

Differentiated Integration in the EU Regarding the Migration Crisis: Disputes Between the Member States

Buket Ökten Sipahioğlu 

Ankara University, Faculty of Political
Sciences, Department of Politics and
Economics, Ankara, Türkiye,
buket_okten@yahoo.com



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Abstract: The European Union (EU) has been challenged by several crises lately. In addition to Brexit, the Euro crisis, and the migration crisis; global issues such as the coronavirus pandemic and the Russian attack on Ukraine affected the EU. The migration crisis, on the one hand, differs from the above-mentioned crises with one remarkable feature. The member states have no real consensus about forming a common migration policy. Besides, for geographic reasons, some member states put much more burden on immigrants. Agreeing on immigration becomes impossible for the border countries and transit countries on the migration route. The paper argues that, unlike the other crises of the EU, the migration crisis reinforces EU integration in such a way that disputes between member states prevent the EU from making institutional changes about the issue. The study results assume that the other above-mentioned crises, on the other hand, stimulated institutional change throughout the EU. In light of this information, this study evaluates, using a method of relevant literature review and comparing the arguments of the researchers, how the migration issue became a subject of dispute between member states by exemplifying the 2015 crisis.

Keywords: European Union, Crisis, Migration Crisis, Differentiated Integration, Member States

1. Introduction

The EU started to be mentioned as 'the union with polycrises' (Schimmelfennig, 2022) regarding the overlapping crises recently. In addition to Brexit, the Euro crisis, and the migration crisis; global issues such as the coronavirus pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine affected the EU. On the other hand, the migration crisis differs from the above-mentioned crises with one remarkable feature. The member states have no real consensus about forming a common migration policy. This paper argues that, unlike the other crises of the EU, the migration crisis reinforces the EU's integration in such a way that disputes between member states prevent the EU from making institutional changes about the issue. The other crises mentioned, on the other hand, stimulated institutional change throughout the union. It can be suggested that the failure to establish a common European migration policy is the crisis of the policy, not the crisis of migrants (den Heijer, Rijpma, Spijkerboer, 2016: 28).

Differentiated integration has, on the one hand, both theoretical and practical links to crises in European integration. After the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, different levels of integration for migrants were established. This means that different EU laws apply to different countries, depending on how close the country is to the EU. Some countries that are not in the EU are considered "associated states" of the Schengen system, which means they participate in the European Economic Area (EEA) and have access to the same legal measures as other EU countries (Filliez, 2008). Silga (2022: 910) argues that EU migration policy is one area of EU policymaking in which differentiated integration has found its clearest expression. D'Appollonia (2019) puts it one step further and states that [t] the EU's immigration policy excellently illustrates a system of differentiated integration. Moreover, although it is still difficult to appraise the effect of differentiated integration in the circumstances of the migration crisis, the differentiation itself has brought about a high level of derangement in the functioning of the EU migration policy.

The 2015 migration crisis is a crucial example of how EU member states acted differently for their interests. The most recent debates in EU politics focused on how integration would affect the Union itself. For now, it is not possible to make concrete judgments about how the EU can handle this migration movement and how its integration will be affected. Still, raising questions about the issue is important to enrich the literature and advance the discussion. The latest articles and books or chapters shed light on the discussion, like the studies by Markakis (2020), Turhan and Yıldız (2022), Comte (2022), and Schimmelfennig (2022). While the EU has tried to overcome the crisis with some forms of reallocation or the new Dublin Regulation, Scipioni (2018) claims that this classification is not enough to describe this policy area at this time. This is especially true in the case of migration. The timing is right for a discussion on whether the Union's current structure is sustainable in the future, considering the confrontations ahead in some policy areas. Additionally, opinions such as Zeitlin (2019) claim that the migration crisis has created a break between member states of Central and Eastern Europe, which are unwilling to share the burden of hosting refugees with the core countries of the northwest and the frontline countries on the south-eastern borders.

Considering the above-mentioned facts, this study contributes to recent debates about the EU, which struggles with various kinds of crises. Differing from previous studies, this study evaluates differentiated integration with one policy area in detail rather than putting forward all policy areas together. Furthermore, the study analyzes this one policy area of the Union—migration policy—by exemplifying the 2015 migration crisis of the Union concretely. With this motivation, the study aims to promote a deeper analysis of the migration policy of the EU and further differentiation in this policy area.

