"The Other" in the Roots of Marxist Philosophy

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Abstract

One of the most important fields of argumentation in modern philosophy is the problematic of the otherness. This problematic, which has exposed different approaches in many disciplines ranging from sociology to political science by overflowing the philosophy, stands as a subject that needs to be dealt with in more detail in today's world where the global agenda is quite preoccupied by ethnic and sectarian conflicts and the immigration waves that emerge depending on them.

Marxist philosophy, which is believed to have declared its defeat since the end of the Cold War and is now regarded only as a "form of interpretation", has managed to produce a more stirring literature on the otherness than its competitors. The creation of this literature is an intellectual achievement, but it is also true that the ideas put forward here fail to produce a coherent and feasible solution.

The aim of this study is to direct criticism towards the building blocks of this philosophy and to present an analysis of it as a starting point of a critical debate about why modern Marxism cannot make up a prescription for the problematic of the otherness. Therefore, in the study, the thinkers and opinions that shaped Marx's thought, not Marxist philosophy, will be read through the concept of "the other".

Keywords: *The Other, I, Identity, Dialectics, Self*

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Özet

Modern felsefenin en önemli tartışma alanlarından biri ötekilik sorunsalıdır. Felsefenin dışına taşarak sosyolojiden siyaset bilimine kadar pek çok disiplinde farklı yaklaşımların ortaya çıkmasını sağlamış olan bu sorunsal, etnisite ve mezhep kökenli savaşların ve bunlara bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan göç dalgalarının dünya gündemini fazlaca meşgul ettiği günümüzde üzerinde daha detaylıca durulması gereken bir konu olarak karşımızda durmaktadır.

Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinden bu yana yenilgisini ilan ettiğine inanılan ve artık sadece bir "yorum biçimi" olarak görülen Marxist felsefe, rakiplerine kıyasla ötekilik konusunda daha canlı bir literatür oluşturmayı başarmıştır. Bu literatürün yaratılması, düşünsel bir başarı olmakla birlikte, burada ortaya konan düşüncelerin tutarlı ve uygulanabilir bir çözüm üretmeyi başaramadığı da bir gerçektir.

Bu çalışmanın amacı modern Marxizmin neden ötekilik sorunsalıyla ilgili bir reçete yazamadığına ilişkin eleştirel tartışmanın bir başlangıcı olarak, eleştiriyi bu felsefenin ortaya çıkışını sağlayan yapıtaşları üzerine yönlendirmek ve bunun üzerinden bir analiz sunmaktır. Dolayısıyla çalışmada, Marxist felsefenin değil, Marx'ın düşüncesini şekillendiren düşünür ve görüşlerin "öteki" kavramı üzerinden bir okuması yapılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Öteki, Ben, Özdeşlik, Diyalektik, Kendi*

Introduction

If to be entitled as an ideology is a crime, though there are no implications of any facticity here, Marxism has become one of the leading criminals in the history of thought. Actually, Marxism is merely an overarching philosophy which can be divided into two different aspects: First, it's an ideogeny as a science concerning all criticism it directs at holistic perspectives of thought came off from the French Revolution. On the other hand, it's a field of argumentation (not an ideology if we put it directly by reversing the thesis of apodictic liberalist *dicta*) in which we can criticize the moments of apparent decadence by referring to philosophical, social and economic phenomena of the era that encloses Marxism itself too, even though it has also eschatological implicatures (at least in Marx's mind) to diverge from other schools of modern philosophy. Despite the fact that it has been differentiated from Marx's original style by the historical process it is in, Marxism still managed to be the only school of thought which has completed its transition from a metatheory to a philosophy, and thus, proved its own dialectics, and constructed a thesis-critics dichotomy in itself by fresh and continuously clashing thoughts of Marxist thinkers.

Right along with this eternal intellectual arena Marxism offers us, it has, of course, a bunch of deficiencies which too can be revealed using the arena provided by Marxist philosophy. And this is the entertaining side of Marxism, it never falls into nomological trap and it's never a *simplex dictum* as the ideologies that attack and entitle Marxism pejoratively.

