'shock and awe' have been covered – the need for harmony amongst large number of members with divergent socio-political conditions, plus populations' appetite for involvement (and electoral cycles). As the Taliban insurgency grew stronger in 2006-2007, ISAF countries realized that they would need partners like the UN to promote effective governance and reconstruction in Afghanistan.⁶⁰ The expansion of ISAF's mandate beyond the capital, which was formerly limited to Kabul and its surrounding, challenging geography of Afghanistan, some Allies' reluctance to provide additional military personnel and the lack of equipment necessary to stabilize the country have led NATO to establish partnerships with other international organizations, non-governmental organizations and willing countries.

NATO's experience in Afghanistan has also been instrumental in the development of NATO's new cooperative approach that has been undertaken during the post-Cold War period. In Afghanistan, NATO has carried out a mission with non-European partners, making the importance of establishing cooperative working relationships a higher priority. In the concept of providing cooperative security, NATO has established several partnerships with actors in Afghanistan. These are Central Asian members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)⁶¹ program, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, the partnership with non-NATO countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan, and the cooperation with other international organizations, including the UN and the EU. These partnerships took place in many areas ranging from border security, military base use, troop and

⁶⁰ Matthew Corcoran, "UN-NATO Cooperation in Afghanistan," available at [https://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/un-nato-cooperation-afghanistan#:~:text=The%20US%20and%20many%20of%20coalition%20defeated%20the%20Taliban%20regime.&text=In%20March%202002%2C%20the%20UN,Nations%20Assistance%20Mission%20in%20Afghanistan\).](https://cic.nyu.edu/news_commentary/un-nato-cooperation-afghanistan#:~:text=The%20US%20and%20many%20of%20coalition%20defeated%20the%20Taliban%20regime.&text=In%20March%202002%2C%20the%20UN,Nations%20Assistance%20Mission%20in%20Afghanistan).) (accessed 01 June 2020).

⁶¹ The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program established between each partner country is tailored to the country's ambitions, needs and capabilities and implemented jointly with the incumbent government. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed the PfP Framework Document with NATO in 1994, and joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 2001 to condemn the 9/11 terrorist attacks and promise to fight terrorism.

equipment supply to expertise reinforcement.⁶² Most of them also served as one of the elements of NATO's CT operations under ISAF's command.

Australia has been one of the prominent partners of NATO in Afghanistan, which supported the NATO-led ISAF mission with 1550 soldiers, played an important role in ANSF's training.⁶³ The Australian Federal Police (AFP) staff deployed to various missions based in Kabul between 2007 and 2014. AFP members have assumed various advisory roles in NATO or Afghan authorities, such as NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) Deputy Commander Policeman and Afghan Government Deputy Security Minister's Administrative Police Advisor.⁶⁴ It also made a significant contribution by assigning additional civilian personnel to support NATO's civil-military stabilization efforts in Afghanistan in 2009-2010.⁶⁵

Japan is another significant partner of NATO in Afghanistan, which has played a leading role in ISAF. It has involved in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts and the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG). In addition, Japan has indirectly contributed to security by providing salary support for Afghan police officers, constituting literacy programs for National Army members and granting \$ 52 million to the PfP Trust Fund.⁶⁶

While NATO's partnerships in ISAF with PfP and other non-NATO countries are more circumstantial, its partnerships with UN and the EU are more institutional and have a long history. Born from the spirit of multilateralism after the Second World War, NATO and the UN are organizations deeply committed to common values, such as ensuring international peace and security, protecting international justice and law, and committing to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁶⁷ The inclusion of the aims and principles of the UN Charter in the North Atlantic Treaty is a clear demonstration of these common values. The NATO-UN partnership, whose main purpose is to promote international peace and security,

⁶² "Security Through Partnership," NATO, available at <https://www.nato.int/docu/sec-partnership/sec-partner-e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2020).

⁶³ "Australia's Involvement in Afghanistan—Frequently Asked Questions," *Australia, Parliamentary Library*, available at <http://parliamentflagpost.blogspot.com/2010/10/australias-involvement-in-afghanistan.html> (accessed 10 January 2020).

⁶⁴ "Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia's Whole-of-Government Mission," *The Australian Civil-Military Centre*, available at https://www.acmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2018-07/apo-nid71004-15836_0.pdf (accessed 21 January 2021).

