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THE VIEW AND THE ATTITUDE OF ALLIES HIGH COMMISSIONERS TOWARD ISTANBUL DURING THE DECLARATION OF NATIONAL PACT

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Abstract

The Ottoman State entered into a new process with the Mondros Armistice Treaty in which it was declared defeat from the World War I and the unoccupied part of the country were subjected to occupation movements of the Allied Powers. During this period, while Ottoman Government was trying to react against occupations by diplomatic channels, it had diplomatic negotiations with the Allied Powers, especially Britain at Paris Peace Conference where the future of the State was to be determined. But despite the attitude of the government, with the passing of Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia, the organization of resistance in Anatolia against the occupations had put a struggle for Allies that they had never thought of in the Near East. This was also the beginning of a new era in which that would change the post-war Allied plans completely for Anatolia and Middle East.

Although the high commissioners in Istanbul warned their governments about the resistance, the Allied Powers ignored the “*Kemalist Resistance*” in the first place and this caused waste of time necessary for Turks to enforce the peace conditions without using force.

Especially against the adoption of the National Pact in the Ottoman Parliament in January 1920, the reactions of the Allied High Commissioners and the Allied governments in the aftermath of these efforts soon brought new developments in Anatolia and the Near East for both sides. As a matter of fact, the occupation Istanbul which was held to give lesson to Kemalists at the time of London negotiations became an instrument for the speed up the developments that would lead to the emergence of a new national state in Istanbul and caused the resistance itself to find an independent place.

Keywords: National Pact, Istanbul, High Commissioner, Parliament, London Conference

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Öz

Osmanlı Devleti, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan yenik ayrıldığıının ilan edildiği Mondros Ateşkes Antlaşması ile yeni bir sürece girmiş, ülkenin işgal görmemiş kısımları Müttefik devletlerin işgal hareketlerine maruz kalmıştı. Osmanlı Hükümeti bu süre boyunca bir yandan işgallere karşı diplomatik kanallardan tepki gösterme gayreti içerisinde bulunurken, diğer taraftan Devletin kaderinin belirleneceği Paris Barış Konferansı'nda başta İngiltere olmak üzere Müttefik devletlerden medet umar bir halde diplomatik görüşmelerini sürdürüyordu. Ancak hükümetin bu tutumuna rağmen, Anadolu'da başlayan işgallere karşı Mustafa Kemal'in Anadolu'ya geçmesi ile Anadolu'da direnişi örgütlemesi Müttefikleri Yakındoğu'da hiç ummadıkları bir çıkmazın içerisine sokmuştu. Bu, savaş sonrası Müttefik planların Ortadoğu ve Anadolu için baştan sona değişmesine sebep olacak yeni bir dönemin de başlangıcıydı.

İstanbul'da bulunan işgal yüksek komiserlerinin aylar öncesinden hükümetlerini bu direnişe karşı uyandırma gayretlerine rağmen, Müttefiklerin "*Kemalist direnişi*", ilk etapta görmezden gelmeleri, sonrasında ise küçümsemeleri, Türklere barış hükümlerini güç kullanmadan uygulatmaları için gerekli olan zaman diliminin de boşa gitmesine neden olmuştu. Özellikle Ocak 1920'de Misak-ı Milli'nin Osmanlı Parlamentosunda kabul edilmesine karşı, başta Müttefik yüksek komiserlerinin ve sonrasında Müttefik hükümetlerin reaksiyonları kısa zamanda her iki taraf için de Anadolu ve Yakındoğu'da yeni bir döneme kapı arayacak gelişmeleri beraberinde getirmişti. Nitekim Londra görüşmelerinin devam ettiği sırada Kemalist kuvvetlere ders vermek amacıyla gerçekleştirilen İstanbul'un işgali, Anadolu'nun bağrında yeni bir ulusal devletin ortaya çıkmasına neden olacak gelişmelerin hızlanmasına, direniş merkezinin kendisine her hali ile bağımsız bir yer bulmasına vesile olmuştu.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Misak-ı Milli, İstanbul, Yüksek Komiser, Parlamento, Londra Konferansı

Introduction

The Ottoman State encountered the danger of losing its territory based on the sharing treaties with allies after the defeat in in the first World war of the twentieth century. Despite signing the armistice treaty which signifies the realization of leaving the war, the governors were in a hurry that they couldnot control the lands that were not occupied. The occupation forces started to occupy the the lands, specially Istanbul and the other Anatolian parts that were not occupied, this occupation process ignited the wick of a long, intense and libertarian struggle that no one could ever predict. Undoubtly, the decisions taken during the Erzurum and

Sivas congresses in which the programme of national resistance in Anatolia was written under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal had influences and contribution to this process.

The emergence of a national resistance in this form that was increasingly shaped against the occupations in Anatolia disturbed Allies, especially England. When the Paris Peace congress was organized to determine the conditions of peace treaties to be signed by the defeated World War 1 and create a new world organisation, the Allies were not aware of the importance of the national resistance against the occupations they had launched in Anatolia.

Although Allies High Commissioners in Istanbul, with the occupation of Izmir sent telegrams and reports full of warning about taking urgent precautions against the resistance which was taking shape every day in Anatolia, the bureaucrats and the diplomats and military experts who were trying to set a policy for the future of Middle East and Near East were not in the alarm level about this issue.

In 1919, when the occupation of Izmir started the great states who saw themselves as the proprietors of determining the future of Anatolia and Near East sent international delegations to Anatolia to help them in their decisions. Although the delegations expressed many points in the reports they prepared after long works they could not transfer the anger against occupations in Anatolia as a result they could not attract the attention of command centres.

Istanbul Government and the major countries that were responsible for the occupations and their representatives in Istanbul entered in 1920 with great ambiguity brought by the above mentioned conditions. Therefore, as the peace treaty issues with the Ottoman State which was like an endless story in 1920 started to occupy the European and Turkish public opinion, the resistance movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia, started to turn upside down the plans of the Allies who had sharing politics on Ottoman lands. In particular, Mustafa Kemal began organizing the resistance against occupations in many parts of Anatolia, especially in Cukurova region, and began to announce the voice of Anatolia to the world public as well as establishing contact with some Arab leaders in the Middle East, especially the French authorities, diplomatically. This unpredictable situation for the Allies, began to accumulate in front of the policy making bodies in Istanbul, about how their regional plans and plenty of telegrams and reports that were sent to their governments by increasing concern of occupation high commissioners. Admiral J. De Robeck sent a long report to Lord Curzon, evaluating the latest developments and the probable predictions and de Robeck stated that as today a different Turkey was against the Allies when compared with the Turkey that signed the treaty and he also pointed out that although the allies needed new methods to overcome the problems, they did not find any solutions, the biggest factor that caused this was the delay of peace treaty with Turkey. In the de Robeck's report, it was very difficult to impose the conditions of peace treaty to the Turks without using force compared to eight months ago and beside the resistance

in Anatolia was supported by many officers, civilians, enlightened and politicians hence it showed a tendency of hostile attitude towards allies and that the new situation would have great difficulties for the Allies with the spread of resistance. Therefore, de Robeck mentioned that it was essential for the Allied forces to build a consensus on what should be immediately taken against the newly emerging situation and he also stated that against the political superiority and prestige of the leaders of Turkish National Movement, it was for the benefit of England to lay the peace treaty in front of the Turks without a moment's delay¹.

