

ON BUREAUCRACY

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I. BUREAUCRACY, AS A CONSTITUENT OF THE MARXIST LENINIST «THEORY OF STATE»

A. General Remarks on Deviationist Tendencies

The concept of bureaucracy constitutes a predominant and integral part of the marxist-leninist «theory of state». With the exclusion of **general** inter-connections through the agency of the state, i. e. the ruling classes organized as a public force, it is **not** specifically related to the marxist «class theory». Unfortunately, however, the deviationist tendency to define bureaucracy as a «**stratum of bureaucrats**» and to thus bring it under the jurisdiction of the marxist «class theory» has become so widespread that distortive efforts of this nature can no longer remain unchallenged.

The prime target of the said deviationist tendency, obviously, is the castration of the revolutionary content of the marxist-leninist treatment of the concept of bureaucracy. The origins of this deviation are to be found in the later writings of messrs. Kautsky and Trotsky; it reaches counter-revolutionary extremes in the voicings of Edvard Kardelj of Yugoslavia. Marx's famous letter to Kugelmann (April 12, 1871), coupled with the reactions of Kautsky and Kardelj, provide a highly illustrative example of nascent and mature (respectively) deviationism in the latter two. Marx, in the letter, states definitely that «**..the preliminary condition of any real people's revolution on the continent..**»¹ is the «shattering of the bureaucratic apparatus». The reactions of Kautsky and Kardelj are more or less similar. «One must not even think of such a thing as the break-up of the old machinery of sta-

(1) Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., London, 1962, p. 463.

te, for how shall we do without Ministries and officials» exclaims Kautsky; apparently attempting to legitimize the Yugoslavian experience and evidently adulterating Marx, Kardelj claims that «**..the working class cannot nor has it any need to destroy bureaucracy as the governing segment..**»² Examples of this sort fairly abund. In the case of Trotsky denouncing the «stalinist bureaucracy», all alleged attacks on bureaucracy, are, in actuality, leveled against the Party and state officials gathered around Stalin. It is obvious that these «criticisms» and refutations rest on the assumption that bureaucracy is a social stratum formed by bureaucrats. Nothing could be more erroneous. **Just as the «abolition of capitalism» is the abolition of capitalist relations of production, and not necessarily the liquidation of capitalists, «the destruction of bureaucracy» is the destruction of bureaucratic relations of administration, and not the physical annihilation of the so-called bureaucrats.**³ It is obvious that messrs. Kautsky, Trotsky and Kardelj are either intentionally distorting the content of the concept of bureaucracy, or are committing the misdemeanor of «broadcasting on different wave-lengths».

Looking back at the history of the concept of bureaucracy, one notes the gradual disappearance of the scientific preciseness observed in Marx, Engels and Lenin, only to be replaced by the distortive vagueness of Kautsky, Trotsky, Kardelj etc. A reversal

(2) Edvard Kardelj, «The Working Class, Bureaucracy and the League of Communists», *Socialist Thought and Practice* (A Yugoslav Quarterly), January-March 1968, no. 29, p. 14.

(3) Several analogies can be drawn to further clarify this point. The most striking and illustrative, however, is provided by the phenomenon called «capital». Capital is a *relation of production* peculiar to bourgeois society; this relation materializes (crystallizes) in a mass of instruments of production. On the condition that this mass of instruments of production is the materialization of capital (as a relation of production), *and on this condition alone*, we can, with certain reservations, acknowledge the mass of instruments of production *itself* as «capital». The same holds true for bureaucracy. Bureaucracy, as an administrative relation peculiar to the bourgeois period of economic development, materializes in the bourgeois state apparatus and the mass of permanent public officials employed in this apparatus. All government officials are not «bureaucrats»; on the condition that the mass of public officials have entered that specific administrative relation called bureaucracy, *and on this condition alone*, can the mass of public officials be referred to as «bureaucracy». This point will be elaborated further on.

of this trend, which, we must admit, will yield no more than the «rediscovery of America», has been long due. To start with, we must answer the very simple question: What actually is bureaucracy?

B. Concept, Components, Definition

The term «bureaucracy», to our knowledge, originally appeared in the writings of **Vincent de Gournay**, economist of the physiocrat school, in 1745. Derived from the words «**burra**» (Latin for a thick, dark and woollen cloth used to cover office desks) and «**kratos**» (Greek for domination or sovereignty), bureaucracy roughly conceptualizes the phenomenon of «domination of bureaus» or «administration through bureaus». Since the domination of bureaus is realized through those persons employed in the bureaus, i. e. bureaucrats, bureaucracy, to begin with, can be defined as «**administration by bureaucrats**». This definition, however, excludes a class approach and is, therefore, highly inadequate.

The available definition includes two concepts, i. e. **administration** and **bureaucrat**. Marx defines «administration» as the «**..organizing activities of the state..**»⁴ and Lenin describes the «bureaucrats» as «**..privileged persons detached from the masses and standing above it..**»⁵ We now have a more refined but still inadequate definition of bureaucracy:

Bureaucracy is the conduct (implementation) of the organizing activities of the state by privileged persons detached from the masses and standing above it.

Attention should now be focused on the fact that the «state», as all concepts go, is an abstraction. What actually does this abstraction reflect? For one thing, the state has not existed from all eternity; according to marxist theory, at a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state and state power became a necessity, due to this cleavage; it is, as a rule, «**..the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the**

(4) T. B. Bottomore and M. Rubel (ad.), *Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England, 1961, p. 222.

(5) V. I. Lenin, «The State and Revolution», *The Essential Left: Four Classic Texts on the Principles of Socialism*, Unwin Books Ltd., London, 1960, p. 250.

medium of the state, also becomes the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class...»⁶ but, by way of exception, «..periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both..»⁷ Thus, we arrive at a new component of the concept of bureaucracy :

The bureaucrats do not conduct the affairs of the state on their own or on behalf of an abstract «state», but function as agents in regulating the common affairs of the ruling classes.

A further question arises at this point. Does the origin of bureaucracy date back to the origins of the state, i. e. have the state and bureaucracy come into existence simultaneously? Or does bureaucracy, as an administrative form, correspond to a certain stage of the economic development of society? Lenin provides the answer to these questions, in one of his earlier writings : «..From absolutist, half-Asiatic Russia down to cultured, free, civilized England, everywhere we see this institution constituting the indispensable organ of bourgeois society..»⁸ In other words

Bureaucracy is a specific form of administration, corresponding to the bourgeois period of centralized state power, born out of the cleavage of society into two antagonistic classes, i.e. the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As such, it is, in the last instance, the indispensable organ of bourgeois society.

Since bureaucracy is the product of a later stage of economic development, i. e. bourgeois society, it is fairly obvious that all administrative forms encountered in history are not necessarily bureaucratic and that all public officials cannot be classified as bureaucrats. Hence, the question : What differentiates bureaucracy from other forms of administration, and bureaucrats from other public officials? Lenin's description of the bureaucrat,⁹ provides the answer. For one thing, the bureaucrat is **detached from the masses and stands above it**; for a second, he is **privileged**. In order to make a sound and scientific evaluation of this point, the said phenomenon, i. e. being detached from the masses and stan-

(6) Marx-Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 320.

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 320-321.

(8) Quoting from Lenin, E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. I, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England, 1966, p. 249.

(9) Bureaucrat : privileged person detached from the masses and standing above it.

ding above it, must necessarily be viewed in the light of the genesis of state and state power.

According to Engels, in order that «..classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary..»¹⁰ This power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above society and increasingly detaching itself from society, is the state. In view of this analysis, it can be stated that bureaucracy is the form of administration created after the last «visible» ties between the state apparatus and the masses have been severed; again, under these circumstances, bureaucracy is the highest stage in the process of the state detaching itself from the masses, that administrative - executive apparatus peculiar to bourgeois society and standing above bourgeois society.

What concrete forms does the phenomenon called «detachment from the masses» assume? In evaluating the experience of the Paris Commune (1871), Marx pointed out that, in order to «shatter the bureaucratic apparatus», the Commune declared all public officials, without exception, «..elective, responsible and revocable..»¹¹ This is an indirect statement of the fact that public officials, under a bureaucratic form of administration, are not subject to election (i. e public offices are not filled through universal suffrage), are not responsible and accountable to the masses, and to top it all, are irrevocable. Earlier, in **The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte** (1851), Marx had accounted for the absence of bureaucracy in the United States with the presence of the so - called «spoils system». The non - elective nature of public officials and the denial of the right of «recall by the masses» (which serves, more or less, as a vote of no - confidence), provides us with the most outstanding and peculiar characteristic of bureaucracy, i. e. **the permanence of public officials**. To sum up

Bureaucracy is the highest stage in the process of the transformation of the organs of state, from the servants into the masters of society, and is characterized by the permanent character of public officials.

The second component of the concept of bureaucracy, as pointed out earlier, is the **privileged position** of public officials. Permanence in office on the one hand, and absence of mass control

(10) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 319.

