

Araştırma-İnceleme

**OTHERNESS AND EXISTENCE: RE-READING SCHMITT
THROUGH A FREUDIAN-LACANIAN POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY**

Efe BAŞTÜRK¹

Abstract: Carl Schmitt handles the political within the concept of externality. For Carl Schmitt, any political organization is constituted by an exteriority by which society can gain its meaning. This idea resembles a Freudian-Lacanian paradigm that links existence with meaning which is external to being. For Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, meaning can be established only by constructing its existence in the eyes of the *other*. Thus, in both Freud-Lacan and Schmitt, the concept of the *Other* points to an ambiguity that sets out the meaning of existence from the outside. This exteriority means that any consciousness of existence must be referred to with an *Otherness*. This article aims to discuss the partnership of Freud-Lacan and Schmitt in order to investigate how the term “politics” maybe understood in the context of psychoanalytical approaches. Understanding politics by psycho-analytical concepts helps to deepen the meaning of politics because politics is also a phenomenon which should be conceptualized by the subconscious processes. So, the action of relating politics with the concept of psychoanalysis helps to understand how politics can be realized and imagined in the social conscious which is the core element of political existence.

Keywords: Schmitt, Freud-Lacan, Political, Symbolic Order, Other[ness]

**ÖTEKİ VE VARLIK: FREUDO-LACAN’CI POLİTİK PSİKOLOJİ
ÜZERİNDEN SCHMITT’İ YENİDEN OKUMAK**

Öz: Carl Schmitt, siyasal olanı dışsallık üzerinden kavrar. Schmitt için, siyasal bir oluşum, toplumsal olanın kendi anlamını idrak edebileceği bir dışsallık aracılığı ile kurulur. Bu, varlığın anlamının kendisinin dışında olduğunu savlayan Freud-Lacan’cı bir paradigmaya benzemektedir. Sigmund Freud ve Jacques Lacan için anlam, ancak ötekinin gözünde – öteki aracılığı ile – meydana gelebilir. Bu yüzden hem Freud ve Lacan’da hem de Schmitt’te öteki’nin pozisyonu varlığın anlamının dışarıdan belirlenmesine dönük olarak çifte bir anlamlılık ihtiva eder. Bu dışarıdanlık (dışsallık), varoluşa dair bilincin mutlaka bir ötekilik nosyonu

¹ Yrd. Doç. Dr., Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü. efe.basturk@erdogan.edu.tr

ile ilişkilendiği anlamına gelir. Bu makale, siyasal olanın psikanalitik argümanlar eşliğinde nasıl kavramsallaştırılabileceğini Freud-Lacan ve Schmitt arasındaki ortaklık üzerinden tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Siyasal olanı psikanalitik kavramlar ile kavramak siyasal olanın anlamını derinleştirmeye yardımcı olur, çünkü siyasal olan aynı zamanda bilinçdışısal süreçlerle kavramsallaştırılması gereken bir fenomendir. Dolayısıyla, siyasal olanı psikanalitik kavramlar ile ilişkilendirme hamlesi, siyasal olanın, tam da siyasal varoluşun temel bileşeni olan toplumsal bilinçte nasıl kavrandığı ve nasıl imgeselleştirildiğini anlamaya yardımcı olur.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Schmitt, Freud-Lacan, Siyasal, Sembolik Düzen, Öteki[lik]

Introduction

The effort to explain or handle politics with the conception of psychological and psychoanalytical terms is not new (Sears; Huddy; Jervis; 2003, p.4-5). Since Freudian psychoanalytic approaches have improved, the aim to comprehend politics with elements of subconsciousness has arisen (Cottam; Uhler; Mastors; Preston; 2004, p. 8). Freudian psychoanalysis suggested that social theory should be based on a suggestion that social evolution of humanity should be analyzed by referring to anthropological elements which produce social subconscious (Obeyesekere, 1990, p. 17-21). Sigmund Freud tried to follow this anthropological evolution in his leading analyses on social subconscious models (such as the Oedipus Complex and Totem & Taboo). In these studies, Sigmund Freud aimed to develop an idea that offers a perspective which handles the social itself with subconscious and unconscious experiences belonging to individuals. So, Freudian psychoanalysis is based on a model following or nominating the social by considering individual psyches arising in social relations.

