

## Policy Entrepreneur or Policy Implementer? The Role of İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil in Türkiye's Distancing from the United States in the 1960s and 1970s

Politika Girişimcisi mi, Politika Uygulayıcısı mı? Türkiye'nin 1960'larda ve 1970'lerde ABD'den Uzaklaşmasında İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil'in Rolü

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### Abstract

This study aims to understand the influence of İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, as the minister of foreign affairs, on Türkiye's relations with the U.S. In the years he served as the minister, from mid-1960s to mid-1970s, Türkiye witnessed a fundamental change in its huge commitments to and trust in Washington. Questioning his role as an individual in these developments, the study is expected to contribute to the literature on Turkish-American relations in an analytical perspective. The study makes use of primary sources like official archives, parliamentary records, memoirs and interviews provided by both Turkish and American circles as well as some scholarly works on Çağlayangil himself and Turkish foreign policy in general. As a result of the analytical interpretation derived from both Turkish and American sources, the study concludes that despite his remarkable career and prominence across many key positions of the Turkish state, Çağlayangil did not propose a previously unheard of geopolitical orientation for Türkiye's relations with Washington. The changing nature of Türkiye's relations with the U.S. since mid-1960s was not initiated by his personal efforts. On the contrary, it was a state-policy which resulting from the structural changes in bilateral relations and the international system. This new orientation was encouraged and advocated by the majority of different ideological sides in Turkish politics and society. Moreover, the increasing U.S. concern over the possibility of losing Türkiye further facilitated the realization of this transformation. Thus, Çağlayangil should be viewed as a well-suited policy implementer rather than a policy entrepreneur.

**Keywords:** Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish-American Relations, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Johnson Letter, Cyprus Issue.

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## Öz

Bu çalışma, dışişleri bakanı olarak İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil'in Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine etkisini sorgulamaktadır. 1960'ların ortalarından 1970'lerin ortalarına kadar süren bakanlık yıllarında Ankara'nın Washington'a olan büyük bağlılığında ve güveninde köklü bir dönüşüm meydana gelmiştir. Çağlayangil'in bu dönüşümdeki bireysel rolünü sorgulayan bu çalışmanın, Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin analiz edilmesine katkıda bulunması beklenmektedir. Makalede, Çağlayangil'in kendisi ve genel olarak Türk dış politikası üzerine yapılmış bazı akademik çalışmaların yanı sıra, hem Türk hem de Amerikan çevrelerinden sağlanan resmi arşivler, meclis tutanakları, anılar ve röportajlar gibi birincil kaynaklardan yararlanılmıştır. Bu kaynakların incelenmesi neticesinde, Çağlayangil'in göz alıcı kariyerine ve devletin birçok önemli konumunda görev yapmış ilmasına rağmen, Türkiye'nin Washington ile ilişkilerine yönelik olarak daha önce duyulmamış yeni bir jeopolitik yönelim önermediği görülmüştür. Diğer bir deyişle Türkiye'nin ABD ile ilişkilerinin 1960'ların ortalarından itibaren değişen doğası Çağlayangil'in kişisel inisiyatifine bağlı değildir. Aksine ikili ilişkilerde ve uluslararası sistemde meydana gelen yapısal değişikliklerden kaynaklanan bir devlet politikası söz konusudur. Türkiye'nin bu yeni yönelimi Türk siyasetinde ve toplumundaki farklı ideolojik tarafların çoğunluğu tarafından da destek görmüştür. Ayrıca ABD'nin Türkiye'yi kaybetme korkusu da bu süreci kolaylaştırıcı bir etki sağlamıştır. Sonuç olarak, Çağlayangil bu süreçlerde yalnızca iyi bir politika uygulayıcısı olarak görülmelidir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Türk Dış Politikası, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Johnson Mektubu, Kıbrıs Meselesi.

## 1. Introduction

As one of the longest-serving foreign ministers of Türkiye, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil served during some of the most turbulent times of Turkish foreign policy, firstly from 1965 to 1971, and then again from 1975 to 1978. The fact that the direction of Türkiye's relations with the United States (U.S.) witnessed critical turning points in these years makes him a figure deserving to be researched with regard to the nature of his impact on those developments. Therefore, this paper aims to explore the role Çağlayangil played in the transformation of Turkish-American relations.

The study reveals that despite his remarkable career and prominence across many key positions in the Turkish state, whether in bureaucracy or politics, Çağlayangil did not propose a previously unheard of geopolitical orientation for Türkiye's relations with Washington. Even before he took office, there had been numerous developments shaking the previously solid ground of Turkish-American relations, which had previously been defined in light of incredible commitment and loyalty from Ankara. However, due to various contentious incidents with the U.S. that emerged in the mid-1960s, Türkiye began to develop a multi-oriented and fresh foreign policy direction to pursue its national interests more effectively in the face of growing American pressures and abandonments. This shift in the foreign policy landscape persisted without deviation in the following years, even as the Turkish governments were led by different political parties with contrasting ideological inclinations.

Both the Turkish and American sources explored in this study reveal that Çağlayangil was simply a talented and well-disposed practitioner of Türkiye's new vision in approaching the U.S. at that time. Despite his apparent goodwill and patriotism, he was far from being an independent initiative-taking policy entrepreneur, and he was quite loyal to the hierarchy prevailing within

governmental bodies in Türkiye. In short, the changing nature of Türkiye's relations with the U.S. since the mid-1960s was not initiated by his personal efforts. On the contrary, it was a state-policy resulting from structural changes in bilateral relations and the international system. This new orientation was encouraged and advocated by the majority of different ideological sides in Turkish politics and society. Moreover, the increasing U.S. concern over the possibility of losing Türkiye even further facilitated it for Türkiye to realize this transformation.

As for the method, this study first explores the key dynamics of the change in Turkish-American relations during the years Çağlayangil served as the minister. To do so, it employs the framework of Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014), which relies on the analytical classification of many leading studies investigating the key parameters of foreign policy changes. This part of the study also involves the investigation of both primary sources such as the session records of Türkiye's former Senate of the Republic and Çağlayangil's personal memoirs, and secondary sources including several books and articles on Turkish foreign policy, to gain an analytical understanding of the essence of the change in Turkish-American relations during these years. Additionally, in order to broaden and enhance the analytical picture obtained from Turkish sources, some U.S.-centred primary sources such as interviews with the U.S. diplomatic staff via the Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training (ADST) and the records on Türkiye from Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) are utilized.

