

# Dimensions of Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History" Vision in the Eastern Europe of the Post-Cold War: Reconsideration of Nationalism

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## ABSTRACT

Following the Second World War, the Cold War initiated a bipolar contest for superiority that would last for decades, and in this era the Soviet Union established communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Nationalism, which the Soviet Union tried to oppress but which played a role in the delegitimization of Soviet control, became an important topic of discussion between authorisation regimes and democratisation efforts in the world politics. During and after the Cold War period several thoughts were introduced about nationalism from different perspectives. Francis Fukuyama was among the important figures who thought about nationalism at that time. In his book "The End of History", Fukuyama touched upon nationalism to explain the struggle for recognition and argued that nationalism is a form of recognition. In this context, this article first focuses on the historical timeline and nationalism in Eastern Europe in the Cold War era. Then, it examines the events that took place in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War by concentrating on Fukuyama's inferences about nationalism and seeks an answer to the reconsideration of nationalism.

**Keywords:** Cold War, Eastern Europe, Francis Fukuyama, Nationalism, The End of History, Soviet Union.

## Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Doğu Avrupa'da Francis Fukuyama'nın "Tarihin Sonu" Vizyonunun Boyutları: Milliyetçiliği Yeniden Düşünmek

### ÖZ

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Soğuk Savaş, on yıllarca sürecek iki kutuplu bir üstünlük mücadelesi başlattı ve bu evrede Sovyetler Birliği Doğu Avrupa'da komünizm yanlısı rejimler kurdu. Soğuk Savaş döneminde Doğu Avrupa'da Sovyetler Birliği tarafından bastırılmaya çalışılan ve Sovyet kontrolünün meşruiyetini yitirmesinde rol oynayan milliyetçilik otoriter yönetimler ve demokratikleşme gayretleri arasında dünya siyasetinin önemli bir konusu oldu. Soğuk Savaş ve sonrasında milliyetçilik hakkında çeşitli perspektifler üzerinden tasavvurlar yapıldı. Bu tasavvurları yapan önemli isimler arasında Francis Fukuyama da vardı. Fukuyama "Tarihin Sonu"nda tarihte önemli bir yeri olan tanınma arzusunun anlaşılması için milliyetçilik olgusuna değiniyor ve milliyetçiliğin bir tanınma biçimi olduğunu dile getiriyordu. Bu bağlamda, bu makale ilk olarak Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Doğu Avrupa'sında tarihsel çizgiyi ve milliyetçiliği ele almaktadır. Makale ikinci olarak Soğuk Savaş sonrası Doğu Avrupa'sında gerçekleşen olayları Fukuyama'nın belirttiği milliyetçilik çıkarımlarını merkeze alarak mercek altına almakta ve milliyetçiliğin yeniden düşünülmesine cevap bulmaya çalışmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Soğuk Savaş, Doğu Avrupa, Francis Fukuyama, Milliyetçilik, Tarihin Sonu, Sovyetler Birliği.

### 1. Introduction

One of the meetings that brought together the leaders of the United States of America, the Soviet Union and Britain in the course of the Second World War was Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943). At that time, the Soviet Union had already started to press its allies for the opening of a second front against German armies. This was among the primary topics of discussion in the Tehran Conference, at which many more issues were discussed. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Josef Stalin and Winston

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Churchill, all representing their countries, participated in Tehran Conference, codenamed "Eureka". Churchill proposed to open the second front in the Balkans in order not to set the Soviets at liberty in this region, and in the early 1944 the idea to open the front in the Western Europe gained weight (Sönmezoglu, 2010, p.629). Tehran Conference was important, for the next step was to decide how the world would be shaped in the post war era and to inspect de facto Stalin's new governments following the liberalisation of the countries in Eastern Europe. During the negotiations in Tehran, international cooperation on a larger scale also raised as a topic of discussion, and the concessions made to Stalin paved the way for the Cold War.

After the Tehran Conference, the war ended as it had been predicted, and German troops were defeated everywhere. The Soviet Armies got closer to Berlin, and the Allies penetrated Germany following their invasions of the Atlantic coast and Italy, establishing a new balance of power in Europe. In February 1945, Yalta hosted meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, and the Soviet troops invaded all of the Eastern European countries. Excluding Yugoslavia, all Eastern European countries came under the Soviet influence (Öymen, 2011, p.88). At the end of the Second World War, Stalin guaranteed many times that he did not intend to spread communism. After the Soviets defeated Finland in 1940, they seized Finland without letting the latter to protect its independency. The Finns had been asked to renounce the foreign affairs harming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A similar assumption was possible in the Eastern Europe. Temporary coalition governments were established in Eastern Europe as it was promised in Yalta in February 1945. The communists took part in these coalitions. The resulting issues put the East-West relations in a difficult position (Swith, 2003, p.18).

