

THE EFFECT OF THE ONGOING RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

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Abstract

The conflict that continues between Russia and Ukraine has greatly influenced the function of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the realm of international relations. Charged with the essential duty of leading efforts to establish and maintain peace on a global scale, IGOs face new challenges. The ongoing war in Ukraine undoubtedly poses a risk to harmonious international relations. Consequently, the anticipated and established roles of IGOs, as outlined by international legal provisions, are brought into focus for examination in terms of how they address such conflicts. Informed by this comprehension, the primary objective of this research is to investigate the involvement of IGOs within the framework of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, considering the relevant diplomatic, economic, and military interactions. This analysis will particularly focus on the activities of the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU). This study aims to comprehend the vital roles played by selected IGOs in addressing the ongoing international conflicts of the 21st century, specifically through an analysis of their actions concerning the Russia-Ukraine war.

Keywords: United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War.

DEVAM EDEN RUS-UKRAYNA ÇATIŞMASININ HÜKÜMETLERARASI ÖRGÜTLER ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ

Öz

Rusya ve Ukrayna arasında devam eden çatışma, uluslararası ilişkiler alanında hükümetler arası örgütlerin (IGO'lar) işlevini büyük ölçüde etkilemiştir. Küresel ölçekte barışı tesis etme ve sürdürme çabalarına öncülük etme temel göreviyle görevlendirilen IGO'lar yeni zorluklarla karşı karşıyadır. Ukrayna'da devam eden savaş; şüphesiz uluslararası ilişkiler için bir risk oluşturmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, uluslararası hukuki hükümler tarafından özetlenen IGO'ların öngörülen ve yerleşik rolleri, bu tür çatışmaları nasıl ele aldıkları açısından incelenmek üzere odak noktasına getirilir. Bu anlayışla bu araştırmanın temel amacı, ilgili diplomatik, ekonomik ve askeri etkileşimleri göz önünde bulundurarak, IGO'ların Rusya ve Ukrayna arasındaki devam eden çatışma çerçevesindeki katılımını araştırmaktır. Bu

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makale özellikle Birleşmiş Milletler (BM), Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı (AGİT), Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü (NATO) ve Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) faaliyetlerine odaklanacaktır. Bu çalışma, 21. yüzyılda devam eden uluslararası çatışmaların çözümünde seçilmiş hükümetler arası örgütlerin oynadığı hayati rolleri ve hayati fonksiyonları özellikle Rusya-Ukrayna savaşıyla ilgili eylemlerinin analizi yoluyla kavramayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Birleşmiş Milletler, Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü, Avrupa Birliği, Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı.*

Giriş

Europe, which was marked by division throughout the Cold War, entered a process of ‘completion’ following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. So much so that the US, emphasizing that the Cold War began with the division of Europe and would only end with the completion of Europe (Bush, 1989), declared the post-1989 European order. This order, aimed at “making Europe whole and free” (Bush, 1989), aimed to expand the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence to the east of the continent. Within this framework, while NATO and the EU expanded from Eastern Europe to the Black Sea on the one hand, they also played a role in the ‘completion’ of Europe by turning to partnerships and integration with countries that were not members of the Alliance and Union. The Russian Federation, which opposes the Euro-Atlantic presence in its ‘near abroad’, which it describes as a vital area of interest including Eastern Europe, has taken its place in the struggle for spheres of influence by determining a policy different from that of the US, NATO and the EU regarding the region. The most important leg of this struggle over Eastern Europe, which has been ongoing between both sides of the Atlantic and the Russian Federation since 1991, has been Ukraine, one of the largest countries in Europe and a Black Sea country. Ukraine, which draws attention with its location between NATO and EU members Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania and the Russian Federation, is a real border country between Washington, Brussels and Moscow’s spheres of influence.

After its independence, Ukraine’s relations with the Euro-Atlantic powers (USA, NATO, and EU) and the Russian Federation were marked by the issue of denuclearization, Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine’s renunciation of nuclear weapons in January 1994 with the Tripartite Agreement, followed by its ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons in November, paved the way for its relations with the Euro-Atlantic powers (Larrabee, 1998; Turan, 2004). Ukraine’s status as a non-nuclear state was once again emphasized with the Budapest Memorandum in December 1994. In addition, within the framework of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the US, UK and RF committed to “respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and current borders” and “refrain from

using or threatening force against its political independence or territorial integrity” with the Memorandum in question. In 1997, after the dispute between Ukraine and RF regarding Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet was resolved, Moscow made the same commitment to Kiev this time with a bilateral agreement. Leasing the ports in Sevastopol for twenty years, RF accepted that Crimea was under Ukrainian sovereignty and the Black Sea Fleet was shared between the two countries (Turan, 2004). With the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty that entered into force in 1998, Ukraine and RF emphasized that they “respect each other’s territorial integrity” and confirmed the “inviolability of their current borders”.

Thus, Ukraine’s foreign policy priority/choice, which has confirmed its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity by resolving its disagreements with global and regional powers, has been important for Euro-Atlantic powers and the Russian Federation, which have different goals in the region. Because the question/problem of whether the Kiev administration will choose to integrate with Euro-Atlantic institutions or with formations led by the Russian Federation has shaped the process of ‘building a new Europe’ after the Cold War.

Ukraine is one of the Eastern European countries that gave birth to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which set out with the aim of being an effective integration initiative under the leadership of the Russian Federation in the former Soviet geography. However, Ukraine, which started to prefer Euro-Atlantic institutions in the early 1990s, became the first CIS country to establish partnerships with NATO and the EU (Solchanyk, 2001); then it took its place among the countries that formed GU(U)AM, which opposed Russian influence. In 2004, after the change of power known as the ‘Orange Revolution’, the Yushchenko administration, which came to power, also prioritized the policy of integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. During this process, Ukraine’s developing relations with the US, NATO and the EU increased the influence of Washington and Brussels in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, in 2010, the agreement signed by the Yanukovych administration with Moscow and the reinforcement of the Russian Federation’s military presence in Crimea changed the balances in the region. The crisis that erupted in November 2013 when the Kiev administration, which once again chose Moscow, decided not to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, escalated with the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, has also been part of the ongoing struggle for spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. However, the crisis that began in 2013 and continued with the Ukraine War in 2022 has been seen as a “turning point in Euro-Atlantic security,” unlike previous struggles for spheres of influence between the Euro-Atlantic powers and the Russian Federation in Eastern Europe. So much so that the Ukrainian crisis was described by the then NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen as “the greatest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War”

(McMahon, 2014). In this process, when the struggle for sphere of influence in Eastern Europe evolved from the Ukrainian crisis to the Ukrainian War, the Russian Federation was described by the Euro-Atlantic powers as a “challenger”, a “revisionist power trying to establish spheres of influence on its borders and achieve great power status”, a “strategic rival” (Fiott and Lindstrom, 2021), and the “most important and direct threat”.

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia holds significant importance in various ways, especially regarding the effectiveness of international institutions. This discussion will primarily center on whether international organizations have a meaningful impact on international relations.

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia lingers, drawing attention from all over the world because the issue is seen to be of great significance in geopolitical terms and has possible implications for regional security. This war has led to what can be termed as a complicated and protracted situation comprising political, military, and social dimensions. At the heart of the conflict are historical, cultural, and political. At the core of this matter are Russia's annexation of Crimea and ongoing hostilities in Eastern Ukraine.

The crisis has attracted vast international attention, leading to the involvement of many nations and intergovernmental organizations in mediation efforts towards bringing peace to the conflict. The following is an outline of how international organizations have had, or continue having today, a pivotal impact on diplomacy initiatives geared toward identifying peaceful solutions. A solution has been actively sought by the UN, NATO and EU which have acted as mediators negotiating and bringing in humanitarian aid. The war between Ukraine and Russia took a lot of casualties around 10.000 people, some of them are civilians. Several countries are urging Russia to settle disputes peacefully to avoid more casualties. Some of countries are already give sanctions to Russia in order to dismiss Russia from attacking Ukraine.

Specific limitations relating to this study should be emphasized. These may or may not include restrictions on data availability, being time-bound, and biasing views by the respondents. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is important to note that this research will contribute to better comprehension of global conflict mediation and diplomacy for providing valuable dimensions regarding the active involvement that international organizations showcase in addressing the major geopolitical issue.

This will require a detailed analysis of the roles and contributions of international organizations. Emphasizing the paper's final remarks on the role of international cooperation and diplomacy in addressing today's global issues and crises. It is very important to investigate how effectively such international organizations helped in facilitating regional stability and pursuing peaceful conflict resolution.

1. ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is one that has been ongoing for close to a decade, with its inception in 2014. This problem is a complicated and major geopolitical issue of the 21st century. NATO, the UN, and the EU have been at the forefront of dealing with this protracted crisis of international concern. Since it involves intricate historical, political, and cultural dimensions, the ongoing tussle has drawn considerable attention from scholars across various disciplines. The present researcher intends to probe into an extensive study on international organizations' mediation efforts in managing the Russia-Ukraine contest. Many critical themes, insights, and discussions arising out of such research are due for exploration. The objective of this review is to have researched practically how international organizations address a global issue by investigating their historical roots, rationale strategies developed, and effects realized through intervention. It seeks to serve this very purpose by building on such inquiries so far undertaken.

