



International Journal of Social Sciences

ISSN:2587-2591

DOI Number:<http://dx.doi.org/10.30830/tobider.sayi.20.34>

Volume 8/4

2024 p. 630-641

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE ON ABROGATION IN THE QUR'AN: PERSPECTIVES OF PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS

KUR'AN'DAKİ NESİH TARTIŞMASININ BİR GENEL BAKIŞI: SAVUNANLARIN VE SAVUNMAYANLARIN BAKIŞ AÇILARI

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ABSTRACT

This research examines the long-standing debate among Muslim scholars regarding the concept of abrogation in the Qur'an. Throughout history, differing opinions have been on whether abrogation is an integral part of Islamic law. While many scholars have upheld the notion of abrogation, some group, including Abu Muslim al-Isfahani (322 AH), challenged its validity. The discussion on this topic gained momentum in later generations, with opponents of abrogation growing in number. Consequently, proponents of abrogation have also produced written works to support and affirm the concept of abrogation. This paper provides a concise overview of both perspectives without bias or presumption. It begins by briefly outlining the arguments of those who support abrogation, highlighting the central claim that certain verses have been practically abrogated. Various estimates suggest that the number of abrogated verses ranges from five to as many as five hundred. Subsequently, the objections raised by those who oppose abrogation are presented. It is worth noting that abrogation proponents also counter objections raised by opposers of abrogation. Such is a statement that provides evidence that the information presented in the subsequent paragraphs is insufficient on its own to illustrate extensively and comprehensively the debate in question. Therefore, the paper's core idea is to depict the general picture of the genesis and essence of the debate between proponents and opponents of abrogation.

Key Words: *Abrogation in the Qur'an, Proponents of Abrogation, Opponents of Abrogation, Abrogated Verses.*

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Bu araştırma, fakihlerin arasında Kuran'daki nesih kavramının üzerine uzun süredir devam eden tartışmayı incelemektedir. Tarih boyunca, neshin İslam hukukunun ayrılmaz bir parçası olup olmadığı konusunda farklı görüşler bulunmuştur. Birçok alim nesih kavramını savunurken, Abū Muslim al-İşfahānī (ö. 322/934) gibi birtakım alimler ise nesih geçerliliğine reddedilmiştir. Bu konudaki tartışma, sonraki nesillerde ivme kazanmış ve nesih savunmayanları sayıca artmıştır. Sonuç olarak, nesih savunucuları da nesih kavramını savunmak ve onaylamak için yazılı eserler üretmiştir. Bu makale, herhangi bir önyargı olmadan her iki perspektifin kısa bir genel bakışını sunmaktadır. Savunanların argümanlarını kısaca özetleyerek başlar ve bazı ayetlerin pratikte nesih edildiği temel iddiasını vurgular. Farklı alimlerine göre, nesih edilen ayetlerin sayısı beş ila beş yüz arasında değişmektedir. Ardından, nesih reddedenlerin dile getirdiği itirazlar sunulur. Nesih savunucularının da nesih savunmayanlarının dile getirdiği itirazlara karşı cevapları olduğu belirtmekte fayda olmaktadır. Bu tür bir ifade, ilgili paragraflarda sunulan bilgilerin tartışmayı kapsamlı ve kapsayıcı bir şekilde açıklamak için tek başına yetersiz olduğunu izah eder. Bu nedenle, makalenin temel fikri, nesih savunucuları ile nesih karşıtları arasındaki tartışmanın genel bakışını tasvir etmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Kuran'da Nesih, Nesih Savunanları, Nesih Savunmayanları, Nesih Edilen Ayetler.*