Throughout this process, the texts of the agreements were vaguely written. However, the key agreement (the Declaration on Liberated Europe) signed in Yalta in the hope that the West would restrict the Soviet acts in Eastern Europe was significant. Stalin agreed that liberated nations would create their own coalition governments. They would be succeeded by free elections that would elect the representative governments. In return, to remove Stalin's security concerns, Roosevelt and Churchill promised that the governments on the borders of the Soviet Union would be friends (Swith, 2003, p.18). Churchill had given some advice to Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt. Yet Truman initially believed that he would establish a good relationship with Stalin. Churchill had suggested that the allies should not withdraw their troops until Russia made the necessary concessions about Poland, but Truman did not follow Churchill's suggestions. Consequently, some of the Eastern European countries remained under the Soviet influence and dictatorship for 45 years. Thus, Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe continued, and Churchill made his famous statement "*From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an "iron curtain" has descended across the continent*", announcing that the polarisation between the East and West would turn into a tension in the years ahead (Öymen, 2011, p.90-93). Churchill openly criticized the Soviet Union in a speech he gave in Missouri in March 1946, which was a source of concern. Truman was among the audience when Churchill gave this talk, and he indirectly approved of his message, further increasing concerns. In fact, Stalin took actions to strengthen his sovereignty over Eastern Europe instead of continuing with democratic elections. A similar model was followed from 1946 to 1949. Conservative and liberal parties were intimidated, and their leaders were imprisoned, killed, or exiled. Their press was muted as well. Socialist parties were forced to unite with communists. Communist regimes came into power with obvious electoral fraud. A police state was, thus, established rapidly. In 1949, a separate East Germany was founded, creating a Soviet empire in Eastern Europe (Swith, 2003, p.18).

The world went through a political and economic transformation with the collapse of communist party states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991. One sign of this transformation was the unexpected union of nationalist and internationalist political positions and rhetoric (Verdery, 2000, p.86). The fall of the satellite regimes in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 gave rise to comments and predictions about the next period. History "ended", and here came a "new world order". There would be a "clash of civilizations" in the future, and there was even "an approaching threat of anarchy". Prior to the predictions and comments, however, the bipolarism in the Cold War era had prevented any expression of nationalism and internationalism. Yet the political scenery had changed in the post-Cold War era, and the roles of nationalism and internationalism in

shaping this scenery were now open to discussion (Goldmann, Hannerz & Westin, 2008, p.1). As the discussions started, Francis Fukuyama appeared among those who commented on the new order.

Francis Fukuyama, who was then working for the U.S Department of State, wrote the article "The End of History?" for *The National Interest* in 1989. Fukuyama was influenced by the general inclination of Western history towards freedoms as proposed by Hegel. Hegel coined the term the "End of History" to refer to the rise of liberal states in history. In fact, liberal democracies had made a progress in history with French Revolution. Fukuyama based the notion of "End of History" on Hegel's understanding of history and turned his article into a book titled "The End of the History and the Last Man" in 1992. With "The End of History", Fukuyama did not only mean that all the problems were resolved; he also suggested that liberal democracy, with all its flaws, was an ideal. Fukuyama distinguished between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in the world history and stated that the ideological evolution of humankind and the universalization of Western liberal democracy reached the final point. Thus, he presented the evolution and universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government in "The End of History".

## 2. Historical Trajectories and Nationalism in the Eastern Europe of Cold War Era

The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which characterized the European states system until 1945, is significant, for it kept international system under control by resolving and preventing complicated conflicts through its principles such as legal equality of states, non-intervention, sovereignty of states and political self-determination. The Peace of Westphalia paved the way for the notion of nation state and influenced the security order by establishing an international system placing emphasis on the sovereignty of nation state and intervention in internal affairs. Giving birth to the modern notion of nationalism, the Peace of Westphalia focused on the state within the context of the construction of nationalism. In time, apart from establishing states, thought systems such as communism and fascism concretized in certain historical conditions and exerted an influence on matters of power. Eventually, the Peace of Westphalia, the First World War, the Second World War, and the consequential policies as well as the influence of nationalism on the formation of states mapped the power dynamics until the Cold War, and a new era of historical sovereignties started.

The Cold War has affected the management of international relations to date. The "chasm" between the two blocks in Europe widened, and ideological positions became ambiguous. The fight was not confined to Russia and the West on a geographical level. During the Cold War era, notions like autonomy versus national security and liberalism versus socialist planning became a topic of discussion, and the Cold War triggered serious social and political turmoil from the Balkans to the East Indies (Kennedy, 1991, p.439-446). Between the two ideological camps that shaped the world from 1946 to 1989, Eastern Europe occasionally hosted the resurgence of older and national foreign policy practices. The global scene witnessed political changes on two sides, namely anti-imperialist and anti-communist (Mayall, 1992). The polarisation started by the Cold War played a role in the shaping of strategic and ideologic alliances. Communism/anti-communism marked internal politics, penetrating into people's minds and souls and affecting their willpower and resistance. Communism, as dictated by the State in the Cold War, tried to create a one-sided monoculture around those who did not conform.