As a result of investigating and interpreting the information from the all available sources in light of the theoretical framework, the study argues that there were a number of profound systemic and domestic factors leading to the shift in Türkiye's stance towards the U.S. These factors can be summarized as the disregard and resistance from the U.S. for Türkiye's vital interests, the Détente period opening more room for alternative orientations in foreign policy, the large discomfort of Turkish society shaped by anti-American feelings, as well as Washington's concerns over the deepening alienation on Ankara's side.

Later, the study attempts at clarifying Çağlayangil's place in that transformation, with the help of the profile of policy entrepreneurs developed within the theoretical framework. The same primary and secondary sources used in the previous section are relied on once again to scrutinize Çağlayangil's place and profile. In conclusion, it is deemed more appropriate to identify Çağlayangil as a policy implementer with the required talents and vision to pursue his country's new foreign policy direction, which had already been revised before he came to power. He is not considered a policy entrepreneur who is largely responsible for devising and realizing alternative visions of foreign policies for personal political advantages.

Regarding the limitations, for the primary sources like archives and memoirs utilized in the study, the scope of the information is naturally limited to what authors and authorities have revealed. Ultimately, an exploratory approach to research and explanation is adopted in this study, as the topic of Çağlayangil's influence on Türkiye's U.S. policy as a minister is an under-studied subject in the literature.

## 2. Theoretical Framework: Understanding the Foreign Policy Changes of States

Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014) attempt to provide a theoretical framework for exploring and explaining main reasons for foreign policy changes of states. They identify two main parameters as lenses to utilize. The first pillar is defined as domestic structural parameters that are divided into the sub-components of *domestic political and institutional setting*, and *advocacy groups*. Regarding the former, it is claimed that the less an authority faces domestic challengers and constraints, the more frequent foreign policy changes can be. In terms of democratic regimes, the hypothesis goes on, foreign policy changes are more prevalent and possible under single-party governments led by leaders who are decisive in decision-making processes along with little intervention from other parts of the state and society.

The context of the transformative turn in TurkishAmerican relations over the years Çağlayanğil served as the minister is not that compatible with this premise. In contrast, once the essence of Türkiye's unidirectional commitment to the U.S. began to change, the domestic context from the 1960s to the late 1970s exhibited significant turmoil characterized by undemocratic military interventions, acts of civil violence and terrorism, and frequent government changes. Therefore, instability, not stability, was dominating the national politics, although Türkiye managed to retain the core democratic principles of its political foundations more or less. This divergence between the theory and the case must be noted before delving into the case with the theoretical perspective.

The second strand of the domestic parameters is advocacy groups holding different foreign policy roadmaps from the prevailing ones. The authors classify these communities into three main categories: those adopting alternative political culture and foreign policy options, socioeconomic groups holding divergent views and interests, and policy entrepreneurs.

Regarding political culture, the greatest significance is centered around its profound impact on social interactions, making it more about continuity than change. As for socio-economic groups aspiring to have more say in and impact on the state's policy implementations, public opinion is an essential element attracting great attention from governments, as it either enables them or enforces them to promote a new foreign policy direction (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014:487).

Lastly, policy entrepreneurs are specified as politically prominent individuals who possess particular talent, vision and propensity to realize a change in foreign policy. The alternative visions and implementations of foreign affairs they promote are motivated by the objective of obtaining political advantages in the future. What principally makes someone a policy entrepreneur is their eagerness to make use of the possibilities for implementing alternative policy visions.

The second pillar of the framework is called international structural parameters. These factors are comprised of several sub-components. Firstly, the authors state, any changes in the structural characteristics of a system that usually limit foreign and security policies of states may result in transformations in states' threat and opportunity identifications (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014, p. 488).

As a second prospect of the international parameters, transformations in one state's posture and place in a system are likely to bring changes in foreign policy. In this regard, the authors set out three various scenarios, each of which has its own separate dynamics. Either because of a radical contextual domestic turn or with the emergence of conflicting interests among the partners, the attitude of one state's friends and foes to itself may witness new trends.

Secondly, changes might appear when states seek membership in different international organizations (IOs) and closer engagement with other states. As the realization of such goals is largely associated with political conditionalities, foreign policy changes might emerge. The conditionalities are defined as positive ones like economic and political incentives, and as negative ones like sanctions.

As a third possibility of how transformations in one state's posture and place in the international system bring changes in its foreign policy orientation, it is related to the socialization process seen in IOs. States may reconsider and revise their foreign policy approaches once they begin observing the peculiar values and norms of an IO they have membership in. The extent of the change depends on how much the state is devoted to and active in that organization (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014, p. 489).

### **3. Between Commitment and Controversy: Turkish-American Relations during Çağlayangil's First Term as Foreign Minister (1965-1968)**

Çağlayangil's first tenure in office as the foreign minister coincided with a period of profound changes in Turkish-American relations. As one of the international structural factors, the hardening approach of the U.S. to Türkiye, and the conflicting interests of Washington and Ankara were the most prominent causes of the change in Turkish-American relations. Until the mid-1960s, Turkish foreign policy had heavily been determined by close relations with the U.S. However, incidents such as the Johnson Letter and the Jupiter Missile Crisis led both the Turkish public and policymakers to reconsider the country's mainly unidirectional commitment to Washington (Bilgiç, 2015, p. 252).

Jupiter Missiles had been stationed in Türkiye in 1961 as a defense measure against a possible attack by the Soviet Union. However, once the Soviets obtained facilities in Cuba that could have enabled Moscow to launch low – and mid-range missiles at American soil, Washington negotiated with Moscow to remove them. When the Soviets offered to dismantle the Jupiter Missiles in Türkiye in exchange for American demands, the U.S. accepted this offer. This caused profound disappointment in Türkiye, which saw these missiles as a security umbrella provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ankara also felt humiliated, as Türkiye's interests were used as a bargaining chip between the Americans and the Soviets without seeking Türkiye's permission. Considering that Türkiye had hardly taken any action in foreign affairs without consulting Washington up until that time, this incident was one of the most significant cracks in the relations (Uslu, 2016:166). This development eroded the belief in the U.S. as a reliable ally

and was interpreted by Turkish decisionmakers as a sign that the U.S. could leave Türkiye alone against the Soviets when Washington's national interests required doing so (Erhan, 2002, p. 684).