⁶⁵ "Annual Report 2009–10." *Australian Government*, available at <https://www.pc.gov.au/about/governance/annual-reports/annualreport0910> (accessed 10 January 2021).

⁶⁶ Victoria Tuke, "Japan's Crucial Role in Afghanistan," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 206 (2013).

⁶⁷ For further information please look at: The North Atlantic Treaty, and Chapter I of the United Nations Charter, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm? and <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art1.shtml> (accessed 10 September 2020).

developed within the scope of dialogue and cooperation in the post-Cold War period and yielded with operations⁶⁸ carried out first in the Western Balkans and then in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Africa.⁶⁹ This part of the study will first examine the problems NATO encountered while cooperating with its partners during ISAF CT operations, then analyze what it has done to overcome these problems, and finally, offer some recommendations based on ISAF experience.

The NATO-UN partnership in Afghanistan began in 2003. Initially, the duties of both institutions were clear. While the UN focused on political process, human rights, the rule of law and gender equality with its United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)⁷⁰, NATO was responsible for ISAF command, mainly tasked with creating a safe environment for political stability and ensuring the economic development of Afghanistan.⁷¹ Since both missions have parallel tasks and their own unique command system, the lack of hierarchical link between them caused great difficulties. UNAMA and ISAF officials came together at numerous meetings at many stages, but these meetings evolved into a vicious circle with no results due to their failure to agree on prioritization and meaningful coordination between them.⁷²

Building an effective partnership was important for not only NATO but also the UN. ISAF countries needed UN legitimacy and support for both encouraging effective administration and reconstruction in Afghanistan and convincing their citizens that they are waging a “just” war. On the other hand, the UN was calculating that increasing NATO’s logistical and military capabilities in an increasingly dangerous environment could ease tensions.⁷³ After increasing contacts over time, a structural framework was needed in order to ensure that partnership activities are carried out effectively. In this context, the UN and NATO signed a joint declaration in September

⁶⁸ These operations are the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) in 1995, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1998, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) from 2004 to end 2011, Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from 2003 to 2014., “Relations with the United Nations,” NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm (accessed 10 September 2020).

⁶⁹ Endre Sebok, “NATO-UN Relations: Looking Ahead After 10 Years of Expanding Cooperation” (NATO Review, September 2018), available at <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/09/28/nato-un-relations-looking-ahead-after-10-years-of-expanding-cooperation/index.html> (accessed 10 July 2020).

⁷⁰ UNAMA was established by UN on 28 March 2002 to support the people and institutions of Afghanistan in ensuring peace and stability in line with the rights and obligations contained in the Afghan constitution.

⁷¹ Michael F. Harsch, “NATO and the UN: Partnership with Potential,” *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs* (2012), p. 12.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Gallis, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance”, p. 10.

2008 to establish a consensus on controversial issues such as aid distribution and civilian casualties and to increase cooperation between headquarters.⁷⁴ However, this cooperation did not last very long. According to Harsch, weakening of the UN's freedom of movement owing to NATO's increasing power in Afghanistan, and ISAF's inability to react to Taliban attacks on UN personnel in a timely manner despite the agreement between them, caused disappointment in the UN.⁷⁵

Another reason why the NATO-UN partnership could not be carried out effectively in Afghanistan was the resource inequality between them. The US reinforcement of its civilian and military presence in Afghanistan has provided NATO a large operational capability, which has led to an increase in UN dependence on NATO. Moreover, different public reporting of civilians who lost their lives due to US and NATO attacks has been another problem between the parties. For example, even though the UNAMA in Afghanistan reported that civilian deaths increased 62 percent in the first five months of 2008 compared to the same period of 2007, ISAF claimed that these figures were exaggerated by the UN. This situation reduced the support of the Afghan people to NATO forces and led to an increase in resistance.⁷⁶

The EU was another significant partner of NATO in the ISAF mission. In fact, NATO and the EU had not interacted with each other during the Cold War years due to diverging objectives and missions.⁷⁷ However in the post-Cold War era when adaptation efforts of both organizations in which the EU tried to become an effective and credible foreign and security policy actor and NATO tried to become more than a collective defence organization through taking on new responsibilities such as crisis management and peacekeeping coincided with each other, a new era of strategic partnership started.⁷⁸ This partnership, increasingly continuing since the late 1990s, began to give more productive outcomes in the 2000s. The partnership, which advanced in a conceptual framework with the Berlin Plus Agreement⁷⁹ in 2003, had the chance to be implemented in the field. Subsequently,

