

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE HUMANITARIAN POLICY OF THE USA^{1 2}



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ABSTRACT | The primary purpose of this study is to determine the foreign policy objectives of the USA for humanitarian crises. It also aims to examine the factors affecting the foreign policy objectives of the United States. The USA's foreign policy objectives regarding humanitarian crises are based on national security, economic interests, etc. are classified as interests. Human rights and democracy are considered US values. The US approach to humanitarian crises is also affected by internal factors, such as the US public opinion, congress, and the preferences of the US president, and external factors, by regional and local actors and the reaction of the international community. The interventions in Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011, in which the USA took part, were selected as comparative case studies. Statements of decision-makers and foreign policy documents were scanned. In all three cases, it was concluded that the USA acted in humanitarian crises on the condition that its national interests were combined with the humanitarian situation, but there were internal and external factors that affected the objectives of intervention.

Keywords: *The USA, national interest, humanitarian intervention, 1995 Bosnia, 1999 Kosovo, 2011 Libya*

JEL Codes: *F50, F51, F53*

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ABD’NİN İNSANİ POLİTİKASINI ETKİLEYEN İÇSEL VE DIŞSAL FAKTÖRLER



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ÖZ | Bu çalışmada temel amaç ABD’nin insani krizlere yönelik dış politika amaçlarını saptamaktır. Ayrıca ABD’nin dış politika amaçlarını etkileyen unsurların olup olmadığını incelemektir. ABD insani krizlere yönelik dış politika amaçlarını ulusal güvenlik, ekonomik çıkarlar vd. çıkarlar olarak sınıflandırılmaktadır. İnsan hakları ve demokrasi ise ABD değerleri olarak değerlendirilmektedir. ABD’nin insani krizlere yaklaşımı ayrıca içsel etkenler olan ABD kamuoyu, kongresi, ABD başkanının tercihlerinden ve dışsal etkenler olarak bölgesel, yerel aktörlerden ve uluslararası toplumun tepkisinden etkilenmektedir. ABD’nin yer aldığı, 1995 Bosna ve 1999 Kosova ve 2011 Libya müdahaleleri karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi olarak seçilmiştir. Karar vericilerin ifadeleri ve dış politika belgeleri taranmıştır. Her üç olayda da ABD’nin, insani krizlerde ulusal çıkarlarının insani durumla birleşmesi koşuluyla hareket ettiği, ancak müdahale amaçlarına etki eden iç ve dış etkenlerin mevcut olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD, ulusal çıkar, insani müdahale, 1995 Bosna, 1999 Kosova, 2011 Libya
JEL Kodları: F50, F51, F53

Alan: Siyaset bilimi ve uluslararası ilişkiler
Türü: Araştırma

1. INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian intervention, whose purpose is to end the prevention and spread of grave violations by a state or states of the fundamental human rights of citizens of the other state rather than their own; the use of force in the other state's territory without permission; is defined as the threat or use of force beyond state borders (Holzgrefe, 2003, p. 15). In short, humanitarian intervention is by a state against another country without the authorization of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Its main features are that it intervenes in the internal affairs of the state concerned (usually without the consent of the state government), the intervention is central to humanitarian purposes, and the active use of military force to achieve other state goals (Cottey, 2008, pp. 429-431). Humanitarian intervention includes, among other measures, the use of military force against a state. Moreover, the consent of the addressee country is not sought for the use of force. It is argued by some authors that intervention without UN authorization is against the principles of the prohibition of intervention in foreign affairs and the sovereignty of the "equal sovereign state", even for humanitarian reasons (Byers & Chesterman, 2003, p. 133).

The United States is one of the countries most involved in humanitarian crises. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the factors that encourage the US to intervene in humanitarian crises. The main purpose of this study is to determine whether the USA is involved in humanitarian crises according to its national interests. In terms of its international legitimacy, the country that intervenes in humanitarian crises, at the same time, whether the country that intervenes in the study takes into account domestic and foreign factors are necessary in order to influence its decisions. If the foreign policy motivation of the USA and the factors affecting them are known, it would be beneficial to work toward influencing the foreign policy of the USA. This examination is important, especially for countries close to conflict zones such as Turkey.

In the 1990s, the United States (USA), together with the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS), made humanitarian interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. The United States and the UN have not intervened to stop all human rights disasters, such as Sudan and Rwanda in Africa (the French had limited intervention in Rwanda, and the international network provided humanitarian aid. The terrorist attack of September 11 and the US revealed "war on terror" (MacFarlane et al., 2004; Weiss, 2004; Kurth, 2006). The United States and other major Western powers are now focused on the new strategic priorities of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and "rogue states" (Australian Department of Defense, 2003; Daalder & Lindsay, 2003).

As Mary Kaldor stated, although the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have discredited humanitarian intervention in the eyes of the international community, how to protect civilians between states, how to establish legitimate states and security issues are still debated issues (Kaldor 2008, p. 195). The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P) which is considered the basis of peacekeeping and response operations was endorsed by the UN World Summit in September 2005. However, the military intervention phase is still a problematic criterion (Freedman, 2005; Mueller, 2005). When the crisis broke out in Libya in 2011, the R2P was cited as a justification. Later this term was used in the Syrian crisis. However, the humanitarian intervention debate has not completely disappeared. As the humanitarian intervention debate continues, the foreign policy objectives of the US intervention require examination in terms of its legitimacy in international law and the R2P good faith criterion. Because in both, the absence of the interests of the intervening country is sought. The foreign policy objectives of the USA also should be examined with internal and external factors affecting it as a democratic country. There are internal factors such as the US foreign policy objectives, the US congress and public opinion, preferences of the US President, and external factors such as the response of the local, regional, and international community and the presence of a humanitarian crisis. For this reason, the study aims to determine the foreign policy objectives of the USA regarding humanitarian crises and to explain the internal and external factors affecting it.

For various reasons, it is not possible for governments to explain any justification, especially to the international public except for humanitarian reasons. Some of these reasons are the prohibition of intervention in internal affairs, the absent of the authorization of the Security Council, the principles of the indivisible integrity and independence of the country, the unwillingness of the international community to accept violations of the sovereignty of other states for any other reason, the support of Western alliances and local support. The most important limitation of states that want to intervene is that they may have to hide all possible inhumane reasons, to explain their ideological assumptions and the reason for the intervention to their citizens. However, genocide, ethnic cleansing and others may result in serious international human rights violations. The national reputation of the state which wants to avoid any kind of interference may also be weakened. On the other hand, some states may want to realize their national interests and foreign policy goals by putting forward humanitarian reasons by reflecting internal conflicts in other states as serious human rights violations. For this reason, humanitarian intervention of the USA should be examined.

The foreign policy objectives of the United States are described in foreign policy-related documents and statements. In foreign policy, the interests of the USA, national interests, and goals are classified according to various criteria. After this classification, the study employs a comparative case analysis, based on a qualitative research method. While making comparisons, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya crises are taken into consideration. It has been tried to determine which interests are dominant by putting the economic and national reliable interests against the humanitarian concerns of the USA.