The Johnson Letter, which was sent in June 1964 by then U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to Türkiye's Prime Minister İsmet İnönü as an ultimatum that if Türkiye were to militarily intervene in Cyprus, in the face of a possible Soviet threat NATO might consider not coming to Türkiye's help was a critical juncture in Türkiye's foreign policy orientation. It remarkably damaged Türkiye's relations with the U.S., deepening the controversies surrounding its reliability as an ally (Armaoğlu, 2017, p. 16). Türkiye's ruling elites concluded that leaning the country's foreign policy on a single side could have devastating outcomes for national interests in the Cold War. This new understanding is clearly seen in the government program of the Justice Party (AP) led by Süleyman Demirel, who won the 1965 elections to form a majority government. It was claimed that:

“... to be tied to an alliance or an ideology does not necessarily prevent one from improving relations with countries aligned with yet another alliance or ideology, or with non-aligned countries, which constitute the majority in the world today” (Balci, 2013:108).

Keeping the Western alliance system as the core tenet of Turkish foreign policy, the Demirel government adopted a dynamic and multi-oriented foreign policy approach, maintaining close relations with the U.S., while simultaneously building better ties with the Soviet Union (Kösebalaban, 2011, p. 87). In a speech he made in the Senate in 1966, Çağlayangil also elaborated on this new foreign policy understanding. First, he reiterated Türkiye's commitment to NATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the initiative founded by the UK, Türkiye, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan in 1955 against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East, emphasizing their positive contributions and high importance to the country's defense. Then, he defended rapprochement with the Soviets by making reference to mutual tolerance and good neighborly relations (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanakları, 1966, p. 178).

According to the theoretical framework, any changes in the structural characteristics of a system that usually limit foreign and security policies of states may result in transformations in states' threat and opportunity identifications (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014, p. 488). In this sense, thanks to the Détente, the loosening of strict hostility in international politics was another key international structural factor resulting in the change in Türkiye's sharply unidimensional devotion to the Western bloc led by Washington, making a talk-to-everyone approach possible. This was acknowledged by Çağlayangil:

“The strong nuclear balance I have just mentioned has minimized the possibility of a nuclear war, allowing national interests and stances to rise to surface, which had been prevented before because of the previously high tension. With the Détente, the rigid structures of the blocs are eroded. Now political and commercial relations

among many countries are developing despite conflicting ideologies and interests” (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanakları, 1966, p. 177).

In another speech he made in 1971, Çağlayangil was more specific about the country's new foreign policy stance. On the one hand, he underlined the need for Türkiye and for the whole world to uphold the Détente by all means, and also appreciated the improvements in Ankara's relations with Moscow. On the other hand, he also drew attention to the fragile status of the Détente, claiming that Türkiye's NATO membership and presence in the Western alliance was still the best way to ensure the country's security (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanakları, 1971, p. 381).

Along similar lines, Türkiye also tried to improve its relations with the Middle Eastern countries that were either non-aligned or closer to the Soviet Union than to the U.S. There were many imperatives to focus on the Middle East such as economic opportunities in these markets, alongside cultural, geographic and religious affinities with the region. However, the most crucial factors allowing this rapprochement were Türkiye's dire need for the support of the Arab world in the United Nations (UN) regarding the Cyprus issue, and the intention to show the U.S. that Türkiye's support for the issues vital interest for Washington could not be taken for granted anymore (Aydın, 2000).

As suggested in the theoretical framework (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014, p. 489), this new opening eventually required Türkiye to meet some implicit political conditions that constituted another part of the fundamental changes in the country's foreign affairs following the alienation from the U.S. Thus, the Middle East policy of the Demirel government became more autonomous from the Western bloc. Firstly, he abandoned the former Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes' failed policy of expanding the CENTO to the Arab world, as Türkiye did not want to be seen by the Third World as a puppet of the the U.S. (Kösebalaban, 2011, p. 101). Secondly, Türkiye altered its stance toward the Arab-Israel and Palestine-Israel disputes to achieve developing its relations with the Arab world. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Türkiye obtained a great opportunity to prove its changed foreign policy stance, when the Demirel government declared that the U.S. bases in Türkiye would not be used in support of Israel and actively pursued diplomacy in a UN session after the war, calling on Israel to withdraw from the lands it invaded (Kürkçüoğlu, 2010, pp. 164-165).

The theoretical framework summarized above asserts that some economic benefits from engaging with different countries may lead states to rearrange their understanding of external affairs, and this is an important international parameter that brings about foreign policy changes (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014, p. 489). As the hardening stance of the U.S. towards Türkiye was likely to generate economic losses for Ankara, the need to find alternative economic resources also contributed to Türkiye's engagement with the Soviet Union and non-Western countries. When Demirel took office as Prime Minister, his government declared that foreign policy would be designed to help the country's economic development. The Economic and Technical Support Treaty that was signed with the Soviet Union on March 25, 1967 was illustrative of this new



understanding and sparked debates over whether Türkiye's orientation had shifted in a different direction (Balçı, 2013, p. 109). Türkiye's relations with the Soviets reached their peak during this period, as Demirel aimed to diversify foreign policy options by advancing relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow also saw the tension between Türkiye and the U.S. as an opportunity to gain ground, and provided significant amounts of credit to Türkiye, which enabled the construction of many Turkish industrial complexes (Kösebalaban, 2011, p. 100).

Although less essential but more consequential, various domestic pressures also played an influential role while Türkiye's relations with the U.S. witnessed critical turning points. It was a pure reflection of what Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014, p. 487) defined as the role of public opinion in foreign policy changes. For instance, Ankara sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. on April 7, 1966, declaring that the Turkish government was under serious pressure of the public because of the bilateral agreements that had been signed with Washington and that those agreements must be unified, simplified and reformed (Balçı, 2013, p. 118). The sovereignty issue centered around the use of some bases in Türkiye by the U.S. without consulting the Turkish government, and ethical problems emerging from the misbehavior of some American staff in Türkiye were among the hot topics putting greater pressure on the government and exacerbating the anti-Americanism in the country (Erhan, 2002, p. 992; Yetim & Balçı: 2021, p. 207). The boycotts and protests against the lecturing of the U.S. Peace Corps, who were regarded by the Turkish society as ill-intentioned American agents of influence, in the Turkish schools and universities in 1965 was another reflection the negative perceptions of the Turkish people towards the U.S. More importantly, acts of violence such as some American soldiers in the U.S. 6th Fleet visiting Istanbul being thrown into the sea by Turkish student protesters on July 15, 1968 (Türkmen, 2012, pp. 124-126), further exemplified the emerging public anger in Türkiye towards the U.S., which sharply contrasted with the once felt gratitude and relief in the Turkish state and society for acquiring the American regard and interest in Türkiye as a leverage to the Soviet threat (Bilgiç, 2014, p. 255).

