

Nietzsche's Early Views on the Relation between Language and Philosophy¹

Necdet Yıldız²

ORCID: 0000-0003-4205-1124

DOI: 10.55256/TEMASA.1416019

Abstract

This paper closely reads Nietzsche's early views on language and its relation with philosophy. The analysis is structured into several key themes. Firstly, regarding the musical and the metaphoric elements of language, Nietzsche suggests that language consists of two main elements: the "tonal subsoil" and "gesture symbolism." Secondly, he asserts the primacy of the musical element. Thirdly, Nietzsche associates the musical element with the Dionysian and the metaphorical element with the Apollonian. On this basis, this paper explores the complex relation between language, philosophy, and "truth." It delves into the metaphorical character of knowledge and its inherent inability to express anything in-itself due to its necessary connection with arbitrary gesture symbolism. Furthermore, regarding the genesis of language, Nietzsche's perspective on the telos of language, and claim of the illogical operation in the formation of concepts, characterized by the equalization of unequal things are discussed. Lastly, this paper scrutinizes the world that language gives us through concepts, highlighting its inherent powerlessness when compared with the world of appearances. Through these discussions, this paper aims to shed light on Nietzsche's profound insights into the complex nature of language-philosophy relation, some important early ones of which are widely neglected.

Keywords: Nietzsche, Language, Concept, Knowledge, Truth, Tonal Subsoil, Gesture Symbolism.

Nietzsche'nin Dil-Felsefe İlişkisine Dair Erken Dönem Görüşleri

Öz

Bu makale Nietzsche'nin dil-felsefe ilişkisine dair erken dönem görüşlerinin yakın bir okumasını sunmaktadır. Bu analiz birkaç ana tema etrafında yapılandırılmıştır. Birincisi, dilin müzikal ve metaforik unsurlarıyla ilgili olarak Nietzsche, dilin iki ana öğeden oluştuğunu öne sürmektedir: "tonal taban" ve "jest sembolizmi." İkinci olarak, Nietzsche, müzikal olan öğenin diğerine olan önceliğini vurgular. Dahası, Nietzsche müzikal öğeyi Diyonizyak olanla, metaforik öğeyi ise Apollonikle ilişkilendirir. Bunların ışığında bu makale, Nietzsche düşüncesinde dil, felsefe ve "hakikat" arasındaki karmaşık ilişkinin izini sürer. Bilginin metaforik karakterine ve kendinde-şeyleri ifade etme konusundaki içsel yetersizliğine vurgu yapar. Çünkü bilgi, zorunlu olarak keyfi bir karakter taşımakta olan jest sembolizmiyle bağlantılıdır. Bunun yanı sıra, Nietzsche'nin dilin kökeni ve teleolojisi üzerine bakış açısı ve kavramların oluşumundaki "eşitsiz şeylerin eşitlemesiyle" karakterize edilen mantıksız işleyişe dair iddiası gibi konuları ele alır. Son olarak, dilin bize kavramlar aracılığıyla sunduğu dünyayı inceleyerek, bu dünyanın görüngüler dünyasıyla karşılaştırıldığında içsel bir güçsüzlükten muzdarip olduğunu vurgular. Bu tartışmalar aracılığıyla, bu makale, Nietzsche'nin erken döneminde rastladığımız ve özellikle bir bölümü literatürde sıklıkla ihmal edilmekte olan bu önemli düşüncelerine ışık tutmayı amaçlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nietzsche, Dil, Kavram, Bilgi, Hakikat, Tonal Taban, Jest Sembolizmi.

¹ This article is derived from the philosophical investigation presented in the thesis titled *Nietzsche on the Relation between Language and Philosophy*, submitted for the degree of MA at Middle East Technical University in 2013.