Differentiated integration, which offers to apply different policies partially to some member or nonmember countries in the EU, is defined by many EU scholars as the prevention of a possible disintegration of the EU. Moreover, the migration crisis is one of the most important key policy areas in which EU members disagree and cannot find common ground. This study, reviewing the relevant literature and comparing the arguments of the researchers, evaluates the most recent debates and argues that, unlike the other crises of the EU, the migration crisis reinforces EU integration in the manner that disputes between member states prevent the EU from making institutional changes about the issue. The study consists of three parts. In the first part, the conceptual framework of differentiated integration is analyzed. The definitions of several scholars about differentiated integration in the EU are examined in the first part of the study. In the second part, the migration crisis in the EU is explained. The historical development of the EU's migration policy is also detailed and clarified in the second part. The third part is about the effect of the migration crisis on the differentiated integration of the EU. How the migration policy as a key area is differentiated, affected, and has possible results is also discussed in this part. The final discussion and remarks are given in the conclusion part of the study.

2. Conceptual Framework of Differentiated Integration

Differentiated integration is one of the most debated topics in the EU literature recently. Since it is hard for 27 member countries to apply identical policy rules, it seems preferable to make them choose some policy applications according to their interests. These different model proposals sparked many discussions, with various challenges in applying them. Recent hot debates about differentiated integration are about Brexit, the struggle with the economic crisis, and surely the migrant crisis. These challenges made the EU decide on some different policy rules to prevent possible more devastating effects of the crisis, like disintegration. Before getting deeper into differentiated integration and its effects on the migration crisis, the term needs to be clarified. According to de Witte et al. (2001), differentiation refers to “the facilitation and accommodation of a degree of difference between Member States or regions about what would be otherwise common union policies”.

Leruth and Lord (2015: 761) state that the existing literature on differentiated integration is miscellaneous. It is often believed that differentiated integration is a new policy tool for the EU, which is not correct. In the 1980s, Wallace and Ridley (1985) described types of differentiated integration not less than today's researchers can. These types include two-speed Europe and gradual integration. Stubb (1996), on the other hand, in the 1990s classified many types of integration he identified throughout the three extents of time, space, and policy. Differentiation can be instrumental in aiding new member states in building the necessary implementation capability, they are temporarily granted an opt-out from

certain aspects of the *Acquis Communautaire*. Constitutional differentiation has been given high importance and hope, which have been emphasized by authors many times. Some scholars, such as Alesina et al. (2005) contend that it boosts efficiency by lessening intergovernmental disagreement, speeding up decision-making, and assisting in the adaptation of EU policies to diverse national preferences. Others, such as De Blok and De Vries (2023), Schraff, and Schimmelfennig (2020), on the other hand, emphasize how heterogeneity fosters legitimacy by shielding member states from EU hegemony and meddling in crucial policy areas. He summarizes differentiation in the EU by stating that since the early 1990s, deepening has frequently been accompanied by differentiation: as EU policies have become more integrated, they have stopped holding in all member states equally. The two most notable instances of deepening-induced divergence are the eurozone and the Schengen region. Widening has also been a significant factor in the distinction. Each accession treaty includes temporary provisions that exempt the new member states from the immediate and full application of EU laws (Schimmelfennig, 2015).

Some rules and policies are applied to some members of the union, whereas some rules and policies apply to non-member partners of the union. Examples can be given for these partial applications, such as monetary policy, internal market rules, and the Schengen regime. Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012: 292) clarify these kinds of policies and thus differentiated integration, as the territorial extension of EU membership and EU rule validity are incongruent and rare cases of differentiated (or flexible) integration. The other scholars that define differentiated integration are Andersen and Sitter, Leruth and Lord (2015), Warleigh-Lack (2015), Cianciara and Szymański, Leuffen, and Schimmelfennig (2023), Hooghe & Marks (2022); Schimmelfennig et al. (2022) Schimmelfennig & Winzen (2023), Kölliker (2001); Dyson and Sepos (1996), Stubb (1996), Andersen, and Sitter (2006); Genschel et al (2023).

Andersen and Sitter (2006) quote Lenin and suggest that European integration constitutes a regime that is 'European in form but national in content'. As well as long theoretical and conceptional definitions, this short, paraphrased sentence summarizes the logic of differentiation in the EU regarding the desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of countries.