The U.S. pressure on the Turkish government to reduce opium production was another development that negatively affected how the Turkish public perceived the U.S. during this period. In fact, this tension became one of the most significant issues dominating bilateral relations throughout the 1970s. At that time, the use of opium-related drugs in American society was increasing, and Türkiye was a leading opium producer in the world. Washington's threat that it would stop its aid to Türkiye if Ankara did not ban the opium production prompted the Turkish government to limit the area of opium production to six Western provinces in Anatolia, a decision that did not fully satisfy the American demands. In response, the U.S. decided to reduce the financial aid given to Türkiye, which encouraged Türkiye to get closer to the Soviet Union (Kösebalaban, 2011, p. 100). As the Turkish government reduced the production amount step by step after Washington's insistence, this policy stirred serious reactions from politicians, media and public in Türkiye, with questions raised on why Turkish farmers had to pay the price for the problems in the American society (Uslu, 2016, p. 260).



Characterized by a relatively greater autonomy in comparison to the past, the novelties in the Turkish diplomatic approach to the external world was also remarkably in line with the Demirel government's conservative foundations, and likewise, was a good response to the rising socialist voices within the country demanding support for nationalist and non-aligned governments in the Middle East. This was also the reason why, despite the concerns of the opposition parties, Türkiye participated, as an observer country represented by foreign minister Çağlayangil, in a meeting organized by the Arab countries in 1969 after an arson attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, albeit with the prior notification that Türkiye was a secular state and would not be obliged by any decision against its UN commitments (Kösebalaban, 2011, p. 101).

Subsequently, Türkiye and the U.S. signed a Mutual Defence and Cooperation Agreement on July 3, 1969. Even though it was abolished after the start of the U.S. embargo on Türkiye after the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, this treaty brought all bilateral agreements, which were around 90, between the two countries under one single text and restricted the U.S. military presence in Türkiye in several ways. First, the U.S. would not be able to use Turkish bases without asking for Ankara's permission. Second, as a sign of empowering Turkish national sovereignty, it was declared that the ownership of the bases in the country belonged to Türkiye. Third, Türkiye was granted the right to inspect all the bases located on its territory. Lastly, Türkiye obtained the right to bring restrictions to the use of the bases in the name of its national security (Erhan, 2002, p. 697).

Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014) identify the socio-economic groups that have competing interests and also the sub-groups that follow different political cultures and alternative foreign policy options in a country as influential domestic drivers of foreign policy changes. It is true that public perception had a considerable role while Türkiye's affairs with the U.S. transformed from a unidimensional commitment to a relatively more balanced one. However, the NATO membership itself and the West-oriented essence of Turkish politics were never questioned by any policymaker or government representative in the country, except for some ultra-leftist groups like the Workers' Party of Türkiye (Balci, 2013, p. 120). Therefore, advocacy which was seen across much of the Turkish state and society for lessening the level of American-centrism in Türkiye's international relations did not imply a wholesale transformation of the political culture of the country. Similarly, specific socio-economic groups were hardly influential as a root cause of the change in foreign policy, although a great deal of outrage emerged across various economic classes of the society in the face of the economic turbulence caused by the deteriorating ties with the U.S.

#### **4. The Ongoing Change During Çağlayangil's Second Term as Foreign Minister (1975-1978)**

Over the course of Çağlayangil's second term as the foreign minister, Turkish-American relations were dominated by the repercussions of an earlier event, i.e. Turkish military intervention

in Cyprus in 1974. Bülent Ecevit, Demirel's main competitor, who was believed to be largely inspired by leftist tendencies, and his Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) had won the 1973 general elections. Ecevit adopted an assertive and confident foreign policy understanding, claiming that smaller countries like Türkiye should not necessarily arrange their foreign policy decisions in strict line with the preferences of their greater allies, and instead, should pursue foreign policies serving the interests of their own. This sentiment prevailed not only in Ecevit's mind, but also in the CHP elites and across the whole country (Aydın, 2000, p. 128).

The military coup plotted in Cyprus against President Makarios by the junta in power at the time in Greece allowed Ecevit to implement this vision in foreign policy. The National Security Council of Türkiye, convening after the coup against Makarios, concluded that the constitutional order in the island had collapsed, an illegitimate government was formed and the treaties and guarantees previously agreed on by all sides in the island were violated. Mentioning its guarantor role in the dispute, Türkiye intervened in the island in July 1974 (Balci, 2013, p. 138).

Similar to what was described above as one of the international structural factors of the change in Turkish-American relations in the 1960s, the ongoing hardening in Washington's stance towards Türkiye, and the ever-increasing visibility of the conflicting interests among the two, marked the transformation in bilateral relations. In this context, Türkiye's relations with the U.S. entered a much worse phase after the Cyprus intervention. The intervention itself was not the sole reason. Previously, the U.S. Congress had already been discussing an arms embargo on Türkiye as the Ecevit government removed the ban on the opium production despite objections from Washington. As the U.S. opposition particularly to Türkiye's second military operation in Cyprus, which was considered unnecessary, unjust and offensive, coincided with this atmosphere, an arms embargo on Türkiye was initiated by the Congress and the political reactions against Türkiye in the U.S. grew harsher. Moreover, the Congress adopted a closer position to the Armenian diaspora, turning a blind eye to the terrorist attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) against Turkish diplomats in Western countries.

Fuelling anti-Americanism in Türkiye, these incidents deepened the deterioration in bilateral relations (Armaoğlu, 2017, p. 18). Consequently, Turkish society united in the anti-American sentiment, regardless of whether they were leftist or rightist. The leftists were anti-American as they were against the U.S. great power expansionism they described as "imperialism". The rightists were intrinsically motivated by nationalist and statist ideas. Therefore the majority of the Turkish public and politicians stood against the U.S. demands that were directed at Türkiye's military intervention in Cyprus grounded upon the country's critical national interests (Uslu, 2016, p. 340). As a domestic factor of foreign policy changes, therefore, the role of the public opinion in the maintenance of the transformation in how Ankara engaged with Washington retained its prominence.