"The other" was the leading problematic Marx was never able to study profoundly because of, presumably, sociocultural conjuncture of the era and the other urgent problems were existent. Therefore, the core idea of this study is to track down "the other", which we can shortly and extensively describe as the excluded since it's "the other I" which is not seen equal by the "I" that defines itself as self-consciousness, especially bypassing the first thinkers that spring to mind when "the other" is in question and focusing on cornerstones that compose Marx's thought.

1. Hegelian Roots

In almost all debates, another thinker who is associated with Marx is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel for whom Marx thinks he stood on his head. In his masterpiece named Phenomenology of Spirit (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*), in which he analyzes the process of self-actualizing in-and-for-itself spirit, one by one Hegel examines *consciousness*, and as sub-categories of consciousness, situation of *this* and *perception* through tendency of consciousness to *this*; then *self-consciousness*, Lordship and Bondage dialectics - as we will see below -, and finally the concept of *reason* and *spirit*.[2] Hegel exposits the genealogy of spirit by starting off these concepts and explains that the reason sees spirit as a *thing* by turning to itself over its own motions, thus affirming Absolute Spirit (*der absolute Geist*) at the end[3], and the war between religion and the Enlightenment as a phase of transition from a paradox (derived from the fact that *reason* shifts itself from subject to thing) to an agonism, and lastly, Absolute Knowing (*das absolute Wissen*) which he analyzes in detail. In this way, Hegel reaches to climax of idealism, so prevalent criticisms towards him focus on that his idealism ends in acceptance of *indefinite Being* as the absolute truth. By starting off from the axiom "reason is spirit when its whole certainty of factuality advances to the truth, and it's conscious of the world as itself, and of itself as its own world" (Hegel, 2004: 285), Hegel pushes spirit, in a ground where criticisms weigh upon the relationship between spirit, its factuality and factuality of *Being-in-and-for-itself* neglect, to an absolute; an absolute that is conscious of its own being and is certain of it - that is to say state, religion, culture[4] and morals. However, language, as the determinant

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[2] See: Chapters A. for consciousness; A.I. for this; A.II. for perception; B. for self-consciousness; B.IV.A. for Lordship and Bondage; C. for reason and C.(BB.) for spirit (Hegel, 2004).

[3] Hegel's desire to reach an Absolute was so strong that he had taken Napoleon for Absolute Spirit. After he saw the Emperor on horseback in Jena, he wrote a letter to his friend Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, saying: "I saw the Emperor - this world-spirit - riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it. (…) This extraordinary man, whom it is impossible not to admire." (Pinkard, 2000: 228)

[4] Here, Hegel do not use the German word *Kultur*, he prefers to use *Bildung*. While *Kultur*, as a middle term which anyone can have, means culture and practices of life as we understand in daily language,

of organic relationship among all inferences in which Absolute Spirit actualize itself, backlashes and unfolds the relentless failing while, in Hegel's mind, it is the most powerful and enthusiastic representation of the idea of Absolute Spirit:

> "[652.] We see *language* as existence[5] of Spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing *for others*, thus it is *present* immediately and *this* is universal as self-consciousness. It is the 'self' which separates itself from itself, so it becomes objective to itself as pure I=I, and in this objectivity it keeps itself as *this* 'self', just as it merges immediately with other 'selfs' and becomes *their* self-consciousness; it perceives itself like it is percept by others, and perception is precisely the *existence became the 'self'*." (Hegel, 2004: 418)