According to Schimmelfennig (2022), differentiation has established itself as a crucial and frequently essential facilitator of integration. Major institutional and policy changes in the EU continue to need the approval of the European Parliament, intergovernmental unanimity, and national ratification in each member state, providing several veto points. The diversity of member state preferences and capabilities and internal opposition to EU policies have expanded concurrently, increasing the likelihood that veto players may exercise their rights. Under these circumstances, reaching a consensus on the uniform implementation or change of EU policy has become increasingly challenging. Differentiated integration minimizes the likelihood that member nations will veto an agreement by accommodating international heterogeneity and eliminating veto issues. It provides member states with the option to reject EU regulations. If there were no differentiated integration in the EU, there would be no common currency or free-travel zone throughout the EU since the member states would not deepen their integration without being blocked.

This exercise can be especially useful for an EU that has officially started developing a uniform immigration and asylum policy. The vast challenges that this ambitious project entails can be made even more onerous by the presence of major disparities across member states in terms of migration realities and orientations, as experience thus far reveals. An output of this comparative exercise could be a determination of which distinctions are more significant and how they affect national postures toward shared policies. Finding out what lessons may be drawn from the experiences of those nations who came before them as receiving nations could be another result (Arango, 2012: 45).

Some or more of the member states could expend leadership in any given 'community' if the future of EU differentiated integration appears to be a core of a various number of member states participating in riding behavior groups. However, while some areas of policy, as previously mentioned, still call for more coordinated integration, such as security and defense or immigration and refugee policy, others, such as the Eurozone, call for greater decentralization (Schmidt, 2020).

3. The European Union Migration Policy and Migration Crisis

For many years, Europe has been a desirable destination for migrants. This is a watershed moment in history, as Europeans could control international migration flows until the 1960s. Europe was earlier an immigrant-sending region, then became an immigrant-receiving country in the following two decades after World War II, although a handful of countries experienced it much earlier. Nevertheless, Europe's current array as an immigration-receiving region was clarified because of the gradual enthalpy of national migration transitions, a few of which are still ongoing. More national transitions are most likely in the years to come (Arango, 2012: 45). Moreover, when it comes to immigration, Europe is one of the most active continents. Thus, the migration policy of the EU can be counted as one of the most important and key areas, and crises in this policy area require urgent resolution. Regarding the crises in key policy areas such as the Eurozone, migration policy, or Brexit, it can be questioned whether the EU should be deeply differentiated or not concerning the possible scenarios in case the member countries put into effect their national arrangements. In one sense, it is arguable whether common institutional arrangements and policies are required for all policy areas in the EU, like the abovementioned key policy areas, including migration policy. Differentiation, therefore, can be perceived as an understandable reaction by the member states, which prioritize their national interests.

Merely, the migration crisis is associated with the 2015 migration movement, when many immigrants and asylum seekers tried to reach Europe via the Mediterranean and Balkans to seek asylum from EU countries. Since then, the migration crisis, or more precisely, migration as a policy crisis, has held the board of the EU. Although the entrance of more than 1 million people into EU territories is perceived by the EU as catastrophic, some scholars like den Heijer, Rijpma, and Spijkerboer (2016) highlight that a million is not a big number compared to the recent population of the EU, which was 446.8 million at the end of 2022 (Population and Population Change Statistics, 2023). With the member states' unwillingness and failure to organize the migration flows effectively, the common asylum system of the EU collapsed. Germany suspended the Dublin Regulation one-sidedly for Syrians in August 2015 (Fox, 2023). The then-German Chancellor presumed that the other states would do the same, but this was not the case.

Unexpectedly, the German government could not remain unresponsive to the intense refugee flow to its Bavaria district and Austrian borders, so Germany had to temporarily reinstate border controls at the internal Schengen border with Austria. Followingly, Austria reinstated border controls, which Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Italy, and Sweden adopted. In November 2015, Sweden followed suit, prompting additional measures in Denmark that increased internal controls but did not reintroduce them.

