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
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# Household Decision-Making Dynamics in Türkiye: An Analysis of **Selected Indicators**

Türkiye'de Hane İçi Karar Alma Dinamikleri: Seçilmiş Göstergelerin Analizi



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Abstract		Using data from the 2021 Family Structure Survey, this study examines the factors influencing decision-making within households in Türkiye, focusing on household headship and decisions related to major expenditures, shopping, and cooking through specialisation, bargaining power, and gender roles. The results from the linear probability model highlight that age seniority plays a significant role in determining household headship, while employment status affects headship, which emphasises time availability as a key factor in decision-making. Regarding decision-making on expenditures, shopping, and cooking, mixed but interesting findings emerged. The multinomial logistic regression results reveal that a wife's higher education increases the relative risk ratio for female-dominant decision-making in traditionally male-dominated areas. Additionally, men's traditional gender attitudes significantly hinder egalitarian decision-making across all areas, limiting shared decision-making. These results underscore the persistent impact of gender roles and time constraints on households, suggesting that changes in employment structures and the promotion of egalitarian attitudes are critical for fostering equality in household decision-making.
Öz		2021 Aile Yapısı Araştırması verilerini kullanan bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki hanehalklarında karar alma süreçlerini etkileyen faktörleri incelemekte ve hanehalkı sorumlusu olma, harcamalar, alışveriş ve yemek yapmaya ilişkin kararları uzmanlaşma, pazarlık gücü ve toplumsal cinsiyet rolleri çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Doğrusal olasılık modeli sonuçları yaş kıdeminin hanehalkı sorumlusunu belirlemede önemli bir rol oynadığını, aynı zamanda istihdam durumunun da zaman uygunluğu açısından karar alma süreçlerinde kilit bir faktör olarak hanehalkı sorumlusu olma olasılığını etkilediğini göstermektedir. Harcamalar, alışveriş ve yemek yapma konusundaki karar alma süreçlerine ilişkin olarak karmaşık ama ilginç bulgular sunulmuştur. Multinominal lojistik regresyon sonuçları, kadının daha yüksek eğitim seviyesinin, geleneksel olarak erkek egemen alanlarda kadın baskınlığı yönünde göreli risk oranını artırdığını ortaya koymaktadır. Ayrıca, erkeklerin geleneksel toplumsal cinsiyet tutumları, tüm alanlarda eşitlikçi karar alma süreçlerini önemli ölçüde engelleyerek ortak karar alma imkanlarını sınırlamaktadır. Bu sonuçlar, toplumsal cinsiyet rollerinin ve zaman kısıtının haneler üzerindeki kalıcı etkilerini vurgulamakta ve istihdam yapısındaki değişikliklerin ve eşitlikçi tutumların teşvik edilmesinin, hanelerde karar alma süreçlerinde eşitliği sağlamada kritik öneme sahip olduğunu önermektedir.
Keywords		Decision-making $\cdot$ gender roles $\cdot$ bargaining power $\cdot$ time allocation $\cdot$ final decision
Anahtar Kelin	neler	Karar alma $\cdot$ cinsiyet rolleri $\cdot$ pazarlık gücü $\cdot$ zaman tahsisi $\cdot$ son karar
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## Introduction

Patriarchal systems have historically positioned men in dominant roles, governing households, land, and society, while women were relegated to subordinate positions (Yüzer & Demez, 2021, pp. 17-18). This structure shaped gender roles, with men seen as breadwinners and decision-makers and women as responsible for domestic duties. Although industrialisation and urbanisation have led to shifts, with men gradually taking on more household responsibilities and women becoming more visible in the public sphere (Yüzer & Demez, 2021, p. 22), gender inequality remains prevalent in Türkiye. The 2014-2015 Time Use Survey reveals that the time devoted by women and men to paid work is only 69 minutes and 238 minutes, respectively. Also, women spend 257 minutes on household and family care, whereas men dedicate minimal time to unpaid work, about 51 minutes (Turkstat, 2015). The recent labour force statistics of the Turkish Statistical Institution (TurkStat, 2024) showing the female labour force participation is 36.6% in the second quarter of 2024 reveal no change in the sphere of women over the years. These statistics reflect that women, who dedicate significantly more time to unpaid household and family care and have lower labour force participation compared to men, are often excluded from decision-making processes within households. Özveren and Dama (2022, p.118) note that while there are cases of female household heads, men largely retain decision-making roles. This raises the critical question: What factors influence individuals' participation in household decision-making?