As noted by Sefti (2022), numerous Western nations have swiftly extended their support to Ukraine through the provision of humanitarian and military aid, both within the country and in various external locations. Nevertheless, individual states are unlikely to address these issues effectively without a coordinated approach facilitated by international organizations. Given the uncertainty of what lies ahead, it is becoming increasingly clear that it will be essential. Collaboration among nations is essential through the establishment of new partnerships and the enhancement of existing ones. Numerous international organizations swiftly responded to the needs of those impacted by the war. Most of these organizations function in countries neighboring Ukraine, primarily in Poland, due to concerns regarding safety and security. When evaluating the magnitude of the issue in relation to the size of the nation, it becomes evident that significantly more efforts are required, both in the immediate future and in the broader context. The current challenging circumstances highlight the crucial role of international institutions in addressing crises like this one. The conflict prompts discussions about the need to reform major international organizations, including the United Nations (UN). It is disconcerting that a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is the nation accountable for the aggression, as this status allows it to veto any resolutions that might benefit Ukraine.

In this case, it can be said that Russia violated international law by launching an attack on the sovereign territory of Ukraine and disregarded the authority of the United Nations as an international body responsible for mediating such conflicts. At the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the United Nations issued its first resolution. The resolution specifically concerned the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which Russia had violated by annexing the Crimea region from Ukraine. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia became a topic of discussion when the Ukrainian ambassador to the United Nations submitted a letter discussing threats to Ukraine's security and

peace. When resolving the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, it is important to consider the response to the letter from the Ukrainian ambassador to the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council recently held a closed-door meeting to draft a resolution. Unfortunately, the resolution was not successfully implemented in the ongoing conflict due to Russia's veto of the proposed resolution. The 80th United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been no greater threat to the security and tranquility of European countries than the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine began around the end of 2021, especially in November, when satellite images showed that about 100,000 Russian soldiers, as well as tanks and other military equipment, were gathered in the border area. The United Nations, as an international organization, immediately responded by convening a meeting, which was subsequently approved by the authorities of both Russia and Ukraine, who agreed to hold a meeting to find a solution to end the war (Sefti, 2022).

As reported by The United Nations (2022), Russia launched a military assault on Ukraine, which the organization has classified as a breach of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This action contradicts the principles established in the United Nations Charter, which should be applied uniformly rather than selectively. All Member States are required to adhere to the accepted regulations. A resolution passed by the UN General Assembly calls for Russia's suspension from the Human Rights Council. According to The UN (2022), this resolution received a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, excluding abstentions, within the Assembly of 193 members. Specifically, 93 countries supported the resolution, while 24 opposed it.

Daenuri (2022) points out that in the seventy years since the founding of the United Nations, most people in the world have felt that they are in a comfort zone, without real fighting as in the past. However, this was destroyed by Russia's military operations in several cities in Ukraine. There are three main variables that led to Russia's intervention in Ukraine, including geopolitical factors, demographic factors, and sociopolitical factors. These three elements are listed in order from most important to least important. Since Russia's intervention violates the norm of non-compliance, it is a criminal act and therefore illegal. The intervention has economic and political effects and can be divided into several categories. On the one hand, war is a series of processes aimed at maintaining power and maintaining the existence of groups and factions; on the other hand, the establishment of the United Nations after World War II is a sign of peace and national security. This is the importance of the United Nations to war. War is not simply carried out through physical resistance or simple military force; it can also take other forms, such as market wars or ideological battles. Therefore, the United Nations, as an international institution, has the responsibility to prevent the outbreak of conflicts and wars.

The United Nations follows a number of principles set forth in the UN Charter. These principles include: The United Nations is founded on the sovereign equality of its member states; each member pursues noble goals in the performance of its duties; the United Nations does not engage in acts of violence or threaten other states; and does not invoke the UN Charter to interfere in the internal legal systems of member states. States that recognize their responsibility to uphold the principles enshrined in the UN Charter can apply to become members of the United Nations. The United Nations has set itself the ambitious goal of achieving global peace by reducing the likelihood of future armed conflicts. Given the UN's significant influence and the fact that many countries are also committed to an immediate resolution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the UN should be able to carry out its efforts smoothly (ABC News, 2023).

The United States of America, NATO, and the European Union have collectively offered substantial military and financial aid to Ukraine, allowing the nation to endure the Kremlin's aggressive actions. Although this support is vital for Ukraine's struggling economy, there is currently no defined end date for the assistance. Nonetheless, it remains uncertain how much longer Kyiv will receive billions of dollars (or euros) in aid from its allies. In the wake of a short-term funding bill passed by the United States Congress, which eliminated support for Ukraine amid its conflict with Russia, President Joe Biden sought to reassure allies that the United States would continue to uphold its financial commitment to the war effort. According to White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre, "Biden had rallied more than 140 countries to condemn Russia's invasion and built a coalition of more than 50 countries to provide aid to Ukraine." She further emphasized, "Biden has also built a coalition of more than 50 countries to provide aid to Ukraine." Meanwhile, sanctions are playing a significant role in the decline of Russia's financial circumstances (Macchiarelli, 2022).

During this period of crisis, the role of the European Union in providing both political and economic assistance is essential. The European Union is comprised of the United and its member states. The European Union together with its governing body should be commended for their response to the recent situation in Ukraine, although some member states did not respond as well. Equally important are the trade sanctions that were put by EU and its members against Russia, together with resuming temporarily trade with Ukraine, military assistance, financial aid - among other ways to help Ukraine during and after the conflict. It is important for the European Union to continue on this course and increase even more support in its region, in various ways — especially during unprecedented crisis situations. As of September 2023, the most recent EU data reports on the European Union and its member states that have provided Ukraine with military aid, financial support, humanitarian aid, and emergency assistance total €64 billion. This includes what is known as military aid, plus funding for Ukrainian refugees from the EU, which brings

the total support to €81 billion. Military Assistance is generally referred to as such because it involves one force element providing The European Union (EU) has funded military support to a remarkable degree through the European Peace Facility (EPF), having allocated a total of €5.6 billion in assistance to Ukraine to date. Of this amount, €3.1 billion is for lethal equipment; €380 million for non-lethal items; and €2 billion for providing 1 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine. The ammunition shall be drawn from either the existing stockpiles of EU member states or through joint procurement programs. The assistance extended may be reimbursed from the EPF by the member states. Also, the European Union has started a training mission for the armed forces of Ukraine in particular. According to ABC News, 2023, information reports on bilateral military support has provided by EU members to Ukraine exceeding €19 billion (ABC News, 2023).

NATO firmly denounces Russia's hostile actions against Ukraine, a sovereign, tranquil, and democratic country. Additionally, Ukraine stands as a close ally of NATO. An extraordinary level of support is continually being provided to Ukraine by NATO and its Allies, which is vital for protecting its fundamental right to self-defense. Various forms of military equipment are being dispatched by NATO member nations. Military equipment, including drones, tanks, howitzers, air defense systems, and both light and heavy machinery, is being generously supplied to Ukraine by NATO Allies, who have contributed billions of euros' worth. Ukrainian troops are utilizing this equipment while receiving training from Allied forces. Each day, these actions significantly influence the battlefield, aiding Ukraine in upholding its fundamental right to self-defense. The principle articulated in the United Nations Charter is significant. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that Ukraine is receiving considerable financial support from the Allies, totaling billions of euros. Many of these Allies are also involved in providing humanitarian aid to civilians and hosting many Ukrainian refugees. The Allies are working together with relevant parties (ABC News, 2023).

According to Gregorio (2022), it is painfully distressing to regularly observe the inhumanity exhibited by humans toward one another in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In truth, the Philippines' lack of active participation as a nation in this horrific war, which deliberately and inevitably targets civilians, should not lead Filipinos to adopt a stance of indifference. The massacre of innocent individuals in Ukraine casts a dark and repulsive shadow over humanity. Even though this violence is not occurring on our soil, it remains an attack on our very essence. Given the nature of armed conflict, the use of deadly force is unavoidable. Nonetheless, the aggression against Ukraine stands out as a specific instance of a stronger nation perpetrating violence against a more vulnerable ally. It serves almost as a forewarning of what might transpire if China were to launch an attack on the Philippines. Once the Philippine armed forces, due to their limited numbers and insufficient equipment, are unable to defend against a potential Chinese

invasion, innocent civilians become the next and only available targets. Consequently, the safety of the civilian population is jeopardized. In full view of a watchful and alarmed international community, Russia is committing acts of inhumanity in broad daylight. The ongoing situation in Ukraine demands the focus of the Filipino populace. Numerous important lessons can be quickly drawn from Ukraine's defense against a vastly superior force. The parallels between the circumstances in Ukraine and those in the Philippines are striking. Nonetheless, while there exists a delicate distinction between the potential for invasion and its actual implementation, we are currently facing only a threat.

