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## **Changing the US Foreign Policy Strategy in the Region and Afghanistan**

### **Abstract**

Bush's "anti-terrorism strategy", Obama's "counter-insurgency strategy" and Trump's "zero foot strategy" are three separate strategies of the US government during the three presidential terms in Afghanistan, which ended with the withdrawal of American forces. Ultimately, the withdrawal of US forces led to the resurgence of the same group that had sought to overthrow the Taliban government 20 years ago in 2001. This article aims to provide evidence supporting the change in strategy and its conflict with the overarching macro strategy, focusing on the shifts in Afghanistan's internal environment. We are looking for an answer to this question, what are the evidences of the change in the US foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the three mentioned periods and what is the relationship between the internal developments in Afghanistan and these changes? In response to this hypothesis, it is proposed that the role of internal opposition groups and their power in these three periods is the most important factor in creating a change in the attitude of the American foreign policy in the era of Bush, Obama and Trump. The findings of this article, according to the American high-ranking documents, show that the pursuit of conflicting strategies with the primary goals is a result of the failure of the strategy in the American foreign policy against the actions of armed groups. Considering the approach of comparative investigation and focusing on its descriptive stage, the method used in this writing is qualitative and of a comparative type.

**Keywords:** America, Afghanistan, Foreign Policy, Strategy, Obama, Bush, Trump

## ABD'nin Bölgedeki ve Afganistan'daki Dış Politika Stratejisinde Değişim

### Öz

Bush'un "terörle mücadele stratejisi", Obama'nın "isyanla mücadele stratejisi" ve Trump'ın "sıfır ayak stratejisi", ABD hükümetinin Afganistan'daki üç başkanlık dönemi boyunca uyguladığı ve Amerikan güçlerinin çekilmesiyle sona eren üç ayrı stratejidir. Nihayetinde ABD güçlerinin çekilmesi, 20 yıl önce 2001 yılında Taliban hükümetini devirmeye çalışan aynı grubun yeniden canlanmasına yol açtı. Bu makale, Afganistan'ın iç ortamındaki değişimlere odaklanarak stratejideki değişikliği ve bunun kapsayıcı makro stratejiyle çatışmasını destekleyen kanıtlar sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. ABD'nin Afganistan'a yönelik dış politikasında söz konusu üç dönemde yaşanan değişimin kanıtları nelerdir ve Afganistan'daki iç gelişmeler ile bu değişimler arasındaki ilişki nedir? Bu hipoteze cevaben, Bush, Obama ve Trump dönemlerinde Amerikan dış politikasının tutumunda değişiklik yaratan en önemli faktörün bu üç dönemde iç muhalif grupların rolü ve gücü olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Bu makalenin bulguları, Amerikan üst düzey belgelerine göre, birincil hedeflerle çelişen stratejilerin izlenmesinin, Amerikan dış politikasında silahlı grupların eylemlerine karşı stratejinin başarısızlığının bir sonucu olduğunu göstermektedir. Karşılaştırmalı araştırma yaklaşımı göz önünde bulundurularak ve tanımlayıcı aşamasına odaklanarak, bu yazıda kullanılan yöntem nitel ve karşılaştırmalı bir türdür.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Amerika, Afganistan, Dış Politika, Strateji, Obama, Bush, Trump

### Introduction

In addition to the main and announced goals of America for the attack on Afghanistan, such as the destruction of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the advancement of the process of democratization and state-nationalization, strengthening the political and governmental structure, creating stability, security and preventing Afghanistan from turning into a terrorist's paradise and also preventing a nuclear confrontation. Access of terrorists to weapons of mass destruction (Hooker, 2016) there were other goals on the agenda, the most important of which were access to important mineral resources and the route of energy transfer from Central Asia to South Asia, preventing the re-establishment of power by Russia and the control of China and Iran. It is obvious that America's achievement of these goals required the existence of a grand strategy in the foreign policy of this country in the case of Afghanistan. The US government in the three terms of Bush, Obama and Trump clearly approves the use of different approaches and even it is conflicting.