Intra-household decision-making, especially regarding major tasks, reflects the dynamics of power, gender roles, and resource allocation between spouses. Compared to the traditional approach, the bargaining perspective views households by incorporating each individual's utility function, where the relative power of each partner is assigned to their respective utility function (for further details, see Browning et al. (2007)). Although relative power is primarily determined by economic factors, many studies also incorporate noneconomic factors in addition to the economic ones (e.g., Bertocchi et al. (2014); Hitczenko (2024); Klesment and Bavel (2022); Lührmann and Maurer (2007); Wang et al. (2020)). When approached from the bargaining perspective, it is expected that the individual with more resources will have greater decision-making power within the household. On the other hand, Bertocchi and colleagues (2014) suggest that decision-making within households is influenced not only by bargaining power but also by time availability, which they examine through specialisation. Becker's (1993, p.34) specialisation theory highlights that the individual with a lower comparative advantage in the labour market will specialise and allocate time to household tasks, while the other will allocate time to the market. According to this theory, it is traditionally expected that women allocate their time to household tasks, while men specialise in market activities. Under this framework, the person with more time availability would take on the more time-consuming household activities (Bertocchi et al., 2014, p.69). In addition to these two approaches, as mentioned above, the gender roles assigned to women and men determine individuals' behaviour inside or outside the household. Traditional individuals living in the same household may tend not to cross into each 's spheres in order to maintain their assigned roles and protect their own domains. In this case, traditional women continue performing their assigned roles, such as cooking, and avoid taking on tasks typically assigned to their husbands, such as managing expenditures.

While decision-making patterns have been extensively studied in various countries, little is known about the specific factors influencing these dynamics in Türkiye. Using data from the 2021 Family Structure Survey conducted in Türkiye, the present study aims to test the factors affecting who holds decision-making power within households, focusing on roles such as household headship and decisions related to major expenditures, shopping, and cooking, within the contexts of specialisation, bargaining, and gender roles. This study contributes to the literature by incorporating the examination of these gaps as well as by introducing



gender role attitude indices for both wives and husbands. Most of these studies either neglect the roles of gender attitudes for both women and men or limit the scope of household decision dimensions. This research analyzes multiple dimensions of household decisions, including who decides on major expenditures, shopping, and cooking. By examining these different domains, the study provides clear evidence of how the tasks expected of men and women are influenced by the frameworks of specialisation, bargaining, and gender roles.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The second section provides a summary of the relevant literature. The data source is presented in the third section, followed by an explanation of the estimation method in the fourth section. The fifth section presents the estimation results, and the final section concludes.

## **Literature Review**

Existing literature has extensively studied the factors affecting household decision-making across various contexts. Bertocchi and colleagues (2014) explore decision-making responsibility within households regarding financial and economic choices in Italy. The estimation findings reveal that the decision-making power represented by the female headship in the household is associated with the relative bargaining power within the marriage, measured by variables such as age, education, and income. The study finds that a wife is more likely to be responsible for financial decisions if her characteristics in these areas are closer to or exceed those of her husband. However, when the wife is employed, her probability of holding decision-making power decreases, which indicates a division of labour within the household that assigns financial responsibility to the spouse with more time available. This study supports the bargaining approach to household decision-making but also finds evidence for a specialisation approach, where time availability plays a crucial role. Similar to Bertocchi et al. (2014), Wang and colleagues (2020) examined decision-making responsibility among rural migrant families in China. The estimation results show that wives who have a higher income and longer migration duration compared to their husbands are more likely to take on the role of the household head. Additionally, the study also provides evidence for specialisation.

