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Ottoman Approach to Shi and Sunni State Officers of Syria in the Examples of Fakhreddin Maanoğlu and Ali Canpolad between 1570s and 1630s

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ABSTRACT

Some scholars argue that Ottoman Sunni orthodoxy began to take shape following the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1516–1517. According to this view, the conquest of these core Islamic lands replaced early Ottoman perspectives on heterodox Islam with a more orthodox understanding, as the influence of these regions spread to Ottoman peripheries. However, many contemporary academics challenge this traditional narrative, suggesting that the role of Arab ulema in shaping Ottoman Sunnism was minimal or negligible. Others attribute the Ottoman emphasis on Sunni Islam to the establishment of the Safavid Empire in the sixteenth century, positioning Sunni orthodoxy as a deliberate response to Shi'i Iran. Despite differing opinions on its origins, scholars largely agree that the Ottoman Empire increasingly enforced Sunni orthodoxy, particularly from the latter half of the sixteenth century onward. Political, administrative, and localized studies offer promising avenues for examining how this process unfolded. Within this framework, Ottoman Syria—located at the heart of Sunni-Shi'i polarization—serves as an ideal setting for field studies during the period in question. This paper is among the first to focus exclusively on Fakhreddin Maanoğlu and Ali Canpolad—two prominent Ottoman provincial governors from differing sectarian backgrounds, one Shi'i and one Sunni. It seeks to examine the extent to which the "sunnitization" of the Ottoman Empire influenced administrative decision-making in the region between the 1570s and 1630s. Through a comparative analysis of these two contemporaneous figures, this study aims to evaluate the impact of sectarian polarization on Ottoman governance in Syria, addressing a research gap that has either been overlooked or insufficiently explored. Additionally, the paper briefly considers how the Ottoman Empire's principal adversaries interpreted sectarian and identity politics during this period. This exploration serves as a preliminary step toward future studies on the broader implications of sectarianism in the region.

Keywords: Islamic History, Fakhreddin Maanoğlu, Ali Canpolad, and Ottoman Understanding of Islam

Fahreddin Maanoğlu ve Ali Canpolad Örneklerinde Osmanlı Devleti'nin 1570 ile 1630 Yılları Arasında Şia ve Sünni Devlet Adamlarına Yaklaşımı

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İntihal: Bu makale, en az iki hakem tarafından incelendi ve intihal içermediği teyit edildi.

Etik Beyan: Bu çalışmanın hazırlanma sürecinde bilimsel ve etik ilkelere uyulduğu ve yararlanılan tüm çalışmaların kaynakçada belirtildiği beyan olunur.

ÖZ

Bazı akademisyenler, Osmanlı Sünni ortodoksisinin 1516–1517 yıllarında Suriye ve Mısır'ın Osmanlılar tarafından fethinin ardından şekillenmeye başladığını savunmaktadır. Bu görüşe göre, bu İslami merkez toprakların fethi, Osmanlıların erken dönemdeki heterodoks İslam anlayışını daha ortodoks bir yaklaşımla değiştirmiş ve bu bölgelerin etkisi Osmanlı periferilerine yayılmıştır. Ancak, günümüz akademisyenlerinin birçoğu bu geleneksel anlatıya karşı çıkarak, Arap ulemasının Osmanlı Sünniliğinin oluşumundaki rolünün sınırlı ya da önemsiz olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Diğer bir grup ise Osmanlıların Sünni İslam'a olan vurgu yapmalarını, 16. yüzyılda Safevi İmparatorluğu'nun kuruluşuna bağlayarak bunu Şii İran'a karşı kasıtlı bir yanıt olarak yorumlamaktadır. Kökenine dair farklı görüşler olmasına rağmen, akademisyenler genel olarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun özellikle 16. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren Sünni ortodoksiyi giderek daha fazla pekiştirdiği konusunda hemfikirdir. Siyasi, idari ve yerel düzeyde yapılan çalışmalar, bu sürecin nasıl işlediğini anlamak için umut vadeden araştırma alanları sunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Sünni-Şii kutuplaşmasının merkezinde yer alan Osmanlı Suriye'si, incelenen döneme ilişkin saha çalışmaları için ideal bir ortam sağlamaktadır. Bu makale, Osmanlı taşrasında Şii ve Sünni kökenlere sahip iki önemli vali olan Fakhreddin Maanoğlu ve Ali Canpolad'a odaklanan ilk çalışmalardan biri olma özelliği taşımaktadır. Çalışma, 1570'ler ile 1630'lar arasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun "Sünnileşme" sürecinin bölgede idari karar alma üzerindeki etkisini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Yani iki çağdaş figürün karşılaştırmalı analizi üzerinden, mezhepsel kutuplaşmanın Osmanlı yönetimine etkisi değerlendirilmektedir. Bu analiz, daha önce göz ardı edilmiş ya da yeterince ele alınmamış bir araştırma boşluğunu doldurma amacını taşımaktadır. Ayrıca, makale, dönemin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun başlıca düşmanlarının mezhepsel ve kimlik siyaseti hakkındaki yorumlarını da kısaca ele almaktadır. Bu haliyle çalışmamız, bölgede mezhepçiliğin daha geniş etkilerini incelemek üzere gelecekte yapılacak kapsamlı araştırmalara bir öncülük etmeyi hedeflemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslam Tarihi, Fahreddin Maanoğlu, Ali Canpolad ve Osmanlı'nın İslam Anlayışı

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Introduction

The Ottoman ruling elite was composed of a diverse minority with various Islamic and sectarian backgrounds. Generally, their affiliation with specific social or political groups was not a decisive factor as the Sunni Ottoman Empire expanded at the expense of other belief systems. However, it is often assumed that starting in the sixteenth century, tensions between the Sunni Caliphate and the Shiite Imamate prompted a shift in Ottoman policies, redefining the state as the protector of the Sunni world.[1] Beyond this general assumption, little is known about whether the Ottomans actively preferred Sunni officers in administrative roles during this period. This paper examines the established notion of "sunnitization" in the Ottoman Empire by comparing two Ottoman provincial governors—one of Shi'i origin and one of Sunni origin—assigned to rule in Syria, a region central to sectarian debates in the sixteenth century. By critically analyzing the Ottoman preference for Sunni officers in Syria, this study provides the first comparative evaluation of the empire's management of religious diversity through state appointments. Existing studies have largely focused on individual Ottoman statesmen and their roles within the empire across different periods. However, they often neglect the sectarian affiliations of these figures or their influence on governance. Notably, no study directly compares Fakhreddin Maanoğlu and Ali Canpolad, despite their contemporaneity, their shared role as provincial governors in the same region, and their mutual rebellions against the Ottoman state.[2] Furthermore, no comprehensive work in the academic literature addresses the Ottoman state's approach to appointing and managing officials from the two major sects of Islam. This paper serves as a preliminary attempt to analyze the selection and governance of Ottoman statesmen from both political and theological perspectives during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In doing so, it seeks to pave the way for future studies to deepen the understanding of sectarian dynamics and administrative policies within the Ottoman Empire.

1. Maanoğlu Family and Emergence of Fakhreddin II

The sanjak (district) of Sidon and Beirut was a key region where the Druze population was concentrated during the Ottoman Empire. While the area was home to a diverse mix of ethnic and religious groups, including Sunni and Twelver Shi'a Muslims as well as Maronites, the Druze emerged as the most politically influential community during the period under review. The narrative of a four-century Lebanese resistance against the "Ottoman yoke" largely revolves around the Druze and their recurrent revolts, which significantly challenged Ottoman authority

[1] Hüseyin Yılmaz, *Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); Tijana Krstic, "State and Religion, "Sunnitization" and "Confessionalism" in Süleyman's Time", *The Battle for Central Europe,* ed. Pál Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2019); Vefa Erginbaş, *Ottoman Sunnism: New Perspectives* (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2019).

[2] William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1983); Selman Oral *XVII. yüzyıl Osmanlı Devleti Şam Bölgesinde Meydana Gelen Ayaklanmalar* (Konya: Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Master's Thesis, 2018); Esma Gürsu *Celali İsyanlarından Canbolatoğlu Ali Paşa İsyanı* (Kilis: 7 Aralık Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Master's Thesis, 2019).

between 1516 and 1697 too.[3] Contrary to nationalistic interpretations, the Ottoman Empire sought to establish cordial relations with the populations of newly conquered territories to maintain long-term control over these regions. Accordingly, the Ottomans often permitted local leaders to retain their lands and govern on behalf of the empire. Despite these conciliatory measures, the Druze repeatedly rebelled against both provincial and central Ottoman authorities. In response, the Ottoman state launched several military campaigns in Syria and introduced new administrative and political systems to assert greater control over the region.

