

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE PIS PARTY IN POLAND AND THE FIDESZ PARTY IN HUNGARY*

Yusuf AVAR** 

Abstract

This study investigates similarities between two right-wing populist parties: The Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość party - PiS) party in Poland and the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Magyar Polgári Szövetség - FIDESZ) party in Hungary by examining speeches of Polish President Andrzej Duda, former-Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Furthermore, the study is carried out on the actions of these parties during their governments. It aims to present the perspectives that PiS and FIDESZ have on identity and religion, democracy, and EU principles and looks at the two parties' strategies for gaining more power. Based on the studies, four main similar characteristics between these two parties are identified. (1) The PiS party and the FIDESZ party and their politicians regularly emphasize "Christianity" to emphasize their identity. (2) These two parties employ every available strategy to protect and increase their positions in the government. (3) They undermine liberal democracy as an authoritarian trend driven by majority rule. (4) The PiS party and the FIDESZ party have refused to follow the core values upon which the EU was founded. Furthermore, these parties use anti-EU rhetoric to increase their power by claiming that they are safeguarding national sovereignty. They believe in the concept of a "Europe of nations."

Keywords: PiS Party, FIDESZ Party, Andrzej Duda, Mateusz Morawiecki, and Viktor Orbán.

* This article is derived from the author's Ph.D. thesis entitled "The EU's Normative Paradox: The Cases of Hungary and Poland".

**Dr., Kilis 7 Aralık University, International Relations Office, e-mail: yusufavar@kilis.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0001-8507-9579.

POLONYA'DAKİ PİS PARTİSİ İLE MACARİSTAN'DAKİ FİDESZ PARTİSİ ARASINDAKİ BENZERLİKLER

Öz

Bu çalışma, Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Andrzej Duda, önceki Başbakanı Mateusz Morawiecki ve Macaristan Başbakanı Viktor Orbán'ın konuşmalarını inceleyerek iki sağ popülist parti olan Polonya'daki Hukuk ve Adalet partisi (PiS Partisi) ile Macaristan'daki Macar Yurttaş Birliği (FİDESZ partisi) partisi arasındaki benzerlikleri araştırmaktadır. Ayrıca, çalışma bu partilerin hükümetleri sırasındaki eylemlerini de incelemiştir. Çalışma, PiS ve FİDESZ'in kimlik ve dine, demokrasiye ve AB değerlerine bakışı ve de iki partinin güçlerini artırma stratejilerini sunmayı hedeflemektedir. Yapılan çalışmaya dayanılarak, iki partinin dört temel benzer özelliği tespit edilmiştir. (1) PiS partisi ve FİDESZ partisi ve politikacıları kimliklerini vurgulamak için düzenli olarak "Hıristiyanlık" a vurgu yapmaktadır. (2) Her iki parti de hükümetteki güçlerini korumak ve arttırmak için her türlü stratejiyi kullanmaktadır. (3) Ayrıca iki parti de liberal demokrasinin temelini, çoğunluk yönetimi tarafından otoriter bir eğilim olarak oymaktadırlar. (4) PiS partisi ve FİDESZ partisi, AB'nin üzerine kurulduğu temel değerleri takip etmede AB'ye zorluklar yaşatmaktadır. Ek olarak iki parti de güçlerini arttırmak için AB karşıtı söylemleri, ulusal egemenliği koruduklarını iddia ederek kullanmaktadır. Her iki parti de "Ulusların Avrupası" kavramına inanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: PiS Partisi, FİDESZ Partisi, Andrzej Duda, Mateusz Morawiecki ve Viktor Orbán.

Introduction

Poland and Hungary share several similarities. They have experienced similar situations historically. The old saying begins in both languages, "Pole and Hungarian cousins be." Could one reword the original statement to read, "They fight together, and they build illiberal democracy together," given that both countries appear to have elected governments with very similar political goals (Kerpel, 2017:68). Furthermore, Tusk, newly elected prime minister of Poland, argues "Pole and Hungarian brothers be, good for fight and good for a party; both are valiant, both are lively, upon them may God's blessings be." (2017).

In addition to having a common ruler and being united by the personal union during the Middle Ages, the socialist countries of Poland and Hungary were forced to adopt a communist constitution that established the socialist model of state and legal systems (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 10). At the time, the Soviet Union influenced these countries. Similar socialist-to-democratic transitions occurred in Poland and Hungary in the late 1980s (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 10). The size, borders, and status of Poland and Hungary have undergone substantial changes in recent centuries (such as losing their independence and sovereignty) (Balcer,

2017: 15). There have been many tragic setbacks throughout the histories of both countries (e.g., Poland in 1939 and Hungary in 1914-1918) (Balcer, 2017:15).

After 1989, the “Return to Europe” scenario was successful for the first ten years since Poland and Hungary had set the standard for newly emerging democracies in the 1980s when it came to Europeanization (Ágh, 2016a: 34). 1989 saw the expectation that all the tenets of constitutional democracy would be implemented in Eastern Europe. Nearly 30 years after communism’s demise, it is widely believed that true implementation of “normality” has not occurred but rather has only been imitated or desire for a (Western style of) “normality” (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 60). Moreover, despite the liberal constitutions that have existed in Poland and Hungary for over 20 years, we seem to have, in differing degrees: They prioritize conservatism and hierarchy over liberal and democratic values, which makes them more likely to be authoritarian; they are reluctant to embrace or have controversial views toward democracy and freedom; they lack respect for others; their confidence is weakened; they feel like victims with all the feelings of inferiority that go along with it; they are desperate for stability, which makes them willing to give up liberal and democratic values and need a strong leader (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 63).

The recent autocratization of Poland and Hungary, together with some partial democratic backsliding in several other EU member states, provide a serious issue with unique features for the EU (Hegedüs, 2019: 2). In Poland and Hungary, where the ruling classes are deliberately moving toward authoritarianism for ideological reasons, power struggles have a structural effect on the quality of the political systems. A competing authoritarian government and a flawed democracy are the results of this (Hegedüs, 2019: 16). PiS and FIDESZ are similar in that they criticize the EU and strongly commit to traditional values and nationalist ideologies (Vachudova, 2019: 694). The rise of the FIDESZ Party in Hungary (2010) and the PiS Party in Poland (2015) have been accompanied by a growing number of breaches of EU norms, values, and principles. In the name of their nations, the PiS party and the FIDESZ party have employed quite similar strategies to boost their economic and political power (Hanley and Vachudova, 2020: 276).