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Harsch, "NATO and the UN", p. 15.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Aslıgül Sarıkamış Kaya, "The EU NATO Relations in the Post-Cold War Security Context," *ÇOMÜ Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 2(4) (2017), p. 114.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ "The Berlin Plus agreement refers to a comprehensive package of arrangements finalized in early 2003 between the EU and the NATO that allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.", "EEAS - The Berlin Plus Agreement," European External Action Service, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en (accessed 10 July 2020).

the NATO-EU partnership has been tested in two successful Balkan operations, EUFOR Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003) and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004), and crowned with the “strategic partnership”, as stated in the official documents of both parties.⁸⁰

The partnership between NATO and the EU in Afghanistan began after NATO took over the command of ISAF. Realizing that the stabilization in Afghanistan cannot be achieved only through military initiatives, NATO has attempted to establish a partnership with the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan⁸¹ mission, which has been responsible for training the Afghan Police Force.

NATO-EU cooperation was not directly in the field of CT, but on the axis of ensuring security in Afghanistan. The NATO-led RSM and its predecessor, ISAF had collaborated with the EUPOL Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014 without any form of official cooperation agreement.⁸² ISAF forces were tasked with training the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to support the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A).⁸³ NATO-EU partnership was implemented at this stage. The ANP training program, which was initially under the responsibility of the EU, was revised several times. This program, which started in 2002 under the control of Germany’s Police Project Office, continued its existence in 2007 as the EUPOL Afghanistan. The EUPOL Afghanistan, which is mostly engaged in the training of Afghan civilian police members, continued to work in the coordination of NTM-A established by NATO in 2009. However, ANA and ANP training efforts, which were created to improve the size and power of the ANSF that would ensure the security of the whole country, could not succeed due to various reasons, such as insufficient manpower, lack of resources and skills, and insufficient number of trainers.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Tinatin Aghniashvili, “Towards More Effective Cooperation? The Role of States in Shaping NATO-EU Interaction and Cooperation,” *Connections* 15(4) (2016), p. 73.

⁸¹ EUPOL Afghanistan, which began its activities in 2007, was established to assist the Afghan government in reforming the police force, and continued its activities until 2016., European Court of Auditors, “The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan: Mixed Results”, (Publications Office of the European Union, 2015), p. 7.

⁸² Attila Mesterhazy, “NATO-EU Cooperation After Warsaw” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Defence and Security Committee, 2017), p. 2.

⁸³ “Backgrounder: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A),” NATO, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_10/20110310_091022-media-backgrounder-NTM-A.pdf (accessed 14 August 2020).

⁸⁴ Andrew R. Hoehn and Sarah Harting, “Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in Afghanistan” (RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 34.

The mandate of the EUPOL Afghanistan was limited to certain areas, including civil policing, home office reform, and criminal justice.⁸⁵ Furthermore, EUPOL Afghanistan did not have an overall leadership mandate, and had relatively limited funding and staff number compared to major actors, such as NTM-A.⁸⁶ While NTM-A mainly focused on Afghan Security Forces, the EUPOL focused solely on civilian police training. The lack of adoption of a common strategic perspective in the training led to various disputes between the partners, but it was observed that these disputes disappeared to some extent at the operational level and a more coordinated approach was observed. For example, while the EUPOL forces were deployed in Kabul, their security needs were met by NATO forces.⁸⁷ However, the unwillingness of these actors to be coordinated by the International Police Coordination Board of Afghanistan (IPCB), which was supported by EUPOL Afghanistan and failed to provide coordination and observation, made the situation difficult.⁸⁸ On the other hand, due to political reasons, the fact that EU member states are more suitable to initiate a civilian operation rather than increasing their contribution to the NATO mission individually was another flaw in the partnership between them.⁸⁹ Despite all these difficulties, the partnership between EUPOL Afghanistan and NTM-A has been successful in specific fields, such as information sharing and human network analyzing.⁹⁰ Above all, both institutions found opportunities to collaborate in an operation away from their own homeland.

4. Conclusions

In sum, NATO has adopted a wide-ranging approach in the CT field since the September 11 attacks. In the context of this, NATO has created and implemented a CT strategy consisting of documentation (texts, academic studies, training and publications), organizational activities and operational activities. On the other

⁸⁵ "The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan: Mixed Results", p. 43.

