



A Comparison of Premier-presidential and President-parliamentary Systems Based on Presidential Elections



Başbakanca-başkanlık ve Başkanca-parlamentar Sistemlerin Başkanlık Seçimleri Üzerinden Karşılaştırılması

Abdullah METİN*

Ömer Faruk UĞURLU**

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Abstract

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While forms of government are generally divided into four main categories, Shugart and Carey suggested that the semi-presidential system should be divided into two categories: president-parliamentary and premier-presidential. This study aims to assess the validity of their suggestion by comparing these two systems based on presidential elections. We hypothesize that president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems significantly differ from each other in terms of the effective number of parties (ENP), the vote ratio of the first party to the second party (VR1:2), and the round in which the presidential elections conclude. To test this hypothesis, we created a dataset by calculating ENP and VR1:2 for the last five presidential elections in 58 countries that adopted either a premier-presidential or president-parliamentary system. The Laakso-Taagepera Index (L-T Index) was used for ENP calculations. The dataset was analyzed using SPSS. The results confirm the hypothesis: ENP is lower in president-parliamentary systems (2.28) and higher in premier-presidential systems (3.22). VR1:2 is higher in president-parliamentary systems (7.02) and lower in premier-presidential systems (3.23). Along with this quantitative evidence and considering the differences in democratic functioning between the two systems, it becomes evident that these two systems are not subtypes of the semi-presidential system, but distinct systems in their own right.

Keywords: Political system, semi-presidentialism, president-parliamentary, premier-presidential, effective number of parties (ENP), Laakso-Taagepera Index (L-T Index).

Öz

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Hükümet sistemleri genel olarak dört ana kategoride ele alınmakla birlikte, Shugart ve Carey yarı-başkanlık sisteminin başbakanca-başkanlık ve başkanca-parlamentar olarak ikiye bölünmesini önerirler. Bu çalışmanın amacı, bahsedilen iki sistemi başkanlık seçimleri üzerinden karşılaştırarak bu önerinin geçerliliğini sorgulamaktır. Hipotezimiz şudur: Başkanca-parlamentar ve başbakanca-başkanlık sistemler etkin parti sayısı, birinci partinin oyunun ikinci partinin oyuna oranı ve başkanlık seçimlerinin kaçınıcı turda bittiği açısından birbirinden anlamlı ölçüde farklılaşır. Amaca ulaşmak için bu iki sistemden birini uygulayan 58 ülkenin son beş başkanlık seçimi sonuçları üzerinden etkin parti sayısı ve oy oranları (birinci partinin ikinci partiye) hesaplanarak veri seti oluşturuldu. Etkin parti sayısı hesaplamalarında Laakso-Taagepera İndeksi kullanıldı. Veri seti SPSS ile analiz edildi. Bulgular hipotezi onaylamaktadır. Öyle ki, etkin parti sayısı başkanca-parlamentar sistemde düşük (2,28) ve başbakanca-başkanlık sisteminde yüksektir (3,22). Birinci partinin oyunun ikinci partinin oyuna oranı başkanca-parlamentar sistemde yüksek (7,02), başbakanca-parlamentar sistemde düşüktür (3,23). Bu nicel kanıtların yanı sıra başkanca-parlamentar ve başbakanca-başkanlık sistemlerinin demokratik işleyiş olarak da farklılaştığı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda bu iki sistemin yarı-başkanlık sisteminin alt tipleri değil, ana hükümet sistemi kategorileri oldukları görülür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi sistem, yarı-başkanlık, başkanca-parlamentar, başbakanca-başkanlık, etkin parti sayısı, Laakso-Taagepera İndeksi.

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* ORCID Asst. Prof. Dr., Çankırı Karatekin University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, abmetin@gmail.com

** ORCID Res. Asst., Çankırı Karatekin University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, omerf.ugurlu@gmail.com

1. Introduction

The semi-presidential system first emerged in the French Constitution of 1958 and was later conceptualized by Maurice Duverger in 1979. Although many countries have adopted the semi-presidential system, legislative-executive relations do not function in the same way across all of them. Considering the significant variations in practice, Shugart and Carey (1992) introduced two new categories: president-parliamentary and premier-presidential.