While European colonialism was dying away and new nations were emerging in 1950s, a new and radical nationalism came into being in the underdeveloped world countries (Swith, 2003, p.42). The Cold War in Europe brought about a radical transformation in the attitudes of European nations. The nations exposed to the Cold War after the destruction of the Second World War and dominance of the United Nations and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Europe started to unite to create their own collective identities. This move was followed by a new stage with the 1951 Paris Agreement signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. The commonly felt Soviet threat, the urge to create a European identity and the cooperation of these countries with NATO contributed to the gradual development of European Union (Subrahmanyam, 2010, p.22). Some of the current members of the European Union, which had single party governments for decades, considered confrontation with history as part of a new and shared European identity.

The situation was different in the Soviet systems. The Soviets tried to transform societies radically and targeted to create an ideal Soviet identity. The desire was to remove various identities in line with an identity politics consistent with communism and ensure that people were less aware of alternatives and submitted to stereotypes. Communist regimes put efforts to prevent people from adopting identities disapproved of by the regime and from acting under different identities. Thus, they tried to solidify their systems. The continuity between Stalinist and post-Stalinist stages was guaranteed as public speaking and organized action were based on the identity notion of the party (Breslauer, 1996, p.6). Gender identities were politically masked in Eastern Europe. A homogenised discourse of equality was imposed on people regardless of their sex, ethnicity or nationality. With the events in 1989 the notion of "new socialist man" became a common currency in historical texts. The democracy discourse encouraged diversity and multiplicity of identities. Democratic practices excited several people in the East and West, and the rising ethnic conflicts took centre stage (Kligman, 1996, p.68). Today, in Eastern Europe class identities, too, have somehow been shaped, and the primary rival of class identity is ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism played an incorporating role and managed to gather various groups under the same roof (Róna-Tas, 1996, p.68).

The traditional notion of power was radically shattered in the Cold War world, and Russia tried to enlarge its area of influence by oppressing freedoms in Eastern Europe. Soviet expansionism was regarded as a serious problem (Kissinger, 2012, p.449-451), and diplomacy was based on the friend or foe principle. During the time when the eastern countries had no choice apart from following Moscow, conciliation was out of question and the rhetoric was marked by the opposing views of the two parties. In this duello, the United Nations and the Soviet Russia tried to attract impartial countries to their camps (İskit, 2012, p.170-171), and since the socialist transformation, which was then incomplete, was imposed on the Eastern European countries, the United States and England made great efforts to stop communist regimes from entering the lands occupied by the Soviets (Wettig, 2008, p.2). In line with these efforts, the United States made attempts to establish a stable government, democratic or not, in the Cold War, its main target being to found anti-communist regimes. Democratisation efforts and nationalistic brainwashing were systematically used by some countries as part of extensive and comprehensive nation building campaigns (Hippel, 2004, p.10-11), and some intellectuals, who were ready to promote ultranationalism like in the 1930s, returned to their countries within the communist system before 1989 (Gallagher, 2003, p.18). During the Cold War, in addition to the democracy terminology, cultural production, a symbol of freedoms, was also used to influence people. As a field of activity that feeds development, culture served as a weapon in the fight of the opposites (Krabbendam & Scott-Smith, 2003, p.3). In the post-Cold War era, intercultural links were influential in the democratisation of Eastern European countries, and it was a fact that before the fall of the iron curtain, the states had already started to integrate with Europe.

In the summer of 1989, the Soviet order, which was imposed on Eastern Europe, encountered significant challenges (Smith, 2006, p.5), and nationalism played an important role in the delegitimization of Soviet control. However, communist parties have survived to date in Eastern Europe. In the Cold War, each and every Eastern European country had its own style of nationalism, but the difficulties about travelling in the Soviet system and the restriction of communication prevented any kind of cross border organization (Carroll, 2012). During the Cold War era, the general tendency in Eastern European countries was to establish a balance between nationalism and socialism. The Soviet regime in Eastern Europe tried to suppress nationalism and prevent its progress. Autocracies sought nothing but power. The efforts to oppress nationalist thoughts through communist policies turned out to be futile. Nationalist autocracies were engaged in cultural propaganda befitting communism. Also, strong patriotism campaigns were organized from nationalist perspectives. For example, Todor Hristov Zhivkov, who served as the Leader of Chairman of the State Council from 1971 to 1989 in Bulgaria, ran a strong campaign of patriotism, introduced an assimilation and Bulgarization policy and started ethnic cleansing against the Muslim population in the country, which changed the direction of nationalism in Bulgaria. Zhivkoz, however, had to resign his post in November 1989 as a result of the waves of democracy affecting Eastern European countries under the Soviet influence.