In summary, this literature review really delves into what the contributions of international organizations are in the relentless pursuit of a settlement regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It stresses the importance of having a background history of the conflict and reviews different strategies adopted by various other actors— NATO, EU, UN— during the conflict. International organizations play critical roles in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Organizations such as the UN, EU, NATO, and OSCE operate in areas such as peacekeeping, mediation, conflict prevention, and ensuring the implementation of international law. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, although the UN continues diplomatic efforts, its effectiveness is limited due to Russia's veto power. The EU provides economic and military support to Ukraine, while imposing sanctions on Russia. NATO, while not directly intervening militarily, has strengthened its presence in Eastern Europe. The OSCE, on the other hand, conducted surveillance missions at the beginning of the war, but was forced to cease its activities. The literature examines the effects of international organizations on the course of the war in a multidimensional manner, and reveals that the roles and activities of these organizations are critical factors in managing conflicts. Problems researchers have underlined for these organizations during the conflict include such as intricacies in maneuvering with Russia's interests and efforts on effective cease-fire agreements. It gives an insight into how international organizations function within this complex dispute and its implications for global efforts aimed at addressing similar challenges.

2. METHODOLOGY

This study seeks to compare the strategies pursued by the various other actors— NATO, EU, UN in their quest for a resolution to the dispute and to assess the outcomes of those strategies. The first research variable is a view of the origins of the conflict. The second and major variable is a review of major international organizations involved in addressing the case, an analysis of their mediation tactics, and an analysis of how these have affected efforts at resolving the conflict. Conflict is the dependent variable and the various other actors are independent variables.

The paper will also look at how international organizations have tried to deal with the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The effectiveness of

their interventions will be assessed from this study. This research tries to answer the question because it looks at many different parts of the conflict. It is hoped that the study helps bring out the various roles played by international organizations in mediating the disagreement. The probe will try to see what kind of initiatives these organizations take, the challenges they meet, and how much they impact processes of conflict resolution. Literature survey method will be used under the methodology heading.

2.1. Data Collection

The data for this research was gathered through gazettes and texts of several publicly available journals. Publicly available data on gazettes and texts were reviewed to assess the situation of interorganizational aid to Ukraine-Russia war. Information from interorganizational websites and social media was also incorporated to provide a comprehensive understanding of the current war issue. Furthermore, additional data was sourced from industry reports and academic studies related to war issue practices.

2.2. Analysis

This study focuses on how international organizations engage and influence conflicts such as the case of Russia and Ukraine by analyzing the behavior and constraints of their mediation besides offering important insights on whether global mediation is effective in dealing with challenges that are both complicated and long-lasting, thus informing efforts of conflict resolution in different parts of the world.

The paper will look at the policies of the interorganizational organizations and the Russian Federation concerning Ukraine. It will be argued that the goal for Euro-Atlantic powers is to build spheres of influence in Eastern Europe as part of the larger idea of "building a new Europe" which does not involve the Russian Federation. It will be argued that the Russian Federation has been identified as an 'unnamed' threat element that will continue the Euro-Atlantic partnership under the leadership of the USA and expand its sphere of influence, thus expanding NATO and the EU to the borders of the Russian Federation. In this context, it will be argued that Washington and Brussels' Ukraine policies are guided by their efforts to establish a complete, free and peaceful new Europe targeting the Russian Federation.

The study will also evaluate the Russian Federation's Ukraine policy, which defines Eastern Europe as its vital area of interest and sets a different continental goal than the construction of the new Europe from which it is excluded. It will be argued that since 2014, the Russian Federation has been openly described as a 'threat' and 'challenger' by the Euro-Atlantic powers, as it has stopped the construction of a new Europe with the annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian War. In this context, it will be argued that the crisis

between the Euro-Atlantic powers and the Russian Federation, which has evolved into the Ukrainian War, is an indicator of the conflicting European goals of Washington, Brussels and Moscow. To this end, the study will first reveal Ukraine's place in the conflicting European goals of Washington, Brussels and Moscow; then, the process of the construction of a new Europe from the Ukrainian crisis to the Ukrainian War will be evaluated. Suggestions will be made for the solution of the problem.

3. FINDINGS

3.1. Historical Outlook and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

3.1.1. Ukraine Aims for a Full, Free and Peaceful Europe

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, both sides of the Atlantic established for Europe a common goal. Nuland (2013) maintains that the common goal since the fall of the Berlin Wall shared by US and EU member states is constituted by building a "complete free and peaceful Europe." These common goals of Euro-Atlantic powers have been declared to entire mankind since 1990s in National Security Strategy Documents of US, NATO Summit Decisions, and EU. For example, US National Security Strategy Document in 1997 underlined it was important to establish a "peaceful undivided democratic Europe"; Washington's goal toward a "complete free and peaceful Europe" was again highlighted in publications from 2006 and 2015.

3.1.2. The Goal of Building A New Europe

With Washington's call to "make Europe whole and free" and its emphasis that this goal was "NATO's new mission" (Bush, 1989), the process of building a new Europe began after 1989. Although Moscow claimed in February 1990 that the USSR was promised that the Alliance would not expand to the east in return for Germany's continued NATO membership, which was united in the east (Newton, 2013), NATO's London Summit decision on July 6, 1990 emphasized the "new Europe" and stated that the Alliance had adopted the choices of Europeans to establish a full and free Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. NATO's emphasis showed that the unification of Germany was the first step in "building a full, free and peaceful Europe." Indeed, NATO, which continued its existence in the international system after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, entered a process of expansion "with the aim of building a complete, free and peaceful Europe." During this period, the Union, which transformed from the European Communities (EC) to the EU, also played a role in the "construction of the new Europe" after 1989 by entering an expansion process that prioritized Eastern Europe (Erhan and Arat, 2001) and overlapped with NATO.

Adopting an open-door policy to 'build a New Europe', NATO's first post-Cold War expansion took place in 1999 with the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, as it was then known, to the Alliance. By

2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania had become NATO members. Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020. During this process, the EU entered an expansion process that overlapped with NATO. In fact, after Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the Union in 1995, NATO's expansion "paved the ground for the EU to expand further" (Stoltenberg, 2022). In fact, in 2004, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, which became NATO members after the Cold War, joined the Union, along with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and Malta. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, which became new NATO members, to the EU in 2007, the Union's borders reached the Black Sea. Croatia became a member of the EU in 2013. In addition, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, which joined NATO after the Cold War, took their places among the EU candidate countries. In 2022, the "official invitation" of Finland and Sweden to Alliance membership at the Madrid Summit of NATO increased the "harmony" between NATO and EU enlargements after the Cold War, and once again demonstrated the role sharing of the Alliance and the Union in the "construction of a new Europe".

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, the 'new Europe' that was built in the international system that was restructured is based on the continuation of the Euro-Atlantic partnership under the leadership of the USA and the expansion of the sphere of influence of this partnership from Eastern Europe to the Black Sea with the expansion of NATO and the EU. In the absence of the USSR, it is important for the USA, which aims to maintain its hegemony under the name of the 'new world order' (Canar, 2012), that European countries continue to approve Washington's leadership. The USA, which is "afraid of Europe becoming its rival" and "disturbed by the EU's attempts to act as a separate economic and political bloc", has tried to "keep the EU under control" with the NATO Alliance (Uzgel, 2001). The continuation of the Euro-Atlantic partnership under the leadership of Washington and the NATO-EU cooperation are important in terms of preventing European countries from emerging as rivals to the US hegemony. In addition, the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence on the former Soviet geography with NATO and EU expansions is aimed at preventing the influence of the Russian Federation, a potential rival to the US hegemony. Within this framework, the US has identified the Russian Federation as "a counter-threat element that will hold the Western world together" (Uzgel, 2001) in Europe. In fact, the Russian Federation has been seen as a "glue" that will hold the Euro-Atlantic powers together under the leadership of the US (Wade, 2015); the discourses of "Russia threatens Europe" and "Russia threatens the world" that were openly voiced with the Ukraine Crisis have "helped to strengthen the Western state order" (Wade, 2015). However, although the Ukraine Crisis and the subsequent Ukrainian War brought the US-NATO-EU unity to the agenda, the common European goal shared by Washington and Brussels since 1989 (Nuland, 2013) has shown

that this unity existed before the Ukraine Crisis and the Ukrainian War. The RF, which sees the former Soviet geography as its vital area of interest and opposes the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence in its 'near abroad'; and objects to the expansion of NATO at this point; has been determined as an 'unnamed counter-threat element' that will continue the US-NATO-EU partnership. Because the 'new Europe' aimed to be created by Washington and Brussels after the fall of the Berlin Wall, while extending to the borders of the RF with NATO and EU expansions, has left the RF 'outside'.