Even though in order to compensate for the failure of the Bush administration, Obama put his "counter-insurgency strategy" on the agenda of his foreign policy, before he could achieve the goals in Afghanistan according to the documents of the top US. The reduction of American forces started in 2014 (Shafi'i, 2016). Trump formulated his "zero foot strategy" against Afghanistan in a criticism of the strategy of previous governments, including the early withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. He considered Obama to be the main cause of Afghanistan crisis. Without providing the conditions related to the implementation of the exit plan, he put the negotiation with the Taliban and the withdrawal of the forces on the agenda; As a result, the government with the support of America suffered erosion and a few months after the end of his presidential term, the Taliban once again dominated Afghanistan.

America's withdrawal from Afghanistan was carried out under the conditions that 20 years ago, the war against terrorism and a group called the Taliban and Al-Qaeda's alliance began, which the Americans had placed at the top of the terrorist list. After 20 years of fighting with these groups, finally Negotiating and signing the peace agreement with the Taliban, this group was brought as a party to the project for reconciliation and transfer of power (Khosravi, 2021). Considering such changes in America's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, this question is raised as to what are the signs of change in the approach of America's foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the three mentioned periods. Is there a relationship between Afghanistan's internal developments and these changes? In response to this hypothesis, it is suggested that the change in America's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, affected by the internal developments of this country, is caused by the presence of armed groups, especially the Taliban, in Afghanistan. It is America's policies and the failure of America's advertising and action programs during the Bush, Obama and Trump eras. In order to verify it, we are trying to identify the most important distinguishing elements in America's approach in these three periods by referring to the American high-ranking documents in these three periods and using the first comparative methodology. not Then, let's analyze the logic governing this change of attitude towards one of the reasons mentioned in the systemic theory of James Rosena. It is meant by the method of comparing its descriptive and qualitative dimensions. As we are trying to compare these three terms by determining the similarities and differences. It is clear that the role of Afghanistan's internal developments is central to America's foreign policy in the sense of negating other effective factors such as developments inside America and the attitude of the intervening actors. It is not Afghanistan, but it is an indication of the focus of this article.

### **Research background**

Literature review and research history has been done based on the topic, level of analysis and time and place period. The importance of the issue of Afghanistan for the great powers and its developments in recent decades has caused it to be one of the most frequent topics in the field of scientific research on the issues of this country. Researches related to the topic of this article can be divided into five sections from the point of view of the level of analysis: micro-domestic, macro-international, medium-regional, and a combination of the two levels within America and Afghanistan and a combination of small, medium and large.

In these levels of analysis, a group of works that have focused on the perception of leaders to researches based on macro theoretical approaches and variables, aimed at the competition of big players, can be found. Of course, the number of researches done on the structure of the international system, as well as the geopolitical and geostrategic features of the realism paradigm is much more. Shafi'i (2016) in the article "Explaining the factors influencing the pursuit of Trump's strategy towards Afghanistan" with the question that the contexts, conditions and factors influencing the development of the strategy of Donald Trump, President How is the Republic of America compared to Afghanistan? It examines the hypothesis that the fear of the collapse of the Afghan government and the transformation of this country into a paradise for terrorists, and as a result, the aim of targeting the interests of America and its allies through terrorists, is the reason for this. America's new strategy against Afghanistan has been set. In this article, the author's focus is on the Trump era and the description of America's strategy in this era. Rashid (2018) in his doctoral dissertation titled "Factors of Government Inefficiency in Afghanistan", while providing quantitative and qualitative evidence to show the government's inefficiency in Afghanistan in various areas of providing the ego of the citizens against the armed rebels to provide the context for economic growth and the provision of services. General, in explaining the factors affecting it, it refers to a set of factors at different internal, regional and international levels.

Although this treatise is in line with the topic of this article from the point of view of focusing on the dysfunctional situation of Tadoudi, it does not consider the differences and changes in America's policy during the periods in question. Jafari (2018) in the article "The changing foreign policy of the United States of America in Afghanistan after the 11th of September 2001" pointing out that the policies of the United States against terrorism from 2001 onwards, from the war There has been a change in priority to peace At the same time, the recognition of the incompleteness of the plan to fight terrorism and create stability in Afghanistan raises the question of what is the basis of the changing foreign policy of the United

States of America in Afghanistan and what are the consequences. Do you have one for Afghanistan? He considers the system motive and the balance of power in the region and the world to be the guide of America's foreign policy, and he believes that the long-term presence of this country in Afghanistan is based on the regional and world priorities and conditions. It should be studied from the point of view of America's political and security strategies. The results of this study show that Russia's re-establishment of power and China's emergence as a great power have affected America's foreign policy in Afghanistan. Despite this, it is not clear if the continuous power of Russia and China has been the axis of formation of the American foreign policy, why despite the steady process of this power, the attitude of the American foreign policy in the period of destiny has changed fundamentally.

