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RESEARCH ARTICLE / ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ

Nuclear Powerplay: Traditional and Emerging State Dynamics in the United Nations General Assembly (1990-2017)

Nükleer Güç Oyunu: Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulunda Geleneksel ve Yükselen Devlet Dinamikleri (1990-2017)

Aylin Ece Çiçek [1]

Abstract

This article deals with the specific topic of nuclear non-proliferation under the umbrella of global governance- namely the United Nations' General Assembly. First, this work will present an account of the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and, secondly, examine the contemporary situation through a realist lens. More specifically, it is aimed to test powerful states' probability to shape the global agenda, through alignment. By establishing the theoretical bases and proposition on which the study is grounded, the following part will focus on methodology and hypotheses. By utilizing ANOVA analysis and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, this paper aims to uncover the relationship -if any- between the factors affecting state behavior on global platforms under the issue area of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation efforts.

Keywords: Global governance, United Nations, quantitative analysis

Öz

Bu makale, küresel yönetişim şemsiyesi, yani Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu kapsamında, nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesine ilişkin spesifik konuyu ele almaktadır. Birincisi, bu çalışma nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesi rejiminin evrimini sunacak ve ikinci olarak güncel durumu gerçekçi bir mercekle inceleyecektir. Spesifik olarak, güçlü devletlerin uyum yoluyla küresel gündemi şekillendirme olasılıklarının test edilmesi amaçlanıyor. Bir sonraki bölümde çalışmanın dayandığı kuramsal temeller ve önermeler belirlenerek yöntem ve hipotezler üzerinde durulacaktır. Bu makale, ANOVA analizi ve Olağan En Küçük Kareler (OLS) regresyonunu kullanarak, nükleer silahlar ve nükleer silahların yayılmasını önleme çabaları kapsamında, küresel platformlarda devlet davranışını etkileyen faktörler arasındaki ilişkiyi -varsa- ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Küresel yönetisim, Birlesmis Milletler, nicel yöntemler

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Introduction

The quantitative methodological leniencies in the discipline of International Relations- both in theory and practice stem from the success and acceptance of behavioralist practices over conservative historical and interpretive approaches.[1] One of the consequences of this shift is seen in the terminology used within the discipline. Normative terms and definitions with charged connotations are of direct impact on the theory produced, compromising scientific principles by creating subjective foundations. However, there are a few are exempt to this unwritten rule. A prime example is the concept of weapons of mass destruction, where the use of these devastating instruments is considered ethically wrong. Consequently, the logical outcome is to accept non-proliferation as the norm (Gavin 2010).[2] Biological, chemical and nuclear weapons- when used for destructive purposes, are almost certain to result in mass extinction. This study deals focuses on one such issue- weapons of mass destruction/nuclear weapons- and how nuclear policy has evolved within the realm of global governance, more specifically within the United Nations General Assembly.[3] By examining the voting patterns of states, it is possible to uncover specific patterns, convergences, and divergences of alignment regarding nuclear proliferation. In simple terms, the aim is to understand how state behavior influenced by relative power positions and narrow national interests- is manifested within the GA. More specifically, how do states behave when their national interests are in a divergent path with the global agenda? This paper argues that a states' narrow national interests are defined in terms of their relative power maximization and trumps their liberal support of the global agenda.

This paper will first provide a brief account of the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Secondly, it will examine the contemporary situation through a realist lens. More specifically, it is aimed to test powerful states' probability to shape the global agenda, through alignment. By establishing the theoretical bases and proposition on which the study is grounded, the following section will focus on methodology and hypotheses. This will include ANOVA analysis and OLS regression. We will begin with a discussion on the relationship if any between the factors that affect state behavior on global platforms within the issue area of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation efforts.

The Traditional Nuclear Regime

In 1945 the United States demonstrated the catastrophic power of nuclear weapons in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Temples 1980).[4] "The usage of nuclear technology in military applications and security concerns changed the arsenal of power munitions making this newly found weapon an indispensable part of prestige, status and, international power (Udum 2017; Çiçek 2020)."