Since it is related to the US foreign policy as a unit of analysis, it has been examined at the state level, but from time to time the issue has been evaluated at the system and individual level. Due to the presence of public opinion, congress regional actors, and local actors, which are internal and external factors affecting decision-making, different levels of actor analysis have been made. The subject is explained within the framework of the predictive rational actor policy model, which includes the rational actor assumption of Graham's rational actor model as actor analysis. In this model, it is the leader who has comprehensive knowledge about the subject and determines foreign policy goals according to his interests and preferences (Singer, 2016; Simon, 1996, pp. 1-80).

The US's humanitarian crisis policy is also influenced by the Congress, public opinion and US leaders as internal factors, and by regional and local actors as external factors. For this reason, internal and external factors were also mentioned in the study.

This examination explains the national interests of the USA and its approach to humanitarian crises in its national security strategies. For this reason, in this study, the national security strategies of the period and the views of the President and his vice presidents were examined. Related literature was reviewed.

In this context, the 1995 Bosnia, 1999 Kosovo, and 2011 Libyan crises were taken as a case study. It has been concluded that the US has made humanitarian interventions in line with the national interests, although they involved humanitarian risks. For this reason, firstly, the approach of the USA to national security and humanitarian crises in its foreign policy objectives and how it structured its national interests in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya according to internal and external factors were examined.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Humanitarian intervention has been studied by various authors and different definitions have been made. Definitions, legality, legitimacy, foreign policy, sovereignty, and humanitarian dimension are discussed based on different approaches.

The liberal approach, approaching it in terms of legitimacy, is considered humanitarian intervention, the main purpose of a state or government to protect the human rights arising from being human. It is stated that “the threat of military force or the international proportional use of power has a double effect if it is done with the principle of a liberal government and alliance if it aims to destroy tyranny and anarchy, and if it is for the benefit of the victim” (Tesón, 2003, p. 93). Helping the victim is accepted as the main duty (Tesón, 2003, p. 95).

Holzgrefe considers humanitarian response in its broadest sense. According to him, “humanitarian intervention means the application of force by a state (or group of states) in its territory without the consent of the state, the threat or use of force beyond state borders, with the aim of preventing and ending the dissemination of gross violations of the fundamental human rights of other individuals rather than of its own citizens.” (Holzgrefe, 2003: 15).

Berkovitch and Jackson expand the scope of the concept of humanitarian intervention. According to them, “humanitarian intervention is carried out when the state collapses when human rights violations occur, when there are discriminatory conflicts and when a dangerous environment occurs” (Berkovitch & Jackson, 2012, p. 103).

There are also authors who consider humanitarian intervention as a duty within the scope of protection responsibility.

Bellamy and Wheler opposed the right of state sovereignty to the duty of the state to protect its citizens. According to them, “states protect their citizens from hunger, ethnic cleansing, slavery, etc. protect from things. If states are unable or unwilling to fulfill this duty, this responsibility is transferred to the community of states” (Bellamy & Wheler, 2016, p. 11.).

The concept of humanitarian intervention is problematic in itself. Because using the words "humanitarian" and "intervention" at the same time, "how can a military intervention be considered humanitarian?" is interpreted by various circles. (Hassner: 1998: 16). If the concept is analyzed in a narrow sense, it means the intervention of a foreign state, especially in the internal affairs of weak and unsuccessful states. “These are states that cannot legitimize and implement their own rules, and are usually in internal conflict or civil war” (Pektaş & Ateş, 2018, pp.1-14). These states cannot legitimize and implement their own rules, and are usually in internal conflict or civil war. Foreign powers often tend to intervene against these states.

According to Geldenhuys, “the political system of one or a group of states, an international organization or another state, in other words, its authority structure, domestic policies”, and political leaders; are defined as “the calculated action of another international actor”. These actions are using coercive methods

or with the threat of coercion. (Geldenhuys, 1998, p.6). In this respect, it is compared with the intervention in international law. Accordingly, the intervention has various dimensions. The dimension of diplomatic intervention can take the form of not accepting a country's policies, or agreements or opposing, suspending, or recognizing its membership. The form of economic intervention can be done by preventive methods such as boycott, embargo, or by providing economic support to various separatist groups within the country. Military intervention, on the other hand, may involve the use of direct force against the other country, or it may be through methods such as providing weapons to the parties to the internal conflict. (Geldenhuys, 1998, pp. 14-15).

Humanitarian response is a concept that encompasses all processes of the response. Assistance and sanctions may vary depending on the size and severity of the crisis. However, it is assumed that all peaceful means should be exhausted in situations such as internal conflicts and uprisings that take place in a country during the military intervention process. In addition, humanitarian intervention is the application of force applied by an external force or a group of forces (Hippel, 1999, p. 3; Wall & Omar, p. 3).

Similar processes and methods are applied in humanitarian crises under the UN. However, in these crises, the consent of the conflicting country is obtained, no action is taken in favor of a single country or group, the permission of the UN Security Council is required, and other member countries voluntarily send soldiers to the country where the crisis is experienced. Whichever country sends more soldiers, the commander of that country will command the operation.

As it is seen, the concept of humanitarian intervention is incompatible as a word, but its content is a concept that complements each other with its military and humanitarian dimensions, even intertwined. Even if actions are taken for humanitarian purposes in the intervention process, both military and civilian casualties are experienced and can cause intense human loss. For this reason, some articles distinguish between military intervention and humanitarian intervention; the concept of "humanitarian military intervention" is used for humanitarian intervention (Waal & Omar, 1994, p. 2-3).

In 2005, the Doctrine of R2P was accepted by most members of the United Nations as a solution proposal against serious human rights violations, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. Responsibility to protect, includes includes taking precautions and protection measures like react, and rebuild in prevent humanitarian crises. The sanctions that are in the reaction phase include embargoes and military intervention. Military intervention can be prioritized without considering other phases. In the 2001 ICISS report on the military intervention, genocide, a failed state, right intention, being a last resort,

proportional practices, reasonable expectation of success, and right authority conditions were recommended (Bellamy & Wheler, 2016). However, there are problems regarding how the right intention and just cause can be known at the stage of military intervention or what can be considered a severe human rights level. It is the USA that intervenes most directly and indirectly regarding these problems. For this reason, it is necessary to examine what the USA's intention is, whether it is a humanitarian or national interest.

3. DEFINING US FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND NATIONAL INTEREST IN FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY CONCEPTS

US foreign policy objectives are divided into three groups in national interest classification in national security and strategy documents (NSSD): National security and power, economic interests, and others. National security interests and economic interests have been recognized as vital interests. Vital interests were seen as interfering. Especially during the Cold War, decision mechanisms and US national interests were formed at the center of hegemon power, structural realism and ideological conflicts. For this reason, the part of the vital interests is considered to be combined with the security of its alliances and the USA. Later, economic interests were vitally attached to this structure (Butler, 2003, p. 28). Democracy and human rights are in fifth place in the list of interests. They are usually included in the documents as US values. However, when associated with other vital interests of the USA, these were seen as a cause of conflict by the USA. Especially in cases where national security is at stake, it can quickly affect the United States' humanitarian intervention decision. In some cases, with the responsibility of defining himself as the "World Leader" of the USA, the USA can see itself as the responsible of intervening in conflicts all over the world, apart from its own country and citizens.