Dahshiar (2011) in his book "America's foreign policy in Afghanistan" emphasizes the superiority of the ahistorical view of America's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. From his point of view, the defeat of England in the 19th century and the defeat of the Soviet Union in the 20th century should make America in the 20th century realize that achieving its goals in Afghanistan is only possible when it seems that the historical patterns ruling the society, i.e. ethnicity, kinship relations and religion should not be challenged directly.

The increase of American forces and its allies in Afghanistan in order to disrupt historical and traditional patterns are only with the aim of achieving military victory, which not only causes the defeat of the central government but also to strengthen the position of the opposing forces became effective. One of the important weaknesses of America work is not paying attention to the comparisons between the eras of Bush and Obama and as a result of neglecting both of them the change or continuity of Afghanistan's position in America's foreign policy during these two periods. Dorani, (2019) in the article "America's foreign policy approaches to Afghanistan in the three terms of Bush, Obama and Trump", for the study of the American foreign policy in these three terms in the Middle East, from Mian Ruik different types of foreign policy analysis, three decision-making approaches, psychological environment - he has chosen and combined social and judicial as his theoretical framework. Despite this, the main concern is not the comparative study of these three courses, but the teaching of methodology and how to use levels of analysis and analytical methods in research. As we said in the statement of the problem, question and hypothesis, the analytical focus of this article is on the developments inside Afghanistan and its impact on the foreign policy approach of the US government. In other words, the point of view of entering the discussion here was different from other researches and instead of focusing on the structural discussions of the international system, it also focused on the attitude of the big states and including America to Afghanistan,

to the role of Afghanistan's internal developments as a powerful factor in the attitude of big states so, the point of view of this article is the opposite of previous common analysis.

### **Theoretical framework**

When faced with a huge volume of foreign policy theories, what is important in using a theory as a theoretical framework is its comprehensiveness and usefulness. Since the general and specific theories of foreign policy have paid attention to this process from a special angle and have ignored other angles, the approach of this article in using this tool is a combination. Among the general and specific theories of foreign policy analysis, James Rozna's synthesis theory is more relevant to the topic of this article from the point of view of usefulness and comprehensiveness. To use Rozna's hybrid theory as a theoretical framework, Afghanistan's internal developments can be considered as independent variables that cause changes in the foreign policy of the states, and Bama and Trump faced Afghanistan. Rozna's theory, which was the first attempt to study foreign policy with a comparative approach, is a multi-level theory for analysis, unlike the classical theories of international relations, which were macroscopic and metaphysical in terms of the level of analysis. It is foreign policy.

Rozna and thoughtfulness, which are in the framework of his comparative approach, to explain the variables included in the foreign policy of the states in five cases such as "individual variables, role, government, society, etc. (Rosenau, 1966; Starr, 1978) that they can be divided into two levels, internal and surrounding, or small and large. Rosenau's comparative theory considers three sets of factors and stages of input, input and output important in every type of decision making. In this article, Afghanistan's internal developments, which cover individual, role, governmental, environmental and social variables considered daily, (Jafari and Abad, 2022) inputs that are the main root of the The wins of the American foreign policy regarding Afghanistan in the three terms of Bush. These data entered the decision-making system of the American diplomatic service and caused the American decision-makers to consider these factors as factors. Contrary to America's national interests in Afghanistan, three types of "anti-terrorism", "counter-insurgency" and "zero-base" strategies are considered as exits to They will be used against Afghanistan in the order of Bush, Obama and Trump.

Regarding the differences between these strategies and whether they have the ability to achieve the foreign policy goals of the United States in Afghanistan, we will explain in the following. What is America's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan? The secret documents of America's war in Afghanistan show that its foreign policy approaches to Afghanistan are continuously changing during the era of Bush, Obama and Trump, and whether they were able to achieve the objectives of US foreign policy in Afghanistan or not, we will explain further.