When the warning in the report that was sent by Admiral de Robeck and briefly *"If it goes like this, the situation will become almost uncontrollable for them in Anatolia and Near East"* was put together with the other evaluations and intelligence reports sent from centers in the region including Istanbul, British official authorities understood that they were faced with the urgency of doing something. There is no doubt that at the beginning of this perception was Lloyd George who was the one directing the English diplomacy and Lord Curzon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Especially in the current conditions, the provisions of any peace treaty to be signed with the Turks were now very difficult compared to eight months ago, revealing the new dimension of Turkish resistance in Anatolia. In the absence of authority, it meant the emergence of a new authoritarian power that the Allies had not foreseen. The news about the Faisal movement in Syria slowly started to be against the Allies were added to all these, getting a move on for the Allies to establish peace in the Near East would help them to solve the difficulties rather than questioning their existence in the region².

Eventually, under the light of these reports the Allies would take action to find a solution for the peace issue in Near East and Anatolia. The decision taken by England was so harsh and willing by England that Lord Curzon, explained the urgency of the situation to the French counterpart Pichon with the similar expressions in the reports that the English High Commissioners in Istanbul had sent:

*"Till the next spring.... Possibly there will not be a Turkish government which we can possibly get a chance to face. It is a high possibility that there will not be anyone to accept a treaty that the Allies want to impose on. Moreover, Even the defeated Turks, who would then become one of the few sides with significant force in their hands, could even be expected to declare war on the Allies and impose their own circumstances. If that is the case, I do not know how to conquer the Asia Minor who will do that. In sum, the weak and miserable among our enemies we may face as a scandalous victory of that."*³

¹FO. 406/41, No: 1836, "from Admiral de Robeck to Lord Curzon", October 10 1919.

²Resul Yavuz, "The Relations between the British and French Representatives after the Sivas Congress and Their Political Reflections", **Journal of History School (JOHS)**, Year 9, Issue XXVI, June 2016, p.283.

³Paul. C., Helmreich, **Sevr Entrikaları, Büyük Güçler, Maşalar, Gizli Antlaşmalar ve Türkiye'nin Taksimi**, Translation: Şerif Erol, Sabah Yay., İstanbul, 1996, p. 136.

In fact, the worrying statements of Lord Curzon, could be assessed as an open house for the English and French diplomats who will come together to find a solution to Turkish peace. Curzon also, considered the undecision of USA government about the future of Turkish lands as the precursor of gloomy atmosphere in Near East.

1. The Opening of the Last Ottoman Parliament and the Attitudes of the Entente High Commissioners

Lord Curzon began to feel very uncomfortable with the developments that took place in Anatolia after the Sivas Congress, while trying to understand this pulse through the High Commissioners in Istanbul based on reports from Europe by his French counterpart Pichon. The congress that was gathered under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Sivas, led to the resignation of the government, by completing the work with great speed and by removing the voice from the Damat Ferit government. Beyond any doubt, this resignation meant that the influence of the national movement that grew everyday in Anatolia and disturbed the Entente States in a great sense, would be felt more closely in any environment of the capital's policy. Following the resignation of the Damat Ferit government, a partial agreement was reached between the national powers and the Ottoman government after the meeting between Ali Rıza Pasha's government and the delegation, which led to the Turkish politics as a result of their decisions. One of the most important results of the agreement was the efforts of reopening of the Parliament in Istanbul by elections in Anatolia. As it is known, the national programme for the resistance in Anatolia with the results of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses that were held under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, in the words of English "*Kemalist movement*" was starting an important part of the work in January 1920 with the move to the Ottoman Parliament, this situation disturbed the Allies more than before. The high commissioners of occupation in Istanbul followed this step by step, and went into the habit of receiving instruction together with their opinions and recommendations on how to develop a policy.

The Entente High Commissioners focused their attention on the way in which the elections were held and after the elections in order to understand the internal situation in Anatolia and to produce policy accordingly. In detailed report about the elections that was sent to Lord Curzon by Richard Webb, it was emphasized that the elections had been very disorganized and excursive, the general interest and the excitement were in low level and the minorities except the Jews refused to join the elections.⁴ It was underlined that the elections held under the control of the Union and Progress committee had caused a great reaction in Independence and Allied Party, and that the national movement gained

⁴IOR-L-PS-11-168, No: 174127, "A Report from Richard Webb to Lord Curzon about the Turkish Parliament Elections", January, 3 1920.

strengthwith the elections and the government sent a delegation to Anatolia against the election abuses. In his report evaluating the possible effects of the elections, Webb mentioned that he was not expected the opening of the parliament to be filled by the Unionist deputies, choosing with major abuse and irregularities, and the government would not allow it. While an unpleasant peace treaty against the Turkish was being expected, Webb said that if parliament convened in Istanbul, it would not be allowed to work quickly until it was disseminated, or until the terms of the peace treaty were announced and he was paying attention to the importance of British political interests in Istanbul.

Besides, Webb, told the opening of the parliament was very meaningful to the Turkish who were in resistance and emphasized that "... *the parliamentary form of opening up ..., will serve the political and military wing of the national movement in all aspects, it is will lead to an effective earning power of action in Turkey against the decisions of the peace conference ...*" Webb warned the fact that the nationalist forces that had parliamentary support -whether the government signed the treaty, it would be very difficult to ratify- possibility of demonstrating a more daring and threatening attitude towards them would give damage to political interests of Allies in the ongoing process⁵. In the meantime, like England many of the representatives of the European Governments who were in Istanbul were following the elections. Marghettitch, the Istanbul representative of Belgium gave the following statements about the elections: "*the formation of the new members of Parliament format, it is not like going to welcome in Europe. The majority are the Unionists. The Turks, who are members of a despicable cardigan, start their own bankruptcy, embarrassing despotism and mass slaughter if they are left to themselves because they are devoid of energy, will and morality. The only solution is to abolish the Turkish Empire as an independent state*"⁶

In fact, Webb's findings and evaluations expressed in the above report included the possible consequences of the political atmosphere in almost every political environment in Istanbul in early 1920s. As Webb, continued sending reports about the busy agenda of Istanbul to London, the efforts to understand what the Ottoman Government members were trying to do against nationalists' attitudes or what their intentions would become even clearer on January 4, the letter to Lord Curzon. In the report that Webb told about the details of the interview with Tevfik Paşa, according to the report the main aim of the parliament was to approve the peace treaty and when the parliament completed its mission, the continuity of it would no be necessary. Webb also stated that Tevfik Paşa wanted them to trust himself and the government and besides he wanted them to believe that the current government was the only one who was responsible about the foreign politics, he also believed that the nationalist movement would not push them in a condition that

⁵IOR-L-PS-11-168, No: 174127, "A Report from Richard Webb to Lord Curzon about the Turkish Parliament Elections", January, 3 1920.