According to Schimmelfennig (2023), in addition to domestic politics, the migrant crisis was also shaped by the intense spreading of disagreements between the countries that were affected. However, compared to the Euro crisis, the risks and costs of disintegration were less, and member states were able to dominate the influx of migrants by combining internal policies with externalization (as in the EU-Türkiye Deal). Additionally, unlike the European Central Bank during the Euro Crisis, the EU's asylum and border control administrations required significant supranational authorities to promote and support integrative crisis reactions (Schimmelfennig, 2018). Everyone can probably agree that the UK and Ireland do not need to reconsider their outsider status because they are willing Schengen non-members and geographically far from the origin of the migration flows. The less-impacted Schengen area member states consequently objected to increased integration. Insiders lacked the support to further integrate, while outsiders lacked the motivation to join (www.ec.europa.eu). According to D'Appollonia (2019), member states differ significantly not only in their approach to the crisis but also in how they reform migration policy. In recent years, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has revealed many shortcomings following the Arab Spring and the crises in Syria and Libya. The Dublin system has put unsustainable pressure on Mediterranean countries within the EU and led to the collapse of the asylum system in Greece, Malta and partly in Italy and Spain (Vara, 2023). The 2015 refugee crisis showed that the system was not adapted to the growing number of refugees arriving in EU member states. Reform of the Dublin regulations or special resettlement arrangements has faced opposition from a group of mainly Central and Eastern European member states that are not affected by migration due to the outbreak of war in Ukraine or just simple transit countries. This group has traditionally opposed

non-European migration for ideological and cultural reasons. However, Mediterranean countries debate the criteria and mechanisms for determining the country responsible for reviewing asylum applications. As a result of the crisis, "the already multi-layered system has become even more chaotic as EU member states responded to this crisis by abusing existing legal elements to facilitate flexibility. Silga (2022) argues that the lack of agreement between Member States can also be explained by the lack of consensus among member states. Deep disagreement – even a "rift" – exists between Member States over the values on which this policy is based.

Scipioni (2018) argues that, during the 2015 crisis, the EU migration policy became more and more unsustainable due to a lack of institutional strength, weak monitoring, low solidarity, and low harmonization. Additionally, because Europe lacks strong institutions and has internal borderless areas, inflows can advance into a state and trigger unpredictably large-scale policy responses. When Schengen rules allow member states to reintroduce border controls, the effectiveness of such a move and the long-term effects of "one of the EU's most blessed achievements" are by no means favorable. The above-mentioned domino effect resulted from Germany reinstating border checks at its borders with Austria in September 2015.

The approach that human mobility should be securitized, prevented, and controlled is very clearly laid out in the EU's New Migration and Asylum Pact (Common European Asylum System, 2020a), where border management and return procedures are frequently emphasized. Recently, the Union has been externalizing its security-oriented approach to non-EU third countries, aiming to transform norms and standards regarding border management in cooperation with third countries in line with EU policies. In this context, the EU has placed Türkiye, which is a key destination and transit country in terms of irregular migration, at the center of its cooperation dialog. The clearest and most obvious reflection of this approach is the EU-Türkiye Deal of March 18, 2016, mainly on the prevention of irregular migration and the prevention of crossings to Europe (Yıldız, Turhan, 2022).

4. How does the migration crisis affect differentiated integration?

Migration is one of the most important policy areas that shows how Member States can be differentiated from each other. Schuessler et al. (2023) conducted a study about public opinion on differentiated integration. In their study, Schuessler et al. observed a comparatively high level of support for optional policy areas. However, there are still disputes between Member States. Such that respondents in Germany and Ireland are generally opposed to this notion, it is strongly supported in Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and particularly in Poland (where net support is under 50%), as well as to a lesser extent in France. Some Dutch respondents may favor delaying additional moves toward a fiscal union on the differentiated integration side, while many conservative Poles may object to shared policies regarding immigration or minority rights. This case study demonstrates that, aside from the member countries, the public in the aforementioned countries tends to stay far from finding common ground.

There is not a uniform migration policy that is adhered to by the member states, which distinguishes the migration crisis from other policy issues the EU faces. The EU's migration policy is made more difficult because of the member states' disagreements, which prevent them from coming together on a common issue. One could argue that the EU's immigration policy articulates the logic of differentiated integration very effectively. The EU member states' behavior in deciding their immigration policies led to a sharp division within the Union regarding the creation of a common immigration policy. According to F. Biermann et al. (2019), the choices of EU member states to promote political reforms primarily reflect the characteristics of states in the context of global mutuality. For instance, the migration crisis pitted governments that were severely impacted by migration flows against those that were largely unaffected. Since there was no agreement on a shared problem that should be avoided by all, member states' priorities in the migration crisis were asymmetrical.