(Whitlock, 2019). In order to understand more details of these changes and differences, it is necessary to examine the foreign policy approaches of the United States towards Afghanistan in each of these countries case by case and according to the high-level documents. Let's study in an applied way.

The foreign policy approach of the Bush government in Afghanistan: Bush's 2002 strategy considers the intersection point of military infrastructure and technology as the main problem for the future of American national security.

In this document, terrorist groups, by acquiring chemical, biological and nuclear weapons along with ballistic missile technology, can gain devastating power to attack America. (NSS, 2002). Also, the weak states that have sheltered the members of such terrorist organizations are known as a threat to the national security of America and the main danger to the international system and its leadership (NSS, 2002). Thus, Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban was recognized as a geographical threat, and the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were recognized as its agents. Such a definition of geography and threat factor did not continue until the end of Bush's presidency, and due to the developments in these two areas, the importance of Afghanistan in the 2006 strategy was reduced and the war in Iraq the priority was set.

In the new strategy, rogue states like Iraq "are not only looking for weapons of mass destruction for themselves, but they can transfer them to their terrorist allies." (Record, 2005). The decline of Afghanistan's position in the foreign policy of the Bush government caused America to forget its ideological goals in Afghanistan and to pursue security and strategic goals. Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Staff of the US Army, focused on the long-term commitments of this country towards Afghanistan in terms of security goals such as state building, strengthening the security forces and supporting the Karzai government for the transition. (Mullen, 2011). Although the strategic agreement between America and Afghanistan refers to economic and political cooperation, the most important part of it is security and military articles (Khalilzad, 2016) as follows:

1. Helping to manage and attract Afghanistan's security forces with the aim of creating the capacity to accept security responsibilities.
2. Helping the government of Afghanistan to improve the security situation.
3. Continuation of operations against terrorism with the participation of Afghan forces.
4. Continuation of security and information cooperation.
5. Strengthening the relationship between Afghanistan and NATO.
6. Strengthening and ensuring the security of Afghanistan's borders (Document, 2005).

These axes show that the American diplomatic service did not follow the same approach in Afghanistan during Bush's two terms, and opposed the strategy of 2002, which was a combination of ideological goals. He was looking for a strategy from the presence in Afghanistan, in the 2006 strategy, the security dimension of these goals was overcome. It got more priority. This kind of change of direction in Bush's foreign policy, from the point of view of American high-ranking documents, shows the Bush administration as unsuccessful in achieving its military goals in Afghanistan. The Obama administration's foreign policy approach in Afghanistan: Obama's first strategy connects the future challenges of America in Afghanistan with a look at the internal possibilities of that country.

In general, in the strategies of 2002 and 2006 Bush, a combination of foundation and technology, and in the strategies of 2010 and 2015 Obama, under the question of the basis of the power and influence of America, one of the main security threats have been brought to this country (Ettinger, 2017). In Obama's government, revitalizing America's global influence and destroying terrorist groups, it is necessary to go through the anti-terrorism strategy against the Soviet Union, which the British ambassador in Kabul has described as having three waves. Military (intensification of operations against the rebels), civil (triple increase in the number of American civil experts) And diplomatic (the process of establishing reconciliation with the Taliban with the cooperation of Pakistan and all of Afghanistan's close neighbors) (Koles, 2012). The point is that, similar to his predecessors, Obama has a more planned approach to the post-Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Kissinger considers one of the reasons for America's defeat in wars to be a non-process view and believes that America does not see the need to establish a relationship between military and diplomatic power in its wars or after Victory in the war acts as if the military element does not interfere in the matter and diplomats can fill the strategic gap (Kissinger, 2004). Apart from the Bush and Obama administrations, the necessary outcomes of Kissinger's opinion can also be seen in the foreign policy approach of the Trump administration.