(11) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 520.

on the other, constitute two major privileges enjoyed by officials, as organs of the bourgeois period of centralized power. These, however, are further supplemented with «privileges, i. e. high salaries, sinecures, honoraria etc.». This situation is indirectly reflected in one of the most effective measures for bureaucracy, originally developed by the Paris Commune and emphasized by Marx¹² and further formulated by Lenin as «**abolition of all representative allowances, and of all special allowances in the case of officials; and the lowering of the payment of the servants of the state, to the level of the "workmen's wages"**». Another privilege is the «right of pension»¹⁴ which guarantees the continuation of pecuniary benefits, even after the concealment of public officials, due to old age, are unable to discharge their duties. Thus :

bureaucrats, in addition to being permanent and not being obliged to account for their actions, enjoy such pecuniary privileges as a fixed and fixed salary, the right of pension, sinecures, honoraria

Last but not least, attention should be centered on the question of how the bureaucratic apparatus is maintained. As early as 1851, Engels stated that «**...strong government and heavy taxation are identical...**»¹⁵ Bureaucracy is «strong government». But as Marx described it in **The Civil War In France**, is not only a «**...parasitic excrescence...**»¹⁶ These, in a nutshell, are the observations which led Engels to remark, in 1884, that «**...in order to maintain this public power, contributions from the citizens are necessary - taxes... As civilization advances, these taxes become inadequate: the state makes drafts on the future...**»

C. The Scientific Approach to Bureaucracy

With reference to the scientific clarity of Marx, Engels and Lenin, we now have, before us, a more or less detailed outline of the concept of bureaucracy. In short, bureaucracy is an administrative relation peculiar to bourgeois society, an inevitable and indispensable administrative - executive apparatus corresponding to the bourgeois period of economic development. Bureaucracy, therefore, is **the conduct of the organizing activities of the bourgeois state by a permanent (standing) army of «public» officials**, who (1) are independent of the masses, i. e. non - elective, irrevocable, irresponsible; (2) enjoy liberal pecuniary privileges, i. e. a high and fixed salary, representative allowances, honoraria etc.; (3) as a privileged group, emerge from society for the sole purpose of administering society and gradually detach themselves from society, until, in the last instance, they stand above society.

Recapitulating briefly, bureaucracy is not «a stratum of bureaucrats», as deviationist tendencies would lead us to believe, but **the administration of the bourgeois state through the agency of a permanent army of privileged officials.**

II. BUREAUCRACY, AS THE INDISPENSABLE ORGAN OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY

A. General Remarks on the Role of Bureaucracy

The ubiquitous organs of centralized state power, corresponding to the bourgeois period of economic development, are the bureaucracy, the standing army and the political police. These organs, «..wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour..»¹⁸ and originating from the days of the collapse of absolute monarchy, served nascent bourgeois society as a mighty weapon in its struggle against feudalism and all forms of development - clogging medieval rubbish, i. e. seignorial rights, local privileges, municipal and guild monopolies, etc.

With the inevitable clearing of the «social soil» of all feudal hindrances to development, with the progress of modern industry and the maturing of bourgeois society, and, as a result, with the intensification of class antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and

(18) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 516.

the proletariat, the bourgeois organs of centralized state power rapidly assumed new functions. Marx describes this process of transformation as the centralized organs of bourgeois state power (i. e. bureaucracy, standing army, political police), in the hands of a rapidly maturing bourgeois society, becoming less and less a means of bourgeois society's «..emancipation from feudalism..»¹⁹ and, more and more, a «..means for the enslavement of labour by capital..»²⁰

Bureaucracy, then, is the peak point of the process of the organs of state detaching themselves from and becoming independent of the masses, i. e. the administrative - executive organ of bourgeois society, nascent and matured alike, formed by the severance of all «visible ties»²¹ between the apparatus and the masses, and constituting the materialization of an administrative relation peculiar to bourgeois society. As such, bureaucracy forms an integral part of the marxist-leninist «theory of state» and, again as such, must be dealt with as regards the genesis of state and state power.

B. Genesis of the State and State Power

The state and state power, according to Engels, has not existed from all eternity but has arisen at a certain stage of development of society, for the sole purpose of holding irreconcilable class antagonisms in check. Engels elaborates this point as follows:²²

In order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary for moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state...

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 518.

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 518.

(21) «The severance of all «visible» ties between apparatus and society» conceptualizes, not the creation of a state machine devoid of class content, but, the disappearance of all forms of responsibility and accountability on the part of the state. Thus, in actuality, the class character and the purely repressive nature of state power comes out in bolder and bolder relief. For example, Marx, Engels and Lenin, comment more than once on the thousands and thousands of «invisible ties» which attach bureaucracy to the ruling class, i.e. the bourgeoisie.

(22) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 319-320.

As the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but as it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class.

This statement obviously implies that society, originally through a simple division of labour, created its own organs for watching over society's common interests; these organs, however, headed by the state, gradually detached themselves from and became independent of society, transforming «..themselves from the servants of society into the masters of society..»²³

C. Bureaucracy and the Bourgeois Revolution

The major class divisions of the history of mankind, i. e. slave owners and slaves, feudal landlords and serfs, bourgeois and proletarians, are reflected in the corresponding forms of state. With the transformation of one form of society into the other, the new ruling class takes over the organs of state power, as welcome instruments to be used against antagonistic classes, **centralizing** and perfecting this wieldy machine in the process.

The disruption of the feudal order of society, i. e. the convergence of self-sufficient local markets into an all-embracing national market, immediately surfaced the need to replace the antiquated and crumbling state edifice of feudalism (i. e. monarchy)²⁴ with a modern state edifice, a new apparatus which would not only be instrumental in waging a **centralized, ceaseless, systematic** struggle against all remnants of feudal society, but would also assist nascent bourgeois society by way of a **unified** (centralized), **uninterrupted, ubiquitous** control over the masses. The long fight of the rising bourgeoisie against decaying feudalism culminated in a string of decisive battles and bourgeois revolutions; in order to

(23) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 483.

(24) As a rule, the state edifice of feudal society is the monarchy and that of bourgeois society, the republic. By way of exception, however, certain bourgeois societies preserve a monarchic state edifice. In Great Britain, for example, the monarchy is based on the principle of «reign but not rule» and has become so institutionalized that the ousted King Farouk of Egypt once commented: «In the very near future, only five kings will remain; the King of England, the king of spades, the king of clubs, the king of hearts and the king of diamonds».

preserve and maintain the newly-acquired power of the bourgeoisie, the centralized organs of bourgeois state power, i. e. bureaucracy, standing army and political police, came into being.

As pointed out earlier, the origins of bureaucracy can be traced back to the decay of feudalism and to the crumbling of its state edifice, the absolute monarchy. The bourgeois revolutions swept away all relics of medieval times, which had proven positive hindrances to the development of bourgeois society, and cleansed the «social soil» of all feudal rubbish, which had obstructed, in one way or another, the creation of centralized organs of state power. What «objective» conditions did the bourgeois revolutions create, which in turn provided the social basis for a modern state edifice, i. e. bureaucracy? Marx, in the **18th Brumaire**, refers to the French Revolution of 1789 and points out that the bourgeois revolutions destroy feudal relations of production and replace it with small-holding property. He describes the relationship between small-holding property and bureaucracy as follows: ²⁵

By its very nature, small-holding property forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy. It creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over the whole surface of the land. Hence it also permits of uniform action from a supreme centre on all points of this uniform mass. It annihilates the aristocratic intermediate grades between the mass of the people and the state power. On all sides, therefore, it calls forth the direct interference of this state power and the interposition of its immediate organs. Finally, it produces an unemployed surplus population for which there is no place, either in the land or in the towns, and which accordingly reaches out for state offices as a sort of respectable alms, and provokes the creation of state posts.

After having completed a brief sketch of the social conditions underlying the creation of bureaucracy, we can now concentrate on why bureaucracy, in the last instance, is the indispensable organ of bourgeois society.

D. Why Bourgeois Society Needs Bureaucracy

1) The Intensification of Class Antagonisms :

Examining the origins and development of bureaucracy in France, Marx comments that, with the removal of all feudal hindrances to bourgeois development on the one hand, and

(25) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 338.

the intensification of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (i. e. the class struggle ceases to be of sporadic nature and assumes a more or less organized continuity) on the other, **permanent and centralized** organs of state power become a dire necessity for the new ruling class.²⁶ According to Marx, it is quite natural that the means of repression available to the state, official interference in the name of the state and ubiquity through organs of state «..were bound to increase in the same measure as the number of quarters increased from which its rule and the conditions for the existence of its class were threatened..»²⁷ Marx further adds that the organs of state power «..cannot be reduced in the same measure as attacks on persons and property increase..»²⁸ In short, as the struggle against bourgeois rule loses its originally sporadic character and assumes a more or less organized nature, the bourgeoisie, too, shifts its policy to **organized detection and defence**. Hence, the immediate need for ubiquitous organs of centralized state power, i. e. bureaucracy, standing army, political police, etc.

2) *Material and Political Interests of the Bourgeoisie :*

Carrying his analysis of the genesis of bureaucracy in France to its logical conclusion, Marx draws our attention to the fact that, in bourgeois society,

where the executive power commands an army of officials numbering more than half a million individuals and therefore constantly maintains an immense mass of interests and livelihoods in the most absolute dependence; where the state enmeshes, controls, regulates, superintends and tutors civil society from its most comprehensive manifestations of life down to its most insignificant stirrings, from its most general modes of being to the private existence of individuals; where through the most extraordinary centralization this parasitic body acquires a ubiquity, an omniscience, a capacity for accelerated mobility and an elasticity which finds a counterpart only in the helpless dependence, in the loose shapelessness of the actual body politic (29),

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- (26) Marx's major works dealing with bureaucracy are the following:
Class Struggles in France (Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 118-242).
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 243-344).
The Civil War in France (Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 473-545).
- (27) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 210.
(28) *Ibid.*, p. 210.
(29) *Ibid.*, p. 284.

bureaucracy, not only serves the practical purpose of establishing bourgeois control over the masses, but also furthers the **material and political** interests of the bourgeoisie.