Although dangers of Hegel's A=A equation have been mentioned by numerous thinkers, Emmanuel Levinas was the first one to correlate those dangers to the problematics of "the other", and this topic will be addressed separately later on. Absolute *identity* Hegel points out, clearly ostracize *the other* (in fact, the worst and the most terrifying side of this *identity* would show itself in Auschwitz due to intellectual support of fascist Hegelians and ironically anti-Hegelians and then again in Vietnam and Fallujah by total annihilation of philosophy); Hegel's optimism would turn into a sharp weapon in the hands of fascist Hegelians. Self-*alienation* of thesis as antithesis was a problematic that which Marx tried hard to overcome and he, with a messianic enthusiasm, related the vector, in which the subjective and the objective alters into the absolute, the only potential that can destroy *alienation*, to proletariat; however, the proletariat would change its mode from for-itself to in-itself and at last it would lose all its

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Bildung includes some other meanings such as exercise, training and education. Therefore it is a form of culture which everyone cannot have, so it belongs to bourgeois as Marx stated.

[5] The exact word Hegel uses is *Dasein*. It literally means being-there/there-being, but Hegel uses the word by the meaning of human "existence" or "presence". Therefore, we chose to translate *Dasein* as existence.

dynamism by being articulated to capitalism as if, if we use Adorno's famous metaphor, it is a prisoner who falls in love with his executioner.

While pulling spirit off from Hegelian philosophy, Marx ignored *the other* and postponed the problematic with an expectation of proletarian revolution and then the evaporation of state, even though he approached and analyzed it by using the concept of alienation. Spiritual motion that reaches to absolute knowledge and conception of history emerged from it turn into a teleological form in Hegel's work and the same form partly occurs in Marx's expectation of revolution.

More specifically, as a middle term of *opposite* momenta that generate revolution, proletariat taking the form of a class is related to Hegelian Lordship and Bondage dialectics. Hegel wrote:

> "[186.] Self-consciousness is, to begin with, simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else. For it, its essence and absolute object is 'I'; and in this immediacy, or in this [mere] being, of its being-for-self, it is an *individual*. What is 'other' for it is an unessential, negatively characterized object. But the 'other' is also a self-consciousness; one individual is confronted by another individual." (Hegel, 1977: 113)

Here, two antipodes need to preserve each other or else it will be impossible for them to recognize themselves:

> "[186.] (…) But according to the Notion of recognition this is possible only when each is for the other and what the other is for it, only when each in its own self through its own action, and again through the action of the other, achieves this pure abstraction of being-for-self. [187.] The presentation of itself, however, as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific *existence*, not

to the individuality common to existence as such, that it is not attached to life. This presentation is a twofold action: action on the part of the other, and action on its own part. In so far as it is the action of the *other*, each seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves the staking of its own life. Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle." (Hegel, 1977: 113-114)

Relation between these two momenta is not only antagonistic but also dichotomic as they are interdependent: "[189.] (…) one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another. The former is Lord, the other is bondsman" (Hegel, 1977: 115). Each one of these two momenta is dependent to each other through their independent beings, each one of them is the definitive for the other one.

The point long quoted passages above bring us is the factuality of interdependent opposition, which is described by Hegel and is determined by economic infrastructure according to Marx, that which preserves Marx's proletariat *as proletariat*. In this case, each class defines itself through the other one by otherizing it; it is the *non-other*, in this way it creates *identity*.

2. Feuerbach and Evolutionary Biology

Marx pulled spirit off from the Hegelian dialectics by studying Feuerbach. According to Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach, religion must be negated in an absolute manner and anthropology must be extolled instead. Yet, the root of this dual proposition also goes back to Hegel. Indeed, the negation of religion begins with Hegel's conversion of theology into logic and is completed by Feuerbach's conversion of logic into anthropology in the next stage. However, when Feuerbach agrees with Hegel in the belief that Homo sapiens is a full adult, he absolutely quits him in the matter of

