


On the Subject, Purpose and Method of Religious Education as a Practical Metaphysics

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to discuss the possibility of conceiving the current science of religious education as a practical metaphysics without excluding its objectives. Contemporary science of religious education is a religious pedagogy in terms of the conditions that brought it into existence and its characteristics. Therefore, religious education activities are implemented following the religious knowledge constructed by the science of religious education within the limitations of pedagogy. And pedagogy, on the other hand, depends on the paradigm of existence, human being and behavior that finds its meaning in natural sciences such as physics and biology, human sciences, especially psychology, and educational sciences, which have been established depending on the natural state in which modernity is formed. A pedagogical approach to religion is necessarily anthropological due to the discursive characteristics of pedagogy. While it considers a specific religion and its tradition, it derives its principles from a spectrum of sciences, ranging from natural sciences to educational sciences. Religious education activities are therefore bound to a paradigm of the human being whose capabilities are determined. But, as a newly established discipline, religious education as religious pedagogy naturally does not possess a thoroughly developed theoretical framework (nazariyat), its principles, purposes, methods and outcomes of religious education activities have not been critically analysed. However, education is the process of becoming human, and by taking various differences in meaning into account, it means becoming a social reality, historicizing, and becoming a subject. Religious education as a practical metaphysics which is proposed to replace religious pedagogy, maintains its critical perspective and since it deals with subjectivity and the historicization of subjectivity, pedagogy can be articulated to other discourses and institutions taking into account the criteria of verification. Religious education as practical metaphysics is not obliged to derive its foundational principles from any specific science, as it's founded on existence (fitrah) itself. Instead, it demands the reconsideration of the sciences in the view of potential forms of subjectivity and promotes the establishment of new scientific disciplines. The basic framework and concepts used in this study have been taken from Platonic philosophy and Foucault's analyses. Because the contemporary educational paradigm is part of a tradition that extends from Aristotle to modern science. Besides, traditional religious thought represented by the sciences of the explication (bayān) has established strong links with Aristotelian thought via kalām. Plato's philosophy, on the other hand, presents a third theoretical (nazari) alternative to Aristotelian philosophy and the discipline of kalām. Plato's allegory of the cave, which coincides with the verses that the worldly life is play and amusement finds its theoretical grounding in Foucault's analyses on subjectivation, encompassing processes of socialization and historicization. The analysis of subjectivity enables us to perceive the human being in a holistic manner, which is reduced in the Aristotelian thought system and fragmented in the discipline of kalām, as it reveals the human existence in its most general characteristics. Religiosity in terms of identity (huwiya) is the primary characteristic of subjectivity. Religiosity in the sense of identity is the primordial attribute and the most general characteristics of subjectivity - in addition to this meaning, religiosity also signifies religious attachment. The analysis of subjectivity allows us to see the human being in a holistic manner, revealing human existence in its most general characteristics, unlike in the Aristotelian thought where it is reduced, or in the discipline of kalām where it is fragmented. The study consists of three parts in which the subject, aims and methods of religious education as a practical metaphysics have been expounded. The subject of religious education as a practical metaphysics is the most general form of human existence in the world, which is subjectivity. Its purpose is to demonstrate the process of subjectification integrated with pedagogy by scrutinizing the conditions for the formation of subjectivity. Thus, pedagogy can be conducted in harmony with the general principles of subjectification. Practical metaphysics employs the dialectical method in terms of human relation to truth, archaeology and genealogy for the analysis of subjectivity and forms of subjectivation, and any proper method for its pedagogical dimension.

Keywords

Religious Education, Religious Pedagogy, Practical Metaphysics, Subject, Purpose, Method.

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Pratik Bir Metafizik Olarak Din Eğitiminin Konusu, Amacı ve Yöntemi Üzerine

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Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, mevcut din eğitimi biliminin hedeflerini dışlamadan onun pratik bir metafizik olarak tasarlanabilmesinin olanağını tartışmaktır. Mevcut din eğitimi bilimi, onu ortaya çıkaran koşullar ve karakteristik özellikleri itibarıyla bir din pedagojisidir. Buna göre din eğitiminin dini bilgiyi pedagojinin sınırlılıkları içerisinde dönüştürmesinin ardından din eğitimi faaliyetleri gerçekleştirilmektedir. Pedagoji ise, modernitenin içerisinde inşa edildiği doğal duruma bağlı olarak kurulan fizik, biyoloji gibi doğa bilimleri, psikoloji başta olmak üzere insan bilimleri ve eğitim bilimlerinde anlamını bulan varlık, insan ve davranış paradigmasına bağlıdır. Dine dair pedagojik yaklaşım, pedagojinin söylemsel özellikleri sebebiyle zorunlulukla antropolojiktir. Belirli bir dini ve onun geleneğini dikkate almakla birlikte, ilkelerini doğa bilimlerinden eğitim bilimlerine kadar uzanan bir dizi bilimden alır. Dolayısıyla din eğitimi faaliyetleri, olanakları belirlenmiş bir insan tasavvuruna tabi olmaktadır. Buna karşın yeni kurulan din pedagojisi olarak din eğitimi disiplini doğal olarak tam anlamıyla gelişmiş bir teorik çerçeveye sahip olmadığından, ilkeleri, amaçları, yöntemleri ve din eğitimi faaliyetlerinin sonuçları açısından eleştirel bir analize tabi tutulmamıştır. Halbuki eğitim, insanın insan olma sürecidir ve çeşitli anlam farklılıklarını göz önünde bulundurmak kaydıyla, toplumsal bir gerçeklik haline gelmek, tarihselleşmek ve öznelenmek demektir. Din pedagojisinin yerine önerilen pratik bir metafizik olarak din eğitimi eleştirel bakış açısını korurken; öznel ve özneliğin tarihselleşmesini konu edindiği için pedagoji de diğer söylem ve kurumlara doğrulama kriterlerini göz önünde bulundurarak eklenilebilecektir. Pratik bir metafizik olarak din eğitimi, varoluşu (fitrat) zemin aldığı için hiçbir bilimden kurucu ilke almak zorunda olmadığı gibi olası öznel biçimlerine bağlı olarak bilimlerin yenilenmesini talep ve yeni bilimlerin kurulmasını teşvik etmektedir. Çalışmada benimsenen genel çerçeve ve kavramlar, Platon felsefesi ve Foucault'nun analizlerinden alınmıştır. Çünkü mevcut eğitim paradigması, Aristoteles'ten modern bilime uzanan hattın bir parçasıdır. Bunun yanı sıra beyan ilimlerinin temsil ettiği geleneksel dini düşünce ise, kelam disiplini üzerinden Aristotelyen düşünce biçimiyle güçlü bağlantılar kurmuştur. Platon'un felsefesi ise, Aristotelyen felsefe ve kelam disiplininin yanında üçünü bir nazariyat olağı tanımaktadır. Foucault'nun insanın toplumsallaşma ve dolayısıyla tarihselleşmesi anlamına gelen öznelenme üzerine analizleri, Platon'un, dünya hayatının oyun ve eğlence olduğu yönündeki ayetle örtüşen mağara alegorisini kuramsallaştırmaktadır. Kimlik anlamında dindarlık ise özneliğin ilksel niteliği yani en genel anlamıdır - bu anlama ek olarak, dindarlık aynı zamanda dini bağlılığı da ifade eder. Öznel analiz, insanın dünyada bulunuşunu, en genel özellikleri itibarıyla ortaya çıkardığı için Aristotelyen düşünce sisteminde indirgenen ve kelam disiplininde parçalanmış insanı bütünlüklü bir şekilde görebilmeyi sağlamaktadır. Çalışma, pratik bir metafizik olarak din eğitiminin konu, amaç ve yöntemlerinin açıklandığı üç bölüme ayrılmıştır. Bu buna göre Pratik bir metafizik olarak din eğitiminin konusu, insanın dünyada bulunuşunun en genel biçimi olan özneliktir. Kimlik anlamındaki dindarlık ise, özneliğin ilk özelliğidir. Zira dindarlık, dinsel bağlılık anlamına gelen ikinci bir anlama da sahiptir. Amacı, özneliğin oluşum koşullarını araştırarak pedagoji ile bütünlük bir öznelenme sürecini serimlemektir. Böylece pedagoji, öznelenmenin genel ilkeleriyle uyumlu bir şekilde yürütülebilir. Pratik metafizik, insanın hakikatle ilişkisi açısından diyalektik yöntemi, öznel ve öznelenme biçimlerinin analizi için arkeoloji ve soybilimi, pedagojik boyutu içinse meşru herhangi bir yöntemi kullanabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Din Eğitimi, Din Pedagojisi, Pratik Metafizik, Konu, Amaç, Yöntem.