1 Often called the Behavioral Revolution. Of course, this is not to argue that there is a clear winning camp within this debate. All methodological approaches contribute to the richness of the discipline.

2 There are very few critiques to this view; see Waltz 1981 and 2012. This holds true politically, as well, with only Saddam Hussein, Muammar Ghaddafi and Kim Jong-Un as outliers.

3 It can be said that the fact that the Americans and the British bringing certain issues to the Security Council and General Assembly is proof of the importance of global governance institutions. However, not all constellations global governance have proven to be of the strong position of the UN Security Council on international topics.

4 It is estimated that over 190.000 people perished.

In the aftermath of this tragedy, power politics became evident once again. Nuclear non-proliferation and prohibition were not topics of interest for the powers.[5] While there were some indications of a potential nuclear regime in the 1940s and 50s, a comprehensive discussion did not take place. The Cold War's onset and the subsequent events of the Cuban Missile Crisis heightened tensions between the USA and USSR: almost resulting in a nuclear catastrophe. Despite the gravity of this situation, both countries continued with their acquisition of nuclear materials, but an effort was made with the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968.[6] Almost immediately, problems regarding the export of nuclear materials to non-member states arose, further developments like the SALT and ABM resulted in a short period of détente. However, these efforts were undermined by the USSR-China confrontation on the Amur River (in 1969) and the Yom-Kippur War (in 1973). Following complex developments in the Middle Eastern region, SALT II was ultimately withdrawn (Grau 2004).[7]

In 1982 START became a potential part of the nuclear regime as a result of Reagan's foreign policy approach. However, no tangible results were achieved during this time.[8] This trend changed with the signing of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signaling a relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev. Shortly after this progress the Cold War ended and nuclear issues came back to the forefront. Below are the milestones pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation since the 1990s.

Chart 1
Historical Treaties

Year	Agreement	Notes
1991	START	
1993	START II	Not implemented
	IAEA Model Protocol	In force with 140 States and Euratom. 13 States have signed but have yet to bring it into force.
1995	NPT rediscussed	Prolonged, additional rules. North Korea withdrawal in 2003
1996	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Not implemented
1997	ABM Treaty of 1972 rediscussed	US withdrawal in 2002
2017	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	First binding treaty. Not signed by nuclear countries

The Contemporary Nuclear Regime

The tragic events of 9/11 caused numerous changes in the international system with non-state actors gaining significance on the global arena. Conceptions of power swayed from a balance of hard and soft power to manifestations of military capabilities. Amidst this chaos, nuclear issues also received attention as a crucial aspect of power capacity.

5 The decade was one of marked by threat perception and, nuclear power became a critical part of state strategy.

6 Goes into effect 1970, members: USSR US CHINA UK FRANCE

7 Between the Soviet Union and Afghani insurgent groups, the Soviet Afghan War resulted in stalemate. The impetus driving Soviet forces was to increase influence in the region.

8 The USSR struggled to keep up with the USA nuclear efforts technologically, and with Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, the USSR took a different approach to nuclear weapons non-proliferation- marked by the 1986 Reykjavik Summit. The failed summit was put together with the aims to deliberate on human rights and the USSR invasion of Afghanistan

Critics of the existing nuclear policy argued that the current status quo was one sided. However, these critiques did not halt the bilateral relationship between the US and Russia leading to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.[9]

In 2007, Iran emerged as a key player in the nuclear arena. In response to this threat, the US proposed taction. Russia, who was allegedly a supporter of the Iranian nuclear programme, did not react positively to this request. During this complex multilateral interaction, the transfer of power from Bush Jr. to Obama also influenced the tone as Obama's approach was of liberal orientation. This led to the development of a joint framework intended to reduce nuclear warheads and capabilities. Obama stated, "Together, we've stopped that drift, and proven the benefits of cooperation. Today is an important milestone for nuclear security and non-proliferation, and for U.S.-Russia relations. It fulfills our common objective to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty". In 2010, START I, the successor, was approved by the Senate with Russia signing on in 2011. Such an upward path is also demonstrated by the data which shows US supports of successful resolutions: they have increased significantly in 2011 following the signing of the Treaty. This is visualized below:



Figure 1. Ratio of successful resolutions

After the increase in 201, there has been a significant decrease in American support of UN resolutions. This decline can be attributed to the Trump administration's opposition to existing Cold War agreements. As a result of this firm stance, the United States has rejected its obligations under the INF Treaty. From a neo-realist standpoint of view, one of the reasons behind this aggressive action is the perception of decision makers that the international system is hostile, with power being the defining characteristic.

