

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY DURING SOCIETAL REGRESSION:
TRANSFORMATION FROM SELF-IDENTIFICATION TO SUB-HUMAN
TRAIT ASSOCIATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Keywords

Collective Identity,
Ethnic Conflict,
Societal
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Symbolism,
Cyprus

In this study, collective identity is explored in relation to socio-political discourses within a historical context through the 13th regression element, which is an association of others with subhuman traits. Arguments are supported through longitudinal documentary analysis and secondary data from unstructured interviews. Discourse analysis was used to analyse data. This article presents several symbolisms relevant to emerging collective identity discourses and provides evidence of how socio-political changes throughout history can cause a change or confusion in collective identity. It also argues that societies with prolonged ethnic conflict, which are under the profound influence of a mainland, are very likely to have dual identities and dissimilar identifications among their group members. Through its analysis, this article develops Volkan's Tree Model and suggests a phase IV in light of the existing dynamics in Cyprus. This study indicates the inclusion of all possible stages in co-existence, from dissociation to unification, in proposed phase IV.

**TOPLUMSAL REGRESYON SIRASINDA KOLEKTİF KİMLİK: KENDİNİ
TANIMLAMADAN İNSAN DIŞI ÖZELLİK İLİŞKİLENDİRMELERİNE
DÖNÜŞÜM**

ÖZ

**Anahtar
Kelimeler**

Kolektif Kimlik,
Etnik Çatışma,
Toplumsal
Regrasyon
Sembolizm
Kıbrıs

Bu çalışmada, kolektif kimlik, diğerlerini insan dışı özelliklerle ilişkilendiren 13. regresyon unsuru üzerinden tarihsel bir bağlamda sosyo-politik söylemlerle ilişkili olarak araştırılmaktadır. Bulgular, boylamsal belge analizi ve yapılandırılmamış görüşmelerden elde edilen ikincil verilerle desteklenmektedir. Verilerin analizinde söylem analizi kullanılmıştır. Bu makale, ortaya çıkan kolektif kimlik söylemleriyle ilgili çeşitli sembolizmler sunmakta ve tarih boyunca yaşanan sosyo-politik değişimlerin, kolektif kimlikte nasıl bir değişime veya karışıklığa neden olabileceğine dair kanıtlar sunmaktadır. Aynı zamanda, uzun süreli etnik çatışmaların yaşandığı bir ana karanın derin etkisi altındaki toplumların, grup üyeleri arasında ikili kimliklere ve farklı kimliklere sahip olma ihtimalinin çok yüksek olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu makale, Volkan'ın Tree Modeli'ni geliştirmekte ve Kıbrıs'taki mevcut dinamikler ışığında modele IV. aşamanın eklenmesini önermektedir. Bu çalışma, önerilen IV. aşamaya, ayrışmadan birleşmeye kadar birlikte yaşamanın olası tüm aşamalarının dahil edilmesini önermektedir.

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1. INTRODUCTION

A way of investigating the impact of social trauma on collective identity is through the concept of societal regression. Scholars such as Hanson (1933) and Memmi (1965) initially discussed the idea of societal regression. Hanson's (1933) invaluable discussion of societal regression was based on Orinoco and Amazon groups and reflected his ethnographic fieldwork observations. However, we see more elements of theory in Memmi's (1965) work. Whilst providing some theoretical ground, one may argue that due to the period of his work, the theory fails to consider developments within the field. Later on, parallel to Bowen's Theory (2004), Vamik Volkan (2004) further developed the Theory of Societal Regression and suggested 20 regression elements.

When Volkan's (2004) Tree Model and regression elements are examined, they provide grounds for conducting work that can be repeatable using a theoretical compass. His work has also been applied to other conflicting regions, making it a good framework. Thus, this article focuses on one of the 20 regression elements put forward by Volkan and utilises his Tree Model to position the socio-political situation in Turkish Cypriots in North Cyprus. Even though North Cyprus has one of the best living conditions of any of the other de-facto nations as a consequence of extensive economic and financial support from Türkiye, collective identity remains a crucial aspect of the political struggle of Turkish Cypriots (Ramm, 2006; Bahçeli, 2004). This article provides valuable discussion through the evidence on how collective identity may shift or multiply with the impact of significant events in time.