Wellington (2022) examined the determinants of household decision-making on major expenditures in Nigeria. The findings reveal that egalitarian attitudes increase the likelihood of making decisions jointly, while higher religiosity decreases the probability of making decisions together on major expenditures. Women who earn more tend to make decisions by themselves, whereas traditional attitudes decrease the likelihood of women being dominant in the household. Additionally, men with higher education levels than their partners tended to dominate decision-making in the household. Couples with similar earnings are more likely to make decisions jointly or have female-dominant decision-making. Like Wellington's paper (2022), Gomez-Valle and Holvoet (2022) examined the factors behind decision-making in Nicaraguan households. The study finds that women with egalitarian roles are more likely to be part of joint decisions on household purchases, income expenditures, and children's discipline. These women also participated in joint decisions on daily meal preparation. Further results highlight that women who contribute significantly to household income are more likely to make decisions on income expenditures and children's discipline alone. Additionally, a higher contribution to the household increases the likelihood of women making joint decisions regarding cooking. Klesment and Bavel (2022) analyse the relationship between relative resources and decision-making in households across 27 European countries. The results indicate that higher relative income increases the likelihood of women being the primary financial decision-maker and the general decision-maker. The studies mentioned here provide substantial evidence for the relationship between bargaining power and women's participation in decision-making. However, certain gaps remain regarding

decision-making. This research aims to address these gaps by focusing on different domains through three distinct approaches.

Cengiz (2009) examines decision-making roles in Turkish households. This study investigates the influence of spouses on family purchasing decisions and identifies the dominant decision-making roles (husband, wife, or joint) across demographic groups and product types. Data from 432 married individuals in four Turkish cities (Trabzon, Ankara, İzmir, Diyarbakır) are analysed. The findings reveal that joint decisions are common for high-income households in Trabzon, especially for vacations and homes, whereas male-dominant decisions are frequent in lower-income, less-educated families in Diyarbakır, particularly for cars and white goods. In addition, female-dominant decisions are prevalent in higher-income families in İzmir and Ankara, mainly for food, clothing, and furniture. Although Cengiz (2009) presents significant findings for Turkish households, its approach is entirely different from the current paper. Overall, to the best of the author's knowledge, the current study contributes to the local literature by providing substantial evidence on decision-making roles in Turkish households, offering an enriched perspective through a large dataset.

#### Data

The research uses data from the 2021 Family Structure Survey, which was initially conducted in 2006. Since then, the survey has been repeated every five years. The questionnaire addresses a broad range of subjects, including demographics, parental background, marital status, children, divorce, societal views, family relationships, lifestyle habits, and more. In 2021, the survey was conducted in collaboration with the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) and the Ministry of Family and Social Services. It encompassed 19,428 households and collected information from 42,043 individuals aged 15 and above. The sample for this study consists of married couples. From each household, data on the household head and their spouse were used. Outliers in the income gap were excluded to ensure the accuracy of the analysis, and all missing data were also removed to maintain the integrity of the dataset. After these exclusions, a total of 11,413 married couples remained in the final sample.

In the survey used in this study, there is no direct question asking who the household head is. However, respondents have the option to identify themselves as either the household head or the spouse of the household head. To define the household head, this part of the survey was used. As there are no direct questions in the survey related to financial matters, such as taking out a loan from the bank or saving money, the following survey questions are used to generate other dependent variables related to household decisions: "Who usually makes the final decision on expenses in your household?" and "Who usually makes the final decision on shopping matters in your household?" In addition to these, the question "Who usually makes the final decision on what will be cooked/eaten in your household?" is also included as a dependent variable. The kitchen is traditionally seen as a female space in Türkiye, and cooking activities depend not only on finances but also on human effort and time. Including the cooking decision in this study is an unconventional approach, but it is expected to provide interesting results. Respondents either chose one person or a joint decision. Those who choose one person are asked who that person is. Additionally, the gender role attitude index, a composite measure, is generated to capture individuals' views on traditional or non-traditional gender roles within the household. The survey included questions asking individuals to indicate their level of agreement with the following statements: "The primary duty of a woman is childcare and housework," "Working women neglect their household responsibilities," and "The primary duty of a man is to provide for the household." The responses to these statements were measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The index is calculated as the sum of responses to the three five-point Likert-scale statements, provided that all responses are non-missing

(i.e., participants answered all three questions). This sum reflects the aggregate level of agreement with traditional gender roles. In the following, a standardised version of the index (*z*-score) is generated to enable easier comparison across individuals.