Jacques Lacan, who is one of the dominant successors of Sigmund Freud, suggested that social structures should be handled as a reflection of desires arising from the universe of the unconscious (Homer, 2005, p.13). He changed the dynamics of the Freudian Oedipus Complex, but then he recreated another typological idea comprehending social structures or identities with the term of subconscious desires or images to be followed in order to construct identity. Therefore, Jacques Lacan could observe the dichotomy between nature (individual universe full of desire, impulses or drives) and culture (based on suppression of natural existence) in a process by which existence can gain its meaning by referring itself to the gaze of the *Other* (Grigg, 2008, p. 9).

It can be said that both Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan handled existence (individual or social) by considering whether it can be situated as a realizable thing in front of the visual field of the *Other*. This means that the *Other* is a symbolic plane that constructs and defines existence with a dialectical mediation: existence can handle its being only when it comprehends itself in the gaze of the *Other*. Thus, the *Other* arises when the existence is in a crisis of

self-recognition (Houghton, 2009, p. 122). Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan tried to show us how existence is linked to the gaze of the *Other* which mediates between the being and meaning. So, according to Freudian-Lacanian theory, the relationship with the *Other* is the constitutive factor of the identity of existence.

The fact that the *Other's* power in providing the core meaning for existence can also be discussed in politics itself is the reason why Freudian-Lacanian theory can be linked to politics by considering Carl Schmitt's theory; because Carl Schmitt tried to handle politics in a zone of distinction between friend and enemy. His suggestion implies that the conceivability of politics as an existence would be possible if there were a distinction from which the being could comprehend itself. In other words, Carl Schmitt simply argues that politics is not an issue of self-being; rather, it will be possible only if there is an *Otherness* which is differentiated from existence. This *Otherness* is not a single, unique and more importantly a constant thing; on the contrary, it is constructed randomly and that is why it is contingent; because this notion is defined according to how existence comprehends itself. That is why Carl Schmitt argues that the distinction between friend and enemy is conditional because the distinction is always framed by the fact of how the notion of 'Friend' [We] is determined.

The aim of this article is to discuss the conceivability aspect of politics with psychoanalytical terms which were mostly theorized by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. As the Freudian-Lacanian concept of psychoanalysis suggests that the meaning of existence is gained from outside, Carl Schmitt's theory of politics can represent a useful example for this suggestion in order to deepen it, because Carl Schmitt argues that politics would be possible if there were a distinction in which existence could comprehend itself. This shows that the possibility of politics is due to the existence of *Otherness*. Thus, this article claims that the theory of politics framed by Carl Schmitt is always an issue of psychoanalytical perspective because both Freud/Lacan and Schmitt reduced the meaning of existence to the being of the *Other*. In order to deepen this claim, the article begins by explaining the psychoanalytical perspectives of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. In this section, the study focuses on the discussion of the notion of *Otherness* in both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. After this, the question of how Carl Schmitt looks at the issue of *Otherness* will be examined in the section in which political theory is discussed. In the last part, the closeness between psychoanalysis and politics will be evaluated through arguments of the Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalytical concept and Schmitt's political theory.

1. The Meaning and Function of the 'Other' in Freudian-Lacanian Psychoanalysis

The notion of *Otherness* in psychoanalytic theory signifies an externalism that establishes existence from the outside and gives a certain sense of meaning to existence (Grünbaum, 1985, p. 3-4). Both Freud and Lacan ascribed a meaning

to this notion in order to claim that the possibility of existence depends on relating with an outside in which existence can be a recognizable object (Freud, 2010; Lacan, 1998). Thus, the mission of the *Other* in psychoanalytical theory is to create a stage by which existence can perceive its being.

