

Turkish Aid Allocation in Turbulent Times: Changes and Continuities in Turkish Aid Modality

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Abstract

This paper investigates how Turkey has adjusted its foreign aid behavior over international and domestic shifts after the July 15 Coup Attempt. There have recently been exceptional developments in international/regional power structures whereby Turkey has a centrality, e.g., the war between Ukraine and Russia. Similarly, main pillars of Turkey's foreign policy have been modified, best exemplified in increasingly strong signs of insecurity and lack of trust between Turkey and its erstwhile strategic partners. More importantly for Turkish aid allocation, a new framework – ‘Turkish-type Development Assistance Model’ (TDAM) has been introduced in late 2010s. As a result, the structural context in the early 2000s which has assisted Turkey in ascending the donor ranks has been gradually giving way to more ambiguous and elusive outlook for many types of international cooperation including foreign aid. To this background, the paper utilizes an interpretive analytical framework based on the critical analysis of key statements as well as on descriptive statistical analysis of databases (such as OECD and TİKA), and compares discursive, practical, and institutional patterns of Turkish aid allocation between the periods of 2003-2015 and 2016-2022 with the purpose of identifying the changes and continuities in Turkish development assistance with a macro-lens. It is concluded that given the growing polarization and competition in development landscape, TDAM should be seen as a robust and operational alternative for the maintenance of ‘relevant and impactful development assistance’ by embodying practical ways of ensuring mutual development without a secret agenda.

Key Words: Foreign Aid, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish-type Development Assistance Model, Justice and Development Party

Çalkantılı Zamanlarda Türkiye'nin Yardım Tahsisi:

Türkiye'nin Yardım Yönteminde Değişimler ve Süreklilikler

Öz

Bu çalışma, 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi sonrası uluslararası ve yerel değişimler karşısında Türkiye'nin dış yardım davranışlarını nasıl uyarladığını incelemiştir. Türkiye'nin merkezi bir konumda olduğu uluslararası/bölgesel güç yapılarında son dönemde sıra dışı gelişmeler, örneğin Rusya ve Ukrayna arasındaki savaş gibi – yaşanmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, Türkiye ve bir zamanlar stratejik ortakları arasında büyümekte olan güvensizlik ve emniyetsizlik emarelerinden de anlaşılacağı gibi Türkiye'nin dış politika temel yapılarında değişimler gerçekleşmektedir. Türk yardım tahsisi konusunda daha da önemli bir gelişme olarak 2010'ların sonunda yeni bir çerçeve – Türk Tipi Kalkınma Yardımı Modeli (TKYM) ortaya konulmuştur. Sonuçta 2000'lerin başında Türkiye'nin başışçı ülke konumunda ilerlemesine imkân veren yapısal ortam dış yardım da dahil olmak üzere birçok uluslararası işbirliği biçimi için giderek daha belirsiz ve zorlu bir duruma doğru evrilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, çalışma eleştirel söylem analizi ve veri tabanlarından (OECD ve TİKA gibi) elde edilen verilerin betimleyici istatistiksel analizine dayalı yorumsamacı bir çerçeve kullanmış ve kalkınma yardımı alanındaki süreklilik ve değişimleri makro perspektiften tanımlamak amacıyla 2003-2015 ve 2016-2022 dönemleri arasındaki yardımların söylemsel, pratik ve kurumsal örüntülerini karşılaştırmıştır. Çalışmada varılan sonuca göre kalkınma mimarisinde gelişen kutuplaşma ve rekabetçilik göz önüne alındığında, TKYM kalkınma yardımlarının bağıntılı ve etkili olabilmesi doğrultusunda gizli gündemler olmadan, ortak kalkınmanın pratik yollarını temsil etmesi bakımından güçlü ve işlevsel bir alternatif olarak görülebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Yardım, Türk Dış Politikası, Türk Tipi Kalkınma Yardımı Modeli, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

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Introduction

This paper investigates how Turkey has adjusted its foreign aid behavior over international and domestic shifts after the July 15 Coup Attempt. Turkey has become an indispensable development cooperation partner as an emerging donor with one of the highest GNI/aid ratios among both traditional and emerging donors since Justice and Development Party (AKP- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) came to power in 2002. However, there have recently been exceptional developments in international/regional power structures whereby Turkey has a centrality such as the war between Ukraine and Russia, the ever-increasing uncertainty over the future of liberal world order, the stalling of Turkey's EU accession process to name a few. As a result, the structural context in the early 2000s which has assisted Turkey in ascending the donor ranks has been gradually giving way to more ambiguous and elusive outlook for many types of international cooperation including foreign aid. In the same period, main pillars of AKP's foreign policy have also been modified, best exemplified in increasingly strong signs of insecurity and lack of trust between Turkey and its erstwhile strategic partners. More importantly for Turkish foreign aid/development assistance¹ allocation, a new framework – 'Turkish-type Development Assistance Model' (TDAM) has been introduced. In other words, there are marked shifts in the structural context that precipitated Turkey's transformation from recipient to an emerging donor. Thus, in which ways Turkish aid modality has reacted over these structural shifts is a timely and puzzling question whose answer also promises fresh insights not only to the mechanisms of international development cooperation but also to the accounts of recent transformation in Turkish foreign policy.

The paper contributes to this lacunae by comparing discursive, practical, and institutional patterns of Turkish aid allocation between the periods of 2003-2015 and 2016-2022. Behind the periodization as such lies two broad reasons as well as other particular determinants. First, Turkey has identified its comparative advantages in development assistance in the 2003-2015 period by expanding its aid allocation into new regions with a more institutionalized development cooperation. Second, unlike the 2003-2015, patterns of aid allocation have developed in a more independent and autonomy-oriented manner – as seen in the diverging paths followed by Turkey and its strategic partners during and after the Arab Spring. In this vein, the paper's primary interest lies in identifying the general evolving trends in Turkish development assistance from a macro-perspective. Thus, investigating particular motives behind aid allocation is beyond the scope of this paper. To this purpose, the paper adopts

¹ Foreign aid and development assistance will be used interchangeably hereafter.

a structural approach utilizing an interpretive analytical framework based on the critical analysis of key statements as well as descriptive statistical analysis of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) databases.