Viewing the matter from the standpoint of the material interests of the ruling class, it should be pointed out that the bourgeoisie, through the bureaucratic state apparatus, not only finds posts for its surplus population, but also «..**makes up in the form of state salaries for what it cannot pocket in the form of profit, interests, rents and honorariums..**»³⁰

The political interests of the bourgeoisie, on the other hand, compel this ruling class to (a) increase daily the variety and intensity of repressive measures and, therefore, the resources and personnel of state power; (b) conduct an uninterrupted crusade against public opinion and, in the process, mutilate, cripple and ultimately amputate the independent organs of the social movement. Marx points out that the «..**bourgeoisie was compelled by its class position to annihilate, on the one hand, the vital conditions of all parliamentary power... and to render irresistible, on the other hand, the executive power hostile to it..**»³¹ In short, the political interests of the bourgeoisie dictate the severance of all «visible» ties between the bourgeois state machine and bourgeois society, i. e. the detachment of the apparatus from the masses. This uninterrupted struggle for domination, waged between the legislative and the executive, results, ultimately, in victory for the latter.

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The ideological heritage of the struggle waged by the European bourgeoisie against feudalism was, in short, «enmity towards the state». The crises of 1870 and 1929 surfaced the need to revise this antiquated ideological attitude. For one thing, historical processes were undergoing a rapid transformation; it was definitely proved that market forces, left alone, did not and could not provide «maximum welfare for a maximum number of persons»; the belief that the market mechanism enabled everybody, without exception, to equally enjoy the opportunity of bettering and enriching themselves, was displayed as pure fiction. In short, it became fairly obvious that such ideological burdens as belief in «the automaticity of the market and the neutrality of the state» had to be

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 284.

(31) *Ibid.*, p. 285.

discarded rapidly, if bourgeois society were to avoid the disastrous and ultimately fatal effects of economic crises, i. e. the death knells of capitalism.³² As a result of these historical developments, «state intervention in the economy» has become an inevitable and unavoidable necessity (if not an accomplished fact), forced on bourgeois society by the material interests of the bourgeoisie.

«State intervention in the economy» assumes the following forms in bourgeois society: (a) **controlled unemployment**, i. e. the maintenance, on the one hand, of a «reserve army of labour», which is absolutely essential for the smooth functioning of the bourgeois economy, and the control, on the other, of the volume of unemployment, so as to avoid social unrest; (b) **the reduction of the length of the work - day or work - week**, so as to avoid overproduction and maintain a balance between the volume of production and the volume of consumption; (c) in cases where the reduction of the volume of production is not possible and the balance can only be attained by an increase in the volume of consumption, **the entry of the state, as a buyer, into the market**; (d) **productive investments by the state**, on the condition that the state does not trespass on the «private preserves» of the bourgeoisie; (e) **non-productive investments by the government**, i. e. arms purchases, etc.

As pointed out earlier, a properly smooth and unhindered functioning of the state apparatus can be achieved only under conditions where the state is not accountable and responsible to the masses. Heavy taxes and public debts, the two most effective means of maintaining the state apparatus and subsidizing the bourgeoisie, are, unfortunate as it may be for the ruling class, unrealizable under conditions where the the parliamentary and executive powers balance out. The bourgeoisie, then, is forced to divest its former stronghold (parliament) of all its powers and realize «strong government», in the form of a non-elective, irresponsible and irrevocable administrative - executive apparatus, i. e. bureaucracy.

E. The Changing Role of the Bureaucracy

With the removal of all feudal hindrances to bourgeois development and the progress of modern industry (i. e. the intensifi-

(32) For further information see: Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, Prometheus Books, New York, 1960, pp. 92-109.

cation and widening of class antagonisms), the political character of bureaucracy underwent a major change. From an instrument in emancipating bourgeois society from all relics and remnants of feudalism, it transformed itself into «..the character of the national power of capital over labour, of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism..»³³

According to Marx, after every revolution marking a progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of the state power stands out in bolder and bolder relief.³⁴ Hence, the bourgeoisie, in order to repress the ever-increasing attacks on property, in order to establish the full independence of the state apparatus as regards the masses, in order to identify state power with the administrative-executive apparatus peculiar to bourgeois society (i. e. bureaucracy), was forced, by its class position, to divest parliament of all its powers and to invest them in the executive. Parliament inevitably forfeits all power and influence, if it does **not rpt. not** (a) simplify administration and reduce, as far as possible, the army of permanent officials; (b) let public opinion create organs of their own, which are independent of governmental power.³⁵ Hence, bureaucracy, i. e. the form of administration characterized by the identification of the executive with state power, by its very nature, **is the final form of bourgeois administration, which precedes the «withering away of the state».**

III. A CASE STUDY IN THE GENESIS OF BUREAUCRACY : FRANCE

A. Historical Tasks of the French Bourgeoisie

In England, where the ex-feudal landowners became «..the first bourgeois of the kingdom..»³⁶ and in the United States, «..where feudalism was unknown and society, at the very beginning, started from a bourgeois basis..»³⁷ bureaucracy has remained a more or less alien institution, until, at least, the third quarter of the nineteenth century. This is due, foremost, to the original functions of bureaucracy (i. e. removing all feudal hindrances to bourgeois

(33) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 517.

(34) *Ibid.*, p. 517.

(35) *Ibid.*, p. 284.

(36) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 105.

(37) *Ibid.*, p. 111.

development) on the one hand, and the obvious absence of feudal hindrances to be removed on the other. France, as a case study in the genesis of bureaucracy, occupies the opposite extreme.

The feudal landowners of France, unlike their British counterparts, proved incapable of keeping pace with historical development; feudalism, in France, not only obstructed the seizure of political power by the rising bourgeoisie, but, also, clogged the further development of nascent bourgeois society; such feudal relics as seignorial rights, guild and municipal monopolies, local privileges etc., hindered and delayed the extension of commodity production. Feudal relations of production, materializing in all sorts of feudal rubbish, had to be removed, if bourgeois society were to move ahead. This historical task fell on the shoulders of the youthful French bourgeoisie; the long fight of the French bourgeoisie against feudalism culminated in the bourgeois revolution of 1789 and, as Marx points out, «..the gigantic broom of the French revolution of the eighteenth century swept away all these relics of bygone times..»³⁸

It is obvious that the historical mission of the French bourgeoisie could not have ended then and there; the breaking of all ties with tradition, the coupling of bourgeois political power with the accomplished fact of the predominance of capitalist relations of production, etc., constituted the simple pre-conditions of the accomplishment of further tasks. For one thing, the bourgeoisie had to clear the social soil of its last hindrances to the superstructure of the modern state edifice and, simultaneously, organize «the unity of the nation», i. e. establish and entrench commodity production, while uniting all self-sufficient local markets around a national market. To achieve the smooth functioning of this new system, it was necessary that the bourgeoisie carry the process of «the centralization of state power», originally started by the absolute monarchy, to its logical extremes. Napoleon Bonaparte, in 1798, acting as an instrument of this pressing need, took over the oppressing power of the former centralized government (i. e. absolute monarchy) and created, as a means for organizing the unity of the nation and for waging an uninterrupted struggle against feudalism, the centralized organs of state power corresponding to the bourgeois period of economic development, i. e. **bureaucracy**,

(38) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 516.

political police, standing army. The modern state apparatus, created by Napoleon and taken over by every new government as a welcome instrument to be used against its opponents, is, according to Marx, provided for and characterized by the following substructural and superstructural tenets: ³⁹

[1] [Transformation of] the peasants from semivilleins into free-holders... [and] the economic development of small-holding property...; [2] strong and unlimited government...; [3] an enormous bureaucracy, well-gallooned and well-fed...; [4] the domination of the priests as an instrument of government...; [5] the preponderance of the army.

These five tenets, described by Marx as the «idées napoléoniennes» and constituting the core ⁴⁰ of the bourgeois approach to the state, find their original expressions in post-Revolution France.

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The process of the centralization of state power, commencing during the rule of Richelieu, gaining momentum with Colbert and assuming a bureaucratic character with Napoleon, can be traced over five major periods: (1) the post-Revolution period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when bureaucracy had not yet been created and the rapidly centralizing state power of the absolute monarchy «..held the balance between the nobility and the class of burghers..»;⁴¹ (2) a. the 1798-1830 period, when bureaucracy was only the means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie, b. the 1830-1851 period, when bureaucracy, however much it strove for power of its own, functioned as an instrument of the ruling class; (3) the 1851-1871 period, when the bourgeoisie and the proletariat had more or less balanced each other, with the result that the administrative-executive apparatus «..played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat..»⁴² and seemingly acquired «..a certain degree of independence of both..»;⁴³ (4) the March 18-May 28, 1871 period, when the proletarians of Paris, in the form of the Paris Commu-

(39) *Ibid.*, pp. 336-339.

(40) The «idées napoléoniennes» are referred to as the core of the bourgeois approach to the state because they tend to reflect a highly backward stage of economic development or, as Marx puts it, «the youth of bourgeois society».

(41) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 321.

(42) *Ibid.*, p. 321.

(43) *Ibid.*, p. 321.

ne, not only laid hold of the bourgeois state apparatus, but also, **shattered** it, thus establishing the first dictatorship of the proletariat in the history of mankind; (5) the post-1871 period, when the bourgeoisie regained and maintained control of the bureaucratic state apparatus.

B. The Centralization of State Power

1) *General Background* :

The French monarchy, firmly established by the end of the fifteenth century and constituting, in the post-Revolution period,⁴⁴ the superstructure of hundreds of independent, privileged and self-sufficient feudal centres, collapsed on the 4th of August, 1789, when the French National Assembly abolished all feudal privileges, and was replaced, on the 22nd of September, by **the republic**.

