

PRO-EUROPEAN LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIORS IN THE 22nd PERIOD TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: A LOGIT MODEL

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22. Dönem TBMM Milletvekillerinin Avrupa Birliği'ne Yönelik Yasal Düzenlemelere Katılımı: Bir Logit Model

Özet

Avrupa entegrasyon süreci, aday ülkelerin ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi mevzuatlarını Birliğin politikaları ile uyumlu hale getirmelerini zorunlu kılmaktadır. Aday ülkelerin ulusal hukuk sistemlerinin AB ile uyumlaştırma sürecinin arka planındaki temel unsur, üyelik müzakereleri'nin getireceği yüksek maliyeti en aza indirme esasına dayanmaktadır. Diğer taraftan, Avrupa entegrasyon sürecinin ekonomik ve politik boyutları, üye ve aday ülkelerin gelişmekte olan bölgeleri için ekonomik fırsatlar sunmasının yanı sıra, zorlukları da beraberinde getirmektedir.

Bu çalışma, 22. Dönem Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Milletvekillerinin Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği ile bütünleşme sürecindeki yasal düzenlemelere katılımlarının bölgelere göre nasıl farklılıklar gösterdiğini bir logit modeli ile test etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, davranış, logit model, milletvekilleri, TBMM, uyum yasaları.

Abstract

Economic and political integration of the European Union (EU) requires the prospective members to make changes in their economic and political structures in line with those of the Union. Most changes are aimed at harmonization of national legislative structures with those of the EU to avoid large costs associated with accession process.

The Union's economical and political dimensions also create new opportunities and challenges for regions within the member states and candidate countries, depending on how well their economic relations are with the Union and future economical and political expectations from the accession.

This paper empirically tests regional effects on the pro-European legislative activities of the representatives in the 22nd Period Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) through a logit model.

Keywords: Behaviors, European Union, logit model, member of parliaments, pro-European legislation, Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Pro-European Legislative Behaviors in the 22nd Period Turkish Grand National Assembly: A Logit Model

Introduction

October 2005 will be a crucial moment along the European integration path. The EU of 25 member states will start an accession talks with Turkey. Since the Ankara Agreement in 1963, the European integration project has clearly taken different directions, but the final destination of an “ever closer” Union seems to have remained constant (ARIKAN/ VASSALLO). Therefore, the EU’s policy towards Turkey has become a potentially important factor in affecting the discussion about the EU’s integration process.

Nevertheless, EU-Turkey relations have been extensively analyzed by both Turkish and Western scholars with the focus mainly on political, economic, cultural and security issues. However, other aspects of relations have been, to a large extent, ignored in the existing literature on EU-Turkey relations. Therefore, this study is aimed to contribute to literature by using a different approach to analyze EU-Turkey relations through the examining of pro-European legislative behaviors of members of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on the basis of regional economic and political factors.

In many ways, Turkey’s main international and domestic policy issues are being discussed and thus developed at Turkish Grand National Assembly. Therefore, interest groups based on different regions and provinces in the country make every effort to pursue their interests by politically pressuring or convincing representatives, especially ministers in the government (MARIN / ÇOLAK / YOLCU, 2004). Furthermore, members of TGNA need to take into account regional and urban interests of their regions in order to get reelected. Thus, representing and protecting of the regional and urban interests by representatives at the Turkish Parliament could be seen as the most efficient

political investment for the future (MARIN / ÇOLAK / YOLCU, 2004). This indicates that representatives of TNGA are willing to pursue regional and urban interests of their region as long as their legislative activities create a good image of a politician to local issues.

This study was conducted to better understand regional differences on the pro-European legislative behaviors of the representatives in the 22nd period Turkish Grand National Assembly. Some scholars in Turkey argue that western part of Turkey including the Marmara and Aegean Regions were pro-European, whereas the Central Anatolian region surrounding Ankara and Eastern part of Turkey was nationalistic.¹ According to this hypothesis, the capital and media in western regions of Turkey were pro-European, due to their strong organic relations with their European counterparts. On the contrary, Central Anatolia and Eastern part of Turkey are nationalist and more concerned with national interest and development of a national capital.

