

-ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ-

**TÜRKİYE-INDONESIA RELATIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF
TÜRKİYE'S SOUTHEAST ASIA POLICY**

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Abstract

Turkish foreign policy increasingly focused on the Southeast Asia region in the post-Cold War era. Türkiye realized the necessity to follow active policy towards the regions that Türkiye had limited access during the Cold War era. Türkiye and Indonesia have historical ties backed to the Ottoman era and even before. Both countries have different position during the Cold War era since Türkiye as a NATO member in the Western Bloc, on the other hand Indonesia was a leading actor in non-allied movement. The situation changed with the end of the Cold War. In the new international system Türkiye and Indonesia developed relations based on mutual interest and historical ties. Southeast Asia region has been defined as a rising region of the post-Cold War world. The region's economic development and opportunities made Turkish foreign policy makers instigated new foreign policy initiatives towards Southeast Asian countries and regional organizations. Türkiye became sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN and signed Free Trade Agreements with some regional countries. Türkiye declared Asia a New Initiative in 2019. Türkiye's trade volume with Southeast Asian countries has substantially increased. Among Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has special importance with its strategic position and population for Turkish foreign policy. Türkiye-Indonesia relations reached the level of strategic partnership and the two countries' cooperation in defense industry cemented bilateral relations. Türkiye-Indonesia relations created atmosphere that both countries could work together on important regional and global issues, which includes from struggle against Islamophobia to regional economic development.

In this article Türkiye-Indonesia relations will be evaluated in the framework of Türkiye's Southeast Asia policy. It is argued that Indonesia deserves more attention in Turkish Southeast Asia policy. Closer Türkiye-Indonesia relations would provide more opportunities for both countries and Turkish-Indonesian relations will become even more important for Türkiye's Southeast Asia policy.

Keywords: *Türkiye, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, Defense Industry, ASEAN*

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TÜRKİYE'NİN GÜNEYDOĞU ASYA POLİTİKASI ÇERÇEVESİNDE TÜRKİYE-ENDONEZYA İLİŞKİLERİ²

Öz

Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrasında Türk dış politikası giderek artan bir şekilde Güneydoğu Asya'ya yöneldi. Türkiye Soğuk Savaş döneminde sınırlı ilişki kurabildiği bölgelere yönelik daha aktif bir politika izleme gerekliliği duydu. Türkiye ve Endonezya kökleri Osmanlı dönemine hatta daha öncesine giden tarihi bağlara sahiptirler. Ancak Soğuk Savaş döneminde iki ülke farklı pozisyonlardaydı. Türkiye NATO üyesi ülke olarak Batı Bloğunda yer alırken Endonezya Bağlantısızlar hareketinin önde gelen aktörlerindendi. Soğuk Savaş döneminin sona ermesi Türkiye-Endonezya ilişkilerinin karakterini de değiştirdi. Yeni uluslararası sistemde iki ülke ilişkilerini geliştirecek yeni kanallar ile karşılıklı çıkarlara dayalı, tarihi bağlarla desteklenen bir ilişki biçimi gelişti. Güneydoğu Asya Soğuk Savaş sonrası dünyada yükselen profiliyle Türk dış politikasının ilgisini çekerken, Türkiye hem bölge ülkelerine hem de bölgede etkili uluslararası kuruluşlara yönelik dış politika hamleleri yaptı. ASEAN'a sektörel diyalog partneri olan Türkiye, bazı bölge ülkeleriyle de serbest ticaret anlaşmaları imzaladı. Türkiye 2019'da Yeniden Asya girişimini başlattı. Güneydoğu Asya ülkeleri arasında Endonezya stratejik konumu ve nüfusuyla özel bir yere sahip olurken, iki ülke arasında stratejik ortaklık düzeyine gelen ilişkiler, savunma sanayi alanındaki iş birliğiyle daha da pekişti. Türkiye-Endonezya ilişkilerinde geline nokta iki ülkenin gerek bölgesel gerekse küresel düzeyde ortak hareket edebileceği bir atmosfer oluştu. İslamofobi ile mücadele eden bölgesel ekonomik gelişmeye kadar pek çok konuda iki ülke birlikte çalışabilir.

Bu makalede Türkiye'nin Güneydoğu Asya politikası çerçevesinde Türkiye-Endonezya ilişkileri analiz edilecektir. Makalede Endonezya'nın Türkiye'nin Güneydoğu Asya politikasında daha fazla ilgiyi hak ettiği ve daha yakın Türkiye-Endonezya ilişkilerinin iki ülkeye de önemli fırsatlar sunduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Türkiye-Endonezya ilişkileri Türkiye'nin Güneydoğu Asya politikasında daha önemli hale gelecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Endonezya, Güneydoğu Asya, Savunma Sanayi, ASEAN

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“Bu çalışma Araştırma ve Yayın Etiğine uygun olarak hazırlanmıştır.”

1. INTRODUCTION

Turkish foreign policy adopted itself to the conditions of the post-Cold War era. The bipolar structure of the Cold War era ended with the disintegration of the Soviet

² The Extended **Turkish** Summary is located the end of the article.