⁶ Zeki Sarıhan, **Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü**, C. II, Öğretmen Dünyası Yay., Ankara, 1983, p. 268.

would cause conflict⁷. In the interview in which the relation between England and Turkey were added to agenda, Tevfik Paşa mentioned about the relations between Turkey and England and the necessity of acting together with the allies; and he passed Webb that it was necessary England to give the support that Turkey would need in future. Tevfik Pasha also expressed to Webb that Sultan Vahidettin believed that it would be of no use and benefit to go to Paris as a delegate without giving some assurances about the situation of Turkey. After transferring the details of the meeting with Tevfik Pasha, Admiral Webb believed that Tevfik Paşa was sent to this interview with the aim of overcoming the bad reputation of Ottoman government with the increasing effect of Union and Progress in Europe by Sultan Vahidettin. Further, at the eve of the signing the peace treaty, Webb also doubted that Ottoman government was successful in implementing its foreign policy plans because of the coldness of Britain, in the report to Curzon he conveyed that such talks were a tactic of the Turks at the point of learning and supporting the goals of the Allies.⁸

When the parliament was opened with 75 members who were elected in Istanbul on January, 12, the the capital's politic life moved into a new and ambiguous turning point under the supervision of the Allies. In fact, the opening of the parliament occurred at the same time with the Allied forces' plans of establishing international Istanbul government within the frame of the treaty that would sign with Turks and movement of the capital city of the New Turkish Government in Anatolia⁹. It was one of the most important problems that the British would allow the parliament to work in the days when the parliamentary opening attempts continued and the novices started to come to Istanbul. Sultan Vahdettin accepted a group of elected deputies with concern that parliament should not be opened, or in case of opening, some of the deputies of the Union of wanted to resign. The request of the Sultan was a subject of the meeting of the Ottoman Government for a day before the opening of the parliament, as British intelligence reported from Istanbul but instead of opening the sultan's heir rather than postpone, it would be more appropriate with the addition of one of the princes¹⁰. In fact, the parliament

⁷IOR-L-PS-11-168, No: 174127, "A Report from Richard Webb to Lord Curzon about the Turkish Parliament Elections", January 3 1920.

⁸IOR-L-PS-11-168, No: 174127, "A Report from Richard Webb to Lord Curzon about the Turkish Parliament Elections", January, 3 1920.

⁹Mustafa Budak, *Misak-ı Milli'den Lozan'a, İdealden Gerçeğe Türk Dış Politikası*, 5. Edition, Küre Yay., İstanbul, 2014, p. 142.

¹⁰FO. 371/5041/E-8, No: 5566. "English Intelligence Report", January, 12 1920; On the day of the opening of the Parliament, Vahdettin would not attend the opening ceremony on the grounds of illness, instead the opening speech would be read by Grand Vizier Ali Rıza Pasha. Resul Yavuz, *İşgalin Sancılı Yılları*, Akis Yay., İstanbul, 2011, p. 252; The following day, he published reports in newspapers that he could not attend due to illness so that Sultan Vahdettin would not be interpreted as having taken a parliamentary stance. Akşin, Sina Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele*, C. II, Türkiye İş Bankası Yay., İstanbul, 1998, p. 315; Mehmet Tevfik (Biren) Bey refers to a report of a physician in the newspapers about the health of Sultan Vahdettin and how hot it is in his memoirs, but still expressing that some parts do not believe in the sultan's illness. In addition, according to Sultan Mehmet Tevfik Bey, Şerif Paşa the Minister of Internal Affairs read

began to work under very difficult conditions. Since the first day of the parliamentary was named as the Unionist, especially by the Union and Entente Society and the British Militia of the black propaganda was held. The British Destroyer Society told "not to open such a parliament full of bandits" in a memorandum to British king and the Sultan.

The opposition press of Istanbul against the Unionist strongly reacted to the opening of the parliament and asking the parliament not to be opened. Refi Cevat, in *Alemdar* "Have you opened? Have you closed?" titled article drew attention these issues, "Assembly opened; But what a treacherous way, almost like a closure ... Those who watch are like me at the end of the funeral and they were blues. Even the weather was closed, the horizons fogged. Passing through the bridges in the whistle that distressed the ferry, I felt a painful collapse. Her husband handed manner in the assembly hall, and deep mourning shadow in a sea of laps here so ... "in the capital with the opening of the parliament did not arouse much interest was expressed sentences. Refi Cevat, as the elected deputies are mostly Unionist, in his article he criticized so heavily, "... some of the leading National Movement should be examined! Those who are doing marvelous services, are the fishy men with fifty feet, like us,? Or are they completely different kinds of creatures? It is understandable ... The deputies who were sent to parliament as a result of the lessons taken from the war should be examined... They will save us from the danger that was the result of unionists, these heads will save us, they will bring peace and save the nation.... Tomorrow this will constitute the cabin, politics they will be governed. They will come into contact with European civilization and of education in the ways they will, in particular, they will save us ... "11 In the days when peace was expected with their voices, this parliament, which would take the power of determining the destiny of the country, was not enough. During the following days Refi Cevat continued his heavy assaults on the parliament deputies, "Now for them what someone Ottoman throne, nor can secure the rest of each of the Ottoman country trust." By these words, he entirely from state to this assembly consisting of Unionists and he claimed would come no nation¹².

2. Events Causing the Stress of the People with the Allies During the Assembly's Work and Reactions of High Commissioners

While the members of the parliament started to work in such an atmosphere, the high commissioners were closely following the government's work. The greatest complaint of the high commissioners was the perception that these days there was a connection between Revolutionaries and Cemal and Cevat Pasha, who were in office in Anatolia. General Milne and De Robeck believed that these commanders were acting unaware of themselves, acting contrary to the treaty conditions. So, on January

speech for opening parliament. For the whole opening speech see Mehmet Tevfik Biren, **II. Abdülhamit, Meşrutiyet ve Mütareke Devri Hatıraları II**, Haz. F. Rezan Hürmen, Arma Yay., İstanbul, 1993, p. 323.

¹¹*Alemdar*, 13 January 1920.

¹²*Alemdar*, 16 January 1920.

20, Interpreter of the French High Commissioner, Ledoux made a visit to Ali Rıza Pasha, giving a note that these two commanders resigned within 48 hours. This note caused all the government members act immediately. The next day, Foreign Minister, Mustafa Reşit Pasha visited the French High commissioner and asked why a note was sent without an oral application. The high commissioner stated that these two commanders were acting incongruously against the treaty conditions and also they supplied weapons and troops to Turkish Revolutionaries. Although Reshid Pasha immediately tried to explain the situation by visiting the British and Italian High Commissioners, the high commissioners demanded that the decision in this note be implemented in a definite manner. As a result, on January 21, the two commanders resigned without further resistance.

But this time, Mustafa Kemal, as soon as he learnt the details, he sent many telegrams to the government and the concerned authorities and forced these aforementioned commanders to change their minds. Mustafa Kemal, sent a telegram to Cemal Pasha who was about to resign in such a pressure atmosphere and said "...It is a matter of course not to accept this kind of abdication which threatens our government and national freedom. We take all precautions to carry out our duty till the end. We invite you to continue your duty by sitting at your Office and doing your supervision. If you do not want to stand for personal or opinion for any reasons, you should resign not because of English note but in a proper manner of our nation" but despite pressure against the resignation, the Pashas announced their resignation with the fear of the resignation would cause bigger chaos¹³.