According to the widespread view in Freudian psychoanalytic theory, from early childhood, existence perceives itself through the objects which are invested emotionally (Freud, 2010, p. 23-24). It is called the *narcissist era*, in which the child pushes itself to perceive its being as a unique and singular object differentiated from the others (Freud, 2010, p. 25). According to Freud, the basic reason why the infant needs to feel itself as a narcissist subject is because of the *primary frustration* which started with birth (Freud, 2010, p. 26). The main reason why primary frustration happens is because that infant feels a lack in its being, because it feels that there is still a part of itself in its mother's uterus in which the infant perceives its being in totality. So, the frustration occurs because the infant now perceives itself outside of its mother. According to Freud, from early infancy, the infant has struggled to get over the primary frustration by investing emotions into objects in order to unify its being (Freud, 1961: 9). According to Freud, the reason why a child is fond of its mother is because the mother has the infant's missing object (Freud, 1998, p. 174). The infant feels that it needs to unify its existence by regaining this missing object and this means that the infant can no longer establish the meaning of existence in its own integrity.

The infant experiences the consciousness of being separated from the mother with a sense of lack. This lack forces the infant to invest its emotions into the objects by which the infant can perceive its being. So, the reason why the mother becomes the basic emotional object of the infant is just because the infant cannot own its missing part without mediating to its mother. This is where Freud says that from the earliest childhood, the child can reach self-consciousness and self-recognition only by a certain notion of *Otherness* which reflects what the infant's desires are (Petocz, 1999, p. 23-26). Thus, the mission of the *Other* is to show what existence already is. However, existence cannot perceive its being without the *Other*, because the *Other* includes the missing parts of existence.

According to Freud, the reason why the mother signifies the *object of love* or why the father represents the *object of hate* is that the child needs otherness to establish its self-recognition (Freud, 1961, p. 14-16). The thing that lies at the root of the meaning of being is the object that feels the absence of existence. Sigmund Freud explains this by discussing the *sublimation* of the object which mediates desires and social structures in itself. Thus, sublimation is the replacement of *lack of desire* with the *will of the other*. Sublimation can be seen as objects or social structures which enable existence to perceive its being in totality. According to Freud, the main function of sublimation is to create a feeling of integrity in existence. Therefore, the objects sublimed reflect the desire of an existence whose aim is to perceive those objects as the integral

parts of its being (Ainsworth, 1969, p. 972). For Freud, cultural symbols, structures, laws, orders, etc. are sublimed because they reflect an ideal type of existence which is integrity. As a result of this, the sublimed social codes are placed into the soul and become the superego.

Freud explains the superego by dividing the human being into two parts: in the first part, there are drives which motivate the body; while the other one is the superego which regulates the drives whether they are realised or not (Ahmed, 2012, p. 61). Thus, the mission of the superego is to reflect social codes in bodily practices and motives. Therefore, the social moved to the being as a superego functions like the *Other* who reflects social and cultural affirmatives in a human being. These affirmatives become reference points against which the being tries to ascribe a meaning to itself by adopting itself to these references. So, the social loses its externality because it has just been moved into the soul. According to Freud, this is the reality principle by which the being may realize that it can no longer pursue its existence only by following its pleasure objects. Rather, it finally realizes that its existence can be pursued by referring those pleasure motives to the reality principle for the purpose of adopting itself to the social affirmatives. So, Freud claims that the aim of the social codes is to make existence be a carrier of the cultural order.