The table provides summary statistics for various variables related to household decision-making, demographics, and socio-economic status. On average, 13% of households have a female head. Joint decisionmaking in expenditure is the most common, with 88% of households reporting it. Shopping decisions are predominantly made jointly (85%), followed by decisions made solely by the wife (12%). Husbands are least likely to make shopping decisions alone. Cooking is also most commonly a joint decision (73%). However, wives were more likely to make cooking decisions alone (26%) compared to husbands (2%). On average, the wife earns significantly less than the husband. On average, wives are about 3.63 years younger than their husbands. On average, husbands have a slightly higher education level than their wives. About 21% of the wives in the sample were employed. Approximately 65% of the husbands are employed, which is significantly higher than the rate for wives. A significant portion of both wives (67%) and husbands (57%) had education levels lower than high school, indicating relatively low educational attainment in this sample. The majority of both wives and husbands reported good health status. The average income for husbands is significantly higher than that for wives. The average marital duration is about 25 years. On average, households have about 2 to 3 children. The average household size is around 3 to 4 members.

#### Table 1

**Descriptive Statistics** 

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
Household head, female	0.13	0.34
Expenditure		
Wife	0.04	0.20
Husband	0.08	0.27
Joint	0.88	0.32
Shopping		
Wife	0.12	0.32
Husband	0.04	0.19
Joint	0.85	0.36
Cooking		
Wife	0.26	0.44
Husband	0.02	0.12
Joint	0.73	0.45
Income gap	-3100.09	2825.43
Age gap	-3.63	4.37
Education gap	-0.76	2.3
Working wife	0.21	.4
Working husband	0.65	.48
Wife's age	45.89	13.79
Wife's education level		
Lower than high school	0.67	0.47
High school	0.21	0.40
University or higher	0.13	0.34



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Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
Wife's income	1144.44	2219.42
Wife's health status		
Poor	0.08	0.27
Fair	0.29	0.45
Good	0.64	0.48
Husband's age	49.52	13.85
Husband's education level		
Lower than high school	0.57	0.50
High school	0.26	0.44
University or higher	0.17	0.38
Husband's income	4244.53	2820.42
Husband's health status		
Poor	0.08	0.26
Fair	0.27	0.44
Good	0.66	0.47
Marital duration	24.92	15.32
Number of children	2.61	1.76
Having a kid	0.94	0.24
Household size	3.53	1.42
Number of observations	11413	

Notes: St. Dev. is the abbreviation for standard deviation. All figures are rounded.

Table 2 lists the percentage agreement on gender roles by wives and husbands. A significant proportion of wives (49.06%) disagree with the statement that their primary duty is childcare and housework, indicating a shift away from traditional gender roles. However, nearly a third (29.04%) still agree with this statement, showing that traditional views remain prevalent among a substantial minority. More than half of the wives (54.90%) disagree with the notion that working women neglect their household responsibilities, suggesting that many women do not see employment as incompatible with fulfilling household duties. However, 22.11% of the wives agreed with this statement, reflecting some concern about the potential impact of work on household responsibilities. A large majority of wives (68.21%) agree that the primary duty of a man is to provide for the household, reflecting a strong adherence to traditional gender roles regarding men's responsibilities. Only a small percentage strongly disagree or disagree with this statement, indicating that this belief is widely accepted among wives. As for husbands, 40.13 percent of husbands disagree with the idea that working women neglect household responsibilities compared to wives, and 32.13% agree, showing that concerns about balancing work and household duties are more common among husbands. Compared to wives, traditional views are more prevalent among husbands than wives.