In this respect, this is probably the first study conducted in Turkey to fill a gap by empirically testing several hypotheses related to regional effects on the pro-European legislative behaviors of members of TGNA. The first section of this study briefly examines views of Turkish political parties on Turkey's EU membership bid. Then, it evaluates regional effects on the pro-European legislative activities of the representatives in the 22nd Period Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) through a logit model. The last section of the paper introduces some final interpretations about policy approaches of representatives of TGNA over EU-Turkey relations.

Views of Turkish Political Parties on Turkey's EU Membership Bid

As the experiences of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in their relations with the EU suggest that political parties have an effect on representatives' attitudes towards the EU's matters. To see how political parties in Turkey may side on the integration debate, it is important to first examine general approach of political parties towards Turkish accession to the EU. Joining the EU appears to be the main foreign policy objective of political parties represented in the Turkish Parliament. The ruling Justice and

¹ For example, in the opening speech of the Uludağ University's First National Young Scientists Symposium, held by Uludağ University in Bursa on 6-7 May 2004, Professor Dr. Anıl Çeçen supported this contention.

Development Party (AKP) have initiated radical policy reforms in domestic politics in order to meet political expectations of the EU. However, given that some of Party members made public statements which were not compatible with principles of secular democracy, policy reforms initiated by the AKP has created some doubts and concerns in the Turkish society (MÜFTÜLER-BAC, 2004:435). As one Turkish scholar puts it, "certain groups might perceive political reforms to increase freedom of expressions attempt to increase the role of political Islam in Turkey disguised as adjustment to the Copenhagen criteria" (MÜFTÜLER-BAC, 2004:435). Although number of policy reforms of AKP and its Cyprus policy have met some resistance from a number of political actors in Turkey, the Party has successfully legitimized these reforms by using the EU membership carrot.

People's Republic Party (CHP), as an opposition party, has also declared that EU membership is a political objective of the Party. In fact, the Party has supported the reform packages introduced by the AKP Government. Nevertheless, some leading figures in the Party have been reluctant to some policy reforms initiated by the Government to comply with the accession criteria. For example, they objected to AKP's flexible approach to the Cyprus issue and some policy reforms granting cultural rights for minorities (KİRİŞÇİ, 2004:13). Overall, despite some policy differences in specific policy issues, the two major Parties have a tendency to support for Turkey's accession to the EU.

Model of the Study

The study utilized a logit model to determine regional effects on pro-European legislative behaviors of the representatives, due to the nature of data and its better results among several experiments. In a logit model, the dependent variable we attempt to estimate through a matrix of independent variables is categorical and only takes the value of 1, when an event is present and 0 otherwise. In this case, the dependent variable is pro-European legislations, which is defined as 1, if a representative signed at least for one pro-European legislation and 0, when he or she did not signed for any act between 2002 and 2004. Theoretically a logit model can be developed from a *latent* (unobserved) variable approach. This approach assumes that there is an unobserved variable that ranges from $-\infty$ to ∞ in values, but it generates y 's. Those values that are larger than y^* can be observed as $y=1$ and those that are smaller than y^* as $y=0$ (LONG, 1997:40). In our case, one can assume that there is a propensity behind the legislative activities we observe. Representative behavior could be the result of political pressure from or persuasion by his/her party, friends or urban and regional interests he/she served. Thus, all we

observed may be the act of a representative's sign, but we cannot be sure how he or she was confirmed about that legislation.

Using Long (1997:41-45)'s denotations, y^* is assumed to be a linear function of a matrix of independent categorical or interval variables as shown by Equation 1

$$y^* = x_i\beta + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

The latent variable y^* is linked to the observed binary dependent variable y by the equation $y_i = 1$ if $y^* > \tau$ and $y_i = 0$ if $y^* \leq \tau$, where τ is a threshold (2)

In logit models, the error term ε_i is assumed to have standard logistic distribution with a mean 0 and variance $\pi^2 / 3$. The choice of this distribution makes estimations easier. The final equation of the logit model is given by Equation 3. ²

$$\text{Log} (P_i / (1-P_i)) = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^x \beta_j x_{ij} \quad (3)$$

The left hand side of the equation is log-odds ratio. This model can be estimated by a Maximum Likelihood function (LONG, 1997:52-53).