Although earlier conflicts between the Ottomans and the Druzes began shortly after Selim I's conquest of Syria, their relationship can largely be characterized as peaceful until the rise of the prominent Druze leader Fakhreddin II (1572–1635) in the late sixteenth century. Before this period, detailed records on the Maʿnid family's interactions with the Ottomans are sparse, particularly before the death of Korkmaz, Fakhreddin II's father, who died in hiding following an Ottoman expedition in 1585. During this time, the Ottoman administration adopted a dual approach toward the Maʿnid family, cooperating with certain members by appointing them as tax farmers (mültezim), while punishing others who participated in uprisings against Ottoman rule. Some nationalist historians claim that Fakhreddin I (purportedly the grandfather of Fakhreddin II) was granted authority over all Druze communities after pledging allegiance to Sultan Selim in 1516. However, no concrete evidence has been presented to substantiate this assertion.[4] In contrast, Abu Husayn's research suggests that neither the Maʿnid family nor Korkmaz held significant influence during the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt. Notably, Korkmaz is absent from Ottoman records as a bey or emir of Shuf, appearing only in the capacity of a tax farmer. This position, while part of the Ottoman administrative framework, represented a relatively modest rank with limited political importance.[5] Instead, Korkmaz is primarily recorded as a notable rebel (eşkıya) among the Druze, who aligned with other insurgents in opposition to the Ottoman state. For instance, an Ottoman document addressed to Ali Pasha, the former governor of Tripoli, dated February 13, 1581, reveals that Korkmaz reconciled with his former adversary, Mehmed (son of Şerafeddin), and together they led a rebellion against Ottoman authority, rallying support from members of the Druze community.[6] In a similar vein, just seven days later, Maanoğlu Korkmaz and his two associates, Seyfeddin and Efrahimoğlu Mansur, were accused of seizing 1,500 gold aspers and other belongings from Sergeant/Çavuş Hasan, the head of the Mısriyyun endowment. In response, the Ottoman state instructed Ali Pasha to bring Korkmaz and his men before the Ottoman court.[7] Over time, however, the long-standing tense relationship between the Ottomans and the Maʿnid family began to shift, particularly after the death of Korkmaz in 1585.

[3] As Abu Husayn rightly observed, this resistance is unlikely to be considered a nationalist struggle aimed at state-building. See Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Rebellion, Myth Making and Nation Building: Lebanon from an Ottoman Mountain Iltizam to a Nation State* (Tokyo: Research Institute forLanguages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 2009).

[4] Kamal S. Salibi, "The Secret of the House of Ma'n", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4/3 (Jul. 1973), 272-287.

[5] Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1985), 70-71.

[6] Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Bab-ı Asafî Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Mühimme Defterleri [A.DVNSMHM.d.],* No. 42, Gömlek No. 590.

[7] BOA, *A.DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 42, Gömlek No. 590.

Maanoğlu Fakhreddin II (1572–1635) succeeded his father, Korkmaz, as the leader of the Maʿnid family in the 1590s with little difficulty. Unlike his predecessors, Fakhreddin sought imperial recognition of his position as a legitimate prince (emir) within the Ottoman administration. In this context, Fakhreddin's name appeared in Ottoman records as early as February 4, 1575, when the Ottoman governor of Tripoli sent a letter to the Porte endorsing Fakhreddin as a capable leader to deal with Arab rebels. These rebels had been attacking travelers and pilgrims between the Sıffın fortress and the Katif region. The governor recommended that Fakhreddin be given control of these areas as a zeamet to restore order, assuring that he would ensure the region's safety in service of the Ottoman state. Since the Ottomans were likely unfamiliar with Fakhreddin and his abilities, they agreed to the proposal, but only on the condition that the governor monitor Fakhreddin's actions to ensure he met the expectations of the empire.[8] Although the document does not provide further details on what transpired afterward, Fakhreddin's later life demonstrates that he was far more successful and adept at integrating into the Ottoman system than his forerunners. This suggests that from the outset of his career, he was highly motivated to build a strong network of relationships and shared interests to support his ambitions within the Ottoman Empire.

Maanoğlu's true advancement in his career took time and became evident only when the Ottomans appointed him as the governor of Safad in 1592–1593. Compared to other prominent groups like the Assafs and Sayfas, the Druzes under Fakhreddin were much more eager to adopt new military technologies, particularly firearms. This likely played a crucial role in Fakhreddin's ability to gain the upper hand in Syria.[9] More importantly, Fakhreddin learned from the mistakes of his ancestors and adopted a more pragmatic approach in his dealings with the Ottoman central administration. Not only did he pay his taxes in full, but he also regularly sent generous gifts and bribes to high-ranking Ottoman officials, including Kuyucu Murad Pasha, who served as the governor (beylerbeyi) of Damascus from 1592 to 1594 and later became Grand Vizier.[10] Both Fakhreddin and the Ottoman administration continued to benefit from each other, particularly when the Ottomans sought to remove rebellious leaders in the region, such as Yusuf Sayfa. This provided Fakhreddin the opportunity to expand his influence into other key cities in Syria, including Beirut and Kisrawan. Ultimately, Fakhreddin demonstrated his ability to effectively govern Ottoman subjects in the region, unlike other high-ranking Ottoman officials who lacked support from both the local population and Ottoman soldiers.

[8] BOA, *A.DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 42, Gömlek No. 1008.

[9] See for example, Uriel Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman according to the Mühimme Defteri* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 94, fn. 94. Some historians question the effectiveness of firearms, noting that, unlike modern rifles, they were effective only when wielded by professional units rather than small bands of bandits. Jonathan Grant, "Rethinking Ottoman 'Decline': Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries", *Journal of World History* 10 (1999), 179-201. Murphey further argues that, considering the difficulty of supplying and maintaining gunpowder, firearms did not provide a decisive superiority over traditional weapons for any group, including the Ottomans. Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700* (Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2001), 13-16.

[10] Muhammad al-Muhibbi, *Tarih hulsat al-atar fi ayan al-qarn al-hadi asar IV* (Beirut: Maktabat Hayyat, 1964), 354.

Fakhreddin's success stemmed not only from his pragmatic approach to the Ottoman authority but also from his ability to thrive in the sanjaks under his control. The Ottoman state formally acknowledged his achievements by sending a letter on 2 March 1605, praising him as the bey of Safad. The Porte commended him (berhudar ol) for "guarding the country, keeping the Bedouins in check, ensuring the welfare and tranquility of the population, promoting agriculture, and increasing prosperity."[11] As time passed, Fakhreddin became increasingly eager to exploit the Ottoman Empire's weaknesses, particularly as it struggled on multiple fronts against both internal and external enemies. For instance, he saw the 1607 rebellion led by Ali Canpolad as a significant opportunity to expand his power at the expense of his chief rival, Yusuf Sayfa, who had previously been defeated by Fakhreddin with Ali's assistance.[12] Although Grand Vizier Murad Pasha requested Fakhreddin's support in his campaign against Ali Canpolad at Payas in June/July 1607, Fakhreddin cautiously aligned himself with Ali. However, after Ali's defeat in October 1607, Fakhreddin had no option but to seek amnesty from Murad, with whom he had maintained a cordial relationship. Overall, Maanoğlu was determined to expand his power and influence throughout Syria, either via cooperation with the Ottoman administration or by other means.

2. Canpolads and Shifting Balance of Power

Before delving into the details of Ali Canpolad, it is important to recognize the significant differences between the Canpolad and Maʿnid families. Unlike the Druze Maʿnids, the power base of the Canpolad family did not rely on distinguished family members or local support in Syria. To clarify, Canpolad Beg, the family's founder, was raised in the Ottoman Palace. He was later granted the sanjak of Kilis as an ocaklık (family estate) in exchange for restoring order to the region and assisting the Ottomans in their military campaigns against the Venetians. The Ottoman archives contain numerous documents detailing Canpolad Beg's influential role in the transformation of Syria under Ottoman rule.[13] These documents indicate that the Ottoman administration not only admired Canpolad Beg's excellence and wisdom in ruling Syria but also placed considerable trust in him. For example, following the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571, Canpolad was able to secure significant state positions for his close relatives and associates. One notable achievement was having his son Mehmed appointed as the alay beyi (head of regiment) in Homs, where he was responsible for overseeing all matters concerning the sipahis (landholders) in the region.[14] Similarly, Canpolad's other son, Cafer, was granted a zeamet[15] in recognition of his bravery during the conquest of Nicosia in Cyprus.[16] Canpolad Beg was not only focused on controlling Syria but also sought state positions for his family members in other Ottoman territories. For

[11] Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615*, 53.

[12] Feridun Emecen, "Fahreddin, Maʿnoğlu", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1995), 12/80-82.

[13] Refer to the documents below to understand his significance as the governor of Kilis province within the Ottoman Empire. BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 5, Gömlek No. 267, 829, 1064; BOA, *A. A.DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 7, Gömlek No.743; BOA, *A. A.DVNSMHM.d.*, No.24, Gömlek No. 189; BOA, *A. A.DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 24, Gömlek No. 702, 704.

[14] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 8, Gömlek No. 242.

[15] An Ottoman military or administrative fief often granted to officers in exchange for their military service to the state.

[16] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 8, Gömlek No. 277.

instance, he requested that his nephew, Ömer, be granted a gedük (a limited right to legal resources) at the Mevlana Ebubekir theological school (madrasa) in Diyarbekir.[17] More importantly, Canpolad also requested a significant number of zeamets for his close associates, primarily based on their substantial assistance during the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. To give but a few examples, Canpolad secured a tımar (fief) worth 4,000 akçes (aspers) for his old servant Ali,[18] another fief worth 4,000 aspers for his chamberlain (kethüda) Hüdaverdi,[19] and a fief worth 3,000 aspers for one of his men, Abdullah.[20] On balance, it is clear that Canpolad built a strong relationship of trust with the Ottoman administration at the time. A notable example of this close confidence is when Canpolad requested a tımar worth 3,000 aspers for his supporter Ferhad, the son of Abdullah, in place of Ali, whom Canpolad accused of not having participated in the Cyprus campaign he had led earlier.[21] The substantial number of petitions written by Canpolad Bey between 1569 and 1570 further highlights that his requests were taken seriously by the Ottoman administration. These petitions also demonstrate his clear intention to establish a power base in the region. There was a strong correlation between his growing presence in Syria and his increasing value to the Ottoman state.