In addition to Freudian cultural psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that the psychoanalytic method is an analysis of meaning (Lacan, 1998, p. 19-24). Lacan attempts to explain the mechanism of suppression occurring in the subconscious by referring to language. According to Lacan, “the subconscious is constructed like a language” (Thom, 2007, p. 435). What Lacan is trying to say is that consciousness in which the being is represented is a system of reconciliation, just like language. The human being is not like the reality of his own existence; he can form, think, and express himself through the structures of language, because language is a symbolic universe in which existence can be expressed as a being. For Lacan, this is the proof that existence is never a pure reality in itself. Existence feels that it is obliged to establish itself with a reference to this symbolic order in order to perceive its meaning. However, this order is not full of objective elements; on the contrary, it is the product of reconciliation by which the meaning and scope of existence are determined.

Lacan tries to problematize the process of symbolic order. To do so, he claims that a human being perceives and expresses himself and the universe through the content that the symbolic order includes (Lacan, 1998, p. 203-216). Thus, the being develops a certain conception of reality through language. Since reality is determined by the symbolic order, the meaning of existence does not have an objective content. The absence of objectivity means that reality is always an imaginary fiction. So, reality is symbolized not in the universe of conscious life but in the world of the sub-unconscious as an imaginary fiction (Lacan, 1998, p. 218-220). Thus, the real world is perceived not in its own reality, but in the way of being associated with the imaginary.

The Lacanian argument states that the meaning of being can only be realized by its mediation with the *Otherness* which exchanges reality with the imaginary. This also shows that there is no permanent existence of an objective reality because it is a fictive thing that can be converted. The conversion of reality into the symbolic-fictive universe reflects the fact that what makes the possibility of existence becoming recognizable is the mediation with the symbolic form. This function of the symbolic form is to create a recognizable universe in which pre-existence can be named so it can become a being. Thus, this symbolic form operates as metaphorical. Lacan argues that because the symbolic form is a kind of language, so the symbolic form functions by resembling facts according to the pre-acceptance elements within the language (Lacan, 1998, p. 81-84). As a result of this, reality, which cannot be simply perceived within the language, needs to be realized within the concept of symbolic statements. This shows how the symbolic order functions because it actually fills the blanks in which reality cannot be explained in a linguistic way, and so the symbolic order re-creates reality by mediating it with the pre-acceptance linguistic codes.

Lacan exemplifies this metaphorical statement of the symbolic order by discussing the Father's position in the infant's consciousness. He calls this position "Name-of-the-Father" (Lacan, 2013). According to Lacan, Name-of-the-Father reflects the fact that the Father does not have a constant existence of its own, rather, it is formed with metaphorical phrases added to its existence (Lacan, 2013, p. 3). As it is discussed in Lacan, Name-of-the-Father means that the Father is not a singular and external being for the infant, rather, the Father is situated in an imaginary place within the symbolic order. The symbolic is an order in which interpellations are formed and gain regularity, and people can be recognizable in the eyes of each of them. So, the Father is a father not because he is the physical cause for the birth of his child, but rather, he is interpellated as a Father which is designed in order to express that he owns the infant's primitive desires. That is why the Father is signified as a Law in the infant's subconscious, rather than expressing himself as an external and physical being.

The Father enters the child's mind just like he castrates or manages the infant's desires. The Oedipus Complex arises because of the Father's penetration into the infant's conscious. According to Lacan, the Father becomes the Law itself by signifying an imaginary prohibition (Lacan, 2013, p. 67-71). This prohibition includes the primitive desire of the infant for its mother, and the Father here becomes the Law which represents the impossibility of the desire. So, the Father arises because of the perception of the impossibility of the desire, and thus, the infant starts to realize that becoming the Father is the necessity of having the desire. According to Lacan, the function of the Father (named as the *great Other*) has two dimensions: the first one signifies the prohibitive power of the Law which establishes the subject as a submissive being in front of the symbolic-cultural order. However, the other one means the possibility of having a desire in the affirmative form. So, the Name-of-the-Father is not just a

prohibition, but rather, it also presents an affirmative form by which the infant can transform itself into a subject who is authorized to have the desire.