This study aims to analyze the differences between the president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems based on presidential elections. If this difference proves to be significant, it will empirically support Shugart and Carey's claim that these two categories are not sub-types of the semi-presidential system but distinct main types. While there are several studies comparing these systems in terms of legislative-executive relations, presidential power, and democratic performance, no study has been found that focuses specifically on the party system. This research aims to fill this gap.

The Effective Number of Parties (ENP) is widely used in the literature to assess party system competitiveness (Brambor et al., 2007; Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Lijphart, 1994; Lijphart et al., 1999; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005; Neto and Cox, 1997; Paskhina and Telin, 2017; Schleiter and Voznaya, 2014; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Given the lack of empirical studies comparing these two forms, this study contributes to the field by analyzing them through the lens of ENP. The hypotheses of this research are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse correlation between ENEP (Effective Number of Electoral Parties) and VRI:2 (the vote ratio of the first party to the second party).

Hypothesis 2: President-parliamentary systems and premier-presidential systems significantly differ in terms of the effective number of parties at the presidential election level.

Hypothesis 3: President-parliamentary systems and premier-presidential systems significantly differ in terms of vote ratio of the first party to the second party at the presidential election level.

Hypothesis 4: President-parliamentary systems and premier-presidential systems significantly differ in terms of the round in which presidential elections are concluded.

2. Literature Review

The president-parliamentary and premier-presidential categories seem to have been well-received by comparative political scientists, although they have not entirely replaced the broader category of semi-presidentialism. These two categories emerged from a crisis driven by profound differences in the constitutional and practical dimensions within the semi-presidential system.

The defining characteristic of semi-presidential systems is the 'divided executive' where both the president and the prime minister hold considerable authority. However, the term 'semi-presidential' may create a misleading impression, suggesting it is merely a blend of presidential and parliamentary systems. Some authors (Linz, 1994: 48; Shugart and Carey, 1992: 23) argue that semi-presidential does not imply semi-parliamentary. Elgie and Moestrup (2016: 8) critique this misconception by posing the question: "Does an invitation to a semi-formal dinner really mean that half of your clothes are expected to be formal and the other half informal?" Other scholars (Elgie, 1999: 13; Lijphart, 1992: 8) view semi-presidentialism as a distinct, third, and sui generis form of government. We support this perspective, emphasizing its unique features that differentiate it from both parliamentary and presidential systems.

Beyond the debate over its naming and originality, the traces of the crisis can be observed in the conceptual development of the semi-presidential form, which Duverger (1980: 166) defined as follows:

A political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it, combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, (2) he possesses quite considerable powers, (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them.

The most contentious aspect of Duverger's definition lies in the ambiguity surrounding the considerable powers granted to the president. Some scholars argue that this definition is too vague. Given the constitutional variations in presidential powers within semi-presidential systems, numerous studies have sought to measure and compare these powers (Cheibub, 2007; Fortin, 2012; Frye, 1997; Hellman, 1997; Magni-Berton, 2013; Metcalf, 2000; Roper, 2002; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Siaroff, 2003). However, these studies have faced significant criticism from other scholars (Elgie, 1999: 4, 2008: 51, 2011: 22; O'Neil, 1993: 197; Roper, 2002: 269).

First, due to substantial differences in scoring across studies, the same country might be classified as presidential-like in one study and closer to premier-presidential in another. Second, constitutional power does not always reflect actual presidential power. For instance, a president with low constitutional authority may wield more influence than one with higher authority. Third, individual leadership styles and personal characteristics can exceed both constitutional powers and scoring metrics. For example, Clark (2010: 59) describes Russia as super-presidential, contrary to the prevailing view that it is semi-presidential. From a different perspective, Munkh-Erdene (2010: 332) critiques Duverger's definition by arguing that the mere presence of a popularly elected, fixed-term president does not necessarily constitute a semi-presidential regime. He provocatively suggests that, by this logic, the British and Japanese systems could be labeled semi-monarchical due to the presence of a monarch.