Canpolad Bey's life was cut short in 1572, preventing him from realizing his long-term ambitions. However, his son Hüseyin succeeded him without difficulty and continued his father's efforts to become one of the most influential Ottoman officers in Syria. Hüseyin was first appointed governor of Kilis, and later of Aleppo, due to his merits and value to the Ottoman state. Leveraging his strong connections with Kurds and Arabs in Syria, he successfully quelled uprisings and reinforced Ottoman control in the region.[22] Initially, the Porte did not fully trust Hüseyin and kept a close watch on him as he interacted with other Ottoman officials. For example, on November 18, 1564, the Ottoman state instructed the governor and judge of Damascus to prevent Hüseyin Canpolad (governor of Kilis) and his son Habib (governor of Cebele) from participating in the Islamic lawsuit involving another Hüseyin (governor of Deyr Rahbe), due to a history of animosity and hostility between the two men.[23] Although the document does not detail subsequent events, it is clear that the Ottoman authorities were concerned that Hüseyin Canpolad might misuse his power for personal gain. Alternatively, this could also reflect the Ottoman desire to maintain control over state officers to ensure a balanced distribution of power in Syria.

Numerous documents indicate that Hüseyin Canpolad emerged as one of the most trusted Ottoman officers in Syria during this period. For instance, an imperial order dated September 30, 1581, addressed to the Ottoman governor of Tripoli, directed the governor of Kilis, Hüseyin, along with the governor of Damascus, to assist in suppressing Arab rebels in the region. Should their combined forces prove insufficient, the governor of Tripoli was instructed to request additional support from Hüseyin, who was expected to provide 5,000–6,000 kawas (chief bodyguards) from his forces to bolster the Ottoman garrison. Moreover, Hüseyin was tasked with eliminating both the former governor of Cebele Sanjak and

[17] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 8, Gömlek No. 323.

[18] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 8, Gömlek No. 282.

[19] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 8, Gömlek No. 1748.

[20] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 8, Gömlek No. 304.

[21] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 8, Gömlek No. 270.

[22] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi Târih-i Na'îmâ (Ravzatü'l-Hüseyn fî Hulâsati Ahbâri'l-Hâfikayn) Cilt II* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007), 329-330.

[23] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 6, Gömlek No. 392.

the Arab rebel leader Maanoğlu Korkmaz. This highlights Hüseyin's prominence as the Ottoman administration consistently prioritized him over other officers in Syria, recognizing his reliability and competence. In contrast, Korkmaz, cooperating with the former governor of Cebele in rebellion, was perceived as a secondary figure of lesser importance, firmly positioned in opposition to Ottoman authority.[24]

Over time, the balance of power between the Canpolad and Maʿn families gradually began to shift in favor of the latter. Despite Hüseyin Canpolad's continued career advancement following 1581, his trajectory came to an abrupt end when Grand Vizier Cigalazade Sinan Pasha executed him in 1605, accusing him of delaying his participation in the Ottoman Persian campaign. Subsequently, in 1606, Hüseyin's nephew, Ali Canpolad, succeeded him as governor of the Kilis. Ali later consolidated control over Aleppo and became its de facto leader, compelling the Ottoman administration to accept this fait accompli, despite initial reluctance. Meanwhile, Fakhreddin succeeded his father, Korkmaz, as the new leader of the Maʿn family. Unlike Fakhreddin, however, Ali lacked the ethnic and religious ties that could rally local support, relying instead on his connections to the Ottoman state for his position in Syria. This fundamental difference rendered both the Canpolad family in general, and Ali in particular, more expendable in the eyes of the Ottoman administration compared to the Maʿn family. Nevertheless, Fakhreddin managed to navigate a dual strategy, forging alliances with rebellious governors in the region while simultaneously cultivating a cooperative relationship with the Ottoman state—an approach that distinguished him from his predecessors and solidified his influence.

Despite participating in Ali Canpolad's uprising in 1607, Maanoğlu Fakhreddin managed to retain his official position within the Ottoman Empire, thanks to Murad Pasha's unexpected decision to forgive him. This act of clemency has raised suspicions among various sources, leading to speculative explanations regarding Murad's motivations. Urdi suggests that Fakhreddin secured Murad's favor by promising a substantial monetary payment when Murad was appointed governor of Damascus. Although Murad's tenure was brief, Fakhreddin reportedly honored his commitment, sending the agreed amount even after Murad's removal from office. This gesture is believed to have forged a friendly and pragmatic working relationship between the two.[25] In contrast, Sandys interprets their association as a mutually beneficial arrangement, framing it as a calculated win-win deal that served both parties' interests.

When Morat Bassa (now principal Vizier) came first to his government of Damasco, he [Fakhreddin] made him his, by his free entertainment and bounty; which had converted to his no small advantage: of whom he made use in his contention with Frecke the Emer of Balbec, by his authority strangled...[After Canpolad uprising was suppressed] they [People of Damascus] sought by manifold complaints to incense him [Murad Pasha] against the Emer of Sidon [Fakhreddin] as confederate with the traitor [Ali Canpolad]; which they urged with gifts, received and lost: for the old Bassa mindful of the friendly offices done him by the Emer, (corrupted also, as is thought, with great sums of money) not only not molesteth but declared him a good subject. Having till or late held good correspondence with the City and Garrison of Damasco, they had made him Sanziack of Saphet.[26]

[24] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 46, Gömlek No. 227.

[25] Abu al-Wafa Al Urdi, *Maadin al-Dhahab fi al-Rijal al-Musharrafa bihim Halab* (Aleppo: British Museum, 1987), 34B-35A.

[26] George Sandys, *A Relation of a Journey Begun an: Dom: 1610: Foure Bookes. Containing a Description of the Turkish Empire, of Ægypt, of the Holy Land, of the Remote Parts of Italy, and Ilands Adioyning* (London: Ro: Allot, 1632), 211.

One should not overly emphasize the purportedly cordial relationship between Kuyucu Murad Pasha and Fakhreddin, as its significance may be overstated.[27] First, Fakhreddin's involvement in Ali's 1606 insurrection did not go unnoticed, as he was compelled to pay Murad Pasha 300,000 piasters—half in cash and half in kind—to atone for his actions and secure his position.[28] More importantly, when examining Murad Pasha's broader policies for dealing with the Celali rebels, his approach to Fakhreddin appears neither unusual nor exceptional. For instance, just before launching his campaign against Ali Canpolad, Murad struck a deal with Kalenderoğlu Mehmed, another key supporter of Canpolad. Under this agreement, Mehmed was granted the governorship of Ankara in exchange for abandoning his allegiance to Canpolad. This strategic move allowed Murad Pasha to isolate Canpolad and suppress his uprising more effectively. However, once the rebellion was quelled, Murad swiftly turned his attention to Kalenderoğlu, who had by then besieged Ankara—after the city resisted aligning with Murad's plan—and even launched an attack on Bursa.[29]

Even at the height of its power, the Ottoman Empire faced significant challenges in maintaining strict control over the Druze community. Despite the Empire's insistence on reserving the exclusive right to bear firearms for Ottoman officers, its efforts to disarm the Druze population ultimately met with little success.[30] The Porte struggled both to effectively collect taxes from the Druze population and to restrict their access to firearms. This issue is underscored by an imperial order sent to the Bey of Safad and the Cadi of Acre, which states:

Previous noble firmans have repeatedly reached [you] ordering that no muskets, armour, and other instruments of war of any kind must be sold to the Druzes, who leave in the said sanjak. Notwithstanding, it has now been reported that some sea captains (re'is), coming to the port of Acre by My imperial order, bring [there] muskets and other forbidden instruments of war and sell them surreptitiously.[31]

The Ottoman central administration's inability to secure tax collectors for the Druze region stemmed largely from the locals' hostility toward these officials, leaving them with little ability to collect revenue. Despite the empire's expenditure on punitive campaigns, such as the significant 1585 campaign led by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt, these interventions largely failed to bring lasting order. Fakhreddin, however, distinguished himself as a capable local leader. As Olsaretti highlights,

[27] Wüstenfeld even argues that Fakhreddin leveraged his good relations with Murad Pasha to orchestrate the murder of one of his enemies, Mansur Furaykh of Biqa, who was, in fact, the pasha's son-in-law. Mansur's unwashed and unshrouded corpse was later delivered to Murad's daughter for burial in a small family cemetery. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld, *Fachr ed-din der Drusendfürst und seine Zeitgenossen: Die Aufstände in Syrien und Anatolien gegen die Türken in der ersten Hälfte des XI. (XVII.) Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Dieterichsche Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1886), 89-90.

[28] Burini, *Tarajim al-Aʿyan II,* 288. Quoted from Alessandro Olsaretti, "Political dynamics in the rise of Fakhr al-Din, 1590–1633: Crusade, trade, and state formation along the Levantine Coast", *The International History Review* 30/4 (2008), 729.

[29] Peçevi also notes that while Murad Pasha was engaged in battle with Canbolad, Kalenderoğlu, Kara Said, and Agaçtan Piri, approximately 30,000 rebels plundered and devastated Bursa, holding the city under their control for an extended period. Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Peçevi Tarihi II* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları 1982), 312.

