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Re-Conceptualization of Political Trust in Relation to Justice

Adaletle İlişkili Olarak Siyasal Güvenin Yeniden Kavramsallaştırılması

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Abstract

This study seeks to contribute to the conceptualization of political trust by uncovering its moral and affective dimensions, particularly its relationship with justice. In the current atmosphere of politics, political trust becomes a complex concept, especially in the face of injustices. Despite extensive discussions on trust and justice in the literature, the interplay between them within the political context remains underexplored. While analytic philosophy delves into a multifaceted exploration of trust, political science often limits its perspective to a performance evaluation grounded in rational calculations and interests. The deficiency in analytic philosophy lies in its failure to adequately address the socio-political dimension of trust, as it adopts a predominantly individualistic viewpoint that neglects politically significant aspects, including justice. The prevailing trend in political science tends to downplay the affective and moral facets of trust. This study endeavours to bridge this gap by re-evaluating our approach to political trust, emphasizing its importance and exploring its determinants, particularly in connection to justice. The argument posits that, in addition to and beyond rational evaluations in politics, a comprehensive understanding of political trust and its relationship to justice necessitates an examination of the affective and moral components, underlying perceptions of trust and justice in real political and social contexts.

Keywords: Trust, Political trust, Justice, Moral emotions

Öz

Bu çalışma, siyasal güvenin özellikle adaletle ilişkili olan ahlaki ve duygusal boyutlarını ortaya çıkararak siyasal güvenin kavramsallaştırılmasına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Mevcut siyasi atmosferin oluşturduğu adaletsizlikler karşısında siyasal güven karmaşık bir kavram haline gelmiştir. Literatürde güven ve adalet üzerine yapılan geniş tartışmalara rağmen, bunların siyasi bağlamdaki etkileşimi üzerinde henüz yeterli çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Analitik felsefe, güven konusu çok boyutlu olarak incelemekte, ancak siyaset bilimi genellikle perspektifini rasyonel hesaplamalara ve çıkarılara dayalı bir performans değerlendirmesine sınırlamaktadır. Analitik felsefenin eksikliği, özellikle adalet dahil olmak üzere politik açıdan önemli yönleri ihmal eden, bireyci bir bakış açısı benimsemesi nedeniyle siyasal güvenin sosyo-politik boyutuna yeterince odaklanmamasında yatar. Öte yandan, siyaset bilimindeki yaygın eğilim, güvenin duygusal ve ahlaki yönlerini göz ardı etmektedir. Bu çalışma, siyasal güvene yaklaşımımızı, önemini ve adalet açısından belirleyici faktörlerini yeniden değerlendirerek bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Siyasette rasyonel değerlendirmelerin yanı sıra, güven ve adalet algılarının duygusal ve ahlaki bileşenleri üzerinden değerlendirilmesinin, siyasal güveni ve onun adaletle olan ilişkisini gerçek siyasi ve sosyal koşulları anlamak açısından önemli olduğu savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güven, Siyasal güven, Adalet, Ahlaki duygular

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Introduction

Trust has been a subject of study in various academic fields, ranging from sociology to philosophy, psychology to politics. Consequently, there exist diverse definitions without complete agreement, but each approach contributes to understanding the characteristics of the concept. The central question revolves around the sources of trust: whom do we trust, with what motivations, who is trustworthy, and how do we decide or feel it? Trust can be rooted in rational evaluations based on information and past experiences, assumed to support reciprocal interests (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 1988; Coleman, 1999; Hardin, 2001, 2002). Alternatively, trust may be based on emotions and moral values, such as sharing values, goodwill, and caring for others (Baier, 1986; Jones, 1996, 1999, 2019; Lahno, 2001; Uslaner, 2002, 2004; Barbalet, 2006), or it can be seen as a virtue, a desirable aspect of character (Flores & Solomon, 1998; Potter, 2002). Various conceptualizations of trust unveil crucial dimensions; therefore, it is a blend of these elements with the presence of complexity of when and why an element precedes others in particular circumstances. However, the crucial oversight in all approaches lies in how our trust in others, whether in interpersonal, social, or political realms, is intricately linked to our perception of justice—a moral ingredient essential to trust relations. Trust appears as a reflection of expectations which includes moral judgements about the other's fairness or rightness.

Despite a broad philosophical study on theorization of trust, theorization on political trust has remained narrow in terms of its determinants. The research on political trust is still dominated by the rational choice approach, focusing on its interest-seeking aspect. It is plausible to claim that a person is inclined to trust the government more when its performance is demonstrated to be satisfactory. The positive correlation observed between the factors associated with good governance and political trust substantiates this claim. While this perspective also accounts for the institutional requisites of political justice, it oversimplifies the intricate nature of political trust, which encompasses far more complex constituents and implications. When making moral judgments about a political issue or leader, our tendency to trust or distrust is intricately connected to our sense of justice. To gain a more nuanced understanding of political trust, it is essential to consider justice as a crucial variable, along with its moral and affective dimensions. Additionally, other features of trust, such as solidarity, care, and empathy, become more significant in this context, in relation to justice. Moreover, the prevailing approach unintentionally neglects the profound significance of political trust, which underpins the very foundations of society and politics, extending beyond the evaluation of state officials' performance. In spite of the necessity and inevitability of a conceptual distinction between political and social trust, it is valuable to acknowledge their interconnected nature, illustrating how political trust is intertwined with individual and social spheres.