² Assistant Professor, Anadolu University, Department of Philosophy. necdetyildiz@anadolu.edu.tr

Introduction

Nietzsche's thinking is commonly divided into three periods—early, middle, and late—and there is a broad consensus on this categorization.³ Regarding quantity, Nietzsche's claims on language belong mostly to his early period. We can see him talking about words, conceptions, the genesis of language, the relations between language and philosophy, and language and truth, in the essays “On Music and Words,” “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” and his published work *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872) in a lengthy and detailed way. In his early period, Nietzsche has a profound interest in the genesis of language, and presumably, his reasoning on the relations between language, philosophy, and truth was based on his conclusions derived from the subject of the genesis of language. Yet, we can say that his treatment of this subject matter in his early period is highly under the influence of academic philologists Burckhardt and Ritschl, and his “educator” Schopenhauer.⁴ Unsurprisingly, he speaks from within the academic and philosophical background, formulations, and terminology of these scholars. Thus, although he has original insights on the relation between language and philosophy, the theme of language in Nietzsche's early thinking seems to be dealt with similarly to his inspirers in theoretical and terminological terms. However, as some scholars noticed a continuity in Nietzsche's thought concerning the relationship between language and human epistemic activities (including philosophy and science),⁵ I believe that Nietzsche acquired the perspectivist insight on knowledge that rather than facts, only interpretations exist from the conclusions he derived about the nature of language in his early years; although perspectivism remains unmentioned *per se* in his earlier works. In the same fashion, according to Alan Schrift's interpretation, from the beginning, “Nietzsche's explorations into the nature of language are directed toward demystifying the philosophical pretensions of truth and knowledge, as man's quest for knowledge reveals itself to be grounded on the “fundamental human drive”: the drive toward the formation of metaphor.”⁶

In this paper, we will expose and interpret Nietzsche's early views on the relation between language and philosophy. Doing this, several things will be revealed and discussed, such as the two main elements of language that Nietzsche puts forward, the primacy he gave to the musical element of language over the conceptual one, his nominalist view on the metaphorical element of language, the relation between language and human epistemic activities, the metaphorical character of knowledge (and its inability to express anything in-itself), the telos of language as the preservation of the individuals and the species, the illogical operation in the formation of concepts (i.e., equalization of unequal things), and the emerged world of language and its powerlessness compared with the world of appearances.

1. The Musical and Metaphorical Elements of Language

[M]usic is an unmediated objectivation and copy of the entire will, just as the world itself is, just as in fact the Ideas themselves are, whose multiplied appearance constitutes the world of particular things. Therefore, unlike the other arts, music is in no way a copy of the Ideas; instead, it is a copy of the will itself, whose objecthood the

³ For example; Walter Arnold Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), 295.; Daniel Breazeale, “Introduction” in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 1999), xv.; and Robert Wicks, “Friedrich Nietzsche,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, sections 2-5.

⁴ Roger Hazelton, “Nietzsche's Contribution to the Theory of Language,” *The Philosophical Review* 52, no. 1 (January 1943): 48.

⁵ Such as Michel Haar, Roger Hazelton and Alan D. Schrift.

⁶ Alan D. Schrift, “Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 23, no. 3 (July 1985): 372.

Ideas are as well: this is precisely why the effect of music is so much more powerful and urgent than that of the other arts: the other arts speak only of shadows while music speaks of the essence.⁷

In this chapter, as the title suggests, we will investigate the musical and metaphorical elements of language. Before doing this, given its high significance to this paper and Nietzsche's specific usage of this term, it is crucial to elucidate Nietzsche's conception of "metaphor" in advance. In his article "Lecture on Rhetoric," Nietzsche references Aristotle's definition of metaphor as "the carrying over [*Übertragung*] of a word whose usual meaning is something else, either from the genus to species, from the species to genus, from species to species, or according to proportion."⁸ However, Nietzsche uses the term in a broader context. While Aristotle's usage is confined to a linguistic context, Nietzsche employs it to signify the transfer from one sphere to another; i.e., "physical to spiritual, literal to figurative, audible to visual, subject to object, etc."⁹