This research develops Volkan's Tree Model by proposing a Phase IV, where integration or unity is achieved. It also directs us to see clearly how and why these symptoms emerge so that, in the future, regressed societies can be understood better, and progression may start earlier. It also provides an understanding of Cyprus's economic, social, cultural, and political aspects for interested academics and practitioners and a point of contrast for similarly traumatised societies.

Instead of social identity, the term collective identity is chosen here since, just like social-group identities, there is an element of shared representation based on shared experiences and interests. However, collective identity also refers to an active process of shaping and forming an image of what a group represents and how a group wishes to be seen by others. Therefore, collective effort has been accomplished in the concept of

collective identities, and it does not only represent the commonalities of group members. It bridges political identity and collective action in political platforms (Brewer, 2001).

Individuals may experience multiple self-categorisation of social identities due to these adverse experiences. Muldoon et al. (2019) stated that traumatising experiences increase an individual's sense of belongingness to a group. Also, when individuals perceive that their collective identity is threatened, their self-identification strengthens and serves as a protective shield for their well-being. Collective identity provides a sense of solidarity, support, trust, and sense of belonging, as well as other psychological experiences (Muldoon et al., 2019). This article argues that as much as ethnic conflict, socio-political and economic changes threaten collective identity and can change what identity means for a society.

As a result of acts of an out-group, a traumatising occurrence is caused by “others”; this leads to individual and social traumatising (Volkan, 2004). Many contemporary societies' cultural memory is formed based on traumatised memory (Halas, 2010). The generation that lived through the traumatising experiences transmits these experiences in the form of stories to the younger generation, leading to trauma and related experiences being transmitted from one generation to another through oral and written stories (Volkan, 2006b). When this happens, a cultural memory reservoir is formed that shapes how members of society react to certain issues. Thus, regression results from the shared negative emotions and societal and political processes that are explicitly visible.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Anxiety is “an internal sign that something dangerous is about to happen”, and individual response to this is regression. (Volkan, 2004, p.54). It cannot be argued that it is a bad or a good state, but it is an unavoidable and crucial reaction to various stress levels, threats or trauma (Volkan, 2001).

When regressing at the societal level, individuals in the same in-group share particular anxieties, actions, behaviours, expectations and patterns of thoughts (Volkan, 2004). Socially traumatising events may be humiliation, loss of property or prestige, and sudden losses of lives at the hand of an out-group, and social regression emerges in these circumstances to protect, alter and repair collective identity (Volkan, 2001).

When traumatising occurrences are experienced at the hand of an out-group, initially, a society regresses, then goes to the stage of progression. Volkan proposed “The Tree Model” after studying various traumatised societies within an international context as part of an international team. He proposed three phases for collective progression: phase one, where the psycho-political situation is diagnosed; phase two, where psycho-political dialogues of opposing groups take place; and phase three, where collaborative institutions and actions emerge out of the process (Volkan, 2006b, p.310; 2006a).




Figure 1: The Tree Model Phases (volkan 2006b, p.310; 2006a).

The Three Model allows one to study phenomena with a multidisciplinary perspective, including history, diplomacy, and psychology (Volkan, 2006b). In Phase III, collaborative action is necessary to develop sound actions, programmes, and institutions. Good leadership is crucial for a society to move from regression to progression. However, once a group’s identity progresses, it never returns to its state before regression (Volkan, 2004, pp. 86-87).

Exploring Turkish Cypriots’ collective identity process through the 13th regression element provides an opportunity to discuss societal regression through real-life exemplars and evidence that when different phases are experienced simultaneously or without consecutively, a rupture or a failure occurs in the psychological flow of the process. This leads to a chronic regression that becomes more complex over time as a society cannot go through the progression stages.

There are 20 identifiable signs and symptoms of regression that can help identify societies going through regression. These signs and symptoms reflect the collectively shared, observable processes after a traumatising experience. In this article, the discussion is focused on the 13th element, which is “shared images depict and dehumanise enemy groups with symbols or proto-symbols associated with progressively more subhuman traits: demons, insects, germs, human waste.”