This study aims to outline the fundamental components of political trust and its connection to justice, challenging the predominant approach to political trust and enriching it by incorporating the dimension of justice. The first section introduces three basic approaches to trust in reference to the studies in analytical philosophy which mostly discuss trust at the interpersonal level, namely, the rational choice, the emotion-based, and the virtue approaches. The second section critically examines the limitations of the

mainstream approach, specifically the rational choice theory, in political trust research. It proposes a broader approach to political trust that considers the plural and intricate nature of rationality, and the intersectionality of morality and politics to elucidate how political trust takes form and is influenced by moral and affective judgments. In light of the re-conceptualization of political trust, the last section delves into the relationship between political trust and justice, exploring the shared affective and non-affective dimensions in both concepts—all of which contribute to strengthening the connection between trust and justice.

The Approaches to Trust

The Rational Choice Approach

The rational choice approach defines trust as a rationally assessed belief or decision, cognitively made in accordance with self-interests and based on information and/or past experiences with trustee. A trust relationship can exist as much and as long as it serves for the interests of both parties, which imposes an obligation to the parties to respond to trust back in a trustworthy manner. Echoing the social contract view, the account suggests that when it is acknowledged by all parties that the betrayal of trust is not in anyone's interest, the trust relationship can sustain itself. In that vein, Gambetta (1988), for instance, defines trust as a basis for cooperation, and argues that people are more likely to opt for building a trust relationship even if it is risky for maximizing self-interests because the cost of damaging the cooperation is regarded as higher. Luhmann (1988), similarly touches upon trust's helping to solve problems of risks in the face of complexities of the modern world. For him, the "unmanageable complexity" of the modern world has led people to rely on strategies rather than emotions in deciding whether to trust or not. Familiarities, at this point, work as facilitators for reducing the possible risks of uncertainty comes along with trusting. Information, brought by familiarity, therefore, plays a crucial role in determining trust.

Indeed, in addition to its emphasis on cooperative and information-based characteristics of trust, the vital principle of the rational choice approach is its equating rationality with utility maximization. The mainstream rational choice theorist, James S. Coleman (1990), defines the parties of a trust relationship as "purposive, having the aim of satisfying their interests" (p. 96). Trust can be built when both parties make rational calculations of potential gains and losses, and are willing to maintain their relationship. From a utilitarian perspective, Russell Hardin, who is one of the most referred theorists in trust studies, defines trust as a rational assessment, which he calls "encapsulated interest view" that "my trust of you is encapsulated in your interest in fulfilling the trust" when there is "an incentive grounded in the value of maintaining the relationship into the future" (Hardin, 2001, p. 3). Therefore, for him, trust is possible when a trustor makes a rational calculation whether trustworthiness of the trustee is in accordance with his/her self-interests. Moreover, Hardin, limits the domain of trust, defining it as a three-part relationship: "A trust B to do X" (Hardin, 2002, p. 9). For instance, a doctor can be trusted in his/her expertise but not in his/her friend-relationships. Thus, he is sceptical whether people tend to trust others in the specific contexts about that their information lacks.

In a hypothetical case, for Hardin, for example, a shopkeeper does not choose to sell bad food to avoid losing customers (e.g. not to ruin his/her reputation in the neighbourhood or to not be punished by the authorities). His/her motivation to be trustworthy is then associated to his/her self-interests. On the other hand, what the rational choice approach might miss is that, his/her trustworthiness is also dependent on the just rules of the relationship between the shopkeeper and customers set up legally and socially. For instance, if there is no legal regulation on selling bad food or any social norm that makes it not worthy to maintain a trustful and just relationship between the shopkeeper and customers (e.g. tourists are deceived in the marketplace mostly because they are not regular customers who can ruin the shops' reputation), it would be not in the interest of the shopkeeper to be trustworthy. The important point which is overlooked in the rational choice approach is that even if a trust relationship serves for the interests of the parties, the relationship needs to be grounded on a just one. If deceiving a customer does not lead to any legal punishment or social condemnation, it would become a matter of injustice, as well as damaging trust relationships. While the establishment of justice in the relationship between the shopkeeper and customers does not guarantee a trustful condition, a just order is a prerequisite for meeting their reciprocal self-interests. Consequently, this sets the foundation for the flourishing of a trust relationship.

Emotion-Based Trust

The alternative approaches to the rational choice theorization of trust are various but it would be plausible to categorize them under the title of trust as an emotion because their main distinctive theorization commonly lies in the argument that people are more likely to rely on their emotions in trusting when information about the possible trustee is absent and/or the trustor deliberately chooses not to rely on the existent information. The view does not regard emotions as non-cognitive, irrational or unreasonable but as a kind of pattern to perceive the world and oneself, and is a sort of insight that the evidence partially exists (Jones, 1996; Lahno, 2001; Barbalet, 2006). In a similar way to the Aristotelian understanding, emotions function to shape our conscious life by guiding us to perceive and judge the world in a certain way (Lahno, 2001).

