AFRO EURASIAN STUDIES

MUSIAD
INDEPENDENT INDUSTRIALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION

JIHADIST DISENGAGEMENT AND DERADICALIZATION IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM: SOME THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

AFRO EURASIAN STUDIES - VOLUME: 12 / ISSUE: 1 pp.1-17

Samir Amghar, Assistant Prof. Dr., Université catholique de Lyon, Department of Sociology

E-mail: amghar.samir3@yahoo.fr

Orcid Id: 0009-0008-2722-5548

Khadiyatoulah Fall, Prof. Dr., l'Université du Québec à Chicoutimi (UQAC

Received: 24.07.2023

Accepted: 23.10.2023

Cite as: Amghar, S. (2023). Jihadist disengagement and deradicalization in France and Belgium: some theoretical explanations, Afro Eurasian Studies, 12 (1) 1-17. DOI: 10.33722/afes.1332193

Plagiarism: This article has been reviewed by at least two referees and confirmed to include no plagiarism.

Fransa ve Belçika'da Cihadçıların Çözülmesi ve Deradikalizasyon: Bazı Teorik Açıklamalar

Öz

Bu makale, bir kişiyi İslamcı şiddeti geride bırakmaya iten faktörleri belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu ayrılma süreci olduğundan, tetikleyici bir unsurun değil, ayrılma denklemi içinde birbirine dolanan farklı değişkenlere bakmayı önermektedir. Ayrılmak için sebep oluşturan faktörler, bir cihatçı hayal kırıklığının ardından, bireyin beklentileri ile cihatçı hareket içinde bu beklentilere ulaşma olasılığı arasındaki bir uyumsuzluğun sonucudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Fransa, Radikalizasyon, İslamcı gruplar, Cihatçı hareket

Jihadist Disengagement And Deradicalization In France And Belgium: Some Theoretical Explanations

Abstract

This article attempts to identify what pushes a person to leave Islamic violence behind. Because disaffiliation is a process, hit suggests looking not for a trigger element, but for the different variables are intertwined in an "equation of disaffiliation". The reasons for getting out are the product of a jihadist disenchantment followed by a discordance between the individual's aspirations and the possibility of reaching those aspirations within the jihadist movement.

Keywords: France, radicalization, Islamic groups, Jihadist movement

Introduction

Although jihadist organizations continue to attract large numbers of people in their wake, particularly from Europe, their recruitment capacity should not mask the difficulties they are currently encountering. In the face of the military setbacks suffered by Caliph al-Baghdadi's organization, experts have noted not only a decline in departures to areas controlled by the Islamic State, but also difficulties in keeping members within the organization. Many of its supporters have decided to desert, abandoning the armed struggle. This phenomenon is confirmed by a King's College study led by Peter Neumann, which claims that between 20% and 30% of jihadists decide to return to their country of origin. This report is based on the testimony of 58 "deserters" from the Islamic State, including nine from Western Europe and Australia, who have publicly recounted their reasons for leaving. In France, according to a report by the Criminal Affairs Directorate, more than 200 individuals have returned from Syria and Iraq. This phenomenon of jihadist defection is not new. It was already observed in the 1970s-1990s among armed Islamic groups in Algeria (GIA, Armée islamique du Salut, Groupe salafiste de prédication et de combat) , Morocco (Shabiba islâmiyya) , or Egypt (Islamic jihad and Gamâ'a islâmiyya) , for example.

While there is an abundance of literature on the factors that explain radicalization processes, few French-language scientific productions address the question of why and how Islamic-inspired terrorist groups emerge from violent action. This dimension is a blind spot in research into political violence, even though it has been an issue in terrorist organizations (extreme right-wing groups, extreme left-wing organizations, separatist movements, etc.) for years. So, working on jihadist disaffiliation offers an interesting perspective by "inversely" questioning Islamic violence itself. As Olivier Fillieule puts it, studying the process of defection in jihadist circles provides a deeper understanding of the conditions that lead to violent radicalization. For this author, "militant disengagement is a revelation of the conditions of possibility of commitment itself, or more precisely, a revelation of the drying up of these conditions. And this at both individual and organizational levels".
What's more, analyzing Islamic radicalization from a dynamic, evolving perspective means moving away from the essentialist definition of the timeless, universal nature of jihadists' own commitment, and thus avoiding freezing former jihadists in ideological and organic postures that are no longer necessarily their own.