1.1. Meaning of Naskh (Abrogation)

The term *Naskh* encompasses various interpretations among scholars. This work will focus on its meaning in juristic terminology to maintain conciseness and avoid excessive elaboration. Abu al-Husayn al-Basri defined Naskh as the annulment of a previously fixed ruling by invoking a subsequent statement attributed to Allah or His Messenger in such a way that if the later ruling had not been revealed, the initial ruling would have remained in practice. Another perspective views Naskh as the revocation of a ruling after its establishment or as the abrogation of a ruling (Kiliçaslan, 2022). Some scholars perceive Naskh as a discourse that signifies the elevation of a fixed ruling by a proceeding text wherein the absence of the subsequent ruling would have prevented the removal of the preceding ruling. This opinion is also supported by al-Ghazali (1993) in his work *al-Mustaşfá*. Alternatively, Naskh has been interpreted as a phrase denoting the discourse through which the legislator (Allah) discontinues a previously established ruling. This interpretation aligns with the perspective of al-Amidi in his book *al-Ihkām fī uşūl al-ahkām* (al-Āmidī, 1981). It is worth noting that different other definitions of Naskh have been proposed.

1.1.1. Distinction between Naskh and Takhsees

Āmidī (631 AH) has delineated the differences between Naskh (abrogation) and Takhsees (specification) from ten perspectives, whereas al-Zarkashī (794 AH) has provided an account for such differences from eighteen viewpoints. For the purpose of brevity, this work presents the points outlined by al-Zarkashī as they encompass the observations made by Amidi. Takhsees involve specifying particular time periods, while Naskh refers to abrogating specific laws or rulings. Takhsees encompass both temporal aspects and specific contextual conditions, whereas Naskh solely pertains to temporal considerations. Additionally, Takhsees is limited in its application to certain individuals, whereas Naskh applies universally to all individuals. Naskh is more comprehensive in its scope compared

to Takhsees. It encompasses all types of rulings, regardless of whether they are fixed for a single individual or multiple individuals, whereas Takhsees does not address the initial ruling itself.

Furthermore, Naskh involves substituting or annulment of a ruling, while Takhsees entails a reduction or specification of a ruling. Takhsees maintain the general semantic implications of the text for all that falls under it, whether in a literal or figurative sense. In contrast, Naskh nullifies the literal meaning of the abrogated text entirely. Naskh allows for the postponement of the ruling beyond the time of the abrogated law, whereas Takhsees does not permit such postponement beyond the specified time period.

Naskh permits the abrogation of one set of laws by another, while Takhsees does not allow such. Naskh completely invalidates the ruling after its establishment, contrasting with Takhsees where the intended meaning of the general text persists until a specific specification is made. In terms of evidence, Naskh relies on explicit statements and directives, while Takhsees can be established based on rational evidence, contextual indicators, and other auditory evidence. Takhsees can be recognized through consensus, while Naskh cannot be established through consensus. Takhsees can be applied to reports and rulings beyond religious matters, while Naskh is specific to religious rulings. Takhsees have an immediate effect, whereas Naskh allows for gradual implementation. It is also worth mentioning that Takhsees signifies that the intended meaning of the general text excludes certain cases, while Naskh affirms that everything encompassed by the text was intended at its revelation. These are the differentiating aspects between Naskh and Takhsees, as elucidated by the scholar al-Zarkashī.

1.2. The Arguments Supporting the Occurrence of Abrogation in the Quran

The advocates of abrogation in the Quran put forth a range of supporting evidence, including specific verses such as "Whatever verses We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, We bring a better one or similar to it" (Quran 2:106), "And when We substitute a verse in place of another verse" (Quran 16:101), and "So, because of the transgression of those who became Jews, We prohibited for them good things which were made lawful for them earlier and for their preventing (people), very often, from the way of Allah," (Quran 4:160). Additionally, they contend that abrogation can be observed within Islamic law (Ibn al-Tilimsāni, 1999). For instance, the requirement of observing 'Iddah (the waiting period) for a widow for one year has been entirely abrogated by the waiting period of four months and ten days. Similarly, fasting on the Day of Ashura has been abrogated by fasting during Ramadan. Furthermore, the obligation to face Jerusalem (Al-Aqsa Mosque) during prayer has been abrogated in favor of facing the Kaaba, and the initial requirement for each individual to engage in combat against ten disbelievers in jihad has also been abrogated (al-Qarāfi, 1973). They also reinforce their argument by citing numerous hadiths and narrations.