Underlining its cooperative function, Lahno (2001) approaches trust as displaying an emotional attitude towards others so as to deal with the uncertainties of the world where familiarity among them is not present. Unlike Luhmann, Lahno (2001) argues that the complexities of the world are so unmanageable that it makes it harder to make rational or strategic calculations in trusting; therefore, people tend to trust based on their emotions. These emotions are fed by sharing common values and goals; however, in a trust relationship, parties need to treat each other as persons with dignity, acknowledging and respecting their personal values, goals and capability to choose actions.

In a similar line, trust is also defined as reliance of the good will of the others by Baier, suggesting that "Where one depends on another's good will, one is necessarily vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity to harm one when one trusts, and also shows one's confidence that they will not take it" (1986, p. 235). Two arguments arise out from the definition; firstly, trusting makes the trustor open him/herself to the other by recognizing the possibility of harm, but secondly, with the

confidence that the trustee will pass the possibility of harm, and act with a good will. On the other hand, the trustee acknowledges his/her responsibility to look after or care for the trustor because the trustor trusts the discretionary power of the trustee (Baier, 1986). Both trustor and trustee share a common understanding that they care for what each other cares. This relationship between trustor and trustee reveals the need for concern for others rather than mere personal interests.

A contemporary philosopher in trust studies, Karen Jones, has developed the argument, describing trust as an affective attitude where the trustor has an attitude of optimism that the trustee is competent and responsive to his/her dependency in the domain of the trust relationship (Jones, 2019). This optimism is not a general outlook but specific to the domain of trust and about the good will and competency of the other. The determinants of competence might be technical, such as professionalism and expertise; but they may also have moral or virtuous characteristics, such as kindness, loyalty or compassion (Jones, 1999). In critique to the rational choice approach, Jones (1996) also argues that trust is not a belief and cannot be willed due to the fact that it is mostly resistant to information or evidence; rather, trusting is the attitude of optimism itself and emotionally motivated which determines a distinctive personal insight.

Referring to the above example of the shopkeeper, the emotion-based approach would suggest that trusting by the customer is possible not solely due to the shopkeeper's self-interest in avoiding selling bad food but also a display of his/her responsibility to care about and concern for the customer's wellbeing. Care and concern here is necessary to show that the shopkeeper is committed to upholding trust even if it goes against his/her own interests. While the shopkeeper's self-interest aligns with his/her trustworthiness, it is not sufficient for earning trust; being trustworthy also demands a moral motivation. If trust arises out of some particular emotions, as the account argues, then some of these emotions could be moral ones. Although the account does not provide a comprehensive explanation of these moral dimensions of trust, one of them is justice. Trust is also a reflection of expectations which includes moral judgements about the other's fairness or rightness. The emphasis on caring in trust relations also aligns with its connection to justice. The ethics of care, for instance, advocates for the moral obligation to address the specific needs of individuals, emphasizing the interconnectedness and interdependency among people, unlike the liberal idea that relies on an abstract view of individuals and rights for justice. The concept of care involves both caring for others and caring about others, necessitating the recognition of their needs, a willingness to assume moral responsibility for their well-being, and the aptitude to respond competently to their requirements (Tronto, 1994). Care, in this context, encompasses various practices, dispositions, or virtues aimed at maintaining and restoring individuals and their environments, contributing to the cultivation of a more just society. Therefore, care incorporates components of both justice and trust.

The Virtue Account

The virtue account agrees with the emotion-based approach in many senses but it approaches trust from the virtue ethics perspective. Potter (2002), for instance, describes the necessity of good will and caring for the other in trust relations as a disposition—displayed in a personal character that diffuses in many contexts. Therefore, trust is a

“prediction of being well-treated that is grounded in a belief that ... the other’s good will is part of a more general disposition that extends beyond the context of this particular relationship” (Potter, 2002, p. 5). Similarly, trustworthiness is “taking care of those things that others entrust to one and (following the Doctrine of the Mean) whose ways of caring are neither excessive nor deficient” (Potter, 2002, p. 16). As the virtue ethics suggests, the mean is desirable too because excess of trust can surpass the capabilities of a trustee, leading to inevitable disappointment on the part of the trustor due to overly high expectations. Alternatively, trust may impose excessive power on the trustee, increasing the risks of betrayal. On the other hand, a lack of trust or trustworthiness reflects a lack of moral concern for the others, resulting in annulling any kind of cooperation. Another feature of trust and trustworthiness is that they are both virtues because there is a circular relationship between them. According to Potter (2002), gaining trust necessitates possessing the virtue of trustworthiness. However, being trustworthy also requires being trusted. A person can develop a trustworthy character when entrusted with the care of certain values, as this is the only means through which they can demonstrate care and responsibility.

The main argument of the virtue account, departing from Jones (1996), is that trust can be willed because virtues require acting with choices, which entails engaging the will (Potter, 2002; Flores & Solomon, 1998). If trust could not be willed, then it would be impossible to cultivate it. Regarding cultivation of trust and trustworthiness in society, the account, moreover, underlines that even if they are individual dispositions, the formation of one’s character is, in part, influenced by social, political, and economic structures. The institutional and cultural framework of society, where power and privilege asymmetry endure, plays a crucial role in determining how responsibilities are distributed, how accountability of institutions is ensured, and how people are optimistic about the future. Therefore, trust and trustworthiness can flourish by all these means of society.