Atıf

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Abstracting and Indexes



Introduction

Jung succinctly delineates the gap between discourses and truth by saying that knowledge of truth does not originate from books.¹ Nonetheless, contemporary individuals find themselves fragmented between discourses and the institutions shaping society and have become a reflection between them. On the ontological level, modern humans have largely forsaken the preoccupation with origin and, consequently, identity, becoming trapped in vertigo as they no longer discern which fragment of the image is the principle.

Ancient societies seem to have been luckier than us, the moderns in terms of experiencing the truth. They lived in an era of prophets, the duration of which we cannot ascertain. In this period which Comte calls the theological age,² those who witnessed miracles and the bonds with God that the prophets established in a way its nature we cannot know perhaps wanted to warn humanity against the claim of certainty of discourses by transforming such experiences into cultural elements such as magic or fairy tales. In this study, we prefer to reclassify human history as the age of the prophets, the theological-metaphysical age and the secular-metaphysical age, in contrast to Comte's explanation of human history as the theological stage, the metaphysical stage, and the positive stage from the Western perspective.³ With the advent of the last prophet, Prophet Muhammad, the age of prophets came to a close, marking the beginning of the theological-metaphysical age. The theological-metaphysical age was replaced by the secular-metaphysical age with the modernity that the West has built in the universe of the natural state. In this perspective, it is emphasized that the modern-secular worldview has its metaphysics and therefore its theology.

Religious education, which generalized and acquired a systematic structure during the theological-metaphysical era,⁴ significantly lost its discursive features through Ottoman modernization and transformed into a field of activity.⁵ The re-discursivization/scientification of religious education activities was realized with establishing the science of religious education in the 1980s in Türkiye. The science of religious education has been structured as a religious pedagogy, as it is in the modern world⁶ in line with the characteristics of the secular-metaphysical age. For example, Pazarlı clearly stated that the science of religious education must be founded on the principles of psychology.⁷ This article aims to discuss the purpose, subject and methods of a science of religious education that can be conceived as a practical metaphysics. And main problem is to answer the question of whether the relationship between revelation and the subject as a historical reality can be included within the scope of the science of religious education. The article is based on document analysis. The basic concepts in the works of Plato and Foucault were brought together to express the structural features of the religious subject. Religious education as a practical metaphysics progresses through a series of principles that are more closely aligned with the ideas of Plato and Foucault: i) Achieving the highest possible alignment with the literal meaning of the Qur'an, ii) ascribing a sociality appropriate to the nature of the worldly life, which the Holy Qur'an describes as play and amusement, iii) avoiding attributing meanings to the concept of truth that do not align with the literal meaning of the Qur'an, and iv) maintaining the foundational role of Prophet Muhammad in his relationship with humanity and truth throughout the system. Plato's philosophy, which provides the possibility of a third metaphysics outside of theology and Islamic philosophy, and Foucault's works, which examine subjectivity,⁸

¹ Carl Gustav Jung, *The Red Book: Liber Novus: A Reader's Edition*, çev. Mark Kyburz vd. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009), 133.

² Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy*, trans. Harriet Martineau (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), I/28.

³ Süleyman Gümüş, "Teist Tanrı", *Bir Dünya Tanrı*, ed. Mustafa Tekin (Rağbet Yayınları, 2022), 370.

⁴ Since the prophet was not discourse masters, the revelation he communicated and his sunnah, which represent the correct life, were interpreted and systematized within discourses in the theological-metaphysical age. After the Prophet Muhammad, scholars developed religious sciences based on the principles of revelation and Sunnah, and material and nonmaterial institutions gave society its characteristic features through that acquis. So in the theological-metaphysical era that followed the times of the prophets, revelation was transformed into a worldview through disciplines and institutions.

⁵ Beyza Bilgin, *Eğitim Bilimi ve Din Eğitimi* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1988), 4.

⁶ Frank E. Robertson, "The Fahs/MacLean Era 1930-1965", *Claiming the Past, Shaping the Future: Four Eras in Liberal Religious Education, 1790-1999*, ed. Roberta M. Nelson (Providence: Liberal Religious Educators Association, 2006), 21-22; John S. Brubacher, *A History of the Problems of Education* (New York and London: McRraw-Hill Book Company, 1947), 329-256. Helen A. Archibald, "History of Religious Education 1850-1950: A Documentary Trail", *Religious Education* 82/3 (2006), 405-414; David Käbisich, "The Professionalization of Protestant Clergy as Teachers of Religion in the Nineteenth-Century – The Example of Jena", *Religious Knowledge and Positioning: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Educational Media*, ed. David Käbisich et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2023), 69-82; Stephan A. Schmidt, *A history of the Religious Education Association* (Alabama: Religion Education Press, 1983), 11-55.

⁷ Osman Pazarlı, *Din Eğitimi ve Öğretiminde Genel Metodlar* (İstanbul: İrfan Yayınevi, 1967), 13.