At this point, it is crucial to state that the discourses presented are the mainstream societal discourse of Turkish Cypriots, and it is subjective in reflecting their narratives of socio-political and historical occurrences.

3. METHOD

This article employed discourse analysis to mainly secondary data sources such as columns, newspapers, magazines, from magazines and newspapers, which are supported by relevant academic literature resources such as books and articles to help contextualise the analysis of the 13th societal regression element within the context of Turkish Cypriots. The data were analysed using three main associations: black beards, seaweed, and jasmines. Ethics committee approval was not necessary to complete this study as primary data were not collected. Analysing these three discourses allowed a further understanding of the healing process of regressed societies in complex settings such as North Cyprus. Due to its existing socio-political, cultural, and economic context, North Cyprus proved to be a unique examination case for understanding more complex regressed societies in relation to the Tree Model and developing the model further according to the conclusions drawn from this work by proposing a phase IV.

4. SELF-IDENTIFICATION: AN IDENTITY DEFINED BY OTHERS

Cyprus is one of the islands in the world that has divided territory among two or more countries (Baldacchino, 2013). One of the reasons why Cyprus became an island of conflict can be attributed to its geographical location. Political science literature widely agrees that although Cyprus is the third largest among Sicily and Sardinia, it is socio-politically and geographically in a key position in the Mediterranean. For this research, the ethnic groups that live in Cyprus are referred to as Cypriot first; then, their ethnic group identity is presented, such as Turkish Cypriot, Cypriot Armenian, and Greek Cypriot. This is because, in many historical texts, the terminology has changed its form, but Cypriotness has been the main overarching group identification that refers to the Islanders.

During the Ottoman period, locals were frequently referred to and categorised based on their religion, such as Christian, Jew, and Muslim (Nevzat & Hatay, 2009). During British Rule, their group identifications were categorised as Cypriot Muslims and Christians or Orthodox Cypriots (Beckingham, 1957) until the end of British Rule, and the post-colonialism period witnessed a rise in independent nation-states with unified

national identities. However, the unification bonds artificially crafted by the colonialist countries based on ascribed distinctive nationalities led to divisive and violence-led ethnic conflicts (Forrest, 2006). Like other post-colonial ethnic conflicts, ethnic violence in Cyprus was a legacy inherited due to this process. In due course, ethnic groups in Cyprus started to be called Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. (Pollis, 1973). In Beckingham's (1957) text, the term Turkish Cypriots is also simultaneously used. Turkishness or Greekness were encouraged as the overarching identities and were dominantly seen in local and international discourses, even though these ethnic groups had more commonalities with each other than their identified motherlands (Doob, 1986). Therefore, this research adopts Cypriotness as the overarching group identification and ethnic identification as sub-group identification.

5. HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

Today's socio-political and cultural background that influences Turkish Cypriots goes back to the Ottoman Empire period (1571-1878) and even before. Throughout history, many civilisations ruled Cyprus, from Assyrians to the British. This created diverse ethnic groups on the Island. Today, there are several ethnicities in Cyprus, including Cypriot Maronites, British, and Cypriot Armenians, but dominantly Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. They are also the main actors in the ethnic conflict that still influences both ethnic groups politically, economically, and socio-culturally.

Most of the population in South Cyprus, which Greek Cypriots govern, are Orthodox Christians, and most of the people in Turkish Cypriot-governed North Cyprus are Muslim. In North and South Cyprus, Cypriot Armenians, Cypriot Maronites, British and other ethnicities and religions exist. During British rule, these ethnic groups were known based on their religious belongingness, so Turkish Cypriots were known as the Muslim community, and Greek Cypriots were the Orthodox community. Towards the end of the British rule, particularly with the rise of decolonisation and nationalism, nationalistic elements became visibly dominant in both communities, and the identities of these groups started to be associated with relevant "motherlands": Greek Cypriots with Greece and Turkish Cypriots with Türkiye. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalistic identity elements were significantly dominant for both ethnicities. Although nationalistic feelings were turmoiling both groups, they became the co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. Movements that started against British colonialism together became an inter-group

conflict where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots began to fight against each other (Papadakis, 2005). Identity conflicts and nationality elements were initiated as part of the divide-and-rule policy and escalated with the intervention of different countries, creating the foundations of inter-group strife, which started in the 1930s and gradually turned into a war in 1963 (Christopher, 1988).