[30] An order sent to Mehmed Beg in May/June 1571 make Ottoman commitment clear: "...You shall not allow peasants [or anyone else] to use muskets excepts Janissaries of My Threshold of Felicity and of Damascus, and timar-holders and ziʿāmet-holders who habitually use muskets. You shall seize and confiscate for the Government muskets found, contrary to My order, in possession of anyone, whoever he may be..." Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615*, 80.

[31] Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615*, 82.

he succeeded in organizing a disciplined army equipped with modern firearms, enabling him to enforce tax collection from otherwise defiant subjects. His effectiveness in maintaining order and generating revenue likely led the Ottoman administration to overlook significant complaints lodged against him during his governorship of Safad, prioritizing the treasury's benefit over enforcing strict punitive measures.[32] Olsaretti concludes that "[Fakhreddin] was co-opted more than any of his predecessors into the Ottoman establishment and also into factional politics within the central administration."[33]

Compared to Ali Canpolad, the Porte was notably satisfied with Fakhreddin's ability to maintain order and stability, which benefited both the economy and political landscape at a reasonable cost. White argues that from 1591 to 1596, Ottoman lands faced their longest drought in 600 years,[34] and more significantly, the Little Ice Age reached its peak during the winter of 1607-1608.[35] The Near East was more severely affected than any other region at the time, but this does not necessarily imply that the Ottoman Empire was "starving or declining, but it was increasingly vulnerable."[36] I agree with Genç's assertion that Ottoman fiscal policy aimed to maximize revenue while minimizing expenses.[37] Under these circumstances, it would have been unwise to eliminate skilled figures like Fakhreddin, as doing so could have jeopardized Ottoman financial and political interests. Therefore, it seems more plausible that Murad's support for Fakhreddin was driven not by choice, but by necessity.

In contrast, Ali Canpolad presents a completely different picture. Humiliated by his devastating defeat at the hands of Tiryaki Hasan Pasha, Ali found himself without a power base in the region. After the defeat, he attempted to retreat to Aleppo, where he was still officially the Ottoman governor. However, the city's inhabitants rejected him, forcing him to flee eastward. Unlike Fakhreddin, who thrived and protected his regions with a relatively modern army, Ali Canpolad attempted to replicate the crumbling Ottoman bureaucratic and military systems, which had already proven ineffective in Syria. Specifically, he divided his forces into two distinct units—cavalry and infantry—mirroring the structure of the Ottoman army. He also organized his army

[32] An order sent to Fahreddin in July-Sept 1604 points out that: "It has now been reported that by imposing, contrary to custom, a fixed lump sum of tax (kesim) on the village named Tiberias and on the inhabitants of other villages which are situated in your sanjak and belong to the waqf of (found by) My ancestor Sultan Süleyman Khan, may he rest in peace, you have caused the peasants of the said waqf to scatter." Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615*, 144-145.

[33] Olsaretti, "Political dynamics in the rise of Fakhr al-Din, 1590–1633", 712, 723.

[34] Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 136-137.

[35] White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, 181. As a contemporary source, Arakʿel observes that conditions worsened drastically in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions at the time. He notes that people resorted to eating cats, dogs, unclean animals, and even human flesh. Arakʿel of Tabriz, *Book of History* (Caloforina: Mazda Publishers, 2010), 95-96.

[36] White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, 1-3, 7, 76, 136-137, 140-141. Despite the significant challenges posed by the Little Ice Age in the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire managed to navigate these difficulties more effectively than the Celali rebels of the time. Abaza Hasan serves as a notable example to illustrate this. See Gündoğdu, *Erken Modern Dönemde Osmanlıda İsyan Algısı*, 112-122.

[37] Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2002), 35-86.

into 162 divisions, each led by a captain, or çorbacı, similar to the Ottoman Janissaries. Furthermore, his cavalry was modeled after the Ottoman People's Six Regiments organized into right and left regiments. Notably, Ali's soldiers received the same salaries and incentives that the Ottoman state paid to the Janissaries at the time.[38] To make a long story short, unlike Fakhreddin, Ali Canpolad inherited the numerous military and economic setbacks that the Ottoman Empire had struggled with for years. Barkey aptly notes that the bandit units, having learned military tactics from Ottoman dignitaries, imitated the state army, adopting similar organization and strategies.[39] This could also explain why Fakhreddin was deemed more indispensable to the Ottoman state compared to Ali, as we will discuss further below.

3. Ali vs Fakhreddin in the Eyes of the Ottomans

Although it is impossible to estimate the exact number of soldiers Ali commanded at the time, it was likely far more than any local leader, including Fakhreddin, could have imagined. Griswold suggests that by the time Ali launched his campaign against his archrival Seyfoğlu Yusuf, supported by Ottoman soldiers in Damascus, his forces numbered over 60,000. Additionally, Ali offered to provide 10,000 soldiers for the Ottoman-Persian war, contingent on Ahmed I recognizing him as vizier and appointing him as beylerbeyi of Aleppo. On behalf of his allies, he also requested important state positions in exchange for participating in the Ottoman campaign with a contingent of soldiers.[40] Another estimate by Topçular Katibi suggests that by 1607, Ali's army included 44,000 sekbans and 20,000 cavalry. Additionally, one of Ali's supporters, Çemşid, contributed 4,000 sekbans and 2,000 cavalry to fight alongside him.[41] According to a more conservative estimate, Ali's forces still numbered around 40,000 against the Ottoman army.[42]

This large number of traditional soldiers should be viewed as a weakness for Ali rather than a strength. Even the Ottoman Empire itself faced significant financial challenges in meeting military expenses. İnalcık's research highlights how military expenditures consumed more than two-thirds of the Ottoman budget, even in years of relative stability.[43] Unlike the relatively wealthy Fakhreddin, who could maintain a moderate army with the support of local forces, Ali Canpolad struggled to cover the exorbitant costs of his large, outdated army. This financial strain partially explains why Ali was unable to establish a more balanced relationship with the Ottoman authority, unlike Fakhreddin. Ali was known for neither offering generous gifts to high-ranking officials in

[38] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Na'îmâ II*, 330.

[39] Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 198.

[40] Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Ali Emiri Tasnifi (AET)*, No. 616.

[41] Ziya Yılmazer, *Topçular Kâtibi 'Abdülkādir (Kadrî) Efendi Tarihi I (Metin ve Tahlîl)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 496.

[42] Abdurrahman Sağırlı, *Mehmed b. Mehmed Er-Rûmî (Edirneli)'nin Nuhbetü't-Tevârih ve'l Ahbâr'ı ve Târîh-i Âl-i Osman'ı (Metinleri, Tahlilleri)* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ph.D., 2000), 12.

[43] Halil İnalcık - Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 77-102. At this juncture, the heavy demands of other campaign in Syria could culminate in another major cause of unrest

the capital nor paying taxes to the state fully and on time. Unsurprisingly, money played a pivotal role in his struggles with local chiefs in Syria. For instance, his main rival, Seyfoğlu Yusuf, initially hid in the Damascus fortress and later fled after paying 100,000 gold pieces to the kadı (judge) of Damascus. Despite persistently besieging the city, Ali refused to withdraw his forces or allow free trade with the merchants. He ultimately relented only on the condition that Damascus pay him 125,000 gold pieces, an amount exceeding what Yusuf had paid to the kadı.[44] On another occasion, after Seyfoğlu Yusuf suffered a devastating defeat, Canpolad allowed him to go free in exchange for a substantial payment and an acknowledgment of Ali's authority.[45] Griswold argues that, despite possessing a few cannons, Ali could not afford the expensive cannon powder and balls needed for their use.[46] Similarly, Akdağ argues that the origins of Ottoman beys—whether graduates of the Palace School or former chiefs of Celali rebels—were less important. They were like slaves, bound to fulfill the wishes of their households, made up of sekbans or levends (irregular military units). Many beys lost their lives for failing to satisfy the demands of the sekbans.[47] On balance, Ali's constant financial struggles often forced him to act like a brigand, seeking more loot at the expense of worsening his relations with both the Ottoman state and the local people.

Before the decisive battle between the Ottoman army and Canpolad's forces, the Ottomans had already learned of Ali's intentions to establish an independent state and divide Ottoman lands among his supporters. Ali planned to grant Damascus, Tripoli, and their sanjaks to his family, allocate Anatolian cities to Kalenderoğlu Mehmed and Kara Said, and give Baghdad to Uzun Ahmedoğlu. Canpolad also sent envoys and letters to Shah Abbas. Last but not least, he proclaimed himself Sultan, having the Friday prayers recited in his name as the Sultan of Syria.[48] These events clarify why Murad Pasha rejected Ali's peace offer on October 24, 1607.[49] After his defeat by the Ottomans, Canpolad became unwelcome in the region, and unlike Fakhreddin, the Ottoman administration never considered allowing him to return to the Syria he had long devastated.

This does not necessarily indicate a fundamental difference between Fakhreddin and Ali from the perspective of the Ottoman government. Murad Pasha was not fully committed to maintaining a cordial relationship with Fakhreddin at any cost. Rather, it is more plausible to suggest that Murad waited for the right moment to address the Druze leader, who continued to provoke Ottoman ire even after the Canpolad rebellion had ended. Fakhreddin further consolidated his position by increasing his sekbans and building new infrastructure in his sanjaks. In response, Sandys argues:

It is said for certainty, that the Turke [whose commander in chief was Murad Pasha at that time] will turn his whole forces upon him the next Summer [meaning 1611]: and therefore more willingly condescends to a peace with the Persian. But the Emer is not much terrified with the rumor

[44] William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1983), 117.