Often reduced to de-radicalization, the processes involved in exiting jihadist logics, which I will refer to as disaffiliation, are complex. Disaffiliation can be voluntary or forced, individual or collective, brutal or slow. It can be suffered individually following arrest or conviction, or imposed collectively by the jihadist organization.

When an individual decides to no longer participate in the activities of the jihadist group, I will use the notion of disengagement (behavioral dimension of disaffiliation). When the individual no longer wishes to identify with the group, I will use the term dis-identification (organizational dimension of disaffiliation). Finally, disaffiliation is described as de-radicalization, when the individual no longer wishes to adhere to the value system advocated by the jihad (cognitive dimension of disaffiliation).

Because disaffiliation is a process, the aim is not to identify the trigger, but rather to show that its origin lies in the interweaving of several variables that explain the "disaffiliation equation". The hypothesis is that the reasons for exiting are the product of "jihadist disenchantment", characterized by a mismatch between individual aspirations and their realization within jihadist movements. A gap is opening up between the organization's injunctions and its own inspirations. The personal satisfaction derived from commitment diminishes, leading to defection. In the process of disaffiliation, the individual becomes aware that something doesn't suit him or her, or no longer does. Based on the initial testimonies I gathered from French and Belgian jihadi "repentees", my hypothesis is that these initial doubts and questioning of commitment should be analyzed as triggers for disaffiliation. These are both macro- and micro-sociological factors that lead the individual to realize that something is no longer right with his or her violent commitment. This may stem from a feeling of being out of step with the jihadist values and environment, political and/or ideological contingencies, living conditions, personal reflection, or even contingencies outside the group, linked, for example, to unwelcome community pressures.

I. Ideological and political factors in jihadist disaffiliation

a) Ideological revolutions and aggiornamentos

The starting point of jihadist disaffiliation is "the decline of ideological and instrumental justifications for violence", in the doctrinal "reversal" of the intellectual references that hitherto justified involvement in organizations advocating armed jihad (if possible, suggest simplifying this sentence a little). In Algeria, many members of the Armed Islamic Groups and the Islamic Salvation Army claim that their decisions to lay down their arms were prompted by fatwas issued by Saudi Arabian theologians calling for an end to fighting. At the instigation of Salafist Algerian preachers with close ties to Algiers, such as the Algerian sheikhs Abdelmalik Ramadani, Mohamed Ali Ferkous and Arif (is that right?), Saudi Arabian theologians issued religious opinions criticizing the Armée islamique du Salut and the Groupes islamiques armés for the un-Islamic nature of the fighting that pitted them against the Algerian government of the time. These condemnations completed the rupture between the

Algerian jihadists and the clerics of the Arabian Peninsula, who were nevertheless first-rate doctrinal references for the Algerian fighters. The stance taken by these theologians against Islamism and terrorism prompted the Algerian and Saudi governments to encourage the development of the pietistic Salafist movement. Even today, the quietist current of Salafism is mobilized to counter the influence of jihadism. For proof of this, you only need to visit Salafist websites, which multiply their warnings against the actions of the Islamic State, whose members are described by the unflattering term "dogs of Hell".