⁸ The term "subjectivity" is often translated into Turkish "öznelik." But according to Foucault, there are historical a priori of being a subject, meaning principles that are antecedent to the individual. For this reason, it is more accurate to use the term "öznelik" instead of "öznelik", which is closely related to

have been chosen as the main sources. The content of subjectivity, however, is of course, the knowledge produced in revelation, sunnah and religious tradition. The works of the aforementioned scholars provide the theoretical framework.

Religious education as a practical metaphysics, or for short practical metaphysics, does not limit itself to the pedagogical conditions of a process of cultural reproduction; it's critical of the discursive and non-discursive formations of the secular-metaphysical age, but at the same time distances itself from the notion of certain knowledge of the theological-metaphysical age. Practical metaphysics is a discourse that analyzes subjectification through its historical a priori, examining processes of subjectification occurring within both discursive and non-discursive formations. Here, the expression practical metaphysics refers to restoring as much as possible the unity of the subject, which emerges in the synthesis of knowledge and power but, for the same reason, becomes fragmented between them. The differences and general characteristics of religious education as a practical metaphysics from religious education as religious pedagogy have been discussed in another article titled "*A Critique of Religious Pedagogy and the Possibility of Religious Education as a Practical Metaphysics*". An evaluation of the studies on the problem has also been included in the same article. The concept of religious pedagogy is being used to refer to the current science of religious education. This term is not our own and is appropriate both in terms of institutional history⁹ and in the sense that the current science of religious education develops strategies, methods, and techniques that enable subjects to be adapted to the situation of students. This article focuses on the subject, purpose, and methods of practical metaphysics. Religious education as a practical metaphysics claims a holistic understanding of the relation of subjectivation to truth and history, the impact of discourses and institutions on the subject, the relation of one general mode of subjectivity (the image of the historical human) to other general modes of subjectivity, and possible general modes of subjectivity. Practical metaphysics, by virtue of being a metaphysics, is a discourse. On the one hand, being practical pushes the traditional distinction between knowledge and action as far as possible. In traditional thought, since the most abstract and superior quality defining the human being is determined as thinking, certain knowledge separates itself from the bodily aspect and actions of the human. At the same time, the notion of certain knowledge claims authority over the realities that manifest in history, transcending history itself. The beliefs and analyses of Muslim thinkers in the context of revelation and prophecy are good examples of this. Additionally, although the discipline of kalām is distant from the notion of certain knowledge that transcends history, it has not been able to establish the relationship between belief, morality, and politics necessary for a proper daily life due to the gap between knowledge and action. Practical metaphysics can transcend the distinction between knowledge and action through the analysis of the reality where knowledge and action are interconnected. This reality is the subject. The subject is a synthesis of knowledge and action, or more specifically of knowledge and power relations. It is a historical reality, but its historicity does not mean that it is entirely a worldly reality. History is an expression of the incompleteness of humanity. In other words, it is the concretization of articulated or overlapping subjectivities in singular and social lives. The subject possesses various general and specific characteristics; its most general characteristic is its connection to the Good. The fact that no society throughout history has been able to remain distant from religion stems from this essential characteristic of subjectivity. The most general characteristic of subjectivity being its connection to the Good also explains why religious education needs to be re-established as a practical metaphysics. If an entire singular life and history can be brought together in a single subjectivity, and if this subjectivization is, in the broadest sense of education, the process of self-construction of the human being, then there must be a discourse for the analysis of the subjectivity that allows for the subjectivation of all individuals in a given historical period.

1. The Subject of Religious Education as a Practical Metaphysics

The subject of religious education as a practical metaphysics is the conditions for the formation of the religious subject in a given period and the cultural reproduction of this subjectivity. Practical metaphysics, in contrast to classical metaphysics, does not accept the human being as the realization of a permanent and definite essence and regards the human being as a contingent being. Accordingly, humans are born with innate nature (*fiṭrah*), but inherent characteristics do not develop in a certain direction. *Fiṭrah* is highly significant for practical metaphysics because, being the truth of existence, it transcends human history to prehistory. So, it is not understood as a potentiality, as in the systems of Muslim philosophers, nor is it a background of transparent existence, as in the theological discourse.¹⁰ Imam Māturīdī expresses the transparent existence of man simply: "The

the meaning of "pertaining only to the individual."

⁹ Fatih İpek, "Dârülfunûn'dan Günümüze Yüksek Din Öğretimi Müfredatındaki Derslerin Değişimi", *Sosyopolitik Değişim ve Yüksek Din Öğretimi Müfredatları*, ed. Fatih İpek (İstanbul: Kitap Dünyası Yayınları, 2023), 78.

¹⁰ Majid Fakhry, *Al-Fārābī, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002), 81, 88; David C. Reisman, "Al-Fārābī and Philosophical Curriculum", *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson - Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 61; Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of The Healing*, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 130 ff.

human being is that which we observe.”¹¹

According to practical metaphysics, the human comes into the world having established a bond with the truth but forgetting it. Life in the world is ontically unsuitable for the renewal of the previous connection with truth or for the establishment of a pure connection. A life by reality can at most confirm the previously established connection and thus justify it. This is related to an ontological difference between humans and other living beings. While other living beings complete their existence at the moment of birth, for humans, this process cannot be fulfilled entirely in the world. As existentialists emphasize, anxiety in the human psyche is an effect of incompleteness.¹² Whereas other creatures, no matter how long they live, cannot give new meaning to their existence, for humans the future is a pure possibility. However, unlike Muslim philosophers, this possibility never becomes entirely actualized. This incompleteness in human existence is not anthropological. In the modern period, psycho-theologians like Lacan tried to ground this in an anthropological principle by the modern paradigm. The Lacanian term *object a* focuses on the incompleteness of the human being, but by explaining it in terms of the baby's separation from his mother, it embeds the human search for meaning in this world.¹³ This ontic difference between humans and other living beings is that, in addition to *zoe*, the common form of life in all living beings, human beings are *bios*, they have a spiritual life.¹⁴ *Zoe* derives from the conditions of the material world and turns back into the matter; *bios*, on the other hand, begins in prehistory, converges to material conditions through *zoe* depending on the embodied existence of human beings, but death leaves *zoe* behind and *bios*¹⁵ continues its existence on a different mode of becoming.