Trump's foreign policy approach in Afghanistan: Trump's strategy considered the main reason for America's defeat in Afghanistan to be Obama's inappropriate strategy, which failed to reduce the weak points of Bush's strategy. It also has many shortcomings, including the early withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

Although the introduction of the 2017 strategy titled "Infinitely Dangerous World" has an overview of transnational terrorists, it focuses more on irresponsible and irresponsible countries such as Russia, China and Iran. It is that "they want to build a world at the opposite point of the values and interests of the United States"(NSS, 2017) Also, Mattis, the Minister of Defense of the Trump administration in January, 2018, saw the main focus of America instead



of fighting terrorism, against great powers like China and Russia (Sanger and Broad, 2018). Despite the decline in the position of Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism in Trump's foreign policy, his strategy is a completely new approach to Afghanistan. The hasty departure of America from Iraq in 2011 was a mistake and caused America's achievements to easily fall into the hands of its enemies (Kelly, 2017). Trump's approach for a dignified exit from Afghanistan can be summed up in following the process of negotiations and reaching a comprehensive peace framework with the Taliban. To be successful in this case, there are undoubtedly many variables involved, which we will discuss further.

### **The reasons for the change in America's foreign policy**

By studying how the change in America's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan in the three terms of Bush, Obama and Trump in the previous section, in this section we will focus on the internal developments of Afghanistan in four axes, which have Tatta Ali about these changes were:

#### **These changes are**

A) Increase in the power of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda: The increase in the power of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda since 2005 and as a result of Bush's prioritization of the war in Iraq, started the process of stabilization in the south and east of Afghanistan. It happened in Afghanistan.

In 2006, the Taliban managed to put parts of the southern provinces of Afghanistan under their unofficial rule and proceeded to overthrow the central government (Kuntzsch, 2008). From the point of view of the American officials in the Obama administration, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, who in 2003 only controlled about 8 percent of the total of 364 geographical divisions in Afghanistan, in 2009 means the end of the presidency. Bush's focus and the pursuit of the small footprint policy in Afghanistan, this number Reach 44 percent.

Mullen, the Chief of Staff of the US Army along with other military officials of the United States in the Obama administration, such as Stanley McChrystal, David Petraeus and Robert Gates, the unstable situation in Afghanistan and the renewed power He recognized the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as a result of the change in the direction of the Bush administration from Afghanistan to Iraq: "I have been arguing for years that due to the unnecessary expenses of America in Iraq, we do not have the necessary resources to properly carry out the mission in Afghanistan" (Hayes, 2009). In this way, Bush's small footprint policy in Afghanistan compared to the large footprint policy in Iraq (Khalilzad, 2016), prevented the achievement of the goals of the US foreign policy in Afghanistan and made the Obama administration a slave. He

encouraged the counter-insurgency. This strategy was formed based on two main pillars: In the first stage, stability must be established in the country.

In order to create stability, Obama opposed the "small footprint" policy, which meant the presence of a limited number of American troops in Afghanistan, and opposed the "big footprint" policy, which meant sending between 10,000 and 45,000 troops. A new American supported and followed the battle area. It was to dismantle, dismantle and defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return (Rozen, 2009). Besides creating stability in Afghanistan, the second vital pillar of the counterinsurgency strategy was to prevent the re-establishment of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Achieving this importance required that the central government be able to show its presence throughout the country by increasing its efficiency and providing the basic needs of the people (Dahshiar, 2011). The point is that Obama's counter-insurgency strategy with stability elements such as maximum presence, multilateralism and separating the good from the bad Taliban, among other goals, is the most important of those who stop the process of growing and gaining strength. Once again, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda could not succeed.

For example, Obama's policy of maximum presence in Afghanistan, not only did not reduce the level of threats, but even managed to preserve the situation during the Bush administration due to the relative security in most of the regions and provinces. This process was reversed in such a way that with one year left to the end of his presidency, 27 out of the total of 34 provinces of Afghanistan, which are mostly located in the south, southeast and east parts of Afghanistan, they have a high level of threats" (Nordland & Goldstein, 2015). The trend of losses is increasing; As in the first years of Obama's presidency, about 1440 people were injured and 1052 people were killed. This figure reached 3,565 wounded and 1,601 dead in 2016, which indicates a doubling of military casualties in Afghanistan (UNAMA, 2016). In this order, according to the British ambassador in Afghanistan, the counter-insurgency strategy is based on three pillars: "cleansing: suppressing Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, holding: preventing the return of insurgents, and building: infantry." construction, welfare and security programs" (Schmitt and Scott, 2009), was stable, not a strategy, but "it was a technique or tactic to suppress the symptoms of rebellion, not the treatment of the original disease" (Koles, 2012). Zalmi Khalilzad, the same as the British ambassador, believes that the main part of the mistake in the war in Afghanistan is related to the Obama administration and believes that "the reduction of American military forces in Afghanistan, the insufficiency of the increase of 30,000 troops." military force by Obama in 2009 in response to General Stanley's proposal McChrystal and David Petraeus on the need to increase 40,000 military personnel and set a one-year deadline