Robert Elgie (1999: 13), a prominent author who published voluminous works on semi-presidentialism, defines semi-presidentialism as *“the situation where a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament.”* Neither Elgie's nor Duverger's definitions involve the different practical and constitutional principles. To handle this problem, some authors (Siaroff, 2003; Skach, 2005; Tsai, 2008) categorized new subtypes but these did not reach a common effect.

As demonstrated, while the semi-presidential system is well-defined in theory, significant differences emerge in practice. These discrepancies lead to confusion in academic discussions about the system's functioning. Shugart and Carey (1992) addressed this issue by distinguishing between president-parliamentary and premier-presidential forms. Shugart and Carey (1992: 23) define the president-parliamentary system as *“the situation where the president is popularly elected, appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers, and has the power to dissolve parliament or legislative powers or both, and cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence.”* On the other hand, Shugart and Carey (1992: 24) describe the premier-presidential system as one where *“the president is elected by popular vote, the president possesses considerable power, and there also exists a premier and cabinet—subject to assembly confidence—who perform executive functions.”* Since their definition of premier-presidentialism closely aligns with Duverger's definition of semi-presidentialism, we regard Shugart and Carey's original contribution to the field as the identification of the president-parliamentary form.

These categories have been widely recognized and utilized in the literature (Bahro et al., 1998; Brudny, 1995; Cheibub, 2007; Cheibub and Chernykh, 2008; Clark, 2010; Elgie, 1998; Metcalf, 2000; Protsyk, 2003; Reiter and Tillman, 2002; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009; Siaroff, 2003; Skach, 2005). However, some scholars have criticized them. Sartori (1994: 126, 133) argues that the president-parliamentary category is “messily and needlessly” included and describes it as “almost an empty class, a container in desperate want of content”. Similarly, Roper (2002: 255) asserts that most semi-presidential cases fall under the premier-presidential category. In contrast, Samuels and Shugart

(2010: 255) contend that semi-presidentialism leans more towards presidentialism than parliamentarism. Indeed, numerous studies (Samuels and Shugart, 2010; Elgie, 2011; Metin and Ünal, 2023) reveal that the number of premier-presidential cases is not overwhelmingly higher than that of president-parliamentary cases.

We can highlight the functioning of these two systems as follows. In the parliamentary system, the prime minister is the 'first man', while in the presidential system, it is the president. The semi-presidential system, on the other hand, is based on cohabitation, where power is shared between the president and the prime minister. Depending on the system's functioning, the balance of power may shift to either the prime minister or the president. In premier-presidential systems, the prime minister typically shares power with the president in a more or less balanced manner. In this system, the president is not authorized to select or control the prime minister and the cabinet, formulate the government program unilaterally, or dissolve the parliament. However, in presidential-parliamentary systems, the president is clearly the first man. The president selects the prime minister, who is loyal to the president. The president controls the cabinet through the prime minister, formulates and implements the government program, and can dissolve the parliament if the prime minister and cabinet do not receive a vote of confidence. While the premier-presidential system is based on the principle of mutual existence among the parliament, the prime minister (government), and the president, president-parliamentary systems operate in a one-man-band style, with the president controlling both the legislature and the executive, and sometimes even intervening in the judiciary.

3. Method

3.1. Data Collection Method

The data set was created using a total of 58 countries, 28 of which are president-parliamentary and 30 are premier-presidential (see Metin and Ünal, 2023). In testing the first hypothesis, the Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) for the last five presidential elections (up to 2023) in each country was calculated. The study encompasses the entire cases, as it includes all countries with president-parliamentary and premier-presidential government systems. We focus on the results of the last five elections because some countries held only a limited number of regular and fair elections before the 2000s. Given this, using earlier elections would reduce the reliability of our findings. Therefore, we consider the last five elections to be sufficient, as they provide enough data to analyze a country's party system and electoral competition. The Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) was not considered, as no seats were allocated to parties in the presidential elections. For ENEP calculations, the Laakso-Taagepera Index (L-T Index) was used.

We used the following formula (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), in which there are no independent votes.

$$N = 1 / \sum_{i=1}^n P_i^2 \quad (1)$$

and the following formula (Taagepera, 1997: 146), in which there are independent votes and seats occupied by independent candidates.

$$N = P^2 / [f(R) + \sum P_i^2] \quad (2)$$

In formulas: N is for ENP, P_i stands for the number of votes for the i -th party, and R is for the residue of votes including independents and others (if any).