#### Table 2

Percentage Agreement on Gender Roles by Wives and Husbands

Variables	Wife	Husband
The primary duty of a woman is childcare and housework.		
Strongly disagree	7.37	4.25
Disagree	49.06	40.13

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Variables	Wife	Husband
Neutral	10.20	11.38
Agree	29.04	37.80
Strongly agree	4.33	6.44
Working women neglect their household responsibilities.		
Strongly disagree	6.28	3.49
Disagree	54.90	44.17
Neutral	14.58	16.94
Agree	22.11	32.13
Strongly agree	2.13	3.27
The primary duty of a man is to provide for the household.		
Strongly disagree	0.79	0.60
Disagree	8.51	5.02
Neutral	6.14	5.14
Agree	68.21	70.13
Strongly agree	16.35	19.11

## **Estimation Method**

The present study aims to examine what factors affect being the head of household as well as decisions on other tasks, such as major expenditures, shopping, and cooking in households. This topic is addressed within the framework of specialisation, bargaining, and gender roles. The first dependent variable in the model is the household head. The subsequent dependent variables are who decides on major expenditures, shopping, and cooking within the household. Since the responses for each dependent variable, except household head, are unordered (e.g., me, my spouse, joint), multinomial logistic regression is used for estimation, a method commonly employed in the literature across various topics when responses are unordered (e.g., Bayar et al., 2020, p.4; Chikhungu et al., 2021, p.8; Çinar et al., 2020, p. 383; Karakaş Aydınbakar, 2024, p.536; Masoumi et al., 2020, p.7; Ugur et al., 2023, p. 103). The main independent variables are the employment status of individuals for specialisation, the income, education, and age gaps between the wife and husband for bargaining, and gender role attitude indices for both the wife and husband. If the wife/husband is employed, it equals 1, and 0 otherwise. All gaps for bargaining power are calculated by subtracting the husband's value from the wife's value. The standardised gender attitude indices are composite ones designed to capture the traditional gender role attitudes of men and women, respectively. For each gender, the index is calculated only when all three-component variables are non-missing, ensuring that the index accurately represents the individual's overall attitude. This index was created by summing the responses to the relevant questions, and then standardising the index. Higher values indicate more traditional views on gender roles. Further control variables encompass the woman's age and its square, her education level, and her log-transformed income. Similarly, the husband's age and its square, his education level, and log-transformed income are included, along with their respective health statuses. The model also includes marital duration and its square, the number of children, a dummy variable for having children, household size, and regional dummies.

## **Estimation Results**

The estimation results for the household head are reported in Table 3. The income gap, defined as the difference between the wife's income and the husband's income, has a coefficient of 0.000 in all models,

indicating no significant relationship between the income gap and the likelihood of the wife being the household head. This suggests that the relative income of the wife compared to her husband does not significantly influence who is considered the household head. The age gap shows a positive and significant relationship with being the household head across all models. Specifically, for every one-unit increase in the age gap (indicating that the wife is older relative to the husband), the probability of the wife being the household head increases. This suggests that when the wife is older than the husband, she is more likely to be the head of the household. The education gap has a positive but not statistically significant coefficient. This indicates that differences in educational attainment between spouses do not have a significant impact on determining the household head. The coefficient for a working wife is negative and significant (-0.029) in models 2 and 3, suggesting that if the wife is employed, the probability of her being the household head decreases. Conversely, the coefficient for a working husband is positive and significant (0.018), indicating that if the husband is employed, the likelihood of his wife being the household head increases. The wife's gender attitude index has a negative and significant coefficient (-0.009), implying that more traditional attitudes (higher scores on the index) among wives decrease their likelihood of being the household head. This suggests that women who hold more traditional views are less likely to be considered the household head. The husband's gender attitude index is positive but not statistically significant, indicating that the husband's traditional gender role attitudes do not have a significant impact on who becomes the household head.

#### Table 3

Determinants of Household Head

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income dan	0.000	0.000	0.000
Income gap	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
440 430	0.017***	0.016***	0.016***
Age gap	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education gap	0.002	0.002	0.002
Education gap	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Working wife		-0.029** (0.013)	-0.029** (0.013)
Working husband		0.018** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)
Wife's gender role attitude index			-0.009** (0.004)
Husband's gender role attitude index			0.002 (0.003)
Constant	0.089 (0.080)	0.074 (0.081)	0.074 (0.081)
Control variables	Included	Included	Included
Regions	Included	Included	Included

Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1

Table 4 presents the relative risk ratios (RRRs) from a multinomial logistic regression analysis, with the husband's decision as the reference category. The dependent variable is who makes the expenditure decisions in the household, with categories being "Female" (Column 1) and "Joint" (Column 2), compared to the reference category "Husband." In the first column, the RRR is 1.000, indicating no significant impact of the income gap on the likelihood that the female alone makes expenditure decisions compared to the husband, while it is indicated in the second column that as the income gap (where the wife's income exceeds the husband's) increases, the relative risk for joint decision-making (compared to the husband making the decisions alone) increases. In other words, joint decision-making is more likely. In both columns, no significant impact of age gap on the relative risk for the wife making expenditure decisions alone or joint decisionmaking to husband is found. On the contrary, it is found that as the education gap (RRR=1.195) increases

(where the wife is more educated than the husband), the relative risk for the wife making the expenditure decisions alone increases. However, the education gap has no effect on the likelihood of joint decision-making. As for working wife, it is detected that if the wife is employed, the relative risk for her making expenditure decisions alone or jointly over husband increases slightly, but this result is not statistically significant. In contrast, if the husband is employed, the likelihood of his wife making expenditure decisions alone increases, whereas no significant result is found for joint decision-making regarding expenditure. The estimation results show no significant impact of the wife's gender attitudes while the results draw different pictures for the husband. As reported in the first column, more traditional gender attitudes among husbands reduce the likelihood of the wife making expenditure decisions alone. This indicates that traditional-minded husbands are less likely to allow their wives to make expenditure decisions by themselves. Additionally, as reported in the second column, more traditional gender attitudes among husbands reduce the relative risk for joint decision-making. This suggests that husbands with traditional views prefer to make decisions on their own rather than sharing this responsibility with their wives.

#### Table 4

	Reference: Husband		
Variables	Wife	Joint	
	(1)	(2)	
Income gap	1.000 (0.000)	1.000*** (0.000)	
Age gap	1.075 (0.075)	1.030 (0.044)	
Education gap	1.195*** (0.056)	1.041 (0.030)	
Working wife	1.045 (0.254)	1.205 (0.188)	
Working husband	1.595*** (0.277)	1.058 (0.110)	
Wife's gender role attitude index	0.943 (0.066)	1.018 (0.042)	
Husband's gender role attitude index	0.772*** (0.053)	0.819*** (0.034)	
Constant	0.122 (0.180)	5.315* (4.691)	
Control variables	Included	Included	
Regions	Included	Included	

#### Determinants of Expenditure Decision

Notes: Relative risk ratios are reported in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1

Table 5 reports the relative risk ratios (RRRs) from a multinomial logistic regression analysis, with the husband's decision as the reference category. The estimation results show no significant impact of the income gap on the likelihood that the wife alone makes shopping decisions compared to the husband. In addition, there is no relationship between the income gap (where the wife's income exceeds the husband's) and the likelihood of joint decision-making (compared to the husband making the decisions alone). As reported in the first column, as the education gap increases (where the wife is more educated than the husband), the relative risk for the wife who makes shopping decisions alone increases. Similarly, it is reported in the second column that as the education gap increases, the likelihood of joint decision-



making increases slightly. No significant effect of working wife on shopping decision is detected. On the contrary, if the husband is employed, the relative risk for the wife making shopping decisions alone slightly increases. More traditional gender attitudes among wives decrease the likelihood of her making shopping decisions alone, although this result is not statistically significant. In the first column, the findings show that traditional-minded husbands are less likely to let his wife take control of their shopping decisions. Also, it has been reported that more traditional gender attitudes among husbands decrease the likelihood of joint decision-making.

#### Table 5

Determinants of Shopping Decision

	Reference: Husband		
Variables	Wife	Joint	
	(1)	(2)	
Income gap	1.000	1.000	
income Sup	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Age gap	1.044 (0.073)	1.009	
Age gap		(0.063)	
Education can	1.157***	1.082*	
Education gap	(0.055)	(0.046)	
Working wife	1.258	1.291	
working wife	(0.317)	(0.293)	
Warking husband	1.331*	0.920	
Working husband	(0.226)	(0.137)	
Wife's gender role attitude index	0.896	1.041	
whe's gender role attitude index	(0.063)	(0.065)	
Huchand's gender role attitude index	0.854**	0.806***	
Husband's gender role attitude index	(0.058)	(0.049)	
Constant	1.317 (1.926)	8.070 (10.298)	
Control variables	Included	Included	
Regions	Included	Included	