In 1974, as one of the three guarantors of maintaining the existence of the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye made a military intervention stating that they were doing so to reinstate the Republic of Cyprus and cease the armed conflict. Since then, Cyprus has been divided into north and south, and borders were closed until April 2023. As it is penned down by Cypriot academic Papadakis (2005), “In Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, walls appear abruptly in the middle of the road. A Dead Zone cuts it into two. Only the excrement in the sewers beneath Nicosia has gained the unquestionable right of free movement..... All of us in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots on one side of the Dead Zone and Turkish Cypriots on the other, are obsessed with one question. Who is to blame?” (Papadakis, 2005, p.xiii).

During 1963-1974, Turkish Cypriots lived in enclaves, which occupied only 3% of Cyprus (Volkan, 2008). All Cypriots experienced many forms of individual trauma, including killing a person, seeing a loved one being killed, rape, torture, getting injured, mass killings, and others. However, Turkish Cypriots, at the same time, had very scarce resources for food, water, medical care, and shelter because they lived in enclaves during that period (Gibbons, 1997). Turkish Cypriots in their 50s and 60s today were children during the 1963-74 period. Once the war ended, there was no psychological support available. These experiences solidified with these individuals who are active within society. They hold many positions within society, including workers, public clerks, members of parliament, business owners, and others.

Since 1974, the transfer of these traumas from the generation who experienced it first-hand to the second and third generations has occurred through narratives and stories, memorial days, and various other visual and written materials available through media (Öksüzoğlu-Güven, 2010).

1974 onwards, several demographic, economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental changes have occurred in Turkish Cypriots' lives. Turkish Cypriots, who initially embraced the intervention with gratitude, now have different opinions on the

influence of Türkiye. This has also caused them to seek a common identification to protect their collective identity. On the other hand, the attachment of political connotations to the definitions of collective identity and nationality resulted in varied social identifications among them. These differences made defining Turkish Cypriots' nationality and collective identity more difficult. For example, they do not have an official passport, which the rest of the world accepts, with which to travel. Therefore, depending on what is available to them based on their rights, some use Republic of Türkiye passports, and some use the Republic of Cyprus-issued passports.

6. ANALYSIS

6.1. Waves of Immigration and the Rise of Cypriotism

The 13th element focuses on common images that dehumanise and depict enemy groups with symbols or emotions associated with progressively more sub-human traits like germs, human waste, insects and demons. The following section provides discussions and an overview of Turkish Cypriots' socio-psychological changes from the traumatising events from past to present and why they feel detached from both Greek Cypriots and Turks of Türkiye. Unfortunately, most of the demographic data was up until 2007; however, since then, there has been no reliable and stable source of information on migration numbers, population, and other similar indicators. The political use of demography and immigration issues created misleading information, thus shifting the opportunity for constructive discussions and policies on migration issues and creating socially acceptable discrimination, which has gradually become more complex (Hatay, 2007).

After the 1974 intervention, Anatolian settlers comprised roughly two-thirds of the North Cyprus population (Bahçeli, 2004; Ramm, 2007). The Turkish and North Cyprus leadership embraced this change in demographics because it would help to manage the workforce shortage that developed after the war, particularly in the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, this would change the population balance in North Cyprus in the long term. (Ramm, 2007, p.10). The newly formed state in the North agreed with the Republic of Türkiye to receive citizens to settle in the Northern part of Cyprus and to allocate them properties to increase the population and improve the economy (Hatay & Bryant, 2008a, p.7). The first arrivals of Turkish settlers from Türkiye were from 1974-1977, and there were approximately 39,600 people. In October 1974, Turkish settlers were brought to

work in gardens and hotels. By January 1975, families of Turkish military personnel who were killed during the war in 1974 were also settled; then this granted right extended further and houses and plots of land were allocated to anyone who wished to settle in Cyprus (UK Parliament, 2005).

