

Political Objective or Concern About Transnational Security? The Intention of Türkiye Syria

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ABSTRACT

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In addition to its geopolitical and geo-cultural significance, the Middle East has been home to a number of civilizations as a result of its natural resources and other richness. Due to the characteristics of the region, Middle Eastern nations have been subjected to numerous upheavals on occasion. This area has been severely devastated by war, colonialism, mandates, and international terrorism. Therefore, global peace and security have become a regional priority. This article seeks to provide a new perspective on international disputes, concentrating on the case of Syria following its civil war. Syria is presently involved in numerous international and regional military and political conflicts. Among these is the protracted dispute between Syria and Türkiye, which is the focus of this.

The article scrutinizes the operations of Türkiye in Syria, furthermore, it elaborates on several theories of international relations concerning the topic. It argues that, despite the widely discussed solutions to the global security and peace problems for more than two centuries, Middle Eastern countries have not reaped the benefits of this situation. This paper is one of Türkiye's first studies since it examines the global issue within the scope of the Syrian case from a historical standpoint.

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Introduction

Despite the fact that international security has been the subject of several studies, there is a gap in the literature reflecting how this notion has affected Türkiye's activities in Syria. Therefore, it will be beneficial to look at the definition of the notion of international security before moving on to the discussions in the literature. Arnold Wolfers asserts that the absence of any conduct that endangers or is likely to endanger acquired values constitutes international security (Wolfers, 2008). International security has military, economic, political, social, and psychological facets. There are many significant facts that are relevant and worthwhile knowing in addition to some fundamental perspectives like realism, liberalism, historical materialism, and social constructivism while analyzing international security in the context of the ongoing Syrian conflict. Almost all states place a high priority on maintaining national security. Unfortunately, there is no power to stop international conflict and carry out accords (Allan, 2013). This indicates that there isn't any global authority or power that promotes peace. International chaos results from states trying to accomplish their goals through their own power because there is no worldwide authority. States must determine what is in their own interests. Realistically, states relate to one another in terms of power. According to the realist theory, governments should continue to exist if competition and war are possible (Glaser L. Charles, 2017).

Terms like national security and security itself were loudly pronounced in the 1972 First Humanistic Environment Summit, which was arranged by the UN, although related discussions exist for over 200 years. Modern peace studies now look at the causes of wars and attempt to define security and global security. Core topics of security studies include the likelihood of using force, the consequences of employing force on people, nations and society, how nations prepare for war, how to prevent war, and the strategies used to wage war. This method holds states primarily accountable for supplying security. As is well known, from 1999 to 2006, the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan exerted pressure on UN members to take action to prevent genocide and war. He underlined the vulnerability of people in comparison to dominant states in practically every speech. The phrase "Protection Responsibility" first appeared in that year, referring to the need for every state to assume responsibility for this problem. The concern for human protection and security brought arguments to the forefront, such as the idea that humanity itself should be referred to as a security keeper rather than a state (*In Portugal, Annan Says Rule of Law Safeguards Against Rule of War*, 2005). There are many differing viewpoints today regarding the role of states and individuals in maintaining security. Indeed, at this time, international security guarantors like the UN and NATO enter the stage. On the other hand, governments' own roles are just as crucial as those of transnational organizations. However, it must be emphasized once more that international organizations like NATO and the UN are more closely tied to the implementations and causes taken to maintain international security.

Talking about international security also brings up processes of securitization and desecuritization. According to the Copenhagen School, securitization and desecuritization are two very important phenomena (Emmers, 2017). Securitization is the term used to describe how unsafe certain security locations are. The securitization process also forecasts the threat to an individual, group, or community (Balzacq, 2005). Some individuals, teams, and communities are tagged during this process. On the other hand, desecuritization entails determining that the aforementioned communities, people, or groups are no longer hazardous (Buzan et al., 1998). Communities and lobbies have the ability to securitize and desecuritize in typical case states. Securitization makes a problem into an emergency, forcing states to respond right away. (Williams, 2003). An effective securitization results in the choice to take extreme measures. Because of this, a process like this could result in the abuse of authority or even the defense of a hazardous group. The people in traditional nations have no voice in the securitization/desecuritization process. For instance, the Assad Government is viewed negatively and dangerously in Türkiye. Thus, the Assad Regime is seen dangerous and therefore securitized by the Turkish Government, propagandists, and populace (IHA, 2022). Türkiye, however, has little hope of international security in this sense. Indeed, only powerful nations have the ability to international securitization or desecuritization.