This responsibility was defined as national prestige in the definitions of national interest after 2000 (White House (W.H.) NSSD 2000, p. 10). The vital interests of the United States are of primary importance in the ranking of national interests. In the context of national security, it is considered as protecting its lands, defending its citizens nationally and internationally, and ensuring the security of its alliances. Interests of secondary importance were included in the documents as protecting the country and the economic welfare of its citizens. In the NSS, humanitarian issues are of tertiary importance, but they are described as of primary importance if they affect US citizens, their alliances, security and economics, or the international prestige of the United States as a world leader

(W.H. NSSD, 2000, p. 22).

In 1994 UGSB, it was stated that the USA would participate in peace operations if it complied with its interests. In addition, in the 1995 US national security strategy document, it was added to this document that it could resort to unilateral force to support diplomacy in threats to the stability of regional alliances as well as national interests. On the other hand, the principles of participation in peace operations were declared by saying that we will participate in peace operations in the context of democracy and conflict resolution, multilaterally, within the framework of “President's Executive Orders”, guided by our national interests. In this context, multilateralism has been counted among the elements of the Clinton Doctrine (W.H. NSSD 1994, p. 13). In the US NGS, the main objectives are grouped under the heading of national security, protecting the welfare of US citizens, and promoting democracy and human rights. However, their provision has been evaluated as a sub-target that must be achieved in connection with Europe. It has been stated that democracy and human rights, which have lifestyles and values, are in the third area of international law (Allison and Blackwell, 2016, pp. 5-7). It is stated that promoting democracy and human rights, and international law is in the third area (Allison & Blackwell, 2016, pp. 5-7). In this context, humanitarian issues were considered necessary to support “the US leadership” if possible (W. H. NSSD 1997, p. 12). As it is clear from these documents, humanitarian issues take place as a means rather than an end. It has also drawn a roadmap for the implementation of the national interests of the USA. There are definite statements such as "If our national interests and values are under threat, we will resort to unilateral use of force" (W.H. NSSD 1997, p. 6; 1999, p. 9). The boundaries of US national security and interests have been progressively expanded.

After making both human and financial cost-benefit analyses on third-class issues related to humanitarian interests, it was explained that “If it is compatible with our national interests, we can use force, preferably multilaterally and diplomatically, and when not possible, unilaterally to share the responsibility”. Clearly, the requirement for a link between humanitarian intervention and US national interests has been strongly articulated (W.H. 1997, p. 6). In the documents after 2000, the USA defined itself as a world leader and a super power. In this context, it considers itself responsible not only for the security of its citizens and lands but also for the security of various regions and countries wherever they are in the world. The welfare of the USA country was also evaluated as equivalent to its national security and was included in the vital interests of the USA (W. H. NSSD 2000, p. 9).

4. 1995 BOSNIA INTERVENTION

When Yugoslavia broke up and conflicts began in 1991, US President George Bush's administration left the solution to the Bosnian crisis to the Europeans (Halberstam, 2002, p. 25). On the other hand, the definition of US interests in the region was defined in the 1991 National Security Strategy document, in which the US defined the "New World Order". This document has two main objectives. The first is to build a new international system in which the USA is a global power and in this context, in line with its values and ideals. The other is the adaptation of NATO to the new environment (W.H.NSSD 1991, p. 6). In this context, it was emphasized that "American leadership is indispensable". In this century, "Europe and the USA would balance the rest of the world" (W.H.NSSD, 1991, p.8). In this period, the role of the USA in Europe within the framework of NATO decreased. The Soviet threat was not yet over. In this context, the main purpose of the USA has been defined as deterring any attack that would put the security of itself and the alliances at risk (W.H.NSSD 1991, p. 8). On the one hand, the USA aimed to reduce its responsibilities by promoting institutionalization in the region, on the other hand, it attempted to strengthen its ties with the region in different ways. Thus, the 1991 National Security and Strategy Document spurred the greater European responsibility of its European partners to build a separate security identity for Europe within the Alliance, and adapt NATO to new structures to encompass US aspirations in Europe, emphasis was placed on the need for defend Europe. In addition, while leading the development of the institutions of European governments, it should be our main goal to strengthen the European Alliance in parallel with these efforts. In addition, the necessity of developing the OSCE to reduce regional ethnic and nationalist tensions was mentioned (W.H.NSSD 1991, p. 14).

The United States also drew attention to multilateralism in relations, the promotion of democracy, and human rights. In other words, while the USA showed interest in Europe and the elements related to Europe, it approached other related issues with reservations. To reach the principles stated in the document, NATO heads of state and government were brought together at the Rome Summit in 1991 under the leadership of the USA and an agreement was reached on the New Strategic Concept called "Out of Area". Within the framework of this New Strategic Concept, NATO is planning to undertake new security missions such as peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and crisis management as well as collective defense (NATO, 2016). When Clinton came to power, alongside the Bosnian crisis, the Somali crisis emerged in 1992. Within the framework of the UN, soldiers were sent to the region by the USA. The USA has lost 18 soldiers in the conflicts in the region. This situation was met with a reaction in the eyes of the

US public and Congress. It even led to the emergence of a similar syndrome with the name of “Mogadishu Line” in addition to the Vietnam syndrome (Halberstam, 2002, p. 277; Holbrooke, 1999, p. 387). This crisis was reflected both in the foreign policy goals of the USA and in its regional practices. This event also changed the perspective of the Clinton administration and the US public towards the UN and humanitarian aid. This situation has had an impact on humanitarian criteria and goals in foreign policy. The approach to humanitarian issues in this period was explained as follows: "The situation requiring intervention includes severe and widespread human rights violations, the US has the military capacity to support the intervention, and there is a change that will make a difference with the intervention" (Önal, 2010, p. 75).

In his speech titled “From Containment to Enlargement” on September 21, 1993, by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, where Clinton's administration's foreign policy interests and perspective on humanitarian issues were explained for the first time, it was deemed necessary for the USA to take Western Europe with it to become a leader. Democracy, the necessity of spreading the market economy, and NATO, which will protect this market, is planned to be adapted to current problems. In addition, NATO would establish a link between Western Europe and the United States. For this, a new task had to be defined for NATO. Thus, NATO would both be integrated into the West and become a security umbrella in the “global leader of the World”. The Bosnian crisis and its regional interests have been shaped by these views (Lake, 2016, p. 1-4). If democracy and the market economy spread, the economic well-being of the US would increase automatically within the framework of interdependence; that there will be no war between democracies; It has been determined as the basic assumption that the USA is the leading country in the international order in which mutual security will be ensured (Lake, 2016, pp. 6-7). NATO's duty has also been defined as protecting this spread. For this reason, the function of NATO should be adapted to the current time and the necessity of giving a wider role has been evaluated. It has been assumed that otherwise transatlantic relations may be endangered (Lake, 2016, pp. 3-4).