Considering these, the purpose of this study is to scrutinize the similarities between the PiS and FIDESZ parties. To accomplish this, the research has relied on several sources, such as speeches of Polish President Andrzej Duda, former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Based on their relevance to the core concepts of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, 55 statements made by Polish President Andrzej Duda between August 6, 2015, and March 29, 2023, from the President of the Republic of Poland’s official website, and 11 statements made by the former Prime Minister of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki between October 18, 2021, and July 15, 2023, from the Chancellery of the Prime Minister have been obtained. In addition, due to their noteworthy

relevance to these mentioned values, 72 speeches by Viktor Orbán, spanning from June 6, 2010, to January 22, 2023, have been acquired from the official website of the Hungarian Prime Ministry. The similarities between the two parties have been emphasized through a detailed analysis of these statements. Furthermore, the conditions of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law have been investigated during the PiS and FIDESZ regimes, respectively, in Poland and Hungary.

Based on this, the study concludes that there are four similar characteristics between these two right-wing populist parties (1) Stressing “Christianity” is a common way for the PiS party and the FIDESZ party to emphasize their identity. (2) These two parties employ all methods at their disposal to preserve and enhance their positions within the government. (3) They discredit liberal democracy as a tendency toward authoritarianism propelled by majority rule. (4) The fundamental principles upon which the EU was established have been breached by the PiS and FIDESZ parties during their governments. Furthermore, they assert that they are defending national sovereignty by using anti-EU rhetoric to consolidate their position. They support the idea of a “Europe of nations.” In addition, it is seen that Orbán prefers the terms “illiberal democracy” and “Christian democracy,” whereas Duda and Morawiecki use “sovereign democracy.” These terms’ descriptions resemble one another and sign out that both Poland and Hungary are sovereign states, and they can decide about their internal politics.

Not many studies have examined how political parties follow one another and highlight their commonalities. This study attempts to fill this gap and is significant because it highlights the similarities between these two right-wing parties and demonstrates how the PiS and FIDESZ parties have breached EU principles, as well as how future EU-skeptic parties may try to emulate them. Furthermore, the study’s explicit focus on political parties and their policies promotes more academic research in party comparisons.

The PiS Party in Poland

Following months of deliberation, the Conservative-Conservative People’s Party officially defected to Civic Platform, and several members of the Christian Nationalist Union, who had previously stayed with Buzek, joined the PiS right away. Rather than directly joining PiS, both of these parties joined together to establish the Alliance of the Right, which included Micha Ujazdowski of the Conservative People’s Party, Wiesaw Walendziak of the Conservative People’s Party, and Marek Jurek of the Christian National Union (Millard, 2009: 100). When the right-wing alliance known as Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnoeae (Electoral Solidarity Action) fell apart in 2001, the PiS party was formed (Modrzejewski, 2017: 23). Not long before the 2001 parliamentary elections, the new conservative cadre party PiS was founded in opposition to both the Democratic Left Alliance and the Solidarity Electoral Action (Zuba, 2009: 333). Former lawmakers from the Jarosaw Kaczyski-led Porozumienie Centrum party formed the core of PiS. His

brother Lech Kaczyński, who headed on to serve as President of the Republic of Poland, was one of the key players in the PiS's history (Modrzejewski, 2017: 23).

The PiS is described as a right-leaning, conservative, Christian-democratic, and predominantly nationalist party (Modrzejewski, 2017: 23). With a populist and authoritarian program that included criticism of European integration, hostility to economic reforms and demands for stringent law and order, it won the elections (Zuba, 2009: 333). Despite this, PiS was first unsure about its stance on the European issue. The necessity of Poland's historical "anchoring" in Western European frameworks was highlighted in the party's program documents. However, it additionally stated that there were several threats in the domains of culture (identity) and economics (Zuba, 2009: 333). The PiS states in its election manifesto that, after joining NATO, the second-most important foreign policy objective is "trying to get Poland into the EU." Nonetheless, the PiS argues that strong and cohesive nation-states ought to constitute the foundation of the EU (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 312).

Anti-corruption and anti-crime were the main pillars of the PiS (Modrzejewski, 2017: 23). According to Pippa Norris, the PiS is a part of the global phenomenon known as "contemporary authoritarian populism." (As cited in Fomina and Kucharczyk, 2016: 58). Furthermore, the PiS party was a prime instance that fits Panebianco's (1988: 147) description of a charismatic party characterized by a "total symbiosis between the organizational identity and the leader." (Tworzecki, 2019: 102). According to PiS, the Polish nation is largely defined by its race and religion, with a strong connection to the Roman Catholic faith, rather than by its citizenship (Balcer et al., 2016: 6). Kaczyński frequently states that without the Church, there is no Poland (As cited in Balcer, 2017:57).

The traditionalist-conservative PiS party and its presidential candidate, Lech Kaczyński, unexpectedly won the 2005 election by framing it as a contest between "social-solidaristic" and "liberal" views of Poland (Szczerbiak 2007:205). However, the League of Polish Families, Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland, and the PiS alliance, which was created in 2006, disbanded in August 2007 as a result of savage infighting (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016:4). The main opposition party from 2007 to 2015, PiS, sought to convince voters that corrupt elites control Poland, that economic growth there is good but moving more slowly than it should, that Poland is a "German-Russian condominium" and that the previous administration's mismanagement has left the country "in ruins," and that former leaders Donald Tusk and Bronisaw Komorowski are "traitors" who willfully and knowingly broke the law (Markowski, 2019: 113). In 2015, the PiS regained power after eight years of governments led by the Civic Platform. That May, the Civic Platform-backed incumbent president was defeated by PiS-backed Andrzej Duda to become the next president (Chapman, 2017: 2). After winning the October legislative elections, the PiS party became the first in post-communist Poland to

achieve an absolute majority in the Sejm (lower chamber of Poland's bicameral parliament) (Chapman, 2017: 2). Rather than a significant shift in voter preferences, this was mainly the result of a significant number of wasted votes (more than 16% of active voters) as a result of party coalitions (8%) and thresholds (5%) (Markowski, 2016: 1311).