The 'construction of a new Europe' process, initiated in 1989 under the leadership of the USA and adopted by NATO and the EU, aimed to expand the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence to the former Soviet geography under the name of the new world order values and the Copenhagen Criteria. These principles, which were re-emphasized under the name of the 'new world order' by the USA (Bush 1989), which emphasized the 'principles of human rights, democracy and freedom' in its call for the establishment of a complete, free and peaceful Europe, were adopted as membership criteria by NATO and the EU. Along with NATO, which is a 'political organization representing the values of the new world order' with its military nature (Canar, 2012), the EU also pursued a policy of expanding the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence in the former Soviet geography starting from Eastern Europe under the principles of 'democracy, rule of law, human rights and free market economy' with the Copenhagen Criteria. Indeed, the "sovereign elections" and "democracy" discourse of the former Soviet countries aiming to become NATO and EU members, emphasized by the Euro-Atlantic powers, "are clearly underlying the geopolitical agenda" (Cohen, 2015). During the "Orange Revolution" of 2004, which was the first disagreement of the Euro-Atlantic powers and the Russian Federation on Ukraine, the priority issue for Washington and Brussels was "Russia, democracy came second". "The West aimed to finish the job it started after the fall of the Berlin Wall and continue Europe's advance eastwards". "The big prize was Ukraine" (Krauthammer, 2004 as cited in Cohen, 2015). Therefore, Washington and Brussels "acted with geopolitical motives" rather than "democratic ideals" (Wolff, 2015); they aimed to establish a Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence against the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet geography. In this context, "both NATO and the EU have taken part in the construction of a new Europe that excludes the Russian Federation" by following a policy of expanding their own geographic areas since the second half of the 1990s (Hill, 2018).

As a potential rival to the US hegemony, the Russian Federation has been positioned by the Euro-Atlantic powers as "a partner that is not granted the power to veto Western policies" (Asmus, 2006; Larrabee, 2004, cited in Canar, 2012). Indeed, while NATO and the EU have expanded "their own geographical areas" in order to build a new Europe, they have left the Russian Federation outside the Alliance and the Union, despite their emphasis on

developing “cooperation and friendly relations” with Moscow (Hill, 2018). While the EU has been conducting its relations with Moscow within the framework of the partnership, the US has been negative about the Russian Federation’s NATO membership. Thus, Washington and Brussels have aimed to create a new Europe in which the Russian Federation is not a member of NATO and the EU, and therefore does not have the right to veto and therefore does not have the ‘right to speak’. The process of building a new Europe that is complete, free and at peace, that excludes Russia while extending to its borders, is aimed at the integration of Eastern Europe into the Euro-Atlantic community, freeing it from Russian influence and control.

The goal of a ‘complete’, ‘united’ or ‘undivided Europe’ refers to the unification of Western Europe with its East; thus, the elimination and completion of the ‘borders’ between the West and East of the continent. In this context, during the process of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea of “two separate Cold War Europe” was primarily opposed (Wilson, 2014). After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, the US, NATO and the EU objected to the idea of the former Soviet geography from Eastern Europe to the Black Sea being in the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation. Therefore, ‘complete Europe’ refers to the fact that other Eastern European countries other than the Russian Federation, namely Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, are also in the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence. Indeed, while NATO, which excludes the Russian Federation, leaves an ‘open door’ to Ukraine, the EU has included these three countries in the Eastern Partnership, which includes integration, although it does not yet promise membership. NATO and the EU have adopted a partnership/cooperation policy towards countries that have territorial integrity issues beyond fulfilling the values of the new world order and/or the Copenhagen Criteria and that cannot become members of the Alliance or Union in the short or medium term due to the presence of Russian military presence on their lands. The aim is to complete Europe by excluding the Russian Federation through NATO and the EU’s expansion and partnership policies, and thus not to divide Europe into spheres of influence centered on the Euro-Atlantic on one side and Moscow on the other, as was the case during the Cold War.

The goal of a ‘free’ and/or ‘democratic Europe’ is aimed at preventing the formation of a Russian sphere of influence and thus ensuring that Eastern Europe is free from Russian influence and control. A ‘peaceful’ Europe is about maintaining and expanding a ‘peace zone’ in which the borders of Europe are not violated or changed by the Russian Federation and where the Euro-Atlantic presence under the leadership of the USA is valid in Eastern Europe as well as in Western Europe.

According to Washington, “democracy alone” cannot ensure peace (Sestanovich, 2014). The US military presence on the continent and the “security umbrella” provided to members of NATO as it expands to the east; prevent conflicts between alliance members and provide assurance against

“threats from non-NATO countries such as the Russian Federation” and thus ensure that Europe “remains at peace” (Mearsheimer, 2010). The Washington administration emphasized in its 2017 National Security Strategy Document, which it described as “realist” because it “accepts the central role of power in international politics”, that it would “preserve peace through force.” With the expansions of NATO and the EU, the borders of the ‘controlled peace zone’ have extended as far as the Russian Federation. Among the Eastern European countries that are ‘not yet’ members of NATO or the EU, Ukraine has been described as a country that will become a member of the Alliance since 2008, and Belarus and Moldova have also been included in the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy along with Ukraine; It has once again shown that the process of building a new Europe that is complete, free and at peace targets the Russian Federation.

3.1.3. Ukraine in the Aim for a Greater Europe

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the USSR under Gorbachev’s leadership also participated in the construction of a new Europe initiated by Washington. So much so that, starting from April 10, 1987, the “Common European House” project put forward by Gorbachev aimed to “integrate the USSR as well as the Eastern European countries into the international capitalist system”; Moscow announced that it would support “the arrangements to be made in these countries” (Tellal, 2010). In addition, Moscow emphasized that it would join the call for a “full and free Europe” and the “effort to build a new Europe” within this framework with the Paris Charter for a New Europe, which the USSR also signed, and which was accepted at the meeting of the CSCE on November 19-21, 1990. Thus, the USSR adopted the European model after 1989 (Krastev and Leonard, 2014). On the other hand, Gorbachev’s “Common European House was established, but the Russian Federation remained outside it” (Tellal, 2010). After the collapse of the USSR, as NATO and the EU expanded towards the borders of the Russian Federation, leaving the Russian Federation outside, in the name of building a new Europe, and as the Russian Federation was treated as “the other” by the Euro-Atlantic powers (Sakwa, 2015); Moscow adopted a different vision of Europe than that targeted by Washington and Brussels. The Russian Federation’s European goal also shaped Moscow’s Ukraine policy.

Moscow’s policy towards the continent is aimed at building a “greater Europe that includes the Russian Federation” (Thomas, 2014) and ensuring that Moscow’s interests are considered by Washington and Brussels. Unlike Washington’s and Brussels’ European goals, Moscow has targeted the idea of a multipolar continent where the Russian Federation is an active participant and has a “right to speak”, in other words, a greater Europe (Sakwa, 2015).

In this context, Moscow, which attached importance to its relations with the Euro-Atlantic powers, signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU on the one hand and oriented itself towards cooperation with

NATO within the framework and the Permanent Joint Council, on the other hand, opposed the expansion of the Alliance into the former Soviet geography (Tellal, 2010). At the signing ceremony of the NATO-RF Founding Act in May 1997, the then President Boris Yeltsin, who once again objected to the expansion of the Alliance, declared that he was in favor of a “greater Europe” order in which Russian interests were considered. Yeltsin, who also called for a “greater Europe” at the European Council Summit held in Strasbourg in October 1997, reiterated that he aimed to establish a European order in which the Russian Federation was a participant, not a “spectator”, with an emphasis on “equality” (Blocker, 1997). In the 2000s, under Vladimir Putin, Moscow once again “advocated a multipolar security structure in which the Russian Federation and the West recognized each other as equal partners and respected each other’s strategic interests” (Siddi, 2016). While continuing to cooperate with Euro-Atlantic powers within the framework of the multidimensionality required by multipolarity, which was determined as the basic foreign policy goal under Putin’s administration, the Russian Federation was also disturbed by the fact that Eastern Europe was gradually losing its “buffer zone” character, or in other words, the military and economic presence of Euro-Atlantic powers was “bounding on Russia’s borders” (Tellal, 2010). Within this framework, NATO and EU expansions were described by Moscow as “the containment policy pursued by the US and its allies against the Russian Federation”.

In addition to the alliance and Union expansions, the EU-based integration policy covering Eastern Europe has drawn a reaction from Moscow. Preferring to “cooperate with EU countries within the framework of the principles of equality and respect for each other’s interests,” Moscow has aimed for “the harmonization of European and Eurasian integration processes from the Atlantic to the Pacific” and has seen the Eurasian Economic Union, which brings together Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia along with the Russian Federation, as important in terms of “the harmonization of integration processes in Europe and Eurasia” (Putin, 2011). On the other hand, the Eurasian Union was described by the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as “the re-creation of a new version of the Soviet Union under the name of economic integration” (Clover, 2012). Emphasizing that “there is a movement aimed at re-Sovietizing the region,” that Washington “knows what the goal is” and is looking for “effective ways to slow down or prevent it” (Clover, 2012), Clinton said; It has opposed the Moscow-centered integration movement that also includes Ukraine, and thus the obstacle to the construction of a new Europe. The Eurasian Union, which is described by Putin as “an essential part of a greater Europe” and presented as a “high-level integration” project that aims to establish a “free trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok” (Putin, 2011), was brought to the agenda following Washington and Brussels’ integration steps regarding Eastern Europe that include Ukraine (Paul, 2014). Indeed, the Eurasian Union, which was started to be developed by the Russian Federation after the NATO Bucharest Summit, has been at the top of

Moscow's agenda, together with the EU's Eastern Partnership policy (Paul, 2014); the RF has opposed the "increasing presence" of the EU in the former Soviet geography (Haukkala, 2015). In this process, "the old neighbors of the RF and the EU's new neighbors have overlapped" (Gallina, 2009); with the clash of Moscow's and the Union's integration policies (Maass, 2019; Özdal, 2015), the struggle for spheres of influence in Eastern Europe has accelerated.