Union. Türkiye as a member of NATO and neighbor of the Soviet Union played critical role in the southern wing of NATO. Although Türkiye with its geopolitical significance played an important role in world politics during the Cold War era, the bipolar structure put limits on Türkiye's policy options. Türkiye had to follow policy of the alliances during the Cold War era. After the end of the Cold War Türkiye has opportunities and challenges in its foreign policy. As a regional power Türkiye had to involve in the regional events even if it did not want to involve in. The new international system and conflicts inflicted in the Türkiye's surrounding regions, Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East, and Black Sea forced Türkiye to take role in the events. Türkiye needed to handle and follow careful foreign policy towards these conflicts. There had not been common policy of allies to the regional disputes and temporary and flexible alliances became possible to be established for each case in the new international system. This atmosphere means unpredictability for every states.

Despite these challenges that Türkiye faced after the end of the Cold War, there are also opportunities in the new environment. Türkiye had a chance to follow policy towards the regions that during the Cold War it would not be possible. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Turkic Republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia became independent and Türkiye gained opportunity to have influence and establish strong strategic ties with these kin states. At the same time Türkiye realized the possibilities and necessities to follow active foreign policy towards the regions that getting increasingly important in world politics. Southeast Asia region has been one of the regions that considered to be a rising star of the post-Cold War era. In the literature of international relations, Türkiye's policy towards Southeast Asia and especially its relations with Indonesia have been neglected. Relations with Indonesia went back to the Ottoman era. There are research to evaluate the Ottoman relations with the Sultanate of Aceh and Ottoman representation in Batavia (Jakarta) during Holland's rule there. After the independence of Indonesia, despite Türkiye's recognition of Indonesia and establishment of the diplomatic relations, there was a lack of interest in academic writings. In the Cold War years, Indonesia's position as a non-allied state and Türkiye's membership of NATO might be one of the reasons of neglect besides the geographical distance of the two countries. After the end of the Cold War era Türkiye's relations have been diversified and growing interest of the Southeast Asia reflected in academic works, however, Indonesia has still been neglected despite its importance as a G-20 state. In recent years, Ankara University Asia-Pacific Research Center (APAM) published edit book titled Türkiye'de Endonezya Çalışmaları 1 (*Indonesian Studies in Turkey-I*) in 2022 (Dündar and Durmaz, 2022). APAM published also books about other Southeast Asian countries. (See its web site, <http://apam.ankara.edu.tr/yayinlarimiz-2/>). Some of the publications specifically related to Turkey's relations with Indonesia, which have been come across during the preparation of this article, such as Purtaş 2019 and Esenbel 2013, are being cited.

Türkiye's growing interest towards Southeast Asia led to improve its relations with Indonesia. Systemic changes emphasized by neo-realist perspective are one of the major reasons of this change. Post-Cold War international system provided regional

powers to exert influence in their own region and beyond and states also need to improve relations with countries even geographically very far away from them. Türkiye and Indonesia are G-20 states and cooperation would benefit for both in many aspects. Türkiye's achievement in defense industry and Indonesia's need for defense products created favorable atmosphere for cooperation. However, Türkiye and Indonesia have not realized the real potential of cooperation yet. Academic publications would help to create awareness regarding benefits for cooperation and close relations. This article would contribute literature of Türkiye's relations with Indonesia underlying political, economic, and strategic dimensions of the relations. It is argued that Türkiye's relations with Indonesia are being neglected by academic circles particularly in the disciplines of international relations. This article may instigate interest for new studies of Turkish-Indonesian relations.

In this article Türkiye's relations with Indonesia will be analyzed in the framework of Türkiye's Southeast Asia policy. It is argued that Indonesia as an important country with its strategic location in the region deserves more attention of Turkish foreign policy and developing relations between the two states are the interests of both countries.

2. Türkiye's Southeast Asia Policy: Brief Evaluation

Although ties with Southeast Asia went back to the Ottoman Empire, this article focuses on Türkiye's policy and mainly concentrated on the post-Cold War era. Türkiye's increasing interest toward Southeast Asia was the result of the rise of many regional countries especially in the economic field. One of the reasons of the Türkiye's opening towards the region was also the change in the international environment which required states to adapt their foreign policies accordingly. Change in the international system is one of the main factors for foreign policy changes. Foreign policy changes can be slow and incremental, which is called normal foreign policy change. On the other hand, major and comprehensive foreign policy changes including behavioral changes in states interactions with other actors are identified as foreign policy restructuring (Holsti, 1988; Holsti, 1991: 83-101). Türkiye's foreign policy change after the Cold War era was normal foreign policy change to adapt the changes in the international environment. Bipolar structure of the Cold War put limits all countries' foreign policies because rigid alliances made difficult to follow a policy different than allies. The disintegration of the Soviet Union ended the bipolar world and new independent states joined the world community. For Türkiye, on the one hand, the discussion started about Türkiye's geopolitical situation vis a vis Europe and the US, on the other hand Türkiye had opportunity to open the regions that were difficult to reach due to the Cold War conditions. Particularly the independence of the Turkic Republics provided opportunity to Türkiye to exert its influence in Turkistan region which was not accessible before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Türkiye established TİKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency later became Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) in order to help development of the Turkic Republics (Özkan and Demirtepe, 2012: 647-648). Türkiye initiated regional integration projects and ideas starting from the Black Sea region with Black

Sea Economic Cooperation projects. Türkiye also organized the Turkic Republics Summits, which later evolved towards Turkic Council and afterwards it became Organization of Turkic States.