Since Clinton was elected, because of his economic promises and because of the obstacles that emerged in foreign policy, he focused his attention primarily on domestic policy rather than foreign policy and was more preoccupied with the US economy (Halberstam, 2002, pp. 201-223). In line with this policy, low-intensity, cooperative activities continued within the framework of the Bosnian crisis. In May 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was sent by Clinton to Europe to share cooperation and US strategies. The Pentagon opposed ground operations because of the possibility of military losses. To

prevent military losses and ensure control in the operations to be accomplished after the Somali operation, the operations to be executed within the framework of NATO, of which the USA is the leader, were adopted by the USA administration (Allard, 2016). In addition, with the Presidential Decision Directive, which will be included in the US national security strategy, the conditions of humanitarian intervention were determined in May 1994: The US would participate in UN operations if it had interests, and there would be a time limit. A cost-benefit analysis would be made and it would not cross the Mogadishu (Somalia) line, so there would be no loss of soldiers. It was considered objectionable to place American soldiers under a foreign command. In addition, it was emphasized that as the largest military power, it should implement the operations with a multilateral organization in which it will be the leader if possible (USA 1994 Presidential Decree, 1994).

Based on Clinton's approach to the crisis, there were four important obstacles: the economic situation of the USA, the American people, and the internal factors such as Congress, foreign policy goals, Clinton's priorities, and the inability of the actors in the region to cooperate as external factors (Holbrooke, 1999, p. 68). The operation to be executed by NATO with air power was announced to the public as a policy of "raise the embargo and strike". The European allies, on the other hand, evaluated that such an operation would prolong the war, and they skeptically rejected the US's request not to use their troops on land (Halberstam, 1999, p. 213; Önal, 2010, p. 307). In the framework of "containment and enlargement" announced by Lake in 1993, the influence of CNN in the humanitarian field was mentioned and public pressure was also emphasized. The supportive role of humanitarian efforts in the spread of democracy and market economy has been emphasized (Lake, 2016, p. 9).

The Srebrenica Genocide, which took place in mid-July 1995, brought the events to a climax. About 8,000 Bosnian Muslims, adults, and children, were murdered in the UN-protected UNPROFOR camp, and women were gang-raped. When the Serbs attacked the UN camps, the US public, who was against the intervention 55% in 1992, supported the humanitarian intervention with 65% both from the ground and from the air (Gallup Poll, 1996, p. 22). The increasing popular support and the event that the Dutch peacekeepers were taken prisoner resonated all over the world. The fact that the Republicans were exposed to criticism on this issue and that it affected the elections forced the Clinton administration to take action. Responses began to rise gradually from the Muslim world. Clinton was pressured both internally and externally. This situation affected the personal reputation and US national reputation of Clinton, whose election period was approaching. (Dumbrell, 2016; Önal, 2010, p. 126). Congress

wanted NATO to intervene for collective defense and opposed out-of-area intervention. Finally, the Congress was promised to stay in Bosnia for a maximum of one year and Congress support was provided (Carey, 2001, p.76; Dumbrell, 2016). They were trying to create their own defense identities. The threat from the Cold War was gone, and there was no need for NATO. Therefore, the USA was not wanted in the region (Oğuzlu, 2009, pp. 141-143).

The EU countries, which are regional actors, wanted Yugoslavia to preserve its territorial integrity. They established an ad hoc Arbitration Commission under the UN umbrella to determine how it would happen if there was a split (Ülger, 2003, p. 123). However, upon Germany's recognition of Slovenia, the Commission decided to recognize the countries that applied for recognition. At the same time, initiatives such as the Lisbon and London Conferences, the Vance-Owen Plan, and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, led by the EU to solve the crisis, were not accepted by the parties. As the Serbs increased violence, a consensus began to form among the alliance members against Serbian President Milosevic. In England public opinion was formed against the Serbs. Especially in France, the President was changed (Holbrooke, 1999, p. 271). The new president, Jacques Chirac, had changed his perspective towards the Serbs, especially because of the French peacekeepers who were taken prisoner in May 1995, and the Russians, who objected to the intervention, were included in the operation (Dumbrell, 2016; Önal, 2008, p. 126; Holbrook, pp. 92- 93).

The Serbs were persuaded to the Dayton Agreement with the 11-day NATO airborne intervention, which started on 30 August 1995, and the movement of Croats and Bosniaks from the ground within the scope of the UN. According to American columnist William Pfaff, "The United States has proven itself to be the leader of Europe with the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. Both the Bush administration and the Clinton administration encouraged European governments to assume European leadership, but the Europeans were not successful" (Halbrooke, 1999, p. 131). This view is a statement that reflects the perspective of the Clinton administration. Clinton's achievements In the 1997 National Strategy Document, "Our intervention in Bosnia within the scope of Europe and NATO was within the scope of important interests" (W.H. NSSD 1997, p. 12).

5. 1999 KOSOVO INTERVENTION

As in the Bosnian crisis, the Clinton administration's aim in the Kosovo crisis was for the US to establish close ties with the EU, the spread of democracy and a liberal economy, and military expansion within the scope of NATO. Within the framework of NATO, it is aimed to strengthen ties and strengthen NATO's

reputation in the field of humanitarian crises. The ultimate goal has been defined as ensuring that the EU sided with the USA and shaping a world dependent on democracy and a liberal economy. However, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Milosevic has been seen as an obstacle to both US military expansion under NATO and the expansion of liberal democracy and market economy in the EU context. The crisis that emerged in Kosovo was evaluated as a unique opportunity for the Clinton administration. It is envisaged that it will both realize its national interests and gain a reputation as a problem solver and savior in the region as a bridge builder between Islam and Christianity. It will be ensured that it regains its national reputation, which it lost in Rwanda and Somalia, and the USA will declare its leadership to the world (Brezesinski, 2008, p. 125). The USA's efforts to reach the Dayton agreement in a short time and the concern to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina have caused the Kosovo issue to take place in the background (Holbrooke, 1999, p. 431). During the Bosnian crisis, Ibrahim Rugova's peaceful, civil disobedience-based resistance efforts did not lead to the emergence of an effective sensitivity in the international arena as intended. On the other hand, the Milosevic administration tried to change the population structure of the region by placing immigrant Serbs coming from the region to this region during the Bosnian crisis. Thereupon, in 1997, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLB) adopted the view that the problem in the region could be brought to the agenda and resolved with violence. By this view, the UCK entered into armed conflicts with the Serbian Army (Oğultürk, 2014, p. 9).