materialism (Feuerbach, 1981). At best, Feuerbach alienates religion and the religious. The defense of religion and the valorization of religion, however, will lead to the creation of a kind of religious xenophobia, in which every religion distinguishes itself from other groups and non-religious communities in society, in particular as separating itself from fundamental values or majority culture within the state (Bradney, 2001: 51) - it is also a fact that each religion can not create a *pathos* towards itself or to be hostile towards others. Yet, Feuerbach's main emphasis is on the reversal of the Cartesian *I*. While *cogito ergo sum* is the method of preservation of *self for itself* (*subjectum*), it implicitly includes objectivism of *self for itself* as well: I *am here*. But, according to Feuerbach, this traditional understanding of *I* is erroneous, *I* is determined not as spontaneous but as the primary recipient, not *self*-determined; it is not active but passive subject (Feuerbach, 1967). This understanding criticizes Hegel as well as Descartes; because in Hegel, sensory perception can not be the ultimate proof of factuality, factuality is in the movement of historical processes, not in individual manifestation. Since in Marx's philosophy labor is the key vector of historical movements, Marx also approached Hegel and criticized Feuerbach in this regard. According to Marcuse, Marx was right, Feuerbach's perceptual materialism perceives the singular individuals of bourgeois society, excluding historicism (Marcuse, 2000: 220). Nevertheless, Feuerbach's philosophy has become a chain linking Marx to Darwinist materialism, revolution to evolution, and thus completes dialectical materialism.

Darwin's core idea is based on the assumption that the biologically strong one, or the one at any upper level of the evolutionary stratum, maintains its particular being by eliminating the weak, or the *other* one at any lower strata of the stratum, in the environment where the interactions between species become a power struggle. And this is generalized as the assumption that the existence of the whole group in which that particular being exists tends to maintain its existence as long as it is not challenged by stronger or *other* higher order beings (Darwin, 2011). The great thinkers of Europe of the era were very concerned about evolution. For example,

Nietzsche supports the theory of evolution, but rightly thinks that the natural selection does not manifest itself in a way that will reinforce the existence of the strong, but that it is more likely that the weaker *others* will take over the strong (Nietzsche, 2003: 258). But Marx is undecided about Darwin's theory; nevertheless, he thinks that the findings of Darwin are important and scientific, which will take the threshold of world and human history (Hodgson, 2006: 12).

This link established by Marx with Darwin's theory has a share in defining Marx's socialism as "scientific". Darwin was, of course, not a philosopher. Although the path he opened with his scientific discoveries continues to evolve and be proven day by day, those findings were first encountered with serious (especially religious) reactions, and were diverted to a dangerous path by adapting to anthropology by some thinkers. Darwin never claimed that Homo sapiens was derived from primates, only claimed Homo sapiens and primates to be two species from a common ancestor in the same gene pool, which the proportions of proximity that appear in today's genetic research seem to verify this thesis.[6] However, Social Darwinists, without truly understanding Darwin, chose a way to legitimize colonialism, slavery and various ethnic massacres, and to absolutize the otherness of the given *other* by arguing fanatically that the genealogy of the Aryan race was the top step and the others were at a step much closer to the common ancestral origin. The connection established with identity has recreated Social Darwinism as Azrael of the modern age: In all cases, the one that eliminated an *other* had to find a new one to overthrow; otherwise it would face the danger of losing his identity. However, at the time when Darwin lived, the issue of evolution had not yet come to light as it is today, and this uncertainty manifested itself in Marx's considerations of Darwinism.

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[6] The works of biologists such as Ivan Ovcharenko (2008), Edward Rubin (2014) and Dario Boffelli (2004) is extremely eye-opening on this topic.

These sources that Marx uses to construct his philosophy are naturally the determinants of an intellectual such as Marx, whose arguments are parallel to his actions, at every stage of his life. For example, some of his writings about Jews or the way he addressed Ferdinand Lassalle were unconscious (perhaps conscious) manifestations of those sources (Skousen, 2007: 161). But Marx was not a prophet. The deficiencies in his thinking and in the resources of his thought were criticized by the followers and tried to be overcome. Problems such as the Eurocentrism of Marx's thoughts, the silence of Classical Marxism about *the other*, or Orthodox Marxism seen as a closed "block" have grown in the eyes of Marxists and non-Marxists and they went into the search for theorizing the concepts of identity, otherness and multiculturalism; but in particular, the *identity* still continues to be one of the most controversial topics of today.