Türkiye's regional power role and the new international environment together with the export-oriented economy required Türkiye to open far away regions. Southeast Asia is the fastest growing region with immense economic opportunities and potentials became the focus on Türkiye's foreign policy. Türkiye's relations towards the region conducted with the parameters of the international system during the Cold War. Türkiye sent troops to Korea and participated the Korean War. Following this, Türkiye joined NATO in 1952 (Weitz, 2014). Türkiye recognized Republic of China on Taiwan and followed policy against Communist expansion. Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüstü Zorlu together with parliamentary delegation visited Taiwan in 1956. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visited Taiwan in 1958. Thus, economic, and cultural ties established between the two countries. Türkiye changed its policy together with its Western allies and recognized the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and started to follow one China policy in 1971. In 1980's Türkiye-PRC relations developed with mutual high-level visits (Kasım, 2015: 83-100; Çolakoğlu, 2012:132). However, Türkiye's policy options were limited due to the conditions of the Cold War.

Türkiye had different policy options and opportunity to have wide range of relations with the end of the Cold War era. Türkiye increased trade volume with Southeast Asia and established multilateral ties with the connections of different organizations. Türkiye participated to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2010 and Türkiye was conferred the status of Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN by the 50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in 2017. Türkiye also became a member of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue in September 2013 and participated in the Pacific Islands Forum as Dialogue Partner. Türkiye has also been a Dialogue Partner of Shanghai Cooperation Organization since 2012 (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2023). Türkiye is also in MIKTA, which is an informal consultation and coordination platform among Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Türkiye, and Australia. MIKTA was initiated by the Foreign Ministers of member countries on 25 September 2013. Türkiye has signed Free Trade Agreements with Republic of Korea, Malasia, and Singapore. Türkiye has also been engaged in Free Trade Agreement negotiations with Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand. Türkiye's trade volume with the region's countries increased. The meeting of Foreign Ministers of Türkiye and the Pacific Islands was convened in Istanbul in 2008 and Türkiye hosted Foreign Ministerial Meeting of Türkiye-Pacific Small Island Developing States in 2014 under the theme of "From Bosphorus to the Pacific: Continued Cooperation for Sustainable Development". Türkiye also contributed to the Pacific Resilience Fund in 2021. The Fund was established within the Pacific Island Forum to tackle the impacts of climate change on the Pacific Island States. Türkiye also contributes peace process in Philippines as the Chair of the Independent Decommissioning Body since its establishment in 2014. Türkiye is also involved in the peace process in Philippines through the Organization of Islamic Conference and

the International Contact Group. The two sides of the conflict agreed to establishment of the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority and to allow the transitional government to take control of regional governance run until 2022 when elections supposed to be held. However, to hold the elections were postponed to 2025. Türkiye also provided humanitarian aid to Rohingya Muslims in the refugee camps in Bangladesh (Anadolu Agency, 2021).

Turkish foreign policy gave priority to Southeast Asia region with the end of the Cold War. Turkish Foreign Ministry launched *Asia a New Initiative* in August 2019. This initiative focuses to improve Türkiye's relations with Asian countries through regional, sub-regional and country-specific approaches, based on common interests and objectives. Türkiye has 54 diplomatic and consular missions in the countries within the Asia a New Initiative. All ASEAN members included this initiative (Asia A New Initiative, Turkish Foreign Ministry).

Türkiye's relations with Indonesia developed in many fields. Indonesia's geopolitical position, G-20 status, founder of ASEAN and the most populated Muslim country made for Türkiye attracted to increase its relations (See Purtaş. 2019:545-568).

3. Türkiye-Indonesia Relations in Political, Economic and Strategic Dimensions

3.1. Historical Overview

Türkiye recognized Indonesia on 29 December 1949 and diplomatic relations were established in 1950. Historical ties, on the other hand, went back to the 12th Century through traders. Aceh became an important center for international trade in the region. Portuguese began to dominate the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the 16th Century and Portuguese invaders threatened and disturbed the trade. The Muslim Sultanes in the region asked help from the Mamluks. The Mamluks sent navy against Portuguese and reached as far as the port of Diu in 1512 (Göksoy, 2011:65-66). Sultanate of Aceh, the Sultan Alaeddin Riayat asked for help from the Ottoman Empire in 1538. Ottoman Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent provided not just weapons and military instructed but also Sultan Süleyman sent construction experts to Aceh. The first exchange of ambassadors happened in 1547. Colonialist countries' invasion and control of the region in 19th Century put obstacles for contact of Turks to the region. Despite this, Ottoman Consulate opened in Batavia (Today's Jakarta) in 1883. Even though the Dutch colonial administration did not initially object to the Ottoman Consulate there, it concerned about the Ottomans' influence on the Muslim population of the region. (Esenbel, 2013; Idrus, 2020). Ali Galib Bey became the first person assigned as a Consul in Batavia. He stayed there about three years. Afterwards other counsels assigned in Batavia. Among them Mehmed Kamil Bey was a Counsel in 1897-1898 who established good relations with the local people and as a representative of the Caliph, Mehmed Kamil Bey became quite famous and a respected diplomat. However, officials of Holland were uncomfortable and declared Mehmed Kamil Bey as a persona non-grata. As a result, Mehmed Kamil Bey had to leave his job. He

prepared reports about Holland's colonial administration and political, social, economic, and religious situations in Indonesian islands and sent these reports to the Foreign Ministry of the Ottoman Empire. Despite all the difficulties that the Ottoman representatives faced in Batavia, Ottoman Empire continued its consulate activities until 1924. The last Counsel of the Ottoman Empire Refet Bey was assigned in 1911 and stayed in Batavia about 13 years. (Tetik, 2020: 99-108; Tetik, 2019: 54-55) After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the national struggle for independence in Türkiye under the leadership of Atatürk was inspired by Indonesians and the victory of Turks over occupying forces celebrated by Indonesians (Göksoy, 2002: 4-5).