In this process, where Belarus and Armenia, two of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries, have taken their place in the Eurasian Union, Ukraine has become the focal point of the struggle for spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Like Washington and Brussels, Moscow has also seen Ukraine as "an important part of its geopolitical project" (Trenin, 2014). As Ukraine's relations with the US, NATO and the EU have developed, the Russian Federation, which is outside the new Europe, has also sought to improve its relations with the Kiev administration. Indeed, "preventing Ukraine's developing ties with the West" was one of the main reasons why Moscow signed the Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Treaty with Kiev (Larrabee, 1998). For the Russian Federation, which could not find what it expected from the CIS and responded to the Union's Eastern Partnership policy with NATO and EU expansion by developing its own integration project under the name of the Eurasian Union, Ukraine has become its main target country (Paul, 2014). Being a single state with the Russian Federation at certain periods of history, cultural closeness, the presence of a Russian minority especially in the east of the country and in Crimea, its role as both an important market for Russian natural gas and a transit country in the transportation of this natural gas to EU countries, the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea and the buffer state nature of the Russian Federation with Europe have made Ukraine a priority country in Moscow's integration project regarding its 'near abroad', which it describes as its vital area of interest (McMahon, 2014).

The victory of Viktor Yanukovich, who was described as "a name closes to the Russian Federation" in the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine (Özdal, 2015), changed the balances in Eastern Europe in Moscow's favor. Yanukovich's policy of continuing cooperation with NATO but removing Alliance membership from his country's agenda and his signing of an agreement that strengthened the Russian Federation's presence in Crimea in the long term by extending the stay of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, which was due to expire in 2017, to 2042 (Özdal, 2015); carried a meaning beyond changing the balances in the region. Yanukovich's consolidation of Russian influence in his country while freezing the NATO membership process; became a problem in terms of Washington and Brussels' aim of removing Ukraine from Moscow's sphere of influence and including it in the new Europe that is in the process of 'construction'.

3.1.4. From the Ukrainian Crisis to the Ukrainian War: The Problem of Building a New Europe

At the core of the struggle for sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, which evolved from the Ukraine crisis to the Ukraine War between the Euro-Atlantic powers and the Russian Federation, lies the problem of building a new Europe. The goal of establishing a complete, free and peaceful new Europe, which began with the call of Washington in 1989 and was adopted on the continent with the Paris Charter for a New Europe, which the USSR also signed in 1990, extended to the borders of the Russian Federation with the NATO and EU expansions that excluded the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the USSR. On the other hand, Moscow, which argues that the Russian Federation is a part of Europe, and that the continent cannot be truly completed without the Russian Federation (Putin, 2007), has set out to stop the construction of the new Europe from which it has been excluded. Thus, the goal of a new Europe that excludes the Russian Federation and does not give Moscow a ‘right to speak’ has conflicted with the goal of a larger Europe that the Russian Federation is a part of and will exercise its ‘right to speak’; Ukraine has been at the center of this “geopolitical struggle” regarding the “future of Europe” (Mitchell, 2018). Indeed, in the process that evolved from the Ukraine crisis to the Ukraine War, while the Euro-Atlantic powers pursued policies to “continue where they left off” in the construction of the new Europe, the Russian Federation aimed to stop the construction of the new Europe.

Ukraine, which was included in the alliance’s expansion policy and the EU’s sphere of influence through the Eastern Partnership with the Bucharest Summit Decision of 2008, has been alienated from the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence by its ‘preferences’ during the Yanukovych era. Indeed, after the Russian military presence in Crimea was extended until 2014, Yanukovych announced that he was abandoning the Association Agreement that was expected to be signed with the EU at the Eastern Partnership Summit to be held in November 2013 (Özdelek, 2015). Instead of the Association Agreement that would include Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence, Yanukovych preferred to establish “closer economic ties” with Moscow (Morelli, 2017; Trenin, 2014). This choice by Ukraine has become a problem for the Euro-Atlantic powers, as it prevents the realization of Washington’s and Brussels’ new European goal. Indeed, while increasing the influence of the Russian Federation in his country, Yanukovych limited his relations with NATO to cooperation, and then announced that he would not sign the Association Agreement with the EU, thus suspending Ukraine’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic system and thus the construction of a new Europe. Thereupon, Ukraine became the scene of the ‘second orange revolution’, referred to as ‘EuroMaydan’, which was “personally directed” by the US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland at the time; the process leading to the Russian Federation’s “special operations” began (Böğün, 2022).

The first wave of protests, called ‘EuroMaydan’, which emphasized the ‘EU election’, included Euro-Atlanticists. On December 17, 2013, Yanukovych signed an agreement with the Russian Federation on economic aid and natural gas discounts, followed by the adoption of a package of laws in the Ukrainian Parliament on January 16, aimed at restricting the activities of the press and civil society organizations, which led to mass demonstrations, and the second wave of protests began (Özdal, 2015; Paul, 2014). Although the package of laws was withdrawn, the protests escalated, with neo-Nazi groups such as Svoboda, Right Sector, and Azov Battalion taking their place in addition to Euro-Atlanticists (Özdal, 2015; Karan, 2022). Yanukovych’s meetings with opposition party leaders and the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Poland were unsuccessful due to Maidan’s rejection. The President, who left Ukraine on February 21, 2014, was dismissed by the Parliament (Özdal, 2015; Morelli, 2017; Trenin, 2014). When Yanukovych’s dismissal brought about the cancellation of the agreement extending the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Crimea, until 2042, the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea decided to hold a referendum (Özdal, 2015; Trenin, 2014). In the referendum held on March 16, 2014, with 83% participation, 96% of the votes resulted in the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation; on March 18, Putin signed the agreement that made Crimea a part of the Russian Federation (Morelli, 2017; Özdal, 2015). During this period, the cities of Donbass, the industrial region of Ukraine where the Russian minority is concentrated, resisted the ‘second orange revolution’ (Bögün, 2022); “neo-Nazi organizations and Ukrainian armed forces began to organize violent attacks” against Donetsk and Lugansk, which declared their independence with the referendums they held (Güller, 2022).

In this process, with the support of Washington, which was reinforced with the visits of the then US Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State John Kerry, and CIA Director John Brennan (Trenin, 2014), the Euro-Atlanticists have consolidated their place in the Kiev administration. Indeed, Petro Poroshenko, who was elected President on May 25, 2014, “promised to bring Ukraine closer to the West.” After EU membership was determined as the “ultimate goal,” Ukraine gave up its neutral, non-aligned status by a decision of the Parliament in December 2014 and “preferred to establish closer relations” with NATO (Morelli, 2017). This preference of the new Kiev administration coincided with its new European goal. However, the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea halted NATO’s expansion to the Black Sea and thus the construction of a new Europe. Thereupon, the Russian Federation began to be openly described as a “threat” by the Euro-Atlantic powers. Indeed, Washington has called the Russian Federation a “revisionist power” that “weakens” the US’s influence on the continent; NATO has described the Russian Federation as a “threat” and a “challenger” to the “goal of a complete, free and peaceful Europe.” The EU has also emphasized that the Russian

Federation “challenges the European security order” based on the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe.

Although it has been suggested that the US and its allies should “stop Westernizing Ukraine” and turn it into a “neutral” country between NATO and the Russian Federation (Mearsheimer, 2014), the US, NATO and the EU have continued their common policies aiming to build a new Europe. Within this framework, the first policy adopted was not to recognize the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea. The Ukraine Support Act, passed by the US Congress in 2014, called for not recognizing the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea. The Ukraine Freedom Support Act aimed to “reestablish the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine” and to deter Moscow from “further destabilizing and occupying Ukraine.” The law with the same title, which was presented as the Stability and Democracy Law for Ukraine in 2016 and adopted in 2017, once again emphasized that the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea was not recognized; In this context, the policy known as the Stimson Doctrine has been recalled. With the 2017 Law on Preventing Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia, Washington stated that it would not recognize the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea and the separation of part of Ukraine’s territory by force (Welt, 2020). Thus, while Washington emphasized its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the fact that the title and content of the laws in question coincide with the goal of building a new Europe that is full, free and at peace has shown that the ‘main issue’ is preventing Russian influence.

The US position has also been adopted by NATO and the EU. Indeed, the alliance’s Wales and Warsaw Summit decisions stated that “the illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea by the Russian Federation has not been and will not be recognized” and that “such a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity poses a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security.” The EU, which “strongly condemned” Moscow, also declared that “it will not recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.”

The Russian Federation, on the other hand, emphasized that the referendum decision of the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was based on the “right of nations to self-determination” included in the UN Charter; and criticized the attitudes of Washington and Brussels by reminding them of the Kosovo policies of the Euro-Atlantic powers. In response, Western sources commented that “Crimea cannot be compared to Kosovo” and that “Crimea is not Kosovo” (Linden-Retek and Brewer, 2014; Somin, 2014). However, what makes Crimea ‘different’ from Kosovo is the change of border in Eastern Europe in favor of the Russian Federation, even though it is not recognized by the Euro-Atlantic powers. With the annexation of Crimea, the European border changed in favor of the Russian Federation for the first time since the Cold War; while excluding the Russian Federation, the

construction of a new Europe extending to all the Russian Federation's borders in Eastern Europe came to a halt.