In 1990, on the day when President George H. W. Bush declared the "New World Order", it was manifest that the war between Soviet Russia and the United States had come to an end and the Soviet Union failed to keep pace with the military fight in the Cold War. Since the United States had a certain organisation and acted according to a doctrine while improving the army (Bourque, 2008, p.1), it was assumed that the Cold War would not start again. The external world started to think that Russia was gradually being normalized after 1991. The problem with this Panglossian thinking was that it was thought that as one opted for Western style freedoms and legality, what was left behind was just the humps on the road. Then it looked like an optimistic idea. However, it is evident that this way of thinking is invalid in today's world (Lucas, 2008, p.6). For instance, the democratisation processes in late 1990s and the shared concerns resulting from the unification of Germany and the developments in the Soviet Union pushed Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to follow similar security policies seeking to unite with the West. Particularly the newly established Eastern-Central European governments focused on getting back to liberal democracy values of the West. The West represented a stable, prosperous, and safe society formed by democratic nations, and other countries desired to be a part of this representation. The same political values and assumptions guided both internal and foreign policies of the new governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (Cottey, 1995, p.156).

With the democratisation and globalisation wave, the former members of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union wished to be a member of the European Union. Underlying this desire is their memories under the Soviet sovereignty in the Cold War. In the light of these memories, nationalism gained ground in the Cold War and in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was seen that communism would not be sustained as an ideology. On the other hand, the Soviets managed to protect peace and order in the Cold War era (Subrahmanyam, 2010, p.22-23), and nationalist and ethnic conflicts were literally frozen in the Eastern Europe for about half a century under the communist regime. Though nationalism was more intense in some countries, it was obvious that its intensity differed from state to state. Consequently, the intensity of nationalism between Eastern and Western European countries was a sign of this (Nye & Welch, 2013, p.429).

### 3. Francis Fukuyama's Vision in "The End of History" and Rethinking Nationalism

What Francis Fukuyama meant in his 1989 article titled *The End of History* was not that the history has come to an end. What Fukuyama meant was that the ideological evolution came to a head as communism perished and that the liberal Western democracy has grown into the final version of human governance. This is because profound ideological divisions had given form to international conflicts throughout the 20th century, and movements such as communism and fascism replaced them as a reaction to the disruption of conventional life by modernization (Nye & Welch, 2013, p.426). In this context, Fukuyama sought to answer long historical questions and underlined that nation building is vital for state building, adding that the fall of communism brought about the end of the great ideological cause. Fukuyama touched on issues concerning nationalism that played a role in the fall of Soviet-like regimes, and made a reference to the historical amnesia in the context of nationalism.

Fukuyama argues that nationalism stands for the more modern and democratic version of the ancient megalothymia. There are large nations that demand recognition instead of princes that fought for a personal victory. Fukuyama says the following in this respect:

"Like the aristocratic master, these nations have shown themselves willing to accept the risk of violent death for the sake of recognition, for their "place in the sun."  
(Fukuyama, 1992, p.201)

Fukuyama argues that nationalism is a modern and yet not fully rational form of recognition in a sense. Fukuyama notes that nationalism has been a means for efforts to be recognized for the past one hundred years and the most common source of conflict in this century. Fukuyama underscores the fact that liberal democracies have perfect skills for wars whereas there is evidence that they do not act as an imperialist power to go into a war with states that do not uphold democracy and share fundamental values. Pointing out that the national identities of the peoples had been long denied in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Fukuyama argues that nationalism has been rising in those lands (Fukuyama, 1992, p.201). Social,

political, and economic uncertainties in Eastern Europe were some of the factors that gave rise to nationalism. The world was divided by two polars during the Cold War and some advocated for multilateralism. That is to say global challenges about making transition from multilateralism to nationalism or nationalism to multilateralism and finding common solutions are growing and whether or not multilateralism poses a threat to national sovereignty is questioned.