[45] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Na'îmâ II*, 330.

[46] Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 123-124.

[47] Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası "Celalî İsyanları"* (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), 487.

[48] Göknur Çelik, *Vâsıtî'nin "Gazâvât-ı Murad Paşa" Adlı Eserinin İnclemesi* (Istanbul: Marmara University, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Master Thesis, 2006), 65.

[49] Zeynep Aycibin, *Kâtib Çelebi: Fezleke I-II-III (Tahlil ve Metin)* (Istanbul: Mimar Sinan Üniversitesi, Ortaçağ Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, Ph.D., 2007), 534.

(although he seeks to divert the temper by the continuance of gifts, the favor of his friends, and professed integrity:) for he not a little presumed of his invincible forts, well stored for a long Warre; and advantage of the mountains: having besides forty thousand expert souldiers in continually pay, part of them Moores, and part of the Christians: and if the worst should fall out, hath the sea to friends and the Florentine.[50]

He passed away in his nineties on August 15, 1611, in Cülek (near Diyarbakır) while preparing for another campaign against Persia the following year. Given the empire's reluctance to place additional strain on the state economy or bear the cost of a prolonged conflict with a relatively successful officer in Syria, the focus shifted. However, with Murad's death, the new Grand Vizier, Nasuh Pasha, had more freedom to confront Fakhreddin. Nasuh's meeting with a Persian envoy in Diyarbakır eventually led to a peace treaty, stipulating that Persia would send two hundred packs of silk and one hundred packs of valuables to the Ottoman capital each year.[51] Thus, Ottoman decision-makers were more focused on the changing political and economic landscape than on personal relationships.

The Ottoman administration did not initially target Fakhreddin or his realm in Syria. According to Mustafa Safi, the Ottoman navy sailed into the Mediterranean to search for enemy ships that might have attacked Ottoman vessels from Egypt. During this mission, the Ottoman admiral learned that Fakhreddin had plundered Damascus and its surrounding areas, as a result of his previous conflicts with the local population. As the navy advanced toward him, Fakhreddin attempted to make amends by sending back more booty than he had initially looted. More importantly, though, the Ottomans soon began to criticize him for underpaying taxes and for paying them late. Safi interprets this as a clear sign of his intent to rebel against the Porte ("işyânı istiṣ'âr olunmağın").[52] Although Fakhreddin's request for amnesty was denied, the Ottoman navy had no choice but to return to the imperial shipyard in Istanbul due to the approaching winter. In the meantime, the Ottomans made new appointments to the sanjaks of Ajlun, Karak-Shawback, and Nablus. In response, Fakhreddin provided asylum to Hamdan Qansuh and Amr Ibn Jabr, assisting them in regaining their positions. Ultimately, he succeeded in reestablishing them in Ajlun and Hawran, first by defeating the Ottoman local army and then its auxiliary forces.[53] Only after these events did Nasuh Pasha ultimately decide to send Hafız Ahmed Pasha with a significant force against Fakhreddin.

We should not completely dismiss the personal and possibly political tensions between Nasuh Pasha and Fakhreddin. Both Ottoman and Arabian sources reference their old enmity ("mâcerâ-i sâbıkı olmakla"). Fakhreddin's refusal to comply with the Grand Vizier and his failure to send annual taxes to Istanbul made his removal crucial for the imperial treasury.[54] It remains unclear

[50] Sandys, *A Relation of a Journey Begun an*, 212.

[51] Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Peçevi Tarihi II*, 318. Arakel shares details of this treaty in his history book. Arak'el of Tabriz, *Book of History*, 531.

[52] Mustafa Safi Efendi, *Mustafa Sâfî'nin Zübdetü't-Tevârîh'i II* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2003), 141-142.

[53] Ahmad al-Khalidi, *Tarikh al-Amir Fakhr al-Din al-Mani* (Beirut: al-Maṭba'ah al-Kāthūlīkīyah, 1936), 8-11. Quoted from Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650*, 90-91.

[54] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Na'îmâ II*, 410. Mustafa Safi Efendi, *Zübdetü't-Tevârîh II*, 311.

what exactly is meant by this enduring hostility. However, the context suggests that the Ottoman decision to eliminate Fakhreddin was not driven by Nasuh Pasha's animosity but by Fakhreddin's refusal to pay taxes in full and on time. By doing so, like Ali Canpolad before him, Fakhreddin became an intolerable partner to the Ottoman Empire, which was already struggling with financial difficulties and political instability in the early seventeenth century.

Khalidi suggests three possible reasons for the deterioration in the relationship between Nasuh Pasha and Fakhreddin. First, Fakhreddin supported the Janissaries in Damascus, undermining Nasuh Pasha, who was the governor there at the time. Second, Fakhreddin not only sent less money to Nasuh but also delivered it through his deputy, Mustafa, instead of his son Ali, as had been the practice under Murad Pasha. Lastly, Fakhreddin formed an alliance with Yunus al-Harfush and Ahmed Shihab against Hafız Ahmed Pasha.[55] None of these explanations were related to Fakhreddin's religious beliefs. More importantly, unlike Canpolad, who failed to establish meaningful connections with Europe, Fakhreddin demonstrated considerable competence in securing European support for his cause.[56] By the time the Tuscan delegation reached Cyprus to assist Ali Canbolad, he had already submitted to Ottoman rule, and Tuscany took no further action to support him. In contrast, following Fakhreddin's first unsuccessful resistance, Tuscany urgently sought to protect him. Ultimately, Fakhreddin managed to escape into exile with the help of a French ship in 1613.[57] Solakzade reports that when Fakhreddin's kethüda arrived with five galleons, fully equipped with cannons and ammunition off the coast of Damascus, Hafız Ahmed Pasha sent soldiers to confront Fakhreddin's allies. The Europeans attempted to attack the Ottoman forces but failed, eventually retreating to their homeland in desperation.[58] Compared to previous decades, the Ottoman Empire was now better equipped and prepared to confront the challenge posed by Fakhreddin and reassert its authority in the region.

4. Fakhreddin's Exile in Europe and Ottoman Response Thereafter

The punitive campaign led by Hafız Ahmed Pasha against Maanoğlu Fakhreddin was swift and decisive. Lacking the strength to resist the formidable Ottoman forces, Fakhreddin sought refuge in Europe to preserve his life ("tahlîs-i can için Frenge dahîl olup"). Naima characterizes

[55] al-Khalidi, *Tarikh al-Amir Fakhr al-Din al-Mani*, 5-7.

[56] Olsaretti argues that by the late sixteenth century, the weakening of empires such as the Ottomans and Habsburgs—primarily due to population growth—allowed smaller political figures, like the Grand Dukes of Tuscany and Fakhreddin, to expand their influence in the Mediterranean. Olsaretti, "Political dynamics in the rise of Fakhr al-Din, 1590–1633", 709-740.

[57] Qarali argues that before the clashes between the Ottomans and Fakhreddin, Tuscany provided him with one thousand muskets, originally intended for Ali Canpolad. Additionally, Fakhreddin continued to use the threat of excommunication against Eastern Christians, compelling them to assist him whenever needed. It was also during this period that he secured the right to seek refuge in Tuscany if necessary. Bulus Qarali, *Ali Basha Junbulat wali Halab: 1605-1611* (Beirut: Darul Maksuf, 1939), 168.

[58] "...üzerine frenk tâ'ifesi dahi cenk û harbe kadir olmagla gemilerine binûb hâib û hâsir memleketlerine mu'avedet itmişlerdi." Süleyman Lokmacı, *Solak-zâde Tarihi'nin Tahlili ve Metin Tenkidi* (Ankara: Atatürk Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ph.D., 2015), 936.

Fakhreddin's political asylum as an act of treachery, highlighting that his acceptance in the West came with the condition of aiding European forces in a future invasion of Jerusalem and its surrounding territories.[59] By this time, the Ottoman navy was unable to prevent French ships from safely transporting the rebel leader to Europe.

> The *Grand Signior* [Ahmed I] doth often threaten his [Fakhreddin's] subversion; which he puts off with a jest, that he knows that he will not this year trouble him: whose displeasure is not so much provoked by his encroaching, as by the revealed intelligence which he holds with the *Florentines*; whom he suffers to harbor within his haven of *Tyrus*, (yet excusing it as a place lying wast, and not to be defended) to come ashore for fresh-water, buyers of him underhand his prizes, and furnisheth him with necessaries. But designs of a higher nature have been treated of between them, as is well known to certain merchants employed in that business.[60]

The Ottoman Empire remained a preferable ally for the major European powers compared to Maanoğlu, who aspired to be more than a primus inter pares along the Levantine coast. However, Fakhreddin's ambition to eliminate all his rivals in Syria ultimately isolated him when he faced the Ottoman forces in 1613. Most Syrian local leaders, including Handan Qansuh, chose to align with the Ottoman Empire at that critical moment. Among them, Yusuf Sayfa, one of Fakhreddin's fiercest adversaries, stands out. A levend who had settled in Syria only about fifty years earlier, Yusuf owed his position as beylerbeyi of Tripoli entirely to the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Fakhreddin, he lacked ethnic or sectarian support in the region, which paradoxically strengthened his position. His absence of local allegiances made it easier for the Porte to be removed from office if necessary, rendering him a reliable and effective tool in the Ottoman strategy against Fakhreddin and other chieftains in Syria.[61]

Despite Fakhreddin's disappearance from the region for approximately five years, Ottoman statesmen were not entirely free to redistribute his positions as they saw fit. Fakhreddin's uncle Yunus sought to mediate a resolution by sending their grandmother to Ahmed Pasha with 50,000 piasters and other valuable gifts. This gesture facilitated a peace treaty between the two sides. The agreement stipulated that the Maʿnid family would pay an additional 400,000 piasters to the imperial treasury. In return, the Ottoman administration confirmed Maanoğlu Ali, Fakhreddin's son, as the new Emir of the Druzes in 1613.[62] Interestingly, sources that eagerly criticize Kuyucu Murad Pasha for sparing Fakhreddin from Canpolad's grim fate are notably silent regarding Nasuh Pasha's decision to reinstate Ali. This reflects the Ottoman administration's continued reliance on prominent members of the Maʿnid family to ensure effective local governance. Following this precedent, Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha, who succeeded Nasuh Pasha after his execution in 1614, similarly facilitated the political advancement of key Maʿnid figures. This decision was partly influenced by the renewal of Ottoman-Persian hostilities in 1615. Mehmed Pasha reinstated Fakhreddin's brother and son as governors of Safed and Sidon-Beirut, on the condition that they

[59] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ II*, 410.