3.2. Türkiye-Indonesia Relations in the Post- Cold War

Türkiye joined the Western bloc in the bipolar international system emerged after the Second World War. Türkiye became a member of NATO and important country of the southern wing of NATO as a neighbor of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Indonesia became one of the leading actors of the Non-Allied Movement, which consisted of countries neither supported the West or Eastern Blocs. Although Türkiye-Indonesia diplomatic ties were established just after Türkiye's recognition of Indonesia in 1950 and Turkish Embassy commenced its activities in Indonesia on 10 April 1957 and Indonesian Embassy commenced its activities in Ankara in 1958, international system put certain limit in the relations. Despite this, Türkiye and Indonesia signed many important agreements in the Cold War years. Trade Agreement was signed on 14 September 1958 and Cultural Agreement was signed on 18 August 1973. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Construction Services was signed on 12 March 1982. Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation was signed on 18 December 1982. The Joint Commission for Economic and Cooperation had two sessions on 15 January 1985 and 27 January 1988 and the sides agreed on minutes (Bilateral Relations Between Indonesia-Turkey, Indonesian Consulate, 2023).

As we mentioned that while Türkiye became a member of NATO in 1952, Indonesia became a leading actor of the non-allied movement. Indonesia adopted Free and Active foreign policy doctrine, which reflected Indonesian long fight against colonialism. Free and Active foreign policy concept was introduced by Muhammed Hatta, the first Vice President of Indonesia. Muhammed Hatta also later published an article in Foreign Affairs Journal to describe Indonesia's foreign policy principles and its position in the Cold War era (Hatta, 1958: 480-490). Free aspect of its foreign policy usually refers to non-involvement in military alliances. Free also meant to resist any kind of external influence and obligations which might restrict Indonesia's autonomous actions in many fields (Anwar, 1994: 146). Indonesian foreign policy also active to encourage de-colonization and Indonesia promoted and established non-allied movement. Indonesia's Cold War years were not free from international system's impact and conflicts. Indonesia's conflicts with Malaysia in 1963-1965 shook Indonesia's relations with the West. Indonesia's close relations with Peoples Republic of China totally changed after left-wing coup attempts as Indonesia froze its diplomatic relations with China and keep distance with the Soviet Union. Indonesia's

important success came with the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. Indonesia ended its confrontation with Malaysia and promoted regional economic cooperation through this, Indonesia countered the communist threat during the Cold War (Anwar, 2023).

The end of the Cold War provided opportunities for Türkiye and Indonesia to improve its relations further without limitations of the international system. Turkish foreign policy started to implement new approach towards far away geographies. Southeast Asia became center of attention with the countries had high economic growth. Indonesia deserved special attention among Southeast Asian countries which is home to be the largest Muslim population besides its high economic growth. Türkiye and Indonesia cooperate in many organizations. Organization of Islamic Conference, Developing 8 and MIKTA. Türkiye also interested in ASEAN, which is the key organization in Southeast Asia. ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 by founders of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN on 7 January 1984. Vietnam joined it 28 July 1995. Lao PDR and Myanmar joined on 23 July 1997. Cambodia joined it on 30 April 1999 (ASEAN, 2023). ASEAN countries' total GDP makes it 8th biggest economy in the world with 650 million population. Türkiye had Sectoral Dialogue Partner status in ASEAN since 2017. Türkiye's total trade volume with Southeast Asian countries was 17 billion USD in 2004 and it sharply increased to 75 billion USD in 2021 (Turkey's Relations with the Asia-Pacific Region, Turkish Foreign Ministry, 2023).

Indonesian reserves to have close relations with communist countries have been lifted with the end of the Cold War. While Indonesia's ties with China developed, China's growing military strength and its assertive policy especially regarding regional problems created anxiety in Indonesia. (For China see, Demirtepe and Özerterem, 2013: 95-118; Turan, 2020. For the US policy to contain China see Kasım, 2017: 175-190; Kasım, 2018: 160-179). The spread of democracy also impacted on Indonesia, particularly in its relations with the West. In post-Cold War era Indonesian foreign policy aimed to assist economic recovery and development, strengthen territorial integrity and consolidated democracy, and enhance Indonesia's regional and international standing. Indonesia also aims to protect the sovereignty of Indonesian territory in the sea, to develop the capacity to make sure the safety of diaspora and to get a full protection of Indonesian migrant workers. Indonesia also aims to strengthen ASEAN cooperation and regional architecture. (Anwar, 2023). Indonesian President Joko Widodo declared an overarching concept of a global maritime fulcrum. The maritime doctrine aimed to make Indonesia a maritime power with comprehensive diplomatic influence and guarantee the maintenance of national sovereignty, maritime safety, and regional security. Indonesia aimed to reassert its archipelagic outlook and valued Indonesian archipelago as its economic potential (Gindarsh and Primarizki, 2015: 2-3). Indonesia realized that the most important challenges that Indonesia faces are maritime in nature and maritime challenges requires a strong navy as a way to deter any external incursion and safeguarding of Indonesia's long coastline and thousands of islands (Shekbar and Liow, 2014). Indonesia's objective to improve its defense capacity created an opportunity for cooperation in Türkiye-Indonesia

relations since Türkiye's defense industry's capacity has also been increasing in recent years.