Notes: Relative risk ratios are reported in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1

The relative risk ratios (RRRs) from a multinomial logistic regression analysis, with the wife's decision as the reference category, are listed in Table 6. There is no significant impact of the income gap on the likelihood that the husband alone makes cooking decisions compared to the wife. Unlike this finding, it is found that as the income gap widens, couples are more likely to share cooking decisions. No association between age gap and cooking decision-making is reported in the first column, whereas an increase in the age gap (where the wife is older) slightly increases the likelihood of joint decision-making for cooking. No significant impact of education is detected. Being employed has no effect on husband to decide for cook. Instead, the findings reveal that if the wife is employed, the relative risk for joint decision-making increases. It is also found that the RRR is 0.812 and significant (p < 0.01), indicating that if the husband is employed, the relative risk for joint decision-making decreases. Wife's attitudes have no significant impact on decision-making making, whereas husband's traditional attitudes decrease joint decision-making for cooking.

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#### Table 6

Determinants of Cooking Decision

	Reference: Wife		
Variables	Husband	Joint	
	(1)	(2)	
Income gap	1.000 (0.000)	1.000*** (0.000)	
Age gap	0.870 (0.075)	1.058** (0.028)	
Education gap	0.939 (0.062)	0.994 (0.019)	
Working wife	1.502 (0.489)	1.255*** (0.116)	
Working husband	0.866 (0.203)	0.812*** (0.052)	
Wife's gender role attitude index	0.996 (0.097)	1.006 (0.026)	
Husband's gender role attitude index	1.111 (0.109)	0.905*** (0.023)	
Constant	0.194 (0.370)	6.938*** (4.001)	
Control variables	Included	Included	
Regions	Included	Included	

Notes: Relative risk ratios are reported in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1

The marginal effects for each are reported in Table 7. Marginal effects show that the probability of the wife's final-say in households is positively related to educational superiority. No other findings related to bargaining power is found. The husband's time availability influences the probability of female-dominant decisions on expenditure by 1.5 percentage points. The findings reported in panel A, column (2) show a decrease in the probability of male-dominant expenditure decisions as the wife's bargaining power, in terms of income, increases. However, although this finding is significant, the effect is quite weak. Similarly, the wife's education superiority reduces the probability of male-dominant expenditure decisions by 0.3 percentage points. Another result from the same panel in column (2) indicates that male-dominant expenditure decisions increase by 1.4 percentage points when the husband holds more traditional gender attitudes. In column (3), the probability of joint decision-making on expenditure increases as the income gap expands, but the impact is negligible. Similar to male-dominant decision-making, joint expenditure decisions are also influenced by the husband's traditional attitudes, decreasing the probability by 1.1 percentage points.

The estimation findings show a significant but negligible effect of the income gap on the probability of female-dominant and joint decision-making. The probability of a female-dominant shopping decision increases by 3.4 percentage points if the husband is employed, while the probability of a joint shopping decision decreases by 3.6 percentage points when the husband is employed. These findings highlight how the husband's time availability shapes household decision-making. A wife with traditional gender attitudes is 1.5 percentage points less likely to make shopping decisions on her own, while such attitudes increase the probability of joint decision-making. In contrast, a husband with traditional gender attitudes is more likely to dominate shopping decisions, while the probability of joint decision-making decreases.

Cooking in panel C reveals interesting findings. The effect of the income gap is negligible, similar to the findings in panels A and B. The kitchen which is assigned to woman traditionally is strongly affected by the time availability of couples and significantly affected by the husband's gender role attitudes. The probability of female-dominance on cooking decreases by 4.1 percentage points if she works and increases by 3.8 percentage points if husband works. The traditional husband is also a driving factor for female-dominance in the kitchen. The last column of panel C again provides evidence for time availability. The increase in the probability of joint decision on cooking by 3.8 percentage points is detected if the wife works, but there

is a decrease by the same percentage points if the husband works. The traditional husband decreases the probability of joint decision on cooking by 2 percentage points.