Having emerged as a paradigm to run international relations in the twenty-first century especially upon the end of the bipolar Cold War, multilateralism heralded a new era. The growing multilateralism has continued to be a form of international cooperation that requires a strong sense of collective identity, shared values and interests in their structures, processes, goals and outcomes. As a concept, multilateralism was against not only unilateralism but also imperialism and isolationism. As multilateralism gives rise to mutual trust, socialization, and norm-setting, new theories and practices have cropped out in the twenty-first century for the eclectic nature of multilateralism (Singh, 2010, p.97). In this context, nationalism in modern Europe is a reaction to the imposed transnationalism. The Eastern and Western versions of transnationalism were the outcomes of World War II. As the Soviet-style transnationalism in Eastern Europe has come to an end, its trajectory is at risk. On the other hand, the Western version of transnationalism has been facing challenges. Europe has emerged as a territory with two rivalled forms of integration. With a victory led by Russia, Eastern Europe is a memory that can be harnessed to dominate over. Therefore, remembering this era is expected by Russia to create positive sentiments and possibilities of identification (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 2014, p.9). The memory of World War II bears the mark of the Cold War past and the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe. The debate over communism and democracy is of great importance for the pro-Western local elites in the region, and societies split in two in the midst of the debates and this leads to more conflicts. In all Eastern European countries, criticism of the Cold War's authoritarian era is still poor, and this points to a great deal about the distribution of power in Eastern European countries (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 2014, p.9-10). Post-ideology remains somehow and it is systematically challenging to impose realistic limits on nationalism. Post-Cold War non-ideological mindsets are presented as a form of ideology, and respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state makes it challenging to address the issue of nationalism at the global, regional, and local scale on the basis of self-determination in highly different tones.

The identities of the peoples and the symbols of their identities have transformed in the post-cold war years. Global politics has been restructured in a cultural framework. The Russians and other peoples mobilized efforts for their new cultural identities (Huntington, 2021, p.19) and the fall of the Soviet-style regimes is a defeat to nationalism. The fall of the Soviet Union is a testament to the fact that the communist regimes of the past are not more advanced than capitalism. Fukuyama addresses history as adaptation of social classes to economic forces of production and progressive salvage of the oppressed peoples. Fukuyama bets on not communism, but the victory of liberal democratic capitalism, and the success of a social class that allows for universal mutual recognition is important (Bertram & Chitty, 2006, p.15-16). Liberal democracy is emphasized as the best form of government at this point, and the populist form nationalism keeps rising despite the emphasis. The populist form of nationalism cannot possibly offer adequate solutions for social problems, and populist leaders' relations with populism in particular can make a positive impact on countries that do not wish to move towards a decline in the long run

Some of the more progressive and ambitious leading communists, who could infer the end of Communist regime from the populist form of nationalism, began to re-characterize themselves as nationalists. It was Slobodan Milosevic who was by far the most successful figure in re characterization. Ahead of the end of the Cold War, he deliberately radicalized Serbian nationalism in an effort to secure his own power starting from 1986, and made far-reaching efforts to fuel the Serbian grievances (Swith, 2003, p.104). The elimination of Soviet domination by nationalism and the end of the Cold War pushed competition forward in Eastern Europe. For instance, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the communist regimes were followed by growing competition among the Croats, the Muslims, the Serbs, and the Albanians of Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia. Having settled in many parts of the former Soviet Union, scores of ethnicities have spread beyond the borders. As they went beyond the borders, new ethnic conflicts and nationalism became more likely to come to life (Nye & Welch, 2013, p.429) and

liberal democracy was associated with patriotism in Eastern Europe. In "The End of History", Fukuyama points out that the culture of a people is made up by the sense of national identity, propensity of civil society, religion, social equality, and past experience of liberal organizations. Fukuyama attributes a certain life story to nationalism and emphasizes that depriving a people of both national identity and political freedom would fuel violence. Policies that advance nationalist priorities can thus influence the legitimacy of national identity, the need to adopt ideological routes in a new framework or based on the past, and the response to perceived internal and external threats, through the actions of governments. In addition, it could boost the interest in reflections of power beyond national borders.