The virtue account is the only account among philosophical approaches to trust that is more convenient to search for the components of trust in political matters in relation to justice. This is firstly because it makes a reference to virtues’ socially constructed nature, affecting the formation of the dispositions for trust and trustworthiness. Potter (2002) interprets Aristotle in the way that the virtue of an individual is interconnected with the virtue of the state and its institutions. Thus, the structure of society plays a crucial role in either fostering or constraining individuals’ capacity for morality, as well as in bolstering or diminishing trust. Consequently, the just set up of a society brings out a trustful and trustworthy society. Moreover, the circular relationship between trust and trustworthiness that perpetuates each other pushes people to develop sensitivity against injustices. Regarding the unwarranted distrust marginalized people face, for instance, Potter (2002) refers to the necessity of consistency with a conception of justice in deciding whom to trust. In a similar vein, secondly, in connection between virtues and justice, O’Neill (1996) suggests that the institutional acknowledgment of the principles of justice¹ alone does not guarantee the establishment of a completely just society. Virtues that influence our actions, attitudes, and emotions, imposing moral obligations, are necessary to bridge

1 O’Neill (1996) defines the universal principle of justice as rejection of injury while the inclusive principle of virtue is defined as rejection of indifference to and neglect of others.

the gap at the interpersonal, social, and institutional levels. Virtues such as care and concern, identified as integral to trust, contribute to the development of solidarity, while the virtue of trust itself fosters cooperation, participation, and engagement with others, thus constructing a trustworthy and just social framework.

Political Trust

Not all the philosophical approaches presented above directly describe political trust specifically but they all reveal important elements of trust in general which also connote to the political trust definition. In addition to these components of trust, political trust is commonly defined in terms of its object—towards politicians and political institutions, such as government, judiciary, parliament, bureaucracy and so forth, and its sources as based on the performance of these groups (Uslaner, 2018). Although it is necessary to make a distinction between types of trust in terms of their scope, such as interpersonal trust, social trust and political trust, it is also crucial to acknowledge the multifaced nature of trust in politics. It would be valuable to regard the scope of political trust as wide as the scope of the political because the political realm is effective in shaping interpersonal and social trust, too. For instance, research reveals that the dislike towards the rival parties' supporters, Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. has been intensified to a higher degree in the last ten years due to the dual design of politics as friends and enemies boosted by populist leaders (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2018), which also signals rising distrust between these two groups of partisans. Trust has also been polarized socially because of the growing negativity that partisans hold towards the opposing political party, which also leads to politically motivated reasoning in individual or social circumstances (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2018). This example exposes that distrust toward a political party due to the politics' boosting polarization has also led to distrust among the partisans at the social level. Although motivations behind to trust or distrust a political party differs from trusting or distrusting a person or a group of people, the realm of politics diffuses to the social realm. Nussbaum (2018) gives another example of the current rise of distrust among the U.S. citizens who are polarized along political lines, "My students don't trust anyone who voted for Trump, and they view such people as like a hostile force, "deplorables" at best, fascists at worst. Many Trump supporters return the compliment, seeing students and universities as subversive enemies of "real people" (pp. 7-8). Hence, even though the conceptualization of political trust regards the object of it as political leaders and institutions, its sources and spheres of influence are wider. Consequently, it is worthy to consider the intersectionality of the realms of trust in social and political areas in order to better grasp how political trust functions and what the underlying motivations are.

In terms of the sources of political trust, the mainstream approach addresses the performance evaluation of politicians and institutions based on information. According to Uslaner (2018), political trust seeks to assess how well the performance aligns with public expectations. The criteria used to measure it typically focus on whether individuals have confidence that political leaders and institutions operate within their designated roles. In spite of the complexity of this evaluation, the prominent approach to political trust embraces the rational choice approach that it is regarded as a strategic decision

by evaluating the actions or commitments of political leaders and institutions based on whether they serve for the benefits of the trustors. The performance evaluation is therefore also regarded as possible only when parties possess adequate information about or have past experiences with the trustee—politicians or institutions. Consequently, Hardin (1999) argues that two forms of political trust—trust in society and trust in the government—are unlikely to exist, as both society and government remain largely unknown to people. He interprets trust in society as arising from a Hobbesian understanding, where a government is needed to establish order in society, and citizens are obligated not to violate rules. On the other hand, trust in the government is seen as a Lockean concept, reflecting society's delegation of power to governors through a tacit trust for their own benefit and the protection of property (Hardin, 1999). Hardin emphasizes that the initial notion of the state providing order to foster citizen "trust" is not precisely trust in his terms but rather a form of fear that encourages individuals to "go along" with each other, yielding mutual benefits. The latter, according to Hardin, poses a challenge because trust cannot be implicitly established; it requires specific knowledge about the trustor. Therefore, citizens cannot trust the government since they lack sufficient knowledge about its institutions and officials. Hardin contends that citizens can only have confidence in governmental institutions based on their past activities, enhancing predictability through inductive expectations. Despite the fact that what people expect from the politics is supposed to go along with their self-interests, as the rational choice suggests; it is more challenging to understand the everyday politics from a merely self-utility maximization perspective.