Migration to North Cyprus slowed briefly in the late 1970s due to international pressure. Still, it resumed in the early 1980s when most Turkish Cypriots gradually moved from the Nicosia walled city to the suburbs where new dwellings were built. The bulk of the immigrants in this second wave were semi-skilled and skilled labourers, and many professionals came to work in the textile industry, which was flourishing due to exports, mostly to the United Kingdom. Most of these immigrants migrated to Cyprus due to restricted prospects in Türkiye. (Ramm, 2007, p.8).

The third wave began in the early 1990s due to global economic factors and rising living standards. During that time, two primary groups came to North Cyprus: highly skilled professionals and labourers. University professors, financial specialists hired to work at local or offshore institutions, and business individuals with assets in North Cyprus were among the highly trained professionals. On the other hand, workers began to arrive in the 1990s due to changes in property law. (Hatay & Bryant, 2008a, p.8).

During that decade, legislative changes led to a booming construction sector. Numerous villas and bungalows were constructed primarily to sell to foreign customers. To meet the need for construction workers, entrepreneurs began hiring labourers from Türkiye who were willing to work for lower wages than Turkish Cypriots. Businesses started hiring workers from the poorer regions of southern and south-eastern Türkiye. A comparison of the immigrants' educational backgrounds shows that those who arrived in the 1980s and early 1990s were generally better educated, but the education levels of subsequent immigrants decreased. By the late 1990s, many workers had fewer skills and little education; some were illiterate. (Hatay & Bryant, 2008b, p.8).

Over the past few decades, it has been estimated that more than 100,000 Turkish Cypriots have migrated from the Island. Out of these, 40,000 moved after 1974. They left for various countries, including Great Britain, Turkey, Australia, the USA, and Germany. While some Turkish Cypriots immigrated to other countries, many moved from Turkey to settle in North Cyprus. Additionally, many came from different nations to study or work at universities in North Cyprus. It is also worth noting that British and other European

expats have purchased properties and established themselves in North Cyprus. (Ramm, 2006). According to 2022 data, there are 94,115 students from Türkiye and other countries (YÖD, 2022).

Even though many Cypriots fled Cyprus as a result of bloodshed and struggle between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots throughout the 1950s and 1960s, following 1974, as internationally isolated North Cyprus faced a "fragile political and economic situation", out-migration surged extremely considerably (Ramm, 2006). Today, more than 130,000 Turkish Cypriots live in the UK, most of them in London; this number excludes dual heritage and British-born children; when they are included, this number goes up to 400,000 (Edwards, 2014). The main reason why they are in the UK is that Cyprus was one of the previous colonies of Great Britain, and they felt a "special" historical connection (Ramm, 2006).

According to 2011 official data, the population was 286,257 (de-jure population); of those, 152,404 were stated as TRNC citizens and TRNC citizens with dual citizenship but other than Turkish (DPO, 2013). Nicosia Embassy of the Republic of Türkiye announced that for the May 2023 presidential and general elections of Türkiye, approximately 142,000 Turkish citizens who reside in North Cyprus would be able to vote (Feyzioglu, 2023). According to 2001 figures, the population in North Cyprus was 212,500; 115,000 were Turkish settlers, and 87,600 were Turkish Cypriots (Laakso, 2003). According to Faiz, it is normal for a country to have an immigrant population as there are Arabs in the UK and Algerians in France, and this situation also contributes to making the World a more just place. According to his argument, the immigrant population in North Cyprus is twice the size of the native population. This creates issues in the social environment by overcrowding hospitals and public transportation, leading to inefficiency. Additionally, since immigrants do not feel a sense of belonging or ownership towards the country, they do not typically contribute to public properties such as schools, roads, hospitals, or other general life. (Gürkan, 2007).