Table 1 shows all variables in the model, their definitions, and expected effects respectively. Considering that there is not any previous similar study in order to compare the results of this study, there was a difficulty in theorizing about effects of several variables including dummy variables MAN, NORTH and AEGEAN, whereas for other variables we had some expectations. A Study by MARIN et al. (2004) looked into the effects of similar variables on the locally-oriented legislative behaviors of representatives in 21st Period TGNA, but used a negative binomial regression. Accordingly, it is not comparable to this study, but it offers insights regarding possible effects of the independent variables.

2 For more details on derivation of the logit equation see G. S. Maddala, **Introduction to Econometrics**, Second Edition, MacMillan Publishing Company, New York, 1992.

Table 1. Variables, their definitions and expected effects on the pro-European legislation

Variable	Definition	Effect
EUSUP	Number of the pro-European legislative activities defined as proposals that are aimed at changes in economic, political and institutional structure of Turkey in line with the EU's requirements	
MAN	Whether a representative is man coded as 1 or woman coded as 0	?
AGE	The age of representative in years	+
COLLEGE	Whether a representative has at least a graduate degree coded as 1 and 0 otherwise	+
CHP	Whether a representative is from CHP coded as 1 and 0 otherwise	+
EAST	Whether a representative is elected in East or Southeastern Anatolian Region coded as 1 and 0 otherwise	+
MID	Whether a representative is elected in Central Anatolian Region coded as 1 and 0 otherwise	-
NORTH	Whether a representative is elected in the Black Sea Region coded as 1 and 0 otherwise	?
SOUTH	Whether a representative is elected in the Mediterranean Region coded as 1 and 0 otherwise	-
AEGEAN	Whether a representative is elected in the Aegean Region coded 1 and 0 otherwise	?
LTOTALLEG	Natural logarithm of the total number of legislative acts each representative signed for	+
PERGNP	Provincial GNP divided by the population in that province	+

Data Description

Data for this study was obtained from the official website of State Institute of Statistics (DİE)³ and the TGNA, which regularly updates published reports and legislative activities, including 22nd period legislation proposals and information on representatives' socioeconomic backgrounds as well as acts that they signed for.⁴ Variables of provincial population and provincial GNP for the year 2000 were similarly collected from the State Institute of Statistics, whereas all other variables from the TGNA.

To determine the pro-European legislative acts, all legislations each representative signed for were carefully examined and those that were aimed at reforming economical, political and institutional structure of the State in accordance with the EU's requirements were grouped as the pro-European legislations. Furthermore, total numbers of legislation acts were similarly identified for each representative in order to measure the degree of active efforts in legislative activities. Dummy variables of party membership, sex, age, and education as well as the province and region where each representative was elected were similarly gathered from the two resources.

Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics of all variables in the logit model.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
EUSUP	.37	.48	0	1
AGE	48.32	8.36	30	78
MAN	.9562	.21	0	1
COLLEGE	.9	.30	0	1
CHP	.31	.46	0	1
EAST	.19	.40	0	1
MID	.17	.38	0	1
NORTH	.14	.35	0	1
SOUTH	.12	.32	0	1
AEGEAN	.116	.32	0	1
LTOTALLEG	1.82	.71	0	3.64
PERGNP	2554.65	1182.55	696.38	7594.94

3 DİE (Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü), <http://www.die.gov.tr/>

Notice that the average of the representatives was 48.32, while that of total legislative activities was 6.9.

Table 3 shows number of pro-European legislations, their frequency and percentages. Representatives who were not involved in the process of pro-European legislations make up the largest group with 62.73 % of the population or 345 persons. Conversely, only 190 members signed for one legislations, compared to 15 representatives who supported 2 legislations between 2002 and 2004.

Table 3. The distribution of the Pro-European legislations

Pro-European Legislation Number	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
0	345	62.73	62.73
1	190	34.55	97.27
2	15	2.73	100.00

Results and Discussions

Table 4 shows estimations⁵ from the logit regression both as logit coefficients (predicted probabilities) and their transformed form, odd-ratios, which are simply equal to $\exp(\beta_j)$, or $p/q = e^{a + bX}$. Statistical package was used to conduct the statistical analysis. Odd-ratios are easier to interpret; they indicate the odds of success relative to odds of failure. For example in Table 4, the odds of a male to sign for a pro-European legislation are 1.16 times greater than those of a female representative, albeit with a statistically insignificant effect. In other words, when all other variable are held constant, the odds of a male representative being a pro-European is 16% greater than a female representative. On the other hand, the coefficients in the second column of Table 4 can simply be interpreted as effects of independent factors on the probability of being pro-European.