Kaczyński is the most important politician in PiS and a fervent advocate of its principles (McMillan, 2017). Kaczyński is the acknowledged power behind the throne (Grzymala-Busse, 2018: 96). After the PiS party won the legislative elections of 2015, Kaczynski nominated Andrzej Duda as the party's winning presidential candidate. He then chose Beata Szydło to serve as prime minister (Grzymala-Busse, 2018: 96). In December 2017, Kaczyński abruptly replaced Beata Szydło with Mateusz Morawiecki, adding insult to injury by doing so on the same day that Szydło's cabinet was given a vote of confidence in the legislature (Grzymala-Busse, 2018: 96). The 2019 election outcomes showed that Poles are still in favor of the PiS's illiberal turn while rejecting the idea of any more plurality losses (Drinóczi and Biń-Kacala, 2020: 230). However, in the 2023 Polish parliamentary election, the PiS party managed to secure the majority of votes (35.58 percent), but it was unable to form a government. Almost two months after a coalition of pro-EU parties won the national election, Tusk was chosen as a prime minister.

The FIDESZ Party in Hungary

Before the first free elections, FIDESZ was a ferocious anti-Communist youth organization. Renouncing its generational identity, the party changed its name to the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party in 1995 (Batory, 2001: 17–18). The FIDESZ party ruled Hungary between 1998 to 2002. By 2002, Hungary's largest right-wing political party, FIDESZ, and the smaller Hungarian Democratic Forum thought that Hungary's entry into the EU would represent a return to its historical and cultural origins, especially about Christianity (Fowler, 2004: 636). The results of the elections in April 2002 have left only four parties with representation in parliament, all of which are in favor of Hungary's membership in the EU: The national-conservative FIDESZ, its tiny ally, the Christian-democratic Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Hungarian Socialist Party (which took the place of the former state party), and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (Batory, 2002: 3–4).

According to FIDESZ, Hungary would be able to take part in the current model of economic and social unification of Europe and be easier to reintegrate into the community of modern European nations if it joined the EU. Furthermore, it was determined that membership was essential to creating a vibrant market economy (Batory, 2001: 18). Thus, Hungary's primary foreign policy goal was to integrate into Europe as soon as possible, as stated clearly in the 1994 manifesto of the FIDESZ Party. But the Party also stressed the significance of putting national interests first in its platform for the 1998 elections (Batory, 2002: 4).

FIDESZ became a major force in the political, social, and economic spheres in the 2000s, and by 2010, its political organization had taken over and colonized a large area of Hungary's political, social, and cultural landscapes (Ágh, 2016b: 280). After eight years of opposition, Orbán came back to power in 2010. Orbán was able to fundamentally transform the Hungarian political system and execute a "second revolution" despite the vocal objections of the feeble parliamentary opposition, thanks to the two-thirds parliamentary majority he gained in the 2010 elections (Körösényi and Patkós, 2017: 324). Orbán, who served as Hungary's prime minister from 1998 to 2002 (and up until 2010), was a member of a distinct generation from the previous two national leaders. Some considered Orbán as a representation of the arrogance of the nation's elite (Pridham, 2005: 80).

Orbán's FIDESZ party won the 2014 elections as well (Benková, 2019: 2). After securing a two-thirds majority in the 2014 elections, FIDESZ regained control of the parliament (Bebel and Collier, 2015: 20). Increased polarization was seen in the Hungarian political party system by 2017. FIDESZ's blatant rejection of liberal democracy and use of far-right xenophobic appeals during campaigning caused his position to shift dramatically toward the authoritarian and nationalist end of the social-cultural axis (Vachudova, 2019: 693). Despite having a rather strong social-cultural alignment in 2017, Hungary's opposition parties have had difficulty working together since FIDESZ took office in 2010. By consolidating power and dismantling independent media, FIDESZ has drastically shifted the playing field. This has left the opposition parties, which likewise lack charismatic leaders and organizational prowess, deeply disillusioned and apathetic (Vachudova, 2019: 693).

The FIDESZ alliance won 133 of the 199 parliamentary seats in the 2018 election (Downes and Venisa, 2018). In the 2022 elections, for his FIDESZ party, Orbán has gained a two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament once again. Keeping in mind that FIDESZ's stance on European integration is characterized by soft-Euroscepticism, which differs in policy areas and prioritizes safeguarding national interests (Bebel and Collier, 2015: 20). In other words, FIDESZ holds a lenient stance toward Europe (Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2002: 334). The FIDESZ administration, led by Orbán, poses problems to the EU because by using the concepts of illiberal/Christian democracy, Hungary has turned its directions from a liberal state to a semi-authoritarian and centralized one.

A comparison of the PiS Party with the FIDESZ Party

Poland and Hungary are exceptional situations in Europe since they are governed by one-party systems of "soft" right-wing national populists (Balcer, 2017: 10). Parties led by Kaczynski and Orbán can be characterized as right-wing populist regimes with economically left-populist social programs (Kerpel, 2017: 68). Populist leaders Kaczynski, the informal leader of Poland's PiS party, and Orbán, the elected prime minister of Hungary, started changing the countries' pre-existing

constitutional democratic government soon after they assumed office (Drinóczy and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 12).

The PiS party and the FIDESZ party have the experiences of the governmental position. The PiS party ruled Poland between 2005 and 2007, and from 2015 to the end of 2023. The first government, led by the PiS Party from 2005 to 2007, attempted to impose its centralized, illiberal conception of the state. However, the Constitutional Tribunal's steadfast rejection and political divisions within the ruling coalition prevented it from doing so (Bustikova and Guasti, 2017: 167). After winning the 2015 election, PiS has been gradually following Hungary's path (McMillan, 2017). However, PiS never had the kind of majority that Orbán has benefited from (Mueller, 2014: 17). Kaczyński might have taken a cue from Orbán: don't only make nationalist speeches attacking the status quo; change the rules and reorganize the system according to what you want (Mueller, 2014: 17). However, the elections of 2023 resulted in Kaczyński's party losing its position in government.