Nietzsche, in the fragment "On Music and Words," explores the complex connections between music and language, as the essay's title suggests. In articulating a "duality in the essence of language," Nietzsche paints a vivid portrayal of the metaphorical nature of knowledge. He maintains that in the multiplicity of languages, the fact immediately manifests itself is that word and thing do not necessarily coincide completely; instead, the word functions as a symbol.¹⁰ Nietzsche then prompts the crucial question of what the word symbolizes asserting that it symbolizes, whether consciously or predominantly unconsciously, "only conceptions."¹¹ According to Nietzsche, hence, words cannot accurately correspond to the "innermost nature" or the essence of things. This applies not only to external phenomena but also to inner experiences, as Nietzsche posits that they can only be "known" through conceptions. Even Schopenhauer's "Will," considered by Nietzsche as a mere conception, represents the most general phenomenal form of a "Something" that remains indecipherable without a conception.¹² Consequently, Nietzsche claims that humans, whose intellects are inherently tied to working with conceptions, can get hold of the "innermost nature of things"—be it in Schopenhauerian terms like Will, primordial Unity, or the original phenomenon—only through metaphorical expressions.¹³ This is to say that we humans are supposed to be in an epistemic connection with things, and with their nature if it is somehow possible, solely through conceptions and their corresponding words. Yet, Nietzsche identifies a fundamental duality within language by discerning a dichotomy in the realm of conceptions. The consequences of this duality, according to Nietzsche, render language radically powerless in unveiling what it professes to reveal.¹⁴

Recognizing the necessity of being confined within the realm of conceptions, Nietzsche distinguishes two species within them. One species "manifests themselves to us as pleasure-and-displeasure sensations,"

⁷ Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 285.

⁸ As quoted in Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric," 374.

⁹ Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric," 375. This distinction becomes more evident when examining Nietzsche's renowned work "On Truth and Lies in an Extramoral Sense."

¹⁰ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, "On Music and Words" in *Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar Levy (London: The Macmillan Company, 1911), 30.

¹¹ Nietzsche, "On Music and Words," 30.

¹² Nietzsche, "On Music and Words," 30.

¹³ Nietzsche, "On Music and Words," 31.

¹⁴ Michel Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, trans. and ed. Michael Gendre. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 71.

constituting an ever-present foundational basis accompanying all other conceptions.¹⁵ This duality aligns with the Schopenhauerian concept of the Will and representation. In the sphere of conceptions, particularly the conceptions of “pleasure-and-displeasure sensations”—referred to by Nietzsche as sensations of the “Will”—play a crucial role. These sensations “by which and out of which alone we understand all Becoming and all Willing,” are “fundamental to language.”¹⁶ Such expressions are symbolized in the tone of the speaker, and they stand alongside all other conceptions which find their symbolism in the speaker’s “gesture symbolism.”¹⁷ The origin of the pleasure-displeasure sensations remains incomprehensible, comparable in complexity to the emergence of living beings. Nevertheless, irrespective of linguistic variations, this “tonal subsoil” [*Tonuntergrund*] is universally shared among all speaking human beings. According to Nietzsche, hence, music becomes a constituent in the evolution of language, representing the primary symbolism directly linked to the primal cause—the Will—with an unknown origin. Furthermore, since the musical element (i.e., tonal subsoil) is universal among all human beings, it possesses a universal character. In contrast, the multiplicity of languages results from a secondary symbolism, which Nietzsche terms “gesture symbolism” [*Gebärdensymbolik*] or the interplay of “consonants and vowels” and “the positions of our organs of speech.”¹⁸

The gesture symbolism is secondary in the sense that it can only develop upon the fundamental basis of “organic pleasure-pain responses.”¹⁹ As our entire corporeality is related to the original phenomenon, the Will, so too does the world constructed from its consonants and vowels relate to its tonal basis.²⁰ Nietzsche supports this notion by asserting that music can create metaphors, while it is impossible for metaphors or conceptions to spontaneously generate music.²¹ In essence, the speaker’s tone directly expresses the Will, or in later Nietzschean terms, the Will to Power, which is a common thread among all human beings. This tone originates from and serves as the expression of the fundamental force of life (the Will or, for later Nietzsche, the Will to Power), responsible for the creation of everything else, including conceptions.

Nietzsche explicates the duality of elements of language, i.e., the one between the tonal subsoil and gesture symbolism through the Apollonian-Dionysian contrast in subsequent sections of “On Music and Words.” The tonal subsoil, described as the Dionysian origin of language, represents the amoral energy and expansive forces of life without concern for communication or control of the chaos within and beyond human beings. It echoes the chaos and mimics the original phenomena whose origin remains unknown to us. Conversely, the Apollonian gesture symbolism, according to him, serves as the epistemological element symbolizing conceptions corresponding to apparent things.²² This symbolism, however, is secondary to and emerges from the original melody—the unconscious and instinctive Dionysian forces of life. “[M]usic, if regarded as an expression of the world, is in the highest degree a universal language related to the universality of concepts much as these are related to particular things.”²³ In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche says the following:

¹⁵ Nietzsche, “On Music and Words,” 31.