The threats to Eastern Europe, the growing power of the extremists in the Soviet Union, and the attempt of the Soviets to re-establish its influence in Eastern Europe led to concerns about regional security. The war that broke out in Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union showed how imminent it was for nationalistic conflicts to infect the region. The new governments of Eastern Europe concluded that only the West and NATO in particular could safeguard them under the new circumstances. Impartiality could not protect the Eastern European countries from the Soviet pressure and nationalistic conflicts. East and Central Europe turned into a grey zone vulnerable to great power relations between the Soviet Union/Russia and the West (Cottey, 1995, p.156). Some Eastern European countries, which had been previously run by democracy to some extent, underwent transformation in the late twentieth century. Some of those earlier democratic eras lasted for years. While the democratic eras were terminated by military coups in Latin America, they resulted in foreign invasions in Eastern Europe. Therefore, democratization in Eastern Europe was, in a sense, the restoration of the former political order that had taken root in the minds of the nations. Across Eastern Europe in particular, the European Union and European countries served as successful paragons of democracy located in close proximity, and they were largely encouraging and helping countries for democratization (Fukuyama, 2018, p.410). Fukuyama argues that the fluctuations in Eastern Europe were not a role model to follow. However, Europe's long and arduous journey of transition from autocracy to nationalism and from nationalism to democracy is a better role model (Fukuyama, 2018, p.414). In addition to this point of view, Fukuyama notes that nationalism clearly has to do with the wars of this century. Fukuyama highlights that the resurrection of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union posed a threat to peace in Europe following the end of communism (Fukuyama, 1992, p.268). Fukuyama points to the dismissal of the communists by the nationalists in the Soviet republics and all the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe, and underlines that their dismissal undermined, for most, the trust in arguments that nationalism was replaced by all universal ideologies (Fukuyama, 1992, p.265). Fukuyama's interpretation of history reveals discomfort over their own speculations becoming true. The outbursts of racism, radicalism, nationalism etc. are aggressive and autonomous counter-utopia designated by dystopia. Social movements in our time are almost far from being universal, and what was once said in Eastern Europe was "we are confident in the future. What is doubtful has passed." When this was addressed from the perspective of communism and Eastern Europe on a historical basis, the presence of historical communism and the red threat were effective in the rebuilding of Europe after liberation (Elliot, 2006, p. 85-111).

Integration to the West played a central role in transforming the security of Eastern Europe in the building phase. Reversing the democratization process and economic reforms in one or multiple Eastern/Central European states could have had a major impact on foreign and security policies. Should an authoritarian and nationalist regime emerge at the time, progress towards establishing democracy and kicking off economic reforms (similar to that in Romania) could be delayed, and nationalist interests could be re-asserted as part of foreign and security policies, and hopes for integration to the European Union and NATO would be undermined. Should an authoritarian and ultra-nationalist regime crop out, as in Serbia, foreign and security policies would be radically reoriented, and the pursuit of integration to the West would likely be abandoned and the nationalist agenda would begin to play a central role (Cottey, 1995, p.159). The collapse of the Iron Curtain, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the division of Czechoslovakia into two independent states, the presence of countries with different socio-economic backgrounds, lack of consensus, and whether a national identity or a European identity should be the

choice brought about various debates over the perception about communism from the historical perspective.

In this sense, Fukuyama argues that perception about communism underwent a dramatic shift upon the fall of six communist regimes in Europe between July and December, 1989. Fukuyama says that communism, which once portrayed itself as a higher and more advanced form of civilization than liberal democracy, can now be associated with being highly political and financially backward, and he describes communism as advocating for an ancient and reactionary social order. Fukuyama emphasizes that the ideological threat posed by the Soviets to liberal democracy expired and that democratic views undermined the legitimacy of communist regimes (Fukuyama, 1992, p.35).

Right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania faced political turmoil, and the State of Yugoslavia experienced civil war and dissolution. Pointing out that only Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and former East Germany would rapidly switch to stable democracy and adopt market economy in years to come, Fukuyama argued that communist totalitarianism can simply be replaced by nationalist authoritarianism (Fukuyama, 1992, p.36) where it does not survive. In fact, gravitating towards nationalist authoritarianism leads to ethnic tension and national movements. As a result, sanctions are imposed to significantly undermine the influence of nationalist authorities.

In this case, sanctions are one of the factors affecting nationalism. The sanctions imposed at the time of Yugoslav crisis were one of the earliest diplomatic instruments put into effect. The sanctions against Serbia managed to force Milosevic's hand to enter into the Dayton agreement. This added to a more influential form of Serbian nationalism in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Croatia in the short term. Additionally, it gave rise to the settlement of the United Nations troops across the region and ultimately to the use of crushing power along with other factors (Hippel, 2004, p.135). Milosevic's attempt in early 1990s to establish Serbian domination in much of Yugoslavia and authoritarian Serbian nationalism brought about little fruition and many disadvantages for Montenegro, and mutual Montenegrin nationalism gradually gained ground (Gallagher, 2003, p.183). The attempt to establish domination and authoritarian nationalism builds a spirit of solidarity in oppressed communities, and gives rise yearning for independence, and brings out an exciting force in conflict with other nations, and the national identity moves into a new phase with the growing momentum of decolonization.

In this context, Fukuyama argues that some national identities are socially established and adds that the social constructivist view needs a series of important questions to be raised. Fukuyama addresses the case of Eastern Europe as follows:

"Who are the ones that build new national identities? Is this from top to bottom or bottom to top? Once they are established, some national identities become immensely resistant whereas some others fail to do so. For instance, the Soviet Union spent seventy years on creating "a new Soviet man" who is cosmopolitan and able to come down on classes such as nation and religion. When the USSR fell apart in 1991, the former national identities, which had been thought to perish, rose from the grave. There is no Soviet in places like Crimea now whereas there were Russians, Ukrainians, and Tatars only. In the similar vein, the European Union has been striving to build a sense of European citizenship based on a conventional concept since the 1950s. This project is facing the limits of the Euro crisis that broke out in 2009" (Fukuyama, 2018, p.189).