3. Identity and Liberalist Search

Recently, Charles Margrave Taylor defined identity as "a person's who is, a demonstration of things like understanding the basic qualities that define someone as a person" (Taylor, 2005: 42). According to this, identity is the revelation of self-conscious in-and-for-itself *I*'s own awareness of itself, leaving out what belongs to *the other*, and this does not mean that those belonging to the other will be negated. Taylor emphasized that the relationship between identity and humanity has changed qualitatively since the *Ancien Régime*; he has made a connection between human dignity and identity, since language is the prominent revealer and enunciator of identity and human is the only creature who uses the conceptual language (Taylor, 2005: 43-48). Thus, human finds himself through relations.

The works of Charles Taylor and Edward Said are important in order to determine the ignored position of the "other" until this time.[7] But

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[7] By the way, there are also some who oppose multiculturalism, such as Slavoj Žižek, perhaps the most popular face of contemporary Marxism, claiming that the multiculturalist policies are just "not too extreme way" of extreme ethnic nationalism (Žižek, 1997)

the most important criticism of the philosophical origin of the issue came from Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas directly targets the Hegelian dialectics, which, contrary to Hegel's, leads not to the inclusionary totality of "absolute", but to someone else or another (West, 2008: 265). Hegel's formulation, A=A, is now transformed to A=B=C=...; in Levinas' philosophy, irreducible Being has become decentralized, the individual's *self* has put being *in-and-for-itself* in the background, now it exists for-other, through-other and with-other. Accordingly, the relation of particular beings with *other* particular beings must be established before they tend to *identify themselve*s with *the others*, otherwise the *subject/I* will be reduced to the indefinite *I*, almost the exact opposite of itself (Touraine, 2007: 250). Moving away from the danger of identity, Levinas regards *the other* as an infinite distance in relation, not as an object; internalizing the beauty of the respect and diversity of *the other* is the essential way of liberation as a particular individual and a whole universal society.[8] By this way, Levinas' thought opens the way to politics which takes account of *the other's right* as we will see in the part on Adorno below.

However, at this point it is necessary to take a brief look at the desperation of the liberalist thought about the "other", which defines itself not by its own but criticism of Marxism. Liberalist thought disdains and tolerates *the other* by an undefined democracy and the principle of *tolérance*, which in itself contains an incredible insult, or at worst, originates the identification of *the other* with *us* (*non-other*) by capitalism leading to fascism in the crisis stages. In his critique of capitalism, Marx's basic thought focused on the creation of socio-economic antagonisms by this economic system, which is, in fact, in Marx's mind, all the history that will occur until the revolution will be a conflict situation (Marx & Engels, 1985: 79). But the most brutal, secret, and universal (Marx & Engels, 1985: 83) form of the conflict is capitalism and it always *otherizes* either openly or deceptively due to this conflict it created. Liberalists try to close this

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[8] A good study on Levinas' philosophy was made by Ebru Apaydın. For the problematic of the otherness and subject in Levinas' work, see: (Apaydın, 2006).

brutality of capitalism with the principle of tolerance that cannot be less innocent. This principle includes that the power belongs to *central I*, implicating that the actions of *the other* are negative and can only be affirmed by a monological tolerance of *central I*, that the other and his actions can be approved *only if central I* is *tolerant*, and therefore the opponent *must remain* as the weakened *other*. *The other*, by remaining the weak(ened) *other*, must also tolerate the mighty *I* so that *I* can protect its interests and the surplus-value that it has usurped as it continues to exploit its rival.