From 1998 to 2002, the FIDESZ party ruled Hungary, and it has been in power since 2010. The FIDESZ party's prominent politician Orbán had strong pro-European credentials at a time when democratic institutions were strengthening, and Hungary was getting closer to joining the EU (Kelemen, 2017: 221). Indeed, attempts were made by both the PiS party and the FIDESZ party to successfully lead their nations into membership in the EU. One election cycle of the Polish swerve was followed by its reversal. This objective has been more successfully realized by the second and the third PiS administrations (2015-2023) (Bustikova and Guasti, 2017: 167). And, since the FIDESZ party took power in Hungary in 2010, the country's politics have become increasingly at odds with EU norms, values, and principles.

PiS and FIDESZ have deliberately elevated protecting the people and the nation to the highest level of the national agenda (Vachudova 2019:692). National populists attempt to portray themselves as the defenders of national interests against federal and supranational utopias in Europe (Balcer, 2017: 6). Consequently, the terms "nation" and "national" are used extensively by Kaczynski and Orbán. Nowadays, practically every occasion, brand-new institution, or activity in both nations is referred to as "national" (Balcer, 2017: 14). In addition to these similarities, the conclusions of this study indicate that the PiS and FIDESZ parties have four characteristics in common. To highlight and demonstrate each of the four commonalities, reference has been made to the histories of the two parties, their acts in government, and the speeches of their officials. Below, each of the common features is numbered and examined separately.

- (01) The PiS party and the FIDESZ party and their politicians regularly emphasize "Christianity" both to emphasize their national and European identity.

According to the PiS party, Poland's national identity, morality, law, and state are all based on the Church, which distinguishes Poland from other EU countries and makes it stand out in the EU (Balcer et al., 2016: 6). The PiS program states that:

The Church has played a specific role in our history, one that differs from that of other nations. It not only created and civilized the nation, it also protected it. (...) The Church remains today the host and advocate of the generally accepted moral teaching in Poland (...) That is why it is fully true to say that in Poland the only moral alternative to the Church is nihilism" (As cited in Balcer, 2017:56).

Duda, Morawieski, and Kaczyński highlight Christianity in their discussion of European identity. PiS party chairman Kaczyński believes that Poland is the only center of the real historic West because of its conservatism, Roman Catholicism, and ethnic nationalism and that the West has lost its way because of its liberal orientation (Balcer, 2016: 103). To put it another way, PiS often maintains the belief that Poland represents the "real West." Western Europe, on the other hand, has rejected the fundamental ideas of the West (Buras, 2017: 4).

In addition, the fundamental Law of Hungary which was prepared by the FIDESZ party in 2011 stated that "we recognize the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood. We value the various religious traditions of our country" (National Avowal the Fundamental Law of Hungary 2023). "The protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State" (Article Q (4) The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2023). It also suggests that anyone interested in learning about the constitution should identify with the Hungarian people's opening greeting: "God bless the Hungarians." (Halmai, 2014: 2).

According to Orbán, Christian morality is the foundation of the European social order. Orbán emphasized that the cornerstone of Western civilization is Christian culture, customs, and religion. He goes on to state that this identity is colorful, exciting, and extraordinary, and it has an impact on Hungary's culture. Orbán often talks about Christianity in terms of identity, highlighting how Hungary is proud of its Christian identity and how Europe also shares this identity, as evidenced by his speeches (Orbán, 2015a). Orbán (2016a) claimed that "Our Europe is built on Christian foundations, and we are proud that it has accomplished fulfillment of human and spiritual freedom" (Orbán, 2016a). Orbán further states that

Europeans will not be able to drive Christianity from their heads. They will not be able to forget the biblical story, the story of redemption. We may have different approaches to the story and its characters, we might interpret it in different ways, we might even think that it is a fictional story, but there is one thing that we cannot do and is very unlikely to

happen in Europe: we cannot behave as if this story doesn't exist and is not at work in the minds of, we Europeans. For we Europeans, our main resource of civilisation is the story of Christianity and the moral role played by this story (Orbán, 2015a).

(2) These two parties employ every available strategy to protect and increase their positions in the government.

The PiS Party and the FIDESZ Party have employed the same broad strategy to subvert liberal democracy, citing the tyranny of the majority as the cause of this move toward authoritarianism (Ágh, 2018: 41). However, the illiberal turn of events started in Hungary in 2010 and Poland in 2015 (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 6). The ruling parties' attempts to limit the chances for an unbiased judicial assessment of their actions have resulted in attacks on the rule of law in both Poland and Hungary (Cooper, 2021: 20). The PiS party, like the FIDESZ party, has made the constitutional court an early target in its efforts to weaken institutional checks and balances (Chapman, 2017: 15). The PiS Party and the FIDESZ Party have also attacked interest groups, local self-governments, NGOs, and civil society organizations. In addition, both parties have launched attacks on the courts and media as well.

(3) These two parties undermine liberal democracy as an authoritarian trend driven by majority rule.

The PiS party is motivated by a majoritarian urge, or the idea that a parliamentary majority, no matter how small, gives the winners the power to eliminate constitutional, legal, and normative restraints on political authority (Chapman, 2017:1). Kaczyński states that "we have legitimacy, so we can rule. The people have chosen us, not our corrupted and immoral enemies, so we enjoy legitimacy, and we decide by-laws, actions, and facts" (As cited in Bunikowski, 2018: 299). After winning legislative majorities, the PiS Party launched an extensive and swiftly executed policy offensive dubbed "Good Change," the party's slogan for its platform (Balcer, 2016: 102). This program emulates the majoritarian democracy practiced in Hungary, which Freedom House has noted as a slow slide toward authoritarianism (Balcer, 2016: 102).

The FIDESZ government also used the majority to establish its dominance and eliminate as many components of checks and balances as possible, resulting in what is sometimes called an "illiberal system." (Bakó, 2022: 1). Since the Constitution was unilaterally altered, undermining the Constitutional Court's previous decisions and its jurisdiction to interpret the law, or at the latest since rigged elections were held in 2014, the Hungarian political system is classified as a non-democratic state (Bozóki and Hegedűs, 2018: 1176). Hungary's election system contributed significantly to the democracy's rapid decline (Benková, 2019: 1). The election

results from 2014, 2018, and 2022 demonstrated that the key components of the new election system supported FIDESZ (Bakó, 2022: 97).