They also invoked the consensus among the Companions and the broader Muslim community regarding abrogation as evidence for their argument (‘Abd al-Karīm, 2000).

Postulating the exhaustive list of pieces of evidence expressed by both sides is beyond the scope of this research. However, further evidence posited by both sides is further elucidated in the proceeding section.

1.3. Evidence Presented by Opponents of the Existence of Abrogation in the Holy Quran

Scholars who challenge the notion of abrogation in the Quran contend that there is insufficient explicit evidence within the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad to support the concept. They argue that the evidence often cited in favour of abrogation is open to interpretation and needs more definitive clarity. Furthermore, they emphasize that scholars have yet to have a consensus regarding this matter, with differing opinions prevalent. For instance, al-Ssirāj al-'Urmawy, in his book *al-Taḥṣīl min al-Maḥṣūl*, cautions against relying solely on such evidence.

Critics scrutinize verses that are commonly invoked as evidence for abrogation, such as the statement in Surah Al-Baqarah: "We do not abrogate a verse or cause it to be forgotten except that We bring forth [one] better than it or similar to it." They argue that this verse does not provide irrefutable and explicit proof of abrogation. Another frequently cited verse is: "And when We substitute a verse in place of a verse - and Allah is most knowing of what He sends down - they say, 'You, [O Muhammad], are but an inventor [of lies].' But most of them do not know." However, they assert that this verse does not offer clear, direct evidence of abrogation. Supporters of abrogation argue that this verse was a response to the mockery of the disbelievers of Makkah towards the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and their accusation that he invented and altered verses. Yet, this interpretation raises a problem as it implies the existence of legislation in Makkah, which was not the case. Therefore, it is problematic to argue that the people of Mecca mocked the Prophet regarding the abrogation of verses when there was no legislation in Mecca. Some interpreters have suggested that the verse in Surah An-Nahl (16:101) does not pertain to abrogation within the Quran but rather to the abrogation of previous scriptures. They posit that the legislation introduced by Muhammad abrogated certain aspects and rulings of the laws revealed to earlier prophets such as Jesus and Moses. They deem it reasonable to assume that divine laws can abrogate one another, as societal needs vary across generations. As societies progress and develop, technological advancements, cultural shifts, economic trends, and political developments continuously influence their social, political, and economic dynamics. Consequently, these societies' rules and regulations must adapt to reflect people's evolving needs and circumstances.

The proponents of abrogation have raised objections against the claim that the Quran mentions "aya" (verse) but not legislation. They counter such argument by arguing that 'ayah' can refer to either verse from the Quran or indications, signs, or symbols of Allah's creation. They support their argument by citing examples from the Quran where 'ayah' means sign. These signs include various natural phenomena such as the sun, daylight, stars, lightning, thunder, mountains, trees, and the creation of animals and humans. Furthermore, the miracles performed by the prophets can also be referred to as "aya" in the Quran. In response to these objections, the opponents of abrogation argue that the most plausible interpretation of the word 'ayah' from the second verse in Surah al-Nahl is that it refers to the Quranic verses. They claim that the term "Nuzul" (revelation) attributed to 'ayah' in this verse specifically pertains to the Quranic verses. However, the opponents of abrogation counter this argument by stating that 'Nuzul' revelation can also be attributed to 'ayahs' that are not Quranic verses. They support their viewpoint by citing verses from the Quran where 'ayah' is translated as a sign rather than a verse. They emphasize that the ultimate sign 'ayah' given to Muhammad, distinguishing him from

other prophets, is the Noble Quran. Additionally, they refer to a verse in the Quran where the disbelievers reject the substitution of one verse for another, indicating that they were seeking a cosmic miracle and did not believe in any verse of the Quran.