Euro-Atlantic powers, objecting to the change in the balance in the region in Moscow's favor, aimed to make the Russian Federation 'step back' through diplomatic and economic measures. Diplomatic measures by Euro-Atlantic powers against the Russian Federation first came to the agenda in March 2014. The US suspended the work of the Bilateral Presidential Commission and reduced political and military cooperation with Moscow. The Union canceled the EU-RF Summits; in April 2014, the Alliance suspended all political and military cooperation within the framework of the NATO-RF Council. Then, the G8 formation, which was planned to convene in Sochi, was transformed into the G7 "in response to the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea."

In this process, the US and the EU also imposed economic sanctions on the Russian Federation. In March 2014, the US began implementing sanctions that included a travel ban and asset freezes on individuals who "threaten the security, stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Ukraine (Morelli, 2017). While the Washington administration expanded the sanctions over time, the US Congress also took steps to enact the sanctions. On March 17, 2014, the EU adopted a similar sanctions decision against individuals who "committed acts against the territorial integrity of Ukraine." The EU continued to expand the sanctions during this process, and took measures to restrict economic cooperation with Moscow, including measures targeting the Russian Federation's five largest state banks, three major energy and defense companies, and sectoral cooperation with Moscow. NATO, on the other hand, announced that it supported the sanctions imposed by the EU and the G7.

Following Moscow's failure to back down on the Crimea issue, the holding of referendums in eastern Ukraine in May 2014, and the downing of a Malaysian airliner in July 2014, the EU has maintained its "single voice" on sanctions. The reason for the EU's 'single voice' is the goal of building a new Europe that the Union shares with the US and NATO. Indeed, although both the European countries' dependence on Russian natural gas and Putin's policy of preventing the Union from taking joint action by developing bilateral relations with EU countries (Tellal, 2010) have been effective in the Union's relations with Moscow, the EU has also aimed to build a new Europe by expanding to the borders of the Russian Federation on the continent. Germany, a powerful member of the Union, has adopted the Ostpolitik approach in terms of developing cooperation with the Russian Federation, while also prioritizing the principles of strengthening ally relations with the US and European integration; thus, it supported sanctions against the Russian Federation (Siddi, 2016). The fact that the Ukrainian crisis was seen as a threat that would halt the construction of a new Europe enabled the Union to take a decision to impose sanctions against the Russian Federation and to continue this policy. In fact, the Union emphasized that the EU's Russian policy should be based

on a "consistent and common approach" and that the continuation of a single voice is necessary.

In this process, in response to the US and EU sanctions, the Russian Federation implemented sanctions targeting especially the agricultural sector; however, comments were made that the Russian economy was negatively affected by the measures taken by the Euro-Atlantic powers (Christie, 2015). However, by imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation, the US and the EU aimed to make Moscow back down on the Crimea issue, in addition to harming the Russian economy. Therefore, the economic sanctions did not achieve their goal; thereupon, the US and the EU expanded the sanctions list again and extended their duration (Morelli, 2017). So much so that Washington, emphasizing that "Crimea is part of Ukraine", declared that "its sanctions on Crimea will continue until the Russian Federation returns this peninsula to Ukraine".

The US and the EU, which imposed sanctions on "those who played a role in the destabilization of Ukraine in response to the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbass region," have also imposed a condition on Moscow's implementation of the Minsk Agreements regarding the duration of the sanctions (Morelli, 2017). NATO, which emphasized that "the Russian Federation continues to destabilize eastern Ukraine," has also pointed out the importance of implementing the Minsk Agreements. However, the implementation of the Minsk Agreements has been important for the Russian Federation, which is in favor of "finding a federal solution within Ukraine in Donbass" (Karan, 2022). Indeed, during this process, Moscow, which will use its "right to speak" in Donbass and supports a "negotiated solution through Germany," has tried to "start autonomy negotiations with the federalists" by ensuring that Kiev "ends the operations it calls anti-terrorism" (Karan, 2022).

In 2014, the then German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande met with Putin and Poroshenko under the name of the Normandy Format. When the Minsk Agreements signed on September 5 failed to achieve the goals of a political solution and an end to the conflict, a second agreement was signed on February 12, 2015. The Minsk-2 Agreements envisaged the establishment of a ceasefire and its monitoring by the OSCE, the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and foreign armed groups, the release of all hostages, amnesty, humanitarian aid and the restoration of social and economic ties in the regions affected by the conflict. In addition, the Minsk-2 Agreements decided to implement the constitutional reform based on the principle of decentralization by the end of 2015 and to hold local elections in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions within this framework (Morelli, 2017). However, the Minsk Agreements were not implemented by the Kiev administration; "the war in Donbass has never completely ended in eight years" (Karan, 2022).

In this process, aid programs aimed at including Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence have accelerated simultaneously with the sanctions of the US and the EU against the Russian Federation. The US, “together with the EU and the IMF”, has continued its aid policy towards Ukraine to strengthen its democratic institutions, economy, civil society, control its border and “preserve its territorial integrity” (Nuland, 2014). In addition, a Multinational Joint Commission on Defense Reform and Security Cooperation was established with the partnership of Canada, the UK, Lithuania and the US (Nuland, 2014). In this process, a similar aid policy was adopted by NATO. At the 2014 Wales Summit, the Alliance established mission funds in the areas of command, control, communications, computers; logistics; cyber defense; military careers; and medical rehabilitation to support Ukraine. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the Comprehensive Assistance Package, which included additional training and technical support for the Ukrainian army, was approved by the Alliance (Morelli, 2017). Within the framework of Washington and Brussels’ policies to integrate Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic system, steps have also been taken to strengthen Ukraine’s ties with the EU. Through the Association Agreement, which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, the Union aimed to strengthen its political and economic ties with Ukraine. The Association Agreement was ratified by all EU countries in July 2017 and entered into force on September 1, 2017. The Association Agreement was described by Washington as “a major step towards the realization of a full, free and peaceful Europe” (Kerry, 2014). The Union also continued its policies aimed at building a new Europe by supporting Ukraine’s reform process in areas such as the development of civil society, the private sector, local government and the fight against corruption through aid packages.

In order to ‘continue where they left off’ in the construction of a new Europe, while integrating Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community; another policy of Washington and Brussels aimed at ensuring that the Russian Federation steps back and preventing it from establishing a sphere of influence has been to increase NATO’s ‘forward presence’. Indeed, at the 2014 Wales Summit, the Alliance adopted the NATO Readiness Action Plan “in response to the Russian Federation’s challenges”. Within this framework, multinational troops were deployed to the Baltic States and Poland. With the Brussels Summit Decision of July 2018, NATO moved its “forward presence” to the Black Sea region; Romania assumed the role of hosting a multinational brigade for the training of Allied land forces.

In this process, the Russian Federation took a step that strengthened its presence in Crimea and thus in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea. In May 2018, Putin inaugurated the bridge built over the Kerch Strait connecting the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea; the Kerch Bridge drew the reaction of the Euro-Atlantic powers as it connected Crimea to the Russian Federation. In November 2018, the intervention of Russian warships against Ukrainian ships

sailing from the port of Odessa to the port of Mariupol on the grounds that they were violating Russian territorial waters disturbed the Euro-Atlantic powers (Welt, 2020). “Separatists in Eastern Ukraine” and the annexation of Crimea, as well as the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait issue, made Ukraine’s NATO and “EU membership impossible” (Maass, 2019), and Euro-Atlantic powers began to emphasize “the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including its territorial waters” (Palladino, 2019). Washington reiterated its support for ensuring Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the name of building a new Europe by referencing the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act with the Crimea Declaration it published during this process. In 2019, the US, which touched on the issues of Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and the Kerch Strait with the Act to Protect American Security from Kremlin Aggression, which was enacted “with the aim of strengthening NATO and imposing additional sanctions on the Russian Federation”, drew attention to the “Russian threat” again. The “Russian threat” was also included in the US Interim National Security Strategy Guide dated March 2021; although it was a “last resort,” Washington stated that it “will not hesitate to use force when necessary to protect its vital interests.” The US, which violated the UN Charter after 9/11 and invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and announced that it would “use force when necessary,” emphasized the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity because the Russian Federation consolidated its presence in the Black Sea following the annexation of Crimea and halted the construction of a new Europe.

The policy of the Zelensky administration, which came to power in Ukraine in 2019, aiming for NATO and EU membership was supported by Washington, which is “trying to create” a new Europe. Indeed, with the Security Cooperation Agreement dated July 2, 2021, the US continued its support for Ukraine to “protect its territorial waters, territorial integrity and borders against possible Russian aggression.” During this process, the Alliance, which openly described the Russian Federation as a “threat” but claimed that NATO “did not pose a threat” to the Russian Federation, reinforced its “forward presence” on land, at sea and in the air in the Black Sea region.