Other than that, the main problem between Türkiye and Syria is not Assad, but terrorism (Lutz & Lutz, 2017). There was terrorism both before and after 9/11 even though Islamic terrorism became an international issue after these attacks (Elif UYSAL, 2022). Terrorism does not have a precise meaning since objectivity is impossible. State efforts to exclude, organizations they sponsor, from this description are the cause of this. Generally speaking, terrorism refers to a person or group using violence to further their political agenda. In addition to terrorism, Türkiye has a long range of justifications for its presence in Syria. Herewith, examining these discourses and justifications historically and keeping track of how they adhere to international security will be instructive.

Literature Review

Arnold Wolfers discusses the term international security in *Theories of International Relations* edited by David A. Baldwin. According to him, the absence of any conduct that endangers or is likely to endanger acquired values constitutes international security. The distinctions between factual, subjective, and discursive notions of security are one of the main epistemological issues with reference to International Security Studies (ISS). Security assesses the lack of threats to acquired values from an objective perspective, while from a subjective one it measures the absence of attack anxiety. The conflict between the subjective and objective perceptions of security is very clearly explained by Wolfers' definition. The subjective approach places more emphasis on the significance of history and norms, the psychology of fear, and (mis)perception, while the objective view typically defines security in tangible terms. The operations of Türkiye in Syria are dominated by both objective and subjective viewpoints. Wolfers' theory contributes to this research in this regard.

According to Charles Glaser, who is known for supporting the ideas of defensive security, there are three main points affecting the security policies of a state. These include, the equipment of a state, its intelligence about other countries and the state incentive. On the other hand, international chaos results from states trying to accomplish their goals through their own power because there is no worldwide authority. Glaser argues that there is no authority to control anarchy. Providing the continuous chaos in Syria, it is possible to talk about the weakness of international authorities. Although states should determine what is in their own interests, realistically, states relate to one another in terms of power. Therefore, Türkiye's actions in Syria are to a large extent, part of a collaboration. Furthermore, according to the defensive realist approach, governments reject that the international system continually encourages state competition with one another (Glaser L. Charles, 2017). However, only by observing the international chaos in Syria, it could be concluded that there is serious international competition between states. Obviously, operations in Türkiye have not been observed within this theoretical framework even though it constitutes a considerable example.

Talking about international security also brings up processes of securitization and desecuritization. According to the Copenhagen School, securitization and desecuritization are two very important phenomena (Emmers, 2017). The Copenhagen school of security studies, which is widely considered to include Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and a variety of other such as, less closely related experts, is largely credited with developing the idea of securitization. Ole Waever first proposed the idea of securitization, which offered a novel perspective on the stale argument between those who held that threats are objective on the one hand and those who insisted that security is subjective on the other. All scholars of the Copenhagen School consist an important point regarding the securitization and desecuritization process of countries. According to Ralf Emmers, as well as to all Copenhagen School scholars, securitization is a speech act that must adhere to three rhetorical requirements. It is a discursive process whereby an actor asserts that a referent object is existentially endangered, demands the right to take extraordinary measures to address that threat, and persuades an audience that breaking the law to address the threat is acceptable. This process has been topic for many articles and research. In this regard, there is a gap in the literature discussing the Syrian issue as a part of the securitization act in Türkiye.

The majority of discussions in the literature about the connection between Turkey and Syria are based on political and historical developments. In addition, James Lutz and Brenda Lutz claim that terrorism, rather than Assad, is the primary issue between Turkey and Syria (Lutz & Lutz, 2017). Brenda Lutz and James Lutz explain one crucial issue of global security within the context of Turkish-Syrian ties rather than providing historical facts. There is no question that a wide range of other security-related topics affect Türkiye's actions in Syria. But there have been discussions on this subject as well over the years.

Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi wrote the book called *Syrien Requiem: The Civil War and Its Aftermath* in which the role of Türkiye in Syria is mentioned many times in an international perspective. Accordingly, between state and political community in Syria, the unique role of sectarianism in Syrian politics, the transformation of Middle Eastern and regional politics by the new roles played by Iran and Turkey, along with the United States' diminished role and Russia's return to a dominant role in the Middle East Turkey and Israel also have important interests in Syria and will pursue them. Rabinovich and Valensi herewith claim that Türkiye has serious interests in Syria and that all its operations are related to these interests (Rabinovich & Valensi, 2021). This study is a reflection of practical information in the area rather than theoretical.