In the summer of 2014, Orbán openly attacked the Western liberal perspective, thereby expressing an anti-liberal ideology (Buzogány and Varga, 2018: 812). Following his election victory in 2014, Orbán advocated for the replacement of liberal democracies with illiberal governments, citing Turkey, China, Russia, and Singapore as examples (Gülmez, 2018: 1561). Remarks made by Orbán in 2014 during a summer university in Băile Tuşnad are noteworthy. Orbán claimed that “the Hungarian nation is not simply a group of individuals but a community that must be organized, reinforced and constructed. And so, in this sense, the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is illiberal, a non-liberal state” (As cited in Bakó, 2022: 83). Orbán further claims that

It is thought that in Central Europe there is simply no democracy if the liberals do not win or are not part of the government. We have had enough of this thinking. We believe there can still be democracy even if the liberals do not win. Illiberal democracy is when someone other than the liberals has won (2017).

(4) The PiS party and the FIDESZ party have refused to follow the core values upon which the EU was founded.” They use the anti-EU rhetoric to increase their power by claiming that they are safeguarding national sovereignty. While Duda uses the concept of “sovereign democracy”, Orbán prefers to use the terms “illiberal democracy”, and “Christian democracy.

Poland and Hungary remain in breach of the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law upon which the EU was founded (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 45). The populist leaders of Poland and Hungary act like young individuals who are testing the boundaries of their abilities (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 45). The PiS party and the FIDESZ party reduced the age at which judges could retire, promoted government appointees to positions in purportedly independent organizations like the public prosecutor’s office, and generally exposed the court to political interference (De Búrca, 2022: 17). In order to punish or remove judges who opposed the government’s agenda, referred cases involving judges’ independence, or on other subjects to which the government objects, such as Hungary’s asylum law, both Poland and Hungary established government-approved disciplinary procedures (and, in Poland’s case, a special “disciplinary chamber”) (De Búrca, 2022: 17). Further limitations on media freedom and the destruction of media diversity have been imposed by Poland and Hungary (De Búrca, 2022: 17). These two incidents highlight the danger that even EU members face of returning to a hostile media landscape (Chapman, 2017: 15). Nonetheless, the media landscape in Poland is significantly more fragmented and larger, with a greater percentage of privately owned media outlets, mostly owned by foreign investors.

Because of this, the media landscape is frequently less responsive to shifts in domestic politics than it is in Hungary (Kerpel, 2017: 76).

Poland and Hungary have repressed and stopped funding civil society groups that oppose or criticize certain aspects of national policy (De Búrca, 2022: 17). The extra-parliamentary opposition and the protest movements, however, have always been more visible in Poland than in Hungary. Considering this, the opposition is weak in Hungary despite being strong in Poland (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 6). Poland and Hungary repressed specific vulnerable groups and communities, and refugees. They especially securitized the migration issue and both the PiS party and FIDESZ parties are against the EU's mandatory quotas in the fields of migration. Orbán claimed that "what we have been facing is not a refugee crisis. This is a migratory movement composed of economic migrants, refugees, and foreign fighters. This is an uncontrolled and unregulated process." (Orbán, 2015b). Duda also considers immigrants as economic immigrants, similar to Orbán's stance (Duda, 2015). In addition, in their speeches in public, Duda and Morawiecki do not discuss gender discrimination. Poland ratified the Istanbul Convention in 2015, before the beginning of illiberal trends. In 2020, just five years after the Convention's increased restrictions, Poland declared its intention to withdraw from it and contested the Convention's legitimacy before the CT (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacala, 2022: 10). Hungary refused to sign the Convention into law.

As previously noted, the PiS party and the FIDESZ party exhibit a trend toward moderate Euroscepticism. Duda, states that

The European Union needs more democracy and respect for democratic elections of European nations. To achieve this, the Union must return to its roots - the model of a community of free nations and equal states. So that - using the words of one of the fathers of European integration Robert Schuman - the value of Europe should be the Europe of values (2017).

Furthermore, Morawiecki states that "any political system that fails to respect the sovereignty of others, democracy, or the elementary will of the nation - will sooner or later lead to utopia or tyranny." (2023). In addition, according to Orbán, the EU is a sovereign group. Hungary, Poland, Germany, and other countries constitute the EU. Orbán believes the main pillar supporting the EU's future is its member states. Although Orbán initially favored the term "illiberal democracy," "Christian democracy" adopted its place in 2018. These phrases served as tools to weaken the nation's system of checks and balances and give the ruling party more power. Orbán governments have consistently opposed more power transfers to "Brussels." (Hettzey, 2021:132). Orbán claims "We will fight all those who want to create an empire out of our Union! We are among the millions in Europe - who want a Europe of free nations and not a Europe of subordination" (Orbán, 2013a).

In addition, they believe the EU has abused its power in their countries. The PiS government's strategy had a considerable impact on Polish-EU relations. It led to the view of Poland as an unsatisfied partner that insisted on upholding its position without making any compromises (İnan, 2022: 38). Duda argues that "the issues discussed in Brussels or Strasbourg do not concern us" (Duda, 2019). Morawiecki argues that

We cannot remain silent when our country - including in this Chamber - is attacked in an unfair and biased manner. The set of rules of the game must be the same for everyone. It is everybody's responsibility to abide by them - including the institutions which were established in those treaties. These are the foundations of the rule of law. It is unacceptable to extend powers, to act by means of accomplished facts. It is unacceptable to impose one's decisions on others without a legal basis. It is all the more unacceptable to use the language of financial blackmail for this purpose, to talk about penalties, or to use even more far-reaching words against certain Member States (Morawiecki, 2021).

Orbán claims that Hungarians have long believed that when they participate in debates, the EU treats them unfairly, applies a double standard, and abuses its power (Orbán, 2013b). Orbán further states that

We will fight against everyone who applies double standards against us, everyone who abuses their power and wishes to treat us as if we were second-class citizens. We will fight all those who want to create an empire out of our Union! We are among the millions in Europe - who want a Europe of free nations and not a Europe of subordination (Orbán, 2013a).

It is also observed that on matters on which they differ with the EU, the PiS party and the FIDESZ party have been advocating for a referendum. For instance, a referendum was held in Hungary on October 2, 2016, to decide whether the European Union should have the power to compel the immigration of non-Hungarians to Hungary without the National Assembly's approval. The referendum was declared illegitimate since only about 40% of eligible voters participated, even though 98% of all legally cast votes and 92% of all ballots cast supported the government's answer to the issue. Only 6% of all ballots were declared invalid (Halmai, 2017: 10). In his news conference following the declaration of the referendum results, Orbán stated:

The EU is a democratic community. Today 92% of those who voted in a referendum in a Member State have said that they do not agree with Brussels' intention. The question is simple: can Brussels, can the democratic community of European states impose its will upon a Member State in which it has been opposed by 92% of those who voted in a referendum? (Orbán, 2016b).