After a decade, there has not been another census, but according to the official end-of-2021 projections, the total de-jure population is 390,745 (KKTC İstatistik Kurumu, 2022). De facto numbers have not been released. Thus, media sources argue that those who come on a tourist visa and have 90 days to stay can enter and exit the country within the same day and extend their stay (TRNC Residency Permits and Visa Regulations, 2023);

in many cases, those who come with a tourist visa work without a work permit. Often, the employer is also unregistered or does not hold a license. As a result, when a fatality occurs during employment or as a result of, for instance, non-compliance to the standards, it is all parties suffer (Refikoğlu, 2022). However, the Turkish population in North Cyprus is not a homogenous community (Ramm, 2006). Although many Turkish Cypriots are immigrating to other countries, there is still migration from Turkey to Cyprus. However, the public's comments indicate that the integration of the two communities has not successfully accepted immigrants from Turkish Cypriots. (Ramm, 2006; Havadis Gazetesi, 2023). The prevalence of racism against individuals from Türkiye and the tendency to exaggerate the population numbers are both extreme and concerning. (Gürkan, 2007).

According to 2023 data, 40% of the students getting an education in pre-schools and primary schools are predominantly from Türkiye, and 8% of the 40% know neither Turkish nor English; therefore, their adaptation to the education system requires special attention for integration (Havadis Gazetesi, 2023).

The issue of immigration and emigration is currently prevalent in North Cyprus. However, the most significant concern is that 15% of young adults in higher education leave the country for education and do not return. This phenomenon is known as "brain migration" and poses a critical issue for North Cyprus. In addition to the young generation, many graduates in various fields, including pharmacists, lawyers, architects, and engineers, are unemployed or working in unrelated professions.

6.2. Sub-human Trait Association: Black Beards, Seaweed and Jasmines

The demographic shift led to social unrest between the immigrant population and the Turkish Cypriot locals. This was due to the contrasting characteristics of the two groups. Most Turkish settlers hail from impoverished, rural regions in Turkey, and they tend to be more socially conservative and religiously devout than most Turkish Cypriots. (Bahçeli, 2004). This also confuses people living in Türkiye, who frequently ask Turkish Cypriots, "Why don't you like us?" "Always the same question; "Why don't you like Turks?" "Well, I am Turk as well." (Güngör, 2002, p.50). Prejudice and, therefore, dislike are mainly against settlers because they are "different".

Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots tend to hold negative attitudes towards immigrants, often expressing resentment in different ways. They have terms such as "fica" (seaweed) "garasakal" (Black beard – although not a derogatory word, it may be used in

that way; initially it denotes the different facial features of those from Türkiye which later on used mostly to refer to someone from Türkiye), “fellaḥ” (An Arabic word, which originally meant “peasant” but in Turkish Cypriot dialect it means Arab gipsy) and “gaco” (gipsy) are considered, non-civilised, underdeveloped, strictly religious, and very conservative unlike themselves. (Hatay & Bryant, 2008a, p.59; Ramm, 2007, p.10).

Fica frequently refers to immigrants from Türkiye, which means seaweed in the Turkish Cypriot dialect. The tide brings in seaweed and covers the shores of beaches. It also sticks to the skin of swimmers. This is a compelling example of the 13th regression element, where out-group members are associated with progressively subhuman traits. Referring to out-group members as fica and associating immigrants with a subhuman trait emphasises Turkish Cypriot dialect and identity and also creates a mental representation of immigrants as washing up Cyprus’s shores and spoiling the natural environment. (Hatay & Bryant, 2008b, p.435).

One of the highlights of the distinction between “us” and “them” is the jasmine, which is strongly associated with nostalgic Nicosia. It starkly contrasts fica, a dark, brown, dead seaweed washed up on the coast. Jasmine is a pure, fresh, white, indigenous Cyprus flower that is grown with care. It brings back memories for Cypriots of old, fresh summer evenings and jasmine blossom necklaces given as a gift to loved ones. More importantly, jasmine reflects Nicosia’s lost purity, and it is a connection to the old days (Hatay & Bryant, 2008b, p.435). Thus, jasmines represent part of Turkish Cypriots; in-group identity, which they can no longer be in touch with or long for as the demographic, socio-political and economic changes were more artificially occurring than naturally occurring.