The outstanding characteristic of the French state machine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which assumed an «absolutist» nature from the 17th century onwards and which, according to Engels, balanced out the feudal elements and the rising burghers, is the dialectical fact that the said apparatus, while obviously hindering the establishment of bureaucracy, simultaneously gave birth to a set of institutions essential for the creation of bureaucracy. In order to reach a proper understanding of this «visibly» contradictory statement, one has to examine, in detail, the three specific institutions characterizing the organization of state administration in France. They are, (a) the centralization of state power, parallel to the increase in the demands of nascent bourgeois society; (b) the vendible and hereditary nature of public offices, which gave rise to a striking example of «the unity of opposites», i. e. public functions subject to private property; (c) a rapid multiplication of the privileges granted the «public» officials.

(44) The French monarchy of the 17th and 18th centuries underwent profound changes and, parallel to the process of centralization of state power, assumed an «absolutist» character. The absolute monarchy created several institutions, which, by their very nature, readily met the increasing demands of nascent bourgeois society. The organs of centralized state power, corresponding to the bourgeois period of economic development, however, were originally created by Napoleon in 1798; therefore, by «post-revolution», we actually mean the pre-1798 (and not 1789) period.

2) *Centralization and the Class Structure of the Monarchy :*

Feudal relations of production, in France, materialized in hundreds of independent and self-sufficient economic units, on the one hand, and was characterized, on the other, by hundreds of privileged «families of nobility», possessed by «..the **ungovernable refusal to be governed..**»⁴⁵ This, in itself, proved more than enough for the feudal elements of French society to fall behind the tide of history. The centralization of state power, unable to transform itself into a process of bureaucratization due to the prematurity of objective (social) conditions, arose out of the demands of a rapidly advancing technology of production and assumed an absolutist character, which, according to Finer, «..was a **direct and natural answer to the ungovernable refusal to be governed..**»⁴⁶ The exaggeration of the demands of «independence» resulted in the «exaggerated» centralization of state power in France, a situation persisting throughout the reigns of Louis XIV and Louis XV.

The first products of centralization and, hence, the first organs of centralized state power, are the **intendants**.⁴⁷ The intendants, according to Finer, started out as itinerant justices (circuit judges) and assumed, shortly afterwards, functions of a military nature. Throughout the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the duties assigned the intendants underwent several further transformations, their jurisdictions being extended to cover the inspection and supervision of tax-collecting activities. Parallel to this steady increase in jurisdiction, the intendants rapidly shed their «itinerant» character and started settling down in a location central to their area of responsibility. The intendants, thus, became integral **organs** of the state apparatus, executing the orders of the king, on the one hand, and intervening, on the other, in a variety of matters which ranged from justice to finance, police to military.

(45) Herman Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1949, p. 742.

(46) *Ibid.*, p. 742.

(47) The intendants, functioning as local agents of the king, constitute a turning point in the process of the state detaching itself from the masses. The bourgeois revolution of 1789 terminated this practice and replaced it with bureaucracy (for a detailed account of the practice, see Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 742-750).

The second stage in the genesis of the intendant, as the «youthful» organ of the centralization and ubiquity of state power, is their intervention (or intrusion) in municipal politics. During the reign of Louis XIII (1610 - 1643) and the rule of Richelieu, the intendants increasingly interfered in local politics, starting off as mediator between the disputing local factions and ending up, in time, as judge and jury. Naturally, these developments placed severe restrictions on local self-government and the play of local politics; inevitably, the intendants, representing centralized state power and armed with vast authorities, were bound to come in sharp conflict with local elements, i. e. the rising bourgeoisie, the feudal landowner, the clergy, etc. By playing off the bourgeoisie against the feudal landowner and the feudal landowner against the bourgeoisie, the organs of centralized state power emerged in bolder and bolder relief.

The predominance and omnipresence of the intendants reached its peak during the reign of Louis XIV and the rule of Colbert. At the time, they possessed the right to levy and collect taxes, to organize military service and local security, to pass binding judgement on local disputes, to supervise public services etc. The genesis of the intendants, numbering sixty-eight in all,⁴⁸ and constituting the basic organ of centralized state power prior to the bourgeois revolution of 1789, had reached completion by the time Louis XVI ascended the throne (1774).

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By the turn of the second half of the seventeenth century, the absolute monarchy had acquired, for the time being, at least, a certain degree of independence of both the rising burghers and the declining feudal landowners. This, however, does not mean that the absolute monarchy is devoid of class content and that the entire state edifice is suspended in mid-air. Like every other form of state in history, the absolute monarchy, too, bore a class content. In order to reach a full and proper understanding of the class structure of the French absolute monarchy of the 17th and 18th centuries, one should start off by analysing the composition of this primitive form of centralized state power.

French public offices, prior to the revolution of 1789, were attainable either as «royal grants» or through direct purchase. It

(48) *Ibid.*, p. 747.

is obvious that those to benefit most from the practice of venality were the richer elements of the rising bourgeoisie, while the feudal nobility sought and received public offices by way of «royal grants». As the bourgeoisie and the feudal landowners tend to balance out, a more or less equal distribution of public offices is achieved, this, in turn, giving rise to the impression that the state power, as ostensible mediator, has «detached itself from society» and is holding «a balance between the nobility and the class of burghers». The French absolute monarchy of the 17th and 18th centuries represents such a balance.

3) *The Venality of Public Offices :*

The vendible and hereditary nature of public offices in pre-Revolution France constitutes yet another factor delaying the transformation of the process of centralization into a process of bureaucratization. This practice, according to Finer, originated in fourteenth century France, as an unwelcome and occasional «last resort», born out of the need to finance Louis XII's wars with Italy, but, with the passing of time, became the rule rather than the exception. By the time of the bourgeois revolution of 1789, such offices numbered around 300 thousand, which, in turn, was roughly equivalent to the number of public officials.⁴⁹ The venality of public offices, on the one hand, and the exercise, by the sovereign, of the right of investiture, on the other, created in 17th and 18th century France, a peculiar combination of the «investiture» and «spoils» systems, which, in turn, delayed the creation of bureaucracy. Serving as a conclusion and, at the same time, as an evaluation of the practice of venality, one cannot refrain from mentioning the conversation between Louis XIV and his Comptroller-General, Desmarets. Arguing in favour of the creation and offering for sale of several, obviously useless public offices and apparently attempting to convince the king that such an enterprise would not prove futile, Desmarets stated :⁵⁰

Your Majesty is forgetting one of the most splendid prerogatives of the Kings of France— that when the King creates a job, God immediately creates an idiot to buy it.

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Parallel to the centralization of state power and the tremendous increase in the ubiquity of the state apparatus, we observe a

(49) *Ibid.*, p. 751.

(50) *Ibid.*, p. 751.

corresponding increase in the number and variety of privileges enjoyed by public officials. The first category of privileges is connected, directly, with the practice of venality of office. The said practice, not only ensures the class origins of the public officials, but, also, through the agency of «hereditability», ascribes a more or less **permanent** nature to these public officials. To illustrate this point, it should be pointed out that the tenure of a public official, at the time, ranged easily from twenty to thirty years.⁵¹ The second form of privilege is associated with the «private» nature of «public» offices, i. e. a certain public office is identified with a certain individual. The fact that public offices are subject to private property, provides for the smooth functioning of the entire system. The third privilege arises from the fact that the organs of state power, as in the case of the intendants, have attained a certain degree of independence and irresponsibility towards the masses. Last, but not least, comes the pecuniary privileges (high salaries, sinecures, honoraria, etc.), enjoyed, without exception, by all public officials.

4) *Pre-Revolution Institutions and Their Effects on the Genesis of Bureaucracy in France :*

As pointed out earlier, the organizational forms of state administration in pre-Revolution France, while preventing the establishment of bureaucracy, simultaneously, created several major institutions which bureaucracy inherited and utilized intact. Since we propose to deal with the substructural hindrances to the creation of bureaucracy later on, we shall, for the time being, limit ourselves to a predominantly superstructural analysis.

The major developments during the absolute monarchy, i. e. (a) the centralization of state power, (b) public officials becoming organs of the state, (c) public officials assuming a permanent and privileged character, have contributed positively to the creation of bureaucracy. The practice of venality (of public offices) has functioned as a double-edged sword, contributing both positively and negatively. Venality, as contrasted to investiture, has shattered the nobility's monopoly over public offices, enabling the richer elements of the bourgeoisie to attain posts in the state apparatus. As a result of this **partial bourgeois control** over the state machine of the absolute monarchy, nascent bourgeois society has not felt

(51) *Ibid.*, p. 747.

a definite and pressing need for the creation of organs of its own. Hence, a delay in the creation of bureaucracy. The vendible and hereditary nature of public offices, on the other hand, has ultimately resulted in the permanence of public officials, thus giving birth to the forerunners of a bureaucratic form of administration. This, of course, is the natural outcome of public offices being subject to private property, i. e. being irretrievable, once granted.

The nobility, by means of investiture, and the rising burghers, by means of venality, were able to retain partial control over the French state apparatus, of the 17th and 18th centuries. A more or less equitable distribution of public offices among the nobility and the bourgeoisie, inevitably, arouses the impression that the state apparatus of the absolute monarchy, in practice, is balancing out the two antagonistic classes and playing off one against the other. As a result of this «balancing» (or rather, «balanced») nature of state power, the political struggle between the bourgeoisie and the nobility was terminated, for the moment, seemingly by the state. The intendants, as organs of centralized state power, emerged from society for the sole purpose of administering society, gradually detaching themselves from and becoming independent of society. As can be observed from this particular case, the absence of a system of universal suffrage in filling public offices, the established and undisputed authority of the intendants, the relative independence and irresponsibility of public officials, their highly privileged positions, etc., have broken the ground for the establishment of bureaucracy.