9 Nuclear activities become transparent during this era

The international system, and in our case, global governance, is closely linked with the concept of power, which has a myriad of various elements. However, for the purposes of this study, a traditional understanding of power is taken into account where abilities to influence and shape the expected behavior of other actors is key (Barnett and Duvall 2004). Concomitantly, global governance embodies many- if not all- of the essential elements of the concept of power. Systemically, global governance without power is unthinkable as power is the gel which grasps all the different actors in one way or another. In the following section, this study will analyse the role of power in shaping the nuclear regime and, demonstrate that power is indeed the primary currency in this context.

Power as the Main Currency in the International Order: Theoretic Framework

The majority of nuclear regimes focus their attention on constraining and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ruzicka 2018). However, the aim for a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was not realized, which suggests that the dominant powers of the period have an impact on the widespread adoption of decisions. It should be noted that, the number of nuclear weapons and state capabilities remained the same. As a result, states possessing nuclear capabilities and arsenals were unofficially granted a form of legitimacy, while those who were not part of the club were simply left to their own devices. Interestingly, this inequality was one of the characteristics of the Cold War era nuclear regime.

Here, it is critical to differentiate between the various operationalizations of power other than simply considering the material capabilities of states (Strange 1982; Ruzicka 2018). Taking a broader perspective, there are several theoretical approaches to take when analyzing the nuclear regime. However, two stand out: realism and idealism (Hymans 2006).

The realist view supports that nuclear weapons are compulsory deterrents within the anarchic international system. These weapons are viewed as being the most effective deterrent due to their sheer destructive force; this provides security (Davis 1993). [10] Classical realism posits that such a force supports and signals the abundance and abundance of power, they demonstrate prestige: both nationally and on the international level (Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 1985; Rosenthal 2002). This understanding contributes to the security-power dilemma where one states' acquisition of weapons leads to another state to compete: resulting in the classic arms race. Countries relentlessly adjust their relative power position within the international system which results in a subsystem of the balance of power (Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 1985; Walt 1990).

This train of thought forms the basis for theories of alliance formation as states seek to enhance their survival capabilities (Wright 1954). For realism, power is seen as a means to manage anarchy and increase security. Cooperation is feasible but it is only maintained as long as it serves a states' interests. However, not all states have the ability to possess nuclear power: "the predictable reactions of other countries may make nuclear status self-defeating (Davis 1993)." Moreover, even if they have the capability, some states may not find it rational to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead, they chose to maintain the status

10 According to Davis (1993) not all forms of power is desirable to classical realists and this is explained through the security-power dilemma.

quo and align themselves with powerful nations as seen in the NPT. The failure of the NPT supports realist claims that such agreements are less likely to succeed. Ben Frankel argues that international nuclear stability is a byproduct of superpowers rather than nuclear regimes or treaties (Cohen and Frankel 1990). Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that nuclear proliferation actually increases international stability (Waltz 1995; Mearsheimer 1993). These ideas lead to a false assumption that realism and its various subcategories do not accept the concept of cooperation particularly on matters of hard power and national security. This is certainly not the case in point: international institutions, norms and initiatives are recognized as platforms in which countries have the potential to cooperate. The extent of this collaboration is debated through a collective security perspective, not its existence. (Gavin 2010). The United Nations is one such organization where it is possible for countries to advocate their agendas and national interests.