¹⁶ Nietzsche, “On Music and Words,” 31.

¹⁷ Nietzsche, “On Music and Words,” 31.

¹⁸ Nietzsche, “On Music and Words,” 32.

¹⁹ Nietzsche, “On Music and Words,” 32.

²⁰ Nietzsche, “On Music and Words,” 32.

²¹ Nietzsche, “On Music and Words,” 33.

²² Hazelton, “Nietzsche’s Contribution to the Theory of Language,” 50.

²³ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, trans. Ronald Speirs. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 77-8.

[I]t is impossible for language to exhaust the meaning of music's world-symbolism, because music refers symbolically to the original contradiction and original pain at the heart of the primordial unity, and thus symbolizes a sphere which lies above and beyond all appearance.²⁴

Hence, with the presence of the musical element in language, it follows that language must serve as a manifestation of the Will—a conceptualization of the “Something” that Nietzsche later articulates as the “Will to Power.” Haar explains Nietzsche's early attitude on this issue using his later terminology as follows: “[W]ords, expressing through their sounds and rhythms the movements of the psyche, manifest some type of Will to Power.”²⁵

On the contrary, the other element of language, gesture symbolism, is inherently arbitrary and thus secondary. It exclusively symbolizes conceptions that are essential to language. However, its arbitrary nature deprives language of the ability to articulate the nature of things, the in-itself. Instead, gesture symbolism operates as a force in “shaping” the world's interpretation and rendering unfamiliar things familiar. As discussed, the pursuit of knowledge is confined to conceptions, and within the realm of its Apollonian origin, language can function solely with these conceptions. This Apollonian element is the only aspect intimately connected with conceptions. Nietzsche here conveys the idea that language originates from the spirit of Dionysian music, endowing it with universality. It is through this union that knowledge is born, with the Apollonian forces within language playing a crucial role. Consequently, the faculty of knowledge assumes a necessarily metaphorical and rhetorical character since the pursuit of knowledge occurs exclusively within language, incorporating the arbitrary element that corresponds to conceptions.

Haar observes Nietzsche's assertion regarding the unity of aesthetic and artistic powers in language, noting that Nietzsche consistently contends that ‘language derives from a pre-linguistic element that controls it and is essentially “aesthetic.”’²⁶ According to Haar, Nietzsche maintains that the origin of every fiction, including all world pictures, is the artistic Will to Power. The apparent separation of music and metaphor resolves itself at the core of this artistic Will to Power. Nietzsche describes language and, consequently, knowledge as having a metaphorical (and artistic) character. As Haar interprets, “[f]or Nietzsche, [...] logos is subject to art, and not art a form of logos.”²⁷ In the realm of epistemic and philosophical activities, where language involves its arbitrary element, there emerges an entropy, indicating that the expression must be of lesser power than the expressed. Nietzsche asserts that “language, as an organ and symbol of manifestation (i.e., as a symbol of a symbol), can never bring forth the most intimate basis of music.”²⁸ The arbitrariness of the sign-aspect in language necessitates a loss of power in expression, rendering language and any epistemic or philosophical activity inherently metaphorical and inadequate to perfectly represent the “object” of the metaphor.

²⁴ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, 36.

²⁵ Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, 69.

²⁶ Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, 71.

²⁷ Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, 71.

²⁸ Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, 71.

2. "Truth" and the Genesis of Language

Nietzsche's writings in his unpublished article "On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense"²⁹ (which will be abbreviated as "Truth and Lies" hereafter) can be called a "genealogy of truth" since it explores the historical conditions under which the term "truth" originates in society.³⁰ "Truth and Lies" aims to unravel the contradictions surrounding the "drive for pure truth" in Western metaphysics.³¹ Nietzsche examines the historical and psychological contradictions of human beings, focusing on the part of humanity, "human beings of knowledge," that once claimed pure truth. This genealogy reveals that the genesis of language, rooted in the human intellect "unfolds its principle powers in dissimulation."³² Language, created for designating "the relations of things to human beings," serves the preservation of the individual, not the grasp of things in themselves. The creator of language employs "the boldest metaphors" to express the relation between things and human beings.³³ Nietzsche argues that a concept is a "residue of a metaphor" since it is a result of a double metaphor (or, double transference). Moreover, in each transference (of nerve stimulus to image and image to sound), there is an entropy—a loss of power.³⁴ This loss of power that he puts forward reflects Nietzsche's belief that language maintains a metaphorical character, limiting its ability to represent the inner nature of things or the so-called (in Kantian or Schopenhaurian terms) the "in-itself" perfectly.