The contradictions inherent in the absolute monarchy were finally resolved by the bourgeois revolution of 1789, which, acting as the midwife of history, swept away all feudal relics clogging the development of bourgeois society, thus creating a substructure suitable for the establishment of the superstructure of the modern state edifice.

C. The Creation of Bureaucracy in France

The National Assembly, stronghold of and spokesman for the insurgent French bourgeoisie,⁵² abolished, on the 4th of August (1789), all feudal privileges, thus declaring and firmly establis-

(52) The Royal Assembly, i. e. Etats Généraux, declared itself, in 1789, the National Assembly.

hing the fact that the new ruling class had come to stay. By doing so, the bourgeois revolution of 1789, transformed semi-villeins into freeholders, destroyed feudal relations of production and replaced it with small-holding property, annihilated the aristocratic intermediate grades between the masses and state power, created a uniform level of relationships throughout the land and, through the agency of the ubiquitous nature of small-holding property, established rigid control over the remaining feudal elements. These relations, created by the French Revolution and cemented by Napoleon, «..forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy..»⁵³

In order to cleanse the social soil of its last hindrances to bourgeois development and to firmly establish the newly-acquired power, the first French Revolution «..was bound to develop what the absolute monarchy had begun : centralization, but at the same time, the extent, the attributes and the agents of governmental power..»⁵⁴ The process begun by the absolute monarchy, i. e. the centralization of state power, was carried to its logical conclusion by Napoleon; the unwieldy and apparently useless constituents of the pre-Revolution state machine were lopped off and the bureaucratic state apparatus, an highly effective instrument for waging a ceaseless struggle against feudalism and for preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie, came into being. This prototype of the modern state edifice, consisting of the bureaucracy, the standing army and the political police and rising above the substructure of small-holding property, reflects, above all, the inherent tendency of bourgeois state power to identify itself with the predominance of the executive.

What factors contributed to this obvious increase in the strength and importance of the executive? What interrelations exist between the five «idées napoléoniennes», i. e. the predominance of small-holding property, strong government, an enormous bureaucracy, the preponderance of the army and the clergy? **What, in short, is the class basis of the bonapartist movement?**

All «idées napoléoniennes», according to Marx, «..are ideas of the undeveloped small-holding in the freshness of its youth.»⁵⁵

(53) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 338.

(54) *Ibid.*, p. 332.

(55) *Ibid.*, p. 340.

and Napoleon represents the most numerous class of French Society, the **small - holding peasant**. Just as the Bourbons (1814 - 30) were to become the dynasty of big landed property and the Orleans (1830 - 48) were to represent the dynasty of money, so the Bonapartes are the **dynasty of peasants**. Marx describes the relations between the «idées napoléoniennes» as follows :⁵⁶

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another, instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse... In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by a simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes... They are, consequently, incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name... They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of the smallholding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself.

Bureaucracy and the standing army, created by Napoleon in 1798, provided the French Revolution's answer to these demands. The process of centralization was transformed into a process of rapid bureaucratization and state administration was organized according to the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour. The practice of venality of public office was terminated, while, on the other hand, measures were taken to further consolidate the permanent character of public officials. Within a very short space of time, Napoleon had gathered, around him, six hundred highly - efficient bureaucrats;⁵⁷ these bureaucrats were directly responsible to the emperor, and none other, for the conduct of the organizing activities of the state; they were completely irresponsible and unaccountable to the masses and, as agents of the sovereign, stood above society. Bureaucracy, as the indispensable and characteristic organ of bourgeois society, had arrived.

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Post - Revolution France, in the course of the 19th century, underwent profound substructural changes, which, in turn, led to the inevitable collapse of the original military - bureaucratic apparatus, forged as a weapon against feudalism, and its subsequ-

(56) *Ibid.*, p. 334.

(57) Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 812 .

ent replacement, with a dual-purpose (i. e. anti-feudal, anti-proletarian) bureaucratic complex. Marx, in **The 18th Brumaire**, provides a penetrating analysis of these changes. The nineteenth century saw urban usurers replacing the feudal lord, mortgages and heavy taxes replacing the feudal obligation, small-holding property destroying aristocratic landed property and, in turn, being destroyed by bourgeois capital, until, ultimately, all that remained of small-holding property could be found in the mortgage registers. Small-holding property, by its very nature, had demanded and got «strong government», but, in turn, had paid for it with «heavy taxes». Small-holding property, originally the condition for the liberation and enrichment of the mass of the French nation, i. e. the peasants, had become, through the agency of blood-sucking taxes and mortgages, a source of social enslavement and pauperization.⁵⁸ With the progressive undermining of small-holding property, the state structure erected upon it, as a means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie, inevitably collapsed and «..the centralization of the state that modern society requires [arose] only on the ruins of the military-bureaucratic government machinery which was forged in opposition to feudalism.»⁵⁹

Napoleonic rule was succeeded, in 1814, by the Bourbons (1814-1830), dynasty of big landed property, and they, in turn, by the Orleans (1830-1848), dynasty of money, i. e. the financial aristocracy. The Second, or Parliamentary, Republic, declared 1848 and representing, as contrasted to the preceding periods, the «joint rule» of the entire bourgeoisie, was no more than an acknowledgement and expression of the common threat to bourgeois rule, the establishment of a «joint front» by the bourgeoisie against its direct antagonists, the proletariat. Throughout the course of this 37-year rule (1814-1851) of the bourgeoisie, the oppressive and particularly anti-proletarian character of the bourgeois state machine appeared in bolder and bolder relief; bureaucracy functioned, no longer as a means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie, for bourgeois class rule had been more or less firmly consolidated, but, as a **direct instrument of the ruling class.**⁶⁰ Actually, as regards the military-bureaucratic apparatus of 1798, «..the Legitimist monarchy [Bourbons] and the July monarchy [Orleans] added nothing but a greater division of labour,

(58) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 336-339.

(59) *Ibid.*, p. 340.

(60) For a detailed analysis see. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-242, 243-344.

growing in the same measure as the division of labour within bourgeois society created new groups of interests, and, therefore, new material for state administration..»⁶¹

The increase in personnel and resources available to the bourgeois state machine and a subsequent increase in the magnitude and variety of ingeniously oppressive measures, has been the direct consequence of the tide of revolution sweeping Europe, in 1848, and the particularly «threatening» contention of the proletariat for power. The parties that contended for domination, according to Marx, considered the possession of the enormous state edifice as the spoils of the victor, but, all revolutions of a non-proletarian character, «..perfected this machine instead of smashing it..»⁶² The political and material interests of the French bourgeoisie compelled it, on the one hand, to further extend the bureaucracy⁶³ and to annihilate, on the other, the independent organs of the social movement, neutralizing the effectiveness of parliament and subordinating it to the executive, in due time.⁶⁴ The contention for power of the proletariat, in 1848, further accelerated this process. According to Marx,⁶⁵

In their uninterrupted crusade against the producing masses, they [bourgeoisie] were, however, bound not only to invest the executive with continually increased powers of repression, but at the same time, to divest their own parliamentary stronghold —the National Assembly— one by one, of all its means of defence against the Executive... In reality, it was the only form of government possible at a ti

(61) *Ibid.*, pp. 332 - 333.

(62) *Ibid.*, p. 333.

(63) The material interests of the bourgeoisie compelled the ruling class to create a completely dependent army of permanent officials and to pocket, in the form of representative allowances, honorariums, etc., what it could not pocket in the form of rent, profit, interest, etc. The political interests, on the other hand, compelled the bourgeoisie to increase the magnitude and variety of repressive measures available to the state, hence, the personnel and resources available to state power. Bureaucracy, thus, reached dimensions hitherto unknown.

(64) In order to subdue the working class movement, the bourgeoisie was forced to maintain an enormous and highly complex military-bureaucratic apparatus. This, in turn, necessitated levying and collection of heavy taxes, an apparent source of intense conflict and strife. The undisputed supremacy of the executive, over such organs of public opinion as parliament, arose out of this necessity.

(65) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 518.

me when the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation.

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The July Revolution (1830) and the ensuing eighteen-year period brought to power one faction of the bourgeoisie, the **finance aristocracy**. The liberal banker Laffitte, in declaring «**From now on the bankers will rule**», had, according to Marx, betrayed the secret of the revolution.⁶⁶ From 1830 onwards, until the declaration of the Second Republic (1848), the contradictions between the various factions of the bourgeoisie increased steadily, while, parallel to these developments, the proletariat emerged as an independent contender for power. From the 4th of May, 1848, to the 25th of June, 1848, all contradictions and disputes, racking the ranks of the bourgeoisie, were set aside; in the face of the tide of revolution sweeping Europe and shaking bourgeois society to its very foundations, the ruling class, with priority, had to settle its account with the proletariat. On the 25th of June, the proletarians of France had been subdued, but, one thing, at least, had become apparent: **the bourgeoisie no longer retained the faculty to rule**. This resulted in the establishment of the «joint rule» of the bourgeoisie, which, in turn, persisted throughout the Second Republic. In the three-year period following the defeat of the proletariat, from 1848 to 1851, the various factions of the bourgeoisie, developed, on the one hand, the complexity of the bureaucratic apparatus and the diversity of the measures of repression, and fought out, on the other, their own «private» battle for domination.⁶⁷ Louis Bonaparte, on the 10th of December, 1848, was elected first president of the Second Republic. This event heralds the start of an uninterrupted and bitter struggle between the legislature and executive, a battle which rapidly tipped the balances in favour of the latter, a natural outcome of the increasing impotence of the former as an instrument of «joint bourgeois rule», and, eventually, culminated in the «farce of the restoration of the Empire».