Indeed, building trust, even in individual relationships, cannot rely solely on knowledge or self-interests. In politics as well, there are numerous instances where people act with a lack of information or ignorance of their self-interests. The essence of the rational choice perspective, in a general sense, lies in how social agents rationalize their judgments and align their actions with their interests. However, rationality at the individual level varies and does not always correspond to the rationality of the broader social and economic system. Although Hardin contextualizes trust with his three-party definition, providing a more practical and particularistic account, his theory falls short by not conceptualizing the context but reducing it to interest-seeking, resulting in an insufficient macro-level explanation for the social. Hardin's pessimism and skepticism about fostering trust among citizens and towards state institutions stem from this outlook, as he contends that it is not "rational" to trust citizens or state officials. Human action, however, occurs with different senses of rationality. The approach referred to as rational is the liberal and capitalist system, where individuals predominantly exhibit egoist moral tendencies with the goal of maximizing self-interests, and trust is seen as a means to navigate the complexities of society due to high interdependence in maintaining strategic relationships. Therefore, while Hardin argues that "The worst failing of contemporary political philosophy is its frequent irrelevance to actual and plausible conditions," (as cited in Gaus, 2018, p. 23), he, in fact, idealizes rationality by equating it with maximizing self-interests. Rationality, in this sense, may be an ideal for a liberal society and political system; however, the contemporary world is much more complex than this assertion suggests.

The idealized version of rationality, advocated by Hardin, does not always manifest itself in the political arena in the presence of several dynamics affecting political

trust sources. Cross-cultural research in political trust, for instance, reveal that some illiberal countries exhibit a higher level of political trust, as seen in China, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, compared to their liberal counterparts (van der Meer, 2017). Another study examining generalized trust in Chinese society finds that there is not a positive correlation between institutional confidence (used in the sense of Hardin's terminology) and institutional performance despite the prevalence of "extensive corruption in Chinese political institutions" (Steinhardt, 2011, p. 11). Setting aside potential methodological flaws in the research, the fact that this finding challenges the argument that corruption weakens trust in the state (e.g., Rothstein, 2011) also poses a challenge to the rational choice approach. This challenge arises from the similar understanding of objective and universal rationality, which is mostly relevant in liberal societies and political systems. It does not imply that corruption is not a significant factor in weakening social and political trust—there are also numerous cases, particularly in Western democracies, where it erodes trust at both the societal and political levels. However, this counter-argument indicates that other variables impact political trust beyond mere rational performance evaluation. For instance, another study conducted in 13 Western European countries reveals that citizens with lower levels of education are less likely to view corruption in governmental institutions as a significant factor in diminishing trust in the government (Hakhverdian & Mayne, 2012). Considering that the majority of these studies are based on determinants used by the rational choice approach—such as performance evaluation based on past information and self-interests—the results highlight how the rationality of citizens differs contextually, for example, in terms of geography and education level, from what the approach itself endorses.

As an alternative to the classical understanding of the rational choice theory, the role of emotions in political assessment and behavior, in addition to or rather than self-utility maximization, is more recently discussed in the literature, challenging to some extent the modern liberal understanding that has traditionally emphasized reasoning, rationality, and objectivity over motives such as desires or passion. For example, emotions, such as anger, are recognized as significant motivators for political mobilization and collective action against injustices (Koçan & Öncü, 2014; Thompson, 2006). The substantial influence of emotions in politics underscores that rationality is multifaceted, and simplifying it to self-utility or interest does not align with actual circumstances. This complexity is also evident in the realm of trust in politics, especially when information is scarce or distorted. As discussed earlier, information is a key element of trust at both personal and political levels. While it may be an ideal criterion for deciding to trust, it may not always be readily available, or it could be deceptive and manipulated. The first case is relevant when considering trust in experts or policies that ordinary citizens may not comprehend. If a policy is not understandable, individuals lack the necessary information to trust or distrust. The latter circumstance often occurs in populist and/or authoritarian regimes, where media control makes it challenging to rely on circulating information. Even accepting this information as true may not lead the trustor to the warranted trust. Additionally, individuals may choose not to rely on the information altogether. In fact, as what the emotion-based and the virtue approaches suggest trust is linked to a specific perception of the trustee, contingent upon both the trustee's characteristics and the trustor's own viewpoint—how he/she interprets the context, the world at large, or the

trustee in particular. This dynamic is similarly evident in political behavior influenced by trust. Therefore, it is not surprising that research on trust in populist parties in Central Europe conducted by Hajdinjak (2022) indicates that in countries where a populist party holds undisputed power, such as Hungary and Poland, supporters of the party are more inclined to trust political institutions. The study reveals that this trust is influenced by ideological alignment with the party and the perception of governance as more democratic, producing favorable outcomes. This does not necessarily imply that the populist party is inherently trustworthy or the opposite; rather, the supporters' affinity toward it shapes their interpretation of its political institutions as trustworthy. Even when considering Hungary and Poland as among the more authoritarian regimes in Europe, the operation of trust as an emotion in this context does not necessarily imply its irrationality or negate reason. Instead, it highlights, alongside the manipulative nature of populism, how trust possesses an emotional character in actual political behavior.