Not to mention, this list may go on forever. In the realm of security studies, international peace and security, several theories and theorists have made contributions. However, observing this topic exclusively from a theoretical perspective result in major errors and a lack of analysis. Türkiye's operations in Syria provide as extremely good illustrations of how to interpret, assess, and analyze these disputes in a real-world context by taking all emotional theories into account. This essay adds to the body of literature by attempting to reflect these analyses while also looking at Türkiye's actions in Syria from a theoretical and temporal perspective.

Examples of Unresolved International Conflicts: The Case Between Türkiye and Syria

Türkiye and Syria have not had friendly relations since the 1970s as a result of Syria's support for the establishment of a Kurdish state on its borders. (*Türkiye-Suriye Siyasi İlişkileri (Political Affairs of Türkiye and Syria)*, n.d.). The Turkish state's integrity would be harmed by the creation of the Kurdish state. In order to preserve its cohesiveness, the Turkish government had to intervene. This is at least one argument used to support the Suleyman Shah Euphrates Operation (Kaya & Özalp, 2015). Around the Turkish border, there have been a number of terror attacks, particularly after 2000. Several of these turned into Turkish domestic issues ("Esad Ordusu Türkiye Sınırında," 2011). With the Arab Spring in 2011, Türkiye had some border attacks carried out by organizations like ISIL, Al Nusra, and Al Qaeda (*İŞİD: İnşallah İstanbul'u Da Alacağız*, 2014). The Arab Spring affected many other Middle Eastern countries in a different way although the aim seemed to be the same. (Borja W. GONZÁLEZ FERNÁNDEZ, 2022). Despite this, there was an attempt to portray Türkiye as if supporting these organizations on a global scale. It has been demonstrated that Türkiye will deploy ISIL, AL Nusra, and Al Qaeda to combat this development because of the threat posed by the creation of a Kurdish state. Moreover, it was attempted to portray Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a leader of the extreme Islamic movement ("Treason! Lawmaker Discovers It's Bad Idea to Accuse Erdogan of Supplying Sarin Gas to ISIS," 2015). Turkish soldiers felt compelled to conduct the Shah Euphrates Operation in February 2015 after a Turkish sergeant was killed by ISIL militants in July 2014 and confrontations between ISIL and YPG/PYD forces on Ayn al Arab directly threatened the Sulayman Shah tomb. Any threat to the Sulayman Shah tomb has been considered a matter of national security because it is the only area of land beyond Türkiye's borders that possesses exclave status. While the ISIL/YPG/PYD side continued to threaten and assault, Türkiye made the decision to start direct operations against ISIL bases. Turkish view holds that ISIL intended to open a front against Türkiye where conflicts can spiral out of hand in order to escalate the confrontation between PKK and Türkiye. ISIL/DAESH are on one side, while PKK/PYD/YPG are on the other, both of whom want to create an autonomous region. In this regard, Türkiye has

numerous justifications for entering Syria once more as it has the longest border (Adem ÜNÜVAR, 2022). Türkiye's motivation for launching Operation Euphrates Shield was all violent factions working together and assisting one another to achieve their goals.

As in the case of ISIS, PKK/YPG had been supported by international forces. Chaos in Türkiye was necessary and of high interest for all kinds of violent organizations to establish their autonomous reign on the Syrian border. In that sense, Türkiye had to struggle with two major security problems on and within its borders. The first was to eliminate PKK's armed forces internally by military means and methods. Secondly, it had to eliminate the capacity of ISIS/DAESH to threaten Türkiye (*Turkey vs. ISIS and PKK: A Matter of Distinction*, 2016). The fact that the Turkish Armed Forces and Free Syrian Army units known for receiving training from Turkish Intelligence carried out Operation Euphrates Shield in cooperation, is noteworthy. This cooperation can be explained by shared beliefs and a shared past. There is a reflection of brotherhood on both sides. The Assad government, however, described this as an intervention and a revolt. The Turkish government claims that Assad is carrying out a slaughter while they are aiding defenseless citizens who want to defend their country.