Subjectivity is thus uniquely human; being a subject is rooted in an existential incompleteness and is a contingent response to this deficiency. However, as Foucault's analysis shows, there is no single form of subjectivity valid for humanity.¹⁶ Humanity's search for meaning stimulates the construction of meaning and creates a field of social reality. Subjectivity is the principle of this field of social reality and a given subject form is the result. In other words, human will and the exertion of power is manifested as a certain sociality through a form of subjectivity. The form of subjectivity has three sub-dimensions: Life/vitality, language and labor.¹⁷ It's the structural difference of vitality, language, and labor that distinguishes one form of subjectivity from another, that determines, for example, the different manner in which modern man is in the world from traditional man. Vitality establishes a connection between lifespan/vitality (*zoe*) and life (*bios*) and contextualizes both, thereby historicizing them. The discursive explanation of the question 'Who am I as a living being?' corresponds to the subjective dimension related to vitality. Classical Islamic history books construct a historical perspective starting from Prophet Adam, the prehistoric context of Adam's creation, and the overflowing and expansion of the perspective in history books by the theological discourse with individual deaths and the apocalypse to go beyond history and *zoe*, build the traditional conceptualization of vitality. On the contrary, biology, which explains vitality in principle as the common quality of all living things, is the modern human's answer to this question. In addition, posthumanism, which proposes a new mode of subjectivity, does not recognize any distinction between *zoe* and *bios* and aims to completely erase the pre- and post-vitality already reduced to mythology by biology.¹⁸

Language, i.e. speech, is the coding of the world and the organization of codes in the process of signification. Existents can speak through human speech and therefore the ability of humans and others to speak depends on how language is organized within subjectivity. The newborn acquires personality through this linguistic extension¹⁹; more precisely, it establishes its personality

¹¹ Mātūrīdī, *Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Dar Al-Kotop Al-Ilmiyah, 2005), IX/607.

¹² Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions Publishing, 1964); Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus, and Other Essays*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).

¹³ Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 67-78.

¹⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1-2.

¹⁵ *Zoe* is the earthly, material, corporeal vitality of all living things. *Bios*, on the other hand, is the vitality that is unique to human beings and is not interrupted by death.

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 126-160; Michel Foucault, "Body/Power", trans. Colin Gordon et al., *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 55-62; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 135 ff.; Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power", trans. Robert Hurley, *Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984*, ed. James D. Faubion (London: Penguin Modern Classics, 2020); Thomas Lemke, *Foucault's Analysis of Modern Governmentality: A Critique of Political Reason*, trans. Erik Butler (London: Verso, 2019), 171-175.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 272-327; Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", *Critical Inquiry* 8/4 (1982), 777.

¹⁸ Rosi Braiddotti, "The Politics of Life as Bios/Zoe", *Bits of Life: Feminism at the Intersections of Media, Bioscience, and Technology*, ed. Anneke Smelik - Nina Lykke (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2008), 177 ff.; Rosi Braiddotti, *The Posthuman* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 60; Rosi Braiddotti, *Posthuman Knowledge* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 179-182.

¹⁹ Nermi Uygur, *Dilin Gücü* (İstanbul: Kabcacı Yayınevi, 1994), 148.

upon its subjectivity. In particular, the reduction of language to a means of communication by discourses such as semiology and logical positivism threatens the stability between *bios* and *zoe*. Heidegger's statement, "Language is the house of being,"²⁰ and Wittgenstein's assertion, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."²¹ in accordance with the Aristotelian paradigm, sever the subjective connection extending beyond the existents and historical boundaries. However, Mead's discussion, conducted within the context of leading figures in the field of education sciences such as Wundt, Watson, and Dewey, regarding language, vitality, and sociability, without neglecting Aristotelian concepts²², qualifies to provide a perspective. Practical metaphysics prioritizes the preservation of the metaphysical status of language in line with the literal meaning of the Qur'an and Plato's theory of the idea. Another crucial aspect, at least as important as this, to update the linguistic sciences developed by the Islamic society after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, such as *naḥw* (syntax) and *şarf* (morphology), and to conduct linguistic studies that will enable a new form of subjectivity. Classical sciences such as *şarf* and *naḥw* are the result of the traditional subject's way of speaking, and without establishing a new communicative order with the Qur'an, traditional texts cannot be fully understood, nor can a new form of subjectivity be historicized.

Labor is the organization of human productivity. As an artifact/*ergon*, singular life, and socialities gain meaning through the organization of labor. Labor, and the value that labor transforms into, spans the entire sphere of productivity, from simple bodily movements, i.e. the exertion of power, to hobbies, art, and the economy. Labor, along with two other sub-forms of subjectivity, is the basic element of moralization. The existential properties of labor and value were, as is well known, well understood by Marx. The alienation of human beings caused by the modern working subjectivity, which is seen in its most concrete form in the capitalist mode of production, undermines the religious pedagogy, but since there is no discourse that deals with subjectivity in a holistic way, the problem is tried to be solved with values education or reactive attitudes such as patience and gratitude. Yet there needs to be a critical examination of the construction of the working subjectivity and the institutions that regulate it, and pedagogy must follow the structural changes.

However, practical metaphysics examines the order of abnormalities by going beyond the analysis of a regime of normality. This is because every regime of normality, while aiming at the productivity of human nature,²³ necessarily constructs a set of abnormalities.²⁴ The regime of anomalies is shared between morality and law, and the administration articulates the domain of anomalies in a way that prioritizes law. Subjectivity is in principle established in the name of a regime of normality, but in reality, it constantly circulates between normality and abnormality. Pedagogy also normalizes in principle, but in reality the regime of abnormalities erodes pedagogy. However, this is not the point, because even common sense can recognize this. The problem is that the regime of normality is considered static and not noticed as embedded in a particular historical sociality. So for pedagogy, consensus is enough and it's blind to the moving relationship between normality and abnormality. Religious education as a practical metaphysics, while analyzing the subject, examines, evaluates, and even theorizes about the regime of normality and abnormality to which the subject is subordinated/subjected. In determining the place of a pedagogical practice in the regime of normality, it reveals its counterparts in legal and administrative mechanisms.

When practical metaphysics can determine the conditions of historicization of the dimensions of subjectivity, it concretizes the subject as the nodal point of all discursive and non-discursive formations. Since subjectivation means the transformation of a newborn, which has no social determination, into a social reality through education, and since the general characteristic of subjectivity is to establish a connection with the Good, all subcomponents of subjectivity must also connect with the Good. Life cannot be established without contact with the Good, and this contact occurs as it is subject to educational processes. If there is no clear connection with the Good, life is divided into sacred and profane. If education and subjectivation are not understood as overlapping concepts, it becomes impossible to know how pedagogical activities socialize human beings according to a particular subjectivity. This is the genealogizing of the subject, the determination of the *genos* in Platonic terms. After this follows the analysis of modalities of subjectivity in different socialities. The subject in traditional societies can be called "the person" until something better is offered. The modality of religiosity of the "person" is traditional religiosity with three sub-dimensions. Since anthropological-rationality is not constitutive in traditional societies depending on the dimensions of subjectivity, religions have provided a generally valid constitutional framework for governing persons and society. For this

²⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 254.

²¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, çev. David F. Pears - Brian F. McGuinness (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), md. 5.6.

²² Georg H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972).

²³ Michel Foucault, "The Meshes of Power", trans. Gerald Moore, *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, ed. Jeremy W. Crampton - Stuart Elden (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 159; Foucault, "Truth and Power", 119; Georges Canguilhem, *On The Normal and The Pathological*, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978), 145-158.