Accordingly, the paper is organized as follows: the first section presents a historical contextualization of Turkish experience as an emerging donor. Then, in the second section, progress of Turkish aid modality between 2003-2015 is portrayed based on its conceptual and practical aspects. The third section puts under scrutiny the ramifications of TDAM as to aid allocation patterns as well as international development cooperation.

1. From Recipient to Donor: Contextualizing Turkey's Rise as an 'Emerging Donor'

It was with the AKP's coming to power in 2002 that Turkish development assistance had acquired unprecedented features not just in terms of volume but in institutional and practical terms as well. Turkey has become a net donor meaning that it consistently allocates more than it receives. The geographical scope of Turkish aid has broadened from as far as post-Soviet geography (including Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkan countries) to the Middle East and North African countries along with the Sub-Sahara region (Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, 2010, p. 135). However, Turkey is but one of the countries that have ascended the ranks within the development assistance community since the early 2000s. As such, a proper contextualization that the Turkish experience deserves entails the identification of systemic as well as domestic dynamics that have coalesced in Turkey's transformation.

From a systemic perspective, the late 1990s was the period of emerging trends in the development assistance landscape, which was until then dominated by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries- the so-called traditional donors (Kragelund, 2011). In the 2000s, economic and ideological hegemony enjoyed by the traditional donors started to erode considerably. There were underlying economic and geopolitical drivers of this shift. First, the economic crises (e.g., 1997 Asia, 1998 Russia, and especially the 2008 Global Financial Crisis) pushed DAC donors for imposing large cuts over their aid volumes to maintain their macroeconomic stability. This 'aid fatigue' meant for a considerable decrease both in aid level and motivation among traditional donors (Thorbecke, 2007). Second, the newly emerging geopolitical and security threats (e.g., international terrorism and armed non-state actors) rendered the traditional development cooperation more securitized and politicized (Woods, 2005, p. 393). Third, comparing to the previous donors, the emerging donors such as China, Brazil, and India, performed outstandingly in the same period and expressed their enthusiasm

in taking more responsibility for global matters in their own ways (e.g., South-South Cooperation-SSC). Given its failure in achieving the expected economic growth and welfare in developing world, the traditional modalities increasingly started to give way to new ones such as SSC - core values of which comprise horizontal cooperation, equality, mutual interest, and waiving of political conditions (Quadir, 2013, p. 322).

The debates are still on-going with respect to indications of emerging donors over development cooperation as such. One obvious outcome however is the increasing competition between traditional and emerging donors over vacuums of power and influence in international development landscape (Severino and Ray, 2009). Indeed, pessimistic observers conceive increasing amount of aid allocated by emerging donors as 'rogue aid' that could undermine the expansion of Western values such as democratization, free-market, and liberal internationalism in periphery (Naim, 2007).

In this context, Turkish case as an emerging donor in development cooperation necessitates a particular attention to domestic drivers as well. Turkish experience of development assistance dates back to the 1950s on the recipient side as part the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the Marshall Plan and continued in the 1970s in cooperation with other traditional donors such as Japan and Germany (Fidan and Nurdun, 2008, p. 99). Turkey's aid allocation, on the other hand, can be seen as a more recent practice, starting back in the 1980s with the Ozal government. Turkey first allocated a food aid package to drought-hit African countries including Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somali, and Sudan (Kulaklıkaya and Aybey, 2008, p. 263). Since then, but especially during the AKP governments, Turkey has logged such a good distance in aid allocation that it has become one of the most generous countries in the world in terms of development assistance.

The main role in bringing together the material and ideational determinants necessary for Turkey's transformation belongs to AKP's foreign policy vision. Some observers even conceptualized the impact of the AKP over foreign policymaking as pushing for a 'paradigm shift' from a passive, reactive and overly Western-centric framework towards a multi-dimensional, assertive, and proactive vision (Sözen, 2010). Indeed, the AKP's foreign policy methodology contains attitudinal, institutional, and practical differences compared to the traditional approach adopted in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Criticizing the traditional attitude of isolationism and reactive approach towards regional matters, the AKP elites imagined an assertive Turkey with an overt desire for becoming an independent actor (Öniş, 2011, p. 50). As explained in Davutoğlu's (2001) 'Strategic Depth' conception, Turkish foreign policy has been redefined to extend beyond its immediate environment and Western

orientation by properly utilizing Turkey's pivotal role based on its cultural, linguistic, and historical ties. Casting Turkey a global as well as regional role, instead of 'a bridge between Europe and Asia', the new framework set especially forth the soft power capabilities and instruments in contributing to the promotion of just and equal system (Davutoğlu 2012, 5). For instance, Turkey enthusiastically sought for the EU membership and was committed to 'maximize' its cooperation with neighbors – also known as 'Zero Problems Policy' - to promote credibility and legitimacy of Turkish foreign initiatives. In practice, Turkey's engagement with regional as well as international politics has considerably increased, e.g., actively involved as facilitator and mediator in the peaceful solution of regional conflicts; managed to hold a non-permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council for the 2009-2010 term.

Accordingly, foreign aid has been one of the foreign policy instruments utilized more effectively in this period. The emerging Turkish economy, thanks to robust growth performance experienced during early 2000s, eased Turkish engagement with new regions one the one hand by opening new trade lines (Öniş 2011, p. 56), and by allowing to share its financial, know-how and technical expertise with developing countries on the other. Moreover, TİKA also has had a special role in improving Turkey's development assistance capacities by becoming a key source of soft power capability for Turkey (İpek, 2015). As such, development assistance (along with peace missions and mediation of conflicts) has become not only 'an integral part' but also 'a peaceful instrument' of Turkey's foreign policy (Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, 2010, p. 132). Moreover, Turkish aid practices, especially in the last two decades, have shown that Turkey is highly interested in sharing its sources, knowledge, and expertise with other developing countries.