D. Severance of All Ties Between State and Society

It seems to be the «joint fate» of the European bourgeoisie that this ruling class, **as a whole**, cannot hold full and durable possession of the bureaucratic apparatus. France is no exception.

(66) *Ibid.*, p. 139.

(67) *Ibid.*, pp. 328 - 329.

From the first revolution to the end of Napoleonic rule, 1789 - 1814, bureaucracy rested on the substructure of small-holding property and served nascent bourgeois society as a means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie; under the Legitimist and July monarchies, 1814 - 1830 and 1830 - 1848, respectively, two very small factions of the bourgeoisie ruled the kingdom, i. e. big landed property and the finance aristocracy, making use of bureaucracy as the direct instrument of their class rule; the Second, or Parliamentary, Republic, 1848 - 1851, attempted to reconcile the clashing interests of the various factions of the bourgeoisie, as an instrument of «joint rule», but its incapacity brought on the Second Empire. The internal strifes and struggles of the bourgeoisie, throughout the Second Republic, enabled the adventurer, Louis Bonaparte, by way of his December 2, 1851, **coup d'état**, to lay hold of the key points of the bourgeois state machine (i. e. bureaucracy, standing army, political police) and to stage, for twenty years, «the parody of the restored empire». Marx compares the first and second bonapartist rules as follows: ⁶⁸

Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce... And the same caricature occurs in the circumstances attending the second edition of the eighteenth Brumaire!

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Of all the «idées napoléoniennes», the most welcome and congenial to the second Bonaparte, seems to be «**..an enormous bureaucracy, well-gallooned and well-fed..**»⁶⁹ Accordingly, his major operations were (1) the severance of all «visible» ties between the state apparatus and the masses; (2) «**..the raising of officials' salaries to their old levels and the creation of new sinecures..**»;⁷⁰ (3) the complete annihilation of parliamentary power and the subordination of the legislature to the executive, i. e. bureaucracy; (4) the consolidation of the ubiquity of bureaucracy, so that the state apparatus could control and regulate even the most insignificant stirrings of public and private existence; (5) playing off the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, and vice versa, so as to uphold the newly-acquired «independence» of the state. **Only under**

(68) *Ibid.*, p. 247.

(69) *Ibid.*, p. 338.

(70) *Ibid.*, p. 339.

the second Bonaparte, claims Marx, does the state seem to have made itself completely independent.⁷¹

In relating the experience of the Second Empire, 1851-1871, Marx and Engels often resort to the use of such terms as «seemingly independent» and «ostensible mediator». Marx, on the other hand, refers to the Second Empire, as the second edition of the First. Similar to the case of the military-bureaucratic machine created by the first Bonaparte, the state apparatus of the second Empire, too, was not suspended in mid-air, i. e. it, too, bore a class content. As mentioned earlier, the Bonapartes, both the first and the second, are the dynasty of peasants. But, **with a difference**. The original **Code Napoléon**, according to Marx, is no longer a means for the enrichment of the mass of the French nation, i. e. the small-holding peasants, but a **codex** of distraints, forced sales and compulsory auctions.⁷² Whereas Napoleon represented the entire countryside and the youth of bourgeois property, the second Bonaparte represents, on the one hand, the conservative and well-to-do peasant, and, on the other, the peasant **lumpenproletariat**. These profound changes compelled the second Bonaparte to adapt, and adulterate while adapting, the original «idées napoléoniennes». For one thing, he was forced to maintain a large body of persons in complete dependence and to increase the ubiquity and omniscience of the state apparatus; he was compelled to extend the tentacles and feelers of bureaucracy to even the most remote corners of the country; he had to play off the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, and vice versa, this, in turn, demanding the immediate detection and subdual of every single stirring; he, by necessity, had to impose upon the pauperized peasants the illusion that their enslavement, indebtedness and pauperization were the result, not of small-holding property itself, but, of factors external to it. Enter bureaucracy, enter the standing army, enter the gendarmery, enter the clergy.

These simple answers to highly complex questions gave birth, shortly afterwards, to a new set of problems. For one thing, how to maintain the enormous state apparatus, which had reached dimensions, hitherto undreamed of? Former experiences provided the answer: **heavy taxes**. The greater portion of this burden fell

(71) *Ibid.*, p. 333.

(72) *Ibid.*, pp. 337-338.

on the shoulders of the peasantry, an apparent contradiction, for it was the peasants who had brought on the Second Empire. The peasants created the monster; the monster, in turn, killed the peasants. The second contradiction rests in the fact that the state, as «mediator» between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, contributed, in the last resort, to the immense strengthening and enrichment of the bourgeoisie, while, in actuality, playing off one against the other. To the existence of this contradiction, Engels provides the following answer: ⁷³

The Second Empire began— the exploitation of France by a gang of political and financial adventurers, but at the same time, also an industrial development such as had never been possible under the narrow-minded and timorous system of Louis Philippe [1830-1848], with the exclusive domination of only a small section of the big bourgeoisie. Louis Bonaparte took the political power from the capitalists under the pretext of protecting them, the bourgeois, from the workers, and on the other hand the workers from them; but in return, his rule encouraged speculation and industrial activity— in a word, the upsurge and enrichment of the whole bourgeoisie, to an extent hitherto unknown.

The definitely bureaucratic nature of state power in the 1851-1870 period proves, beyond doubt, that bureaucracy, rising above the soil of bourgeois society, has assisted history in preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie and, ultimately, in extending, consolidating and maintaining this rule.

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The contradictions inherent in French society, which found their most striking expressions in the peculiar functioning of the state apparatus of the Second Empire, not only increased the momentum of industrialization, but, also, hastened to an early grave the class rule of the bourgeoisie. The Second Empire, among other things, had been an appeal to French chauvinism. This led to the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and the ultimate defeat of the armies of the Second Empire, at Sedan, in 1870. The Second Empire fell as it had risen, a parody.

Even as the Prussian armies stood at the gates of Paris, the Third Republic was declared (September 4, 1870). After a bitter struggle lasting 131 days, Paris fell. The Thiers government, representing a coalition of the capitalists and the big landowners, on

(73) *Ibid.*, p. 476.

the 18th of March, 1871, rallied its forces and called upon the proletarians of Paris and their National Guard, to lay down their arms. That very day, the proletarians of Paris formed the Paris Commune, the direct antithesis to the Second Empire⁷⁴ and the **first dictatorship of the proletariat** in the history of mankind.

From the 18th of March to the 28th of May, 1871, until the last proletarian fighter fell on the hills of Belleville and Menilmontant, «dual power» existed in France, the bourgeois dictatorship of Versailles and the Paris Commune. During its seventy-day life-span, the Paris Commune, not only **shattered** the military-bureaucratic apparatus of bourgeois state power, but also proved beyond doubt «..that the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes..»⁷⁵ As we propose to make a detailed study of the Paris Commune in connection with the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus and the withering away of the state, this brief resumé of the activities of the Commune will apparently suffice for the time being.

E. The Aftermath of the Paris Commune

Twenty years after the collapse of the Paris Commune, Engels, in the **Preface** to the english edition (1892) of his pamphlet, **Socialism: Utopian and Scientific**, wrote: ⁷⁶

It is only now, in the Third Republic, that the bourgeoisie as a whole have kept possession of the helm of state power for more than twenty years.

Joint possession of state power, or the joint rule of the bourgeoisie, whatever one calls it, reflects, as pointed out earlier, the **predominance of the legislature**. This supremacy of the legislature, excepting the Vichy period (1940-1945) which reflected the hegemony of the German executive, continued a further seventy years, until the Fifth Republic.⁷⁷ It is a historical fact that «joint power of the bourgeoisie» stands for «weak government».

The first four years of the Third Republic witnessed a struggle between the Bourbon and Orleans dynasties and the Bonapar-

(74) *Ibid.*, p. 518.

(75) *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 516.

(76) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 111.

(77) Throughout the five-year Vichy period, Petain, head of the pro-Nazi government, ruled France with governmental decrees and resolutions.

tists. Representing the three major factions of the ruling class, i. e. big landed property, the finance aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie, all three groups were in favour of the immediate restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of «strong government», but could not settle, one way or the other, which faction of the bourgeoisie would dominate the «power pact». The struggle ended in deadlock. The laws of the new republic, promulgated 1875, served as a «peace treaty» between the warring factions and was an acknowledgement of the fact that no one faction was strong enough to subordinate the others and gain undisputed control over the executive, i. e. bureaucracy. Consequently, the executive was held responsible to the legislature, i. e. instrument of joint bourgeois rule; was deprived of the right to disperse parliament;⁷⁸ was subject to all sorts of limitations and restrictions. In short, the executive was subordinated to the legislature, which, in turn, resulted in the severance of any dangerous ties between the executive and its administrative apparatus. Rapid industrialization, so characteristic of the 1851 - 1870 period of strong government, came to a standstill.

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The 67 - year period, from 1873 to 1940, as mentioned earlier, is characterized by «weak government» and the institutionalization of the inability of one faction, or the other, of the bourgeoisie, to seize and maintain control over the executive. The following table, provided by Finer,⁷⁹ is highly illustrative of this fact.

Duration of French Cabinets, 1873-1940

Duration	No. of Cabinets	No. of Premiers
6 months + under	50	17
6-12 months	31	18
12-18 months	9	5
18-24 months	1	6
24 months + over	8	8
TOTAL :	99	54

NOTE : Cabinets, with durations of less than a week, have been excluded.