Opponents of the concept of abrogation in the Quran continue to argue that there are no authentic and valid hadiths in the accepted Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) that specifically support abrogation, except for one hadith attributed to Ali (may Allah be pleased with him). This hadith, which states that various acts of worship abrogated their counterparts, has been deemed false due to its unreliable chain of narrators (Şubhī Maḥmūd, 2017). Scholars of hadith criticism unanimously agree that the chain of narration includes al-Mussayyib ibn Shurayk, whose credibility is widely discarded. Muhammad ibn Mubarak Hakimi also declared the weakness of this hadith in his book *al-'Atīq* which is a comprehensive collection of the fatwas (legal opinions) of the Prophet's companions (Ḥakīmī, 2021)

Furthermore, proponents of abrogation use statements from the Companions, such as Ibn Abbas, as evidence. However, some scholars argue against using these statements as evidence, claiming that the Companions sometimes used the term "abrogation" to mean "specification" rather than complete annulment. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1991), in his book *I'lām al-muwaqqi'in*, clarifies that the early Muslim scholars used the term "abrogation" when a seemingly general ruling is made specific through conditions, restrictions, or qualifications. Abū Ishāq al-Shātibī (1997), in his book *al-Muwāfaqāt*, also mentions that the early scholars used the term "abrogation" when a connected or disconnected evidence clarifies a broad and ambiguous statement. Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī (1986), in his book *al-Fawz al-Kabīr fī Uṣūl al-Tafsīr*, states that the early scholars had a broad understanding of abrogation, allowing room for interpretation and resulting in differences regarding the number of abrogated verses, which could range from a few hundred to an unspecified quantity as also postulated by Atan (2008).

It is important to note that those who reject the concept of abrogation have actually established a form of abrogation based on the terminology used by early scholars. The disagreement arises when considering the terminology of later scholars. al-Shinqīfī (2004) and Adila (2023) assert that there is no disagreement among Muslims regarding the rationale and legal permissibility of abrogation and its actual occurrence. Any disagreement attributed to Abū Muslim al-Aṣfahānī is merely related to the concept of abrogation as understood by later scholars. According to Abū Muslim, the apparent meaning of the initial legislation implies its continuity throughout all times, while the second legislation indicates the specification of the first legislation to a particular period. Thus, according to him, abrogation does not invalidate the first legislation's validity but specifies it within a given time frame. Consequently, after abrogation, the first legislation becomes restricted by what comes after it. Therefore, the entire Muslim community agrees on the permissibility and occurrence of abrogation. The disagreement attributed to Abū Muslim al-Aṣfahānī is merely a linguistic disagreement that does not lead to a difference of opinion or denial of the occurrence of abrogation. This viewpoint is supported by scholars of Islamic principles such as Ibn al-Subkī (2004). In his book, *Jam' al-jawāmi'* the latter states that Abū Muslim referred to it as 'specification.' It was said that he opposed its existence because he did not mention it by its popular name. Therefore, the opposition mentioned by scholars is merely verbal, as previously stated, and it does not lead to a difference of opinion or denial of the occurrence of abrogation.

Various schools of thought have emerged among scholars throughout history regarding abrogation (Naskh) and abrogated verses in the Quran. Their perspectives can be broadly categorized into three main schools. The first school consists of proponents of abrogation who assert its occurrence and claim that there are approximately five hundred abrogated verses in the Quran. They maintain, for example, that the verse of Jihad abrogated nearly 70 verses of the Quran (Gümüştekin, 2021). Those who oppose the idea of abrogation, as Osman (2014) explains, argue that the above assertion undermines the notion of a well-structured Quran with clear and detailed rulings because it implies the presence of numerous or nullified rulings.

The second school acknowledges the existence of abrogation in the Quran but limits its scope. For instance, Jalal ad-Din as-Suyuti (1974) identifies twenty abrogated verses and gathers them in a specific section of his book, focusing on topics such as bequests, the direction of prayer, fasting, and others. Ibn al-Jawzi (2003) initially lists 247 verses that are believed to be abrogated. Still, upon further analysis, he concludes that only 22 of them are genuinely abrogated, leaving 205 verses that are not abrogated. Similarly, al-Zurqānī (1948) presents twenty-two incidents concerning abrogation; after analysis, he contends that only twelve of them were abrogated. Imam Ad-Dahlawi (1986), concurring with Ibn al-Arabi, identifies twenty-one abrogated verses, some of which are subject to differing opinions. However, he asserts that only five verses can be definitively classified as abrogated: the bequest verse in An-Nisa, the verse on patience during battles in Al-Anfal, the verse stating the impermissibility of marriage after divorce in Al-Ahzab, the verse about giving charity before private conversations with the Prophet in Al-Mujadila, and the verse about standing in prayer during the night except for a little in Al-Muzzammil.

‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Shinqīṭī (2002) suggests that there are nine confirmed abrogated verses, falling under seven subject categories. He highlights the verse regarding offering charity before private conversations with the Prophet as the only one unanimously agreed upon to be abrogated. Regarding other verses, there are varying opinions among scholars. Ash-Shanqīti arranges the verses based on the likelihood of abrogation and mentions the abrogating verse in each incident.

Muṣṭafá Zayd (1987), renowned for his book *Naskh in the Noble Quran: A Legislative, Historical, and Critical Study*, offers one of the most significant works on this topic. Spanning approximately one thousand pages, his comprehensive and scholarly work provides a juristic analysis and arrangement of confirmed instances of abrogation. The latter identifies five incidents involving six verses: the obligation to perform the Tahajjud prayer and its subsequent abrogation in Surah Al-Muzzammil, the obligation to give charity before private conversations with the Prophet and its subsequent abrogation in Surah Al-Mujadila, the initial obligation to stand firm in the battle against ten times the enemy's numbers and its subsequent abrogation, limiting it to facing the enemy in equal numbers only, in Surah Al-Anfal, the punishment for adultery as described in two verses of Surah An-Nisa and its subsequent abrogation by the punishment of flogging mentioned in a verse of Surah An-Nur, and the revised understanding of the verse in Surah An-Nisa that advises against approaching prayer while intoxicated, ultimately leading to the complete prohibition of alcohol in Surah Al-Ma'idah.

The opponents of abrogation argued that accepting it would imply an acknowledgment of the distortion of the Quran. Consequently, this perspective could lead to certain Sunni scholars suggesting that the distortion occurred in the divine scripture, the Book of Allah. These opponents further claimed that most Hadiths, or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, are narrated through solitary chains of transmission (Ahad), meaning they lack multiple independent chains of narration. Based on this premise, they argued that a solitary Hadith should not be considered abrogating the Mutawatir or consensually transmitted verses of the Quran (Doğan, 2022). The opponents reasoned that the Quran's authority rests on its continuous transmission, whereas a solitary Hadith lacks such widespread confirmation.

For instance, in Sahih Muslim, Aisha, one of the wives of the Prophet, reported the existence of a verse in the Quran that initially prescribed ten fully breastfed times but was later abrogated to five. These verses related to breastfeeding were among the recited verses of the Quran. The opponents questioned the origin of these verses and who abrogated them after the death of the Prophet. Furthermore, they cited a narration in Sahih al-Bukhari, where Umar bin al-Khattab, the second caliph of Islam, expressed his intention to add a verse to the Book of Allah. Umar's statement raised doubts, as it seemed peculiar that he alone possessed knowledge of this verse. This raised questions regarding the completeness of the Book of Allah.

Another instance was found in Surah Al-Ahzab, where it was claimed that the Surah was as long as Surah Al-Baqarah, one of the longest chapters in the Quran. Aisha mentioned verses that were present and written but were completely lost due to a sheep having ate them. These various narrations gave rise to skepticism compared to the Almighty's statement, "Indeed, it is We who sent down the Qur'an, and indeed, We will be its guardian." Given the above discrepancies, the opponents questioned how it could be argued that Allah protects the Quran.