²⁴ Michel Foucault, *Abnormal*, trans. Graham Burchell (London and New York: Verso, 2003), 43-44.

reason, religions have paved the way for an objectivity similar to the image of the “citizen” of today with their mode of religiosity. Through the understanding of faith, a very clear objective religiosity was able to emerge in Islamic society, whereas in the West an objective-subjective subject was designed. While objective religiosity in Islamic society was defined by kalām as a religious discourse, later Muslim thinkers proposed a philosophical modality of objective religiosity, and the competition between kalāmī objective religiosity and philosophical objective religiosity continued for a long time. While al-Fārābī’s *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* can be seen as the demand for philosophical objective religiosity, al-Ghāzzālī’s *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* can be characterized as a decisive point of conflict. Subjective religiosity is a personalized way of understanding and living, especially in a moral formation, provided that it is consistent with the discourses of objective religiosity. While objective and subjective religiosities are constructed by rational discourses, folkloric/vulgar religiosity emerges according to the people’s understandings and lifestyles that arbitrarily conform to the general principles of rationality. While objective and subjective modes follow a clear line of formation and transformation under the authority of discourses, folkloric religiosity has correlates that can transcend even the ages. Eliade’s work offers a remarkable catalog of these. In modern societies, there are no objective and subjective distinctions in religiosity as in traditional societies, and folkloric religiosity is in the process of disappearing as the communicative fields of action in the space of modern governmentality transform folks into public -public is the space of publicity in modern paradigm. The general modality of religiosity is religious literacy. Religious literacy is not a mode of objective or subjective religiosity. More precisely, since there are no objectifying discourses, subjectivity is out of the question. But it is necessarily individual. The religious literate is a sub-dimension of the modern modality of subjectivity, *the individual*, and is linked to citizenship in terms of publicness. The religious literate is bound to the regime of normality and abnormality through citizenship. The experience of the regime of normality and abnormality through citizenship, the most general form of individuality, suggests that the moral principles of the subject of the traditional world are not meaningful enough for modern life, and at the same time raises the ironic problem of values education.

To become a subject is to become an agent, that is, to become humanized as a spiritual being, in Hegelian terms, after the universal act of forgetting to which one is subjected twice, before birth and during infancy. The analysis of the subject is the way to a higher level of understanding of the word education, which is narrowed down to the word teaching. In the process of its institutionalization, modern religious education has become a lesson among other lessons²⁵, has lost its ability to understand human beings holistically, and has become able to indirectly affect a very limited part of life. In the current science of religious education, that is, in religious education as religious pedagogy, the “behavior” in the expression “acquiring religious behavior”²⁶ comes from pedagogy, while pedagogy has taken behavior from psychology and psychology from biology.²⁷ The concept of behavior in biology is a derivative of the concept of motion in physics. Therefore, the behavior in religious pedagogy²⁸ is a concept that has been and is being processed by many discourses. Behavior conceptualizes in the place where the distinction between *bios* and *zoe* is blurred, and it is defined as “Behavior is a generic term describing any activity in which an organism engages.”²⁹ Since it overlooks the structural nature of subjectivity, the place of the acquired behaviors in the whole remains unclear, and religious pedagogy is in a passive and consumer position in the conceptualization process shaped from physics to pedagogy. In addition, “behavioral change in the desired direction” evokes more the meaning of guidance by experts of discourses; teaching functions as the intermediate term between learning and behavioral change. In fact, teaching covers the whole space between learning and behavior. The analysis of the subject brings an open universe model to the agenda by moving away from the (*huwiya*) identity-centered perspective of classical metaphysics, the over-objective modalities of religiosity of classical religious discourses, the boundaries of social reality drawn by disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and ethnology, and the reduction of subjectivation to psychological processes. Classical metaphysics, much like in Şūfism, designates pedagogy as exclusive to a few persons who have the potential for perfection. Meanwhile, the over-objectivity of classical religious discourses restricts the connection between faith and action, detrimentally affecting morality. While the discourses that set sociality as the boundary try to find realities such as language and morality in an evolutionary sequence, the parenthesis opened by these discourses is closed by psychology at the opposite pole; the evolutionary perspective is carried backwards towards other living beings; the transcendental origin of realities such as language and morality is interrupted by an interesting

²⁵ Arlo Ayres Brown, *A History of Religious Education in Recent Times* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1923), 195-225; Muhammet Şevki Aydın, *Din Eğitimi Bilimi* (Kayseri: Kimlik Yayınları, 2021), 190; Nurullah Altaş, *Din Eğitimi* (Ankara: Nobel Akademi Yayınları, 2022), 13.

²⁶ Cemal Tosun, *Din Eğitimi Bilimine Giriş* (Ankara: Pegem Akademi Yayınları, 2012), 34.

²⁷ James A. Dinsmoor, “The Etymology of Basic Concepts in the Experimental Analysis of Behavior”, *Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior* 82/3 (2004), 311; Donald H. Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949), 1.

²⁸ James Michael Lee, *The Shape of Religious Instruction: A Social Science Approach* (Indiana: Religious Education Press, 1971), 12, 212.

²⁹ James Michael Lee, “Key Issues in the Development of a Workable Foundation for Religious Instruction”, *Foundations of Religious Education*, ed. Padraic O’Hare (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 40.

notion of individuality and they are released into the sky of sociology. The balance point between sociology and psychology is childhood. Childhood, like a kind of stock exchange, revalues the truths of the old world with the criteria of the new world.

2. The Purpose of Religious Education as a Practical Metaphysics

The main purpose of religious education as a practical metaphysics is to elucidate the conditions of historicizing subjectivity and to make life a consciously enacted endeavor through the freedom-responsibility relationship it preserves to the fullest extent. But its way of explanation resembles neither the identity-centered precision of the discourses of traditional society nor modern science, which holds the monopoly of explaining reality. Both have developed their unique model of a closed universe. Since, according to practical metaphysics, the subject is a contingent reality, its conformity to truth can be confirmed not by an illusion of precision, but by goodwill towards the uncertainty of the future time. The difference is this: The idea of a certain truth always keeps its critical gaze on the abnormal, and the presence of the negative pole effortlessly concludes the truthfulness of the normal. For example, the criticism in the Qur'ān is centered on non-believers, and those who believe do not direct this criticism at themselves. However, morality can be asserted as long as the criticism is directed at persons and societies themselves. Another consequence of this attitude is that, as in kalām discourse, the capacity of the discourse is determined by the opponents as a result of the effort to refute the opponents' discourse. The situation in the philosophical religiosity of Muslim philosophers is more terrifying. Those who refuse to be shaped according to the principle of identity -as a term of logic- are expelled from society, as in *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*³⁰, or society is completely abnormalized, as in Ibn Bājja's *Tadbīr al-Mutawaḥḥid*.³¹