It was the security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(YFR) that held the monopoly on the use of force in Kosovo. With the permission of the president, the security forces had seriously violated international human rights. This was accepted by the security council. Kosovo refugees were starved and subjected to various tortures in concentration camps. Most of the civilians arrested for being KLB militants were shot. Civilian settlements were bombed and aid activities of the UN were prevented (Manavoğlu, 2001, p. 29). It was pointed out that he aimed at genocide because the human rights violations in Kosovo were planned and performed by the state. YFR military units entered Kosovo to take control of the region, killing 10,000 civilians and causing approximately 1,000,000 people to leave their homes (Çevikbaş, 2011 p. 19). After the massacre in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999, the allegations of ethnic cleansing and genocide by the Serbs came to the fore. Although it was estimated that the heavy terms of the agreement would not be accepted during the negotiations, the Rambouillet Agreement was presented to Milosevic on 6 February 1999 within the framework of the Contact Group. As a matter of fact, this agreement was rejected by Milosevic (Kissinger, 2001, p. 273). When the

Kosovo crisis emerged, the USA sent its diplomats, who had experience in the Bosnian crisis, to the region (Halbrooke, 1999, p. 444).

At the same time, the contact group formed during the Bosnian crisis, consisting of the USA, England, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, was reactivated (Piaskow, 2016, p. 60). The United States actively sought to evaluate the common ground of agreement established during the Bosnian crisis (Carey, 2001, p. 76).

It is possible to see all these aims of Clinton and his team and that the USA's work in the region is not finished yet in the UGSBs. Foreign policy objectives and national interests after 1996 were structured according to threats and opportunities in the National Strategy Papers. The threat was the communist structures left over from the cold war, the opportunity was the US leadership. In fact, the commission, evaluating the last 6 years in 2000, stated that "the USA has become the largest country after Rome (Allison & Blackwell, 2016, p. 1).

Slightly different from the Bosnian crisis in this period the Clinton administration was evaluated by various authors that it was an organized and monophonic structure rather than having different views. In addition, the Clinton administration was sympathetic to the Albanian movement because it had previously shown peaceful resistance. On the other hand, Milosevic was regarded as a possible aggressor and murderer again because of his distraction tactics and massacres during the Bosnian crisis (Piaskowy, 2016, p. 60). In addition, the Clinton administration thought that Milosevic did not learn the necessary lesson from the results of the Bosnian crisis and wanted him to understand the US power sufficiently (Carey, 2016, p. 76). Madeleine Albright was particularly at the forefront of this issue and made very harsh statements to the public. She likened Milasovic to the dictator Hitler. According to him, "Tirana Milosevic did not feel the power of the UN and NATO, he had done ethnic cleansing. Now injustices and evils had to be ended" (Piaskowy, 2016, p. 61; Halberstam, 2002, p. 393).

Clinton, on the other hand, preferred to direct the attention of the US public to foreign policy because he was dealing with the Monica Lewinsky scandal in domestic politics at that time (Önal, 2010, p. 127, Halberstam, 2002, p. 402). The US public also evaluated that the Kosovo issue was kept on the agenda by Clinton 57% (Gallup, 1998, p. 21) while the US public opinion supported the US air strike against Serbian forces with the Western European Alliance with a rate of 46% for the intervention in Kosovo in 1998. This rate increased to 54% in February 1999 within the framework of the UN and 43% within the scope of NATO. In April 1999 support reached to 65%. The number of people who believed that the intervention would protect US interests in Europe was 47%. On the other hand, 58% of the US public believed that the Serbs were

ethnically cleansing the region. Therefore, Clinton provided the necessary public support for an intervention (Gallup Poll, 1999, pp. 21-24). Especially the situation of refugees in Italy forced the US public to react (Carey, 2016, p. 26; Newport, 2018). It was also clearly included in the 1999 and 2000 National Security and Strategy documents, in which the Clinton administration took into account the US public opinion (W.H. NSSD 1999, pp. 20; 2000, pp.36-37).

The Congress also approached the Kosovo intervention moderately (Önal, 2010, p. 125). Thus, no internal obstacle has emerged that would prevent the Clinton administration from intervening in Kosovo. During the Kosovo crisis, the USA, England, and Turkey initially wanted to intervene in the event. Later, Italy, Germany, and France also decided to support the intervention. On the other hand, Greece, Russia, and China refused to intervene in the Kosovo crisis (Paskowy, 2016, p. 58). In his article, Çevikbaş interpreted this behavior of the Western Bloc as “European leaders agreed for peace and security and regional stability” (Çevikbaş, 2012, p. 46). However, problems have arisen regarding the UN mandate to intervene in the crisis. Albright argued that what is desired by the USA in this regard is authorization, but UN authorization is not very necessary. China and Russia were considered calculable risks (Piaskowy, 2016, p. 63). Thus, no external obstacle was foreseen to prevent the intervention of the USA. Western states, especially Germany, supported the KLB and undertook the activities of training, equipping, and directing the public. The USA, which initially regarded the KLB as a terrorist, defined Serbia as a rogue state after 1998 and started to provide the necessary support for the training-equipment activity (Traves, 2001, pp. 250-254). After the humanitarian intervention decision was taken, the intervention was successful with the UCK airborne NATO operation from the ground (Sancaktar, 2016, pp. 445-459). According to Allison, the intervention in Kosovo threatened the US relationship with Russia and China but was seen as important for the US reputation that had eroded in previous years. (Allison, 2016, p. 17) According to Kissinger, China, and Russia have threatened the security of the USA since they have the heart of Europe. The USA wanted to eliminate this situation (Kissinger, 2001, pp. 234-283).

In the 2000 National Security Strategy document, the situation was explained as follows. While US soldiers were shaping the international environment, NATO ensured both humanitarian and US interests, and prosperity and placed European security on solid foundations (W.H. NSSD 2000, p. 23). In this document, problems related to Bosnia and Kosovo were also attributed to Milosevic. According to them, they tried to turn Milosevic's authoritarian rule into democratic rule with Kosturica. Because it was seen that the ethnic problems in Kosovo affected the resolution of the Bosnian problem, which was resolved

with Dayton. Therefore, it was foreseen that the problems would return to their former state without strong US engagement and that intervention was necessary for regional stability, peace, and prosperity (W.H. NSSD 2000, pp. 49-51).

Concern for Europe was explained in connection with NATO and military enlargement: European Security defense identity was established with the EU. However, according to the Clinton administration, the relations established in the region within the framework of NATO, in which the USA is the leader, were deemed necessary to maintain regional stability. NATO's enlargement was considered vital, and stability was achieved in the European area with the joining of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO in 1999. Within the framework of partnership for peace, the participation of new members was considered necessary (W.H. NSSD 2000, p. 52).