#### Table 7

Marginal Effects

		Wife	Husband	Joint
	-	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A				
Expenditure	Income gap	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
	Age gap	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
	Education gap	0.005*** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
	Working wife	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.010)	0.017 (0.012)
	Working husband	0.015** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.009)
	Wife's gender role attitude index	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
	Husband's gender role attitude index	-0.003 (0.002)	0.014*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.004)
Panel B				
Shopping	Income gap	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
	Age gap	0.003 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)
	Education gap	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)
	Working wife	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.010 (0.014)
	Working husband	0.034*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.036*** (0.009)
	Wife's gender role attitude index	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.015*** (0.004)
	Husband's gender role attitude index	0.005 (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.004)
Panel C				
Cooking	Income gap	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
	Age gap	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.012** (0.005)
	Education gap	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.004)
	Working wife	-0.041*** (0.016)	0.004 (0.005)	0.038** (0.016)
	Working husband	0.038*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.038*** (0.012)
	Wife's gender role attitude index	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.005)
	Husband's gender role attitude index	0.018*** (0.005)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.005)

*Notes*: Marginal effects are reported in the table. Delta-method standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1. All models include control variables and dummies for the regions.

## Conclusion

The present study estimates the factors influencing who becomes the household head and who decides on major expenditures, shopping, and cooking, within the contexts of specialisation, bargaining power, and gender roles. The results highlight the importance of age seniority in determining household headship, consistent with Bertocchi et al. (2014, p. 66). Additionally, employment status significantly affects this probability: working women are less likely to be household heads, whereas a working husband increases

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the likelihood of the wife becoming the head. Bertocchi et al. (2014, p.67) explain this through time availability, as the partner with more time tends to handle additional tasks. These findings align with the specialisation approach emphasised by Bertocchi et al. (2014). However, unlike the study by Bertocchi and colleagues, this research finds no significant relationship between income gap or education and household headship, suggesting limited evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis. The findings of this study on decision-making for major expenditures, shopping, and cooking reveal mixed yet interesting results. The results from the multinomial logistic regression display that a wife earning more than her husband has no significant effect on decisions regarding major expenditures or shopping. However, a wife being more educated than her husband increases the relative risk for female-dominant decision-making relative to male-dominant decision-making on these tasks. The effect of the education gap between partners on household decision-making is also confirmed by Wellington (2024, p.14). Additionally, the estimation findings from the multinomial logistic regression show that while women's employment does not influence household decisions, men's employment plays a crucial role; their time constraints often determine who decides on major expenditures and shopping. The most notable finding is the influence of men's traditional attitudes, which significantly hinder egalitarian decision-making. Although wives' attitudes have no impact, men's traditional views are a major barrier to shared decision-making. Regarding cooking, a joint decision relative to female-dominance is weakly related to the wife's higher income or age, but the effects are small. Time availability encourages couples to make joint decisions on cooking, yet traditional-minded husbands are less likely to support an egalitarian approach in this regard.

The findings of this study highlight several important issues. First, the traditional attitudes held by men serve as a barrier to women's participation in decision-making. Similar to the intergenerational transmission of divorce (Stanfors & Bergvall, 2024), poverty (Parolin et al., 2023), and employment status (Aydinbakar, 2023; Karakaş Aydınbakar, 2024), ideology is also transmitted across generations. In households where women are excluded from decision-making, children are likely to adopt these attitudes, posing a significant challenge to the spread of egalitarian households in future generations. Additionally, participating in household decisions depends on time constraints. In this sense, more flexible working conditions for men could pave the way for the shared distribution of household responsibilities. Family support programs for gender equality in all spheres, systems that teach egalitarian attitudes from a young age, and social policies that remove barriers to women's economic empowerment are crucial for ensuring sustainable equality in households.

This study has certain limitations although it provides valuable findings on the household decisionmaking dynamics in Türkiye. First, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits the ability to examine changes in decision-making dynamics over time. Longitudinal data could offer a more detailed understanding of how gender roles and bargaining power evolve within households. Second, in-depth case studies could complement these quantitative findings by providing a richer context. Lastly, the survey's questions on household decisions do not comprehensively cover financial decision-making, such as saving or investing, which are crucial aspects of household economics.

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