Another operation was Idlib, which began in 2017 and ran through the years up to 2020. As is well known, the US backs Türkiye against ISIS while also backing the PKK, YPG, and PYD against Türkiye. Hence, we are aware that these two nations' long-term interests are different. For instance, the Manbij Military Council under US leadership was founded by the Syrian Democratic Forces of the Assad regime in April 2016, however Türkiye declined to participate. The conflict over the SDF and Kurdish organizations between the US and Türkiye grew entrenched. Türkiye remained firm in expelling the YPG/PKK from Manbij after expelling ISIS fully. Yet, US Secretary for International Security Elissa Slotkin frequently asserted during the January 2017 Astana international peace talks that the US only targets ISIS. (Roy, 2017). During the Astana meeting, it was also decided to create a protracted de-escalation in the region between Idlib, the western countryside of Aleppo, northern Hama, and Latakia. That decision led to the Idlib Operation. Türkiye wanted to reflect this as an intention of the US to intervene in Syria. The US's interference in a regional issue and Türkiye's need to act as a regional actor were often brought up in media propaganda. Operation Idlib was finally launched by Türkiye by highlighting the significance of maintaining regional stability. The policies of Türkiye and the US-led NATO began to diverge at this point and Türkiye was suddenly left alone in the region.

In response to the Northern Syrian Federation declaration to be established in 2016 by Afrin, Jazeera, and Kobani, Türkiye decided to launch Operation Olive Branch, a military operation that targets the YPG (Allsopp & Wilgenburg, 2019). Türkiye was effective in containing the ISIS threat on its border in 2016 and 2017. Turkish media referred to the ISIS-created corridor in northern Syria as a "terror corridor." ("Mehmetçik 'Terör Koridoru' Hayalini Böyle Yıktı," 2022). To secure security at its borders, to put an end to the instability, and to safeguard its trade with Middle Eastern nations, the Turkish government sought to demolish this corridor. The Euphrates Shield and the Olive Branch Operation were both inspired by the worry that the corridor would reach the Mediterranean. In fact, the Syrian border security force, made up of the Syrian Democratic Forces, founded by the YPG, would be constructed and sent to the Turkish-Syrian and Iraqi-Syrian borders, according to an announcement made by the UN Tasking Force, which is led by the US, on January 13 (Stocker, 2018). The PYD/YPG and ISIS/DAESH were neutralized as a result of Türkiye's refusal to accept this decision, and on January 20, 2018, the Turkish Military Forces announced the beginning of an operation to ensure stability and safety along the Syrian-Turkish border. NATO in general and the US in particular opposed Türkiye's activities during this operation. On the other hand, Türkiye once more indicated a threat to its integrity and sovereignty. At this point, it should be noted that there will always be a segment in a country that wants to return to its former size if it was once significantly larger than it is today. This faction in Türkiye is much easier to persuade to support an intervention than contemporary nationalists.

The Syrian Democratic Forces unilaterally proclaimed autonomy in northern Syria towards the end of 2019. The Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces responded by

launching Operation Peace Spring. Türkiye was resolved to stop the establishment of the terror corridor. For the first time, during this operation, the US threatened the Turkish government to stop its actions in Syria. Either Türkiye would stop its aggressive attitude in Syria, or the US would ruin Turkish economy. Türkiye on the other hand was convinced that neither the NATO nor the US as a single state had a word to say in Syria. However, Türkiye has the longest border to Syria and faces therefore the most risk. To prevent any kind of terror attack or division, Türkiye used the classical international peace and security strategy by resorting to military action.

Towards the end of 2019 the Syrian Government supported by Iran, Russia, and violent groups such as the Hizbollah, decided to launch an operation called 'Dawn of Idlib2' against opposing groups (Gurca, 2019). Türkiye supported the National Syrian Army, the Turkistan Islamic Party, and the Hayat Tahrir as-Sham organization on the opposition's side. As Iran and Russia-backed militant groups blockaded some Turkish checkpoints in February 2020, the Turkish Armed Forces made the decision to launch an operation against the Syrian Military Forces in Idlib. The battle over Idlib turned into a public conflict between Türkiye and Russia. Dawn of Idlib was the name given to this operation by Russians. The Turkish administration felt satisfied that Moscow was not also involved in Syria. Türkiye began its talk about foreign forces being exploiting groups in 2020. It recognized that the only way to maintain ties based on a shared past was to help the Syrian people in their fight against this exploitation.

It would not be wrong to state that most states benefit from instability because it serves their interests (Wolfers, 2008). It has even been asserted that states can only exist if chaos is present. If not, the realist thesis contends that strong nations purposefully foment turmoil (Uslu, 2000). Historical materialists perceive this position as capitalist countries oppressing and exploiting less developed countries, in contrast to the realist perspective. Therefore, the weapon trade can be justified in terms of purposefully causing instability and crushing a less developed nation in the international system. These facts most clearly explain the Syrian conflict, the ongoing disarray, and the legal or illicit arms trade in this region ("Treason! Lawmaker Discovers It's Bad Idea to Accuse Erdogan of Supplying Sarin Gas to ISIS," 2015).