6. 2011 LIBYA INTERVENTION

Since the establishment of Libya, there has been no regular relationship between the United States and Libya. After Gaddafi came to power, the USA closed Wheelus Air Force Base, which was established in 1954. In addition, US oil companies were also affected by the nationalization policy. Libya's rapprochement with the USSR, its adoption of Islamic socialism, Libya's support of terrorism due to its anti-imperialism policy, and efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and nuclear power were causing discomfort in the USA (Hasler, 2012, p. 78). In the 1980s, third-world states were tried to be influenced and weakened again within the framework of the Reagan Doctrine, due to their closeness with the USSR. During the Reagan era, Gaddafi was described as the "rabid dog" of the Middle East. The U.S. had included Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua, as well as Libya on its terrorist list. During the Clinton era, the country was included in the rogue state. While hostilities such as the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986, which resulted in direct attacks by the USA, left their mark, the Lockerbie incident and terrorism issues dominated the USA's Libya policy (Zoubir, 2011, p. 25).

During the Libyan-Chad War, Libya supported the actions of some terrorist organizations against the USA, as the USA supported Chad. On April 5, 1989, Germany announced that Gaddafi supported the attack on the US soldiers having fun at La Belle Disco in West Berlin (Doğan & Durgun, 2012, pp. 71-72). There was also the Lockerbie disaster on the international agenda, on December 21, 1988, the plane departing from England and going to the USA was bombed. In this action, all 243 passengers and 16 officers who boarded the plane died. Libyan leader Gaddafi was blamed for the attack because he was involved in the incident. After this incident, Libya was subjected to various sanctions and

embargo practices within the framework of the UN. Gaddafi admitted responsibility for Libya's Lockerbie bombing in 2003 and paid compensation to the victim's families in 2003. However, he never admitted that he ordered the attack (BBC, 23 February 2011). However, these attacks created the impression that Gaddafi was retaliating against the US policy (Bowen, 2006, p. 12). Gaddafi has successfully emerged from the US regime change efforts. Gaddafi attempted to develop the Nuclear Program and Weapons of Mass Destruction to become stronger against both the USA and Israel, which he had problems with. Gaddafi, who was left alone in the international arena with the embargoes imposed by the UN and the country's economy deteriorated, started reform efforts after 1986 and took steps to liberalize the Libyan economy (Zoubir, 2005).

Relations began to soften after the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States because he condemned international terrorism. He was invited the United States to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and to become a part of the anti-terrorism agreements. With the EU members following a policy of opening up to Libya, international relations with Libya started to develop from 2003-2004. This was followed by economic liberalization, bilateral oil agreements, and international investments. Allowing political prisoners and political asylum seekers to return to the country on the issue of human rights softened the relations but the government's inaction in the face of the calls for guaranteeing fundamental political rights and drafting a constitution reduced its credibility although there were no objections to the necessary reforms (Bölme, 2011, pp. 16-17). Libya has also abandoned its nuclear program and the development of weapons of mass destruction. Depending on all these, bilateral trade agreements were made between the USA and Libya. However, Libya was promoted from the "rogue state" list to the "state of concern" list (VOA, 2010).

The region and Libya were considered within the scope of the fight against terrorism in the US 2006 National Security Strategy under President George W. Bush. The United States agreed to strengthen fragile and failing states to ensure their security and to make effective efforts to control effective democracies in unmanaged areas (W. H. NSSD 2006, p. 22). Failed and fragile states are defined as regions that may provide a potential refuge for terrorists or other criminal elements and may have matured which can lead to humanitarian or political crises that threaten stability and security in the surrounding regions (US Department of Defense, 2005).

Obama stated that his priority in the US presidential elections was to solve the problems related to the economy. However, when he came to power, he declared that "the humanitarian interventions that the USA will carry out from time to time should be seen as a part of the US interests" (NBS News, 2008).

While expressing that he will generally solve international problems through negotiation and cooperation rather than conflict and unilateralism (Kelley, 2012); In 2008, the United States explained its vision: “Responsibly ending the war in Iraq. Fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban, securing all nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in terrorist and rogue states, ensuring energy security, rebuilding the world with the EU in the 21st century, and ensuring US leadership in a world where shared security and common humanity are shared.” (Foreign Affairs, 2007).

G.W. Bush's idea of failed states and the potential need to intervene (military) are included in President Obama's approach to US security policy (Homolar, 2012, p. 10). A collaborative engagement between the US and regional powers was aimed at aid or intervention in failed states (US Department of Defense, 2010, p. 18). It was foreseen that the war on terror would intensify, especially if the Middle East continued to be problematic. Where the increase in terrorist activities intersects with energy sources or weapons of mass destruction, the US Joint Force commanders (JFC) aimed to develop contingency plans that may require the use of significant conventional capabilities (US JFC, 2010, p. 71). In the event of an attack on key US and EU interests, it would persuade potential adversaries not to take threatening actions by influencing their decision-making mechanisms, as part of deterrence. Convincing defense and offensive abilities to prevent climbing could be used for this. Since civil crises can lead to the spread of conflicts, it was necessary to be prepared in cooperation with partners to intervene in crises and disasters (US Department of Defense, 2009, pp. 9-11).

The first National Security Strategy, announced by the Obama Administration in 2010, explained that the United States and its Alliances were within the scope of vital interests and that they could intervene unilaterally for vital interests. It was aimed accomplish good neighborly policies in the world within the framework of "equal partnership and common interests" and to strengthen the US economy. In the region, it was geared towards taking “a series of measures, such as access to open markets, conflict prevention, global peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, and protection of vital carbon resources,” emphasizing the need to “adopt effective partnerships.” But unlike George W. Bush, US efforts to address transnational challenges in the region, conduct capacity-building and peacekeeping operations, prevent extremism and address humanitarian crises, prioritize working with regional partners within NATO and the UN over unilateral relations. (W. H. NSSD 2010, pp. 20-30). Homos defined this approach as collaborative security (Homolar, 2012, p. 13).

Although Libya was not named in the 2010 National Strategy Document,

there were concerns about terrorism originating from the region (especially Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Boko Haram) and weapons of mass destruction, and the existence of Islamic-extremist groups. These were considered within the scope of threats that could reach US soil. It was emphasized that the measures to be taken for the threats that may arise should be done across the border. He even stated that for his vital interests, the right to unilaterally intervene in actions against EU and US superiors abroad is reserved. It was emphasized that the burden of humanitarian crises should be shared with the international community (W. H. NSSD 2010, pp. 30-50). Parallel to this policy, in his speech in Cairo, Obama stated that he would maintain partnership relations with Muslim countries, but he also called for reforms to non-democratic countries (Corbin, 2009). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared the foreign policy of the Obama administration by saying, "Democracy and human rights are at the center of the US's foreign policy strategies, but it is in our vital interests to close our foreign financing deficit and foreign debts without losing our influence in the world" (Al Jazeera, 28 May 2010).

In parallel with Obama's 2010 strategy document, the USA cooperated with the Gaddafi regime within the framework of regional partnerships in the first period. In particular, within the scope of the fight against terrorism, it has allocated \$350,000 funds to support Libya's efforts to improve its security capabilities in areas of common concern, such as border control and export/import monitoring, and training of security forces. He also realized activities to support military personnel training (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011, p. 39).