[60] Sandys, *A Relation of a Journey Begun an*, 212.

[61] Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650*, 17-34.

[62] Wüstenfeld, *Fachr ed-din der Drusendfürst und seine Zeitgenossen*, 139-140.

provided substantial gifts and an additional 50,000 piasters in annual taxes.[63] Once again, it was not personal relationships but rather the political, economic, and social conditions of the time that compelled the Ottoman Empire to cooperate first with Fakhreddin and later with his close relatives after he escaped to Europe.

Fakhreddin and Tuscany had established a well-founded relationship even before he sought refuge in Europe.[64] Immediately after the suppression of the Canpolad uprising by the Ottomans, Ferdinand I, Grand Duke of Tuscany (1587–1609), and Fakhreddin strengthened their ties and forged an alliance against the Ottoman Empire in 1608. Following this agreement, Ferdinand promptly dispatched a ship loaded with weapons that had originally been prepared for Canpolad.[65] Ferdinand's death in 1609 did not terminate the alliance, as his successor, Cosimo II de Medici (1609–1621), continued to pursue his father's plans without deviation. In 1613, Cosimo II de Medici received Fakhreddin in Florence with great honor and respect. Similarly, Pope Paul V demonstrated a long-standing favorable attitude toward Fakhreddin, as reflected in a letter sent to the Maronite patriarch in 1610. In the letter, the Pope entrusted the Maronite community to Maanoğlu's protection and instructed Fakhreddin to care for the patriarch and his subjects in the East. The following year, a Maronite bishop visited both the Tuscan court and the Holy See as Fakhreddin's representative. During this period, Fakhreddin sought to persuade the Grand Duke of Tuscany that he could reconquer the Holy Lands for Christianity—a proposal that likely earned the Pope's approval. This culminated in Fakhreddin being granted an audience with Pope Paul V in Rome.[66]

Following his return from Italy after the death of Nasuh Pasha, Fakhreddin steadily ascended to the height of his power and influence in Syria. His rise, often at the expense of the Sayfa family, made him the region's most prominent ruler. By 1627, he had not only seized control of Tripoli but also extended his authority over numerous other territories. Similarly, Fakhreddin expanded his dominion at the expense of Yunus Harfush, a former ally against Hafız Ahmed Pasha in 1613. Harfush, however, had exploited Fakhreddin's absence in Europe between 1613 and 1618 to collaborate with Shiites against the Maʿnids. Unsurprisingly, Fakhreddin's expansionist ambitions further strained relations between the two families. Although Harfush's machinations cost Fakhreddin several sanjaks, including Safed, Ajlun, and Nablus, the Porte ultimately restored them to the Maʿnid family. Fakhreddin solidified his dominance in 1623 with a decisive victory over his local rivals at the Battle of Anjar. Shortly afterward, he demonstrated his growing influence by intervening in the appointment of the beylerbeyi of Damascus, successfully securing Mustafa Pasha's installation as governor.[67] With the dethronement of Mustafa I in 1623 and the accession of

[63] al-Khalidi, *Lubnān fī ʿahd al-Amīr Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī al-Thānī: wa-huwa kitāb tārīkh al-Amīr Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī* (al-Matbaah al-Kathulikiyah: Beirut, 1936), 36, 43.

[64] The first attempt to negotiate with Fakhreddin occurred between 1599 and 1602. Although two Tuscan agents sought to reach an agreement with him, Fakhreddin completely rejected their offer at that time. Olsaretti, "Political dynamics in the rise of Fakhr al-Din, 1590–1633", 718.

[65] Instructions, Lioncini, Feb. 1608. Quoted from Olsaretti, "Political dynamics in the rise of Fakhr al-Din, 1590–1633", 719.

[66] Wüstenfeld, *Fachr ed-din der Drusendfürst und seine Zeitgenossen*, 139.

[67] Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650*, 110-124.

Murad IV (1623–1640), the Ottoman state had little choice but to acknowledge Fakhreddin's de facto leadership in Syria.

Many scholars argue that the Ottoman provincial policies, which fostered competition among various power groups, often favored local rulers with strong financial strategies. In this context, Fakhreddin's success in driving economic development along the coastal regions was unparalleled. Members of the Maʿnid family consistently demonstrated their ability to generate substantial revenue, enabling them to fulfill their tax obligations to the imperial treasury and provide generous bounties to high-ranking Ottoman officials. Olsaretti highlights the distinctive approach of the Maʿnid family, and particularly Fakhreddin, in leveraging these resources. In a period marked by insecurity—characterized by piracy, brigandage, and heavy taxation—the Maʿns monetized their authority by offering "protection rent" in exchange for security. Fakhreddin strategically reinvested this surplus income into infrastructure projects, particularly fortifications, which helped establish order and stabilize agriculture. These efforts were instrumental in fostering economic growth along the Levantine coast.[68] Accurately estimating the financial performance of the Maʿnid family is challenging, but two reports by Tuscans Giovan Battista Santi and his companion Carlo Macinghi provide valuable insights. These reports were written shortly after they visited Sidon in 1614, following Fakhreddin's arrival in Tuscany. According to Santi, Fakhreddin's domain generated an annual income of approximately 300,000 piasters. Of this, 80,000 piasters were allocated to military expenses, and 70,000 piasters were paid to the Ottoman treasury, leaving a surplus of 150,000 piasters—funds over which the Ottomans had no claim. A separate estimation by the French ambassador Deshayes de Courmenin, who traveled through the Levant in 1624, reported that Fakhreddin's income amounted to 900,000 francs, of which only 340,000 francs were sent to the Porte. This financial strength enabled him to maintain a force of 10,000 soldiers, excluding the sekbans tasked with guarding the borders. These substantial resources solidified Fakhreddin's reputation as one of the most illustrious and powerful princes of his time.[69] At this point, it is crucial to emphasize that, unlike Ali Canpolad, Fakhreddin safeguarded his budget surplus by investing in local levies as a military force rather than relying on costly professional soldiers.

In the seventeenth century, even the Ottoman Empire struggled to sustain mercenary armies, as their costs frequently pushed the treasury toward bankruptcy. Consequently, the Ottomans increasingly relied on local militia units (nefir-i ʿam) rather than the central army, which proved far less effective in peripheral regions.[70] Moreover, unlike the central forces, local levies were deeply motivated to protect their villages. They fought relentlessly against any threat to rural

[68] Olsaretti, "Political dynamics in the rise of Fakhr al-Din, 1590–1633", 731-732. Similarly, Derviş Mehmed Pasha, appointed beylerbeyi of Baghdad during Murad IV's reign, engaged in trade and oversaw the city's reconstruction. This enabled him to support 10,000 men, including his immediate entourage and soldiers. İbrahim Metin Kunt, "Derviş Mehmet Paşa, Vezir and Entrepreneur: A Study in Ottoman Political-Economic Theory and Practice", *Turcica/9* (1977): 197-214.

[69] H. Lammens, *La Syrie II* (Beyrut: Imprimiere Catholique, 1921), 80.

[70] Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire", *Archivum Ottomanicum/6* (1980), 305-308.

security, driven by the desire to safeguard both their income and their personal property.[71] More importantly, Fakhreddin fostered an urban economy that offered locals a market to sell their products and purchase the manufactured goods they needed. He also provided well-fortified strongholds where people could seek refuge during times of danger. In summary, both Fakhreddin and his local subjects had a vested interest in collaboration, as he improved agricultural methods and promoted commerce to their mutual benefit. By relying primarily on local forces, supplemented by professional soldiers, and constructing or restoring sturdy fortifications, Fakhreddin successfully established a thriving economy for both residents and merchants. In return, he adopted a pragmatic approach to taxation, charging reasonable fees that balanced local prosperity with his fiscal needs. This strategy enabled him to secure cooperation—or, when necessary, buy the support—of high-ranking Ottoman officials, further consolidating his power and influence.