Beyond the loss of power in word formation, in "Truth and Lies," Nietzsche addresses the telos or utility of language. Language, invented for socialization and individual and species preservation, establishes a "uniformly valid and binding designation for things," creating the first laws of truth.³⁵ Nietzsche claims that truth's moral value arises from its life-preserving consequences. An honest pursuit of pure truth appears incomprehensible to Nietzsche. This is because he sees language as an intrinsically metaphorical tool and if one assumes in language complete correspondence among different spheres of nerve stimuli, mental image, and the "thing in itself," this results in something like a "true metaphor," which clearly is a *contradictio in adiecto*. Consequently, Nietzsche, through his critique of Western philosophy's pursuit of pure truth, communicates the idea that language is inadequate for explaining the true nature of reality. With its necessary artistic element and resulting entropy in linguistic expression, language falls short of expressing reality perfectly. Nietzsche challenges the concept of "pure truth" as unattainable, considering the metaphorical nature of language from its genesis. Language, as a tool for preservation, is not a reliable foundation for the search for alleged "pure truth." It remains, for Nietzsche, the necessary metaphorical basis of knowledge, serving the preservation of individuals and species. Consequently, philosophy, as a human activity, can only address relations, not unchanging essences.

²⁹ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, ed. Daniel Breazeale Amherst (N.Y.: Humanity Books, 1999).

³⁰ Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann. (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), Preface, 3.

³¹ Cf. Jessica N. Berry, "Skepticism in Nietzsche's Earliest Work: Another Look at Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,'" *International Studies in Philosophy* 38, no. 3 (2006): 34.

³² Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," 80.

³³ Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," 82.

³⁴ Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," 85.

³⁵ Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," 81.

Another crucial Nietzschean argument from “Truth and Lies” addresses the formation of “concepts,” supplementing the earlier discussion. Nietzsche claims that the construction of concepts relies on an illogical operation—“the equation of unequal things.”³⁶ For instance, while individual apples cannot be entirely identical, the concept of “apple” is applied universally. Nietzsche illustrates this with the example of “honesty.” When one calls another “honest” and is asked why, the typical response is “on account of his honesty.”³⁷ Nietzsche points out the illogicality of attributing an abstract quality (like honesty or goodness) as the cause for calling different things the same. Concepts, as discussed, are “residues of metaphors,” derived from words rooted in nerve stimuli, and they acquire meaning solely as tools to communicate affects or relations of things to human beings.

Finally, Nietzsche tackles the question of “truth” in one of his most famous quotations from “Truth and Lies.”

A moveable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations that have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions we have forgotten are illusions— they are metaphors that have become worn out and drained of sensuous force, coins that have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.³⁸

In these lines, Nietzsche highlights the profound connection between language and the assumption of “pure truth.” Although the invention of words and concepts originally aimed at expressing relations between things and human beings, over time, through artistic intensification, a society of “truth”—metaphysicians—disregards this anthropomorphic origin. They declare the relations between concepts as indicative of an ‘unchanging’ world. However, Nietzsche points out that this forgetting extends to the formation process of concepts. The connections between concepts and senses are consigned to history, and concepts are elevated to the status of real objects. The “real world” becomes one of concepts, forms, and species, disconnected from the bodily, sensual, temporal world of appearances—a world drained of time, motion, and life. Moreover, Nietzsche highlights that our belief in knowing “something about the things themselves”—trees, colors, snow, and flowers—is illusory. “We possess nothing but metaphors of things.”³⁹ Concepts, through logical connections, construct a world—language establishes a world of its own, but it emerges from a wholly different sphere than the world of the senses, tricking us into believing that we comprehend the essence of things. This intensification, reinforced by forgetfulness, culminates in the creation of a second world—the purported “true world.” However, needless to say, this is a completely different world from the “real-real world,” which is, for Nietzsche, “the world of appearances.”⁴⁰

Conclusion

In conclusion, Nietzsche’s early works elucidate language as a manifestation of the will to power, functioning as a social utility mechanism with Apollonian characteristics. Philosophy and science, emerging from

³⁶ Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 83.