A negative sign is an indication that the variable under consideration reduces the probability of being pro-European, whereas a positive sign an indication of an increasing probability. Within these variables, only those with statistically significant coefficients desire more attention to discuss, for

4 TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi), <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/>

5 Statistical analysis was done using Intercooled Sata Version 8.2. StataCorp LP

Table 4. Results from Logit Model

Variables	Coefficients	Odds Ratios
MAN	0.15 (0.6)	1.16 (0.69)
AGE	-0.31 (0.14)**	0.97 (0.01)
COLLEGE	-0.15 (0.42)	0.86 (0.36)
CHP	-6.55 (0.82)***	0.0014 (0.0011)
EAST	0.98 (0.42)**	2.66 (1.13)
MID	1.22 (0.38)***	3.39 (1.29)
NORTH	0.81 (0.40)**	2.25 (0.90)
SOUTH	0.46 (0.44)	1.60 (0.70)
AEGEAN	0.44 (0.43)	1.56 (0.67)
LTOTALLEG	1.63 (0.27)***	5.11 (1.37)
PERGNP	0.0003 (0.0001)**	1 (0.0001)
CONSTANT	-2.06 (1.07)*	
Log Likelihood		-241.005
LR Chi²(11)		243.49
Prob>Chi2		0.000
Pseudo R²		0.34
Observations		549

*Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations and * shows statistical significance of variables at 0.1, ** at 0.05, and *** at 0.001 levels respectively*

their effects on pro-European legislations can not be explained by chance, but rather by a predictable underlying pattern. Accordingly, the attention will be given to AGE, CHP, LTOTALLEG, PERGNP and regional dummy variables. But before proceeding further, some explanation should be made about the overall model. The last five raw gives Log Likelihood Ratio Chi Square (LR Chi²), a value of 243.49, and another important statistic, Pseudo R² with a value of 0.34. The first statistic indicates that at least one variable is able to explain the variation in the dependent variable, whereas the second one indicates that all factors in the model explain 34% of this variation.

This model correctly predicted 74.15 % of the total representatives who were pro-European and 77.91% of those who were not pro-Europeans. Overall, the model predicted 76.50% of the cases accurately. Thus, the model is very useful in explaining the variation in the pro-European legislative activities of the representatives. Several versions of this model with the same variables were tested for different transformation of the independent variables, specification error and co-linearity, but the model used in this paper yielded the best results.

The variable AGE with a statistically significant coefficient of -0.31 indicate a negative effect on the probability that a representative would sign for a pro-European legislation. That is, holding all other variables in the equation constant, as representatives got older, the probability that they voted for pro-European legislations were decreased (see Figure 1). The odd of being pro-European was 0.97 to 1, or decreased by %3 with one age. This effect was




Figure 1. Effect of AGE on being pro-European

statistically significant at 0.05 level, an indication of an underlying reason. There was an expectation that the pro-European legislative activities would decline, as representatives got older.

A previous study by Marin et al. (2004) used age and age square and found a statistically significant positive and negative effect respectively on the locally oriented legislative behavior in the 21st TGNA. This suggests that as age increased, locally oriented legislations also tended to increase but with a declining rate. Hence, we expected to find a negative effect of the age. Though a test showed a need for use of age and age squared in our model, this construction led to another a serious problem, co linearity. In any case, the decrease in pro-Europeanism with age may be contributed to the fact that representatives become more conservative, as they got older.