2. Portrait of Turkish Aid Modality between 2003-2015: Conception and Practice

This section presents progress of Turkish aid modality during 2003-2015 based on its conceptual and practical aspects. Aid modality in general comprises of the motivation for, the institutional structure and practical implications of allocating aid. Donors might allocate aid for diverse motivations including strategic, political, and economic interests as well as security concerns. The rise of emerging/non-traditional donors brought along with it new institutional forms and practices namely new modalities. In this regard, a comparison with traditional as well as emerging donors is presented below to identify prominent features of Turkish aid modality. Then, follows a snapshot of Turkish aid patterns during 2003-2015.

2.1. Neither North nor South: Turkish Type

To characterize emerging aid modalities, dynamic classifications such as ‘Southern’, ‘Arab’, and ‘DAC-oriented’ have already been introduced into the development cooperation jargon (Smith et al., 2010, p. 1). As to existing classifications, AKP’s aid modality signify quite a particular position. Indeed, its distinct character – sharing commonalities with both traditional and emerging donors - lead some observers to consider it ‘ambivalent’ (Hausmann, 2014, p. 11). However, three broad arguments can be put forward in asserting that ostensibly contradicting mechanisms of Turkish aid modality actually operated in harmony with each other.

First, traditional modalities have had a significant impact in development of Turkish aid modality. The scope of Turkish aid materialized in consistence with the ‘European values and transatlantic orientation’ to serve to the principles of ‘democratization, pluralism, and sustainable development’ (Davutoğlu, 2009, as cited in Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, 2010, p. 136). Furthermore, Turkey, as one of the founding members of the OECD, shares DAC norms such as demand-drivenness, country ownership, and harmonization among donors. The international agenda of development assistance – such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the principles of Paris Development Agenda, and the Monterrey Consensus – constitutes a notable part of Turkish aid agenda. Turkey consistently allocates aid to the multilateral organizations such as the UN. And TİKA collects, monitors, and reports aid activities according to DAC standards.


Turkey’s commitment to DAC standards might lead to put it along with the other DAC-oriented emerging donors such as Poland, and Mexico. However, Turkey also emphasizes strategic autonomy and being an independent actor in foreign policy. In this vein, Turkey does not always follow step by step the DAC donors and not particularly chase for increasing collaboration with other donors – sometimes even abstain from directly aligning its aid allocation with those of traditional donors. This as well as the other commonalities with the group of Southern donors (despite being heterogenous themselves) such as ‘emerging economy, receiving aid, waiving of political conditionalities’ as well as lacking a grand aid strategy (Hausmann, 2014, p. 12) have led some observers to consider Turkey closer to the Southern donors (e.g., Özkan, 2018). Furthermore, rejecting any post-imperialist motivation and colonial disdain, Turkish aid addresses its recipients with a discourse of solidarity, equality, and partnership – as exemplified in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s many speeches that Turkish developmental experience should not be seen as a ‘model’ but as an ‘inspiration’ (Marcou, 2013, p. 4).

The third point that is particular to Turkish aid is the ‘proactive and humanitarian’ diplomatic orientation. What is meant by proactive orientation can best be seen in the call for an appropriate revision in the power dynamics of development landscape. ‘The World is bigger than the five’, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s oft-heard motto, is presented as the ‘biggest-ever rise against Global Injustice’ in the global governance (Presidency of Republic of Türkiye, n.p.). Such objection to the existing hierarchy in international system is also common to the SSC framework. Turkey, however, does not align itself directly to the Southern donors. Unlike the Southern donors pioneering the calls for change in development assistance regime, Turkey did not take an active part in the post-Busan discussions; yet, spent great efforts in the formation and implementation of post-2015 Development Agenda (Hausmann and Lundsgaarde, 2015, p. 6). In other words, reformism instead of radical revisionism better describes Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the existing development landscape. In a similar fashion, Turkish humanitarianism, the other half of Turkish modality, has a distinguishing style compared to that of great powers. In the first place, Turkish humanitarianism means special focus over fragile situations that have been either ignored or abstained from by other international actors (Haşimi, 2014, p. 128). And as Gilley (2015, p. 40) describes it by ‘political neutrality, Islamic bias and professionalism’ based on principles such as boots-on-ground, demand-drivenness, waiving of political and economic conditions, Turkish humanitarianism meant practical differences as well. Accordingly, under its particular understanding of humanitarianism, Turkey allocated significant amount of development assistance into new regions – stretching from Central Asia and Balkans to the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

2.2. Snapshot of Turkish Aid Allocation between 2003 and 2015

As Turkey has become a trustworthy development partner by engaging with many countries in different continents, the trend of Turkish ODA volume followed a sharp rise during 2003-2015 (Figure 1). And Turkey met, even surpassed, the DAC target of .30 GNI/ODA ratio regardless of the fluctuations in its economic growth performance (Figure 2). Despite this remarkable increase in volume, however, Turkish aid did not expand under a grand strategy in this period. Instead, what has shaped this growth can be described as a mentality. Since it was this mentality that to a large extent determined the type, instrument, and destination of aid, academic as well as policy circles interested extensively in identifying its material and ideational determinants (e.g., Kavaklı, 2018; Zengin and Durmaz, 2019), whether it is authentic humanitarianism or a disguise for pragmatism (e.g., Bayer and Keyman, 2012; Altunışık, 2018; Gilley, 2015), and in which ways differs from traditional as well as other modalities (e.g., Langan, 2017; Mugurtay and Baç, 2023).

Figure 1: Turkish ODA during 2002-2015 (million US Dollars)




Source: OECD.

To understand the contours of aid mentality as such the main pillars of foreign policy provide a solid base. A triangle of overarching foreign policy objectives – ensuring strategic autonomy, being an independent actor, and actively engaging with global affairs – frames the patterns of Turkish aid in becoming a ‘crucial actor in promoting international peace’ (Hausmann and Lundsgaarde, 2015, p. 2). And as an emerging donor in search of its comparative advantages, in which ways Turkish aid carried this mentality into action can best be inferred from motivational, institutional, and discursive patterns developed in this period. Indeed, Turkish aid patterns followed a consistent path until the Arab Spring which created new fragile situations urgently needing attention nearby Turkey. Thus, the deep repercussions of the Arab revolts for the volume, direction, and sectoral distribution of Turkish aid are also identified in each point of analysis.