Another aim of practical metaphysics is to reveal ideologies in discourses. As the subject is a synthesis of discourses and non-discursive formations, the relationship between knowledge and power is in constant flux within subjectivity. For subjectivity to be formed, knowledge needs power and power necessarily needs knowledge.³² However, the relationship does not cease here; knowledge imitates power and power imitates knowledge. The reason for this is the human desire to know.³³ The fact that human beings can know because of their desire to know reminds us that knowledge is sealed by the will and that words, besides conforming to the criteria of semantics and verification as they turn into propositions, revolve around the orbit of the will. Therefore, according to practical metaphysics, humane knowledge and truth cannot be identical. This does not mean that there is no truth in humane knowledge, nor does it mean that truth is relative. According to practical metaphysics, truth is a necessity and consequence of the existence of God, and it's the truth that renders human knowledge possible and meaningful. Once Muslim philosophers argued that God is an intellect³⁴ and the soul is also an intellect, the philosophers' certain knowledge (*burhān*)³⁵ and truth became one and the same thing. Western thought, which can be considered a good follower of Muslim thinkers, has reversed this equation and relativized truth. While the major narratives of modernism cover up this problem, postmodernist minor narratives voice or defend the relativity of truth.

The second consequence of exposing ideology in discourses is to perpetuate a critical attitude towards oneself. Practical metaphysics bases moral progress neither on the doctrine of the middle way nor on modern utilitarianism. Practical metaphysics recognizes the reciprocity between body and soul and accepts that moral progress increases the powers of the body and that anything that diminishes the powers of the body is morally problematic.³⁶ Emotions like jealousy not only have negative spiritual consequences; such emotions also diminish the powers of the body.³⁷ Another stage of self-critical attitude concerns the consequences of theoretical perfection. According to practical metaphysics, certain knowledge, or rather truth, cannot be attained through the faculty of thinking. For the contingency of the subject is a postulate for it. The knowing subject knows with an impulse arising from the will to know, but because it does not know, because it is ignorant. It is clear that the faculty of thinking is power, but the faculty of thinking synthesizes knowledge by converting ignorance. In other words, ignorance is a *dunamis*, both in terms of quantification and in the sense of undeterminedness. This presupposition has two consequences: i) humane knowledge cannot be equivalent to truth since it is derived from ignorance, and ii) since ignorance is

³⁰ Al-Fārābī, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's Mabādī' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, trans. Richard Walzer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 283.

³¹ Ibn Bājja, *Tadbīr al-Mutawaḥḥid*, trans. Ma'an Ziyadah (Montreal: McGill University Institute of Islamic Studies, 1968), 59-61.

³² Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures", trans. Colin Gordon et al., *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 93.

³³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Richard Hope (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), par. 980a; Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 110-112; Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense", trans. Daniel Breazeale, *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, ed. Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1990), 79.

³⁴ Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of The Healing*, 285; Al-Fārābī, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's Mabādī' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, 71.

³⁵ Al-Fārābī, *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's Mabādī' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*, 165 ff.

³⁶ Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics: Proved in Geometrical Order*, trans. Michael Silverthorne - Matthew J. Kisner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), Ch. III and IV.

³⁷ Spinoza, *Ethics: Proved in Geometrical Order*, Ch. IV, Pro. LIV.

unlimited, humane knowledge can increase continuously in a non-cumulative manner. The third consequence of exposing ideology in discourses is the development of a new doctrine of belief. Muslim society, after the Prophet Muhammad, constructed a doctrine of belief, that is, a formulation of faith (*īmān*), driven by various crises. At the center of the conflict between theological objective religiosity and philosophical objective religiosity is the irreconcilability of doctrines of belief. Modernity also seems to have been founded on a new formulation of faith, systematized in the *Meditations* of Descartes. But today the distinction between the doctrine of belief and faith is erased and completely ignored. Faith comes from God, it is not anthropological; it cannot be destroyed or reshaped. Belief, on the other hand, is the experience of faith, an anthropological description of it. The relationship between faith and deeds is also theorized by the doctrine of belief. The doctrine of belief in traditional society reflects the characteristics of objective and subjective discourses of religiosity and necessarily has political implications. Today, being a subject is not in accordance with the traditional subjectivity mode. Neither is the objective appearance of religious literacy the effect of objective discourses of religiosity nor are the behaviors of the religious literate in line with the pure modern episteme and power relations. A new sociality is possible through a new formulation of faith. It is the failure to adopt a Western doctrine of faith, which is being a Christian, that prevents Muslims from becoming fully westernized, no matter how eager they have been. Similarly, the reason for Muslims drifting out of history is the formulation of faith of traditional sociality, existing in a modality of subjectivity that is inappropriate to it.

The preservation of the distinction between the doctrine of belief and faith is also important in terms of the establishment of the moral subject because when this distinction is not maintained, an over-objectification tendency in religiosity intensifies persons and social life, leading to its internal collapse. The chaos caused by the Khāricīs and later the Mu‘tazilites³⁸ is directly related to this. A proper gap between faith and belief can increase individual responsibility for the moralization of life. In addition, there will also be a space where subjective religiosity can expand. In Islamic society, subjective religiosity has been institutionalized through the discourse of *taşawwuf*, but the dominance of objective religiosity has prevented the generalization of subjective religiosity, and the pressure on subjective religiosity has aggravated its anomalies. Even today, a nonsense conflict between the representatives of objective religiosity and the representatives of the discourse of subjective religiosity continues, contributing nothing to the future.

Another problem with extreme objective religiosity is the role of the devil in the doctrine of belief. *Kalāmī* objective religiosity has carried the principle of the devil's inability to interfere with faith into belief. Although the Qur'an states that the devil is the greatest enemy of mankind, in *kalāmī* objective religiosity, the devil is completely excluded from the system. In philosophical objective religiosity, the devil is merely a representation, a fictional figure. Modern solution and rationality based on Descartes' "I think, therefore I am"³⁹ that similar to the *kalāmī* objective religiosity of his *Meditations*⁴⁰ allows, at most, to accept the devil as an irrational reality.⁴¹ When the devil is not there, the system closes in on itself and objective discourses of religiosity derive their criteria of truth from discourses like a simulation. Furthermore, the malevolence of the absent devil transforms into the characteristic of anomalies, and the religious subject becomes alienated from himself. Deriving the criteria of truth from discourses is to ignore the source of legitimacy of modalities of religiosity. All forms of subjectivity as the ultimate synthesis of episteme and power relations mimically represent the Prophet Muhammad. Discourses speak on His behalf. Since the modality of the religious subject mimically represents Him, when any person becomes a religious subject, he resembles Him. Because Prophet Muhammad encompasses all possible modes of proper subjectivity and is the best model between all modes of subjectivity and God. The absolute authority of discourses is a violation of the boundary between the Prophet Muhammad and modalities of subjectivity.