Türkiye's increasing interest towards Southeast Asia and both Türkiye's and Indonesia's growing economy provided atmosphere for relations to be improved. Indonesia faced tsunami disaster in 2004. Türkiye mobilized to collect donations and besides sending food and medical facilities, Turkish Red Crescent constructed 1050 buildings. Turkish government also opened Istanbul Village, which included a school, a mosque, and an orphanage, in Aceh. Türkiye has sent over 75 million USD aid to Indonesia after 2004 tsunami (Anwar, 2023).

Turkish-Indonesian relations entered the new stage when "the joint Declaration Indonesia-Turkey: Towards an Enhanced Partnership in a New World Setting" was signed on 5 April 2011 in Jakarta. Türkiye-Indonesia relations were elevated to the level of Strategic Partnership. The Consulate General of Indonesia opened in Istanbul in 2012. During the visit of Indonesian President Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi) in 2017, Türkiye and Indonesia made commitment to enhance cooperation in the fields of politics, security, economy, culture, education, science, and technology and set a target to have 10 billion USD trade volume by 2023. Türkiye and Indonesia agreed for the negotiations on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017 (Anadolu Agency, 13 October 2017). During his visit in Türkiye, President Jokowi stated that "*We have agreed to bring positive trends in trade and investment including through conducting negotiation of Indonesia-Turkey Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IT-CEPA), reducing or removing trade barriers and creating conducive investment climate.*" (Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia", 2017).

Turkish and Indonesian Presidents met in G-20 Summit in Osaka, Japan in 2019 and in Bali, Indonesia G-20 Summit in 2022. Türkiye and Indonesia established the High-Level Strategic Council and signed the two agreements and five memorandums of understanding in 2022. One agreement was signed in the field of defense. Another agreement was about forestry. One of the five memorandums of understanding was cooperation in the field of research, technology, and innovation. Second one was signed in the field of environment and third one was about on development cooperation. The fourth memorandum of understanding was about joint production and distribution of electric busses. The fifth one was on the development of the trans-Sumatera toll road stretching across the island of Sumatra (Anadolu Agency, 14 November 2022). During his visit to Indonesia for the occasion of G-20 Summit in 2022, President Erdoğan, wishing success to Indonesia during its ASEAN term presidency, said that "*I expect your support for our dialogue partnership goal*". President Erdoğan also said that "*The High-Level Strategic Cooperation mechanism, which we have established jointly, constitutes a historic step in terms of our bilateral relations.*" ("President Erdoğan meets with President Widodo of Indonesia", Turkish Presidency, 2022). President Erdoğan's eagerness to deepen Türkiye's ties with ASEAN and further development of Türkiye and Indonesia relations noted during the visit.

In terms of economic relations CEPA negotiations are important and even the process has impacted on bilateral economic ties. Türkiye and Indonesia have talks to establish cooperation in satellites and satellites launch vehicles, aerospace industry and electric cars (Darmawan, Husaini, Rakhmadi and Atiqasani, 2022: 77-88).

There are many instruments which should play more active role to boost Türkiye-Indonesia relations. Indonesian Parliament House of Representatives Deputy Speaker Rachmat Gobel emphasized the need for the parliament to play a role in bolstering Indonesia's relations with Türkiye. He argued that "*heart-to-heart diplomacy avenue is expected to boost bilateral relations with Turkey, particularly in the manufacturing sector, such as in the electronic, healthcare, and defence technology industries. He added that Turkey is part of a trade organization with Europe, and they can be the entry point for Indonesian products*" (Antara Indonesian News Agency, 15 September 2022). Cooperation among Universities and academics should also play comprehensive role to boost Turkish-Indonesian relations. Turkish and Indonesian academics can cooperate from technical subjects to subjects of social sciences. In terms of international relations, Turkish academics' growing interests towards Southeast Asia region, should be more focus on Indonesia and Indonesia related issues in the region. Another important point to increase cooperation should also be further exchange of students and academics.³ Yunus Emre Institute opened its representative's office in Jakarta in 2022. Yunus Emre Institute affiliated to the Yunus Emre Foundation is carrying out activities to promote Türkiye, Turkish language, history and culture and art. Yunus Emre Institute is conducting culture and art activities and giving support to scientific research besides teaching Turkish language (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 2022.).

Indonesia also decided to move its capital Jakarta to the East Kalimantan. Jakarta's congestion, pollution, and its situation prone to earthquakes are the main reasons for government's decision. The new city will be sustainable forest city and the environment will be at the heart of the development and to be carbon-neutral by 2045 (Associated Press, 9 March 2023). Turkish contractors have over 10,000 projects worth more than 400 billion dollars in many countries could play a role in building the new capital of Indonesia (Daily Sabah, 24 June 2020).