The motivators of Turkish aid, at least until the Arab Spring, were highly compatible with those of international development agenda. For instance, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) benefitted increasingly from Turkish aid in line with the principles such as eradication of poverty, restoration of peace and stability as described in UNDP MDGs. Turkey also hosts ‘the Technology Bank for Least Developed Countries’. Furthermore, in 2011, Turkey organized the 4th United Nations Conference on the LDC. However, the importance of the LDCs in Turkey’s development cooperation agenda sharply decreased after the 2010s when Turkey concentrated more on disbursing aid for its own agenda. In this period, although Turkey doubled its ODA volume, the bulk of (nearly 80%) Turkish aid has been allocated on low-income countries located in the immediate surrounding of Turkey.

Figure 2: Annual GDP Growth (2002-2015) and ODA/GNI ratio (2009-2015)



Source: Author’s own compilation from OECD and World Bank.

Figure 3: Share of Top 10 Recipients (2003-2015)




Source: Author’s own compilation from OECD and TİKA.

Indeed, a closer look to primary recipients as well as the sectoral distribution of Turkish aid sheds light to the changing patterns of Turkish aid allocation. For instance, during 2003-2015 Turkey provided 19.407 million US Dollars ODA, over 70% of which disbursed to top ten recipients (Figure 3). However, when evaluated together with sectoral breakdown of Turkish

aid (Figure 4), both figures tell a different story. In the first place, the main recipients changed with the eruption of the Arab Spring. Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, and Somalia took the place of Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine as the main destinations of Turkish aid. In this sense, Turkish motivation to take an active part in sociopolitical transformations during the Arab Spring modified the patterns of Turkish aid. Furthermore, Turkish engagement was not limited to just providing aid but also included other complementary activities such as humanitarian intervention, mediation, peacekeeping as well as state-building. These shifts can also be inferred from the changes in sectoral distribution of aid. Until 2010, Turkish aid had a relatively balanced composition – mainly focusing on social infrastructure and services, economic infrastructure and services, and humanitarian aid. However, in response to the emerging humanitarian crises, the share of humanitarian aid in Turkish ODA on average rose to 50% from 16% after 2010 and nearly 50% of humanitarian aid was directed to the fragile states such as Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq (Göle, 2014, p. 91).

Figure 4: Sectoral Breakdown of Turkish Aid (2005-2015)



Source: TİKA.

The role of TİKA in providing aid to such a vast geography and contexts has been crucial. Besides to providing aid, TİKA is also in charge of coordinating the development assistance activities of other public institutions and actors. In doing so, Yardımçı (2019, p. 362) argues that Turkey has adopted a ‘multi-track approach’ which is an ‘an important step in diversifying its ODA modalities’. According to Apaydın (2012, p. 8), the coordination between Turkish NGOs and private sector, both of which contributed significantly to the development

cooperation, has been ensured thanks to TİKA's sector-wide approach. Unlike the increasing domestic cooperation, however, Turkey has less and less opted for collaboration with other international actors in development cooperation in this period. As such, Turkey increasingly focused on providing bilateral aid - amounting to 11% in 2005 while dropped nearly 2% in 2015. Actually, this tendency was best exemplified in the discourse accompanying Turkish aid. AKP elites often expressed their enthusiasm in presenting Turkey as quite different from the traditional donors. In addition to practical differences from traditional donors such as political impartiality, responsiveness to local needs, and 'no strings attached' policy, Turkey also differed itself morally from the other emerging donors (e.g., China and India). This was obviously the case for Turkish engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially Somalia. As Langan argues Turkish altruistic humanitarian involvement in Somalia differs significantly from the 'machinations of imperial' actors (2017, p. 1400). Therefore, Turkish aid modality's proactive and humanitarian discourse was clearly based on a delicate 'balance between conscience and interest' (Akpınar, 2013, p. 735).

As argued above, the changing structural context has had a considerable impact over the constitutive elements of Turkish aid modality the main pillars of which are humanitarianism and proactive orientation. Accordingly, unfolding of Turkish aid patterns during 2003-2015 allows us to argue that Turkey progressed an 'apprenticeship' stage in development cooperation. On the one hand, Turkish aid has expanded its scope and coverage into uncharted regions and countries and acknowledged its comparative advantages in aid disbursement on the other. To sum up, Turkey has developed a special tendency for formerly Ottoman regions and Muslim-majority countries, a concentration on fragile situations by providing humanitarian aid, and a growing interest in sub-Saharan Africa in this period.

3. Turkey as a Maturing Donor: Changes and Continuities in Aid Allocation After July

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Global governance structures have recently witnessed emerging trends of compartmentalization and polarization. As such, the international development landscape which in the first place gave rise to Turkey's transformation from recipient to donor country has been gradually changing. The argument advanced in this section suggests that the framework of Turkish aid modality – TDAM has developed in part as a response to the implications of changing international development architecture and also according to requirements of a more efficient aid allocation.

3.1. ‘Enterprising and Humanitarian’ in the wake of Tumultuous Shifts

In the late 2010s, mechanisms of global governance structures took yet another turn and created deep repercussions for international development architecture as well as Turkish development cooperation. The on-going Russia-Ukraine War, China’s increasing weight in global affairs are only some recent examples of increasing competition and fragmentation in international power structures. In a similar fashion, the institutional and financial capabilities of development partners are ever-more hard-pressed to keep up with the ever-growing problems such as regressing human development indicators, extreme poverty, migration, global pandemic, and financial contraction (UNDP, 2022, p. 10). Together, these trends have led to an unprecedented increase in total ODA demand. However, rival development models and racing for the dwindling resources-markets can be seen as solid proofs of that the premises on which the existing international development regime has founded are under serious threat (Melanio, Naudet and Rioux, 2022, 2). Thus, these global as well as other regionally crystallizing trends of fragmentation and competition put under difficult test many types of international cooperation (OECD, 2023).