for the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, due to the increase in the power of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda groups in became Afghanistan" (Khalilzad, 2016). Similar to Khalilzad, the officials of the Trump administration stated that the reduction of American military forces and the setting of a timetable for their withdrawal by the Obama administration were the main reasons for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda's rise to power and the implementation of the plan. They consider the exit conditional on the fulfillment of conditions that were not achieved in the Obama administration.

Despite the fact that the Trump government's strategy of zero-sum involvement with the help of the exclusive superiority of the American military technology was able to kill thousands of people from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, just by killing them. You will not get a day, because "there is always a "pool of volunteers" among the Pashtuns to fight. , a society that considers death against external forces a "pride" for the nation, family and religion" (Dahshiar, 2011) and defines the security of its identity in its grove.

Trump's inability to achieve the goals of America's foreign policy in Afghanistan, including preventing it from falling again to the Taliban, was a result of a question-oriented foreign policy which also existed in the Bush and Obama administrations. As a result of this weakness, "America took a loan of 2 trillion US dollars to pay for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq." The total cost of these wars, considering the current value conditions, is more than 4 trillion US dollars" (Bilems, 2013). In the meantime, despite the presence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, "out of the total 2 trillion dollars of the cost of the American war in Afghanistan, the second part of it was allocated to the fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda" (Almukhtar and Nordland, 2019).

B) Intensification of Afghanistan's internal problems: retaking the proposal of prominent political and military strategists such as Khalilzad and David Barneau, the commander of the US military forces in Afghanistan, based on Rett used a more comprehensive approach in Afghanistan because "we have not gone to solve their problems" (Khalilzad, 2016), caused the increase and complexity of the internal resource chain of Afghanistan's problems.

The main cause of many of America's problems in Afghanistan was the inefficiency and weakness of the governments of this country for long periods, especially the civil wars. In such a country, the only hope of the people was that America would calm down their country, provide them with help and organize comprehensive measures to solve the aforementioned problems. Unfortunately, this was not achieved and the result of the American war in Afghanistan revealed more than before the limitations caused by the internal sources of the problems (Callahan, 2008). Instead of paying attention to the Afghanistan crisis from the perspective of politics, the

Bush government relied more on physical power and force to solve it. Ezainro, "in 2008, the London officials came to the conclusion that in order to solve the historical problems of Afghanistan by means of a targeted diplomatic and consultation process, they should try to target the new American government that was identified. It is a democratic government and it looks at the issues of Afghanistan with a wider perspective than Bush (Koles, 2012).

In the Obama administration, the officials of the Pentagon, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Army, including Holbrook, Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, need to solve the historical problems of Afghanistan. Yiri knew both military and political approaches and believed that "they should A parallel political trend was made with the increase of the military force, and the increase of the force was used to get the military privilege and then we will discuss the issue of power" (Koles, 2012). Despite the simultaneous pursuit of two approaches by the Obama administration, Khalilzad believes that the main reason for the aggravation of Afghanistan's internal problems is caused by the difficulties of reactive and persistent to preventive policies (Khalilzad, 2016). The shortcomings of the Obama administration's foreign policy satisfied the White House officials in the Trump administration to use a new strategy to solve the historical problems of Afghanistan. In the zero-sum strategy, "implementation of the exit plan is conditional on providing conditions such as comprehensive support from the government in support of America in Afghanistan" (White House, 2016). It was aimed at solving the historical crisis of this country.

The solution of the Afghanistan crisis required a bilateral political process. This process, which "must pay attention to multiple internal sources of conflict and to foreign actors including Pakistan, India, China, Russia and Iran" (Koles, 2012), is similar to Trump's foreign policy.