Syria, on the other hand, has undertaken efforts to construct the Irani-Syrian Pipeline to Europe as an international strategy since it is aware of the deliberately generated disarray and the weapon trade. This response is being taken because attacking Türkiye given its NATO membership would be risky (Ganser, 2020). As national states are seen as rational actors, deciding for their own interests, realists are convinced that chaos is inevitable (Uslu, 2000). The Syrian regime by establishing this pipeline used exactly this strategy. It decided to cooperate with Iran against Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. However, the devastation in Syria is the result of external interference. International Security Studies show that less developed countries generally act against equal or slightly better states but prefer not to push the limits. So did the Syrian regime against Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. When looking into the Suleyman Shah Operation, it is as well obvious that next to ISIS, and other radical groups, the official Syrian regime took also provocative and aggressive actions against the tomb (Anderson, 2016). This is of course another example showing that less developed countries take action against each other. But that the Assad regime as well supports ISIS/DAESH, Al Nusra, and Al Qaeda to provoke Türkiye, brings the issue to a completely different point (Herrmann, 2016). Such terror groups only care about their earnings. International Security Studies, therefore, talk about the necessity of their destruction, as well includes the support of countries to them. Imagining that even international security and peace organizations support these groups for their interest, is it possible to emphasize that similar groups never will disappear? (Ganser, 2020). The Sulayman Shah Tomb was displaced by Türkiye with NATO's support. Even though that seems to be a liberal cooperation, it is obviously about capital interests (Izci, 1998). Indeed, historical materialists underline the connection between violence and capitalism. The question is, to what extent capitalism is related to international organizations?

Following the Suleyman Shah operation and the Syrian regime's collaboration with ISIS/DAESH, Türkiye continued to target ISIS bases. The Syrian government had to maintain

regime security at this moment, which is a crucial topic of conversation in regard to international security challenges. And to obliged maintain human security, we had Türkiye (Uslu, 2000). One of the most important subjects is without doubt the protection responsibility of a state (Arcudi, 2006). In this case, we have Syria as well as Türkiye aiming to protect their regime, people, and security (Berkman & Holt, 2006). Even though the use of military power is a sign of capitalism, the realistic point of view mentions that states have to reach their targets by their own power (Allan, 2013). So did Türkiye during Operation Euphrates Shield. Thus, it will not be wrong to say that the international system is anarchic and there is no authority, not even international peace and security organizations, to prevent international war (Ganser, 2020).

During Operation Euphrates Shield, Türkiye's actions against so-called Islamic groups were appreciated as a NATO ally. However, not because of NATO's permanent support and love for Türkiye but because of organizational interests and the mutual aim to change the Syrian regime (Leukefeld, 2015)(*Amnesty International: Report 2010 Zur Weltweiten Lage Der Menschenrechte*, 2010). This is a sign for the capitalist system continuing to exist only if chaos is available. While Türkiye and other regional countries and organizations fight each other, international powers find a better place to reach sources and exploit them, so the historical materialism approach.

Operation Idlib was also about terrorism in general. As mentioned above, in April 2016 the Assad government established the Manbij Military Council. For the first time, Kurdish groups such as YPG/PYD/PKK were offensively supported by the US and NATO. There was Türkiye targeting ISIS/DAESH, Al Nusra, Al Qaeda, PYD, PKK, YPG, and the US targeting ISIS/DAESH, Al Nusra, Al Qaeda and supporting PYD, PKK, and YPG. Russia on the other hand seemed to be completely supportive to the Assad regime on the surface. In this case, it would be correct to mention that each state and organization in this territory fights for its own interests. For instance, Türkiye announced its aim during Operation Idlib to prevent uncontrolled immigration, which is of course a very important national issue (Mearsheimer, 2001). The amount of immigration is a sign of chaos and unsafety in a country. Therefore, International Security Studies put great importance on interconnected topics such as immigration, human security, environmental security, and social security. Not to mention that the permanent war in Syria caused huge immigration to all over the world but mostly Türkiye.

Due to its own interests, Türkiye educated and supported the Free Syrian Army during Operation Idlib against the Assad Regime. Türkiye is the only nation among those involved in the Syrian conflict that would be significantly impacted by unchecked immigration. Finally, this is what took place. The liberal strategy highlights how interdependence is a component of international relations. One example is the Free Syrian Army's collaboration with the Turkish military. Although it is impossible to conclude that this approach was successful, Türkiye did not wish to experience an uncontrolled population growth. Despite this, it is obvious that immigration is not the main goal or benefit of aiding and even training the Free Syrian Army. During Operation Idlib, Türkiye had then opportunity to also demonstrate its military power to the world. (Berkman & Holt, 2006).