The 2015 migration crisis somehow showed the differentiation between the member states in such a way that there is a lack of a system of burden sharing among member states that would support the border countries (Schimmelfennig, 2022). Geographically and by nature, immigrants from Northern Africa and the Middle East affect Mediterranean countries. The other prominent EU member countries could not take the necessary steps at that time to share the burden of the migrant crisis with the Mediterranean countries, namely Italy, Greece, Malta, and Spain. Besides, the countries that can be counted as secondary destinations for the migrants, like Germany and Sweden, are also affected by the

migratory movements. The countries that are not located on the migration routes or are transit countries do not feel responsible for sharing the burden. Flexible solidarity' was put forth as a substitute in 2016 by the Central and Eastern European opponents of corrective reallocation. However, unlike its successor notion, "effective conditionality," it does not imply a formal division of the Schengen area into two groups subject to various asylum laws, Schimmelfennig (2022) argues. Instead, it means that each member state needs to decide on specific forms of contribution on their own while taking their expertise and capabilities into account. Any distribution method should also be voluntary.

After the adoption of The Amsterdam Treaty, the application of legal measures around migration showed itself as a variation in the territorial scope. According to Comte and Lavenex (2022), this means that all EU legal measures are not applied to all Member States in the same way. Moreover, these legal measures regarding migration also apply to non-EU Member States. These states are in the Schengen System but are not EU members, namely Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. These countries are also part of the Dublin System and are liable for the different criteria of the migration policy.

Giorgia Papagianni (2006) puts it out like this: "[T]o the extent that migration-related issues are concerned, Member States have always managed to secure their central role as well as to reserve a predominant position in that area". Further clarifying Papagianni's statement that, in general, the EU member states are in favor of cooperation regardless, it should be kept in mind that the entry and residence of foreigners in the national territory of each member state is primarily sensed as a sovereign right, the exercise of which is based on principally national economic, social, and political considerations. With the perception of the migration issue as a security constituent, it is not surprising that the EU countries are reluctant to integrate migration issues into the EU institutional framework.

Decision-making was not necessarily related to the EU's inability to handle the migrant flow, according to Börzel and Risse (2018). Between the end of September 2015 and the end of April 2016, the member states agreed on a comprehensive set of cooperative measures aimed at managing future refugee flows and "sharing the responsibility" for refugees who had already entered EU territory. The legal foundation for the EU's single asylum and immigration policy served as the basis for the choice. Several billions of euros in funding have been allocated as part of the main measures to help member states and other countries manage. The adoption of a common list of safe countries of origin, the relocation of 120,000 people who require international protection, the establishment of new hotspots in Italy and Greece, as well as the allocation of several billion euros to various funds, are among the main measures. There will also be more hotspots created in other European nations, such as Türkiye and Greece. As a result, the inadequate refugee processing systems in both countries were overwhelmed and waded through by asylum seekers. Large secondary movements toward Northern Europe resulted from this. The Dublin system, which held border nations responsible for any asylum seekers who entered the Schengen area through their soil, eventually fell apart completely. Or, to put it another way, it was so heavy that it toppled (Menendez, 2016: 388).

The disputes about some policy areas like migration issue, which this study focuses on, can be associated with not only differentiated integration but also graded membership, which, in a study declared by Schimmelfennig (2016) in the last years like: "not only has European integration increased in depth and breadth, but it has also grown increasingly distinct and long-lasting." The EU's system of graded membership has become more precise and now covers the whole of Europe. Graded membership is most frequently the unintended result of international disagreement over the expansion and deepening of integration. Giving nations a perspective that contradicts or is unsuitable for more supranational policy integration with a tailored perspective, resolves such disagreement. A state's proximity to the core members' standard for good administration determines whether further integration is permitted or not, where it sits in the system of graded membership, and the conditions under which it advances toward the core. The fundamental principle forbids further integration for nations that fall short of the good governance criteria. However, communities and governments that perform better than the core do not value comprehensive supranational integration.

A France-Italy dispute in November 2022 about Italy's "closed port" policy towards non-governmental organization (NGO) ships that rescue migrants in the Mediterranean caused a rift with France (Thomas and Fonte, 2022). Moreover, the dispute between Hungary and Poland could not be solved at the latest EU Summit in June 2023. Poland and Hungary refused to budge in their stalemate with the other 25 EU

leaders, making it impossible for EU leaders to find a solution to the acrimonious issue of reforming the bloc's immigration laws.