Realist thoughts posit that institutions such as the United Nations serve as a platform in which powerful states can promote their own agendas and shape the international discourse on specific issues. One such issue is the nuclear regime, which has been a complex phenomenon discussed within the United Nations General Assembly. Nuclear matters hold significant importance within the UN system, but it seems that nuclear non-proliferation norms only truly affect those states that lack sufficient relative power. States with significant nuclear capabilities often act outside of the boundaries set by these norms and regimes. One example of this is the United States' withdrawal from all Cold War era agreements. Another way to measure this is by examining UNGA voting records: do great powers remain silent? How do great powers act when emerging powers support non-proliferation? If history is examined, it is observed that great powers either choose to abstain or vote against such efforts, which supports the proposition that nuclear regimes do not apply to them.

Research Question

For the purposes of this article, the United Nations General Assembly serves as the prime model of a global governance platform. While it may seem counter intuitive since the Security Council specifically handles with nuclear issues, the fact that the topic of nuclear power is also discussed in the General Assembly highlights this significance. Therefore, the research question of this study revolves around the following idea:

How do narrow national interests and relative power considerations affect state behavior in global governance platforms?

To identify the independent variables two steps are required. First, a classification of issues and states' power is necessary. For simplicity countries are divided into two groups under the organizing principle of power: traditional and emerging powers. Secondly, a generalization of the range of issues is required. Due to the complexity of identifying the powerful, the second analysis will utilize an Ordinary Least Square regression. In this regression, power is calculated by combining the following independent variables: GDP, exports, imports, military expenditure, and research and development expenditure This analysis is strongly inspired, influenced, and is based on the data collected by Eric Voeten.

The initial purpose of this inquiry is to determine how both traditional and emerging powers vote in the UN General Assembly. This descriptive analysis aims to provide various explanandum for the existence of coalitions and alliances in the international arena. The resulting options can be classified into two categories. The first possibility is that a consistent pattern will emerge, indicating that traditional powers and emerging powers vote jointly. In the instance that this is confirmed, theories of coalition building, and block voting would be strengthened. The second possibility is that votes are diverge, suggesting that each country prioritizes different issues based on their definition of national interest. Both outcomes have implications for the realist and liberal camps.

Details, Definitions, Data and Methodology

Uncovering patterns of cooperation between states and attempting to demonstrate similarities and differences within these dynamics will contribute to our understanding of the "who" which governs the global nuclear programme between 1990-2018. Under this umbrella, there are both neo-liberal and realist claims over what constitutes emerging and traditional powers. Although this study reflects the realist outlook, there are aspects of the neo-liberal paradigm as well. Especially through observations of the evolution and current state of global governance. Here it can be argued from the liberal perspective that global governance constellations have indeed evolved to include emerging powers as significant actor, whereas the realist perspective does not argue the importance of such actors as being shifters and shapers of the international regime (Humphrey and Messner 2006, Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2019, Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2019, Weiss and Wilkinson 2019, Beeson 2019). Additionally, new crises have also changed the manner and frameworks in which issue areas have been decided. However, this shift is realist in nature, as the problematique of terrorism has indeed shifted the foci from economic topics to security-based concerns (Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2019, Koenig-Archibugi 2019). This new system is a result of the interactions of the aforementioned multiple explanandum. Concomitantly, the emergent global system, or global governance, is framed significantly differently. The impeding imminent threats produced by this system is closer to the realist argument that powerful states are more influential in deciding, framing and shaping the outcomes constituting global governance. This is the theoretic bases of this article in which the methodologies have been selected. Put simply, it will be argued that great powers are the locomotors of this system.

Here, it is necessary to disclose that by no means is this work explanatory of the whole global governance system. Such a lofty aim is beyond the scope and range of this paper. A narrowing of the research is both necessary and essential. The more specific question of inquiry here, is to investigate the specific role of power within global governance and even more so to investigate the cases in which relative power concerns shape state behavior. However, this is also not a specific enough statement to measure. To measure the powerful, this work will concentrate on the hard measures of power. The United Nations General Assembly has been chosen as a proxy for global governance as it is the most inclusive and universal of such constellations. The General Assembly voting records are indicators of state behavior and this, state preferences. The collective decision-making processes and coalition building procedures provide specific cases for analysis.