The function of the *otherness* in Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis can be seen in the process of the establishment of the subject. The subject can gain its meaning of existence by referring itself to a symbolic order. The possibility of becoming a subject necessitates a submission that the human must perform in order to be recognizable in society. Both Freud and Lacan focus on the possibility of existence to become a meaningful being in the eyes of the *Other* (Ferrell, 1996, p. 60-66). We can say that Lacan is more focused on the establishing influence of the *Other* than Freud, because Lacan assumes well of the imaginary position of the *Other*, and besides, he realizes that the *Other* is constructed contingently. That is why Lacan can explain this contingent construction of the *Other* by likening the situation to the linguistic codification of the social. Like the subject constructed in linguistic-symbolic code within the social, the construction of the *Other* always addresses and assumes another *Other* in order to ascribe a meaning to itself. Thus, we can say that any reference ascribing a meaning to the being must presuppose a discourse of the *Other* who is authorized to determine the scope and meaning of the order. This is the crucial point by which we can handle Schmitt's political theory with the psychoanalytical arguments developed by Freud and Lacan, because Schmitt, like Freud and Lacan do, determines the meaning of existence in a certain externality against which existence can perceive its becoming.

2. The Construction of the Political: *Otherness* in Schmitt's Political Theory

In Schmitt's thought, the political is above all a theological character (Schmitt, 1931, p. 30). This is the basic point by which we can realize how the term 'Political' is handled as a theological modality in the context of '*otherness*' in Schmitt's political theory. In spite of the fact that the concept of otherness is mostly used to describe the 'enemy' (Balakrishnan, 2000, p. 3-5), Schmitt refers to an '*otherness*' in order to describe a momentum in which the concept of 'enemy' can be realized. That is to say, Schmitt actually frames a universe by which transboundary existence – such as the *enemy* – can be determined by the concept of the inside. According to Schmitt, the first thing to do is to determine what the inside is; for this reason, it is a precondition for determining what the outside is (Schmitt, 2007, p. 19-23). The aim of this section is to read the best known distinction in Schmitt's political theory in a reverse way by discussing the concept of the otherness within the psychoanalytical discourse.

2.1. The Political

From Schmitt's point of view, the Political is the predominant concept of the State (Schmitt, 2007, p. 37). Although the modern concept of political thought is State, Schmitt wants to emphasize the role and priority of the Political against the State. In his best known manuscript, Schmitt argues that the Political comes before the state and determines it (Schmitt, 2007, p. 45). The reason why the Political comes before the state is because only the Political can determine the

primary boundary by which existence can be established. The primary boundary is the certain point in which the term “We” and the “Other” can be expressed. The mission of the Political is to determine this primary boundary so that existence can be expressed as a perceptible unity (Marder, 2010, p. 35). However, the mission or the function of the State is to maintain this boundary; it means that the State is not obliged to determine the pre-conditions of existence. Rather, the main task of the state is to ensure the continuity of collective existence within the Political (Bredenkamp, 1999, p. 252).

The distinction between *the Political* and the State is also important for understanding how Schmitt aims to analyze the potential of the Political in determining the conditions for existence. Therefore, Schmitt always aims to determine the boundaries by which existence can be realized. The importance of the Political can be seen in this effort because Schmitt tries to handle the Political as an expression of the social itself (Freund, 1995, p. 23-29). It shows us that the Political in Schmitt’s theory is evaluated as the perception of existence. Schmitt uses the term Political because he aims to emphasize the constitutive power of the Political and also, he tries to mention the differences between two words which are wrongly handled as synonymous. For Schmitt, the Political differs from politics because unlike politics, the Political refers to the historical and material existence of the social being (Meier, 2011, p. 34). According to Schmitt’s theory, the Political is the adjective of politics. It means that politics is integrated within the Political so that the condition and ingredient of politics can gain an ontology in which it can be materialized. So, this ontological parameter is the Political itself; and Schmitt tends to evaluate this as the condition for the reflexivity by which existence can perceive itself.