While in Algeria it was necessary to call on Saudi religious references to encourage defection, in Egypt it was leaders belonging to the jihadist movement who provided a religious framework for abandoning the armed struggle. Indeed, the rejection of jihad by certain al-Qaeda militants and the ceasefire signed by Islamic Jihad and the Gamâ'a islâmiyya at the end of the 1990s were prompted in particular by the publication of a book by the intellectual reference of Osama bin Laden's organization, Imam al-Sharif, better known as Dr. Fadl. Although little-known, this fellow traveler of Osama bin Laden and Aymen al-Zawahiri was one of the founders of al-Qaeda in 1988, and the leader of the jihadist organization Islamic Jihad in Egypt, which carried out numerous attacks during the 1990s. After September 11, 2001, he was arrested in Yemen and transferred to Egypt, where he was sentenced to life imprisonment. During his imprisonment, he wrote a 200-page book, Wathiqat tarshîd al-'aml al-jihadî fî-l Misr (Guidance document on jihadist activity in the world and in Egypt), in which he argues that the killing of innocent people is contrary to Islamic values. He asserts that "Every drop of blood that has been shed or is being shed in Afghanistan and Iraq is the responsibility of Bin Laden, Zawahiri and their followers". "The terrorist attacks of September 11 [2001] are immoral, and they have proved counterproductive," he adds. "Attacking the United States head-on is now the shortest route to glory and power among Arabs and Muslims. But what's the point of destroying one of your enemy's buildings if your enemy then destroys one of your countries? What's the point of killing one of your own if, in return, he wipes out a thousand of yours? That, in a nutshell, is my analysis of 9/11. He is equally critical of Muslims who settle in the West and then commit terrorist acts. "If they have given you permission to enter their homes, to live with them, if they have provided security for you and your money, if they have offered you the opportunity to work or study, or have granted you political asylum," explains Dr. Fadl, "then it is 'contrary to honor' to 'betray them with death and destruction'".

These ideological changes were accompanied by a shift in the way militants perceived their armed struggle. From being "fighters for freedom and divine justice" against taghût (idolatry), they become terrorists. This transformation undoubtedly diminishes the symbolic reward for their commitment: : they are no longer actors of divine will.

In addition to delegitimizing the use of violence in religious terms, these doctrinal reversals also take the form of a critical assessment of jihad. They are based on the idea that violence alone does not pay off; on the contrary, it can be counter-productive to the original aim of overthrowing godless power and creating an Islamic state.

b) The effects of public policies

To explain exit processes, it is certainly important to highlight religious justifications aimed at delegitimizing jihad, but it is also worth emphasizing the role of state strategies aimed at making recourse to armed action more costly and less justified. Research into the effects of public policies, whether repressive or preventive, tends to show the ambivalent nature of their consequences. For the proponents of the various versions of frustration theory, repression tends to radicalize protesters and thus slow down or even prevent their disengagement. For proponents of resource mobilization theory, these policies would have a demobilizing effect and encourage disengagement, due to the imbalance between the costs, risks and benefits of violent action. Stephen Mullin believes that amnesty and rehabilitation policies for incarcerated jihadists have an effect on their relationship with radicalism. He shows that the release of jihadists has led them to abandon armed struggle. Indeed, the amnesty policies implemented in Algeria have contributed to the demobilization of jihadists. In 1999, two months after the election of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire, followed a month later by President Bouteflika's Independence Day pardon for 2,300 imprisoned Islamist militants (is that right?). One gets the impression that it was the AIS that stopped fighting, even before the amnesty. This hardly corroborates the thesis defended above). At the same time, the Algerian president was defending before Parliament his "national reconciliation" law granting amnesty to AIS members and sympathizers. This law, adopted by an overwhelming majority in both chambers (288 votes in favor out of 380 in the National Assembly and 131 votes in favor out of 150 in the Council of the Nation), was ratified by referendum on September 16, 1999, and several thousand more prisoners were quickly released. Objectively, this policy encouraged many jihadists to lay down their arms, convinced that they would no longer be bothered by Algerian justice.