Turkish company Karsan and Credo Group's Schacmindo signed a Memorandum of Understanding to explore the future electrification of Indonesia's public transport network. They aim to realize most of the transformation of billion-dollar city Jakarta's electric public transportation and tens of thousands of vehicles to be completed by 2030 (Karsan Signs MoA to Advance Bus Electrification in Indonesia", 2022). Trade volume between Türkiye and Indonesia reached about 2 billion USD in 2021. However, this volume was far behind the two countries target of 10 billion USD in 2023. Another point is that Türkiye's import was 1.6 billion USD, which surpassed to its export to Indonesia, which was 271 million USD. There are 19 Indonesian

³ Author's observation during his visit of Indonesia University/Jakarta, 6-14 May 2023.

companies operates in Türkiye and 51 Turkish companies operates in Indonesia (Türkiye-Indonesia Economic-Trade Relations, Turkish Foreign Ministry, 2023. For trade relations see also Erdal, 2022: 7-12). Considering the potential of both countries, Türkiye and Indonesia should increase bilateral trade volume and investments.

3.2.1 Cooperation in Defense Industry

Defense Industry is an area of great potential for cooperation in Türkiye-Indonesia relations. A memorandum of understanding on defense industry cooperation was signed in June 2010. Collaboration had begun in some areas, whether it be on specific equipment, such as radar systems, or more general exchanges of expertise between their militaries. One of the important demonstrations of defense cooperation between Türkiye and Indonesia is Kaplan MT medium weight tank, which is being produced by FNNS-Turkish armored vehicle manufacturer and PT Pindad Indonesian Defense Company. A cooperation agreement was signed to develop 2 prototype medium tanks in 2015. KAPLAN MT (HARIMAU) Medium Weight Tank Serial Production Long-Term Collaboration Agreement was signed between FNSS and PT Pindad in 2019. The agreement envisaged the production of 18 KAPLAN MT vehicles and design perfection studies completed in 2020. The production technical support and supply parts provided to PT Pindad to be produced in Indonesia were completed in 2021. The production of the first batch of vehicles in the serial production configuration completed in 2022. The KAPLAN MT, which was started within the framework of the Defense Cooperation Agreements signed between Türkiye and Indonesia, is the Türkiye's first defense export program in the Tank Class (Defence Turkey, 2022. FNSS Completed the Serial Production; KAPLAN MT Medium, 2022). Turkish-Indonesian defense cooperation continued with various agreements and negotiations. One of the contracts was signed about Khan missiles and multilayer air defense system, which are produced by Turkish missile-maker Roketsan. Indonesian military will be the first foreign users of the system (Indonesia to be first foreign user of Turkey's Khan missile system", Defense News, 2022). ADVENT Combat Management System produced by HAVELSAN, was delivered to Indonesia to be used by patrol ships of Indonesian Navy in 2022. Acoustic Torpedo Countermeasure Jammer was delivered to Indonesia for submarines being produced by ASELSAN. Türkiye also delivered 30 mm MUHAFAZ Remote Controlled Stabilized Gun System to the Indonesian Coast Guard Command. Regarding defense industry, Türkiye's export to Indonesia was 2.311 million USD in the first quarter of 2021. Türkiye's export to Indonesia reached 10.661 million USD in the first quarter of 2022 (Doğan, 2022: 10-11).

Türkiye and Indonesia have great desire and motivations for further cooperation in defense industry. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi also mentioned that cooperation in defense industry would be one of the priorities of the two countries. She argued that defense cooperation should not be limited to Indonesian purchasing defense industry products from Türkiye. Indonesia and Türkiye should have strategic cooperation including manufacturing, production, and joint development of defense industry products. She stated that "*We are ready for such cooperation, and that is why*

we decided to form a 2+2 format dialogue forum in which foreign and defense ministers from both countries will meet to discuss policies and strategies for cooperation in the field of defense industries.” She also mentioned that Indonesia has that type of meeting in the form of 2+2 with Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Türkiye would be the fourth one. This is the clear indication that Indonesia attaches great importance for cooperation with Türkiye (Move2Turkey News, 2022).

Defense cooperation between Türkiye and Indonesia reached a different level with a defense cooperation action plan signed in February 2023. Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto stated that *“We have just signed a very historic and important pact, namely an action plan, which is a follow-up to the strategic cooperation relationship between the two countries. I am optimistic that the close cooperation, in the framework of strategic partnership between Turkey and Indonesia, can contribute to peace and stability in the World.”* Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar argued that *“It is important for us to increase the potential for military training and cooperation between Turkey and Indonesia in the defense industry.”* Akar also underlined the fact that this is very positive contributions not just for the national interests of Türkiye and Indonesia but also for regional security (Anatara, Indonesian News Agency, 2023).