In addition to being a current sign of separation between Cypriots and others, it also functions as a temporal continuum through symbolism, establishing a link between past and present notions of Turkish Cypriot identity.

In the 1960s, Turkish Cypriots attributed significant meanings to jasmines, which is still evident today. These flowers represented the “us” and “them” divisions that emerged for Turkish Cypriots. While historical research often focuses on the war during the 1960s, there are few discussions about the daily social lives of Turkish Cypriots in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Following the first serious inter-communal conflict on 21 December 1963, many Turkish Cypriots left their villages.

Back then, they faced undignified situations at Greek Cypriot checkpoints and had limited access to fresh produce and supplies. They stayed in cramped living quarters with families whose extended relatives had escaped their villages. Thus, many homes were overcrowded. Supplies were regulated at Greek Cypriot checkpoints, and unfortunately, they were frequently neglected, leading to spoilage or confiscation. This situation resulted in an extremely militarised Turkish Cypriot population who relied heavily on their local Turkish Cypriot administration and their “motherland”, Türkiye. (Hatay & Bryant, 2008b, p.439).

In January 1964, the Turkish Cypriots established a governing body and created posts to serve their community. Every Turkish Cypriot was primarily responsible for defending their community; even young boys and girls were instructed to help with the defensive effort. Many local youngsters in the Nicosia enclave recall little changes besides an overflow of unwanted refugees from the villages. Economic and social disparities progressively faded as everyone contributed to the community’s defence. Everyone who could carry a gun, man or boy, became mücahit (a unique term for Turkish Cypriot fighters). Boys as young as 16 would attend school during the day and were guards at night, influencing the customary hierarchy of younger and older. While men and boys defended the neighbourhood, girls cleaned and loaded weapons, and women sewed uniforms (Hatay & Bryant 2008b. p.439).

Although Turkish Cypriots remained in the enclaves until 1974, conditions improved in 1968; still, they refused to give Greek Cypriots access to their enclave territories. During his 1968 visit to enclaves, psychiatrist Vamık Volkan noted symptoms similar to depression among Turkish Cypriots. When restrictions were lifted, and they experienced freedom, many were unhappy to return to their houses at night. Even though they continued to live mostly within their enclaves and endured significant restrictions on rights, and resources were very scarce, their adaptive defensive illusions were no longer viable. Their captivity had taken them from a state of extreme suffering and some danger to a world shared with their fellow men in which the actions of those in need and their mythic saviour could be psychologically controlled. This world no longer existed, and its residents confronted the humiliating realisation that an affluent Greek lifestyle surrounded them (Volkan, 1979).

During their confinement, Turkish Cypriots' anger grew, and they believed in a fantasy that if they managed to dominate the Greeks, they would prevail. However, they were under the authority of Greeks and Greek Cypriots, who controlled the greater "world", and Turkish Cypriots had to be submissive. This fuelled internal hostility and reduced Turkish Cypriot's self-esteem. Not allowing Greeks into their enclaves was a method to retain control and secrecy, letting them enjoy the "power", which, in reality, was a delusion and distorted feeling of self-worth (Volkan, 1979). Thus, by thinking that they had preserved some sovereignty and the notion that they determined their future during the enclave period, Turkish Cypriots were self-contained and were in a "world apart". Turkish Cypriots thrived socially and culturally while living in enclaves with their compatriots, particularly in Nicosia. The men and boys who participated in the armed struggle gave traditional manhood values a new significance, which affected how everyone viewed socio-cultural values during this time; Turkish Cypriots underwent modernisation, which was influenced by the developments in Türkiye. This helped in the social and cultural progress of their envisioned new state. (Hatay & Bryant 2008b, p.40). Hence, fun-filled, jasmine-scented, breezy Nicosia represents Turkish Cypriots' longing for a better past, a past "characterised by an egalitarian struggle for an independent future". (Hatay & Bryant, 2008b, p.441).

Socio-psychologically, the experience of Turkish Cypriots from 1963 until late 1974 differed greatly from now; nevertheless, considering the emotional scars left by those experiences and the meanings ascribed to Nicosia, the significant changes, including a demographic profile of the city triggered feelings of humiliation, suffering, struggle, hope, and enjoyment. Thus, jasmines are viewed as strong objects representing a reoccurring psychological separation between us and them.