In Morocco, the main ideologues of the jihadist movement, who were sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for being the brains behind the May 16, 2003 attacks in Casablanca, were almost all released after a few years. This early release, decided by the authorities, was negotiated between the Moroccan monarchy and the doctrinaires of jihad, in exchange for their ceasing all calls for violence and their opposition to armed action in the name of Islam. The best-known and most publicized of these ideologues is undoubtedly Muhammad al-Fizazi, long considered one of the most virulent

preachers of the Moroccan jihadist movement, until his imprisonment. A beneficiary of a royal pardon, he has since shown unwavering support for King Mohammed VI and frontally opposes the departure of Moroccans for the "jihad" in Syria. Another jihad leader, Abu Hafs, also convicted of involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings and released in 2011, has become a leading opponent of the Islamic State, calling for a liberal reform of Muslim law to better counter it. In his own words, he "de-radicalized" himself while in prison, and today considers that "Islamic heritage" needs to be revised to fight Daesh.

Often presented as an incubator for radicalization, reinforcing the idea that only violence pays, prison can also have a "de-radicalizing" effect. Farid Benyettou and David Vallat , sentenced to 6 and 5 years respectively, claim to have been de-radicalized in prison. Following the example of John Rawls, according to whom prison serves to punish and protect society, it is possible to assert that, in the case of jihadist "radicalized" individuals, it contributes in theory to making them understand that they risk being punished if they commit further acts of terrorism. While a stay in detention may have a curative effect, it has above all a dissuasive effect, making some of them "aware" that the violent option is too costly in relation to the benefits of this type of commitment. Kamel Daoudi, a Franco-Algerian sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment for intending to carry out an attack in front of the US embassy in France, testifies on a France 4 television program: "I can't deny my past. It's an integral part of my life. At the time, I thought that violence could make things better. Now I realize that it's counter-productive. That period is behind me. All I want is to pick up where I left off...". It is even possible that in the case of jihadist defendants, the fear of prison has a demobilizing effect, more so than incarceration itself. During the first trials we attended in France, it was striking to note that the vast majority of defendants indicted for terrorism stated that they had distanced themselves from the ideas of the Islamic State. While it is difficult to gauge the sincerity of these statements, they are very different from those of defendants from Corsican, Basque, far-left or far-right separatist circles, who continue to claim loud and clear before the magistrates the legitimacy of their struggle.

c) Jihadists' entry into politics: from revolution to integration

In some cases, the radicalization of Islamic organizations stems from the closure of the political field and their inability to defend their political project "peacefully". This radicalization can increase with the repression of their members, who see power as a tyrant to be brought down by force. The justifications for the use of violence by the Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb can be partly explained by his exclusion from the political arena. Similarly, the banning of the Islamic Salvation Front and the imprisonment of its leaders in 1991 led its members to turn to violence as the only way to respond to

repression and establish an Islamic state. Conversely, it can be argued that de-radicalization and disengagement can be the result of (re)integration into the political arena. De-radicalization of jihadists is therefore linked above all to the degree of institutionalization and political opportunities available to them. The more political opportunities they have, the more likely they are to abandon armed struggle. Movements such as the Gamâ'a islâmiyya in Egypt and the Shabiba islâmiyya in Morocco, which emphasized the revolutionary dimension of their activism, gradually abandoned violence and opted for legal action as they became more officially integrated into the political landscape. In the 1970s and 1980s, they engaged in violent action to destroy institutions they considered anti-Islamic from within, but were too weak to succeed. The international experience of September 11 2001 and the Casablanca bombings in 2003 have also had a kind of "regulating" effect on the majority of Islamist movements in the Arab world, helping them to avoid repression. Little by little, their leaders got caught up in the political game.