These structural trends on the other hand provide a mixed picture for Turkish development assistance. In the first place, the founding pillars of Turkey’s foreign policy has already started to dysfunction as early as the Arab Spring. Turkish efforts to build a security and peace area by improving relations with the neighbors (‘Zero Problems’ policy) compatible with the necessities of global governance structures have been seriously undermined when the cooperation between Turkey and its strategic partners such as the US was disrupted as in the Syrian case, or when Turkey more independently sought for engaging with non-Western partners such as Russia as in the case of S-400 missile procurement (Mengüaslan and Çelik, 2023). More importantly, lukewarm reactions of Turkey’s strategic partners over the July 15 coup attempt casted a bitter chill over relations (Kubicek, 2022, p. 646). There have been other remarkable instances of diverging interests as well. In the end, given the increasing signs of a more security-oriented, unilateral, and confrontational attitude compared to that of the early 2000s, all these changing geopolitical and security relations together point to one vital question of whether the compatibility between agendas of Turkey and its partners have been eroding.

The structural changes brought Turkey geopolitical and economic ramifications as well. For instance, Turkey has found itself surrounded by an intersection of urgent humanitarian crises – namely, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Moreover, similar to many other developing countries, Turkey’s recent economic performance has lagged behind the successes

of the early 2000s. Thus, these shifts indicated a strong push for Turkey to allocate its limited capabilities efficiently enough to be able to simultaneously address the multiple contexts.

To this background of increasing necessity to fine-tuning the international development regime on the one hand, and Turkey's particular geopolitical and economic circumstances on the other, Turkey introduced in 2016 its particular framework of development assistance – namely TDAM. First, the new framework was meant as a robust and operational alternative to traditional as well as emerging donor modalities (Turhan, 2022). In TİKA reports, TDAM is presented as a framework based on Turkish developmental experience and expertise to share 'the tools of an ongoing significant economic and social transformation' (TİKA, 2016, p. 5). The core values of this model are identified as 'people oriented, sensitive, devoid of personal gain, creating, and sustaining the circumstances as needed' (TİKA, 2018, p. 9). Therefore, while emerging Southern donors are criticized mainly due to their unselective aid modality, i.e., support for undemocratic, rogue political regimes, and traditional donors because of their ongoing neo-colonial relations disguised as development cooperation, TDAM embodies practical ways of ensuring 'mutual development' without 'a secret agenda'.


Second, TDAM displayed Turkey's growing interest in effective utilization of foreign aid in line with foreign policy objectives. In this sense, the relation between TDAM and foreign policy have been put under scrutiny from different angles. Some scholars for instance relate the particularities of TDAM to Turkey's structural position as middle-power; in that, TDAM has an ambitious agenda in relation with international norms and regimes, and on-going conflicts while Turkey has limited institutional and financial capacities (Donelli and Levaggi, 2018, pp. 58-59). While others attach Turkey's increasing presence in and contribution to multiple arenas of development assistance to Turkish type proactive humanitarianism (e.g., Özkan, 2018), there are also those with skeptical views who saw the expanding Turkish engagement as part of a pragmatic agenda mainly driven by Neo-Ottomanist worldview and strategic concerns that serves Turkey's security and economic interests (e.g., Altunışık, 2018; Aydın-Düzgüt, 2020; Yavuz, 2022). However, such simplistic accounts miss the particularities of Turkey's subtle position in development assistance which is aptly conceptualized by Akpınar (2013) as managing to keep 'a balance between conscience and interest'. With respect to Turkey's particular foreign policy in the late 2010s, Keyman (2017) also introduced a new term of 'moral realism' to account for the existence of humanitarian objectives together with security and geopolitical interests. In a similar fashion with these arguments, the author contends that the structural and domestic alterations of the late 2010s put Turkish aid modality into a difficult test for maturity. Having identified its comparative advantages over the 2003-2015 period, Turkey

has put into action its own assistance model since 2016 to disburse aid more efficiently and flexibly in line with both its foreign policy and the requirements of the international system.

3.2. Turkish Aid Patterns during 2016-2022: Changes and Continuities


Turkish aid has been disbursed under the framework of TDAM since 2016 and Turkey continues to be an indispensable partner in development cooperation. However, it has also evolved significantly with respect to practice, discourse, and institutional structure of aid disbursement. First, similar to early patterns, TDAM adopts a peaceful and humanitarian discourse. Aiming to contribute to international stability and security, Turkish aid policy blends constructively the objectives of international development cooperation with its own agenda. For instance, ‘to eradicate poverty and sustain development’ as envisioned by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Turkey collaborates with other international actors as well as NGOs. Furthermore, TDAM shapes Turkish contribution in a ‘human-centered and demand-driven’ manner with a special focus on from ‘food security, unemployment, and inequality’ to fragile regions such as stricken by wars, conflicts, emergencies, or natural disasters (OECD, 2021). On the other hand, as can be seen from the discursive positioning of the traditional development partners within TDAM, Turkey utilizes a negative discourse against traditional donors to demonstrate the differences between Turkish and other modalities. However, Cihangir-Tetik and Baç (2021) argue that the severity of the humanitarian crises such as the Syrian one provides also significant opportunities for cooperation despite the negative discourse. In this vein, the cooperation between Turkey and the EU gained formality especially after 2015 with the EU-Turkey deal on controlling the irregular migration (Mengüaslan and Fidan, 2022).

Figure 5: Turkish ODA (2016-2021) in million US Dollars



Source: OECD.

Figure 6: Annual GDP Growth (2002-2015) and ODA/GNI ratio (2009-2015)



Source: Author’s compilation from World Bank and OECD.


As well as international cooperation, TDAM also brought about a robust institutionalization process into Turkish aid, especially in providing humanitarian aid. Again, the Syrian crisis has been one of the most important drivers of this change. To address the urgent as well as other needs of the Syrians, TİKA has improved its collaboration with many public as well as other actors such as AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority), Directorate General of Migration Management, and NGOs (such as Red Crescent). Indeed, TİKA continues to be the main agent of development assistance in ‘education to health, from agriculture to economic development and from cultural heritage projects to vocational training programs’ (TİKA 2016, p. 7). However, compared to early period, the amount of development assistance provided by the NGOs and the investments of private sector has decreased (TİKA, 2021).