Another crucial aspect to consider is the connection between emotions and morality, which the rational choice theory overlooks. If utility maximization is not the only moral motivation and emotions are effective in shaping political attitudes and action, the connection between emotions and morality matters in understanding how political trust operates, too. Emotions are often classified in diverse ways, one of which includes moral sentiments. Jasper (2008) places moral sentiments in a category that necessitates cognitive processing. These are intricate emotions that may initially manifest as reflexive anger, for instance, but as they persist, they transform into a blend of reflex and moral emotion, such as hate. Jasper (2008) rightly suggests that, unlike the Kantian deontological model, following a moral rule may stem from a moral sentiment, or at the very least, it motivates the right action. Engaging in morally correct behavior, for example, brings about feelings of pride, and adhering to this moral rule intersects with emotions like pride or satisfaction. These emotions are particularly influential when others are present to endorse the morally upright action, or when the actor is uncertain about what is morally right. Therefore, moral sentiments are inherently social; they are shaped by society, and they, in turn, influence the social fabric. Contemporary research in game theory, offering alternative variables to market exchange, indicates that "people are willing to pay a great deal to remedy perceived injustices" rather than solely maximizing personal gains. Individuals are more likely to opt for equal distribution to others due to their outrage against unfairness (Jasper, 2008, p. 166). This example aligns with the argument put forth by Koçan & Öncü (2014) regarding the motivation of Gezi protesters. They contend that evaluating the injustices faced by the initial demonstrators is a "moral shock or outrage" toward the police and the government and an affinity toward the demonstrators, leading to moral engagement of larger groups in the fight against injustices (p. 184). This perspective also resonates with the moralistic character of trust. As the emotion-based approach asserts, individuals believe that others will behave in a way they wish for themselves, irrespective of self-interests or past experiences, based on the assumption that people share the same moral values. The shopkeeper example presented above supports the argument that a customer is more likely to trust the shopkeeper if he/she believes that the shopkeeper cares about the wellness of the customer, mainly because he/she is one of the fellow members of the society who shares the same morals. This belief, moreover, can be rooted in affects. Jasper (2008) defines affects as "another type of emotion, more stable and

more tied to cognition,” such as love, hate, respect, and trust, providing something akin to basic values (pp. 162-163). While a positive affect arises from sharing the same values, fostering trust, hate with the belief of different morals can activate distrust. Furthermore, these affects, whether positive or negative, are more likely to motivate political action (Jasper, 2008). For instance, when the media and populist parties heighten the perception of security threats, people may become anxious or scared, leading to increased distrust toward the out-group. Erişen’s study (2018) which shows the affective polarization in Turkey along political lines is another example of how liking or disliking party leaders is both caused by and produces enthusiasm or anger, influencing other political decisions and voting behavior. The same study also unveils that individuals identifying with right-wing ideology are more likely to feel threatened by the Gezi protests while trusting the political institutions governed by the incumbent party (Erişen, 2018). It is reasonable to assume that the affection toward the protestors would correlate positively with distrust in political institutions in Turkey. Consequently, political action or stance tends to be shaped by moral judgments, influenced by both affective and non-affective components.

Political trust is, therefore, more complex than the rational choice theory formulates. Equation of rationality with utility maximization is to some extent a reductionist approach in exploring the sources of political trust. Hardin’s pessimism on political trust aligns with the approach; however, he poses a normative outlook to the politics and trust in line with the liberal understanding. The components of political trust, on the other hand, are various, including emotions and moral judgements in the presence or without solid information about the politics. The emotion-based approach is successful in explaining the sources of trust but the virtue account offers more in revealing the social dynamics and sphere of trust in relation to political trust. Being individual dispositions socially and politically constructed shows how sources and tendency of trust intersect at interpersonal, social and political levels, as how political polarization affects political and social trust at the same time.

Political Trust and Justice

Given the framework of political trust that encompasses individual and social aspects and is affected by emotional and non-emotional motivations, what is missing in the presented approaches is the interconnection of trust and justice in politics. Despite the implicit touches, neither the approaches to trust discussed in analytical philosophy nor empirical studies in political science regarding political trust have provided or pointed out a conceptualization of the relationship between trust and justice. However, our trust in others—whether on an interpersonal, social, or political level—is closely tied to our perception of justice. When moral judgments about a political issue or leader guide our decisions to trust or distrust, these judgments inherently involve our perception of justice. In trust relationships, individuals accept vulnerability with the expectation that others will act in their favor. This acting for the good of others inherently encompasses, or even revolves around, doing what is just. Trust can be established when this relationship is perceived as just. This is evident in why supporters of the Turkish government trust political institutions while Gezi protesters oppose the government, driven by their belief in the injustice of the situation. Similarly, the social polarization of citizens along political

lines, often seen in populist regimes, reflects people's judgments not only about politicians but also about each other's sense of justice. Political tension, whether characterized by high levels of trust or distrust, manifests among citizens who are more likely to view out-groups as untrustworthy and less likely to recognize the injustices they face. Thus, trust and justice are intricately intertwined, and the question of how we determine what is just aligns with the process of deciding to trust or not. In addition to the rational processes such as calculating risks, searching for solid information, and the like, both trust and justice share a critical component: their connection to moral judgments of political matters, which also possess affective dimensions. While the act of trust involves affective dimensions, the perception and act of justice can be shaped through the same elements that affect trust. These affective dimensions can also be produced by a reasoning process, including rational choices, although they do not always have to. Neglecting the influence of affective dimensions on political decision-making hinders the conceptualization of political trust from understanding and explaining the actual circumstances of politics.