The political narratives of Poland and Hungary frequently touch on the use of national sovereignty as a shield against the EU's centralized goals (Csehi and Zgut, 2021:11). Orbán and Kaczyski have repeatedly stated that they are defending their country and the state against foreign hegemony (Balcer, 2017: 21). Duda believes that the EU should be a union of equal states and free countries (2016d). And, as Morawiecki also points out, the European agora is all too often replaced with the Brussels institutions' offices, where decisions are made in private (Morawiecki, 2023). In addition, it is noteworthy that in response to criticism of legislative initiatives from the opposition or the European Commission, the PiS government and its allies have invoked the narrative of "sovereign democracy." (Przybylski, 2018: 59). According to this viewpoint, the party that has the majority of seats in Parliament represents Poland's legitimate will (Przybylski, 2018: 59). The PiS party program states that

For us Poles, our own state has also another meaning – no sovereign Polish state existed for 123 years. We could not decide our fate, which is why we have recognized the Polish state as a value of the highest order, and any form of undermining its sovereignty or existence is unacceptable, dangerous to the nation, and a threat to Polishness in its current and historical dimension (As cited in Balcer, 2017:12–13).

In short, they use anti-EU rhetoric to increase their power by claiming that they are safeguarding national sovereignty. Both Kaczyski and Orbán want to present the country as a strongman opposing Brussels bureaucrats on the Western Front (Kerpel, 2017: 81). Kaczyski and Orbán use anti-EU rhetoric to strengthen their positions of power by arguing that they are safeguarding national sovereignty (Nas, 2018: 187). These movements portray the EU as a bureaucratic apparatus, an encroaching foreign power, and a threat to national sovereignty (Nas, 2018: 187). Overall, democracy in both countries is inevitably shaped by the kind of nationalism that Kaczyski and Orbán espouse (Balcer, 2017: 14).

Conclusion

The PiS administration in Poland and the FIDESZ administration in Hungary have persistently attempted to weaken the EU's values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. They have breached the independence of election laws, civil society, the media, the judiciary, and local government. They also have attacked media diversity, civil service, and the countries' Constitutional Courts. Consequently, Poland and Hungary are among those where the level of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law have deteriorated since the PiS party and FIDESZ party came to power, respectively. Thus, this research attempts to identify and present the commonalities between the PiS party in Poland and the FIDESZ party in Hungary, two right-wing populist parties. The speeches of the politicians were examined to identify similarities between the two parties. In this context, the websites of the Polish Prime Minister and President provided access to

55 remarks made by Duda (between August 6, 2015, and March 29, 2023) and 11 speeches made by Morawiecki (between October 18, 2021, and July 15, 2023). Furthermore, Orbán's 74 speeches (between June 6, 2010, and January 22, 2023) were obtained from Hungary's prime ministerial website. Content analysis was utilized for these speeches. The study also examined the policies of the ruling FIDESZ party in Hungary and the PiS party in Poland

Ágh (2018: 42) claims that Poland and Hungary share two noteworthy commonalities: First, they presented their identical plan to undermine liberal democracy as a trend toward authoritarianism propelled by majority rule. Second, the fundamental principles upon which the EU was established have been ignored by Poland and Hungary. However, according to the study's conclusions, four characteristics are shared by these two right-wing populist parties. The history of the two parties, their acts in government, and the speeches of their executives have all been studied to identify the commonalities between these two parties. Firstly, the study has observed that the PiS and FIDESZ parties and their politicians frequently highlight "Christianity" to accentuate their identities. Secondly, it is seen that to maintain and strengthen their positions in the administration, these two parties take every strategy at their disposal. Thirdly, these two parties discredit liberal democracy as a majority rule-based authoritarian movement. Fourthly, it is seen that the fundamental principles upon which the EU was founded have been breached by the PiS and FIDESZ parties. The study concludes that these two parties assert that they are defending national sovereignty by using anti-EU rhetoric to consolidate their position. They support the idea of a "Europe of nations."

References

- Ágh, A. (2016a) “Cultural War and Reinventing the Past in Poland and Hungary”, *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 45(1): 32–44.
- Ágh, A. (2016b) “The Decline of Democracy in East-Central Europe: Hungary as the Worst-Case Scenario”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 63(5–6): 277–87.
- Ágh, A. (2018) “Decline of Democracy in the ECE and the Core-Periphery Divide: Rule of Law Conflicts of Poland and Hungary with the EU”, *Journal of Comparative Politics*, 11(2): 30–48.
- Bakó, B. (2022) *Challenges to EU Values in Hungary: How the European Union Misunderstood the Government of Viktor Orbán* (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis).
- Balcer, A., Piotr B., Grzegorz G., and Eugeniusz S. (2016) “Change in Poland, but What Change? Assumptions of Law and Justice Party Foreign Policy”, *Stefan Batory Foundation*, 1–18. <<https://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Otwarta%20Europa/Change%20in%20Poland.pdf>>, (1 July 2023).
- Balcer, A. (2016) “Poland:” Good Change”, Bad Change.” Poland: Keeping Europeans Together, Assessing the State of EU Cohesion” European Council on Foreign Relations, 102-105. <<http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep21671.25>>, (1 July 2023).
- Balcer, A. (2017) “Beneath the Surface of Illiberalism: The Recurring Temptation of ‘National Democracy’ in Poland and Hungary—with Lessons for Europe”, Fundacja Warszawski Instytut Studiów Ekonomicznych i Europejskich, Warszawa. *Wise Europe*. <https://pl.boell.org/sites/default/files/beneath_the_surface_illiberalism_national_democracy_poland_hungary.pdf>, (3 July 2023).
- Batory, A. (2001) “Hungarian Party Identities & the Question of European Integration.” *Working Paper 49*, Sussex European Institute, Sussex.
- Batory, A. (2002) “The Political Context of EU Accession in Hungary.” *Briefing Paper*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, European Programme.
- Bebel, J., and Collier, J. (2015) “Euroskepticism’s Many Faces: The Cases of Hungary and the UK.” Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2015, Article 4. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.201501.04