C) Decrease in public opinion of the American presence in Afghanistan: before Bush gave priority to the American war in Iraq and the decline of Afghanistan's position in his government's foreign policy, the level of public opinion satisfaction with the American presence It is very high in Afghanistan. Khalilzad, Bush's ambassador and special representative in Afghanistan, explains the evolution of public opinion regarding this presence as follows:

Before I went to Afghanistan, due to the historical xenophobia of Afghans, I supported from the point of view of keeping a small footprint. But during my first trips in 2002, talking to ordinary people, I realized how much I was wrong. When people see armed people in the streets coming towards them, they get scared and expect to be hurt or robbed or beaten for no reason. Compared to that, when they saw soldiers from foreign countries, they felt calm. (Khalilzad, 2016).

The small footprint policy based on the military and security approach of the Bush administration was not suitable for the conditions of Afghanistan and most of the people of this country are not interested in the big footprint policy of America, such as providing security, etc. For the sake of democratization, economic revolution and prevention of the interference of regional neighbors were accepted. As a result of not paying attention to the aspirations of the people of Afghanistan, Bush missed this opportunity to encourage other countries in the Islamic world to unite with the United States in an ideological confrontation with Islamic extremists (Khalilzad, 2016). It was the reason for the change in the public mentality towards the policies of the United States towards Afghanistan. As a result of this development, the need to change from the strategy of counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency was felt. According to the high-level documents of the Obama administration, the counter-insurgency strategy is also unable to create a systematic system to prevent violent actions, solve the root of historical problems and attract public opinion in Afghanistan has been satisfied.

James Dobbins, the special representative of the Obama government in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2013 and 2014, considers the goal of the US occupation to be peace and believes that "in carrying out this mission in Afghanistan, the line was defeated." (Whitlock, 2019). Considering the inability of the Obama administration to implement its military, diplomatic and counter-insurgency strategy goals, which included "cleansing", "maintaining" and "building" Afghanistan, "in the opinion polls of the people of this country It was completed in 2011 and 2016, respectively 7 and 12 percent of the participants considered "Pakistan's intervention and support of terrorist groups in Afghanistan" as the reason for the continuation of war and instability, and 21 and 12 percent of them called "the presence of foreign forces" as the cause of this situation (The Asia Foundation, 2016) .In order to stop the dissatisfaction process of the internal environment of Afghanistan due to the presence of America in this country, Trump developed his zero-base strategy in order to put an end to the crisis in Afghanistan. and to prevent the loss of life and property of the Americans. Despite the fact that this strategy faced negative reactions in the environment surrounding Afghanistan, including Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, due to its pragmatic approach and more focus on Afghanistan has been accepted as the internal environment of this country. The Trump administration's decision to hastily withdraw American troops from Afghanistan despite many warnings and without consulting the allies or individuals who have directly intervened in the fight against terrorism for twenty years, is a result of the challenge. Sasi and the wrong choice between "full control of Afghanistan" or "exit" According to Kissinger, it was "full of it" that has continued in the twenty years of America's presence in Afghanistan. According to him, ignoring the necessity of a combination

of strategic and political goals in several generations of America's efforts in counter-insurgency operations from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan has led to failure. In this way, the United States' approach to Afghanistan in the three terms of Bush, Obama and Trump turned the American war in Afghanistan into a failed war similar to Vietnam and the reason for the destruction of Bina Station. America's nationalism and the hope and trust of public opinion towards it decreased.

The ups and downs of America's relations with the former government officials of Afghanistan: since in the previous constitution of Afghanistan, the political structure of this country is the presidency and the president has many powers and powers. What is the relationship between these two presidents and America, while being from The influential variables in changing the foreign policy of America can be the source of many internal developments in Afghanistan.

1. How is America's relationship with Hamid Karzai: Although America's relationship with Karzai had worsened during Bush's presidency, it became clearly hostile during Obama's presidency. If the United States worked with him properly, positive projects would be formed one after another in Afghanistan (Khalilzad, 2016). Khalilzad, the ambassador and special representative of the government in Afghanistan, cited the tension between the US and Afghanistan during the presidency of Hamid Karzai as one of the problems caused by reactive and persistent policies. The United States of America decides to attack Afghanistan (Khalilzad, 2016) which has no result other than wasting resources and America's defeat in Afghanistan.

Rangin Dadfar Sapenta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and National Security Advisor of the Karzai government, considers the most important factor in the tension between Karzai and the US officials to be a deep difference in their perception of threats from the enemy. (Spanta, 2017). This turn, in the change of the foreign policy direction of the Bush government from Afghanistan to Iraq, the replacement of the counter-terrorism strategy with the counter-insurgency strategy by Obama and the result of Trump's yellow-footed strategy.