The practical outcomes of TDAM display a mixed pattern compared to those of early period. For instance, instead of an upward trend in ODA volume, the aid allocated follows a stable line in this period regardless of the economic growth (Figures 5-6). As such, Turkey has consistently disbursed aid with a higher ODA/GNP ratio than the UN target of 0.7%. In a similar fashion, as Turkey opted for bilateral form of aid, the multilateral contributions from Turkish ODA in 2021 dropped from 3.6% near to 1% in 2016. The bulk of multilateral contributions have been directed to UN and its programs. However, Turkey continues to prioritize LICs other than LDCs - which compared to previous period receive less ODA (near 1.5% in 2021). Thus, the share of LDCs is well below the average of other non-DAC donors. These two trends enable to argue that Turkey increasingly favors to act independently as a development partner.

The most important continuity under TDAM is the increasing concentration of Turkish aid to the fragile situations. Accordingly, Turkish aid modality has tailored itself according to


the necessities of emerging humanitarian crises in Syria, Ukraine, and Afghanistan. Indeed, top 15 beneficiaries of Turkish aid can be described as fragile states (Figure 7) and near 90% of total ODA has been directed to top 15 beneficiaries in the period of 2016-2021. While top 15 recipients geographically cover a vast area stretching from Middle East to Balkans and Central Asia, the share of Syria is near 96%. In 2021, the 90% of ODA directed to fragile situations was in the form of humanitarian assistance (Figure 8).

Figure 7: Top 14 Recipients (Syria excluded) 2016-2022



Source: TİKA.

Figure 8: Sectoral Distribution of Turkish ODA 2016-2021



Source: TİKA.

To sum up, Turkish foreign aid under the framework of TDAM has once more proved its value in quelling the pressing security threats in multiple contexts. Accommodated to Turkey's 'enterprising and humanitarian' foreign policy the aid patterns of TDAM picture an altruistic and constructive Turkey that prioritize contributing to the international peace, solidarity, and human welfare with its experience and expertise especially, but not solely, in the former Ottoman areas by disbursing aid, especially in the form of humanitarian aid, for those stricken by calamities such as natural disasters, conflicts, and war. In this context, unlike the other modalities, TDAM not only defies concerns as to creating new dependencies in return for assistance but also embodies a robust alternative to existing development cooperation methods.

Conclusion

This paper contended that identification of changes and continuities in Turkish aid modality brought about by TDAM in the late 2010s promises fresh insights not only into evolving patterns of Turkish development assistance but also mechanisms of international development cooperation as well as theoretical accounts of the recent shifts in Turkish foreign policy. When examined in comparison with the early patterns of Turkish aid modality, TDAM can be argued to represent 'mastership' stage of Turkish aid allocation in practical, institutional, and discursive aspects.

To put in a nutshell, after Turkey has identified its comparative advantages vis a vis other donors and configure its aid modality in tandem with both its core values, capabilities, and systemic requirements, TDAM crystallized in the late 2010s. As such, the primary features of aid patterns can be described as standardization of volume (around 8 to 10 billion US Dollars), mostly bilateral, concentration of recipients (to a large extent Muslim-majority countries with Low to Middle Income level), prioritization of certain sectors (average share of humanitarian aid in Total ODA has risen to near %70 compared to near 30% in the first period) and geographies (mostly fragile situations and former Ottoman countries). In a similar fashion, Turkish aid modality considerably improved its institutional capacities throughout the 2010s. Although the share of NGOs and the private sector in development assistance, inferred from the volume of aid/investment directed, has been decreasing compared to early 2000s, TİKA continues to be the main agency of development assistance and coordination.

A similar continuity exists in the discourse accompanying TDAM. As in the early period, Turkish elite opts for presenting TDAM as completely a different modality from those of Western colonial-imperial development cooperation. Indeed, the emphasis on core values of TDAM such as 'people-oriented', aiming for 'mutual development', and 'without thought of personal gain' has been frequently uttered in high-level official statements to demonstrate that

unlike traditional development cooperation informed by donors' political and economic interests, TDAM allows Turkey to keep a delicate balance between its policy interests and morals. As such, TDAM perpetuates discursively positioning 'the West as the other'.

As to the ramifications of TDAM over the trajectory of international development cooperation, the paper argues that TDAM should be seen as a robust and operational alternative for the maintenance of 'relevant and impactful development assistance'. Given that growing competition and polarization are the main troubles of the development landscape, TDAM embodies practical ways of ensuring 'mutual development' without 'a secret agenda'. However, together with an aggressive discourse accompanying the unilateral and security-oriented foreign policy of lately, the presentation of TDAM as an alternative to traditional donor modalities raises concerns about which purposes Turkish aid allocation seeks for.

Indeed, these concerns stem mainly from the recent shifts in Turkey's foreign policy. Unlike the early 2000s, Turkish elites frequently express their orientation shifting from collaborationist and partnership-based towards anti-Western, revisionist, and security-driven understanding. This leads some observers to question TDAM's emphasis on humanitarianism and morals as a disguise for pragmatic concerns such as domestic accountability and international credibility. However, as the argument above suggests Turkish aid volume has reached a significant level and Turkish development assistance with TDAM has actualized a 'matured' humanitarianism. Despite of the negative discourse especially against the Western development partners, Turkish aid has neither given up its commitment to international peace and welfare nor changed its orientation completely beyond existing global governance structures. As such, Turkey continues cooperating with the EU especially in the Syrian case, while also leading a prominent role in the maintenance of the 'Black Sea Grain Corridor Agreement'. In this regard, what the aid patterns of TDAM signify for recent shifts in Turkish foreign policy can be put as that the concentration of Turkish aid mostly in the form of humanitarian aid to Muslim-majority countries provides a solid empirical evidence for the constructivist theoretical accounts arguing that ideational frameworks, e.g., Eurasianist, Middle Eastern or Neo-Ottomanist, drive the recent shifts in Turkish foreign policy.

Overall, although the case of TDAM have still not received the attention it deserves, it hints at an extensive research agenda with its indications to mechanisms of international development cooperation. Further research on regional and country-specific patterns under TDAM offers original insights as to contours of Turkish foreign policy as well.