The results will show us an aspect of who governs, empirically.

The most important, and perhaps the most critical definition here is uncovering what power is. It is a key concept for many disciplines; international relations, philosophy, political science, economy to mention a few. For the intents and purposes this paper will accept the concept of what constitutes the powerful as based on post-war conceptions. Power is the ability to influence independent variables to realize the intended dependent outcome which is shaped by rationalist means. When the concepts and notions of global governance and power are reconciled one statement is imminent: global governance without power is unthinkable.

Moving on to the more pragmatic measurement aspect of power which presents a dichotomy. Are great powers the traditional powers? Should we understand powerful as the victors of the two World Wars? How should the powerful be measured? To tackle these problems and make certain that no leaf remains covered, it will be argued from both sides. In the first part of the analysis the definition of the powerful will indeed be the victors and shapers of the post-war order. These countries are: China, France, Germany, USA, UK, Japan, Italy and Russia (Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann 2004, Fazal and Poast 2019, Han and Paul 2020). Emerging powers on the other hand will be the states which reflect an increasing trend in the areas of militarization, economy, resource management…etc (Mourato Pinto 2013). The two country groups will be the units of analysis for the first part- the ANOVA t-tests.

However, just comparing the two groups in terms of their convergences and divergences in their voting patterns provides descriptive results and in not an original inquiry. Therefore, another type of analysis will be conducted- a more systematic and numbers-based analysis through the use of statistics to illustrate that power indeed is the main currency which shapes and frames the global agenda for nuclear issues (1990-2018).[11] The logic here to understand that not all traditional powers hold the attributes of the superpowers. Therefore, the first descriptive analysis is just that- it paints rudimentary picture of the situation. The quantitative part of this paper, which aims to achieve a certain amount of correlation, does not accept the predetermined conditions of what constitutes the powerful on the basis of the post-war order. Here, the powerful is decided on hard variables as parameters: GDP, military expenditure…etc. This will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of what influences voting patterns.

The chosen methodology is a type of regression: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This study constitutes a large-N study as the number of observations are above 600. The results of the UN General Assembly session assumes that yes votes are considered in support of the issue and no votes reject the actions proposed. Moreover, the successful and rejected outcomes of the UN session is calculated by taking a simple majority (% 50 +1). The analyses of the hypotheses' are considered to illustrate the correlation of likelihood of voting patterns. Here, the analysis provides an explanation of the reasons behind the results of the ANOVA analysis.

The variables are as follows: the dependent variable is taken as the ratio of the yes

11 The temporal frame of this study is based on two factors; data availability and the significant changes in the international system with the end of the Cold War.

votes in the topic of nuclear non-proliferation in a given year. This data is taken from Eric Voeten's UN GA dataset. This is our unit of analysis; it is calculated through the division of yes votes to the total votes in a given year. The dependent variables are gross domestic product, levels of imports and exports, military expenditure data, Polity IV data, population data, the existence of militarized inter-state disputes as well as R&D expenditures. Data sources are as follows:

GDP: World Bank dataset (constant US dollars in thousand), indicator of economic power

Imports and Exports: International Monetary Fund dataset, indicator of economic power

Military Expenditure (1): SIPRI database (constant US dollars in thousands) indicator of hard power, taken as share of GDP

Military Expenditure (2): Composite Index and National Capabilities database (constant US dollars in thousands), alternative measure for hard power as it is more comprehensive integrating populations, resources… etc, taken as share of GDP. Utilized as second alternative due to temporal data unavailability.

Polity V: Composite Index of Levels of Democracy, range from -10 (autocratic) to 10 (democratic). Control variable for regime type.

Population: World Bank dataset (constant US dollars in thousands, share of GDP)

Research and Development: World Bank dataset (constant US dollars in thousands, share of GDP)

Militarized Interstate Disputes: Correlates of War database, dichotomous variable

All variables are transposed logarithmically to achieve unit compatibility. Aditionally, to overcome the random effects and endogeneity the variables have been lagged for one year. Decade dummies have been utilized to control for fixed effects. The OLS regression will constitute around the clustering of the countries.