- Benková, L. (2019) “Hungary-Orbán’s Project towards ‘Illiberal Democracy.’” Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik *AIES Fokus* 2. <<https://www.aies.at/download/2019/AIES-Fokus-2019-02.pdf>>, (3 July 2023).
- Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2016) “BTI 2016 Poland Country Report.” Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. <https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2016_POL.pdf>, (9 July 2023).
- Bozóki, A., and Hegedűs D. (2018) “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union.” *Democratization* 25(7):1173–89.
- Bunikowski, D. (2018) “The Constitutional Crisis in Poland, Schmittian Questions and Kaczyński’s Political and Legal Philosophy.” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 26(3):285–307.
- Buras, P. (2017) “Europe and Its Discontents: Poland’s Collision Course with the European Union.” Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations <https://ecfr.eu/publication/europe_and_its_discontents_polands_collision_course_with_the_eu_7220/>, (2 July 2023).
- Bustikova, L., and Petra G. (2017) “The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe?” *Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)* 5(4):166–76.
- Buzogány, A., and Varga, M. (2018) “The Ideational Foundations of the Illiberal Backlash in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary.” *Review of International Political Economy* 25(6):811–28.
- Chapman, A. (2017) “Pluralism under Attack: The Assault on Press Freedom in Poland.” *Arch Puddington, Distinguished Fellow for Democracy Studies, Freedom House* <https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_Poland_Report_Final_2017.pdf />, (9 July 2023).
- Cooper, L. (2021) “Authoritarian Protectionism in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: Diversity, Commonality and Resistance.” *LSE IDEAS Ratiu Forum*, <<https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-Authoritarian-Protectionism-in-Central-Eastern-and-South-Eastern-Europe.pdf>>, (9 July 2023).
- Csehi, R., and Zgut, E. (2021) “‘We Won’t Let Brussels Dictate Us’: Eurosceptic Populism in Hungary and Poland.” *European Politics and Society* 22(1):53–68.

- De Búrca, G. (2022) “Poland and Hungary’s EU Membership: On Not Confronting Authoritarian Governments.” *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 20(1):13–34.
- Downes, James F., and Venisa, W. (2018) “Summary of the 2018 Hungarian National Parliamentary Election: The ‘Rise’ of Illiberal Democracy.” Europe Asia Policy Centre for Comparative Research EAP Hong Kong Baptist University
<<https://euap.hkbu.edu.hk/main/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Eelctoral-Volatility-in-the-2018-Hungarian-Election.pdf>>, (9 July 2023).
- Drinóczi, T., and Bień-Kacala, A. (2020) *Rule of Law, Common Values, and Illiberal Constitutionalism: Poland and Hungary within the European Union*. (Oxon: Routledge).
- Drinóczi, T, and Bień-Kacala, A. (2022) *Illiberal Constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary: The Deterioration of Democracy, Misuse of Human Rights and Abuse of the Rule of Law*. (Oxon: Routledge).
- Duda, A. (2015) “Migration Crisis Is a Problem of Entire EU.” 9 October, <<https://www.president.pl/news/migration-crisis-is-a-problem-of-entire-eu,36016>>, (9 July 2023).
- Duda, A. (2016) “We Want a Union of Free Nations and Equal States.” 13 January, <<https://www.president.pl/news/we-want-a-union-of-free-nations-and-equal-states,36061>>, (9 July 2023).
- Duda, A. (2017) “President: True unification of Europe still before us” 29 September, <<https://www.president.pl/news/presidenttrue-unification-of-europe-still-before-us,36554>>, (9 July 2023).
- Duda, A. (2019) “President: Each EP Election Vote Counts.” 23 May, <<https://www.president.pl/news/president-each-ep-election-vote-counts,36993>>, (9 July 2023).
- Fomina, J., and Kucharczyk, J. (2016) “The Specter Haunting Europe: Populism and Protest in Poland.” *Journal of Democracy* 27(4):58–68.
- Fowler, B. (2004) “Hungary: Unpicking the Permissive Consensus.” *West European Politics* 27(4):624–51.

- Foy, H., and Wasik, Z. (2016) “Jaroslaw Kaczynski: Poland’s Kingmaker.” *Financial Times* 26. <<https://www.ft.com/content/8238e15a-db46-11e5-a72f-1e7744c66818>>, (9 July 2023).
- Furedi, F. (2017) *Populism and the European Culture Wars: The Conflict of Values between Hungary and the EU*. (Oxon: Routledge).
- Grzymala-Busse, A. (2018) “Poland’s Path to Illiberalism.” *Current History* 117(797):96–101.
- Gülmez, R. (2018) “Test of the European Union with Authoritarianism: Hungary.” *İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi* 7(3):1554–68.
- Halmaj, G. (2014) “Towards an Illiberal Democracy: Hungary’s New Constitution” Eurozine <<https://www.eurozine.com/towards-an-illiberal-democracy/>>, (9 July 2023).
- Halmaj, G. (2017) “National (Ist) Constitutional Identity?: Hungary’s Road to Abuse Constitutional Pluralism.” EUI Working Papers, EUI Research Repositor, EUI LAW <<https://hdl.handle.net/1814/46226/>>, (9 July 2023).
- Hanley, S., and Vachudova, M. A. (2020) “Understanding the Illiberal Turn: Democratic Backsliding in the Czech Republic.” in Licia Cianetti, James Dawson and Seán Hanley (ed.s) *Rethinking ‘Democratic Backsliding’ in Central and Eastern Europe*. (Oxon: Routledge) pp. 34-54.
- Hegedüs, D. (2019) “What Role for EU Institutions in Confronting Europe’s Democracy and Rule of Law Crisis.” *GMF Policy Paper* (4) <<https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Confronting%2520Europe%25E2%2580%2599s%2520Democracy%2520and%2520Rule%2520of%2520Law%2520Crisis.pdf>>, (9 July 2023).
- Hettyey, A. (2021) “The Europeanization of Hungarian Foreign Policy and the Hungarianization of European Foreign Policy, 2010-18.” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 29(1):125–38.
- Hughes, J., Sasse, G., and Gordon, C. (2002) “Saying Maybe’ to the Return to Europe’ Elites and the Political Space for Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe.” *European Union Politics* 3(3):327–55.
- İnan, A. V. (2022) “Member State Foreign Policy versus EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Polish Foreign Policy on Ukraine.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul.