For presidential elections, the results of the first-rounds were used. In cases where parties formed alliances and the vote share of each single party is unclear, the total vote of the alliance was considered as that of a single party. The second rounds were not taken into account because only two

parties/candidates compete in second round, a significant portion of voters cast their votes reluctantly. This makes it an unreliable measure for determining the party system.

In testing the third hypothesis, the vote ratio of the first party to the second party, which was put forward by Siaroff (2003: 271), was taken into account. This ratio is crucial for understanding the competitiveness of the electoral system and the degree of party fragmentation. A lower ratio suggests increased party competition, which may indicate that political participation is inclusive and the electoral system is fair. Conversely, a higher ratio points to the presence of a dominant party, and as it rises further, it signifies the emergence of a hegemonic party. At this stage, party competition ceases, and the fairness of the electoral process is compromised. Although Siaroff calculates this ratio based on the seats (SR1:2), in this study, the calculation was performed using the presidential vote percentages (VR1:2). According to Siaroff, a ratio above 1.8 indicates the dominant party system, and if it is above 6.0, while a ratio above 6.0 signifies a hegemonic party. Notably, nine extreme data points in the range of 40 to 560 in the VR1:2 results were excluded to ensure the reliability of the analysis.

As for the fourth hypothesis (regarding the round in which the presidential election concludes), descriptive frequency statistics were used to allocate the rounds to the systems. The round in which a presidential election concludes is also significant in illustrating party fragmentation. If elections consistently proceed to a second round, it reflects a high level of party and voter fragmentation, as well as competitive elections. Conversely, if elections consistently conclude in the first round, it indicates the presence of a hegemonic party.

3.2. Data Analysis Method

The data set was analyzed using SPSS. To investigate the distribution of the data, we applied the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality (Field, 2024: 296). These two tests are commonly used to assess normality, which is an assumption for many parametric statistical analyses. If the test statistics indicated a significantly non-normal distribution of data (i.e., with a p-value less than 0.05), we resorted to non-parametric tests (Cronk, 2024: 83).

When the data were not normally distributed, we performed the Mann-Whitney U test to compare two independent groups and the Kruskal-Wallis test for comparisons between three or more independent groups (Cronk, 2024: 142, 156). These non-parametric tests are appropriate when the assumptions of parametric tests cannot be satisfied.

Descriptive statistics were also calculated to summarize the central tendency and variability of the data, including means, medians, and standard deviations. The mean and standard deviation provide insight into the average and dispersion of the data, while the median is used as a more robust measure of central tendency when data distributions are non-normal.

4. Findings

The first hypothesis of this research is: “*There is an inverse correlation between ENEP and VR1:2.*” In other words, as VR1:2 increases, ENEP decreases, indicating that the party system becomes less competitive. As seen in Table 1, there is a significant and negative relationship between ENEP and VR1:2 (-.711, $p < .01$), which confirms our hypothesis.

Table 1. Correlation between ENEP and VR1:2

		ENEP		Vote Ratio
Spearman's rho	ENEP	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.711**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
		N	274	267
	Vote Ratio	Correlation Coefficient	-.711**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
		N	267	267

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

When comparing president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems, the relatively close number of cases (135 and 139, respectively) offers a solid basis for comparison. As seen in Table 2 and Table 3, in both comparisons of forms and continents in terms of VR1:2 and ENEP, the significance level is .000, which means the difference is significant.

The second hypothesis is “*President-parliamentary systems and premier-presidential systems significantly differ in terms of ENEP (effective number of electoral parties) at the presidential election level.*” In the president-parliamentary form, we expect the mean to be lower for ENEP and higher for VR1:2.

Table 2. ENEP and VR1:2 Results Based on the Form of Government

Factor	Dependent Variable	Groups	N	Percent	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation	Sign.
Form of Government ^a	ENEP	President-Parliamentary	135	49.1	2.28	1.86	1.45	.000
		Premier-Presidential	139	50.9	3.22	3.03	1.45	Z: -6.5
	VR1:2	President-Parliamentary	127	48.2	7.02	3.41	8.41	.000
		Premier-Presidential	136	51.8	3.23	1.46	5.38	Z: -6.2

^a Mann-Whitney test was applied.