In August 2021, the Kiev administration continued its foreign policy in line with Washington and Brussels’ goal of building a new Europe that would include Ukraine. So much so that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba emphasized that his country “is not a former Soviet space; it is a part of Europe.” Kiev’s emphasis was reiterated at the Crimea Platform Summit held on August 23, 2021. At the summit, which was also attended by the EU, NATO, G7 countries, Georgia and Moldova, Zelensky stated that they would “use political, legal and diplomatic tools to ensure that Crimea becomes a part of Europe together with Ukraine.” In addition, the published Joint Declaration reiterated “commitment to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, including its internationally recognized borders and territorial waters,” “guided by the Paris Charter for a New Europe,” as well as

the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Then, in the Biden-Zelenski meeting, it was stated that “a full, free, democratic and peaceful Europe” is the basis of the US-Ukraine “strategic partnership”; thus, the goal of building a new Europe, from which the Russian Federation is excluded, was once again emphasized. Within the framework of this goal, Washington and Kiev also stated that they “oppose the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which they describe as a threat to European energy security”. The emphasis on ending the dependence of EU countries on Russian natural gas, and the need for the Union to have a “single voice” and to “act together” with the US, was another indicator of the policy of building a new Europe targeting the Russian Federation.

Because the Black Sea is a region where the Russian Federation has “vital security interests” (Wade, 2015). NATO and the EU’s expansion and partnership policies and strategies to distance Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence and integrate it into the Euro-Atlantic system have triggered the Ukraine crisis (Mearsheimer, 2014). Just as “the US would not tolerate Mexico or Canada forming a military alliance with China or Russia,” the Russian Federation has also objected to Ukraine’s NATO membership (Wade, 2015). In 2021, the development of relations between the Euro-Atlantic powers and Ukraine and “NATO’s frequent unplanned exercises in the Black Sea” have necessitated “action” from the Russian Federation’s perspective (Güller, 2022). In this context, in December 2021, the Russian Federation presented a draft agreement to the US and NATO. Moscow proposed “preventing NATO’s expansion, the Alliance refraining from deploying offensive weapons on Russian borders and bringing the Alliance’s military capacity and infrastructure in Europe back to before 1997” (Putin, 2022). Moscow, whose demands were rejected, launched a “special military operation” on February 24, 2022, “the main political goal of which was declared to be ensuring Ukraine’s neutrality status” (Güller, 2022).

Putin’s speech on February 21, 2022, which he began with a ‘criticism’ that “modern Ukraine was created by Bolshevik, Communist Russia” and that “historical Russian lands were separated”, and ended by emphasizing that “Russia recognizes the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics” (Putin, 2022) and then launched a ‘special military operation’, is aimed at preventing Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership, and thus the construction of a new Europe. In the process that evolved from the Ukrainian crisis to the Ukrainian War, the Russian Federation aimed to “redraw the borders” (Allison, 2014) and aggravate the problem of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, narrow the sphere of influence of NATO and the EU, which expanded to the Black Sea, and to stop the construction of a new Europe from which it was excluded.

In this context, for the Euro-Atlantic powers, “the ongoing crisis is about more than just Ukraine” (Stoltenberg, 2022). Contrary to claims that the Ukrainian War and the policies of the Russian Federation “united the Euro-Atlantic powers more than ever” and/or led them to act together, the Euro-

Atlantic powers, who had already been “united” since 1989 in the goal of building a new Europe, have strengthened their partnership in the process of the Ukrainian War in order to “continue the construction of a new Europe from where it left off”.

Indeed, on February 26, 2022, the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Canada and the US announced, “measures to isolate Russia from the international financial system and their economies”. The Washington administration, simultaneously with its sanctions against Russian officials, including Putin’s Foreign Minister and Defense Minister, increased its aid to Ukraine in security and non-security areas (Blinken, 2022). In this process, the EU also reinforced its sanctions policy against the Russian Federation. Emphasizing that it acts together with NATO, the G7, the US, Canada, Norway, South Korea, Japan and Australia, the Union, like the Washington administration, simultaneously implemented its aid policy to Ukraine with the sanctions against the Russian Federation. While the US provided “defense equipment” to “Eastern European countries affected by the Russian aggression against Ukraine” through the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act, 1; The EU has announced that it will “finance the purchase and distribution of weapons to a country that has been attacked for the first time in its history.” EU Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen emphasized that “Since the first day of the war, Europe has been on Ukraine’s side with weapons, funds, hospitality towards migrants and the toughest sanctions the world has ever seen” (Leyen, 2022). In this process, various steps have also been taken ‘for the continuity of Euro-Atlantic unity’. Indeed, just as Nord Stream 2, which was seen by the US as a project that prevented the EU’s ‘single voice’, was suspended, the EU “turned to reliable suppliers such as the US, Norway and Algeria” in order to reduce the dependence of the Union countries on Russian natural gas; “the transition from natural gas pipelines to LNG” has accelerated (Leyen, 2022).

The Euro-Atlantic unity towards the construction of a new Europe, which has existed since 1989, was also emphasized in the EU’s Strategic Compass dated March 21, 2022. In fact, the EU, which stated that the “major geopolitical shifts” that occurred with the “return of war to Europe” were a challenge for the Union “in terms of defending its interests”, announced that it would act together with its partners such as NATO and the US “against common threats and challenges”. In addition, with its emphasis on “strengthening civilian and military Common Security and Defense Policy missions and operations” with its “commitment to defend the European security order”, the EU stated that it had ‘gone beyond being an economic formation’. The EU’s announcement that it “had to increase its presence, influence and visibility in its neighboring regions” was also an indication of the Alliance’s policy in line with NATO, which has ‘reinforced its forward presence’ in its eastern territories. Therefore, the EU and NATO, which objected to “RF’s efforts to create a sphere of influence” and increased their

‘presence’ from Eastern Europe to the Black Sea in the name of “responding” (Stoltenberg, 2022), aimed to ‘complete the construction of the new Europe’. In this context, the Ukrainian War was described by the Euro-Atlantic powers as “a war on the future of Europe”; it was declared that “Putin will not be successful and Europe will prevail” (Leyen, 2022).

3.1.5. In What Ways Have Intergovernmental Organizations Participated In The Initiatives Aimed At Promoting A Resolution To The Ongoing Conflict Between Russia And Ukraine?

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have played important roles in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict through a variety of channels, including diplomatic negotiations, humanitarian assistance, economic sanctions, military support, and post-war reconstruction planning. The United Nations (UN) has actively participated in diplomatic efforts through the Secretary-General’s mediation of negotiations, and the UN Security Council and General Assembly have passed resolutions condemning the invasion and defending Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, Russia’s veto power has often prevented definitive action. The UN-backed Black Sea Grain Initiative, with Türkiye’s participation, has sought to allow Ukrainian grain exports in order to prevent a global food crisis. The UN has also sought to ensure the implementation of international law by establishing independent commissions of inquiry to investigate war crimes in Ukraine.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has made efforts to broker ceasefires and document human rights violations, but its operations have been hampered by security risks and Russian resistance. The European Union (EU) has imposed harsh economic sanctions targeting Russia’s banking, energy and trade sectors, while also providing Ukraine with billions of euros in financial support and military equipment. The EU has set up funds to rebuild Ukraine’s infrastructure and developed social and economic support mechanisms for Ukrainian refugees.

NATO has refrained from direct military intervention, but has significantly increased Ukraine’s defense capacity with modern weapons, intelligence sharing and military training programs, while also strengthening its eastern flank member states against potential threats. NATO countries have provided Ukraine with air defense systems, drones and armored vehicles to boost the country’s defense capacity. NATO also supports the modernization of Ukraine’s military to Western standards. In order to deal with security dilemma that continue to fuel the Russia- Ukraine war, a power balance is necessary to be created in the international system, which remains a severe challenge (Bossman et al., 2023).

Humanitarian aid efforts have been coordinated by organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) to meet the basic needs of millions of displaced people.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has facilitated prisoner exchanges, provided medical assistance and played a role in identifying war victims. UNICEF has implemented education, health, and psychosocial support programs to mitigate the devastating effects of war on children.

Financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have provided billions of dollars in emergency funding and reconstruction assistance to stabilize Ukraine's economy and rebuild critical infrastructure. The World Bank has established special loan programs to repair damaged health, energy, and transportation infrastructure. The IMF is providing long-term support programs to strengthen Ukraine's financial structure.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has investigated war crimes and issued arrest warrants for Russian officials, while the UN Human Rights Council has documented violations and helped bring justice. The ICC supports the implementation of international law by investigating war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possible acts of genocide committed on Ukrainian territory. Efforts are also underway to increase sanctions against Russia for war crimes through international legal mechanisms.