In Istanbul, the government was shaken by the fact that Turkish Revolutionaries in Gallipoli Peninsula invaded the Akbaş Ammunition which was under the control of Entente Powers between 26-27 January just after the resignation of Cemal and Cevat Pasha. The Allies were planning to send the equipment in Akbaş Armory to Denikin that was fighting against the Bolsheviks¹⁴. As the Armory was

¹³Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, C.6, 2. Baskı, Kaynak Yay., İstanbul, 2003, p. 66: In addition, for extensive and detailed information about the reasons why Cemal and Cevat Pashas resigned, Mustafa Kemal's reaction to the resignation see. Akşin, *ibid.*, p. 294-302; Hüsrev (Gerede) Bey, in his memoirs resignation of the Pashas with a common note by the British and French High Commissioners regarding the resignation, which would cause a major crush during the National Pact's work, the withdrawal of the government in response to the note incident was on the agenda; but in order to avoid separating Istanbul from Anatolia, expressed the right of the government to remain in office until the start of the business.. Hüsrev Gerede, **Hüsrev Gerede'nin Anıları**, Haz. Sami Önal, 2. Ed. İstanbul, 2002, p. 172.

¹⁴The 61st Division Commander Colonel Kazım (Özalp) Bey, who was in Balıkesir for the Akbaş Ammunition Attack, gave Drama Rıza following the Anzavur Force and the forty man under the leadership of Köprülü Hamdi Bey. As a result of the domination of the Koprulu Hamdi Bey, the ammunition under French protection was seized and transferred to the inner regions of the dwelling. Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent telegrams about the congratulations and expressions of appreciation to Hamdi Bey and Kazım Bey shortly after the incident. Abdurrahman Bozkurt, **İtilaf Kuvvetlerinin İstanbul'daki İşgal Yönetimi**, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yay., Ankara, 2014, p. 296; For the Akbaş Ammunition attack see. Kazım Özalp, **Milli Mücadele I (1919-1922)**, TTK Yay., Ankara, 1988, p. 88-97.

under the control of French, The English government wanted the French to investigate the issue¹⁵. Then the English started to put pressure on Ottoman Government to investigate people involved and arrest the responsible ones. When the Ottoman Government did not delivered the people who involved, the Allies High Commissioners took action to arrest them. De Robeck decided to report the names of the people to London in order to put them in the list which contained the names of the people who would be arrested in accordance with the terms of the peace treaty, unless they were arrested. In addition, the high commissioners asked the Ottoman government for the delivery of the ammunition to them, as much as the amount of weapons and ammunition abducted.

İngiliz Hükümeti, otoritelerine büyük bir darbe olarak nitelendirdikleri bu baskın olayının peşini kolay bırakmayacaklarını göstermek için 11 Şubat'ta sadrazama şifahi bir nota vererek, baskının Anadolu'daki milliyetçiler tarafından yapıldığını, hükümetin de bu olayda sorumluluğunun bulunduğunu, ifade ederek hükümeti Anadolu Hareketi ile bağlantıyı kesmeleri noktasında bir kez daha uyardılar In order to show that the English government would not stop following this attack which was considered as a strike against themselves gave the grand vizier a verbal note and told that the strike was done by the nationalist in Anatolia and the government had responsibility and warned the government about cutting of its relation with Anatolian movement¹⁶.

After the opening of the parliament, Admiral de Robeck who assessed the relations of the Istanbul government with the national movement sent a report to Lord Curzon on February, 10 he stated that the government had a closer relationship with the nationalist movement after the opening of the parliament, moreover some of the members acted only with the directions of the nationalists¹⁷.

The anxiety was so high after the Akbaş attack, in another letter that was sent to Lord Curzon by de Robeck on February 12, it was pointed out that nationalist rebellion against Allied elements could bring down the terrible flows in the whole of the East and it was important to prevent it.

According to De Robeck, if a definite decision was not made to deprive the Turks of Istanbul and Izmir, he immediately stated that a declaration must be issued or that he should be empowered to have a calm atmosphere in this regard. This would alleviate the current excitement among the Turks and prevent some of the excesses of the nationalists who threatened the Allies. By stating that the French and Italian colleagues in Istanbul had the same opinions he conveyed that these people were doing correspondence about these issues with their own governments¹⁸.

¹⁵FO. 371/4162, No: 174944, February, 1, 1920; Bozkurt, *ibid.*, p. 296.

¹⁶Bozkurt, *ibid.*, p. 299.

¹⁷British Documents On Foreign Affairs, Volume: I, Doc. 137, (E.58/3144), No: 118.

¹⁸Mehmet Okur-Murat Küçükuşurlu, *National Struggle According to the British High Commissioners (1918-1920)*, Serender Yay., Trabzon, 2006, p. 155.

While the representatives of Entente States reacted in this way to the developments, they had recently considered as a challenge to their authorities in Anatolia and Istanbul, they had been amazed with the news from Maras since January 1920, Maras was occupied by the British like Antep and Urfa after the Mondros Armistice. However, due to conflicts of interest in the Middle East, which had begun to be experienced between the two countries, the British withdrew to France in return for the cities they had occupied in Kilikya with the Syrians in accordance with the Treaty of 15 September 1919 with the French¹⁹. As a matter of fact, the collisions between the Turkish Revolutionary Unions and the French Unions, which were at a low level from this date, had started to climb in Maras since the end of January 1920. When the French began to lose strength in Maras, they had heard of the need to contact the Government of Istanbul in order to take the precautions and prevent conflicts. They believed that the greatest responsibility for the events in the region belonged to the government authorities and that these officials could stop their clashes with the measures they would take. For this purpose, the French High Commissioner made an interview with the Ottoman Foreign Minister and held that the The Revolutionaries was responsible for the incidents in Maras and wanted the government to stop these conflicts. In the meeting, the Ottoman prime minister did not accept the high commissioner's accusations, arguing that the real responsibility of the events in the region was Armenian gangs, against the accusing attitude of the high commissioner. After the talks, the French high commissioner, consultation with the British High Commissioner Admiral Calthorpe, the responsibility for the events that belonged to the Ottoman Government, expressed once again Britain to make pressure on the government to stop the events²⁰. Admiral Calthorpe, with his support from his government, met with the Ottoman Foreign Minister, in order to promptly stop the incidents in Maras and tried to get information about the details of the incident. The events at the meeting tried to be revealed with all the nudity overlooked, The Minister tried to explain the greatest responsibility in the growth of the event and expansion into the French and that of the Armenians²¹.

As a result, the Allies entered into a chaos that they had not anticipated in the early 1920s. On the one hand, the events of Maras, on the other hand the attack of Akbas Ammunition and the resistance of the Anatolian resistance, which was well shaped under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and the Parliament in the capital, which would be accepted as an extension caused a deep anger against the Turks. Besides these, the news about the supporters of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia had

¹⁹Bilge Yavuz, **Turkish French Relationship Duruing the war of Independence 1919-1922**, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yay., Ankara, 1994, p. 53.

²⁰FO.371/4162, No: 1767861, January, 28 1920.

²¹FO. 371/4162, No: 176775, "A Secret Telegram from Admiral De Robeck to Lord Curzon ", February, 5 1920.

contacted with Bolsheviks, Azeris and Faisal forces operating in Syria had upset the nerves of the Allied Representatives²².