ENEP: Effective Number of Electoral Parties

VR1:2= Vote ratio of the first party to the second party

Sign.= Significance N= Number/frequency

As can be seen in Table 2, the mean ENEP of the president-parliamentary form (2.28) is considerably lower than that of the premier-presidential form (3.22) and these two forms differ significantly from each other (sign. .000; see Table 1). In addition, the median in the president-parliamentary system is 1.86, compared to 3.03 in the premier-presidential system. These results confirm the second hypothesis. The lower mean in the president-parliamentary system suggests that presidential elections are less competitive. This outcome may stem from various factors, such as voters exhibiting more homogeneous voting behavior, restrictions or barriers placed on political parties, unfair election practices, or opposition parties boycotting the elections. Furthermore, the larger difference between the mean and the median in the president-parliamentary system indicates a more irregular data distribution.

The third hypothesis is as follows “*President-parliamentary systems and premier-presidential systems significantly differ in terms of VR1:2 (vote ratio of the first party to the second party) at the presidential election level.*” As seen in Table 2, the mean value of VR1:2 for the president-parliamentary system is almost twice that of the premier-presidential system (respectively 7.02 and 3.23). This sharp difference is also seen more clearly in the median (respectively 3.41 and 1.46). On VR1:2, these two forms differ significantly (sign. .000, see Table 1). That means the hypothesis is confirmed. The high VR1:2 values in president-parliamentary systems indicate the prevalence of dominant and hegemonic parties, with one party clearly dominating the system. Conversely, in premier-presidential systems, the vote margin between the first and second parties is smaller,

reflecting more competitive elections. The low median in the premier-presidential system (1.46) further highlights the reduced presence of dominant and hegemonic parties.

Additionally, the round in which presidential elections conclude may provide further insight into the VR1:2 results. This aligns directly with the fourth hypothesis of the research: “*President-parliamentary systems and premier-presidential systems significantly differ in terms of the round in which presidential elections are concluded.*”

Table 3. Round-Based Results

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Dependent Variable</i>	<i>Groups</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Round	President-parliamentary	First Round	116	84.0
		Second Round	22	16.0
	Premier-Presidential	First Round	66	47.1
		Second Round	74	52.9
	Africa	First	89	76.0
		Second	28	24.0
	Americas	First	4	40.0
		Second	6	60.0
	Asia	First	43	91.4
		Second	4	8.6
	Europe	First	46	44.2
		Second	58	55.8

As indicated in Table 3, the presidential elections are concluded in the first round by 84% in the president-parliamentary system, and only by 47% in the premier-presidential system. These results confirm our hypothesis. The results also confirm our earlier interpretation that a significant number of president-parliamentary systems are characterized by dominant and hegemonic parties.

When comparing the president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems, it is essential to consider both the results on a continental basis and the functioning of each system. This is because, regardless of the government system in place, similar outcomes in terms of democracy and authoritarianism can sometimes arise. For example, in Western Europe, it is highly likely that any system—whether parliamentary, semi-presidential, or presidential—will function democratically. The president-parliamentary system, which tends to align more with authoritarianism, is unlikely to be implemented in this region.

Our study includes all global cases that have adopted the president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems. Most of the cases are comprised of African and European countries (respectively 41% and 38%). The number of president-parliamentary and premier-presidential forms is respectively 16 and 7 in Africa, 4 and 18 in Europe, 7 and 4 in Asia, and 1 and 1 in the Americas (Metin and Ünal, 2023). Due to the low number of cases in the Americas, we excluded it from the continent-based comparative interpretation below. The predominance of the president-parliamentary system in Africa and the premier-presidential system in Europe turns the comparison of these two forms into a kind of Europe and Africa comparison.