Studies and historical evidence suggest a connection between a state's technological, military, and economic might and its global influence. Everything revolves around the capitalist system, which is fueled by rogue states, exploitation, the existence of terrorist organizations, and the trade in weapons. During operation Olive Branch, for the first time, Türkiye stayed completely alone and had a chance to show its military power to the international arena. This was of course due to the rising danger on its borders. As a regional country, Türkiye had to act according to its national interests and tried to do this for the first time without any support or cooperation. The only cooperation of Türkiye was the Free Syrian Army educated and trained in Türkiye (Ganser, 2020). As mentioned above, the realist theory is talking about a missing authority in this anarchic system (Findlay, 2002). The establishment of the UNITED Security Force under UN control was exactly a attempt to create an authority. It symbolized the peaceful international power stated in the realist approach. However, during the Olive Branch operation, this was visibly not true. Türkiye had to protect its borders as a self-defense action as stated in

the UN Charter Article 51. International powers on the other hand felt interrupted due to the danger to their own interests (UN, n.d.). Türkiye's actions during the Olive Branch Operation were completely legal. But its actions were against others' interests. Therefore it would be much more suitable to say that the historical materialists have the right prediction (Herring, 2017). Namely, capitalism is exploitation and can be seen in different forms, even under the leadership of an international peace force.

After learning that Türkiye was constructing a safe zone on October 6, 2019, US President Donald Trump famously wrote a letter to the Turkish President. He vowed to bring down the Turkish economy. Türkiye has the appearance of interfering with Syrian rights and merely seeking to topple the Assad government. President Erdogan in particular and Türkiye in general were securitized on the global stage.

Now Türkiye was completely alone in the region and had to fight for its interests. Operation Idlib 2020 was as well not a struggle to keep international security, but more to exclude Türkiye from the region and especially from Idlib. A Syria in chaos, is much more useful to international powers. Within the framework of international security, Türkiye as the only country having such a long border with Syria, had responsibility for human security, environment security, social security, regional security, and border security. Of course, all facts are effective in keeping international security, but the question is if all interfering countries want to keep international security in reality.

Conclusion

Overall, it can be said that despite more than 200 years of debate, achieving international security, particularly in Middle Eastern Nations with a wealth of natural resources to exploit, is still a long way off. A component of the realistic, liberal, and historical materialist approach is evident in all of Türkiye's actions since 2011. It is neither possible to conclude that Türkiye acts only interest-oriented, nor is it right to deduce a pure intention to keep transnational peace and security. Theoretical discussions logically reflect this problematic. By simply studying some of the actions of the current Turkish administration, it is easy to see all kinds of theoretical discussions throughout history, in action. All operations are entangled with the aforementioned methods that have developed over time. Without a doubt, powerful states frequently find themselves taking advantage of less developed nations. One of these nations with abundant rich natural resources and no understanding of how to harness them is Syria. This study focused solely on analyzing historically established international security approaches by observing the situation in Syria. It is sufficient to grasp historical occurrences and Western dominance for more than 200 years by examining merely contemporary issues. One should be able to compare previous crises in this region within the context of global security and peace after reading this essay. The repetition of events becomes obvious by digging into historical data about Syria and Türkiye, including information about global influence. Therefore, reading and understanding historical events is vital since it serves as a guide for potential future events as well as a record of past occurrences. One fact that is taught by past experience for instance is how to keep dominant power. Some international tactics that have been developed as a result of previous battles and wars, can help strong nations maintain their dominance. One of these tactics is to encourage anarchy and terrorism. During the whole article, it was mentioned that terrorism is the most affective factor causing conflict between Syria and Türkiye. Furthermore chaos, is of essence for international powers interfering in Syria. As a result, it becomes necessary to pause and maintain safety and peace. However, it can be concluded loudly that none of these interruptions resulted in peace. Established international organizations that appeared to maintain peace and security, such as the NATO or the UN, were unable to do so. The cause is their interests, as described in the realistic approach, not the frailty of these organizations. There will never be security in the Middle East or in any other exploited nation with abundant natural resources as long as strong governments and organizations behave solely in the interests of their own national security and global peace. Instead, colonized nations will never be able to match the social and economic standing of exploiting nations. This might be seen as the key lesson learned from studying historical occurrences like those in this article.

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