2. How is America's relationship with Ashraf Ghani: Ashraf Ghani showed his attachment to the Taliban as the head of the government of national unity as the head of the government of national unity. "Political opponents" addressed (Spanta, 2017). Due to this change in the position of the government with the leadership of Ashraf Ghani regarding the Taliban group, in the strategy of 2017, Trump put negotiation with them on the top of his foreign policy list and Obama's slogans on this matter applied in practice. If we understand the peace process of America and the Afghan government with the Taliban as a summary of America's goals from its presence in Afghanistan for two decades, this question is raised as to why this

process progressed slowly and as expected. Didn't finish the trip? For this question, many answers can be given, and here, according to the necessity of space, we will briefly review the causes and factors that are aimed at the internal developments in Afghanistan.

US President Nixon in the book "Seize the opportunity: America's mission in a world with a superpower", the reason for America's failure in the negotiation process with the enemy is the continuous, direct and active involvement of the person. The President knows, because "history is full of special representatives of the President who are in the mission They have failed themselves" (Nixon, 1992). Nixon's speech about the failure of American political talks with the parties involved is fully applicable to Afghanistan, because Trump chose Khalilzad as his special representative. Afghanistan affairs, he handed over all his powers and options regarding the promotion of negotiations with the Taliban. He, who is an American of Afghan descent from the Pashtun nation, wanted to confiscate all the benefits created from the peace negotiations for the benefit of his own people, in order to face the negative reactions of other nations and their external supporters.

In this context, high-ranking officials of the US Ministry of Defense believe that the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban had its roots in the agreement that Trump signed with this group in 2020, and on that date, the withdrawal of US forces. From the point of view of General Mackenzie, the commander of the central headquarters of the US forces in the region, the Doha agreement "had a harmful effect on the situation in Afghanistan and caused the Taliban to become stronger." The reduction of the forces to less than 2,500 people in April by the order of Joe Biden drove another nail into the coffin of the Afghan government and accelerated its collapse" (Mackenzie, 2021). There were different analyzes regarding the collapse of the government under the support of America and the fall of Afghanistan again to the hands of the Taliban. What is important in this article is an analysis of Afghanistan's internal developments that led to such a situation as a process. The first mistake of the American officials and the Afghan government was that they treated the different streams of the Taliban group as if they were part of a whole. The second mistake was that the American authorities, with the mutual support of people like Ashrafghani and Khalilzad, who are not related to the Daranis from the point of view of descent, strengthened and expanded the influence of the Gholjais in the body and became the political structure of Afghanistan. Ashrafghani and Khalilzad themselves committed the third mistake. In the process of "replacement" with their management, the Guljais who had the Taliban's thinking with sunglasses and American jeans, took high positions in the government. Since these people defined their identity in the group of anti-Westernism, after the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, they tried for the fall of the

"republic" to the leadership of Niktai. The prosperity and re-establishment of "Emirate" under the leadership of Mandil Poushani like Haqqani and others They evaluated the provision of this type of security.

### Conclusion

By comparing the documents of high-ranking American officials in the three terms of Bush, Obama and Trump, we see important and fundamental changes in their foreign policy approach towards Afghanistan. Afghanistan's internal developments, which are focused on the individual, role, community and government levels emphasized in the multi-level and systemic theory of Rozna, were expressed as variables that are in the form of a process. They caused a continuous change in the foreign policy of the United States towards Afghanistan in these three periods. The use of different strategies such as "anti-terrorism", "counter-insurgency" and "zero footing" by Bush, Obama and Trump in the two decades of America's presence in Afghanistan is one of the confirmed characteristics of the change in foreign policy. Using different and sometimes conflicting approaches in the governments of Bush, Obama and Trump in response to the internal developments in Afghanistan and their inability to direct and manage these developments towards national interests. Rika is the expression of this new idea that, contrary to the prevailing image among theorists and analysts, the diplomatic apparatus America does not have a systematic attitude towards Afghanistan. Despite this, even if this deductive view is not accepted; it should be emphasized that despite the existence of a grand strategy in the American foreign policy regarding Afghanistan, what has caused confusion and changes in the attitudes of the three countries towards Afghanistan is rooted in internal developments.

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