CONCLUSION

Turkish foreign policy gave priority to the Southeast Asia region with the end of the Cold War and launched a policy of Asia a New Initiative. This initiative focusses to improve Türkiye’s relations with the Asian countries through regional, sub-regional and country specific approaches, based on common interests and objectives. To reach its objectives Türkiye has focused on Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. Türkiye participated to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of the ASEAN in 2010 and Türkiye was conferred the Status of Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 2017. Indonesia’s importance increased in Türkiye’s regional policy by each passing year since the end of the Cold War. Despite the distance between the two countries, they have the close ties due to the history and civilization and opportunities to develop economic, politic, and strategic relations further. Türkiye-Indonesia relations reached the level of Strategic Partnership, and the High-level Strategic Council was established in 2022. Turkish-Indonesian cooperation have very productive in defense industry and opened the way for further developments. Türkiye and Indonesia have also potential to increase bilateral trade volume a lot more than its current level. For Türkiye, Indonesia is an important market for its products with its large population and Indonesia also provides investment opportunities for Turkish firms. For Indonesia, Türkiye has investment opportunities for Indonesian firms also a place where Indonesian products could reach all European market.

Türkiye and Indonesia besides economic cooperation, they can work together on regional as well as global political issues. Academic cooperation has also great potential needed to be fulfilled. Türkiye and Indonesia have also potential to have common strategy to struggle against Islamophobia, which is became a global concern.

Indonesia with over 274 million population and 1,905,000 square kilometers territory deserves more attention and will become even more central position in Turkey's Southeast Asian policy in the future.

TÜRKİYE'NİN GÜNEYDOĞU ASYA POLİTİKASI ÇERÇEVESİNDE TÜRKİYE-ENDONEZYA İLİŞKİLERİ

1. GİRİŞ

Türk dış politikasında Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrası ilişkilerin yoğunlaştığı bölgelerden birisi Güneydoğu Asya olmuştur. Bu makalede Türkiye'nin Güneydoğu Asya'nın önemli ülkelerinden Endonezya ile ilişkileri Türkiye'nin Güneydoğu Asya politikası çerçevesinde analiz edilecektir. Makalede Endonezya'nın bölgedeki stratejik konumu ve nüfusuyla Türk dış politikasında daha fazla ilgiyi hak ettiği ve ikili ilişkilerin daha da geliştirilmenin her iki ülkenin de çıkarına olduğu ileri sürülmüştür.

1.1 Türkiye'nin Güneydoğu Asya Politikası: Kısa Değerlendirme

Türkiye Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrası Güneydoğu Asya ile artan ilişkilerinin sonucu olarak bölgedeki kuruluşlarla yakın bağlar kurmuştur. Türkiye 2010'da ASEAN Dostluk ve İşbirliği Anlaşmasına taraf olmuştur. 50. ASEAN Dışişleri Bakanları toplantısında 2017'de de Türkiye Sektörel Diyalog Ortaklığı elde etmiştir. Türkiye ayrıca 2013'te Asya İşbirliği Diyalogu üyesi olmuş ve Pasifik Adaları Formuna da Diyalog Ortağı olarak katılmıştır. Türkiye 2012'den beri Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü'nde Diyalog Ortağıdır. Meksika, Endonezya, Kore, Türkiye ve Avustralya Dışişleri Bakanları'nın girişimiyle 2013'te kurulan MIKTA da Türkiye için önemli girişimlerden birisi olmuştur. Güney Kore, Malezya ve Singapur ile Serbest Ticaret Anlaşmaları imzalamış olan Türkiye, Endonezya, Japonya ve Tayland ile de Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması görüşmelerine devam etmektedir. Türkiye'nin bölge ülkeleriyle ticareti 2004'te 17 milyar dolar iken 2021'de 75 milyar dolara çıkmıştır. Türkiye Ağustos 2019'da Yeniden Asya girişimini başlatmış ve tüm ASEAN üyeleri bu girişim içinde yer almaktadır.

1.2 Türkiye-Endonezya İlişkileri: Politik, Ekonomik ve Stratejik Boyutlar

Türkiye Endonezya'nın bağımsızlığını 29 Aralık 1949'da tanımış ve ardından diplomatik ilişkiler başlamıştır. Tarihsel bağlar ise 12. Yüzyıla kadar gitmektedir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminde Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Portekiz işgalcilerine karşı Açe Sultanına askeri destek ve uzmanlar yollamıştır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1883'te Bataviya'da (Cakarta) Konsolosluk açmış ve İmparatorluk sona erene kadar Endonezya'daki temsil devam etmiştir. Millî Mücadele Endonezya'ya örnek oluşturmuş ve Türklerin zaferi Endonezya'da kutlanmıştır.

1.3 Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Sonrası Türkiye-Endonezya İlişkileri