From revolutionary rhetoric, they moved on to protest demands, before becoming conservative pillars of society and the state. With the backing of various governments, the jihadists' model of political integration mobilizes a subtle game of self-inclusion and self-exclusion from the parliamentary system, the aim of which is to reassure its base, seduced by the anti-establishment dimension of the party's ideology, while at the same time seeking to appear to other parties and the political system as agreeable players and a stabilizing factor. The aim is to establish themselves as a stabilizing, non-disruptive political force, while retaining their protest potential. A large proportion of those who today claim to be moderate Islamists in the Maghreb and Egypt were militants of violent and radical action in the 1970s and 1980s, a means they felt was the only one capable of establishing an Islamic state in a context of closure and political repression of all forms of opposition. The Algerian Mahfoud Nahnah, founder of the Hamas movement, distinguished himself through sabotage operations. The current Moroccan Prime Minister, Abdelilah Ben Kirane, who founded the Justice and Development Party (PJD), began his career with the Shabiba islâmiyya, which is believed to be responsible for several political assassinations.

II. Micro-sociological and personal factors

a) Jihadist disenchantment or the accumulation of negative experiences

The logics of jihadist disaffiliation also draw on the exhaustion of the grand narratives and grand totalizing constructions of Islamic meaning that have largely constituted the ideological matrix of jihad. "Islam is the solution", the slogan underpinning the jihadists' utopia, through which religious reference was presented as a global framework

providing the answer to all questions concerning the organization of social life, is now "short of breath". Much more than a slogan, this formula was fed by the idea that a total response, formulated on the basis of religion, could solve all the problems facing Muslims. While this expression enjoyed its heyday in the ranks of the jihadists at the start of each revolutionary uprising, creating the hope of an Islamic revival capable of founding a new society, and fuelling an Arabic-language literature on Islamic responses to the challenges of contemporary Muslim societies, it has shown its limitations when put to the test of reality. Indeed, after three years of hoping that the Islamic State would embody the fraternity and solidarity of the ideal city of Medina, more and more European jihadists are joining the ranks of deserters, citing the failure and unfulfilled promises of Daesh's Caliph, al-Baghdadi, of a better life thanks to Islam. This totalizing approach is exhausted, not only because of its disconnect with the concrete experience of jihadists, but also because the idea of an Islamic panacea as a solution to the problems of Muslims everywhere is proving ineffective. Thus, jihadist disenchantment is characterized by a mismatch between individual aspirations and their realization within jihadist movements. Satisfaction with commitment declines.

On reading and listening to the accounts of disaffiliates, we can see that, on coming into contact with the jihadist reality, they all experienced strong disagreements with the milieu and, more specifically, with the modus operandi and political choices of the jihadist organizations to which they belonged. Whatever form these disagreements took, they provoked relatively strong feelings of disappointment or disillusionment in these individuals, prompting them to leave the jihadist organizations.
By setting high entry fees, jihadist organizations have ab ovo encouraged allegiance to the movement in a way that restricts speaking out or defecting. While European jihadists joined the ranks of the Islamic State with the conviction of participating in an Islamic front against the impiety of Bashar al-Assad, many left them having witnessed internal quarrels between the various jihadist factions. For Peter Neumann, "Many deserters argue that clashes against other Sunni groups are wrong, counterproductive and even religiously illegitimate" . Because the Islamic State kills Muslims, instead of protecting them, the jihadists only divide and weaken the Islamic opposition. Their brutality towards civilians and the corruption of their leaders also shock recruits. Deserters report that their superiors showed little consideration for possible collateral victims, particularly women and children. They were also offended by the arbitrary execution of hostages and the mistreatment of local populations. "The main reason I left was that I wasn't doing what I came to do, which was to help the Syrian people on a humanitarian level," Ibrahim told a CBS journalist in February 2015.

The practices of Saddam Hussein's former regime still apply: "In the army, they treat you like a dog. It's not an Islamic organization in the true sense of the word, where

everything is Islamic from beginning to end; it's only its members who claim to be Islamic. But the institutions and practices have nothing to do with that. They're more like the practices of the old Baathist regime," he says, referring to the movement to which Saddam Hussein, among others, belonged. He describes his daily life in the "caliphate" as a distressing period: "I've never experienced the humiliation, injustice and segregation of Dawla. However, Peter Neumann's study reminds us that it is only violence against other Sunnis that shocks the recruits. They are not indignant about the fate of religious minorities such as the Yezidis.