Hypothesis Testing and Results

Steven Cimbala claims that "international politics is a game of oligopoly, where the few rule the many." Should the following hypotheses be confirmed, this statement and the realist line of thought will be supported.

H1: Traditional powers are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation.

H2: Emerging powers are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation.

Below are the results of the ANOVA independent t-test:

Chart 2: ANOVA results

Group Statistics

	TRAD_EMG_OTHERS	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
vote_1_Sum_NU	1 EMG_PWR	232	11.25	5.365	.352
	2 TRAD_PWR	203	6.50	3.696	.259
vote_3_Sum_NU	1 EMG_PWR	232	1.54	2.641	.173
	2 TRAD_PWR	203	5.72	3.906	.274

Both claims hold true: first, it is observed that traditional powers are less likely to support nuclear non-proliferation on the international front because their national interests lie in increasing their relative power. Traditional powers are less likely to support others' increase in nuclear power, playing into the zero-sum game view of the international system. Secondly, it is detected that emerging powers are more likely to support nuclear regimes and non-proliferation efforts to reinforce their stance by reducing the magnitude of threat that such weapons cause. The results of the ANOVA analysis, demonstrate the heterogeneity in the likelihood of traditional powers and emerging powers' voting tendency. Put simply, variance exists in the means of the vote numbers.

Here, it is critical to also include theories of damage limitation as explanations of the real-life dynamics which have been observed between the United States and China. Although China has a strong No First Use (NFU) policy, its efforts to strengthen the nuclear arsenal is regarded as a threat by Washington- not only due to a comparison of numbers. In the unlikely instance that such a catastrophe should occur, the US views its relative capability to withstand attacks as a major aspect of its power. This is a key example in which relative systemic factors shape state perceptions.

The confirmation of the two hypotheses support realist explanations on the nature of international cooperation- especially when the issue is critical to its survival and relative power position. However, a more detailed account of the voting patterns and their directions can be uncovered by looking at the ratio of the means of yes and no votes over time. This will allow an analysis bridging the gap between theory and practice; supporting that realpolitik is applicable to the events which have been summarized in the previous sections.

The second part of the analysis tests the variance between the two groups by automatically clustering emerging and great powers. This provides a much more accurate contemporary analysis through the introduction of success variables which allows an understanding of reasons behind the likelihood of agreeing with the winning camp. A simple majority threshold is adopted: 50% +1. This provides for a detailed understanding of which country groups are invested with the global agenda. Here, the explanandum is calculated through the division of a states being in the success category to total votes. Identical controls have been utilized.

The hypotheses are as followed:

Hypothesis 3: Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear non-proliferation.

Hypothesis 4: Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote yes on issues pertaining nuclear non-proliferation.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	-0.0157	-0.0167	-0.112***	
	(0.0163)	(0.0143)	(0.0244)	
Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP per capita	-0.0748	-0.450	0.00583	
	(1.382)	(1.428)	(1.481)	
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes	-0.0257**	-0.0346***	-0.0313***	-0.0162***
	(0.0102)	(0.0114)	(0.0115)	(0.00373)
Population		-0.0180	-0.0930***	
		(0.0113)	(0.0196)	
Polity V		-0.00674*	-0.00445	
		(0.00395)	(0.00432)	
Export			-0.00563	
			(0.0310)	
Import			0.0886***	
			(0.0293)	
CINC				-2.285*
				(1.251)
Constant	1.081***	1.411***	3.375***	0.833***
	(0.254)	(0.328)	(0.523)	(0.0489)
N	2630	2484	2203	2360
R^2	0.398	0.433	0.456	0.390

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 2. OLS results

The results of the OLS regression testing H3 and H4 are below:

The results of the tests indicate that H3 is not statistically significant, but there is a finding which posits that if militarized interstate disputes are happening in a state, it is more likely for that state to support non-proliferation efforts. Although this indication is present, it would be too far of an assumption to stipulate this hypothesis is supported with a small margin of error, as this claim just points us in the direction for further research under the discipline of conflict studies. The results of H4 provides us with a finding that is indeed statistically significant. The results show clearly that GDP per capita is a variable of explanatory power. In other words, as GDP per capital increases by a one standard deviation, it is more likely for a stat to vote against with the UN agenda- more specifically, the probability decreases from 72 percent to 55 percent. This clearly show that nuclear non-proliferation efforts are not supported by the economically powerful- the rich are less likely to support a world without nuclear weapons. Theoretically speaking, it is possible in the near future to expect another arms race- perhaps with the existence of nuclear weapons. Certainly, this is quite worrying. Below are the results in detail.