The continuation of change in Turkish foreign policy towards the U.S. was evident after the U.S. embargo that started in 1975, when Türkiye declared the foundation of Federal Turkish State of Cyprus as a response to Washington. Issuing a diplomatic protest, Ankara also terminated the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S., shut down all U.S. bases and intelligence gathering centers in Türkiye, and handed the control and supervision of all facilities over to the Turkish military. The İncirlik Base was kept open as an exception, but its use was limited only to NATO missions (Türkmen, 2012, pp 137-138). In 1976, a new Defense Cooperation Agreement, the enforcement of which was conditioned on the eradication of the embargo and congressional approval, was signed as a sign of mutual desire to repair the deteriorated ties between the two countries. Although the Congress hindered the implementation of this agreement, the U.S. sanctions against Türkiye that had been partially eased in 1975 were totally removed in 1978 (Kösebalaban, 2011, p. 107).

As another international structural parameter of foreign policy change, the motivations for economic benefits driving states to rearrange how they engage in external affairs maintained its prominence for Türkiye throughout this period. Thus, the rapprochement with Moscow that started in the mid-1960s in economic, commercial, and diplomatic fields continued. Four years after the military intervention that toppled him down, Demirel regained power to form a government, and Çağlayangil was reappointed as the foreign minister in 1975. Similiar to his first term between 1965 and 1971, high-level diplomatic visits to and economic treaties with the Soviet Union were the most salient features of the second Çağlayangil period in Turkish foreign policy. Aimed at increasing the annual capacity of the İskenderun Iron and Steel Factory and at expanding the Seydişehir Aluminium Facilities, the Second Treaty for Economic and Technical Cooperation between Türkiye and the Soviet Union was signed on July 4, 1975 (Tellal, 2002, p. 782).

In December 1975, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Aleksey Kosygin, visited Türkiye at the invitation of Demirel for the opening of the İskenderun Iron and Steel Factory. Moreover, in 1976, both countries agreed to initiate preparations for a friendship treaty or declaration, which would be distinct from a non-agression treaty to avoid incompatibility with Türkiye's NATO membership. Additionally, a Cultural and Scientific Exchange Programme was established covering the period from 1976 to 1978. Subsequently, Çağlayangil visited the Soviet Union in 1977, leading to the establishment of treaties of cooperation in economic, scientific, and technical fields (Yıldırım, 2019, pp. 114-115).

With the assistance of the theoretical framework, it is important to note that these developments were further facilitated by another international structural parameter: the changes in the core features of the international system resulting from the D tente. However, caution and the previously maintained balanced stance towards Moscow persisted. Confirming this, Çağlayangil said:

“...the presence of a D tente process should not be seen as an alternative to defence (policies). D tente has been achieved thanks to the fact that we have not neglected to do what the defence (policies) required us to do. If they were abandoned, this would be devastating for both D tente itself and the whole world” (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanakları, 1976, p. 414).

Due to the similar international dynamics that encouraged the country to diversify its foreign affairs, T rkiye continued to pursue closer relations with Middle Eastern countries. Initially, T rkiye participated in the Organization of Islam Conference (OIC) gathering in Jeddah in 1975 at the foreign minister level, and also offered to host its next meeting in Istanbul in 1976. As a result of these efforts, observer status was granted to the Turkish Cypriots in the OIC in 1979. Moreover, by improving relations with these oil rich countries, especially in the post-1973 oil-crisis environment, T rkiye, being an oil-dependent country, gained more options in addressing its foreign trade deficit problems caused by the substantial amount of oil imports (Sander, 2006:236; Fırat & K rk ođlu, 2002, pp. 792-793).

T rkiye also explicitly supported the Arab thesis during the 1973 Arab-Israel War, and did not allow American forces to use  ncirlik Air Base in support of Israel, whilst opening its airspace to Soviet planes carrying support to the Arab forces. After the war in 1975, T rkiye cast an affirmative vote in a UN resolution defining Zionism as a form of racism. In January 1975, Ankara recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinians and announced the following year its decision to allow the organization to open a bureau in Ankara (K sebalaban, 2011, p. 110). These actions should be seen as the results of a set of natural political conditions that one country must fulfill to cultivate the benefits it expects from new bilateral and multilateral relations it develops. However, these shifts in the overall foreign policy orientation did not result in significant levels of socialization leading to normative changes in the direction of foreign policy (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014, p. 489). This was also the case in 1969 when T rkiye declared its strong commitment to Western values, particularly secularism, on the occasion of participating in a meeting organized by the Arab countries following an arson attack on the Aqsa Mosque.

In conclusion, during  ađlayangil’s two terms, T rkiye implemented a more autonomous foreign policy, enriched by the diversity of the cordial relations it engaged in and showing signs of greater sovereignty and independence from the U.S. T rkiye’s departure from its previously unquestionable attachment to and trust in the U.S. was caused by a series of intertwined developments. The first factor was that Washington was not taking into consideration the national interests and expectations of T rkiye in the international issues in which they were both involved.

Secondly, the D tente process between the two rival poles, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, allowed for engagement between the Western and Eastern blocs and for the eradication of strict hostility in international politics. T rkiye maintained its newly-adopted multi-oriented and multi-dimensional foreign policy that emerged in the mid-1960s for many years, regardless of whether

leftists, rightists, military or care-taker governments were in power. Thus, this was more of a state policy than Çağlayangil's personal innovation.

Thirdly, the almost unanimous domestic discomfort, which was continuously growing in the face of the increasing disregard and pressure by the U.S. against Türkiye's expectations and moves driven by its core national interests both encouraged and enforced the governments in power during these years to initiate and sustain a concrete departure from the previously unidimensional reliance on Washington.

## **5. The Change in Turkish Foreign Policy from the U.S. Perspective**

As derived from the FRUS archives, American assessments of relations with Türkiye and its international political direction in the mid-1960s were considerably concerned with key Turkish interests and principles regarding the Cyprus issue. These included insistence on providing equal rights to the Turkish Cypriot community in comparison to those of the Greeks Cypriots on the island, decisive rejection of the Enosis, and demands that the U.S. should put greater pressure on Greece regarding the Greek Cypriots. Elaborations concentrated on greater trends of Turkish foreign policy are hard to identify in these records (for detailed insights see FRUS, n.d.). However, interviews with American diplomatic figures in Türkiye, conducted by the Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training provide further information about the American perspective on Türkiye in the late 1960s, a period when bilateral relations were strained.