As it can be seen, the liberalist principle of tolerance serves as an affirmation of capitalist immorality; in any case, this principle goes unsold when it comes to the question of whether tolerance will be shown to those who are not liberalist. For example, while looking for answers to this question Chandran Kukathas, as a libertarian, wrote: "The practice of the principle of libertarianism should include everyone, not just its supporters. This means that even those who do not defend the principle of libertarianism must be *tolerated*. (…) Libertarians do not harass them if they do not attack any of the Libertarians" (Kukathas, 2003: 70). Although these words sound innocent, someone can come out and ask: Libertarians have the status to tolerate those who do not think like themselves, but based on which *power* or right? If we make an addition to the second part of the quote, in the same article, Kukathas described "the attack" as: "Attack or harassment means 'the use of physical force or the beginning of the threat against a person or property of someone else'" (Kukathas, 2003: 72). It, of course, serves the liberalist interests that "the attack" is so narrowly and solely reduced, excluding psychology and other factors, to the use of physical force; for instance, when Kukathas says "No one or any group has the right to attack someone else's personality or property" (Kukathas, 2003: 70), he easily overlooks the fact that nature, which basically does not belong to anybody and is not a property, is parceled out, usurped and exploited - that is an incredible "attack" in the eyes of people who share that nature

(think about the reaction that the Amazon natives try to show against the factories built on forests).

As a matter of fact, Kukathas' conclusion is not a solution of the problematic of whether the other is respected or not; the solution has been postponed to a future time by becoming a kind of simulacrum (Kukathas, 2003: 76). Because, like many liberalist thinkers, his weakness is that in almost every argument liberalist principles are *a priori* accepted, for this reason Kukathas (and most liberalists) does not see the contradictions that those principles contain. Finally in his well-written article, Kuyurtar had the courage to express the truth, including a confession that liberal capitalism had an irrepressible tendency to *standardize* every single social being by destroying all *others*: "(…) Liberalism is not a 'possible meeting space for all cultures', because it has its own unique culture and needs a community bonded to liberalist principles to maintain its existence" (Kuyurtar, 2003: 105). However, in the same article, Kuyurtar also mentions that minority or *other* practices can be banned for Eurocentric fundamental rights. Accordingly, a developed and expanded liberalism can meet the demands of cultural minorities (Kuyurtar, 2003: 109), but citizens need to accept the principle of tolerance dogmatically from the very beginning; that is, this argument is just a tautology from beginning to end. As summarized by this tautology, liberalism cannot find a way out concerning the other, and was not looking for it anyway, and liberalist principles such as non-intervention, tolerance, etc., oblige *the other* to choose between a state of continuous marginalization and a state of complete assimilation (identity) (Tok, 2005: 43).

Conclusion: Fill in the Blanks

As a result, the liberalist theses cannot go beyond offering powerless apologies, as seen in these limited examples of the general ideas of the liberalist thinkers.[9] His presumptions involved by his etiological

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[9] Neo-liberalism, which gained strength in the 1980s, reduced trade unions to an ideological apparatus of the system by linking those unions to itself so that liberal capitalism guaranteed that the workers who

research that he has developed against the chronic problems and symptoms of capitalism which perpetuates all the contradictions about *the other* are what make Marx important in this regard. Marx was interested in *the other* by the concept of alienation he borrowed from Hegel at an early date. He has identified the four main characteristics of alienation (the secondary meaning of the otherization we assign here) as follows: alienation of a man from the nature, from himself, from "species-essence" (*Gattungswesen*, a term derived from Feuerbach) and from others (Swingewood, 1998: 88). This well-intentioned effort, we repeat, is missing when we are concerned about the possibility that the willingness not to be alienated from others could turn into the willingness to resemble others or to make others assimilated. However, again the Marxist and postmodernist thinkers, who came after him, tried to complete Marx's missing points. From these thinkers, here we will dwell on only Jean-François Lyotard, Theodor Ludwig-Wiesengrund Adorno from Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas (former Marxist).