The new doctrine of belief would therefore pave the way for a new paradigm of natural science. To repeat, the Cartesian *ego cogito* is a new form of knowing subject as well as a new form of believing subject, and the modern Western natural sciences are the manifestation of this intertwined knowing and believing subjectivity. The modern subject has its code of life, language, and labor, and the scientificity of the natural sciences is confirmed by the knowing subject, and their metaphysical principles by the believing subject. The counterpart of the natural sciences is therefore natural theology, not revelatory theology. The notion of law in the natural and human sciences is connected to the religiosity mode⁴², traversing natural theology through concepts such

³⁸ Hannah-Lena Hagemann, *The Khārijites in Early Islamic Historical Tradition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 41 ff.; Muammer Esen, "Early Debates On 'The Word Of God' (Kalāmullah/Qur'an)", *Journal of Islamic Research* 2/2 (2009), 42; Massimo Campanini, "The Mu'tazila in Islamic History and Thought", *Religion Compass* 6/1 (2012), 45.

³⁹ René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 18-19.

⁴⁰ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15, 24-36.

⁴¹ Süleyman Gümüş, "Modern Bir Fenomen olarak Postmodernizm ve Postmodern Bireyin Eleştirisi", *Diyanet İlmî Dergi* 58 (2022), 1323-1326.

⁴² Süleyman Gümüş, "Din Pedagojisinin Doğuşu", *Modern Dünyada Çocukluk ve Çocuk Eğitimi: Temalar, Tartışmalar, Kuramlar* (Ankara: Nobel Akademi Yayınları, 2022), 84.

as order, intelligence, and design.⁴³ The rationality of materials such as textbooks in religious pedagogy is an effect of the notion of law. The law guarantees the western believing subject's break with medieval subjectivity but renders the Muslim religious subject's traditional doctrine of belief meaningless.

By structuring the subject ontologically in this way, practical metaphysics also decelerates the master-slave dialectic between the learner and the teacher. The fact that every human being has a will creates tension in the encounter of wills. Hegel eloquently expounds on this in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁴⁴ Although he used the results of his analysis of the master dialectic to justify the individual existence of the Western subject modality, this theatrical narration recognition undeniably provides insight into the relationship between human beings. The rule is simple: He who cannot truly respect another's self cannot approach his presence with pure respect. Since no one truly respects anyone except the prophets, the existence of each human being is a risk for the others. This risk is even higher for those who require care and attention, such as children. Societies veil this dialectic with established rules and everyday life that seems to flow in its own natural way; they rationalize it, they make it conform to common sense, they reinforce the forms of this dialectic with legal and moral rules. Modern pedagogy, in line with the managerial logic of modern sociality, conceives the learner and the teacher as a duality within the scope of the activity of 'behavior acquisition' and thus prepares the conditions for the master-slave dialectic to function. Acquiring behavior is an informational process⁴⁵; a conditioning in practice. Despite the increase in teachers, budget, physical conditions, and even more systematic educational materials within the system, the ongoing moral and ethical decline can be attributed to the crisis within pedagogy. There are other contexts and dimensions to the problem; however, from the perspective of subjectivity, the issue lies in the operation of a systematic, and even professional, master-slave dialectic. This is not limited to schools alone. Starting from schools, which are just one of the managerial archipelagos, this pedagogical logic spreads throughout the rest of society, reaching into family life, mosques, and kindergartens, and transforming to the extent that it even reaches prisons. But modern pedagogy and its religious sub-branches recognize problems on the level of signs. However, unless the master-slave dialectic is appropriately decelerated, increasing the variables within the system seems to be the only option. Efforts are made to produce more shaped behavioral patterns, and these modeled patterns generate further deprivation. The more the master-slave dialectic accelerates, the more pedagogy takes on a culturing function. Since discourses such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and ethnology, which are the dynamics of modern pedagogy, have already anthropologized the meaning, the route that the system takes towards uncertainty seems natural to everyone. On the other hand, religious education as a practical metaphysics, can ensure that pedagogy is closer to the truth by analyzing all stages of the subjectivation process, starting from historical a priori to cultural reproduction.

3. The Method of Religious Education as a Practical Metaphysics

Religious education as a practical metaphysics is divided methodologically into three main categories due to its examination of all processes from the historical a priori of subjectivity to the individual subjectivities: The dialectical method in the Platonic sense, archaeology, and genealogy and pedagogical methods. Each category is not isolated from the others.

The most delicate matter for practical metaphysics is the relationship of sociality with truth. The relationship with truth is established through the practice of *theoria* in the discourses of theological objectivity and philosophical objectivity. According to these, the practice of *theoria* provides definitive knowledge. While the *kalāmī* objective religiosity takes the declarative character of the Qur'ān as a reference, philosophical discourses assume that they can acquire certain knowledge by using demonstrative methods thanks to the parallelism between God as the Intellect and the soul as intellect. Although their contexts are different, the knowledge they both attain is the knowledge of the truth. In the dialectical method, the knowledge that is the result of reasoning cannot be regarded as certain knowledge because of its internal consistency. More than that, the knowledge obtained through reasoning needs to be negated (*unhypothesios*).⁴⁶ Otherwise, the knowledge of reasoning turns into a claim to the truth due to its soundness in its internal consistency and, to use Platonic words, the exit of the cave is forgotten. The dialectical method is the "decomposition of genes spectated in terms of *eidos*."⁴⁷ *Eidos* is the substance of a being, it comes from God and is static. The coming into being of the *eidos* follows the order *eidōlon*, *eikon*, *eikónes*⁴⁸, according to the nature of the

⁴³ William Paley, *Natural Theology*, ed. Matthew D. Eddy - David Knight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 11; Charles Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time* (Illionis: Open Court, 1989), 34.

⁴⁴ G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), par. 178-196.

⁴⁵ I mean cognitive conditioning.

⁴⁶ *Unhypothesios* represents the negation of knowledge obtained through reasoning.

⁴⁷ Oğuz Haşlakoğlu, *Platon Düşüncesinde Tekhnê: Sanat ve Felsefenin Ortak Kökeni Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme* (Bursa: Sentez Yayınları, 2016), 103-104.

⁴⁸ *Eidos* is the essence of manifestation. *Eidōlon* means small *eidos*. *Eikon* is the form of manifestation in accordance with essence. *Eikónes*, The materiality of the

existent.⁴⁹ *Eidos* is involved in reality from the *eidōlon* onwards and therefore contains the part-whole relation. The part-whole relation turns *eidos* into *genos* and the analysis of *eidōlon* in terms of *genos* becomes possible. The analysis of the *genos* is contingent because it is subordinated to the historical episteme. Therefore, a negation (*anupothētos*)⁵⁰ between the analysis of the *genos* and the realization of the *eidos* is necessary. The dialectical method transcends the closed universe model, releasing the reflective reactions of discourses as well as perpetuating moral development.