b) Fear of dying

Numerous studies show the fascination of European jihadists with death. For some, dying a martyr's death seems to be the sole objective of their violent commitment. They are said to be driven by a mortifying nihilism. Clearly, the numerous attacks that have taken place in Europe and the Arab world seem to support this analysis. Moreover, one of the figures of jihadist commitment within the Islamic State is that of the inghimasi, literally the one who immerses or melts into an element. Unlike the kamikaze, another figure of jihadist militancy, the inghimasi fights with weapons in hand while wearing an explosive belt around his body that is activated only when he runs out of ammunition or feels trapped. Even if it's quite rare, an inghimasi sometimes comes back alive from a mission, which is never the case for a kamikaze, who is killed or captured if he fails.

However, it would be wrong to assume that all Islamic State jihadists fight with the aim of systematically seeking death. Indeed, the first testimonies of "returnees" show that the fear of dying, or of having seen "brothers in arms" die, was one of the triggers for distancing oneself from violence. One explains that he decided to return to France after being wounded in combat, another that he was dismayed by the decisions of the Islamic State command to abandon French co-religionists to certain death without sending reinforcements. For Isabelle Sommier, "when death comes in the form of a concrete event, its effects are similar in all cases, putting the brakes on the warrior's momentum". From the few testimonies I've been able to gather, it's clear that the fear of dying for a cause that is ultimately beyond the individual's control prompts him to leave the jihad. In addition to death, the daily reality of lives perceived as difficult by jihadis can be a trigger for disaffiliation. The lack of hot water, basic foodstuffs or even the international coalition's bombardment of towns held by the Islamic State are highlighted by disaffiliates. "In Syria or Iraq, no imam, no Koranic school welcomes you when you arrive. In fact, in the cities, near the combat zones, there's nothing for guys like me who are new to religion. It's not their priority," 20-year-old Sofiane told France 2.

c) A burdensome jihadist commitment

The key to disaffiliation in this context lies in the fact that the commitment is now perceived as burdensome and restrictive, all the more so as it has often been experienced as a sacrifice (of professional life, family life or university studies) or a "deviant career". If there is a system of rewards for militancy among jihadists, both immaterial (satisfaction in serving the cause of Islam, feeling of belonging to an enlightened avant-garde and a religious aristocracy) and material (pay, for example), it struggles to satisfy a member who sees the costs around him multiplying. As a result, ad honorem and symbolic rewards are no longer enough to maintain commitments in the face of the multiplicity of risks run by jihadists. If, to quote Albert Hirschman, the militant can be satisfied with a situation in which "the individual benefit of collective action [is] not the difference between the hoped-for result and the effort made, but the sum of these two magnitudes", he nonetheless expects this sacrifice to be rewarded by promotion. However, the returnees claim that positions of responsibility are monopolized by Iraqis and that French speakers are relegated to menial tasks and often regarded as cannon fodder. This assertion seems to be confirmed by the testimony of Abu Omar al-Faransi, who states in a video published on the Internet: "It's the law of the strongest. The Iraqi is above everyone else. After that, it's the emirs. Then it's the man above the woman and the Muslim above the slave [...]. They're not interested in anything that isn't Arab and Sunni. They're into nationalism, nothing to do with what we came here for. So, in fact, we're dying for nothing. [...] It's an Iraqi tribal enterprise". Others denounce a form of racism. An Indian told the Times of India that he had been scrubbing toilets for six months.

The high level of commitment, experienced by these people in terms of constraints, soon raises other questions, notably that of the freedom left to individuals. Many will interpret their former commitment, or the commitment of jihadists in general, in terms of deprivation of freedom. From then on, the heaviness of life within the Islamic State (deprivation, moral rigorism, military discipline, etc.), opposing any autonomy for the individual, can be a factor in defection, because the community is experienced as a prison.