- Kelemen, R. D. (2017) "Europe's Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe's Democratic Union." *Government and Opposition* 52(2):211–38.
- Kerpel, A. (2017) "Pole and Hungarian Cousins Be? A Comparison of State Media Capture, Ideological Narratives and Political Truth Monopolization in Hungary and Poland." *SLOVO Journal* 29(1):68–93.
- Kopecký, P., and Mudde, C. (2002) "The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe." *European Union Politics* 3(3):297–326.
- Körösényi, A., and Patkós, V. (2017) "Liberal and Illiberal Populism: The Leadership of Berlusconi and Orbán." *Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 8(3):315–37.
- Lendvai-Bainton, N., and Szelewa, D. (2021) "Governing New Authoritarianism: Populism, Nationalism and Radical Welfare Reforms in Hungary and Poland." *Social Policy & Administration* 55(4):559–72.
- Markowski, R. (2006) "The Polish Elections of 2005: Pure Chaos or a Restructuring of the Party System?" *West European Politics* 29(4):814–32.
- Markowski, R. (2016) "The Polish Parliamentary Election of 2015: A Free and Fair Election That Results in Unfair Political Consequences." *West European Politics* 39(6):1311–22.
- Markowski, R. (2019) "Creating Authoritarian Clientelism: Poland after 2015." *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 11:111–32.
- McMillan, S. (2017) "Why Poland Is a Threat to the European Union." *New Zealand International Review* 42(5):2–4.
- Millard, F. (2009) *Democratic Elections in Poland, 1991-2007*. (Oxon: Routledge).
- Millard, F. (2021) "Transitional Justice in Poland: Memory and the Politics of the Past." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 74(1): 172–173.
- Modrzejewski, A. (2017) "Catholic and Nationalist Populism in the Current Poland." *Perspective Politice* 10(1): 21-32.
- Morawiecki, M. (2021). "Statement by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki in the European Parliament - The Chancellery of the Prime Minister - Gov.Pl

- Website.” 10 October, <<https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/statement-by-prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki-in-the-european-parliament>>, (8 July 2023)
- Morawiecki, M. (2023) “Mateusz Morawiecki at Heidelberg University - "Europe at a historic turning point”” 3 March, <<https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/mateusz-morawiecki-at-heidelberg-university---europe-at-a-historic-turning-point>>, (8 July 2023).
- Morawiecki, M. (2023) “Mateusz Morawiecki at Heidelberg University - ‘Europe at a Historic Turning Point’” 20 March, <<https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/mateusz-morawiecki-at-heidelberg-university---europe-at-a-historic-turning-point>>, (8 July 2023)
- Mueller, J. W. (2014) “Eastern Europe Goes South: Disappearing Democracy in the EU’s Newest Members.” *Foreign Affairs* 93(2):14–19.
- Nas, Ç. (2018) “AB Dönüşürken: Popülizm ve Türkiye’nin AB Süreci.” *EURO Politika*, 181-194.
- Orbán, V. (2013a) “Prime Minister Orbán’s Opening Speech in the European Parliament.” 2 July, <<https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-Orbán-s-opening-speech-in-the-european-parliament>>, (5 April 2023).
- Orbán, V. (2013b) “Prime Minister’s Pre-Agenda Speech and Replies to Comments.” 4 July, <<https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-s-pre-agenda-speech-and-replies-to-comments>>, (5 April 2023).
- Orbán, V. (2015a) “Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 15 March – Miniszterelnok.Hu.” 15 March, <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-on-15-march/>>, (6 April 2023).
- Orbán, V. (2015b) “Speech of Viktor Orbán at the EPP Congress.” 26 October, <<https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-of-viktor-Orbán-at-the-epp-congress20151024>>, (6 April 2023).
- Orbán, V. (2016a) “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s State of the Nation Address” 28 February, <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/prime-minister-viktor-Orbán-s-state-of-the-nation-address/>>, (6 April 2023).

- Orbán, V. (2016b) “Viktor Orbán’s Press Conference after the Announcement of Referendum Results” 2 October, <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/viktor-orbans-press-conference-after-the-announcement-of-referendum-results/>>, (5 April 2023).
- Orbán, V. (2017) “Viktor Orbán’s reply in the European Parliament” 26 April, <<https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/viktor-orbans-reply-in-the-european-parliament/>>, (5 April 2023).
- Pállinger, Z. T. (2022) “Referendums and ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary.” in Ellen Bos and Astrid Lorenz (eds) *Politics and Society in Hungary: (De-) Democratization, Orbán and the EU*. (Wiesbaden: Springer), pp. 99–120.
- Poland’s Constitution. (1997) “Poland’s Constitution.” <<https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>>, (5 April 2023).
- Pridham, G. (2005) *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe*, (Wiesbaden: Springer).
- Przybylski, W. (2018) “Explaining Eastern Europe: Can Poland’s Backsliding Be Stopped?” *Journal of Democracy* 29(3):52–64.
- Szczerbiak, A. (2007) “‘Social Poland’ Defeats ‘Liberal Poland’? The September–October 2005 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.” *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 23(2):203–32.
- The Fundamental Law of Hungary. (2023) “The Fundamental Law of Hungary.” <<https://www.parlament.hu/documents/125505/138409/Fundamental+law/73811993-c377-428d-9808-ee03d6fb8178>>, (5 April 2023).
- Tusk, D. (2017) “Acceptance Speech by President Donald Tusk upon Receiving Honorary Doctorate from the University of Pécs.” December 8, <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/08/acceptance-speech-by-president-donald-tusk-upon-receiving-honorary-doctorate-from-the-university-of-pecs/>>, (9 September 2023).
- Tworzecki, H. (2019) “Poland: A Case of Top-down Polarization.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 681(1):97–119.
- Vachudova, M. A. (2019) “From Competition to Polarization in Central Europe: How Populists Change Party Systems and the European Union.” *Polity* 51(4):689–706.

Zuba, K. (2009) “Through the Looking Glass: The Attitudes of Polish Political Parties towards the EU before and after Accession.” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 10(3):326–49.