First of all, we should mention the importance given to "language games" (a term that Lyotard inherited from Ludwig Wittgenstein) in Lyotard's conception of *other*, who is known for his writings on postmodernism and preserves his link with Marxism superficially at least, because this emphasis is the backbone of Lyotard's criticism, along with most other postmodernists, towards Habermas' communicative action. According to Lyotard, what creates *the other* as a figure is the pragmatic function of the human language:

> "*I* is the one who speaks at the moment; *you* is the person
> to whom this communication is directed for now. While *I* is
> talking, *you* are quiet, but *you* can talk, did talk and will talk.
> (…) Citizen is a single human being whose right to talk to *others*
> is given by *others*. (…) This relationship with language excludes

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seek their rights would remain as *the other*. While this stands as a historical example of problematics of *the other* in liberalism, the apologies are once again wasted.

the alterity that is immanent in civic dialogue. The *other* remains *foreign* and does not have the rights granted to nationals. The Greeks who founded *Politeia* also ostracized *barbaroi*. The right to dialogue is not given to every human being. The figure of other stands as an external *threat* to the integrity of the national community." (Lyotard, 1999: 145)

This threat perception, which cannot be explained better than this, will always exist whatever complementary policy is followed and all the solutions that are revealed will remain palliative. That's exactly why Adorno feels there is a need to change this perception from the very beginning. The negative dialectics that he designed removes "synthesis" from Hegelian and Marxist triadic dialectics. Thus, the risk of achieving absolute identity is lifted, the oppositions internalize one another, and the polylectical process is infinite (Adorno, 2007). Adorno's negative dialectics puts *aesthete* in the foreground, and the formula for A = B = C = … is preserved avoiding any syncretic attempt, but aiming rather a symbiotic cosmos.

Adorno's aesthetic symbiosis can be summarized by his use of the term, *übergreifen* (overlap, reaching out): Accordingly, the individual information is like a composition and is not fragmented. In this respect, all information can only be explained in the context of other information (Veysal, 2009: 357). Here, according to Adorno, social mutualism must be like the dependency of information. Unfortunately, however, Adorno's philosophy is again missing *praxis* in this regard too.

Starting from this, Jürgen Habermas brings the dialogic side of this cosmos to the forefront. In his design, the clogging liberal democracy is replaced by an understanding of deliberative democracy, which will be run through discourses of rational individuals with one another. But while Habermas' dogmatization of the rationalist postulate, by itself, is a matter of criticism, there is also no guarantee that deliberative democracy will not eventually turn into (a kind of) a vanguardism of the rational against the

irrational. Besides, deliberative democracy designed by Habermas takes on the form of an ethnometodological quest, since it silently accepts otherness of *the other*, as well as it is practically impossible to apply on large scaled societies. And again, it can be said that Habermas, with his subsequent writings after he quit philosophy and Marxism, continued to pursue the Kantian Project and proceeded to examine the process of establishing a European identity, and beyond, the conditions of cosmopolitan citizenship (Habermas, 2007: 144-180). In other words, in Habermas' theory, there was a chance for *the other* could catch a light of peace in a sense, but Habermas himself destroyed that possibility.

As we have seen, the deficiencies in the roots of Marx's philosophy about *the other* have been addressed, but the necessary progress and debate has been ironically provided by neo-Marxists and postmodernists, not by liberalist critics. Of course, in a world where all of us are *the other* of one another on any subject, the problematic of *the other* is too complex to be reduced to thinkers and their ideas only in this article. For instance, from the distinction of Dasein-Sosein in Heidegger's work through its reference to Cartesian solipsist ego or from the implicatures about *another one* in Said's orientalism-occidentalism definitions to the ambiguity of *the other* as both *I* and *non-I* in the mind of the postmodernists, much can be discussed by putting *the other* in the center, but these discussions could not deliver a solution to the problematic of *the other* (even sometimes they have created problems by themselves as in Heidegger), nor could they be included in the content of this article that goes through the roots of Marxist philosophy. In this study which intentionally follows a limited content, a satisfying solution is not presented as it is seen in a few examples examined above, which is the subject of another article.

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