Besides the dummy variables for regions, legislative activities (LTOTALLEG), per capita GNP of the provinces where each representative was elected (PERGNP) and party membership (CHP) were other statistically significant variables. LTOTALLEG was expected to have a positive effect on the probability of being pro-European or pro-European legislative activities based on results from another study that applied similar variables for explaining locally oriented legislative behaviors (MARIN / COLAK / YOLCU, 2004). An active representative that was deeply involved in legislative efforts was also likely to gain knowledge and experience and thus similarly participated more in legislation activities related to the EU. Table 4 shows that the odds ration of pro-Europeanism relative to those of none-pro-Europeanism was 5.11:1. Moreover, the coefficient of LTOTALLEG was statistically significant at 1% level.

When all other variables were held constant, one unit change in PERGNP increased the odds of being pro-Europeanism by a factor of 1. This positive effect was as expected (see Figure 2). We assumed that the representatives from the provinces with higher per capita GNP were more willing to sign for




Figure 2. Effect of pergnp on being pro-European

pro-European legislations, because rich provinces were more likely to be open to liberal values. Furthermore, citizens in rich provinces possibly had a similar lifestyle and values with those in the EU. Perception of positive outcomes from the pro-European legislative activities would encourage local citizens to impose political pressure on their representatives.

To control effects of the party politics and discipline, the dummy variable CHP was used. In the logit model, there were three dummies to estimate party's effects: AKP, CHP and OTHER that included only 11 members distributed among independents and two other right wing parties. The estimates from the regressions with only CHP and AKP included in the model and with all parties were not much different in terms of their coefficients. Therefore the final regression was run with all parties included in the model. Few members with only slight differences from AKP were the justification to just look into effects of CHP, while using AKP and OTHER as the base or comparison group. Figure 3 shows the effect of the dummy CHP on being pro-European. Clearly,




Figure 3. Effects of CHP on being pro-European

compared to the representatives in AKP and OTHER, those in CHP were less willing to sign for pro-European legislations as shown by a declining line in Figure 3. This was expected in that the previous studies showed a similar negative effect. Table 4 shows that effect of CHP was statistically significant at 1% level, whereas its relative odds ratio to those of AKP and OTHER was quite smaller. Thus, a representative with the CHP party membership 99% times signed less for legislations that were related to the EU's reforms.

Finally, the model included six regional dummy variables, the focus of this study, to analyze how regions with different socioeconomic characteristics

affected pro-European legislative activities of the representatives. As the Public Choice theory suggests, a representative's political behavior, being pro-European in this case, could be determined by his/her rational to maximize self-interests through acts that as if he/she was promoting interests of the electors or region where he/she was sent to the parliament. By these very activities, representatives attempt to ensure next reelection. In one sense, representatives' behavior can be viewed as a good political investment for the future. Whatever the motivation a representatives might have, it was very likely that their decisions to sign for pro-European legislations was influenced by future elections and thus by their efforts to create a perception or image through some legislative activities with determinant effects on the future direction of the region.

Representatives' efforts to be viewed as concerned with and sensitive person to the regional issues could be a factor in explaining why they might have taken a regional perspective in their legislative activities. Another factor was the fact that various interests groups, including business, labor unions, NGOs and those others deeply concerned with regional problems, could impose political pressure on them to act according to regional interests. Based on the previous literature review, we assumed that western regions with highest per capita income would be more concerned with economical benefits of the pro-European legislative reforms, as they had more intensive economic relations with the EU's member states. In this line, a similar argument could be made for the poor regions of East, Southeastern and Black Sea. Citizens from these regions could view progress toward the accession as creation of some potential economic benefits, such as free movement of people, some financial aids from EU budget, and expectation of new jobs created by the movement of the foreign capital into their regions. On the other hand, there are some political outcomes of the pro-European legislative activities that might be viewed sensitive and dangerous by some regions for several reasons, including such as undermining of the national sovereignty and values, whereas an opportunity by other regions to improve democracy in the country.