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Geniřletilmiř Özet

Bu alıřma Türkiye'nin 15 Temmuz Darbe Giriřimi sonrası uluslararası ve yerel deęiřimler karřısında dıř yardım davranıřlarını nasıl uyarladığını incelemiřtir. Türkiye 2002 yılında iktidara gelen Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti) döneminde yükselen donör ülkeler arasına girmiř, kurumsallařma sürecinde önemli ilerlemeler kaydetmiř ve sonuta vazgeilmez bir kalkınma iřbirlięi paydařı olarak uluslararası kalkınma mimarisinde iddialı bir aktör konumuna yükselmiřtir. Ancak Türkiye'nin merkezi bir konumda olduęu uluslararası/bölgesel güç yapılarında son dönemde sıra dıřı geliřmeler, örneęin Rusya ve Ukrayna arasındaki savař, liberal dünya düzeninin geleceęine dair belirsizliklerin artması gibi – yařanmaktadır. Benzer řekilde, Türkiye ve bir zamanlar stratejik ortakları arasında büyümekte olan güvensizlik ve emniyetsizlik emarelerinden de anlaşılacaęı gibi Türkiye'nin dıř politika temel yapılarında dikkat çekici dönüřümler söz konusudur. Sonuta, 2000'li yılların bařında Türkiye'nin uluslararası kalkınma mimarisinde donör ülke konumunda ilerlemesine imkân veren yapısal ortam bařta dıř yardım olmak üzere uluslararası iřbirlięinin birok alanı için giderek daha belirsiz, zorlu ve istikrarsız bir hale bürünmektedir.

Dięer yandan aynı dönemde (2010'ların ikinci yarısından itibaren) Türkiye Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi iktidarında dıř politikada oldukça etkili biimde kullanılan yardım tahsisi alanında kendi birikim ve tecrübelerine dayanan yeni bir çereve – Türk Tipi Kalkınma Yardımı Modeli (TKYM) ortaya koymuřtur. Bu bağlamda Türk dıř politikası için ok önemli araçlardan birisi olan dıř yardımların söz konusu yapısal deęiřimler karřısında nasıl etkilendięi sorusu oldukça vakitli ve ilgi çekici bir arařtırma konusudur. Bununla birlikte, TKYM'nin bu yapısal deęiřimlere yönelik ifade ettięi sonuçlar uluslararası kalkınma iřbirlięi mekanizmalarının iřleyiři ve Türk dıř politikasında son dönemlerde yařanan deęiřimlerin deęerlendirilmesi gibi alanlar için de yeni ıkarımlar ortaya koyma imkânı vermektedir. Bu doęrultuda, alıřmada eleřtirel söylem analizi ve veri tabanlarından (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD ve Türk İřbirlięi ve Koordinasyon Ajansı-TİKA gibi) elde edilen verilerin betimleyici istatistiksel analizine dayalı yorumsamacı bir çereve kullanılmıř ve Türkiye'nin kalkınma yardımı alanındaki süreklilik ve deęiřimler makro perspektiften tanımlanmıřtır. Bu amala Türkiye'nin kalkınma iřbirlięi faaliyetleri iki genel dönem (2003-2015 ve 2016-2022 dönemleri) içinde kategorize edilmiř ve söz konusu dönemler arasında Türkiye'nin kalkınma yardımlarının pratik, kurumsal ve söylemsel örüntüleri karřılařtırılmıřtır.

alıřma öncelikle TKYM çerevesinin uygulamaya konulduęu dönemin (2016-2022) Türkiye'nin kalkınma yardımı alanında 'ustalık' ařaması olarak deęerlendirilebileceęini tartıřmaktadır. Dıř yardımlar ve kalkınma iřbirlięi her iki dönemde de Türk dıř politikasının en

önemli araçlarından birisi olarak görülmektedir. Türkiye bir önceki dönemde olduğu gibi bu dönemde de kalkınma işbirliği alanında aktif bir şekilde faaliyet göstermektedir. Bu çerçevede diğer gelişmekte olan ülkelerle kaynak, bilgi ve tecrübe paylaşımının devamlılığına büyük önem verilmektedir. Diğer yandan temel değişim noktaları Türkiye'nin 2003-2015 döneminde sağlanan kalkınma yardımları ve girişilen kalkınma işbirliği süreçlerinden elde edilen birikim ve tecrübelerle dayanarak diğer donör ülkeler karşısında görece avantajlarını belirlemesi ve kendi yardım yöntemini gerek temel değerleri ve kapasiteleri gerekse de sistemsel gereksinimler doğrultusunda şekillendirebilmesidir. Bu bakımdan TKYM Türkiye'nin kalkınma yardımları alanındaki ustalaşma sürecinin önemli bir çıktısıdır. Pratikte, TKYM dönemi kalkınma işbirliği davranışları içinde öne çıkan bazı özellikler şu şekilde özetlenebilir. Bir önceki dönemdeki dalgalı yükseliş seyrine kıyasla kalkınma yardımları miktarında standartlaşma gözlemlenmektedir (ortalama 8-10 milyar ABD doları). Türkiye'nin sağladığı kalkınma yardımları 2003-2015 döneminde olduğu gibi ağırlıklı olarak ikili yardımlar şeklinde sağlanmaya devam etmektedir. Türk kalkınma işbirliğinden en çok fayda sağlayan alıcı ülkeler içinde En Az Gelişmiş Ülkeler grubunun payı önemli ölçüde azalmış, bu ülke grubunun yerini düşük-orta gelir seviyesine sahip gelişmekte olan ülkeler almıştır. Bununla birlikte, alıcı ülkelere daha yakından bakıldığında TKYM döneminde sağlanan yardımların önemli bir kısmının ağırlıklı Müslüman nüfusa sahip ülkelere yöneldiği ve bir önceki döneme kıyasla çok daha yoğun bir biçimde (ortalama yaklaşık %70 oranında) insani yardım sektörüne odaklandığı görülmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, Türk kalkınma yardımları kırılğan ülkeler-hassas toplumsal kesimlere öncelik vermeye devam etmektedir. Kurumsallaşma ve temel aktörler açısından TİKA bir önceki dönemde olduğu gibi TKYM çerçevesinde de Türkiye'nin kalkınma yardımları alanındaki en temel organı olma işlevini sürdürmektedir. Diğer yandan, gerek Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları -STK'lar gerekse de özel sektör yatırımlarının Türk kalkınma yardımları içindeki payı açısından bir önceki döneme kıyasla önemli düşüşler kaydedildiği söylenebilir. Benzer değişimler Türkiye'nin kalkınma yardımları faaliyetlerine eşlik eden söylemsel çerçevede de görülmektedir. Öncelikle Batılı geleneksel donörlerin kalkınma yardımı yöntemlerine yönelik eleştiriler TKYM döneminde de devam etmektedir. Türkiye geleneksel kalkınma işbirliği yöntemlerinde alıcı ülkelerin ihtiyaçlarından ziyade donör ülkelerin siyasal ve ekonomik çıkarlarının önceliklendirilmesi gibi durumlara nazaran TKYM çerçevesinde sağlanan kalkınma işbirliğinin insan odaklı ve dayanışmacı bir anlayışla şekillendiğini sıklıkla dile getirmektedir. Sonuç olarak, kalkınma işbirliği sürecinde bir yandan donör ve alıcı ülkeler arasında yeni bağımlılık ilişkilerinin oluşmasının önüne geçilirken diğer yandan ortak ve daha sürdürülebilir bir kalkınma süreci mümkün kılınmaktadır.