Table 4. ENEP and VR1:2 Results by Continents

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Dependent Variable</i>	<i>Groups</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Sign.</i>
Continent ^a	ENEP	Africa	115	41.2	2.52	2.03	1.56	.000
		Americas	10	3.6	4.32	4.23	2.09	
		Asia	45	16.8	1.81	1.60	.88	
		Europe	104	38.4	3.27	3.06	1.33	
	VR1:2	Africa	110	41.8	5.98	2.49	7.78	.000
		Americas	40	3.8	1.88	1.41	0.97	
		Asia	41	15.6	8.95	3.33	10.32	
		Europe	102	38.8	2.86	1.51	4.08	

^a Kruskal-Wallis test was applied.

ENEP: Effective Number of Electoral Parties VR1:2= Vote ratio of the first party to the second party

Sign.= Significance N= Number/frequency

Table 4 presents that the continent with the least electoral competition (based on ENEP) is Asia, with a mean of 1.81. This figure is 2.52 in Africa and 3.27 in Europe. The VR1:2 values reveal even more striking results; 8.95 in Asia and 5.98 in Africa, indicating a clear hegemonic party system in presidential elections in both regions. In contrast, Europe shows a lower VR1:2 of 2.86, suggesting more competitive presidential elections. These findings are further supported by the number of rounds in which the elections are concluded. As seen in Table 3, while almost all presidential elections in Asia (91.4%) and a very high percentage in Africa (76.0%) are concluded in the first round, the majority of elections in Europe (56%) go to a second round.

5. Discussion

This study aims to compare the president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems based on presidential elections. Shugart and Carey considered these two systems not as subtypes of the semi-presidential system, but as distinct main types that could replace it. Although some comparative political scientists find this categorization unnecessary, this study seeks to contribute to the discussion by supporting Shugart and Carey's classification through quantitative research.

All hypotheses of this study were confirmed. Specifically, president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems differs in terms of ENEP, VR1:2, and the round in which elections are concluded. Although these systems are similar in cases where the president is elected by popular vote and the government is responsible for legislation, this meaningful differentiation distances them from being subtypes of semi-presidentialism.

The semi-presidential system is, by definition, a soft separation of powers. In president-parliamentary cases, the president's extensive control over the executive and legislature moves this system further away from the separation of powers, and thus from democracy and the rule of law. In president-parliamentary systems, elections lack competitiveness due to the ruling party's use of public resources for its own interests, the restriction of opposition parties' organizational and propaganda rights, and the formalization of these injustices in a so-called legal manner.

The low ENEP, both in mean and median, in president-parliamentary systems proves that elections lack competitiveness. The high ratio of VR1:2 in these systems (mean 7.02, median 3.41) also supports this argument. A party system is considered a dominant party system when the VR1:2 ratio exceeds 1.8 and a hegemonic party system when it exceeds 6.0 (Siaroff, 2003). The findings of this study indicate that president-parliamentary systems generally contain either a non-competitive dominant party or a non-democratic hegemonic party. Additionally, the fact that presidential elections are concluded in the first round with a high rate of 84% supports this conclusion.

The dominance of a single party in the president-parliamentary system cannot be solely attributed to homogeneous voting behavior. In other words, a single/dominant party is not the result of homogeneous voting behavior, but rather its cause. This is because the ruling party influences voters to cast their ballots in a particular direction through manipulation, pressure, or the restriction of opposition.

Presidential elections are generally concluded in the first round (84%) in president-parliamentary systems, whereas 53% of elections go to a second round in premier-presidential systems. This dynamic enforces parties and candidates in premier-presidential systems to adopt more conciliatory and less polarizing approaches, as they must secure support from opposition voters in the second round. In contrast, dominant and hegemonic parties in president-parliamentary systems tend to be less conciliatory, often ignoring or even suppressing the demands of opposition voters, whose support they do not need.