The fact that the ontology of politics depends on the Political indicates that the Political has a metaphysical conception. That is why Schmitt argues that the Political far exceeds politics and the State which is the signifier of the politics. As the Political is beyond the physical being of the social, it becomes the substantial basis of society. The Political is transcendental for politics, so any political debate or position takes its reference by relating itself with the Political, which is the ontological basis of politics. Although Schmitt’s theory of the Political is mostly referred to with the distinction of friend-enemy, there is an alternative discourse that can be explored in Schmitt. As is known, the basis distinction (friend-enemy) depends on the Political, so it means that the ontology of the Political arises from an acceptance in which existence is handled as an integrity in itself and the otherness is moved to beyond that being (Ojakangas, 2007, p. 209). However, the concept of ‘otherness’ can be explored in another path of Schmitt’s theory. This other path only includes the possibility of the existence of its own being without any relation with any other being. For instance, this conception of otherness focuses only on the condition that existence can perceive its being in itself. It means that the basis distinction (friend/enemy) may be irrelevant because the conception of otherness is firstly produced from the perception of the being in its own conscious.

So, it can be suggested that Schmitt handles the Political as the reference point for the being in order to be perceived in its own conscious. The possibility or the condition of the Political does not need to depend on the existence of the enemy. If the conception of *otherness* were handled as the conditional part of existence, then it could be said that the social itself can transform itself into a political unity by referring itself to its abstract entity which is the otherness itself. Thus, according to Schmitt's political theory, the Political, which firstly becomes the reference of existence in order to be perceived, includes a *theological meaning*. This theological form is the basis idea that Schmitt can claim that the Political is the ontology of politics in which society can perceive itself. So, the theological form of the Political indicates that society can perceive itself as a differentiated unity by relating with its theological existence. This theological existence is the abstract being of the social, and so it is the universe by which society can organize and perceive itself.

2.2. Theological-Political or the *Otherness in Itself*

“Any political matter does also include a matter of theology”.

What is meant by this suggestion is to emphasize the resemblance of handling the Divine and denominating politics. From the point of view of Schmitt, the citizen is positioned in front of the sovereign (the State), just like the human being is positioned in front of the God (Schmitt, 2005, p. 10-11). Schmitt makes this analogy to emphasize the similarity of each political form to a divinity positioned as a reference for the universe; and the human gains its meaning through the relationship of the positioning (Bates, 2006, p. 417). In other words, association with an *otherness* shows itself in the Political; or the Political is the association of existence with the *Other*.

According to Schmitt, the God is a divine figure that absolutely must be outside and he also must not be a symbolic form who cannot be identified with (Schmitt, 2005, p. 12). The design of God as available for identification results in the deification of the individual. For Schmitt, here is where nihilistic pluralism arises because any transcendental principle cannot longer be maintained (Schmitt, 2005, p. 57). Anarchism, for Schmitt, is not simply the rejection of the principle of authority, rather, it is the pluralism of truths in which there would be no external and transcendental principle governing the order of things. The meaning in this pluralist anarchism is produced within the inside of the being; it means that the being perceives itself as a total and a perfect unity. However, the Political refers to an externality by which existence can ascribe a meaning to its being (Bendersky, 1983, p. 223). The necessity of existence to denominate itself as a Political unity is because that existence cannot perceive itself as unity in its pure presence. Therefore, the Political itself is a matter of ontology by which social existence can perceive itself and can both denominate and comprehend itself as a political entity by this external reference. This is the theological basis of the Political and, therefore, Schmitt

could explain the ontological condition of the Political by referring to the theological conception of existence (Ostovich, 2007, p. 44-47).

At the heart of Schmitt's political theology is the notion of "relevance of the church" (Schmitt, 2005, p. 55). The basis of the relevance of the church is seen in the representation. The church is something that appears before the priest. According to Schmitt, the irrational-concrete personality of the priest and the rational-formal function of the position that he is in exist together (Schmitt, 1996, p. 52). Schmitt was influenced by the concept of medieval representation and expanded the concept of representation by adding the word "creation".