6.4. Collective Identity and Progression of Turkish Cypriots

Most Turkish Cypriots do not share a common idea of collective identity, which has become a significant aspect of their political conflict. (Ramm, 2006). However, South Cyprus also shares the issue; both groups imported their national identities from their motherlands during British rule; hence, some writers blame Britain for the differing nationalist identities (Ramm, 2006; Tahsin, 1995). Nevertheless, "Cypriotism" refers to cultural and traditional commonalities that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots share.

According to this approach, before problems broke out in the 1950s, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots lived peacefully together. (Ramm, 2006).

Turkish Cypriots are lenient in adopting a “Cypriot” identity against Turkish people and stress their “Turkish Cypriot” identity against “Greek Cypriots.” According to this, the general tendency among Turkish Cypriots is the adoption of the “Turkish Cypriot” identity (Gürkan, 2007), and fewer Cypriots adopted the “Cypriot” identity as its simplest and purest form (Vural & Rüstemli, 2001).

Adopting a “dual” identity, or adapting to different social identities yet not having a collective identity depending on the person to whom they speak, is also evident from the interview conducted by Güngör (2002). A female participant states that she feels solely Cypriot, but when someone asks her in London where she is from, she replies by saying she is Turkish, but when someone asks the same question in Türkiye, she replies stating she is a Cypriot (Güngör, 2002. p.16).

In the 2000s, particularly with the Annan Plan acting as a catalyst, which aimed to resolve the Cyprus Conflict, the main discourses of Cypriotism and collective identity discourses were strongly evident. However, the voice of these discourses gradually faded as the population of Turkish Cypriots kept shrinking due to continuing emigration and accelerated immigration from Türkiye and other countries. Those who voice Cypriotist discourses are banned from entry to Türkiye, which is the main gateway for those who would need to exercise several human rights such as getting medical attention for serious health issues, access to higher education, travel and similar others (Lüle, 2022). Therefore, existing secondary data is limited to the previous decade, and people are hesitant to give interviews for fear of being labelled based on their opinions and becoming out-group or experiencing disadvantage in public offices. Now, Turkish Cypriots are in the timeless purgatory of collective identity.

Table 1: The Tree Model Applied to Turkish Cypriots

| Ledger: (1) Not Started Yet | (2) Continues | (3) Completed |
|---|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Phases | Sources of Trauma | |
| | Ethnic conflict with Greek Cypriots | Unnatural socio-demographical changes |
| Phase I: Psycho-political diagnosis of the situation | (3) Completed | (3) Completed |
| Phase II: Psycho-political dialogues between groups | (2) Continues | (1) Not Started Yet |
| Phase III: Collaborative actions and institutions | (1) Not Started Yet | (2) Continues |
| Phase IV: Co-existence | (2) Continues | (3) Completed |

This research suggests that Phase IV is a promising phase to add to the Tree Model, which suggests all possible stages of co-existence (from dissociation to unification). It provides unique insights into Turkish Cypriot's collective identity and the relevant processes they have been going through as a result of ethnic conflict and sociocultural changes at the same time. We see that a society's collective identity cannot be associated with a particular time frame, but it is a continuing and dynamic process that feeds from social memory reservoirs. When a society experiences trauma, the emotions associated with the traumatising event are transmitted from one generation to another as historical trauma. With the socio-cultural, political, economic or environmental changes, these shared emotions materialise through certain discourses within that society. Phase IV suggests that a society sequentially and completely needs to pass through previous phases to reach the co-existence stage, at which point the members of the society may dissociate or reach complete unification.

5. CONCLUSION

Confrontation and closure with the past through social support systems are helpful tools in aiding in healing past traumas; however, history education is crucial in minimising the negative effects of transgenerational and intergenerational trauma. Exploring the implications of prolonged ethnic conflict and multiple group identities is a promising path in understanding identity construction in these societies so social policies can be developed accordingly to aid reconciliation.

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