By a qualified majority, EU home affairs ministers earlier this month approved the introduction of mandatory migrant relocation, with countries that refuse to accept them being charged a fee of €20,000 per person. Poland and Hungary were against the accord (Fox, 2023). At the two-day summit meeting in Brussels, the capital of Belgium, EU leaders could not accept a joint statement on migration.

It is crucial to note that no one should expect to apply the same policies in the same way to their national sovereignties. Wealthy and old member states share the burden of some policies differently than the new and weaker countries of the Union. Winzen (2016) argues that opt-outs from Member States have long been a common occurrence in the Union's legislative procedure. Furthermore, despite being best viewed as a solution to certain Member States' capacity issues before Maastricht, they have lately mostly been the product of the EU's wealthy and nationally focused countries' demands for sovereignty. While the legal covering of the "traditional" EU competencies in the market and agriculture has become more consistent, differentiation has dramatically increased in tandem with the ongoing European integration of key state functions, such as internal and external security and monetary policy.

5. Final Remarks

The EU has been challenged by crises lately, namely Brexit, the Euro, and the migration crises. Some scholars lately have called the EU poly-crises, like Zeitlin and Schimelfennig (2022). Differentiated integration, namely the adoption of EU policies differently by the member states, in which some member states integrate further and some do not accept to adopt several policies, differing from the others, the migration issue is rather sensational for the member states since it has been perceived as an issue of security and can be threatening to their national security. Because of this reason, the formation of a common migration policy for the EU is a long-discussed issue. Therefore, this paper argues that the migration crisis reinforces EU integration in such a way that disputes between member states prevent the EU from making institutional changes about the issue. The migration crisis started in 2015 when many immigrants and asylum seekers tried reaching Europe via the Mediterranean and Balkans to seek asylum from EU countries. Some countries, like Greece and Italy, had more responsibility for the migrant flows, which resulted in conflicts between the member states about the unfair share of the burden of refugees. The migration crisis, therefore, is said to be a policy crisis rather than a crisis that occurs because of the migrants. The national measures and externalization alternatives of the migration-related policy outcomes make this migration crisis different than the other crises that the EU has been experiencing. The EU-Türkiye Agreement can be counted as one of the national measures and externalization alternatives for the 2015 migration crisis.

Several scholars have been studying differentiated integration in the EU. Differentiation, as a synonym for differentiated integration, means applying some policy areas to only some member states, excluding others. This is crucial for a supranational structure such as the EU, concerning the fact that it consists of 27 member countries, each of which is heterogeneous in terms of economic, social, and other factors. In this sense, forming common policies in these policy areas seems impossible within the Union. Migration is presumably the most important and noticeable subject for the EU, about which it is not possible to form a common policy. Scholars even argue that migration is the best example to clarify differentiated integration in the EU. So much so that changing disputes between the member states according to their interests makes this area of policy far from coming together. Although the scholars put forward different views about the changing disputes about the migration issue under the framework of differentiated integration, they strike a balance about one issue: migration is perceived as a security threat, and member states regard this issue as harming the national threat.

Taking the 2015 migration crisis as an example, this study argues that the above-mentioned differential disputes among the member states prevent the EU from making institutional changes to the migration policy. Greece and Italy took on the burden of the refugees in the 2015 crisis, whereas Hungary and Denmark overtly refused to share the burden of the vulnerable people fleeing from war and persecution. Germany welcomed those vulnerable people aiming to enter its borders, assuming that other EU member states would do so, which was not the case. As Vara (2022) puts it, flexible solidarity does not

necessarily lead to better protection of asylum seekers and the development of greater solidarity between Member States. Greater differences are unlikely to allow the EU to address the shortcomings currently faced by CEAS until there is an agreement between member states on the implementation of the principle of unanimity. If flexible unanimity is eventually accepted by member states in its current form, this will introduce a high level of complexity in the administration of asylum and migration policies, leading to difference increases. In one sense, having several crises lately cannot be suggested to form a more differentiated integration. In another sense, the crises would not bring a less differentiated Union as long as the member states remained distant from agreeing on some policy areas like migration policy.

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