“The visibility of the church is based on something invisible. (...) Thus, the Church can be *in* but not *of* this world” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 51).

Representation, therefore, does not mean that of what is "visible" in the physical sense; rather, the representation is to make the invisible visible, and for this reason, it is the product of a spiritual effort that blurs the boundaries. That is why the representation is to represent the essence, but not to represent the physical being.

“To represent is to make an invisible being visible and present through a publicly present one” (McCormick, 1999, p. 166).

Representation is handled as a Hegelian context (Kochi, 2006, p. 51) in Schmitt's thought. According to this conceptualization, existence reaches a transcendence through representation (Pippin, 2000, p. 159). So, the image in which existence is represented is naturally the supreme ideal of existence. So, representation is a political imperative which announces what existence substantially is. In fact, Schmitt tries to relate the physical being of society with its spiritual being, and that is why he argues that despite the fact that a political entity is comprehended by its physical appearance, the entity does also have a spiritual being which is the reference of its physical being.

2.3. The *Friend*: The Missing part of Existence

Although Schmitt seems to situate the term “enemy” at the center of the Political², he actually presents an assessment evaluating the notion of “friend”. In fact, Schmitt's theory is mainly focused on establishing a possible condition for creating a perceivable notion of the inside which is represented as “we” in an ontological sense. Besides, Schmitt himself has opposed the theory that the concept of the enemy should come first in theory:

“The case as a legal act occurs only when a right is negated... Does this mean that the crime is primary?” (Schmitt, 2007, p. 34).

According to this passage, the notion of the “enemy” must presuppose the notion of the “friend”. From a Hegelian point of view, the notion of the “enemy” reflects the existence of the notion of the “friend” within the concept –

² For example, David Dyzenhaus argues that Schmitt's theory simply causes “blind hatred against the other” (Dyzenhaus, 1998).

even if the notion of the enemy tries to negate the notion of the friend. This negation clearly shows that the condition in which the notion of the “enemy” can be realized is bound up with the notion of the “friend”. So, the notion of the “friend” is the condition of the existence of the “enemy” as an ontological object. It may be suggested that the notion of “we” is held in the foreground compared to the concept of “the enemy” (Hirst, 1990, p. 134-135). Again, for this reason, it can be argued that the condition of existence firstly depends on “we”. This emphasizes that the enemy is coming after the notion of the “we”.

In Schmitt’s theory, the notion of “friend” signifies the imaginary unity of the social (Wolin 1992, p. 433-437). In other words, the “friend” is the concrete reflection of the “we”. The members of society can realize each other as their friend because of the they accord with that imaginary signifier. If we think that society is not based solely on a material partnership but also on the meaning of a spiritual organization, we can understand that the “we” refers to a far more imaginary signifier than to a concrete meaning (Carty, 1995, p. 1256-1260). People living in a society are considered as friends of one another when they conform to the notion of an imaginary symbolization of “the friend”. The notion of friendship, whether based on a common ancestor, the same ethnicity or the same language, etc. always points to an imaginary connotation in the eyes of each member of society. That is why the notion of friendship is much more than a concrete unity. The imaginary context of friendship can be understood as a reference to existence, because the concrete notion of friendship can be established according to that imaginary context. As Vander points out, the notion of friendship can be called ontological guardianship (Vander, 2002, p. 156). So, the possibility of establishing the “we” solely depends on the accordance of a concrete organization with the imaginary reference of existence (Dean, 2006, p. 7-11). That is why the basis point of the political is the notion of the “friend”, because the “friend” is the only thing that shows accordance between the concrete organization and its imaginary context. If the concrete context of the organization were not in accordance with the imaginary concept of the social, then it would be impossible to handle this organization as a political collectivity. As the notion of “we” can not be imagined, there would be no possibility to take a reference to concrete being.