Soğuk Savaş döneminde Türkiye 1952’de NATO üyesi olurken Endonezya Bağlantısızlar Hareketi’nin önde gelen ülkeleri arasında yer almıştır. Bu durumun getirdiği sınırlamalara rağmen, Türkiye ve Endonezya Soğuk Savaş döneminde de çok sayıda anlaşmaya imza atmışlardır. Soğuk Savaş döneminin sona ermesi ise Türkiye ve Endonezya’ya ilişkilerini geliştirmek için önemli fırsatlar sunmuştur. İki ülke çeşitli uluslararası kuruluşlarda birlikte çalışmaktadır. Endonezya’da 2004’te yaşanan Tsunami felaketi sonrası Türkiye gıda ve tıbbi yardımının yanında Açe’de İstanbul Köyü açmış ve 75 milyon doların üzerinde yardım göndermiştir. Türkiye-Endonezya ilişkileri 5 Nisan 2011’de imzalanan ortak deklarasyonla yeni bir aşamaya geçerken, stratejik ortaklık düzeyine erişen ilişkilerde Üst Düzey Stratejik Konsey 2022’de kurulmuştur. Bu gelişme Başkan Erdoğan tarafından ikili ilişkilerde tarihi bir adım olarak ifade edilmiştir. Türkiye-Endonezya ilişkilerinde parlamentoların rolünden akademik iş birliğine kadar ilişkilerin daha da ilerlemesini sağlayacak pek çok araç bulunmaktadır. Türkiye’de Güneydoğu Asya’ya yönelik akademik alandaki ilginin özellikle Endonezya’yı ilgilendiren konularda uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini de daha fazla yayının yapılmasına yol açması ve öğrenci ve öğretim üyeleri arasında daha fazla karşılıklı değişimin olması ilişkileri daha da geliştirecektir. İki ülke ekonomik ilişkilerinde de fırsatlar çok fazladır. Endonezya başkent Cakarta’yı Doğu Kalimantan’a taşımayı planlamaktadır. Dünyanın çeşitli ülkelerinde projeler yürüten Türk inşaat firmaları Endonezya’nın yeni başkentinin inşasında da önemli rol alabilir. İki ülke arasındaki ticaret hacmi 2021’de 2 milyar dolardır. Bu 2023’te 10 milyar dolarlık ticaret hacmi hedefinin çok gerisinde kalmıştır.

1.4 Savunma Sanayiinde İşbirliği

Türkiye-Endonezya ilişkilerinde işbirliği potansiyeli en yüksek alanlardan birisi savunma sanayiidir. İki ülke arasında Haziran 2010’da imzalanan Memorandum sonrasında radar sistemlerinden karşılıklı askeri uzmanların değişimine uzanan işbirliği başlamıştır. Türk ve Endonezya ortak üretimi Kaplan tankı iki ülke savunma sanayii işbirliğinin çok somut bir örneği olmuştur. Endonezya’ya füzeden çeşitli savunma sanayii ürünlerine kadar geniş bir yelpazede Türkiye’den ihracat olmuştur. Türkiye’nin Endonezya’ya savunma sanayii ihracatı 2021’in ilk çeyreğinde 2,311 milyon dolarken, 2022’nin ilk çeyreğinde 10,661 milyon dolara ulaşmıştır.

SONUÇ

Türk dış politikası Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrasında Güneydoğu Asya’yı öncelerken 2019’da Yeniden Asya girişimini başlatmıştır. ASEAN ile imzalanan Dostluk ve İşbirliği Antlaşması’nın yanında Türkiye 2017’de ASEAN’a Sektörel Diyalog Ortağı olmuştur. Türkiye’nin Güneydoğu Asya politikasında Endonezya’nın ağırlığı giderek artmaktadır. İki ülke arasındaki coğrafi mesafeye rağmen gelişen ilişkiler stratejik ortaklık düzeyine çıkmıştır. İki ülke ticaret hacmi hedeflenenin gerisinde kalmasına rağmen savunma sanayiinde oldukça verimli bir işbirliği yapıldı. Türkiye açısından Endonezya nüfusuyla önemli bir pazar konumundadır. Yine Türk firmalar içinde

Endonezya yatırım fırsatlarının olduğu bir ülkedir. Endonezya için de Türkiye yatırım fırsatları barındırmakta hem de Endonezya ürünlerinin tüm Avrupa pazarına ulaştırılmasını sağlayabilecek bir ülkedir. Türkiye ve Endonezya ekonomik işbirliğinin yanında bölgesel ve küresel politik konularda da işbirliği yapabilirler. Hatta iki ülke İslamofobi ile mücadelede de işbirliği yapabilirler. Endonezya 274 milyonu aşan nüfusu ve 1.905.000 km² yüzölçümüyle Türk dış politikasında daha fazla ilgili hak etmekte ve ileride Türkiye'nin Güneydoğu Asya politikasında Endonezya daha merkezi bir konuma gelme potansiyeli taşımaktadır.

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KATKI ORANI / CONTRIBUTION RATE	AÇIKLAMA / EXPLANATION	KATKIDA BULUNANLAR / CONTRIBUTORS
Fikir veya Kavram / <i>Idea or Notion</i>	Araştırma hipotezini veya fikirini oluşturmak / <i>Form the research hypothesis or idea</i>	Kamer KASIM
Tasarım / <i>Design</i>	Yöntemi, ölçeği ve deseni tasarlamak / <i>Designing method, scale and pattern</i>	Kamer KASIM
Veri Toplama ve İşleme / <i>Data Collecting and Processing</i>	Verileri toplamak, düzenlemek ve raporlamak / <i>Collecting, organizing and reporting data</i>	Kamer KASIM
Tartışma ve Yorum / <i>Discussion and Interpretation</i>	Bulguların değerlendirilmesinde ve sonuçlandırılmasında sorumluluk almak / <i>Taking responsibility in evaluating and finalizing the findings</i>	Kamer KASIM
Literatür Taraması / <i>Literature Review</i>	Çalışma için gerekli literatürü taramak / <i>Review the literature required for the study</i>	Kamer KASIM