Using the dummy WEST as the base category for comparison, based on the previous literature we expected to find a negative sign for the dummies MID and SOUTH, whereas a positive effects for EAST. On the other hand, the directions of the remaining variables were not known with certainty. Compared to the dummy WEST, MID was found to have a statistically significant positive effect on the being pro-European. A representative that was from the Central Anatolian Region had a odd ratio of 3.39 in comparison to that of Western regions (see Figure 4), which meant that the odd ratios of being pro-European




Figure 4. The effect of the dummy MID on being pro-European

for the Central Anatolian representatives was 339% more greater than those from the Western region of the country. This effect was not as expected. Considering that MID was less prosperous than WEST and weaker in terms of its economic relations with the EU, one of the explanations for a positive coefficient was related to the potential political outcomes, as they might have considered Turkish accession to be good for the region and for country at large. This may be related to the perception in which Turkey's accession progress towards the EU would result in improvements in human rights and democracy in Turkey. Another plausible explanation for a positive effect of MID might be related to their preferences over Turkey's place in the changing Europe. Since the foundation of the new Republic, political elite attempted to transform the Turkish society and to establish a modern westernized secular state. Hence, there has always been a vision or an ideal type of society in the minds of the Turkish political elite. Therefore, according to Turkish political elite, such ideal society and state could be progressively formed through close relations with the European institutions and adaptations of the western values. Indeed, joining the EU has always been regarded as the acceptance of 'Turkey's European identity' by the West (REDMOND, 1993).




Figure 5. Effects of the dummies EAST and NORTH on being pro-European

Similarly, the dummies EAST and NORTH had a positive and statistically significant effect on being pro-European (see Figure 5 and Table 4). Compared to the western parts of the country, these regions have lower per capita income and their economies are relatively less integrated with that of Europe. In this respect, the business community in the western regions of Turkey might have more intensive organic relations with the European business community. Thus, we assumed that representatives from these two regions were more likely to sign for the pro-European legislations on the basis of smaller economic advantages and political outcomes that support democratization and improvement of human rights regime in Turkey. Other two regional dummies AEGEAN and SOUTH also have positive coefficients, but are not statistically significant. By implications, effects of these two dummies are not different from the base category, WEST. Besides, these two regions are also ranked second and third respectively after the west in per capita income (DPT, 2000:70). Thus, economies and lifestyles in WEST, AEGEAN and SOUTH are alike in many respects. This suggests that if economic factors were involved in contributing to the positive coefficients of EAST and NORTH, they were more related to small advantages such as creation of new jobs and the freedom to move freely in a search for better jobs in the European countries, rather than the improvement of relationships with the European business community. Furthermore, given that these regions are relatively less developed, they would qualify for huge financial funding from EU structural and agricultural funds. A second explanation for these positive effects could be political reasons involving the future place of Turkey in Europe. Unfortunately, we were not able to determine whether political or economic factors were more weighted in the positive effects of EAST and NORTH.

Conclusions

The results from this study are interesting in that they did not support one of the well-known economic arguments supported by some scholars in Turkey. This argument suggests that due to an intensive economic interaction between the western part of Turkey and the EU, relatively more developed western regions in Turkey would benefit more from the accession process of Turkey with the EU through alignment of Turkish legal structure with those of the EU norms. Accordingly, representatives from these regions in TGNA were expected to be more active in initiating legislative changes to comply with EU norms. However, the results showed that the poor regions of Black Sea and Eastern part of Turkey had statistically significant effects on pro-European legislations. A similar result was also found for Central Anatolian Region. These results indicate that there might be both political and economical motivations behind regional effects on pro-European legislative activities. Considering relatively the lower per capita income and economic structures of Eastern, Southeastern and Black Sea regions, economic effects seem to be mostly related to the perceived benefits from EU's economic programs. Therefore, it would be not totally wrong to argue that representatives from these regions have been strongly supportive of the Turkish accession on the grounds economic gains. Their positive behaviors could be explained by the fact that representatives from these regions are just forced by the voters' desire to enter the EU. Overall, the results from this study is not well-suited with the assumption that Western regions with more intensive relations with the European economy would impose more pressure on the TGNA's representatives to initiate and support for legislative reforms in comply with the EU's standards.

It appears that the political factors have also played an important role in explaining pro-European behaviors of members of TNGA. This might be related to the perceived effects of Turkey's accession to the EU on democratization process in the country, as well as perception of the Turkish political elites in relation to the future vision of Turkey in the European integration. All these factors at some extent carried a weight in Central Anatolian, Black Sea and Eastern Anatolian Regions in contributing to the positive effect on the pro-European legislative activities. However, there was a difficulty to identify political and economic factors into separate components. Further studies that use more detailed data may help to answer these questions.

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