Conclusion

Based on the above statements, it can be said that the central elements of Schmitt's political theory are in fact similar to the basic components of psychoanalysis. The founding function of *the Other* that psychoanalysis discusses has a similar content in Schmitt's political theory, because, for Schmitt, *the Political* is not a sign of existence, but a condition. Thus, Schmitt applies a similar analogy to the constructive function that psychoanalysis puts in theory. This theoretical attempt is an aim to perceive *the Other* as a constructive ontology that confirms the uniqueness of existence. Just like Freud and Lacan, Schmitt seeks out the condition of existence in the outside of it. So, he aims to reach an ontology in which existence can be realized by an external reference.

The reference must be outside and transcendence as well, because existence needs to resolve its *lack of meaning* by referring itself to a transcendence context.

The mission of the *Other* in Freud and Lacan's theory is that of experiencing differentiation. In other words, the *Other* is an empty-signifier that is attributed to the subjective meaning of existence. Thus, the content and meaning of the *Other* are always determined by how existence aims to perceive itself. In Schmitt's theory, the *Other* is referred to for pointing out the enemy, but it actually refers to a context that establishes the subjective experience of existence. That is why Schmitt's political theory includes a psychoanalytical context which can be seen in Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis. As Freud and Lacan treat the *Other* as an abstraction located outside the being but positioned as an inherent part of existence, Schmitt tends to evaluate the otherness of the political being as a reference by which existence can realize itself as a singular and differentiated entity. Although Schmitt's political theory is based on a distinction between enemy and friend, the primary distinction is the differentiation of the social between its concrete and abstract being. In this sense, the notion of the friend is the expression of the concrete unity which is in harmony with the spiritual existence of society. The notion of *the otherness* in Schmitt's theory, then, becomes a condition for existence to perceive and present itself as a different being. As Schmitt mentions, the condition of the political is the differentiation of the social by which the social can realize itself as a singular unity which is the basis dynamic of establishing the distinction between the enemy and the friend.

The idea to be proposed here is that *the otherness* that we can trace in Schmitt's mind points to the concept of "we" before the concept of the "enemy". Therefore, the condition of the political is not *the enemy*, which is regarded as the "other", but an abstract image of the social by which the social entity can realize its being. Thus, the content of the political does not necessarily require a concrete otherness which is totally differentiated from existence. The argument to be proposed in this article is that the notion of *the otherness* emphasized in Schmitt's political theory can be broadly addressed within the psychoanalytic view. For this reason, the Freudian-Lacanian viewpoints on *the otherness* are discussed here to comprehend Schmitt's political theory with the arguments of psychoanalysis. This is because the concept of the "other" and its relation to existence discussed in Schmitt's political theory can only be resolved by a psychoanalytic approach, since the notion of *the Other* signifies an abstractness rather than a concrete situation within the psychoanalytic approach. Thus, the notion of the otherness through a psychoanalytical approach arises as a problem of the conditional circumstance of existence. In contrast, Schmitt's theory has usually been attempted to be understood with a reference to a concrete *otherness* outside of existence. However, the notion of *the otherness* should be handled as an abstract context that existence cannot easily realize itself as a being differentiated from externality.

The basic assertion of this article is to emphasize that there is a notion of “otherness” in Schmitt's theory just as in psychoanalysis. It can be seen in Schmitt’s viewing of the notion of the friend in his theory, because, for Schmitt, the notion of the “we” must be settled before the concept of the enemy, even though Schmitt himself perceives the notion of the enemy as the primary condition of the political. For this reason, it can be argued that the notion of existence in Schmitt's political theory is conditionally based on an "otherness" approach, just as psychoanalysis treats the notion of "otherness", because what lies at the root of the notion of "friendship", as Schmitt treats it, is some kind of "other as us" that a concrete society will refer to as a reference to itself. It is the moment that the psychoanalytic approach and political theory meet together, and Schmitt’s view on friendship enables us to unite these approaches.

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