⁸⁶ NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), a multinational military organization, began its activities in November 2009 and carried out its activities to provide high-level training for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF)., "The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan: Mixed Results", p. 39.

⁸⁷ Aghniashvili, "Towards More Effective Cooperation?", p. 80, p. 81.

⁸⁸ "The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan: Mixed Results", p. 19.

⁸⁹ Siddharth Tripathi and Enver Ferhatovic, "The European Union's Crisis Response in the Extended Neighborhood", in *The EUs Output Effectiveness in the Case of Afghanistan* (EUNPACK Paper, WP 7, March 2018), p. 30.

⁹⁰ Thierry Tardy and Gustav Lindstrom, "The Scope of EU-NATO Cooperation," in *The EU and NATO The Essential Partners*, (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2019), p. 66, p. 67.

hand, NATO has carried out various cooperative initiatives with other international and regional organizations in the CT field, and even has played a leading role in some of them. Of course, like all partnerships, it is unrealistic to expect from this partnership to show excellent results. The existence of different structures and working conditions in these organizations results in various problems in establishing inter-institutional partnership. However, the most important role in eliminating this complexity will undoubtedly belong to NATO. Since NATO, which was established as a regional security organization, is fairly superior in terms of both experience and capability in the field of CT compared to other organizations.

The study focuses on how NATO can contribute more to global cooperation on the CT. The case study approach was adopted as the method in the study, and in this context, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which was under NATO's command, was chosen as the case study. In the light of NATO's Afghanistan experience, it can be concluded that the partnerships are the products of the common security concerns of the allies. However, despite the good intentions of all parties, it is observed that their initiatives could not find the same response in the field. In fact, NATO has taken on a great responsibility by taking over the command of a complex and inextricable mission in which it was not involved from the very beginning. Controlling a range of incompatibilities has been very difficult for NATO. After NATO took over the command of ISAF, it was thought that the security of the Afghan people would be re-established through a strong military organization. At this stage, European allies insisted that there should be a UN resolution legitimizing the deployment of NATO troops in Afghanistan and that the UN should lead NATO's ISAF mission.⁹¹ However, the failure to meet these expectations and the challenges confronted in controlling the wide area of operation caused the differences of opinion and the coordination problems among NATO members.⁹²

NATO leaders have complained at times that they had trouble in persuading their allies to support ISAF. Because some members were reluctant to send the necessary troops and equipment as they claimed that ISAF was a rebuilding and stabilization mission, not a CT mission.⁹³ For this reason, NATO had to get support from non-member countries, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. At this stage, NATO has established partnerships with UN

⁹¹ Gallis, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance", p. 10.

⁹² Ibid. p. 11, p. 29.

⁹³ Ibid. p. 21.

and EU-led elements on the ground. However, it cannot be said that the expected results from these partnerships have been achieved due to the reduction in the number of NATO and US forces. Because of this reduction, Afghan security forces have begun to confront with Taliban militants directly since 2014 and 45,000 of them died.⁹⁴ Moreover, with the increase in the opium trade, Taliban is strengthening its financial condition and this makes Afghanistan even more complex.⁹⁵ However, the presence of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan under the RSM and the ongoing US funds to the Afghan institutions are the crucial developments in terms of fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. The recommendations listed below are expected to enable NATO to contribute more to global cooperation on Counter-Terrorism.

- NATO could take advantage of the UN's legitimacy in Afghanistan and could have delegated its authority on certain issues during the partnership, such as press releases and public information. Thus, consistency could be achieved in sharing information among partners.
- It seems essential for NATO, UN and EU to increase coordination between them to avoid competition and duplication in the CT field. At this stage, NATO can take a leadership role in terms of its high power.
- It is quite natural to have units serving the same purpose in organizations. However, in order to avoid disruptions in coordination in sensitive operations such as CT, a joint structuring can be made or representatives from other international organizations can be employed within the partners.
- In the light of the lessons learned from experience on terrorism, NATO should show maximum sensitivity to planning in CT operations, in which it takes the lead. NATO should keep in mind that CT operations are a long and tiring process, and above all, it should establish mutual trust among its members and take action by taking their sensitivities into account.

⁹⁴ Hakimi, and Ashe, "The U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the Afghan Peace Process".

⁹⁵ For further information, please look at; "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Opium_Surveys/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2018.pdf?lf=28&lng=en (accessed 28 January 2021).

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