Undoubtedly, the connection between the concepts is in line with the rational choice approach to trust, too. As discussed in the shopkeeper example, a well-established just structure fosters political trust. The common elements of justice and trust also encompass explicit determinants of good governance. Extensive empirical studies on political trust embrace this perspective. The rule of law, for instance, referring to processes, mechanisms, practices, and norms that ensure a non-arbitrary use of power by governments and citizens, is expected to be a critical determinant of political trust. Citizens are more likely to trust a well-functioning state governed by the rule of law, confident that they will be equally treated, protected, and provided for. The concept of good governance in democracies encompasses various variables, including impartiality, transparency, income equality, and incorruption. In a recent study on public and political trust, the OECD (2022) uses indicators such as responsiveness and reliability in providing services and policies, emphasizing values like openness, integrity, and fairness. The study, was conducted in countries such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, indicates an overall decline in trust during the pandemic, though not as much as during the 2008 economic crisis. Despite the pandemic, the majority of people express satisfaction with general public services, such as health services, administrative services, and education, increasing trust in their governments (OECD, 2022). However, the study also identifies lower levels of trust among young people, women, less-educated individuals, and those with low incomes. Moreover, fewer people believe that their governments meet expectations for participation, representation, and responsiveness. While acknowledging differences between countries, and considering that the countries in the study are high-income well-developed democracies, citizens' evaluations and perceptions of government performance appear parallel to the "rational" aspects of trust in relation to justice. The lower trust levels among groups alienated from the political system are akin to the way the perception of injustices decreases trust. Citizens in developed democracies may have higher expectations for participating in decision-making processes, contributing to their lower trust levels when these expectations are not met. Another report on the perception of corruption in public administration, conducted by Transparency International in 2022,

reveals that OECD countries (on average) are perceived as having the lowest corruption levels compared to other regions. However, Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey are perceived to have the highest level of corruption (2022 Yolsuzluk Algı Endeksi Açıklandı!, 2023). While large-scale research on political trust in Turkey is lacking, it is unsurprising that the high level of perceived corruption has led to a high level of distrust, even as trust in the government remains relatively high.

Rationality that the rational choice approach emphasizes for trust is grounded on an objective evaluation of information regarding the political matters. Thus, political trust requires full information and awareness of the political matters. As seen in the examples in the previous section, it is not possible and/or the case all the time. Misinformation, deception or biases that are boosted by politics can lead to misplacement of trust and distrust in politics. As Potter (2002) from the virtue approach argues that power relations within politics affect whom to trust, implying that they also influence either promoting justice or perpetuating injustices. Echoing the virtue account, Fricker's theorization of epistemic injustice (2007) is relevant in this context. She suggests that power holders, individuals or institutions, can affect the credibility and knowledge of others, affecting trust relations. As a form of epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice involves unfair treatment due to identity prejudices, undermining the credibility of a speaker's testimony. In other words, some people's testimonies are discredited based on false assumptions merely because of their "disadvantaged" identities. Fricker (2007) suggests that the primary reason for this unwarranted distrust or lack of trust in one's testimony is the belief that the speaker is not competent and/or sincere, unjustly dishonoring them. Credibility deficit can misplace or hinder trust and distrust but on the other hand, credibility excess is also possible within epistemic injustice (Medina, 2017), as affirming the virtue account that seeks for a balance for trust and trustworthiness. Trials based on testimonies of women in assault cases, for example, have sparked debates about whether women's testimony is sufficient for accusations. Disproportionate trust is also evident in the case of some political figures. It is a very common tool for especially populist politicians to distort the perception of reality through marginalizing the opposition or some specific group of people, such as immigrants, LGBT groups and so forth. While creating distrust towards certain groups based on their political, ethnic, and sexual identities, it also fosters high levels of trust among their own supporters. This aligns with Fricker's power argument that the more powerful one is, the more trusted they are, resulting in injustice. This dynamic includes oppression, exclusion, underestimation, and distortion of actual facts and meanings, intentionally structured to sustain injustices. Among many others, Fricker's conceptualization of epistemic injustices firstly shows how epistemic processes (acquisition and evaluation of information) can be causes of injustices due to the misplacement of trust or distrust. Secondly, it shows how the realm of the politics affects trust and justice relations at the interpersonal level.