Allied High Commissioners in Istanbul on longer receive an unavoidable state of events in Maras, giving a note to the Ottoman government, the responsibility of Maras and around massacred Armenians claiming that belonged to the Turks, they wanted an end to the resistance²³. In the British, French and Italian High Commissioner joint note, it was stated that because of the provocative publications against the Entente Powers the public was about to be agitated and some members of the military formed gangs in the vicinity of Silifke²⁴. However, in response to this note Defense Minister Fevzi Pasha, stating that it was unfounded allegations of massacres, informed the high commissioners that the people were defending themselves consumed remarks about members of the army was also used to describe it as unfounded²⁵.

The events in Maras and its vicinity were closely followed and directed by Mutafa Kemal, who was in Ankara and closely followed the parliamentary work in Istanbul. In a telegram to Turkish Revolutionary commander, Emir Aslan Bey who was located in Mersin on February 11 was asked to go to the region immediately in order to help the people in the difficult situation in Maras. In addition, a day after it was told that the 3rd Corps in Maras, 13 Corps in Urfa, 12 Corps in Kilikya, 20 Corps in Pozantı Adana were charged to help the militia. Alongside of all these works, Mustafa Kemal followed the events closely by sending telegrams to Countrywide Resistance units, governorships and the other military troops. At the same time, in a telegram that he sent to Countrywide Resistance Organization in Sivas, he ordered to organize protests meetings to announce the occupations in Maras and other parts, inform the Ottoman authorities and the impartial governments in the capital about the events and send telegrams to the representatives of the occupying states and the Paris Peace Conference to protest the unjust occupations²⁶.

Maras and the surrounding events had affected the Allies very much, it was taken into consideration in the negotiations of London Conference which was gathered to determine the conditions of the peace treaty that would be signed with the Ottoman State.

In the meeting on 28 February, while the Allied representatives were talking about the problems under the influence of the incoming telegrams, they were very impressed by the speeches and the statements of specially Bogos Nubar Pasa and the

²²Abdurrahman Bozkurt, *ibid.*, s. 301.

²³Bozkurt, *ibid.*, s. 302.

²⁴Biren, *ibid.*, s. 340.

²⁵FO. 371/4162, No: 176775, "A Secret Telegram from Admiral De Robeck to Lord Curzon", February, 5 1920; A detailed response by the government to this common note of the Allies was prepared and sent to the high commissioners of the occupation forces. For the note of the Ottoman Government see. Biren, *ibid.*, p. 342-344.

²⁶Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, s. 306, 312, 323.

other Armenian patriarchs telegrams in the newspapers. In the negotiations, Lord Curzon started to tell about the situation they faced in Maras by reading these statements. Berthelot who provided the most detailed information about events in the region, stated that the situation in Maras was so serious and pointed out that the main responsibility of the events in the regions belonged to Mustafa Kemal. At this point, Curzon referred to relation of Mustafa Kemal with the events and in case of the continuation of the events in the regions, it was necessary to announce that Istanbul would be taken from the Turks and and take action at the local level and he also said that sending the British navy which was in the Bosphorus to Iskenderun to support the French in Kilikya he would do a deterrent effect²⁷.

Once in the afternoon session, the committee took the subject again on the agenda with Lloyd George's supports, Lord Curzon gave a broader explanation and offered that in order to not to repeat the events Maras, giving authority to the high commissioners in Istanbul to visit the grand vizier and told "if you allow these massacres to continue by not hard no other choice than to radically alter the conditions of the peace treaty, including deportation of the sultan and Istanbul would be taken from the Turks ...". Eventually, in line with these proposals assignment of the High Commissioners in Istanbul was approved by the members of the committee²⁸.

In fact, the Allies, began to feel themselves helpless at this point. Because they had understood that the Istanbul Government had no authority neither in Kilikya nor in the other parts in Anatolia from the reports sent from the region. Nevertheless, they thought the origin of the confusion was Istanbul Government. Hence these thoughts caused them to make mistake about to prevent the resistance in Kilikya and othe places by dethroning the Sultan or taking the Istanbul away from the Turks. So that in almost all member states opinions in the negotiations at the conference was dominated by this idea.

3. The Acceptance of the National Pact decisions in the Parliament and Announcement in Allies Parliaments

After the intensive discussions In Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, on 28 January 1920 at the Ottoman Parliament, the decision of national pact were accepted in a special informal meeting of countrywide resistance members, and again these decisions were accepted unanimously in the open session of the parliament on February, 17²⁹. During the sessions, Edirne deputy Aykut Bey who offered the pact, explained how excited he was on day of voting the National Pact Declaration in his

²⁷Osman Olcay, **Sevres Andlaşmasına Doğru**, (Çeşitli Konferans ve Toplantıların Tutanakları ve Bunlara İlişkin Belgeler), Ankara Üniv. SBF Yay., Ankara, 1981, p. 135-140.

²⁸In the common telegram draft which was going to send to high commissioners and navy and land commanders "...The Turkish government is now absolutely clear that when such situations arise, the old diplomatic notes and methods of intervention will not be followed, but instead the Allied governments will be actively intercepted..."Olcay, **ibid.**, p. 149.

²⁹Budak, **ibid.**, p. 155.

memoirs in the following sentences: "*National Pact moment of which can enter easily into my pocket the full text, thin, long paper on the large letters I wrote, I had prepared. No longer I was going to start reading before making speech and when it comes to the end I was going to put it as also presided over the nation and the world ... I went to the stand. All eyes were upon me. Especially ours ...*"³⁰

Seref Bey, made a brief introduction before reading the text to the deputies as follows:

"My dear friends, our voters, they installed a patriotic service on our shoulders while sending us here. The nation of this state who stood up leaning towards the sharp sword of the justice wanted us to defend all its historic, religious and all rights. Since we came here, an idea occurred in our hearts and minds. One of our friends, gathered the voice for peace that came from the hearts and all conscious are united on this point. A national oath which will last until our death occurred. This is such a national moment of our Parliament that we will have prepared the most glorious days we expect for our hope and our state a definite decision of the past while recording our next date stronger and brighter days until future for our nation. We Turks and Muslims are essentially a democratic nation. Never, to crush a layer has remained below come to a Turk's mind. How behind a mihrab, everyone is equal, the understanding of equality and justice is the same in Turks and Muslims. Destroying the rights of a nation that is dedicated to walk side by side with everyone who believes in justice and equality cannot be acceptable neither by humanity nor by God. Taking the most obvious right of living away is not a commandment of God. For this reason, I will read the National Pact with our friends who constitute the Parliament all together. In order to make all the sad people in the world live a peaceful day and I offer to announce to all civilized nations that they do not want to live captive " and he explained what the National pact meant for themselves³¹. After the Şeref Bey's words, after the National Pact was read article by article, with the question of Chairman Celalettin Arif Bey, "*Do you accept that?*" the question submitted to the approval of deputies³². After the voting session, Sinop

³⁰Cemal Kutay, *Üç Devirde Mehmet Şeref Aykut 1874-1939*, Teknografik Matbaacılık, İstanbul, 1985, p. 240.