Bununla birlikte, TKYM uluslararası kalkınma işbirliği yapılarının işleyişi ve geleceği açısından da önemli sonuçlar barındırmaktadır. Pratik, kurumsal ve söylemsel nitelikleriyle Türkiye'nin kalkınma tecrübesi ve işbirliği birikimine dayanan TKYM mevcut kalkınma işbirliği yöntemlerine kıyasla (geleneksel kalkınma işbirliği ve Güney-Güney İşbirliği gibi) dikkat çekici avantajlara sahiptir. Öncelikle TKYM ahlaki değerler ve siyasal çıkarlar arasında çatışmacı bir ilişki ortaya koyan geleneksel işbirliği yöntemlerinin aksine her iki olguyu bir arada ve dengeli bir biçimde gözetebilecek bir yardım modelini temsil etmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle gizli gündemler olmadan ortak kalkınmanın pratik yollarını somutlaştırmaktadır. TKYM'nin bu iddiası kalkınma işbirliği alanında son dönemde önemli ilerlemeler kaydeden diğer Güney ülkelerinin benimsediği GGİ vizyonu ile benzerlikler taşımaktadır. Ancak mevcut uluslararası kalkınma mimarisi yapılarına yönelik daha radikal bir değişim anlayışıyla hareket eden GGİ'nin aksine TKYM daha barışçıl ve işbirlikçi bir değişim anlayışına dayanmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, uluslararası sistemde son dönemde yükselen kutuplaşma ve rekabetçilik eğilimlerinin uluslararası işbirliği alanlarını daraltıcı etkisi göz önüne alındığında TKYM söz konusu nitelikleriyle mevcut kalkınma işbirliği yöntemlerine insancıl ve işlevsel bir alternatif olarak gelişmeye devam etmektedir.

Diğer yandan, Türkiye'nin son dönem dış politika tutumunda benimsediği tartışılan Batı-karşıtı, sert güce dayalı ve güvenlikçi söylem göz önüne alındığında, TKYM ve TKYM'nin dayandığı insancıl ve girişimci dış politika çerçevesine şüpheyle yaklaşılmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, TKYM ve dış politikada sıklıkla vurgulanan ahlaki ve etik değerler temelli yaklaşımın pragmatik bazı hedeflere – iç politikada meşruiyet ve dış politikada güvenirlilik sağlanması gibi – hizmet ettiği tartışılmıştır. Öte yandan bu çalışma yukarıda da bahsedildiği gibi Türkiye'nin sağlamış olduğu yardım miktarının standartlaşması ve istikrarlı bir şekilde sürdürülmesi gibi niteliklerine dikkat çekerek Türkiye'nin yükselen donör konumundan istikrarlı bir kalkınma paydaşı konumuna geçtiğini ve dış yardım davranışlarını 'olgun' bir insancılık anlayışı içinde yürüttüğünü tartışmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye'nin TKYM çerçevesiyle başarılı bir şekilde hayata geçirdiği alternatif kalkınma işbirliği anlayışı, Batılı geleneksel donörlere karşı olumsuz söylemsel öğelerine rağmen, uluslararası barış ve düzenin sağlanması hedeflerine bağlılığı ve mevcut küresel yönetim yapılarının işlevselliğine karşı yapıcı tutumu reddetmemektedir. Örneğin, Türkiye Suriye krizi sürecinde Avrupa Birliği ile eşgüdümlü hareket etmenin önemini vurgulamaktadır. Benzer şekilde, uluslararası jeopolitik dengelerin yanı sıra gıda güvenliği gibi konularla da yakından ilişkili olan Karadeniz Tahıl Koridoru Anlaşması'nın devamlılığı için öncü bir rol üstlenmektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışma TKYM ve Türk dış politikasına yönelik pragmatik nitelemesinin insancıl ve girişimci anlayışın

etkisini göz ardı ettiğini savunmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, Türkiye'nin TKYM çerçevesinde gerçekleştirmiş olduğu kalkınma yardımı davranışlarında öne çıkan eğilimler- ekseriyetle Müslüman yoğunluklu ülkelere insani yardım sağlanması, Batılı geleneksel donörlere ve yöntemlerine karşı eleştirel bir söylem benimsenmesi gibi – dış politikada ortaya konulan girişimci ve insancıl performans ile bir arada düşünülmelidir. Bu açıdan, Türkiye'nin kalkınma işbirliği alanındaki faaliyetlerinden elde edilen bulguların Türk dış politikasında son dönemde yaşanan değişim süreçlerine yönelik inşacı teorik yaklaşımlar tarafından öne çıkarılan söylemsel-yapısal unsurların açıklayıcı gücüne katkıda bulunacak ampirik kanıtlar sunduğu iddia edilmiştir.