Despite geopolitical complexities, such as conflicting positions among different international actors, IGOs continue to play a vital role in conflict resolution efforts; through diplomatic, economic and security measures to mitigate the effects of the war and lay the foundations for long-term peace. In this context, the coordinated work of the international community to rebuild Ukraine and ensure a sustainable peace process is of great importance. The coordinated efforts of the IGOs are critical to maintaining regional stability, addressing humanitarian crises and holding perpetrators accountable, and play a decisive role in shaping the future resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

3.1.5.1. United Nations (UN)

In the article titled "International organizations and settlement of the conflict in Ukraine," Alena F. Douhan discusses the involvement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in addressing the persistent crisis between Russia and Ukraine. This engagement aligns with the council's duty to uphold international peace and security, as outlined in Article 24. The text regarding the United Nations Charter discusses the ongoing monitoring and examination by the UNSC of various elements related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Currently, the UNSC is actively engaged in analyzing and deliberating on a range of issues raised by both the Ukrainian government and the Russian Federation. These concerns encompass the invasion of Crimea by Russia, along with the underlying causes of the war and its related impacts. The ongoing killings in Ukraine, insurgent activities in the southeast, and the aircraft crash in Kyiv highlight a troubling observance of human rights violations (Douhan, 2022). Despite the pressing concerns that warrant practical action, the UNSC has approached conflict resolution with caution.

This hesitance stems from Russia's partial involvement, its use of veto power during the voting process on resolutions, and the potential for further vetoes by Russia if additional votes occur.

Consequently, the main aim of the text is to provide information regarding the measure proposed by the UNSC as appropriate for adoption to tackle the crisis. To systematically diminish the conflict's prevalence and ultimately bring it to an end, the UNSC has recommended involving all parties associated with the war (Douhan, 2022). Douhan has formed this perspective on advocating for the active engagement of those involved in the conflict to facilitate a comprehensive, thorough, and inclusive investigation into the issue, leading to effective proposals. Regarding the ongoing crisis, the UNSC has aimed to create a platform for discussion by evaluating the viewpoints of nations concerning the issues and proposals they present. This approach avoids assigning blame to any of the parties involved, instead fostering an atmosphere of objectivity, neutrality, and impartiality in tackling the conflict.

3.1.5.2. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Sinambela and Arsyad in their paper describe the OSCE initiatives directed to act on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Advocacy is strong across all dimensions for monitoring and settling different aspects of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Arsyad (2023) reports that the OSCE has appointed a special envoy to Ukraine who will be mandated to monitor the situation within the country and regularly recommend timely actions based on emerging issues, as well as on specific contexts with distinct actors. Therefore, the contribution by Sinambela and Arsyad gives an emphasis on improvements realized. The official appointed by OSCE to take care of Russia-Ukraine relations resulting from aggression confides in me that he has used various approaches in ensuring that wars do not break out with high intensity ones involving national discussions among warring parties thereby posing a threat to peace negotiations....

The Special Envoy has set up a mission of military observers on the repeated attacks in Ukraine. The special envoy also reports weekly on the movement of arms, vehicles, and individuals from the war-affected areas. Also, this includes rights impact assessments and special monitoring missions for the investigation and remedial action of these issues. According to (Sinambela & Arsyad, 2023), national minorities in Ukraine have major problems during the conflict. In response to this crisis, engulfing Ukraine currently, OSCE through its special envoy urged parties to start dialogue and cooperation regarding the abnormal military actions which constitute a threat not only for regional stability but also for international peace.

Sinambela and Arsyad have come to the belief that consultation and collaboration are essential for tackling the Russia-Ukraine war, firmly convinced that the most effective solution lies in an unconditional yet

mutually advantageous dialogue between the two countries. Consequently, they concluded that dialogue serves as the ideal foundation for comprehending the war's underlying causes, enabling the parties involved to achieve a mutually agreed-upon compromise for a cease-fire that aids in resolving the conflict.

3.1.5.3. European Union (EU)

The article titled "EU Cooperation in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Impacts and Limitations" by Sara Mahilaj examines the European Union's involvement in resolving the Russia-Ukraine war. It focuses on the EU's dedication to tackling the ongoing crisis stemming from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Convinced that Russia is the aggressor in this war, the text aims to outline several measures implemented by the EU regarding the halted negotiations. Concerning visa, trade, and partnership issues with Russia, Mahilaj reports that the EU has declared its willingness to suspend Russia's involvement in the proposed G8 initiative. This effort aimed to broaden the existing G7 membership to include eight members, thereby integrating Russia into the circle of global superpowers (Mahilaj, 2023). The suspension remains in effect until Russia reaches a conclusive resolution to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

3.1.5.4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

In their article on crisis management titled NATO Involvement in the Handling of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Competitive Synergy or 'Freezing' Crisis Management, Oleksandr Tytarchuk and Maksym Khylyko discuss the initiatives led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to tackle the Russia-Ukraine war. The actions suggested and implemented by NATO closely resemble those taken by the EU. The ongoing conflict is predominantly framed with Russia as the antagonist and Ukraine as the victim. Recognized as the primary instigator of the war's onset and continuation, the work by Tytarchuk and Khylyko discusses potential strategies to persuade Russia to cease its participation in the conflict. In this context, the text aims to raise awareness about NATO's initiatives aimed at addressing the situation in Ukraine, specifically highlighting Russia's role.

Consequently, Tytarchuk and Khylyko concluded that NATO has strongly denounced violations of international law perpetrated by Russia. In doing so, it has shown support for Ukraine by urging Russia to fulfill its international obligations by engaging in negotiations with Ukraine and addressing matters within the NATO-Russia council aimed at resolving the ongoing conflict (Tytarchuk & Khylyko, 2022). This perspective emerged from their condemnation of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the incursion of Russian convoys into Ukrainian territory, which they view as actions that escalate the conflict. NATO has thus demonstrated solidarity with Ukraine in

denouncing the increasing aggression of the Russian military. The researchers noted that although NATO had earlier considered the possibility of implementing military measures in Ukraine against the Russian Federation, it ultimately decided to restrict its response to merely disapproving of Russian-affiliated activities as a means of addressing the conflict.

Conclusion

Having developed over nearly a decade, the Ukrainian-Russian strife—deeply enmeshed with historical, political and human rights entanglements—has proven itself a vital case to scrutinize the participation of international organizations in addressing global geopolitical crises. The present research had, as its primary goal, an assessment of their approaches and comprehension of their impact on resolving such conflicts by exploring the different ways through which foreign entities help. As this inquiry draws to a close, there are several major insights and general conclusions that can be made.

The research underlines the life and death importance of international organizations in dealing with complicated and long-lasting geopolitical problems. From diplomatic dialogues to humanitarian aid distribution, global institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, OSCE, and the European Union are involved in a wide array of activities. The involvement thus multilaterally depicts these organizations in the dynamic realm of international diplomacy for effective resolution of their far-reaching and grave-conflict implications.

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict has had significant impacts on intergovernmental organizations. The United Nations (UN) has been unable to intervene effectively due to Russia's veto power, which has highlighted the need for reform of the organization. The European Union (EU) has imposed economic sanctions on Russia, accelerated Ukraine's application for membership, and made strategic changes to address the impact of the conflict on energy security and food supply. NATO has revived its policy of eastward expansion, while providing support to Ukraine, carefully balancing its efforts to avoid direct conflict. This has changed the balance of power between the organizations and has once again emphasized the importance of multilateral diplomacy and international law.

Key among the findings of this study is the realization that mediation by international organizations in a conflict as complex as that between Russia and Ukraine is likely to face some significant challenges. The challenges will emanate from the need to navigate Russia's strategic interests, managing what entails ceasefire agreements, as well as reconciling historical context to present-day realities. Because these are the contexts of challenges, the mediation would have to be flexible in light of what goes at that particular time. The role of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) in mediating the Ukraine-Russia war has faced significant challenges due to the

complex political, military, and strategic interests involved. While the United Nations (UN) struggled to intervene effectively, primarily because of Russia's veto power in the Security Council, it still facilitated humanitarian aid and condemnation of Russia's actions. The European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on Russia and provided support to Ukraine but refrained from direct mediation due to internal divisions. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) played a role in monitoring the conflict and facilitating early dialogues, including the Minsk Agreements, but failed to achieve a lasting peace. Regional actors like Turkey and France also attempted to facilitate negotiations, but overall, the mediation efforts by IGOs have been hindered by lack of enforcement power and geopolitical interests, preventing any significant breakthrough toward peace.

Moreover, the findings of this research emphasize how important knowing history is for resolving conflicts. The lasting effects that their historical origins have had on mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine drive home the need for acknowledgment and addressing past wrongs in addition to the geopolitical entanglements related to the issue. Such a historical dimension is acting as quite a relevant background against which current diplomatic pursuits need to be framed.

In broader terms, this research improves our understanding of global diplomacy and brings to light the roles that international organizations play in solving complex geopolitical problems. It stresses the importance of international cooperation and calls for flexible and astute strategies in conflict resolution. The findings from this research are applicable to not only the Russia-Ukraine conflict but also several other global crises that require cooperation at the international level.

Therefore, the paper considers the mediation in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and argues that such a typical case reflects the intricate problem of modern conflict resolution in a globalized world. The results of this research provide substantial evidence that international organizations are still relevant to the progression of global conflicts, as well as invaluable information for policymakers and conflict-resolution practitioners across different parts of the globe regarding ways through which peace and stability can be maintained in an ever-changing environment based on lessons from the past. It is hoped that these findings have set forward-looking opportunities for us as we march into the future.

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