³¹Mahmut Goloğlu, *Üçüncü Meşrutiyet*, BaşnurMatbaası, Ankara, 1970, p. 79-80.

³²Goloğlu, *ibid.*, p. 81; Şeref Bey stated that after the reading of the Decree of the National Pact there was a great excitement within the frenzy of the excitement and said that even the Greeks and Armenians who were opposed to such a movement at any cost were surprised. Kutay, *ibid.*, p. 242: The first draft of the National Pact of the National Pact was decided in Erzurum and Sivas congresses. During the meetings of the delegation under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in the early days of meetings with deputies came to Ankara, Defense Rights Group Programme was planned and it was delivered by Hüsrev (Gerde). The draft which was signed by Mustafa Kemal and the deputies was sent back to Ankara in order to prevent the British to see. It can not be determined whether the content of the draft dated 19th of January 1920 written by Mustafa Kemal is the same. Later, the draft of the "Countrywide Resistance Group Program" dated January 21, 1920, written by Mustafa Kemal and signed by Mustafa Kemal, was sent to Istanbul. The "Group Program" sent by Mustafa Kemal was read during the parliamentary session on 22 January 1920. In a series of interviews in the meeting held after the reading program it was decided to establish this commission. After the commission made some changes on this draft, "National Pact Declarations", where the signatures of Erzurum Mebusu Celalettin Arif and 121 deputies, were

Deputy, Rıza Nur Bey who came to the stand to make the closing speech, mentioned the words of the British Prime Minister Lloyd George and American president Wilson during the war and after the war at different times and stated that they had to keep their promises. Rıza Nur Bey, continued his speech by quoting from Wilson Principles, after mentioning the importance of these principles for themselves, specially the Article 12, he expressed his wish to announce the National Pact decisions in world parliaments³³.

The National Pact Declaration was a peace conditions of Turkey wants to have and a message towards the aims of the Allied States during Lozan Peace Conference process in that all the Entente Powers were trying to make an end to the East problem by sharing Ottoman Government after World War 1³⁴. . With this aspect, representatives of the occupation forces in Istanbul, followed the government's and parliament's works more closely after the opening of the parliament.

Ottoman Parliament is aware of this follow-up, it took a decision to announce the decision immediately on the day of National Pact Declaration to domestic and foreign public³⁵. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal was also very well informed about the developments in Ankara. Mustafa Kemal who learned that the Declaration was adopted on February, 6 from Rauf Bey, sent a telegram asking about border changes as expressed in the declaration of this program and asked why the declaration was kept in secret. Rauf Bey expressed that the nationality was kept as a basis in the National Pact and this was the way in which the Turkish Sulaymaniye and Kerkuk were also said to be included in the National Pact³⁶. In addition, Rauf Bey, declared

held in private and secret meetings held on 28 January 1920. After the vote, National Pact was signed by almost all the council members. However, some of the signatures on the document had been issued by the submitting parties after the meeting at the time of the vote. Thus, the National Pact, originally considered as a group program, was converted into a parliamentary decision by voting. **Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri (1919-1920)**, C.6, Kaynak Yay., İstanbul, 2001, p. 159-160: Mustafa Kemal Nutuk gave the following statements about the principles of the National Pact: *"Gentlemen! It was also discussed in a collective manner, with the aim and objectives of the nation as a basis for a brief program. The first draft of this program on behalf of the National Pact also called, was drafted in order to give an idea. In the Assembly of Istanbul, these principles were indeed written and determined in a collective manner."* Kemal Atatürk, **Nutuk**, C. I, Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, İstanbul, 1961, p. 360; Hüseyin Gerde talks about the fact that the commission members held a meeting on January 24th in order to carry out a national convention to declare the points of view of the foreign policy of the nation and that they decided to present the National Pact to the Parliament. Gerde, **ibid.**, s. 171; Hussein Kazım Bey (Kadri), memoirs Pact Shaft famous as the text for the first time come out of their pens, naturally this declaration that their work, by his own interpreter sent to the European Parliament; but Mustafa Kemal's Speech refers to not talk about in this case. Hüseyin Kazım Kadri, **Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'e Hatıralarım**, Haz. İsmail Kara, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 1991, p. 165. Further information about this and to see the full text of the National Pact. Budak, **ibid.**, p. 130-185; Cengiz Sunay, **Son Karar Misak-ı Milli**, Doğan Kitap Yay., İstanbul, 2007, p.67-86.

³³Goloğlu, **ibid.**, p. 82.

³⁴Budak, **ibid.**, p. 159.

³⁵Kutay, **ibid.**, p. 244.

³⁶Budak, **ibid.**, p. 150.

that they were also in favor of publishing the declaration as soon as possible but the reason of the delay was said that some of the deputies supported that the decision about publication could be made by a council of foreign affairs ³⁷.With this delay, after the two weeks from the approval in the parliament, the French translation to announce in the European Parliaments and by this it was expected that the Parliaments of Entente Powers and World public to be aware of the National Pact. With this aim, it was sent to French Parliament with a letter signed by Ottoman Parliament President Kazım bey on February, 20, 1920. However, due to the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies, French foreign minister recommended that the National Pact not to be notified officially to the French members of parliament. Likewise, the dclaration was sent to the British Parliament by Huseyin Kazım Bey and with the warning of the British Foreign Ministry no response was given to the National Pact³⁸.However the high commissioners in Istanbul became aware of the National Pact in a short time. And this caused a great inconvenience. The chief translator in charge of British high commissioner, Andrew Ryan expressed this confusion and discomfort with these sentences *"that period was passed so quietly without attracting it was noticed outside"* and talked about his amazement about the National Pact as *"Sometimes even I can not be sure whether this is indeed the work of the parliamentary session in Istanbul."* Ryan, in his memoirs regarded the content of the National Pact with the following statements:*"National Pact, became the the main platform of Ankara in a short time. When formally considered as modest though it comes from a country that is still seen as a defeated enemy by the Allies, it had unprecedented degree content. It gave the right to Arab countries and Thrace to determine their own future and although Batumi, Kars and Ardahan had re-unite with Turkey, it also would agree to held the plebiscite in those places"*As Ryan expressed that it reflected the relevant portions of Sivas Decrees both in content and the language in the National Pact it was included the following: *"In a quite sharp and uncompromising manner, Turkey, whether in or out of the ceasefire, it declares the right on Istanbul which is the capital of the Ottoman and center of the caliphate and Empire regions where muslim Ottomans live. . The opening of the Straits trade, minorities and issues such as Turkey's future economic development is dealt in a peaceful way ... "* Ryan stated that the text which was penned using a language quite daring against the Allies was written in terms of the language of intergovernmental negotiations and he quoted about the insist on the principle of full independence ³⁹.

During the works on the Declaration of the National Pact, Admiral de Robeck had a meeting with the Foreign minister of Ottoman on February 19. De Robeck who transferred the interview details in long report to Lord Curzon on

³⁷Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, C. 6, p. 171.

³⁸Sina Akşin, *ibid.*, p. 318; Şeref Aykut Bey stated that despite the decision to send a delegation to announce to the Parliament of big states for the announcement of the National Pact. Şeref Bey thought this was the result, as a justification for the invasion of Istanbul and the Occupation of the Entente States, Kutay, *ibid.*, p. 244.