³⁷ Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 83.

³⁸ Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 84.

³⁹ Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 83-4.

⁴⁰ Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*, trans. J. Norman. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Book, *Twilight of the Idols*, Chapter, “How the True World Finally Became a Fable. The History of an Error,” 5-7.

language, are inherently metaphorical and arbitrary, depicting only relations between things and human beings, akin to creating “maps” of the world—a representation from a particular perspective. Language serves as the material for the *techné* of mapmaking.

These insights provide a backdrop for Nietzsche's later ideas such as perspectivism and the will to power. If language is inherently arbitrary, leading to mere relations without factual grounding, then all philosophy and sciences become interpretations. Even physics, according to Nietzsche's later views, is considered an interpretation.⁴¹ Furthermore, music, symbolizing pleasure-pain sensations, represents the Dionysian and the primary element of language signifying the “will to power,” a term coined by Nietzsche in subsequent years. As Nietzsche extended his research to revalue the life-denying values of Platonic metaphysics, his early views on language served as a foundation, aiding in the complexity of his inquiries and formation of his “physiological thinking” from the perspective of life.⁴² As a philologist, Nietzsche's deep understanding of language allowed him to identify hidden traps influencing philosophy, science, and culture. In this paper, we presented several key themes from Nietzsche's early works, often overlooked (shedding light on the dual elements of language, the Dionysian and Apollonian aspects, the metaphorical nature of knowledge, the emergence and telos of language, the illogical operation in concept formation, and the contrast between the world of concepts and the one of appearances) with the aim to contribute to Nietzsche scholarship by offering a clear and compact interpretation of his early thoughts on language. This involves illustrating their connections to both his own philosophical works and philosophy in general, as well as anticipating their impact on his later writings.

⁴¹ Bkz. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Will to Power, with Facsimiles of the Original Manuscript*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. (New York: Random House, 1968), 636.; and *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Judith Norman. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14. References are to the sections.

⁴² Cf. Tracy B. Strong, “Language and Nihilism: Nietzsche's Critique of Epistemology,” *Theory and Society* 3, no. 2 (1976): 241.; and Andrea Rehberg, “Nietzsche's Transvaluation of Causality” in *Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science*, ed. Babette E. Babich (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 279.

References

- Berry, Jessica N. "Skepticism in Nietzsche's Earliest Work: Another Look at Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,'" *International Studies in Philosophy* 38, no. 3 (2006): 33-48.
- Breazeale, Daniel. "Introduction" in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*. Edited by Daniel Breazeale, xiii-l. Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 1999.
- Haar, Michel. *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*. Trans.: Michael Gendre, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.
- Hazelton, Roger. "Nietzsche's Contribution to the Theory of Language," *The Philosophical Review* 52, no. 1 (January 1943): 47-60.
- Kaufmann, Walter Arnold. *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. "On Music and Words" in *Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, Edited by Oscar Levy, 27-48. London: The Macmillan Company, 1911.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" in *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, Edited by Daniel Breazeale. Amherst, 79-100. N.Y.: Humanity Books, 1999.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*. Trans.: Judith Norman, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*. Trans.: Walter Arnold Kaufmann, New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*. Trans.: J. Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*. Trans.: Ronald Speirs, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *The Will to Power, with Facsimiles of the Original Manuscript*. Trans.: Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Random House, 1968.
- Rehberg, Andrea. "Nietzsche's Transvaluation of Causality" in *Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science*, Edited by Babette E. Babich, 279-286. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
- Schopenhauer, Arthur. *The World as Will and Representation*. Trans.: Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Schrift, Alan D. "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 23, no. 3 (July 1985): 371-395.
- Strong, Tracy B. "Language and Nihilism: Nietzsche's Critique of Epistemology," *Theory and Society* 3, no. 2 (1976): 239-263.
- Wicks, Robert. "Friedrich Nietzsche," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013 Edition), Edited by Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/nietzsche/>