The second layer of methods used by practical metaphysics is archaeology and genealogy. Since practical metaphysics is the analysis of the subject, it investigates the conditions of its historicization, i.e. historical a priori and their realization in the context of knowledge and relations of power. Archaeology deciphers the hypothetical correlation (*episteme*) between reasoning and language use of the historical human image in a given sociality. The interest of archaeology is in the structurality of discourses. The rules according to which discourses begin to historicize and the primordial terms, the statements,⁵¹ that give unity to the many and ever-increasing discourses as if they were a single discourse is the context of this structurality.⁵² Archaeology also uncovers the archive,⁵³ which is the total of the discourses that develop around the words in a given episteme. The archive is what remains of a knowledge production encircled by discontinuities, and when an archive completes itself, the episteme's ability to construct subjectivity ends. Those engaged in pedagogical religious education or traditional religious education remain committed to the archive of the traditional society, albeit in different ways. Both activities create a structural disorder in the religious subject through education. However, first of all, a catalog of the archive has to be made, the statement, the secondary terms, and the discourses that externalize the words have to be analyzed, and then the conditions of their attachment to power relations have to be examined by genealogy. The theorization of faith, or the believer or the *mukallaf* (responsible person) within a discipline, or the construction of a theological system in general, is spread across a very limited discursive space, although it may seem ambiguous because it is dispersed. This regime of discourse shows that knowing subjects positioned in opposition to each other are in a process of knowledge production that is at least as identical as those in agreement. It also draws a one-dimensional epistemic schema of a whole society by mapping the unity of different seemingly disconnected disciplines within discourse specializations. Each modality of subjectivity and form of sociality connects words and things in its unique way. When one sociality is replaced by another, the knowledge produced according to the old episteme solidifies in a static archive. Since a language is the interface of the episteme, the continuity of language use creates the illusion that the archive continues to live in another sociality. But when sociality changes, the order (episteme) that constitutes the archive of that sociality also loses its effectiveness and the archive enters a vegetative state, so to speak. What makes an archive in the past meaningful in the present is the actual episteme.⁵⁴ If the epistemic differences between two different socialities are not taken into account, the hermeneutics made possible by the language interface sets up a line of continuity between the past and the present. Modern episteme discourses such as sociology and anthropology making sense of the past can be given as examples of this hermeneutic activity. This is what ensures the harmony between religious pedagogy and religious sciences. Since the episteme has changed, the archive holding the religious sciences, which cannot speak for themselves, is recoded in accordance with the modern episteme through hermeneutic activity. In this process of translation, religious sciences are placed in sociological and psychological categories, and thanks to ideological superiority, it is argued that these categories have been there from the very beginning. Thus, through the human sciences, religious sciences are historicized. In the absence of episteme analysis, i.e. archaeology, the present is projected onto the past (anachronism and alienation) as al-Jabri does⁵⁵ or the past is transferred to the present (irrationality and fundamentalism).

The historical conditions of knowledge make the discursive horizon of religious education as a practical metaphysics more clear, but knowledge needs power to be actualized. Just as power relations need knowledge to be approximated to truth and thus legitimized.⁵⁶ Genealogy analyzes hypothetical syntheses of knowledge and power.⁵⁷ Living subject, the speaking subject, the working subject as primary sub-forms of general subjectivity and such as sick subject, the criminal subject, the student subject, the doctor subject as the myriad secondary sub-forms of general subject... crystallizes in this hypothetical synthesis. Without

form of manifestation in accordance with its essence.

⁴⁹ Plato, *The Republic*, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), par. 509d-514a.

⁵⁰ Haşlakoğlu, *Platon Düşüncesinde Tekhnê*, 114-115; Oğuz Haşlakoğlu, *Felsefece* (Ankara: Hece Yayınları, 2021), 30-41.

⁵¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 56-57, 106-113.

⁵² Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 4-5, 164-165; Foucault, *The Order of Things*, xxii-xxiv.

⁵³ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 126-131.

⁵⁴ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, xxiii.

⁵⁵ Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, *The Formation of Arab Reason* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011).

⁵⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 46.

⁵⁷ Michel Foucault, "Michel Foucault on Attica: An Interview", *Social Justice* 18/3 (1991), 27-28; Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 16-18.

analyzing forms of subjectivity, one cannot determine which form of subjectivity is culturally reproduced. One cannot identify which patterns of behavior are more probable and which are less probable or impossible for the historical human image in a given sociality; one cannot adequately understand the organization of the body as the first space of individuality (microphysics) of discourses and non-discursive formations, and the organization of the city as the space of the modality of subjectivation. Hermeneutic activities without identifying the discursive representation of the modality of subjectivation in an old sociality assume that the behavioral patterns valid for the historical human image in that sociality are still valid today.

Religious education as a practical metaphysics uses educational methods on the third layer to identify the characteristics of pedagogical settings, identify the needs and develop teaching materials. These methods aim to make knowledge teachable according to the characteristics of individuals in the environment. These are the known methods used by the current science of religious education, which are used to examine specific problems, develop teaching materials, and so on. The problem of religious education as a religious pedagogy is that it uses such methods without employing the first two.

Conclusion

What makes history possible is that human beings are contingent beings. Adding social reality to reality is unique to human beings, and social reality is the historicization of the humanity's potentialities. On the other hand, contingency is a threat to the will to truth. Anxiety, one of the existential characteristics of human beings, is the cost of proximity and distance to the truth, of being at the limit between knowledge and conjecture. This anxiety is the recurring vibration in the subject's chest. By abandoning certain possibilities on the edge of history, at the cost of renouncing them, human beings can become part of social reality and become agents. By analyzing the subjectivity that is the contingent actualization of the human being, religious education will also encompass the general features of the his being in the world. Such an analysis has not been done so far. The limits of pedagogy, by contrast, begin with possibilities and end in the subjectivation of each person. Thus, because religious pedagogy disregards the conditions necessary to achieve its objectives, it is impossible to be certain whether these objectives have truly been met. Furthermore, the sources of the problems cannot be identified. This is the justification for the new purpose and subject of religious education as a practical metaphysics. Subjectivity is a societal decision regarding the fundamental conditions of being in the world -namely, language, vitality, and labor- under a constrained existence. Living religiously, or religiosity, is the faith-mediated relationship that an individual, existing within the current form of subjectivity whose alignment with these general conditions is uncertain, establishes with religion. As a matter of fact, throughout the modern period, people become subjects in a mechanism independent of the principles of religiosity. As long as we understand pedagogy as a formalized learning process, we will confine the problem to a narrow framework and we will not be able to make a structural analysis of subjectivation. This will make it difficult to understand the past more accurately, to recognize the conditions of the present correctly, and to build the future. Religious education as a practical metaphysics claims to minimize these problems and perform a more conscious pedagogy since it deals with subjectivity and subjectivation. In doing so, it will use the dialectical method to understand the ontological and epistemological status between human beings and truth; archaeology and genealogy for the conditions of historicization of subjectivity; and other methods for the pedagogical dimension of discourse.

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