³⁹Sir Andrew Ryan, **Sonuncu Dragoman**, Translated. Dilek Berilgen Cenççiler, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 2005, p. 126.

February,23 asked descriptive information about the recent provoking events in Kilikya and Maras from the foreign minister. According to the report, de Robeck told forign minister that nationalists in Anatolia were responsible and due to their behavior in this way, they had problems that were undesirable to the Allies and by doing this they could not show the love of the homeland.

In his report, he also highlighted the works in parliament, Robeck said that the government, was especially under the control of the whole nationalists after the opening of parliament, and parliament deputies weremaking extremely fiery speeches that they could bringthe people to boil, under the latest developments it could drag the country to a civil war⁴⁰.While assessing the events emerging day by day in conjunction with the work of the parliament de Robeck's accusatory phrases showed how flurry the Allies high commissiners were in this period.

4. London Conference

Declaration of the National Pact adopted by the council in the first place did not find any echo in the Entente centers in Paris and London. Because despite numerous warning telegrams of the high commissioner of the Entente in Istanbul, the leaders of the winning states did not fully understandthe seriousness of the national movement in Anatolia. Moreover, precisely in these days the Allies, with the participation of Japan in the months-long conference talks in London were trying to determine the terms of the peace that treaty would be put in front of Turkey⁴¹.

Indeed while the Allied High Commissioners were in rush to determine a policy against developments in Istanbul, fiery talks about the peace treat with the Ottoman State between French and British were going on in the prime minister's residence in Downig Street.After ongoing bilateral talks in January, on February 12 with the participation of Italian and Japanese representatives took the form of Allied conferences continued with intense negotiations at intervals until March 10.However, writing the terms and the level of ambassadors continued at intervals until April 10.However, until March 10, several sessions were held with the foreign minister and prime ministers. Prime Minister Lloyd George and Foreign Minister Lord Curzon attended the conference on behalf of British Empire and Prime Minister M. Millerand and Foreign Minister B.Berthelot accompanied the conference on behalf of France. However, Prime Minister B. Nitti and Minister of Foreign Affairs B. Galli on behalf of Italy and Vikont Chinda on behalf of Japan attenden the meetings⁴².

⁴⁰FO.406/43, No: 88, "A Report from Admiral De Robeck to Lord Curzon", February, 23 1920.

⁴¹ Bilge Yavuz, *ibid.*, p. 64.

⁴² Olcay, *ibid.*, p. 1.

First by Lloyd George said in his capacity as host of the conference, waiting for the most important solution to issues in front of them expressed that the Turkish Treaty, the Allied Council stressed that the Allied Committee waited much time that could be considered dangerous to tackle this problem. In the continuation of Lloyd George words, the delay was not a blame themselves but the problems that whether the United States would accept the mandate on the issue of Turkey or not he said. Lloyd George said that they waited a conclusion about the delay until August and September but the American administration was not in position to decide neither in past nor in three months and he drew attention the relevant states to find a solution to this issue ⁴³.

While expecting Allies to take the reports that were sent from Istanbul and Anatolia by high commissioners to determine the conditions they wanted in the peace treaty with the Turks, Allied board members negotiated the decisions that were impossible to apply and incompatible with each other. But during the conference, the controversy about the conditions of treaty between the allies was not missing. Indeed, although French and Italian authorities wanted to reveal the terms of a more moderate agreement for Turkey than the British, the British authorities did not want to take a step back at the point of imposing a peace where harsh conditions. This attitude of the British caused the blockage of negotiations on several points and caused to be postponed without consensus on the issues discussed. In ongoing negotiations that continued until April 10, the issues of Istanbul, Straits, Thrace and Izmir and also Kurdistan and Armenia that were planning to establish in Anatolia and middle East lands that were going to be detached from the Ottoman Empire, the financial supervision were taken into consideration. The Allied board members, were in negotiations for months on these issues in a manner that could be called hard part. Surely, as they continued these negotiations they were receiving information about the extent of this resistance from the reports of High Commissioners. In particular, these reports that were sent during the discussions of leaving Istanbul to Turks strengthened their hand at the point of making of decision.

As Ottoman Parliament's opening and behind the above-mentioned reasons, the occurrence of the developments that challenged their authority, members of Allies board in London were in necessity of revealing a good lesson to the insurgents that were called as "Unionists". Surely, this situation which was called as necessity was the occupation of capital Istanbul. Indeed at the last five sessions on March 5,8,10, specially the situation in Istanbul, Akbas Armory attack and the collisions between the Turkish Revolutionaries in Maras and the French were discussed. In the talks, the last case in Anatolia began to create a lot of anger and resentment against the Turks. Thus the closing sessions of the conference ended with the examining of the reports of High Commissioners in Istanbul and negotiations about determining a way. The Allied Council would have signed a decision about the occupation of Istanbul urgently in these negotiations.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 1.

5. Occupation of Istanbul

Council members started to discuss the issue of Istanbul as well as these developments with the attendance of Greece Prime Minister Venizelos and British Defence Minister Winston Churchill on March 5⁴⁴. Lloyd George, stating that the high commissioners advised them to occupy Istanbul and read the admiral's telegram demanding information about the peace treaty that would be signed. Lloyd George then stated to the board members that the conditions of peace would be very hard on the way to being soothing qualities, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Thrace, Izmir, Syria and Palestine would be detached, Turks in Asia Minor were prepared to be under control.

In his speech Lloyd George pointed out that these decisions would create great resentment among the Turks and the necessity of taking a decision on the action at conference he expressed his anger with these statements "*... is not taken now, severe measures against the Turks us holding the head, Turks out again, will continue to challenge with success ...*"⁴⁵ saying if they remained inactive against this situation, this would lead to frustration against the Allies in the World. Also talking about the information they got about Mustafa Kemal who was organizing the resistance in Anatolia. "*... under Mustafa Kemal's command, powerful, organized, well-organized and well managed army is located, Mustafa Kemal's not an ordinary bandits or robbers head he was, appointed by the Turkish government, clear that the Governor that the government popular Erzurum ...*" but gave ground knowledge, "*... a Turkish governor is attacking our our allies, and we're unable to show no reaction! ..*" using expressions, it would make emphasis should be undertaken immediately a violent act according to their own convictions⁴⁶. Lloyd George requested from Turkish government to termination of Mustafa Kemal after the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Forces, would demand. Cambon began to speak against Lloyd George's words, referring the breakdown of the Allies occupying Istanbul, not the high council of the Allies in case there was such an activity, could not tell responsibility for the massacre of Christians in the World. Lyod George, stated that Britain had the power to occupy Istanbul alone but the government wanted to cooperate with the allies Curzon said there were two ways to be quite option to make a harsh peace treaty with a solid political imposition against the Turks or make a soft peace treaty and as they were determined to follow their own decisions and stated that their high commissioners to be given instruction to apply the conditions of peace treaty by force when it went wrong in Istanbul and Anatolia. After Cuzron's statement, the Allied Council entered into an argument for determining how much of the Allied forces in and around Istanbul. Venizelos participating in the discussion, in Western Thrace and Izmir a hundred thousand Greek soldiers were found in the vicinity, if necessary, will be found through these forces since the invasion, he said. Including Churchill primarily from other members

⁴⁴Olçay, *ibid.*, p. 221.