In addition to information-based trust that is in relation to justice, moral and emotional components of trust emerge more in line with what the emotion-based and virtue accounts offer. The most common and important components are solidarity, care, and empathy because they are interconnected elements in both concepts, representing the affective and moral components of trust. These aspects play a crucial role in reinforcing the relationship

between trust and justice in a circular manner. Justice is essential for trust, while the act of trust, laden with moral obligation, can also contribute to the flourishing of justice. Solidarity, for example, serves as a foundation for cooperation, similar to trust, and collective political action formed through solidarity often aims at achieving justice. In the Rawlsian theory of justice (2001), solidarity is crucial for creating a shared understanding of justice, spreading just principles across society and its political institutions. Civic solidarity involves the moral obligation to protect citizens from vulnerabilities by ensuring basic needs, while political solidarity aims at social change against injustices and oppression (Scholz, 2008), as in the way of moral sentiments that bring out political action. At all levels, embracing, caring for, and concerning those in the out-group are essential. Trust in cooperation operates similarly. Beyond seeking interest maximization through cooperation, trust is also built upon shared moral values. The observation that greater inclusivity in the moral community leads to increased trust supports the idea that trust imposes an obligation on the trustee to be trustworthy and just, fostering a reciprocal relationship of trust and justice in society. This argument also supports the virtue account that O'Neill proposes that virtues like care and concern, recognized as essential to trust, play a crucial role in cultivating solidarity. Simultaneously, the virtue of trust fosters cooperation, participation, and engagement with others, thereby building a reliable and equitable social framework.

Similarly, care is a shared component of justice and trust. In this context, care refers not only to meeting someone's needs but also to genuine concern for and care about others. Trust theorists like Baier (1986), Jones (1996), and Potter (2002) include care in their will and virtue accounts of trust, arguing that trust is established when one depends on another's goodwill and willingness to care for what the other values. It is a cooperative activity that necessitates sharing the same values and common concerns. Citizens' trust in politicians can be viewed in a similar light, as citizens expect politicians to care not only by recognizing and meeting needs but also by taking responsibility for them and working for their welfare with competence. This expectation aligns with what a state is expected and appointed to do, and it is also what justice requires. For citizens to trust the state, they should believe that the state fulfills its duty with good intentions. The perception of being cared for, especially for a specific group, can lead to high trust in the state. Some political leaders portraying a fatherly figure for their "people" is a sign of their will to provide care, address their needs, and offer protection.

Last but not least, empathic motivation in trust relations becomes more significant in understanding the circular relationship between trust and justice. Mansbridge's (1999) concept of altruistic trust highlights the relationship between the act of trust and justice, suggesting that trust reinforces justice. Trust, resulting from empathy, may serve as a display of respect and provide a model for others. In the same way the virtue account argues, trust imposes a responsibility on the trustee to respond in a trustworthy manner, encouraging the trustee to act justly. Therefore, trust expands both trust and justice simultaneously. Social polarization, influenced by clientelist politics, for instance, can be mitigated by trusting a fellow citizen to act justly toward an out-group, encouraging her to be just, unlike the testimonial injustices based on identity biases. Empathy's role as a motive for acknowledging just principles is crucial in shaping trust. Demonstrating empathy and feeling recognized, respected, and supported can increase trust, asserting the idea that justice raises trust.

Conclusion

In sum, all the approaches to trust touched upon in this study are significant in providing important elements of trust in general and political trust in particular. The missing element, however, is justice. As the rational choice approach suggests, political trust demonstrates a positive correlation with the objective benchmarks of justice; when political practices align with the principles of justice in an ideal, objective, and universal manner, citizens are more inclined to trust both the government and each other. The explicit indicators of justice influencing trust levels lend support to this assertion. Moreover, trust and perception of justice share similarities in that both emerge from moral judgments, incorporating moral emotions. Consequently, political trust entails affective and normative assessments alongside information-based evaluations, including those related to justice. While the act of trust involves affective dimensions, the perception and act of justice can similarly be moulded through the same elements that influence trust. These affective dimensions may emerge through a reasoning process and can involve rational choices, but they extend beyond mere rationality. The emotion-based account is here successful in unveiling the affective dimension of trust which also works with moral judgements where information is lacking or manipulated. Trust's relation to solidarity, care and empathy also goes along in a similar way with its relation to justice. Trust's imposing moral obligation to the trustee to be cared, recognized and cooperate is also an expected outcome of justice. In addition to the common affective dimensions of trust and justice, the virtue account contribution is significant for revealing the relationship between the two concepts with its emphasis on trust's leading to the expansion of trust. While justice can contribute to the establishment of political trust, the reverse is also true – political trust can foster justice when it stems from the fulfilment of the responsibility to be just and trustworthy. Furthermore, as the virtue account suggests, since the capability of trusting and being trustworthy is socially gained, the politics is responsible for cultivating trust and justice.

It is worth noting that the study aimed to reconceptualize political trust in three primary ways: firstly, by encompassing a broader scope that considers its interpersonal and social dimensions; secondly, by emphasizing its emotional and moral determinants alongside rational and information-based sources; and thirdly, by incorporating justice as a crucial component. In doing so, it was targeted to provide some examples and theorizations from different disciplines, and to compare the philosophical approaches to trust in terms of their capability in covering the relationship between trust and justice in politics. While the rational choice approach to trust presents an unmoral notion of trust, the emotion-based and virtue accounts are found more successful in elaborating on this relationship that matters in politics. The studies adopting the virtue account viewpoint, however, are more inclined to connect trust and justice including social and political perspectives and to offer more for the cultivation of trust and justice together. Regarding the political science perspective which has a tendency to rely on the rational choice approach, a more comprehensive view of political trust, including its emotional and moral determinants, is considered to enhance our understanding of politics and the pursuit of a trustful and just society. It is believed that future research on the relationship between trust and justice will pave the way for new discussions and yield significant contributions across various disciplines.

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