According to proponents of the non-abrogation interpretation, such as Muhammad Al-Ghazali, the concept of abrogation in the Quran is deemed invalid. Al-Ghazali argues that although the story of abrogation or the suspension of certain verses is mentioned, this does not imply that the argument is valid. He asserts that no verse in the Quran can be considered dysfunctional or abrogated. Instead, every verse holds applicability, but the All-Wise and All-Knowing Allah understand the circumstances under which a verse can be applied. Therefore, the distribution of Quranic verses is based on human conditions, guided by wisdom and sound advice (Umar Ubayd Hasanah, 2022 & Karaođlan, 2019)

Jamal Al-Banna presents A similar viewpoint in the book "Refuting the Claim of Abrogation in the Noble Quran" (2004). Al-Banna summarizes the previously mentioned arguments in his refutation of the abrogation claim. He points out that out of the over six thousand verses in the Quran, proponents of abrogation could only find two verses that support the concept. Their argument relies solely on these two verses, disregarding numerous verses affirming the Quran's steadfastness. The two verses in question are Verse 106 of Surah Al-Baqarah, which states, "Whatever verses We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, We bring better than it or similar to it," and Verse 101 of Surah An-Nahl, which states, "And when We substitute a verse in place of another verse."

Al-Banna argues that the term "verse" (ayah) in the Noble Quran does not refer to a Quranic verse itself, but rather denotes proof, indication, miracle, or sign that establishes prophethood or leads to faith. When the Quran intends to refer to texts in holy books and their valuable instructions, it employs the term "verses" (ayat). The distinction lies in the idea that a miracle is typically singular, while instructions, including analysis, prohibitions, commands, and intentions, can be multiple. Al-Banna supports this view by citing Muhammad Abdul-Baqi, who noted in his indexed glossary of Quranic words that the term "ayah" appears eighty-two times in the Quran. Throughout the Quran, the term "ayah" is never used to denote a textual verse or a sentence from the Quran, but rather signifies a miracle, indication, proof, sign, or evidence of the truthfulness of prophethood. Examples of these "ayah" include the sun, the moon, the night, the day, life, death, the table spread of Jesus, the staff of Moses, the body of Pharaoh, the she-camel of Salih, and many others. This interpretation is supported by the Quran's usage of expressions like "Verily, in that are signs (ayat)" or "that there may be a sign (ayah)." Furthermore, the Quran mentions challenges those polytheists pose to the prophet to bring forth a sign and make their faith contingent upon it. These examples represent the majority of instances where the term "ayah" is used in the Quran, he argued.

Mohammad Abdo has interpreted verse 106 of Surah Al-Baqarah to support Al-Banna's statement. According to Abdo, the contextual understanding of the verse suggests that the term 'ayah' refers to that which substantiates the prophethood of the prophets. In other words, 'ayah' signifies the evidence or proof Allah grants to the prophets to establish their legitimacy. Consequently, the aforementioned verse could be interpreted that if we (Allah) disregard or cause people to forget the proof which establishes the prophethood of a particular prophet due to the passage of time, then Allah, with His absolute power and authority over His creation, will bring forth something superior to it. This superiority may be in terms of persuasive strength, the establishment of prophethood, or something similar. He who (Allah) possesses such ability and vast dominion should not confine himself to specific proofs bestowed upon all prophets. Moreover, the term 'ayah' in its original language signifies evidence, proof, or a sign of authenticity. The entire Quran is called 'Ayat' because it is a testament to the Prophet's veracity through its miraculous nature. It functions as evidence indicating that he is supported by divine revelation from Allah, the Almighty (Muhammad Rashid Ridā, 1990). There is a proposition that the verses claimed to be abrogated can be interpreted differently. In the first verse in Surah Al-Anfal, Allah instructs the Prophet to encourage believers to engage in battle. The verse states that if there are twenty steadfast men among the believers, they can overcome two hundred. If there are one hundred, they can overcome a thousand disbelievers because the disbelievers lack understanding. However, in the subsequent verse, Allah states that He has lightened the hardship for the believers, recognizing their weakness. It can be argued that this falls under permissibility or allowance (Rukhsah).