⁴⁵Olçay, *ibid.*, p. 221.

⁴⁶*ibid.*, p. 221.

voiced their opinions on a possible invasion of the nature of where to be covered. On the first meeting about the occupation of Istanbul, the committee drafted a text to be sent to British high commissioners in Istanbul. It was reported that the Constitutional Court declared that Istanbul would be occupied by the Allied Forces and that the occupation of the peace treaty provisions would continue until the enforcement of the provisions of the peace treaty. It was desired to inform that Mustafa Kemal, who was appointed as the governor of Erzurum, was required to be put down at the point of termination of his office by the Istanbul Government and to inform the Ottoman Government that the provisions of the peace would be further aggravated if the connection with the national resistance was continued.⁴⁷

On the same day, the Allied Committee discussed the question of whether the American Unions would participate in the occupation. Lloyd George pointed out that the occupation intentions of the Allies would be reported to Washington and insisted that the US Administration would now make a decision in an environment where the American government was being crushed to Armenia, asking how American nationals in Anatolia would be murdered and their schools could be silenced.⁴⁸

In fact, this was what Lloyd George said about the demands of other members who spoke at the session. While Lord Curzon, expressed that they would be very pleased with the participation of the Americans in the occupation of Istanbul Berthelot said, "..... to call America for help will have a good effect on the World public opinion in their favor ..."⁴⁹.

Members of the Allied Committee in London discussed the occupation of Istanbul in other sessions they held on March 8 and 10, opening the debate about which Allied commander had to be responsible for the invasion.

In fact, while all these developments were taking place in London, as the high commissioners of Istanbul expressed in their reports, the present situation entered a huge and turbulent stage. Since the government came to power, Ali Rıza Pasha government, which established a close relationship with the National Movement in Anatolia, was taking the reaction of the British, and at every opportunity the British put pressure on the government. As it is known, these pressures led to the resignation of some ministers in the government who were close to the national movement. Robeck, who assessed the turbulent situation in the capital on 5 March, pointed out that in the shadow of the problems such as the news of Kilikya, the issue of the Akbas Ammunition, the government was now shaking, and that it was very difficult to establish a new government in the current situation. De Robeck expressed that Tefik Pasha did not want to take part in establishing government work and that Ahmet İzzet Pasha would not welcome the presence in the government and that in

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 227.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 232.

such a case Minister of Navy Salih Pasha, would not be allowed to establish a government⁵⁰. Another comment that he sent to Lord Curzon on 7 March, Robeck offered that they had to control the police, gendarmerie, telegraph and postal services in the fastest way to explain their determination to the Turks effectively in relation to the occupation of Istanbul and he insisted to arrest the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, which could be dangerous, and even to close the Parliament.

De Robeck pointed out that such a mode of action could be represented as a violation of Armistice conditions, hostile attitudes and attacks by the national movement, deterioration of public order, as well as reasons for public reaction and not to cause an indignation. De Robeck stated in this grounded statement that such measures would not have a provision on the future of Istanbul and that the declaration of this condition only by the conference would have a profound effect on the public⁵¹.

Lord Curzon, on March 13, 1920, sent all instructions to Robeck about the occupation to the High Commissioner de Robeck, as the Allied Board had argued over the days of occupation in London. And the occupation began with the invitation of the Allied Military Units on March 16, 1920, in the direction of this instruction, occupying important military and civilian institutions, including the Military and the Maritime Supervisions⁵².

Conclusion

While negotiations as to how a peace treaty would signed with Turkey in the months ongoing countless sessions in London, in order to give a lesson in order to take the control they occupied Istanbul as Mustafa Kemal they accused of being the cause of "*resistance to*" in Istanbul and Anatolia. Also such an attempt of the Allies were to Show how hard conditions the treaty would have, it should not be underestimated effective mean to imply that somehow resisting the nationalists. Especially in the talks held in London in March, the expression of Lloyd George about the occupation was realized in accordance with the demands of the high commissioners was the sign that the things developed outside their control after the opening of the parliament. Considering this aspect, although the occupation of Istanbul was a measure for them, it had the goal of providing a bore intimidate the resistance.

Immediately after the occupation of Istanbul was completed and the important buildings and institutions were under control, the Allied Occupation Force's invaded the Parliament to immediately arrest the nationalist insurgents they deemed

⁵⁰Okur-Küçükuşurlu, *ibid.*, p. 168.

⁵¹*ibid.*, p. 169-172.

⁵²*ibid.*, p. 175.

important and exile them to the Malta Island put forward their intolerance to the national freedom.

The fact that the Allied Forces in the Middle East and the Near East started to get all balled up in a way for them, occupation of Istanbul in this would undoubtedly lead to developments at the same time, both for the region and for Anatolia.

Immediately after the invasion, Mustafa Kemal sent a command to the corps commanders protesting the invasion on March, 19 and called "*The gathering of a national assembly with extraordinary authority in Ankara, one of the safest places in Anatolia ...*" this calling would now make it possible to announce the codes of changes "*that could not be reversed*" in Anatolia and Near East to European and World public⁵³.

Just after the occupation, the nationalist reaction under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal caused the Allies to notice that it was a very organized and alive structure of resistance in Anatolia. Despite the numerous detailed reports about Istanbul's National Struggle and its leader, Mustafa Kemal by occupation high commissioners, in a time that could be called too late Allied leaders realized that this was not such an ordinary occasion.

As soon as he heard about the occupation, Mustafa Kemal's reaction to the occupation by holding the telegraphs in a very intense and serial manner was also showing that the nationalist rebels who were in front of the occupation forces would not be indifferent to these developments. In the protest text which was prepared to send to all political representatives of the Allies and impartial states after the occupation in less than 24 hours, it was emphasized that this last coup, which was brought to the political sovereignty and liberty of the Ottoman Nation, was expressed as a coup d'état to all the sacred principles of the twenty-first century⁵⁴.

New place for National Struggle was Ankara where Grand National Assembly was opened. After this date, Ankara would begin to carry the feature of becoming the heart of the National Struggle, the city where the foundations of the new Turkish State would be established after the war. All kinds of political negotiations will be carried out here by the military and political representatives of foreign states, and all of these important initiatives would provide a source of legitimacy in the capital of the new state, which had not been announced yet.

⁵³Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in the introduction to the 12-point general, expressed what the occupation caused: "*the occupation officially by the Allies in the center of the Islamic Caliphate and the Ottoman Sultanate's payitaht, law-making, in violation of the three forces of the state, which consists of the judiciary and the enforcement powers meet and officially notified by the government that see the opportunity to do duty in the face of this situation, which is distributed Ottoman parliament. Thus, even the independence of the Caliphate and the Sultanate authorities immunity and can think of measures to ensure the recovery of the Ottoman Empire and the invitation to the meeting in Ankara, an exceptional jurisdiction by the National Assembly to administer and arrived in Ankara, the deputies dispersed been deemed indispensable to be participating in this council.*" For the full text of the Circular. **Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri**, C. 7, p. 153.

⁵⁴Fort he full text of the protest manifestosee. **Hâkimiyeti Milliye**, March, 18, 1920, No: 16; Alsosee. **Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri**, C. 7, p. 121.

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