In this vein, the statements of Parker T. Hart, U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye from 1965 to 1968, offer a good deal of insights. Firstly, he confirms that they were so busy with the Cyprus issue that it prevented them from focusing on anything else they were supposed to cope with (ADST, n.d., p. 308). Secondly, he admits the rising anti-American sentiment in Türkiye, initially referring to the leftists as the main source of questioning NATO membership and the distance from the Soviets, and confesses that after a while, the rightists too began to get more suspicious of and dissatisfied with the alliance with the U.S. In the face of rising tensions, he personally organized a tour for Turkish leaders to the U.S. facilities in Türkiye to ease their worries and confusion about the U.S. intentions (ADST, n.d. 303), and refers to the Johnson Letter as a huge mistake that deteriorated bilateral relations (ADST, n.d.:299). Finally, he defines Demirel, the man who presented Çağlayangil to Turkish foreign policy circles, as very friendly to the U.S. (ADST, n.d., p. 300).

His remarks about the strong impact of the Cyprus issue on Turkish-American relations are in accordance with other records. Moreover, his astonishment at the anti-Americanism seen in Türkiye regardless of the domestic polarization among different ideological sides verifies that Türkiye's decoupling from the U.S. was more a deep-rooted state policy than a mere initiative of any individual. His appreciation for Demirel's closeness to the American side is in line with the information retrieved from Turkish sources, revealing Türkiye's strong commitment to the Western alliance system, despite different viewpoints on many topics.

As the crisis in Turkish-American relations reached its peak at the beginning of the 1970s, there are considerable and detailed reports and analyses concerned with the shifts in and the prospect for Ankara's foreign affairs. Firstly, rightist parties were still regarded as more desirable for American interests, as seen in a report dated back to October 1973, which was about Türkiye's coming elections. The main concern was not that if leftists such as Ecevit and his party came to the power, they would push Türkiye to the Soviet bloc, but rather that they would probably take a harder stance towards some aspects of the Turkish-American relations. Therefore, even under the likelihood of Ecevit's rise to the power, Washington hardly felt any anxiety over a possible complete deviation from itself that might emerge on Türkiye's side. Besides, it was assumed that no matter which ideological side won the elections, the U.S. was most likely to maintain its good relations with Türkiye (National Archives, 1973).

A special assessment in 1974 by Henry Kissinger after Türkiye lifted the ban on opium production recommends a middle-way, neither soft nor radical, approach to tackle the issue. He underlined the possibility of reactions that might be caused by a nationalistic pride arising after explicit pressure from Washington (Ford Library, 1974c). Thus, the sharply increasing nationalistic sensitivities in Türkiye, which posed an obstacle for retaining the all-weather alliance commitments, seem to be noticed. In some other documents, the U.S. government's high efforts to prevent the embargo on Türkiye and to underscore how its consequences would be unbearable and useless for American interests are clearly seen. Intense debates indicated that Türkiye was too important an ally, given its geopolitical position, to lose, and there was no need to inflame the Turkish public and policymakers against Washington in such a harsh way (Ford Library, 1974b).

After the embargo was implemented, more detailed analyses with evident concern about Türkiye's future political direction emerged. According to these assessments, Türkiye was very likely to deliver harder retaliatory responses, such as closing U.S. military and intelligence bases in the country, suspending treaties with Washington, and even looking for alternative arm suppliers. They concluded that, although Türkiye was re-examining its NATO membership, neither Ankara nor Moscow had illusions that the Soviet Union could effectively replace the U.S. as an arm supplier in terms of either quality or quantity. Besides, Türkiye's Western orientation was not considered to change fundamentally. Finally, Ankara's improving ties with Middle Eastern countries were seen as a kind of alternative economic and diplomatic support for Türkiye in the international arena (Central Intelligence Agency, 1975). There was no other judgement based on questions like whether Türkiye was trying to become a regional hegemon or something similar.

As time passed, the possibility of Türkiye turning its back on NATO and forming a new alliance structure with the Soviets was discussed, particularly after the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin's visit. Therefore, anxiety over losing Türkiye, a country possessing sensitive geopolitical assets, seemed to be rising in Washington. What did not change was the references to Türkiye's importance to American interests in several regions surrounding it (Ford Library, 1976). These intense discussions not to lose Ankara were further amplified after the lifting of the embargo (National Archives, 1976).

The significance attributed in the American view to Türkiye is also clear in many other interviews with U.S. diplomatic staff. For instance, the U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye between 1977 and 1980, Ronald I. Spiers, said that when he talked to Kissinger about Türkiye before arriving there, the latter defined Türkiye as one of the most important places in the world (ADST, n.d., p. 654). Similarly, another retired U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye, William B. Macomber, Jr., serving from 1973 to 1977, said that when he was a young officer in the State Department, it was a widely-taught belief there that the best friendship the U.S. ever involved was neither with the UK, France, nor Israel, but with Türkiye (ADST, n.d., p. 503).

In short, the U.S. view of Turkish foreign policy throughout Çağlayangil's two ministerial tenures displays parallels to what the Turkish sources show regarding the same matter. However, there are two outstanding points that are hardly recognizable when only the Turkish sources are explored. Firstly, even though Turkish policymakers were strongly devoted to the alliance with the U.S. and NATO, they seemingly were unaware of the level of anxiety and worry prevailing among the U.S. diplomatic staff and the government during the strain in bilateral relations. Secondly, as Türkiye's distance from and disappointment with the US increased, American assessments began to consider a new alliance between Ankara and Moscow as so possible that even Türkiye itself could not think of the nature of the relations in such striking terms. This is important, as it was the main leverage that strengthened Türkiye's hand in the negotiations for easing the tensions. Therefore, in addition to the structural and domestic parameters explained previously, Washington's concerns over the deepening of the alienation on Ankara's side were also a key enabler of the change realized in bilateral relations by Türkiye.

## **6. Entrepreneur or Implementer? Defining the Right Place of Çağlayangil in Turkish-American Relations**

As key agents of change in foreign policy, policy entrepreneurs are specified as politically prominent individuals who possess particular talent, vision and propensity to realize a change in foreign relations of a country when conditions allow them to do. The alternative visions and implementations of foreign affairs they promote are motivated by the objective of obtaining political advantages in the future. What principally makes someone a policy entrepreneur is his/her eagerness to make use of the possibilities for implementing alternative policy visions. (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2014, p. 488)

Given his background, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil in some senses, appears to be a policy entrepreneur, meeting the principle of having political prominence and the skills required for pushing for a change. He was born in İstanbul in 1908 and graduated from the faculty of law of İstanbul University in 1931. His career included roles such as a lecturer in the police college and higher police institute of the general directorate of public security, deputy chief of general police forces, and governor of the Yozgat, Antalya, Çanakkale, Sivas and Bursa provinces. After serving in Türkiye and abroad in the ministries of energy and labour, he was appointed as the Minister



of Foreign Affairs in Demirel's government in 1965. After completing his first term in this post in March 1971, he held the same position from 1975 to 1978. In 1979, he became the chief of the Senate of the Republic and acted as the Acting President of Türkiye between April and September 1980. Following an unsuccessful attempt to become a founding member of the Greater Türkiye Party (*Büyük Türkiye Partisi – BTP*), he joined the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi – DYP*). Yet, he ended his political life in 1990 and died in 1993 (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, n.d.).