The second verse pertains to offering charity before privately consulting the Messenger of Allah. Allah advises the believers to present a charity before their consultation, stating that it is better and purer for them. However, Allah follows it by saying that He is Forgiving and Merciful if they cannot do so. From the latter part of the verse, it can be inferred that the matter was not obligatory but recommended. Since we have no evidence of the Companions acting upon this verse and the narration attributed to Imam Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) reported by Al-Hakim being weak, it does not establish that Imam Ali gave charity before consulting the Prophet privately. Therefore, this matter

does not appear to be of abrogation (Nasikh) and abrogated (Mansukh) nature. Instead, it falls under what was legislated for a specific purpose and ceased when that purpose was achieved. As Al-Qurtubi mentioned from Ibn Abbas, this revelation alleviated the burden of numerous questions posed to the Messenger of Allah by Muslims. When Allah mentioned it, many people refrained. Subsequently, Allah expanded their permission with the following verse (al-Qurtubī, 2003).

Concerning the verses related to wine and fasting, it is suggested that they followed a gradual process of Islamic legislation and were not abrogated. The verse addressing those who commit adultery where Allah says: 'Those of your women who commit the shameful act, have four witnesses (against them) from among you. So, if they testify, confine those women to their homes until death overcomes them, or Allah prescribes a way for them.' And in another verse which says: 'Those two of you who commit it, chastise both of them. However, if they repent and make amends, then overlook them. Surely, Allah is Most-Relenting, Very-Merciful.'

The former verse refers to homosexuality, while the latter verse concerns sodomy. Similar interpretations have been presented by multiple scholars, including Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī (2000) in his work *al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ*

Regarding the verse "Stand (to pray) all night except for a little," it is suggested that this was specific to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). The author of *At-Tahrir wa at-Tanwir* mentions this, stating that it was a specific ruling for the Prophet and is discussed in the chapters on the special qualities of the Prophet in the works of jurists. It was not obligatory for others, and Muslims were not required to perform a prayer before the five daily prayers. Instead, they simply followed the actions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) (Ibn 'Ashūr, 1984).

Conclusion

In conclusion, Students may perceive the scholarly debates surrounding the concept of abrogation in the Qur'an as a dichotomy between individuals adhering to their religious and Islamic heritage versus those adopting a more lenient stance. Alternatively, they may view it as a division between traditionalists and scholars prioritizing principles. Another perspective could frame it as a conflict between proponents of narration and transmission and jurists known for their reliance on personal judgment. Additionally, it could be interpreted as a division between the Mu'tazilites, renowned for their emphasis on rationality, and followers of transmitted knowledge.

However, it is important to recognize that the issue extends beyond these perspectives. Emotions often cloud objectivity in academic discussions, yet it is crucial to respect the rights of both supporters and opponents of abrogation, particularly considering the historical disagreements surrounding the matter. Furthermore, when examining the issue from an academic standpoint, it is not fundamentally distinct from other juristic matters that have evolved alongside the development of jurisprudence and its principles. For instance, later scholars extensively addressed the concept of Maqasid (objectives) more than earlier scholars did. Therefore, a similar perspective should be applied to examining abrogation, especially since its understanding has evolved over time within jurisprudence.

Its meaning has transitioned from ancient comprehension within the context of specification and restriction to becoming an independent academic concept among later scholars. Moreover, it can be observed that the disparities between early and later scholars concerning abrogation may not be significantly substantial. The differences often lie in wording, other than essence, even though numerous books have been written both in support of and against abrogation by later scholars. While proponents of abrogation primarily rely on its occurrence as evidence, opponents predominantly argue for its absence. Scholars who focus on providing evidence for its occurrence encounter academic challenges and methodological issues, such as a lack of consistency and the inability to determine the abrogating and abrogated verses. As a result, opponents of abrogation have primarily aimed to gather purportedly non-abrogated verses from the works of those who downplayed the extent of abrogation. Consequently, their compilations lead to interpretations wherein each verse possesses an alternative explanation without resorting to abrogation. The existence of diverse interpretations for every verse prompts us to question the necessity of emphasizing the existence of abrogation. As a result, for insisting on such an approach, the discourse surrounding abrogation tends to shift from being an academic and scientific inquiry to becoming intertwined with matters of pure worship and emotional sentiments.

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