The foreign policy behavior of the USA when the Libyan crisis emerged, and its response to the humanitarian crisis that emerged in Benghazi; can be explained in connection with geostrategic, national security interests, and economic interests as well as humanitarian concerns. Because when the US was examined within the framework of regional geostrategic interests and energy security, Libya was located at a point close to Europe. EU members were having problems with immigration flowing to Europe via Libya. Geo-strategically, it was located at the crossing point between Africa and Europe extending to the Atlantic Ocean. Eighth in the world proven crude oil resource according to OPEC data; was in the twenty-first place in the natural gas reserve ranking (Gönen, 2016, p. 12). It is not possible for the USA, which is one of the countries with the largest economic production in the world, not to take part in the crises that arise in a place that is both an oil transit route and an energy source. This situation was later explained in the US Congressional Research Report (CRS) within the framework of oil and global trade, energy security, fight against extremism, fight against

terrorism, and armed conflicts (Ploch, 22 June 2011, pp. 1-19). Libya ranks first in Africa and ninth in the world in terms of the size and quality of its proven oil reserves (Al Jazeera Turk, 2014). The place of Libyan oil in the US oil trade is 5% (Blanchard & Zanotti, 25 February 2011). Especially considering the trade volume between the USA and the EU, the effect of the region on the US economy can be explained more easily.

The impact of the Libyan crisis on the US economy is more related to its economic relations with the EU: According to the US Energy Information Administration, Libya's most important energy export rates are in 2010, with Libyan oil being Italy 28%, France 15%, Germany 10%, Spain, Greece, 5% UK % 4% et al. of which 85% were made to European countries. The rate of US energy imports from Libya was 3% of total energy imports (US Energy Information Administration, March 21, 2011). All Libyan gas exports were to Europe: 13% was going to France and other European countries, including Italy. However, the Libyan oil and gas supply disruption could have both direct and indirect effects on the US economy through the EU. Unrest in one country by the domino effect could have led to potential concerns and disruptions in another country through a perceived risk of "contagion". Unrest and turmoil in economies that are not critical to global oil supply could spread to other neighboring countries, which may be more important politically or culturally for energy market participants. Emerging concerns could shake global markets (US Energy Information Administration, March 7, 2011). This situation would, directly and indirectly, affect the USA. Because the US economy was heavily dependent on Europe. At that time, the USA made 11% of its exports to Europe; 18% of its imports. 3 of them were met from Europe. The first largest trading partner of both the USA and Europe was each other (Eurostat, 2021; Wikipedia English, 2021). Although this situation was not clearly stated, it worried the USA in terms of energy sources, energy transition security, and direct impact on the US economy.

Since the instabilities that may arise in the European economy will affect European security, it could have negative consequences for the USA in the world balance of power. In addition to these, the instability that emerged in the region could also affect other energy exporting countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, which are suffering from the pain of democracy, from which the USA supplies oil. Therefore, it could shake other economies globally, especially the USA and Europe (US Information Administration, 2011). This could be seen as a vital economic interest for the Obama administration, which attaches particular importance to the economy. It could also weaken the power alliance with the EU, the US alliance. There was another element of regional concern for the United States. China has been operating in the region due to its increasing energy needs

in recent years. The United States was disturbed by China's entry into bilateral trade agreements in Sudan and Libya. According to Petras and Nuruzzaman, the reason for the USA's involvement is that it is one of the operations that China, which has been on the rise recently, used to reverse its economy (Petras, 2012; Nuruzzaman, 2014).

According to Dimitrova, the smart power strategy was at the heart of Obama's Libya strategy. As the main priorities of the US foreign and security policy, the aim of the Obama administration was not only to strike a new balance between defense (based on deterrence) and diplomacy, but also to integrate economic development with defense and diplomacy. This context includes humanitarian concern, responsibility to protect, and multilateralism. By seeking UN authority, England left the responsibility of the operation to France with limited participation (Dimitrova, 2011). This situation has been described by Chesterman as "leadership from behind". Because NATO infrastructure and management system are dependent on the USA. Until October 2011, the USA led the operation in the background (Chesterman, 2011.)

In January 2010, Hillary Clinton clarified the link between development and democracy in the context of US foreign policy: "Development also advances one of the key objectives of our diplomatic efforts: advancing democracy and human rights worldwide" (Zoubir, 2011 p. 29). In the 2010 USGB, the USA announced that it would participate in international crises within the scope of the UN and NATO (W.H., 2010). In a 2007 press release, Obama stated that there was a growing discrepancy between NATO's expanding missions and its lagging capabilities, which could be overcome by NATO allies sending more troops into collective security operations and investing more in rebuilding and stabilization capabilities. The United States declared that "while we strengthen NATO, we must forge new alliances and partnerships in other vital areas" (Foreign Affairs, 2007).

The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2010 also affected Libya. Gaddafi predicted that a Tunisia-like demonstration would take place in Libya on February 6, 2011, and detained human rights supporter Fethi Terbil Salva and writer Idris al-Mesmari on February 8, whom he held responsible for the protests. On February 15, 2011, demonstrators started demonstrations in front of the Benghazi Police Station for the release of the arrested human rights activists. Meanwhile, Gaddafi used force to suppress the demonstrations, and several protesters were killed. Clashes surrounding funerals and other protest gatherings escalated severely when government officials were reported to have fired live ammunition. In the resulting chaos, it was claimed that the Libyan security forces opened fire on the protesters with heavy weapons. On February 17, Gaddafi

distributed weapons to his supporters and made a statement on television that “cleaning the rebels house by house” and had “no mercy for the rebels” (Hasler 2012, p. 18). On February 20, 2011, a person named Mehdi Ziu, accompanied by demonstrators, drove his truck to the main barracks of the government's ground forces in Benghazi and cleared the way for the demonstrators, allowing the barracks to be captured by the demonstrators (Prajhad, 2012, pp. 106-107).

Upon the outbreak of conflict in Libya, on 28 February 2011, Hillary Clinton met with the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) representatives in Libya and elsewhere in the region on February 28 in Geneva, Switzerland, urging the Obama administration to reimpose the economic sanctions against Libya. She also called on the United Nations to protect civilians (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011, p. 5).

Under UN Security Council resolutions of 1970 and 1973, on March 18, US President Obama outlined to Gaddafi and his government the "non-negotiable conditions" for ending violence in Libya. He also stated that the United States was ready to act militarily as part of a coalition to implement Resolution 1973 and protect Libyan civilians (White House Press Office, 2011). The US also took various measures against sanctions, imposed financial sanctions, restricted funds, and froze the assets of Libyans (White House Press Office, 2011).

On March 14, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met privately with Mahmoud Jibril, the opposition NGK foreign relations representative, during the G8 summit in Paris. While the United States has not made it clear that it does not formally recognize the NSC or its intention to provide financial support to the group, it has allowed the Council to establish a representative office in Washington DC (Hendrix et al. 2011).