Towards a typology of jihadist disaffiliates

On the basis of these elements, it is possible to propose a typology of the different figures of the disaffiliated. First, there is the disengaged figure (behavioral dimension of disaffiliation). Voluntarily, following an individual process of self-criticism of their militancy, or under duress (arrest, incarceration...), the disengaged no longer wish to participate in the activities of the jihadist group to which they belonged. This does

not mean, however, that they have abandoned the value system advocated by jihad. Michaël Younnes Delefortrie , a former member of Sharia4Belgium , explains in his book J'ai été djihadiste en Syrie (I was a jihadist in Syria) that he joined Syria at the end of 2013, spending six weeks in the ranks of the Islamic State. He affirms that he continues to share its ideology and would go back to Syria if he didn't risk prison.
Next comes the figure of the dis-identified (organizational dimension of disaffiliation). This figure is often embodied by individuals who have become disillusioned with their involvement in jihadist organizations. While they may have broken with a particular organization or movement, this does not mean that they have abandoned the ideal of jihad. It is not uncommon, as David Thomson's survey tends to confirm, for returnees to be critical of the Islamic State apparatus, but they have not abandoned the idea that violence can be legitimate in building an Islamic society.

These same returnees make no secret of their desire to join other fields of jihad that they consider legitimate. In his book, David Thomson refers to a young woman who returned in the summer of 2015, saying that the attack on Charlie Hebdo was the happiest day of her life and that she dreams of a woman one day committing an attack in France, while recounting her disastrous experience during her stay with the Islamic State.

Finally, the figure of the de-radicalized. A disaffiliated person is qualified as such when the individual no longer wishes to adhere to the value system advocated by jihad (cognitive dimension of disaffiliation). While this is the best-known form of jihadist disaffiliation, it is not the most common, at least among European jihadists returning from Syria and Iraq. This is the ultimate aim of the de-radicalization programs underway in many European countries, which seek to deconstruct the system of representation and values and substitute others. In Germany, the ideological component is an important element of de-radicalization programs. This includes deconstructing the concepts of jihadist ideology. In Great Britain, the Active Change Foundation (ACF), set up by former Islamists in 2003, has set itself the goal of deconstructing and "delegitimizing" extremist jihadist discourse, through workshops on Islam.

Some jihadists opt for a depoliticized and "peaceful" form of Islam: quietist Salafism, which nevertheless shares a common doctrinal basis with jihadism. This de-radicalization by substitution is based on the idea that the military strategy of direct action and agitprop are not the best options for establishing God's sovereignty on Earth. Ex-jihadists who have become quietist Salafists are now convinced that the advent of Allah's reign on Earth will require a series of steps, including religious training to instill an Islamic consciousness. Through preaching, they hope for a total overthrow of the world's

hierarchical and social organization, which will grant them collective pre-eminence, no longer through violence but through religious training. They are thus waiting for a political and social revolution. Thus, the return to true Islam will give rise to a social movement that will enable the establishment of an Islamic state. While the radicality of this reading of Islam is not embodied in violence, which it otherwise condemns, it does take shape in a religious radicalism or even sectarianism in the Weberian sense of the term, insofar as it seems to serve a precise function: to delegitimize all forms of authority by theologically outlawing the belief system of parents and the social order insofar as the latter is based on a mode of unequal arrangement between young people and non-Muslim societies. In this context, the religious radicalism and anti-Western imprecations of militants act as a "safety valve" that distracts them from direct action.

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Farid Benyettou est considéré comme le cerveau de la filière des Buttes-Chaumont. Il aurait incité de nombreux jeunes à rejoindre les jihadistes irakiens en 2004. Il aurait été le mentor de Chérif Kouachi, l'un des auteurs de l'attentat de Charlie Hebdo et proche de Dalil Boubakeur. Voir son ouvrage, coécrit avec Dounia Bouzar, Mon djihad, itinéraire d'un repenti, Paris, Éditions Autrement, 2017.

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directe, cette association aujourd'hui dissoute aurait envoyé sous sa houlette près de 70 Belges sur les 450 partis en Syrie.

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