4.1. What Went Wrong This Time?

This balance of economic stability and security began to falter toward the end of Fakhreddin's era. On the one hand, he increasingly relied on sekbans for military support; on the other, his growing collaboration with foreign merchants often came at the expense of local interests as he sought to maximize his revenue.[72] More significantly, this period marked the reestablishment of political stability and centralized power within the Ottoman state. As part of a broader effort to reconsolidate control over its provinces, Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623–1640) showed little tolerance for Fakhreddin, who had risen to dominance in Syria at the expense of Ottoman interests. The death of Shah Abbas in 1629 further freed the Porte to focus on quelling defiance and disobedience within its domains. During this time, Fakhreddin's actions worsened the already strained relationship with the central administration. For instance, he refused to allow the sipahis of Hüsrev Pasha to take winter quarters in Syria after Hüsrev's failed campaign to recapture Baghdad in 1625–1626. By this point, the Porte harbored serious concerns about the possibility of Fakhreddin launching an invasion of Damascus.[73]

On December 28, 1632, Emir Ali, the mirliva (brigadier) of Sayda, Safed, and Beirut at the time, brought a tax payment of 1,700,000 aspers to Constantinople, likely to ease tensions and prevent a potential Ottoman campaign against his father.[74] Unfortunately for Fakhreddin, Sultan Murad had already made up his mind to eliminate the rebellious governor of Syria. Grand Vizier Halil Pasha eventually dispatched Küçük Ahmed Pasha to decisively deal with Fakhreddin. Although Ibrahim, the kethüda of Ahmed Pasha, was initially defeated and captured by Maanoğlu, the Ottoman forces later managed to wound and kill Fakhreddin's son, Ali. Fakhreddin could no longer resist the Ottoman army and fled to an inaccessible cave in the Shuf mountains to hide. However, Küçük Ahmed soon captured Fakhreddin, along with his sons Hüseyin and Mesud, and seized all their possessions. Fakhreddin was then sent to prison in the

[71] In contrast to the local levies, Fakhreddin's experience with mercenaries was also negative. See Abdul Karim Rafeq, "The Local Forces in Syria in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", *Wars, Technology and Society in the Middle East* ed. V. J. Parry - M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 291.

[72] Istifan Duwayhi, *Tarikh al-Azminah* (Beirut: Dar al-Hadd Khatir, 1900), 497.

[73] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Na'îmâ II*, 761.

[74] BOA, *AET,* No. 789.

Ottoman capital, while his sons were enrolled at the Galata Palace to be trained as future Ottoman officers. It took nearly two more months before Sultan Murad, intent on reconquering Baghdad at all costs, ordered Fakhreddin's execution during his journey to Sivas in 1635.

What went wrong for Fakhreddin this time, when he was neither able to seek refuge in Europe, as he had two decades earlier, nor secure a new state position as he had under Murad Pasha's vizierate? By the time Fakhreddin began consolidating power in Syria, Cosimo II had passed away in 1621. His son, Ferdinand II (r. 1621-1670), was only ten years old when he succeeded his father. During Ferdinand's minority, his mother, Maria Maddalena, and his grandmother, Christina of Lorraine, ruled on his behalf. Although Ferdinand officially took power in 1628, Christina retained the real authority until she died in 1636. By this time, the previous offensive strategy against the Ottomans, which had been pursued during Maddalena's reign, was abandoned. More importantly, Fakhreddin had lost much of his support among the local population. His earlier successes, which had once made him a powerful figure, now turned into his greatest weakness. Many local leaders began sending letters of complaint to the Porte, accusing Fakhreddin of various misdeeds. Among the charges were insults to Islam, converting mosques into churches, associating with Maltese knights, sheltering and aiding pirates who plundered coastal areas, and colluding with Christian princes who sought to seize the Holy Land.[75] After returning from Tuscany, Fakhreddin introduced new economic and military policies that secured the loyalty of his allies against his powerful enemies but also alienated the local population, undermining their common interests. As a result, the Ottoman Empire soon recognized that Fakhreddin was no longer as crucial to Ottoman Syria as he had been previously. After holding him in prison for a brief period, he was eventually replaced with a more reliable and trustworthy figure, all while ensuring that revenue and military support from the region were not lost.

Wüstenfeld argues that Fakhreddin's execution was prompted by his grandson, Mulham. After defeating the Ottomans in battle and plundering Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Acre, Mulham reignited hostilities. In response, Sultan Murad changed his position on Fakhreddin and ordered the execution of his four wives and his son Hüseyin. Despite Fakhreddin's death in Constantinople on April 13, 1635,[76] the Porte sought to reintegrate his close family members as potential loyal subjects. Two of Fakhreddin's sons, Mesud and Hüseyin, were enrolled in the Palace School (gılām-ı hass) to be trained as future Ottoman administrators. However, Mesud was soon strangled under unclear circumstances, and his body was dumped into the Marmara Sea as punishment for his perceived ingratitude toward the sultan. In contrast, Hüseyin rose through the ranks, first serving as a confidential secretary and chief deputy of the imperial treasury, before becoming the Ottoman ambassador to India during the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha. Naima, who met Hüseyin in person, described him as an astute, skilled, and virtuous governor of the time.[77] In brief, although Fakhreddin was no longer essential for the smooth governance of Ottoman Syria, some of his close relatives were still welcome to serve the Ottoman state.[78]

[75] Hrand D. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnamesi* (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2013), 219.

[76] Wüstenfeld, *Fachr ed-din der Drusendfürst und seine Zeitgenossen*, 168, fn. 161.

[77] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Na'îmâ II*, 763 and 804. Simeon presents a slightly different account, noting that two of Fakhreddin's grandsons were brought to Istanbul with their grandfather. The elder, Emir Hasan, was placed in a sack and thrown into the sea, while the younger was taken to the palace to be educated. The latter later acquired a great fortune and never returned to his ancestral lands. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnamesi*, 222.

[78] Barkey makes a similar claim regarding the notorious bandit Deli Hasan. Despite his earlier misdeeds, his request for amnesty was granted, and he was appointed governor of Bosnia. However, once his usefulness in the west had ended

5. The Role of Islamic Sects Reconsidered

Did differing religious interpretations of Islam influence Ottoman decision-making in dealing with Maanoğlu Fakhreddin and Ali Canpolad? On the one hand, it is evident that, as non-orthodox Muslims, the Druzes likely faced more opportunities for conflict with the Sunni Ottoman Empire. From the reign of Selim I onwards, the Ottomans recognized that the Druzes in Syria, under the leadership of the Maʿn family, were not inclined to accept Ottoman rule, given their opposition to the Sunni Ottoman identity. Despite this, Sultan Selim, who was one of the most ardent supporters of Sunni Islam in the empire, did not hesitate to cooperate with the Druzes against the Sunni Mamluks in 1517. On the other hand, it is notable that the Ottomans did not systematically condemn the Maʿn family for representing a heterodox branch of Islam. This lack of a consistent religiously motivated condemnation does not imply, however, that the Ottomans and the Druzes always coexisted peacefully. For example, after the Druzes, including the Maʿn family, killed an Ottoman Subashi in the Shuf region, they were accused of hostility toward Sunni Islam. This led to a fatwa from the Ottoman ulema in Damascus in 1529, calling for the Druzes' execution and the confiscation of their property.[79] In a similar vein, some Ottoman sources described members of the Maʿn family (and their associates) using derogatory terms such as "Benî-Kelb" (sons of dogs)[80] and "dürûz-ı meẕhebsüz" (undenominational Druzes).[81] Ottoman intellectuals continued to use such insults long after Fakhreddin died in Istanbul. For example, Katip Çelebi interpreted Fakhreddin's retreat to Europe as a consequence of his lack of religious affiliation, stating that he became part of the Franks because he was neither a member of a religion nor pious ("bir din ile mütedeyyin olmadığından Frenk'e dahîl olup").[82]

Despite the derogatory descriptions of the Druzes, whose doctrine was closer to the Shiites than to the Sunnis, it is more plausible to view their relationship with the Ottomans in political terms rather than strictly religious ones. Unlike Ottoman writings on the Shiite Safavids, which often contained hostile rhetoric, there is no evidence of any systematic discourse or planned strategy specifically targeting the Druzes or their faith. The Ottoman Porte was generally more suspicious of the Shiites and Alevites, primarily due to the prolonged Ottoman-Persian conflicts that began in the early sixteenth century. Interestingly, the Ottoman Empire considered Fakhreddin and his Druze allies more trustworthy and competent in dealing with these "heretics" than its Orthodox subjects. For instance, in an imperial decree dated March 25, 1582, the Porte instructed the beylerbeyi and judge of Damascus to remain vigilant against the revafız (a term for Shiites here), who might attempt to enter the town of Safad in defiance of the sultan's orders.[83] Likewise, in collaboration with the governor of Tripoli, the Ottomans entrusted Fakhreddin with the

and the Ottoman Empire faced Shah Abbas in the east, the decision was made to execute him. Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 206-207.

[79] Abu-Husayn, *Provincial Leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650*, 77.

[80] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ II*, 336.

[81] İbrahim Hakkı Çuhadar, *Mustafa Sâfî'nin Zübdetü't-Tevârîhi* (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1995), 304.

[82] Aycibin, *Kâtib Çelebi: Fezleke I-II-III (Tahlil ve Metin)*, 601.

[83] Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615*, 134, fn. 132.

responsibility of preventing the Rafizis from entering Tripoli as well.[84] Eventually, Fakhreddin was granted control over territories traditionally governed by Shiites. More importantly, however, it was not the orthodox Ottoman officers or Sunni subjects of the empire who voiced objections to Fakhreddin's rule, but rather the local Druze population, who lodged official complaints about his religious policies in Syria. The Druzes—Fakhreddin's loyal followers—also turned against him when they realized he was a dishonorable ("şerefsiz") master.[85] In the end, it was not the sectarian differences of the Druzes, but rather the shifting political and economic stability in the capital, that compelled the Ottomans to oppose Fakhreddin in the early 1630s. As with Sunni rebel leaders like Hüsrev and Ilyas Pashas in 1632, Sultan Murad had lost patience with the troublemakers in the empire and sought to eliminate them, placing little or no emphasis on their religious identity.