On March 18, Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa stated that the Gaddafi government had to accept the Security Council resolution allowing the use of force to protect the civilian population, and announced that the Libyan government had decided to cease and desist immediately. Despite Kusa's claim, the operations of the Libyan military ground forces against the opposition-held areas continued in violation of their ceasefire commitments. The US, meanwhile, said its policy towards Libya was “the focus of protecting innocent civilians” in Libya and holding the Gaddafi regime accountable for the conflict. The US administration especially wanted the support of the Arabs because the oil source did not want relations with Muslim Arab countries to deteriorate. (For this reason, it was announced that the operation against Libya was aimed at protecting civilians within the framework of the responsibility to protect (Blanchard, 2011, p.22).

In his speech on 18 March Obama drew attention to the following points about the intervention. Protecting civilians from the possibility of Gaddafi's massacre, protecting the region from instability, ensuring shared responsibility for protection, the right to self-determination, and ensuring universal human rights, it has been declared that the US troops will not be on land, and he stated that the US as a leader will take responsibility for global peace and security for intervention (Obama, 18 March 2011).

Congress members in Congress generally supported Obama's request for intervention in the debates on Libya between March 1 and March 23 but made negative statements regarding authority and rules. There were opinions on the possibility of a heavy and systematic massacre in Libya, the recognition of the National Transitional Council, and the response to the calls of the African Union and the Arab League but for the President to receive war authorization from the Congress, and the determination of the boundaries and rules of the operation (Blanchard, 2011 pp. 8-12).

In the US public opinion poll conducted on March 22, 2011, the Americans supported the military action against Libya with a ratio of 47%. Although Republicans and Democrats are normally opposing parties, they accepted intervention in Libya with 62% of the vote (Gall Up, 2011). Therefore the obstacle of Congress and the people in front of Obama has been removed.

The coalition with the USA, France, and the UK started the operation to create a no-fly zone but it turned into a regime change target after a time. NATO was later engaged in the Libyan intervention. Its leadership was led by France, Germany, and Türkiye under the name of joint leadership. As most of NATO's infrastructure was managed by the US the US was not at the forefront. Discussions on which UN could be the most appropriate authority in humanitarian crises indisputably revealed the functionality of NATO according to the USA (Pattison, 2011, p. 29). In this way, NATO was articulated with the UN as the most appropriate military authority for humanitarian crises in the international arena.

The operation ended with the capture of Gaddafi on 31 October with the cooperation of the alliance members, especially the training-equipment activities for the local forces by especially France (Karaoğlu, 2019: p.22). The intervention in Libya was accomplished with the Libyan forces without foreign soldiers taking part on the ground. For this reason, it has been determined by some authors to be legal, legitimate, and suitable for protection responsibility (Zipcak, 2011, p. 11; Chesterman, 2012, p. 21; Buchanan, 2012, Bellamy, 2011).

For Pattison, the intervention in Libya was morally problematic. Because the NATO-led coalition and the United States had not responded similarly to the

crises that emerged in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. The lack of military action to respond to these crises showed the inconsistent moral standards of the coalition and the predominance of self-interest in its decisions (Pattison, 2011, pp. 5-7).

During the operations, Russia, China, and Brazil frequently expressed their dissatisfaction with regime change and reconstruction. However, they abstained from the decisions regarding Libya. In addition, some authors criticize the humanitarian intervention process as the operation included limited civil protection to evolve into a regime change. They argue that Libya is still in conflict because of the non-fulfillment of the duties of last resort, goodwill, and reconstruction, which are the terms of the Responsibility to Protect. For this reason, they argue that external forces fuel conflicts to achieve their interests, so the intervention is no different from humanitarian intervention (Nuruzzaman, 2012, Petras, 2011; Cohn, 2011; Hasler, 2014). According to them NATO first violated the principle of neutrality by supporting the rebels rather than protecting its civilians. NATO destroyed the other side by arming the rebels. It has led to tribal wars and extrajudicial executions. Secondly, the UN Security Council resolution did not include the killing of the Libyan leader and the UN Security Council did not base its decision on the consent of the relevant country according to the UN Charter.

Reza was based on the call of the national transitional council. Therefore, future interventions regarding R2P became the subject of the Security Council's commitment to international fundamental principles (Evans, 2011, p. 41).

7. CONCLUSION

US national interests are listed in foreign policy documents as national security interests, economic interests, and other national security interests were considered vital, economic interests were also included in the scope of vital interests over time. In the study, national security interests, economic interests, and humanitarian concerns were compared in the events of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya. The United States regards humanitarian crises as a vital interest when it affects the national security of the United States and its alliances and the economic interests of the United States and approaches humanitarian intervention warmly.

In the study, the foreign policy behaviors of the US President, the US Congress and the US public in humanitarian crises were examined as internal factors by comparing national security documents, congressional reports and opinion polls. The response of the international community to the crisis, which affects this foreign policy behavior, and the local cooperation in the intervened country were also investigated. Since there was no active congressional and

public support in the Bosnian crisis at the beginning, and the US President's effort to get regional support and his desire to activate NATO, he did not want to get involved in the crisis. After the massacres, the US President, who received Congress, public and regional support, took action to solve the crisis in line with his foreign policy goals. In Kosovo and Libya, the US President intervened in the crisis by ensuring the support of Congress, the public, the international community and local cooperation.

In 1995 The United States intervened in the Bosnian crisis which started in 1991. USA troops on the ground were the absence at the beginning of the crisis because wanted to intervene with the operation in the air in NATO but France and Britain initially did not accept it, but after the Srebrenica genocide, they took active action. The USA has linked its interests to the enlargement strategy of the EC and NATO. On the other hand, although the same goals were achieved, quicker action was taken in Kosovo. Both the regional actors and the US president are the same. The operation was successful with the intervention of local forces from the ground and NATO took operation from the air.

In Libya, the negative relations of the USA with the Libyan leader from the past ended with a softening. But when the crisis arose, the US immediately got involved in the operation with its coalition partners. Bosnia and Kosovo declared action within the framework of the R2P as opposed to intervention. However, the operation started with the aim of protecting civilians and ended with a regime change.

Although the USA did not express its interests in Libya at the presidential level. It was linked with energy security and the security of European alliances through its institutions and ensured that NATO would once again maintain its functionality. While realizing these goals USA was influenced by the preferences of the internal actors, the public, the congress, and the US president and paid attention to the reactions of regional, local, and international actors which are external factors. However, it has been concluded that the United States has made humanitarian interventions for foreign policy purposes even though it includes humanitarian risks.

8. CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

There is no conflict of interest between the authors

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10. AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

OO, EK: Idea
OO: Design
APPENDIX: Supervision
OO: Collecting and processing resources
OO: Analysis and interpretation
OO: Literature review
OO: Writer
APPENDIX: Critical review

11. ETHICS COMMITTEE STATEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COPYRIGHTS

While conducting the present study, all the rules within the scope of the "Higher Education Institutions Scientific Research and Publication Ethics Directive" were obeyed and none of the "Actions Contrary to Scientific Research and Publication Ethics" were performed. Ethics committee principles were paid great attention in the study and necessary permissions were taken in accordance with the principles of intellectual property and copyright.

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