The continental results also have a significant impact on the differentiation between these two systems. While the premier-presidential system, which allows greater political participation, is common in Europe (18 out of 30 cases), the more restrictive president-parliamentary form is more prevalent in Africa (16 out of 28 cases). It is clear that Africa lags behind Europe in terms of electoral democracies. In fact, Moestrup (2011: 146) showed in a study on Africa that premier-presidential systems survived at a rate of 60%, while president-parliamentary systems survived at only 20%. Additionally, Elgie (2007) reveals that in nascent democracies, the survival rate of democracy is higher in premier-presidential systems. The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is not that president-parliamentary systems are more anti-democratic because they are common in Africa, but that African politicians with authoritarian tendencies prefer this system more. Particularly, nascent post-Soviet democracies in Europe and Asia also favor the president-parliamentary form. However, we do not claim that president-parliamentary systems are unique to nascent democracies or that they evolve into premier-presidential systems with democratic gains over time. It is beyond the scope of this study to draw up a cycle of democratic government systems, including parliamentary and presidential systems. The key point we focus on here is that the president-parliamentary system lags far behind the premier-presidential system in terms of competitive elections.

This study also contributes to the debate over whether the president-parliamentary and premier-presidential types are necessary. The findings of this study reveal that these two forms function quite differently from each other in terms of the party system; therefore, they should be regarded as separate categories. In addition to the party system, given the significant differences between these two forms in terms of legislative-executive relations and democratic character, it is inappropriate to classify them under the semi-presidential category. Premier-presidential systems are more democratic not only in terms of competitive and fair elections but also in terms of the use of general freedoms. President-parliamentary systems, despite the existence of regular elections, are not transparent and fair in terms of the functioning of the government and state institutions and are more restrictive in the use of general freedoms. In this case, president-parliamentary systems can be considered to be close to hybrid regimes that combine elections and authoritarianism (Schmotz, 2019: 521; Wigell, 2008: 230). These two systems also differentiate democratic functioning. Power sharing in the premier-presidential system is closer to democratic principles. In president-parliamentary systems, the president's desire to control the government as well as the state, parliament, and judiciary can turn into a desire to control the media, NGOs, unions, the business world, and the people, which creates an authoritarian regime. In short, semi-presidentialism is a hybrid political system of presidential and parliamentary systems, while president-parliamentary becomes a hybrid regime of democratic elections and authoritarian principles. Just as the popular election of the president and the considerable powers he holds are sufficient features to differentiate the semi-presidential system from the parliamentary one, the prime minister's subordination to the president due to the absence of cohabitation should also be sufficient to create a new category. Accepting these forms as separate

categories (replacing the semi-presidential system) is more consistent with the classification logic of comparative political systems.

6. Conclusion

Since the aim of this study is to discuss the position of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary forms within the semi-presidential system, presidential elections in presidential systems were not included in the dataset. Further studies may focus on a triple comparison. In such a comparison, ENEP (Effective Number of Electoral Parties) is likely to be higher in president-parliamentary systems compared to presidential systems. A continental comparison would also be worthwhile, as it may reveal that the primary variable of party competition is not the form of government itself, but rather regional factors.

Additionally, this study focuses solely on presidential elections. In the case of comparing president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems based on legislative elections, we predict that ENEP will be lower for the former, as the president-parliamentary system is inherently less competitive. For such a study, ENPP (Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties) data should also be considered alongside ENEP, as understanding the party system requires taking into account not only the parties that contest elections but also those that gain seats in parliament. Furthermore, this analysis may reveal which form of government allows for greater political representation through the electoral system and may also highlight how legislative and presidential elections differ from one another.

President-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems can also be compared through studies that numerically measure the power of presidents, as cited in the literature section of this study. In such a comparison, a scale is needed to score the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. Then, each president is scored according to the authorities they possess. As a result, we predict that presidents in the president-parliamentary system will achieve a significantly higher score compared to those in the premier-presidential system.

Finally, future studies could explore president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems within the context of hybrid regimes. Such studies, using indexes like the Democracy Index, Fragile State Index, Political Stability Index, Human Development Index, Human Freedom Index, Economic Freedom Index, and others, could reveal whether these two systems differ in terms of their functioning in relation to democracy and authoritarianism. It is highly likely that president-parliamentary systems will align more closely with hybrid regimes.

These future studies are highly likely to confirm, as our study aims to demonstrate, that while president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems are similar only in terms of the cohabitation between the president and prime minister, they operate quite differently in many other aspects and exhibit distinct characteristics. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to consider them as independent forms of government rather than as subtypes of semi-presidentialism.

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