Evidently, he was a well-experienced bureaucrat and politician. Due to the turbulent period he lived, he also witnessed many significant developments in Türkiye's political history. To say with his own words, he saw three Ottoman Sultans and one Caliph; when the republic was founded he was 17 and he lived with 7 presidents (Çağlayangil, 1990, p. 273). After he took the office of the ministry, there were people across media and the ministry suspicious of Çağlayangil's suitability for foreign services as he had mostly experience in internal services. However, some time after serving as the foreign minister, he received great appreciation across the country, and the media and the ministry's staff appreciated him as a very talented person with upper skills compared to most of the professional diplomats (Yıldırım, 2019, pp. 52-54).

Regarding his vision, Çağlayangil was characterized by an open-mind and multi-orientational understanding of external affairs. In this vein, he placed great importance on cultivating friendly individual relations with decision-makers of foreign countries. For instance, he invited foreign ministers of Egypt and Belgium, Mahmud Riyad and Pierre Hamel, to spend their holidays together with him in his summer house (Çağlayangil, 1990, p. 275). This also demonstrates that he did not differentiate between East and West, and gave equal priority to both when pursuing his personal relations. This can be seen from the part of the memoirs where he wrote about King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and his country, referring to the Saudi people as "our Saudi brothers" (Çağlayangil, 1990, p. 274).

His vision also included a strong belief in Türkiye's influence and prominence in the world. Referring to Belgium's then foreign minister, Hermel, he said "*he understood our country's invisible might after coming frequently to Türkiye*" (Çağlayangil, 1990, p. 275). Çağlayangil was also interested in new means in the conduct of foreign policy. In this sense, he recognized the importance of soft power to increase a country's influence and to attract a positive impression from foreign nations, even in such an earlier and still-Cold War period as 1960s. In a session of the Senate of the Republic, during the discussion of the 1967 budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he pointed out how Greece, a rival at the time, set up Hellenic markets for greater people-to-people bonds in distant locations like Jakarta and Hong Kong and how this initiative served Greece's national interests abroad better than its foreign ministry, while the Turkish foreign ministry was suffering from inefficiency in public relations caused by budgetary constraints (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanakları, 1967, p. 374).

In a similar manner, throughout his years as the minister, Çağlayangil was always confident and courageous in explaining and defending national policies, and he stood firm on protecting red lines in hot topics like the Cyprus issue, as demonstrated by the American records. Meetings that were mostly focused on the Cyprus issue and attended by diplomatic staff from the two countries, including Çağlayangil himself, witnessed long-lasting, patiently sustained, and nuanced bargainings. Çağlayangil appeared to be a tough and elaborative negotiator, firmly believing in his country's strength and the justifiability of its position. However, his self-confidence found expression on some occasions in a manner that was perceived by American officials as ugly and churlish (Department of State, 1967b).

Even though his priority in solving problems was to achieve what was possible through dialogue and peaceful means (for exemplary cases please see Department of State, 1966 & Department of State, 1968), he also implied in harsher times, such as when there were murders of the Turkish community in Cyprus, that Türkiye could resort to military means if necessary (Department of State, 1967a).

Over the course of the event where Çağlayangil was considered to be rude, a more striking point appears from one report prepared by the American Embassy in Greece. There, his softening attitude in the afternoon session of the gathering was underlined, and it was reported that President Cevdet Sunay probably interfered in Çağlayangil's approach and warned him (Department of State, 1967d). Although this may be one of the rare personal initiatives Çağlayangil took in foreign affairs, except for inviting foreign politicians and government representatives to Türkiye, it was interrupted by the president.

Nevertheless, this should not be seen as his inefficiency in cooperating with higher national authorities. As for the governmental level, he almost always spoke as the voice of the government, and did not take independent actions to shape the final results of the meetings or introduce new steps. He frequently used sentences like "I have to share/consult with my government before we reach a conclusion" when faced with unusual or new offers (for some instances, see Department of State, 1967c; Department of State, 1965; Carter Library, 1977a). This reflects his instinctive commitment to the sense of hierarchy that might have come from long-lasting bureaucratic experiences.

One yet salient point is that during a visit to Washington in 1977, a time when Turkish-American relations were suffering from the activities of the Greek lobby in the U.S., which were undesired by Ankara, Çağlayangil used Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran's then Ambassador to the U.S.,

“...as the intermediary for getting together with the hard core of the Greek lobby. He had breakfast with Brademas, Sarbanes, Eagleton and Rosenthal on 11 October. Clark M. Clifford, US President's Personal Emissary to Greece, met with this group the next day and thinks he detected some slight “give” in their position, especially Sarbanes, who has been the most anti-Turkish of all” (Carter Library, 1977b).

This behavior fits his foreign policy approach which emphasized peaceful means. Çağlayangil was always viewed favorably as a foreign minister and negotiator by American officials. He was openly declared by the Americans as a statesman compatible more with the American side in international politics. Although there was a difference in the degree of his anger and attitude towards the U.S. between his first and second terms, this was seemingly affected by the ever-worsening situation of the Turkish Cypriots. As displayed in the previously assessed documents, during the late 1960s, he was tougher in negotiations and even sometimes got so hard that his interlocutors saw him rude. However, after Türkiye interferred militarily in Cyprus and improved both Ankara's and the Turkish Cypriots' position in the field, the atmosphere of his meetings with U.S. officials transformed into a more cordial one. It should be noted that this happened despite the U.S. embargo still being in force.

What prevented relations at this point from further deterioration was the U.S. governments' desire to develop the affairs, showing more tolerance to retaliatory acts from Türkiye, which was perceived as a sign of goodwill and sincerity, with efforts to lift off the embargo initiated by the Congress. Here, the records of a meeting attended concurrently by Kissinger and Çağlayangil provides a nice portrait of the promising situation at that time. Çağlayangil says:

“Although our (previous) efforts to get the embargo lifted off failed, we can now say that it has been lifted off (in some way). Our Prime Minister has ten security guards and we got (some) weapons for them here in the United States. I told (the Americans) that (while we are leaving) they could not take these weapons back because of the embargo, and, in response, we were informed that (the weapons) could be taken to Türkiye. So, we have (principally) removed the embargo.”