(78) The only attempt to disperse parliament came from president MacMahon, May 16, 1877. This attempt was frustrated and no attempt at renewal occurred throughout the Third and Fourth Republics (Finer, *op. cit.*, pp. 623 - 624).

(79) *Ibid.*, p. 627.

The parliamentary system, actually institutionalizing «weak government», has obviously functioned as an auto-control mechanism, preventing, on the one hand, the hegemony of one faction of the bourgeoisie against the others, and deadening, on the other hand, the class struggle, which is the essential condition for economic development.

The relations between the legislature and the executive and between the executive and its administrative apparatus remained, more or less, intact, throughout the Fourth Republic, 1946-1958. This should not be understood to mean that the relations of production and the resulting balance of power between the various factions of the bourgeoisie have remained static. Far from it. As a result of the increasingly international character of capital, we observe a gradual, but slight, shift in the balance of power, in favour of the industrial bourgeoisie. These changes, coupled with the loss of colonies abroad and the intensification of class antagonisms at home led, inevitably, to the Fifth Republic (or Third Empire), «..the institutionalization of de Gaulle..»⁸⁰ or the re-establishment of the domination of the executive, the creation of a mechanism functioning as a «safety belt» for the whole bourgeoisie, and, at the same time, acting as an agency for facilitating the upsurgence of the industrial bourgeoisie or, to put it more plainly, the repetition of the first and second empires at a higher level of economic development.

IV. THE DESTRUCTION OF BUREAUCRACY AND THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE STATE

A. Theoretical Foundations

The state, according to marxist theory, arose at a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes and the need to hold these class antagonisms in check. As for the future of the state, Engels remarks :⁸¹

We are now approaching, rapidly, a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to pro-

(80) Maurice Duverger, *Institutions Politiques*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1965, p. 499.

(81) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 322.

duction. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. Along with them the state will inevitably fall. The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe.

The state, originally intended to watch over the common interests of society and to safeguard society against a sterile class struggle, which would ultimately consume both the warring classes and society, inevitably detached itself from society (a process necessarily bound up with the increasing complexity of the division of labour) and, in time, became the masters, rather than the servant, of society. The ubiquitous and omniscient organs of centralized state power, corresponding to the bourgeois period of economic development, i. e. bureaucracy, political police, standing army, represent the final stage of the process of severance of all «visible» ties between state and society. In short, bureaucracy is the last and most accomplished form of bourgeois state administration, preceding the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus.

What then, according to marxist theory, is the historical task facing the proletarian revolution, as regards the bourgeois state apparatus? In evaluating the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871, Marx and Engels point out that the Commune proved at least one thing, *viz.*, that the working class cannot simply lay hold of a ready-made state apparatus and wield it for its own purposes. What then, is the working class to do with the unwieldy bourgeois state machine. In his **Preface** (German Edition, 1891) to Marx's **Civil War in France**, Engels remarks : ⁸²

From the very outset the Commune was compelled to recognize that the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials.

How to do so? Marx, in a letter to Kugelmann, provides the answer : «..the next attempt of the French Revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it..»⁸³ This, in turn, «..is

(82) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 483.

(83) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 463.

the preliminary condition for every real people's revolution on the Continent..»⁸⁴

What is meant by «smashing» or «shattering» the bourgeois state machine? What is the «smashed» (or «shattered») state machine to be replaced with? Since, according to marxist theory, «smashing the bourgeois state machine» heads the working agenda of the proletariat and since this act, according to Engels, is the essential pre-condition for «**the withering away of the state**»,⁸⁵ what measures should be resorted to, so that, ultimately, «**..the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and by the conduct of the processes of production..**»,⁸⁶ i. e. the state loses its «political» character and assumes a purely «administrative» nature? The Paris Commune of 1871 provides the first answers, or, to put it more properly, **the major antidotes to bureaucracy.**

B. The Experience of the Paris Commune, 1871

The Paris Commune was formed, on the 18th of March, 1871, under conditions of siege by the Prussian armies. In its manifesto of March 18, the Central Committee of the Commune said:⁸⁷

The proletarians of Paris, amidst the failures and treasons of the ruling classes, have understood that the hour has struck for them to save the situation by taking into their own hands the direction of public affairs... They have understood that it is their imperious duty and their absolute right to render themselves masters of their own destinies, by seizing upon the governmental power.

Marx adds:⁸⁸

But the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.

Even in the absence of ready-made prescriptions on what was to be done after state power changed hands, the proletarians of Paris, throughout the seventy-day period of «dual power», organized themselves around the Commune and adapted a series of measures, which, in turn, constitute the major steps in combat-

(84) *Ibid.*, p. 463.

(85) *Ibid.*, p. 151.

(86) *Ibid.*, p. 151.

(87) Marx - Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 516.

(88) *Ibid.*, p. 516.

ting bureaucracy. The first such measure, adapted April 1, 1871, **was the abolition of all representative allowances and sinecures, and the lowering of the payment of all public officials to the level of workmen's wages.** No public official, whatsoever, from the members of the Central Committee of the Commune downwards, was to receive payment exceeding 6000 francs. Thus, by constructing an effective barrier against careerism and place-hunting and by abolishing, in a single act, all pecuniary privileges hitherto enjoyed by the permanent army of public officials, the Paris Commune dealt, on the one hand, a fatal blow to bureaucracy and realized, on the other, «cheap government».⁸⁹

The second action undertaken by the Commune, in the direction of shattering bureaucracy, **was the destruction of the practice of «separation of powers» and, hence, parliamentarism.** According to Marx, «..the Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time..»⁹⁰ The Commune, thus, concentrated all legislative and executive powers in a single organ, an organ, which, in turn, was comprised of the elected representatives of the proletariat, organized as the ruling class.⁹¹ This action, on the part of the Commune, represents a return to direct democracy; **direct democracy, in turn, is the most effective weapon against bureaucracy.**

Before proceeding with our analysis, it is necessary, we believe, to stop and take a critical view of this second action of the Commune, i. e. concentration of state power in a single organ, an organ comprised of the elected representatives of the proletariat and, thus, by its very nature, representing a monopoly of power. The concentration of state power, on the one hand, in a single organ and the declaration, on the other, that this is a highly effective method of combatting bureaucracy, **seem, at first glance, to be contradictory.** Centralization of power, for one thing, obstructs the functioning of a mechanism of «authority and control emanating from below», this, in turn, resulting in bureaucratization. This impression, obviously, is erroneous, because, centraliza-

(89) Bureaucracy and the standing army constitute the two major items of expenditure in the bourgeois state. The Commune realized «cheap government» by abolishing the said institutions.

(90) Marx-Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 519.

(91) «The proletariat, organized as the ruling class», according to Marx and Engels, is the dictatorship of the proletariat (*Ibid.*, p. 53).

tion of power, under a Commune-like administration, and the concentration of functions of state in a single organ, the legislature, **brings along its own antidote.** For one thing, the concentration of legislative and executive powers in an elected and responsible organ, i. e. the legislature, destroys the artificial barriers between the «professional administrator», i. e. the bureaucrat, and the «elected representative of the people», i. e. the responsible and revocable deputy, thus, representing, on the one hand, a return to direct democracy and discarding completely, on the other, any need whatsoever for the «professional administrator».⁹² The destruction of the practice of parliamentarism based on the «separation of powers»,⁹³ in addition to abolishing the need for professional administrators and annihilating certain elements of bureaucratism (careerism, irresponsibility, privileges, etc.), destroys by **concentrating state power in an organ comprised of the elected and revocable representatives of the people, that most outstanding characteristic of the bourgeois state apparatus, i. e. detachment of the executive from society and its complete independence and irresponsibility towards the masses.** Hence, the «apparent» contradiction mentioned above is not «apparent» at all, but, to put it properly, «illusionary».

The third vitally essential act of the Paris Commune, according to Marx, was to **employ universal suffrage, not as a means of determining once every three or six years which representative of the ruling classes would «misrepresent» the working class in parliament,**⁹⁴ but, as a means of attaching state to society and reversing, in full, the process of the state transforming itself from **servant of society into master over society.** Universal suffrage was to serve the Commune, as individual suffrage serves the employer in his search for workmen.⁹⁵ In order to achieve this end, the Commune, according to Marx, resorted to the following measure:⁹⁶

(92) For a detailed analysis, see. *Ibid.*, pp. 473 - 545; Lenin, *State and Revolution, op. cit.*, pp. 187 - 192.

(93) The way out of parliamentarism, according to Lenin, is to be found, not in the abolition of the representative institutions and the elective principle, but in the conversion of the representative institutions from «talking shops» into working bodies (Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 188).

(94) Marx - Engels, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 520.

(95) For further details, see. *Ibid.*, pp. 520 - 521.

(96) *Ibid.*, p. 484.

It filled all posts —administrative, judicial and educational— by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors.

Thus, the Commune declared all servants of state, from the highest official to the lowest, without exception, **elective, responsible and revocable**. Thus, universal suffrage in place of hierarchic investiture, responsibility in place of irresponsibility, revocability in place of permanence, qualifications and ability in place of vested rights, took over as the guiding principles of Communal administration.

Summing up, (1) the fusion of legislative and executive powers under the legislature, composed of elected and revocable representatives of the working classes; (2) the lowering of all payments to public officials to the level of workmen's wages, and, finally, (3) the utilization of universal suffrage as the sole means of filling public offices, has served the Paris Commune, during the seventy-day period of dual power, as a highly effective means of «shattering» the bureaucratic state apparatus, on the one hand, and protecting the proletariat, on the other, against its own deputies and officials.