It seems that it remained linked with national traditions, culture and myths under the intellectual circumstances of the time. That is the reason why the ethnic conflicts that erupted in the former Stalinist countries are portrayed as a victory of ancient traditions over the arrogant project of social engineering. Revived and built on the past, nationalism is portrayed as history's defeat of historicist thought, and Fukuyama regards the past as a protagonist in "The End of History" (Füredi, 2006, p.61-62). Assigning the role of a protagonist to the past gives rise to the historical exploitation of peoples by leaders and systems through nationalism. Considering the totalitarian impulses of Eastern Europe, nationalism concentrated on creating equivalent movements and parallel societies on the grounds of security concerns. In Eastern Europe, nationalism boasted many qualities ranging from the preservation of domination and the racist aspirations experienced to the views of reform into the system and the desire to found an ethnic



state. Reforming the system and pushing nationalism into the political foreground led to choices for defensive and offensive positions. The organizing principle of nationalism drove states to seek internationally prestigious and influential positions, and systems were called into question. Fukuyama, therefore, makes a comparison between "The End of History" and communism and liberalism and points to the bankruptcy of communism. Referring to the bankruptcy of communism, Fukuyama addresses history from a long perspective in building a nation and makes liberalism an important element in building one.

Fukuyama argues that building a nation is more than an open-ended phase and that a national identity is built by four qualities that emerge in concert or over time:

"Some are expressly top to bottom and political and they need the executive power of a state. Others are from bottom to top and a result of sudden actions of societies. Top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top should complement one another. Otherwise, identities fail to take root.

The first one is the imposition of political boundaries that people are to adapt to. The second one is the relocation of people or their elimination to adapt to the current boundaries. The third one is the cultural assimilation of sub-peoples by dominant cultures and the fourth one is the adaptation of a nation's identity to the political mindset fit for its social and physical capital. The most successful projects of nation building emanate from the combination of these four elements" (Fukuyama, 2018, p.190).

The Eastern European countries exerted efforts to tap into their national identity to build their nation and the nationalists felt the urge to control their own destiny upon the fall of communism. The Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bosnians joined their forces in the multinational state of Yugoslavia after World War II while Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent states following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1990. The dissolution was followed by genocides and conflicts went on for years. The multinational territories of the former Yugoslavia have yet to enjoy peace to the full extent. The tensions that have broken out after the declaration of independence in 2008 by Kosovo, which previously was part of Serbia, and the tension with Serbia in 2022 reaffirm Fukuyama's argument over nationalism in Europe.

Fukuyama argues that one should not fully bet on Europe being free from nationalist conflicts in the future. This is particularly true for newly-liberated nationalists who were dormant and insatiable in Eastern Europe and under the communist regime of the Soviet Union. Fukuyama argues that one can expect a higher level of nationalist conflicts in Europe after the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama, 1992, p.272). In this case, nationalism is a natural consequence needed to mainstream democratization. It is because nations and ethnic groups deprived of influence for a long time would stand by their sovereign and independent survival. For instance, the free elections held in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia in 1990 after which non-communist governments came to power paved the way for the civil war in Yugoslavia. To Fukuyama, most of the nationalist movements emerging in territories with a relatively poor level of socio-economic development would likely be highly rudimentary, intolerant, chauvinist, and externally aggressive. Fukuyama argues that the new versions of nationalism could develop in an aggressive sense. Fukuyama points out that nationalism is poised to remain dominant in Eastern Europe and is of the following view about the dynamism and ultimate realization of the new versions of nationalism.

"The vividness of these new nationalisms seems to have persuaded many people in developed liberal democracies that nationalism is the hallmark of our age, without noticing its slow decline at home. It is curious why people believe that a phenomenon of such recent historical provenance as nationalism will henceforth be so permanent a feature of the human social landscape. Economic forces encouraged nationalism by replacing class with national barriers and created centralized, linguistically homogeneous entities in the process. Those same economic forces are now encouraging the breakdown of national barriers through the creation of a single, integrated world market. The fact that the final political neutralization of nationalism may not occur in this generation or

the next does not affect the prospect of its ultimately taking place" (Fukuyama, 1992, p.273-275).

Another inference from Fukuyama's arguments is the correlation between economy and nationalism. The economic circumstances may give rise to a certain ecosystem that would influence nationalism and intended national economies can build a basis of common language and culture.