Figure 3. Linear predictions for militarized interstate disputes

However, the above hypotheses do not provide us with information to illuminate the voting patterns in detail. Do great powers vote together? Are they in the winning camp? To uncover this inquiry, two other hypotheses are tested:

Hypothesis 5: Countries possessing high military strength are less likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear non-proliferation issues.

Hypothesis 6: Countries possessing high economic strength are more likely to vote in line with the global agenda pertaining issues concerning nuclear non-proliferation issues.

The results are below:

	Model 1	Model 2
GDP per capita	-0.00921	-0.00675
	(0.0119)	(0.0119)
CINC	-2.556**	-2.572*
	(1.211)	(1.368)
Population		0.0126
		(0.00978)
Total Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes		-0.0277***
		(0.00808)
Polity V		-0.00370
		(0.00232)
Constant	0.948***	0.726***
	(0.166)	(0.231)
N	4188	3539
R^2	0.233	0.276

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 4. OLS results for Convergence

In the new tests, which are much more detailed, the results support that economic power is indeed critical. Predicted ratios decrease even more substantially with each standard deviation: a decrease in two standard deviations show the following: 83 percent to 57 percent. Such finding indicate again the importance of economic power. The last model in Figure 4, which calculates CINC scores as a measure for power also claims that states with higher national capacity decreases support to the suggested resolution. The confidence interval is 90 percent here. Another interesting finding comes to light with the previous tests: as the democratic nature of a state decreases, it is more likely for that state to support resolutions as well as being in the winning group within the results of aforementioned resolution.

Conclusion

Realist theories posit the prevalence of relative power concerns as a major driving force shaping 21st century global governance. In theory, the machinations of the international system align with understandings of the zero-sum geopolitical landscape. Although there are different perspectives from understanding state behavior within the liberal scope to shape inter-state more idealistically, the state as one of the main actors of international relation in theory and practice try to maximize their capabilities. Theoretically, great powers must be the foremost actors of the international system in terms of their decision-making capacities. Additionally, they have the potential to effect and influence emerging powers' decision-making processes. When theory and practice are put together, it is observed that power remains the primary currency in international affairs. For such reasons, this study has aimed to find relevant data that can prove the assumption that states use their power positions to maintain and maximize their national interests.

The findings align with realist assumptions confirming that this game is indeed a zero-sum game, particularly when it comes to nuclear discussions within global governance. At the end of the day, international society expects that global governance- the new liberal world order- would show a new global understanding in contrast to the hard power approaches of states. Thus, the state will get the position only as a philosophically positive state. States do not embrace a position in which they are more likely to lose standing, instead they are more likely to choose a path in which they become a part of the nuclear armed states' club. States desire control over others, especially in nuclear matters, through their decision-making capacity in international organizations. There, they are expected to be a part of the major bargaining and negotiation apparatus of international governance such as United Nation. In such platforms, states which have historically been on opposing camps have the potential to be aligned, creating an interesting case study.

Consequently, states are less inclined to embrace liberal claims of common interest, leading to significant tensions between international actors. As mentioned, even though states can come together on some controversial topic idealistically, they are less likely to adopt approaches which jeopardize their relative positions, especially within the modern state system. This has been evident both historically and quantitatively. Unfortunately, achieving an idyllic and peaceful world seems unattainable under the current system. However unlikely, the most attainable solution would be a comprehensive paradigm shift in the understanding of national interests moving away from a state-centric perspective towards a more global perception.

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