C. The Experience of the Soviet Revolution, 1917

The second dictatorship of the proletariat, in the history of mankind, was established in Russia, November 7, 1917. In accordance with the prototype created by the Paris Commune of 1871, the **Soviet**, basic organizational unit of the newly-acquired power, **was to be a working body, legislative and executive at the same time**. Representative allowances and special salaries were abolished; the payments to servants of state were lowered to the level of ordinary workmen's wages; all public officials, without exception, were declared elective, responsible and revocable. These measures, however, fell far short of meeting up to earlier expectations. Not only did these measures, developed by the Paris Commune, prove incapable of shattering the bureaucratic state apparatus of Russia, but, at a time when the smooth functioning of the said apparatus was absolutely essential to repress the class enemy, i. e. the bourgeoisie, they paralysed and incapacitated it. Lenin, not even for a moment losing sight of the specific conditions of Russia, had foreseen such a possibility, in **The State and Revolution**. The proletarians of Russia, therefore, were quick on the uptake.

Lenin, outlining the tasks of the proletariat in revolution, points out that to **abolish bureaucracy at once, everywhere and finally is utopian**; that, in order to replace bureaucracy with the self-administration of workers, one has to begin immediately to build up a new machine which will permit the gradual extinction of bureaucracy. This is an acknowledgement of the fact that, in the face of Russia's specific conditions, the process in which «**..public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true interests of society..**»⁹⁷ is to be postponed for the time being, until, at least, the creation of the objective (substructural) conditions which will eventually enable the immediate and complete annihilation of bureaucracy.

The basic factors preventing the immediate and complete destruction of bureaucracy, and its replacement by the self-administration of workers, are the following: (1) Russian society, prior to the proletarian revolution, is characterized by petty-bourgeois capitalism, backward technology, etc. For these very obvious reasons, administrative functions have not been relegated to a level of simplicity which will enable the ordinary workman to master them; (2) a fairly-high percentage of the urban population and nearly the entirety of the rural population do not know how to read and write, and possess no knowledge, whatsoever, of the first four arithmetical rules, this, in turn, being the prerequisite of the «book-keeping and control» necessary for the smooth functioning of proletarian state power; (3) the proletarians of Russia recline at a very low cultural level and possess no **administrative experience**, whatsoever. This led Lenin to remark (immediately after the Revolution): «**We know that an unskilled labourer or a cook cannot immediately get on with the job of state administration..**»;⁹⁸ (4) Soviet power, due to the cultural and administrative backwardness of the Russian proletariat, was forced, in the immediate post-Revolution period, to rely on the hundreds and thousands of bourgeois experts inherited from tsarist Russia. These bourgeois experts, in turn, were hostile to Soviet power, resorted to all forms of sabotage, remained contemptuous of the masses and, inevitably, constituted the major outlet of rebureaucra-

(97) *Ibid.*, p. 639.

(98) V. I. Lenin, *On the Soviet State Apparatus*, ed. L. A. Kashnitskaya and N. N. Surovtseva, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 72.

tization and counter-revolutionary tendencies; (5) cultural and, above all, material backwardness compelled the adaption of material incentives, i. e. pecuniary privileges, and, as such, encouraged bureaucratic tendencies. Summing up, the Soviet experience started off from a relatively backward social basis, as compared with the favourable conditions surrounding the Commune, and, consequently, was compelled to set aside the original antidotes prescribed by the proletarians of Paris, devising realistic and specific measures of its own.

The first measure taken by Soviet power was the **simplification of the state apparatus and, hence, the process of administration**. This, inevitably, becomes the essential first-step in assisting the proletariat to master the newly-acquired state power. The second measure was to issue an obligatory call to all citizens, to **gradually and increasingly participate in the day-to-day tasks of administration**, so that, with the acquirement of administrative abilities by all, the need to be administered would gradually and eventually disappear.⁹⁹ The following analogy can be drawn from this principle: where all are bureaucrats, nobody, in actuality, is a bureaucrat. Hence, the first step to be taken in the destruction of bureaucracy, is to acquaint the masses with state administration and, then, assure that all citizens, without exception, participate in administration. Only then, with the abolition of the need to be administered, can the authority of the government over persons be replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The main steps in realizing the second measure are, (1) to issue an obligatory call on all citizens for the fulfilment of a definite task of administration, (2) to ensure active participation, and not merely participation in discussions, (3) to vary, systematically, the tasks of administration so that they will ultimately cover all branches of administration,

(99) An indirect reference to this measure can be found in the writings of Marx and Engels. The «indirect» nature arises from the fact that they based their analysis on the experience of the Paris Commune. The French proletariat had gone through the school of revolution and was fully capable of running the affairs of the state. Self-administration by the workers, more or less, was an accomplished fact and, hence, constituted a basic assumptional premise. The writings of Lenin, on the other hand, provide an analysis as regards the case of backward countries, where the workers are culturally not yet ready to undertake the task of *direct* administration.

(4) to gradually draw every single member of the working population, individually, into the work of administration. The third measure in combatting bureaucracy is to consolidate the practice of criticism and self-criticism, throughout the state apparatus, from the topmost echelons to the lowest, as a means of realizing the principle of «authority and control emanating from below». This measure is an acknowledgement of the fact that no servant of the state, from the highest ranks to the lowest, is above criticism, and, hence, irresponsible. The fourth measure, rising out of the specific conditions of Russian society, was the establishment of «workers' control», a means for providing the proletariat with a certain amount of administrative experience and preparing them for proletarian self-administration. Workers' control is the preliminary stride in the direction of divesting state power of all its political attributes. In addition to the four major anti-bureaucratic measures discussed above, the Soviet experience devised and developed a host of others, all aiming at the encouragement and facilitation of participation. The following list may be illustrative: Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, State Inspection, factory committees, work reports, non-party workers and peasants conferences, workers and peasants reporters, labour armies, complaint bureaus, discussion groups, production conferences, judicial control, promotion for the successful and demotion for the useless, eradication of illiteracy, etc., etc.

D. The Experience of the People's Democracies

The People's Democracies, coming into existence after the Second World War, as a specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, have provided us with additional techniques in the battle between proletarian power and bureaucracy. Some of the People's Democracies, due to the peculiarity of their class structures,¹⁰⁰ have been able to postpone the destruction of the bureaucratic ap-

(100) The dictatorship of the proletariat, like all historical forms of the state, is based on a class alliance. The Soviet version of the dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, was based on an alliance between the proletariat and the poor peasants, under the guidance, leadership and hegemony of the former. The class alliances in the People's Democracies include certain sections of the petty-bourgeoisie and, again, reflect the guidance, leadership and hegemony of the proletariat. The specific character of the class alliance in the People's Democracies result, for the time being, in the continuation of previous superstructural forms.

paratus indefinitely, thus extending the life-span of parliamentary forms. The People's Republic of China, on the other hand, has witnessed the period of the so-called Hundred Flowers, an uninhibited and unrestricted period of nationwide criticism and self-criticism, which, however, was followed up by The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a period characterized by the uninhibited and unrestricted suppression of the so-called bureaucrats. The lack of detailed data, excepting these very simple observations, prevent us from further continuing this analysis of the experience of the People's Democracies.

E. Summary and Evaluation

Bureaucracy, as «the conduct of state affairs by a privileged and permanent army of officials, detached from the masses and standing above society», represents the most developed form of state administration, corresponding to the bourgeois period of economic development.

The revolutionary task of the proletariat, according to marxist-leninist theory, is to «shatter bureaucracy», which in turn is the essential condition for the withering away of the state. How will bureaucracy be smashed? How will the state be divested of its political attributes and how will the political functions of the state be transformed into simple administrative functions? How will the state «wither away»? A very brief analogy can provide the answer to these questions. A police officer can use his stick for two purposes: (1) to break up a demonstration, which is a political job; (2) to direct the traffic, which is an administrative job. When the police officer uses his stick for the sole purpose of directing traffic, and for that purpose alone, his job has been divested of all its political attributes and the state has withered away. This, of, course, is an analogy and never claims to be anything but an analogy.

History's three versions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i. e. the Paris Commune, the Soviet model and the People's Democracies, have devised a variety of measures for combatting the evil of bureaucracy. The most well-known and effective are the fusion of executive and legislative power, the declaration of all public officials elective and revocable, the abolition of all pecuniary privileges enjoyed by public officials, and, for societies starting from a relatively backward level of economic development, the simpli-

fication of state administration and the gradual introduction of the masses to the day-to-day tasks of state administration. Criticism and self-criticism, on the other hand, can be considered as a primitive, yet highly effective, introductory measure to the process of eradicating bureaucracy and its various ramifications.

The process of replacing «government over persons» by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production, i. e. the withering away of the state, is, by no means, a simple project. Various complications, from time to time, set in; bureaucratic distortions occur, for one reason or the other, in a proletarian state apparatus.¹⁰¹ These observations, however, constitute a digression from the original scope of this study. In concluding, one last point should be made: history has irrefutably and definitely proved that the solution of the problem of bureaucracy cannot be sought and found within the framework of the nation-state, in an era when capital has been stripped of all its national attributes, for, in the last resort, the total and utter abolition of bureaucracy rests in the resolution, at international level, of the contradiction between labour and capital.

(101) The abolition of the standing army and other organs of state power, hence, an attempt to «wither away», the state, would be a superbly «quixotic», if not ridiculous, mission, considering that the world of today remains divided into two antagonistic camps, i. e. the socialist and the imperialist. For further information, see. Kurt-han Fişek, *100 Soruda Sosyalist Devlet*, Gerçek Yayınevi, No. 16, İstanbul, 1970.