After the laughter, he continues “We have been following with appreciation the efforts of the President and yourself with regard to the embargo. The Turkish people understand this.” Then Kissinger answers, “the Congress does not reflect the view of the American people on this issue” (Library of Congress, 1975b). As a result, the main driver of Çağlayangil's emotional and diplomatic tone in Turkish-American relations was largely influenced by the urgency of the situations Türkiye encountered and by how effectively the U.S. responded to Türkiye's immediate expectations and needs as well.

As for his views on the U.S. and NATO, he always saw great importance for Türkiye in both. Even as Türkiye started to diversify its foreign policy during his first ministry years by getting closer to the Soviet Union and the countries outside the Western alliance, he suggested that Türkiye would remain a NATO ally and also, not seeing this as an obstacle, would improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. However, he also exhibited a strong opposition to the spread of communism, a key concern for becoming a staunch ally of the U.S. initially (Bilgiç, 2015, p. 254). He called Türkiye's new stance as “neither a footman of the U.S., nor a foe of the Soviet Union” (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanakları, 1967, pp. 374 & 378).

Once the Warsaw Pact's interference in Czechoslovakia in 1968 reversed the winds of goodwill following the Détente, the continuing importance of NATO for Türkiye's defense and security became more evident. While Çağlayangil acknowledged that the overall situation was worsening, he also suggested that the Détente must be sustained for the sake of world peace, displaying his preference of multidimensional relations with both blocs over sharp Cold War enmity. He also stressed NATO's contribution to Türkiye's security budget and infrastructure development, another factor showing his commitment to NATO membership (Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanakları, 1969, p. 34).

The prominence he attached to the alliance with the U.S. and NATO is evident in American archives as well. Starting in an early date like 1965, in meetings with U.S. officials he reiterated constantly that Türkiye was decisively committed to NATO and was determined to do what would be necessary to improve relations with Washington (Johnson Library Country File Turkey, 1965). Even ten years after his first term as foreign minister, he was seen as "well-disposed toward Washington and was convinced of Türkiye's need to remain in the Western alliance" (Library of Congress, 1975a). However, his insistent emphasis on devotion to the relationship was followed by demands grounded on reciprocity and mutual understanding, expecting the U.S. to do its best for its part in the relationship (Johnson Library Country File Turkey, 1965).

Even though Çağlayangil acted with caution towards the Soviets while enhancing the ties with them and retained his belief in NATO's relevance and benefits for Türkiye, he also grew skeptical of the U.S. on some occasions. He once pointed to the coups happening in developing countries and warned against the possible ties of the coup plotters with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). When asked why he thought in this way, he mentioned some news that appeared back then in *The Economist* which implied that two military coups in Türkiye were backed by the CIA. He went on to say:

“... they are not hiding this. One might become a CIA agent and work for them without even realizing that. When I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. Ambassador asked me to offer President Demirel that Türkiye stops opium production and his country, in return, will pay cash for all the expected yield. After Demirel refused, the Ambassador reacted by saying ‘it is a pity, this will bring terrible consequences’ and after a while the terrible consequences really emerged. Our government was toppled down three months later [on March 12, 1971] (Çağlayangil, 1990, pp. 62-63).

In the end, a comprehensive investigation into Çağlayangil's individual talents, vision and inclinations reveals that as a foreign minister, he primarily implemented, rather than initiated, the new foreign policy preferences of the Demirel government. Çağlayangil personally advocated this new framework in theory and practice (see, for instance, Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanakları, 1976:416). However, the changes in Turkish foreign affairs, particularly in the relationship with Washington, were not introduced by Çağlayangil's individual inventions. There are no signs that

he ever came up with any entirely new perspectives. What he offered to his audience was the implementation of the novel direction in Turkish foreign policy, which, as explained above, was formed by deep-rooted and structural reasons. These reasons directed all politicians in charge of the country at that time in the same direction, regardless of their ideological differences, including Ecevit who held a worldview directly opposite to that upheld by the circles in which Çağlayangil appeared.

Therefore, although his talents and vision were well-suited for implementing the diversification of Türkiye's foreign affairs as well as the change in the unidimensional loyalty to the U.S., Çağlayangil was not the architect of this new posture. He did not strive for the realization of an alternative vision of foreign policy developed by himself particularly. Moreover, his motivations for conducting foreign affairs were mainly concerned with national interests, not by expected individual political advantages. As his "neither a footman of the U.S., nor a foe of the Soviet Union" formulation indicates, he aimed to pursue a foreign policy that was based on a pragmatic and realistic assessment of Türkiye's national interests, with the objective of de-emotionalizing it. In short, he was more of a policy implementer than a policy entrepreneur.

## **7. Conclusion**

As a well-experienced minister with a rich background in statecraft and strong communication skills, Çağlayangil deserves attention as the subject of debate regarding the role he played in the transformation of Turkish-American relations across both of his terms of office. The research conducted in this paper demonstrates that the divergence in Turkish-American relations in the mid-1960s was not the result of Çağlayangil's personal initiatives. Rather, it was a state policy devised due to a number of key factors.

The first factor is the growing disregard and humiliation shown by Americans for Türkiye's national interests and sensitivities, which had begun to appear by an earlier event like the Johnson Letter, sent to Türkiye when Çağlayangil was not yet the minister. Such incidents sparked increasing anti-Americanism across the whole country and the need for a more balanced and independent approach to the relationship between the two countries, which constitutes a second factor for Türkiye's shifting attitude.

As a third factor, the Détente process enabled the countries from different blocs of the Cold War rivalry to get closer to each other. Therefore, Türkiye adopted a more multi-oriented and independent direction of foreign affairs, resulting in improved relations with Middle Eastern countries and the Soviet Union. The new perspective in foreign policy was applied non-partisanly by all governments running the country, regardless of whether the Prime Minister was Demirel from the right or Ecevit from the left.

Lastly, as more of an enabler than a root cause, the American fears of growing the gap with Türkiye facilitated Ankara's success in pursuing a less U.S.-centric and more autonomous foreign

policy. Çağlayangil's mind and heart remained loyal to the Western club and NATO alliance, while he also grew skeptical of American policies occasionally. Moreover, he fiercely embraced an opening to countries outside the Western bloc in terms of state-to-state and personal relations. Against this backdrop, he seems to be a well-suited implementer of Türkiye's new foreign policy direction, revolving around distancing from the U.S. and expanding the options of countries and regions engaged with.

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