#### 4. Conclusion

World War II was followed by a world with two polars during the Cold War. Two polars namely the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in a long and tense conflict from 1946 to 1991. The Cold War was a geopolitical competition between two countries and their allies and a struggle of domination that stood for the interests of the great powers. While the United States made attempts to take communism under control during the Cold War, an ideological war was staged between the two powers. Eastern Europe was another territory where it was fought. The Soviet Union began to build communist regimes in the Eastern European countries. The regimes were a satellite to the Soviet Union and they shared economic, cultural, and political points of view with the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union began to fall apart, the countries tended to break up with it and nationalism started cropping out in Eastern Europe. In fact, efforts were made to ethnically cleanse the Balkans.

Starting from the end of the Cold War, the conventional notions of sovereignty were effectively disregarded in some cases and the dependence on nation building emerged even if it was reversed. Democracy was exploited in actions against communism during the Cold War while the dominant view was that promoting the democracies after the end of the Cold War would lead to a safe and peaceful world. That is why it was considered that democratic states would rarely fight against one another as nations are more peaceful and safer (Hippel, 2004, p.9-10). With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, peace and order in Eastern Europe came to an end. The mindset of the Cold War remained in force after the end of the Cold War for the Eastern European countries in particular. Therefore, the Eastern European countries take sides with NATO, NATO's expansion, and the dominant presence of the United States in Europe (Subrahmanyam, 2010, p.23).

After the end of the Cold Wars, some forms of nationalism such as ethnic nationalism that glorified its own culture and marginalized others and religious nationalism cropped out in Eastern Europe on the grounds of security concerns or filling the gap. Political units were much more complicated and the forms of nationalism shared and coded by the nation's own construction and the revelation of oppressed sentiments moved into a new phase thanks to intense ethnic sentiments. In this sense, what Fukuyama typically describes about nationalism is that nationalism is a form of recognition, and nationalism rises where identities are denied, and freedom is ultimately achieved through developments similar to those in Eastern Europe. Noting that new forms of nationalism can revive, Fukuyama presents a mode of nationalism based on liberalism, which is of importance for all peoples to build a nation. Expressing an ideological consensus over secular and liberal democracy around the globe in "The End of History", Fukuyama argues that people cannot have democracy and control their own borders unless they have dominance over their identity concerning matters around it. Fukuyama argues that a national identity is required and a liberal identity is tolerant of diversity, non-aggressive, and integrative from the historical, ethnic, and racial perspectives. Fukuyama adds that nations should be linked to one another through shared values as long as the sense of civil identity is present. However, the sense of civil identity currently fails to advance as desired and it seems that ethnic and religious nationalism rises in various nations.

The end of the Cold War made people assume that liberalism won. Fukuyama was right in a sense. Liberal capitalism has more than one rival even though it is the dominant ideology. This is because the relations among wealthy democracies have undergone a profound shift. Germany, Japan, or the United States do not expect or plan to go into a war with one another. Their interdependence creates immense democratic realms around the world in line with the liberal projections of Kant (Nye & Welch, 2013, p.427).

Nationalism emanating from dependence and identity makes a negative impact from the social-psychological perspective once it involves us versus them as an antagonist. As seen in the historical

conjunctions, nationalism can serve as a driving force in political actions as both a threat and an opportunity. People seek factors to hold on to in an effort to reinforce their sense of identity and eliminate their concerns. Ultimately, what needs to be emphasized from the historical perspective is the fact that nationalism and patriotism are not identical. As inferred from Fukuyama's conclusions, nationalism has a universalist aspect and being a universalist is not equal to being patriotic. In consideration of the Cold War and the afterwards, addressing assumptions about nationalism from a universal perspective, respecting identities, turning universalism into a norm, avoiding to be analytical over identities, and intellectually combining the concept of nationalism with the civil rights movement will ameliorate the divisions and make the world a more habitable place.

#### **Arařtırmacıların Katkı Oran Beyanı / Contribution of Authors**

Yazarların alıřmadaki katkı oranları Emrah AYDEMİR %60/ Oğuz GÜNER %40 şeklindedir.  
The authors' contribution rates in the study are Emrah AYDEMİR %60/ Oğuz GÜNER %40 form.

#### **ıkar atıřması Beyanı / Conflict of Interest**

alıřmada herhangi bir kurum veya kiři ile ıkar atıřması bulunmamaktadır.  
There is no conflict of interest with any institution or person in the study.

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Bu alıřmada Yükseköğretim Kurumları Bilimsel Arařtırma ve Yayın Etiđi Yönergesi kapsamında belirtilen kurallara uyulmuřtur.  
In this study, the rules specified within the scope of the Higher Education Institutions Scientific Research and Publication Ethics Directive were followed.

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