Additionally, Fakhreddin's close relationships with certain European elites gave rise to rumors about his conversion to Christianity, either in Europe or within Ottoman territories. According to Lammens, he permitted a missionary to baptize him after recovering from a serious illness.[86] Moreover, Wüstenfeld states that Sultan Murad granted Fakhreddin a brief moment to perform Islamic prayer before his execution. However, Fakhreddin chose instead to cross himself, which led to his immediate execution by the Sultan's direct order.[87] Simeon adds that after his death, it was discovered that Maanoğlu had a cross on his chest.[88] One could easily cite numerous claims that Fakhreddin renounced Islam and became a renegade. However, these claims appear to be little more than speculation. Most of these stories are later fabrications, rather than contemporary accounts of Fakhreddin's faith at the time. The Druzes, being few in number, did not pose a significant threat to the mainstream Ottoman understanding of Islam. Equally important, even the Shiites anathematized them as heretics. Therefore, unlike Sunni Canpolad, who sought help from Shah Abbas as a last resort, Fakhreddin never considered seeking refuge in the East. This also explains why the Porte did not perceive any tangible threat from Fakhreddin's previous role in opposing the Rafizis. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire decided to eliminate Fakhreddin, not because of his unorthodox beliefs (or alleged conversion to Christianity) or his association with the Shiites, but because he had become not only a liability to the state and local populations but also undesirable among his co-religionists in Syria.

As adherents of Sunni Islam, the Ottomans could not publicly repudiate Ali Canpolad or denounce his faith without risking ideological inconsistency. Consequently, no Ottoman sources explicitly accuse members of the Canpolad family of heresy or association with heterodox sects. However, this absence of explicit condemnation does not imply that Ali Canpolad unconditionally recognized the Ottoman leadership of the Sunni Muslim community. For instance, the chronicler Vasiti accuses Canpolad of obstructing pilgrims en route to Mecca and Medina. If true, such actions could be interpreted as deliberate attempts to undermine Sultan Ahmed's reputation as the Caliph of Islam. Vasiti further speculates that Canpolad might have sought control over the Holy Cities,

[84] BOA, *A. DVNSMHM.d.*, No. 102.

[85] Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnamesi*, 219-220.

[86] Lammens, *La Syrie II*, 81.

[87] Wüstenfeld, *Fachr ed-din der Drusendfürst und seine Zeitgenossen*, 167.

[88] Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnamesi*, 218, 222.

contingent on a hypothetical victory against Murad Pasha in 1607.[89] Overall, Ali's uprising was seen solely as huruc-ı alessultan (withdrawal of allegiance from the sultan), with no reference to his beliefs. Ottoman sources labeled him as müfsid (troublemaker), hain (traitor), or asi (rebel) while referring to their forces as leşger-i İslâm (soldiers of Islam).[90] Kuyucu Murad Pasha carried the Holy Flag of the Prophet Muhammad against Ali Canpolad, who unsuccessfully attempted to seize it. While the flag primarily motivated Ottoman soldiers, the conflict was not portrayed as a war between believers and unbelievers.[91] Unlike other rebels, such as Hüsrev and Ilyas Pashas, who had served in the Ottoman palace, the contemporary chronicler İbrahim Peçevi therefore expressed no objection to praying for God's mercy on Ali after his execution in 1610.[92]

Similar to Maanoğlu Fakhreddin, the Ottoman court successfully integrated key members of the Canpolad family into the palace following Ali Canpolad's execution. For instance, Mustafa Agha, the son of Ali's uncle Hüseyin, was enrolled in the Palace School and later became an Ottoman captain under Murad IV.[93] According to Naima, Mustafa was not only skilled in Ottoman calligraphy and clockmaking but also a talented poet.[94] Edirnevi further notes that Mustafa advanced to prominent positions such as mîrâhûr-ı evvel (chief supervisor of the sultan's stable) and musâhib (companion of the sultan). More notably, he was granted hass (sultanic lands) and, for the first time, the honorific title of vizier, which had not been bestowed upon Ali Canpolad.[95] Mustafa Agha eventually joined other high-ranking officials in scheming against Murad IV. Encouraged by Grand Vizier Recep Pasha, he persuaded the Sultan to entrust Musa Çelebi to the Vizier's protection. After Musa's assassination by Janissary rebels, both Mustafa and Recep Pasha were executed for failing to ensure his safety, however.[96]

Conclusion

Following its conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1516-1517, the Ottomans began fostering a Sunni identity by emphasizing specific Islamic jurisprudence and reinforcing the divide between Sunnis and Shiites within the empire.[97] However, the Ottoman ruling class did not allow religious ideology to constrain pragmatic political decisions, particularly in governing regions like Syria. The Ottoman approach to figures such as Fakhreddin and Ali Canpolad should be understood in economic and political terms rather than religious, ethnic, or personal ones. The Ottoman state consistently sought to integrate any political

[89] Çelik, *Vâsıtî'nin "Gazâvât-ı Murad Paşa"*, 59, 65.

[90] Sağırlı, *Nuhbetü't-Tevârih*, 12, 38.

[91] Yılmazer, *Topçular Kâtibi Tarihi I*, 501-502.

[92] Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Peçevi Tarihi II*, 313.

[93] Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Peçevi Tarihi II*, 313.

[94] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ II*, 691.

[95] Sağırlı, *Nuhbetü't-Tevârih*, 95-96.

[96] Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Naʿîmâ II*, 711-712.

[97] See Derin Terzioğlu, "Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Siyasa al-Shariyya,* and the Early Modern Ottomans", *Historicizing Sunni Islam in the Ottoman Empire, c. 1450-c.1750*, ed. Tijana Krstić - Derin Terzioğlu (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2020). Nir Shafir, "How to Read Heresy in the Ottoman World", *Historicizing Sunni Islam in the Ottoman Empire, c. 1450-c.1750*, ed. Tijana Krstić and Derin Terzioğlu (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2020).

or religious entity into its apparatus if they were deemed useful to the state's interests. While the Maʿn family officially entered the Ottoman system, the Canpolads had long been part of the Ottoman administrative framework. In contrast, those already entrenched in the central system had fewer opportunities to maintain their positions compared to those who were later integrated.[98] The Maʿn family serves as an example of how the Ottomans cultivated cordial relationships with local elites to maintain their power in Syria. For the Canpolad family, members were typically trained in the Ottoman Palace School as future governors. The empire was eager to promote them to the highest imperial posts but also quick to punish disobedience when necessary. Despite this, the Ottomans remained open to integrating members of both families, regardless of sect affiliation. This supports Barkey's argument that "the power of the state necessarily grew not only at the expense of societal groups but also because the state incorporated or legitimized these groups and linked them to itself".[99] This study thus highlights the contradictions between the Ottoman state's confessional policies and its political expediency, as seen in the cases of Fakhreddin and Ali Canpolad. Although the Ottoman approach may have evolved following the reconquest of Baghdad from the Safavids in 1638 and during the Kadızadeli movement from the 1630s to the 1690s—topics beyond this paper's scope—it is clear that political pragmatism often superseded sectarian divides.

Finally, while orthodox or heterodox interpretations of Islam did not significantly influence Ottoman decision-making in the examples of Fakhreddin and Ali, they played a crucial role in shaping their relationships with foreigners. Maanoğlu's heretical views of Islam appear to have facilitated his refuge in Europe, in contrast to Ali Canpolad. This cordial relationship persisted even after Fakhreddin's return to Syria. For instance, at the request of Louis XIII of France, Fakhreddin not only restored the Basilica of the Annunciation but also constructed a new Franciscan monastery adjacent to it. Additionally, he granted permission for the construction of other churches within his domains. More importantly, Fakhreddin cooperated with the Maltese Knights, allowing them to engage in trade along the Levantine coast, including the sale of goods plundered from Muslims in the Mediterranean.[100] In contrast, Ali Canpolad's relationship with European powers presents a starkly different picture. Despite losing everything to Murad Pasha, Ali never considered fleeing to Europe as an option, nor is there any evidence suggesting he collaborated with European powers to promote Christian hegemony in the Holy Lands. Interestingly, as a last resort, Ali offered his military services to Shiite Shah Abbas after his defeat at Oruç Valley in 1607, though without success. Conversely, there is no evidence that Fakhreddin ever sought cooperation with the Shiite Safavids against the Sunni Ottomans. These differences highlight the general approach of the Ottomans compared to foreign powers in dealing with sectarian leaders. The Ottomans viewed sectarian divisions pragmatically, focusing on governance, while foreign powers framed them as theological disputes, exploiting them to undermine the Ottoman Empire. This contrast warrants further exploration in future research.

[98] To examine the differences in the Ottoman approach to officials who were raised within the central Ottoman administration from the outset versus those who were later incorporated into the Ottoman system: Birol Gündoğdu, "Katırcıoğlu Mehmed ve Abaza Hasan Örneklerinde Osmanlı Devleti'nin 17. Yüzyılın Ortasında Asilere Yaklaşımı," CUJOSS 48/1 (June 2024): 47-65.

[99] Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 1.

[100] Lammens, *La Syrie II*, 78-81.

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