

“MARKETING STRATEGIES AND TACTICS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS”

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ÖZET

Demokratik toplumlarda seçim kampanyaları hayatın vazgeçilmez, renkli uğraşlarından birini oluşturmaktadır. Tüm adayların kazanmak için çaba gösterdikleri kampanyalarda, belirleyici etkenlerin başında ilgili partinin politik hayattaki yeri ve önemi ile yarışan adayların başta liderlik vasfı olmak üzere şahsi karakterleri gelmektedir.

Değişik taktik ve bunların bileşiminden oluşan stratejilerin etkinlik kazanması, başta televizyon olmak üzere diğer kitle iletişim araç ve yöntemlerine bağlı kalmaktadır. Bu etkinlikte, daha ziyade Amerika'da gözlemlenen ve gittikçe ülkemiz Türkiye'de içinde olmak üzere diğer ülkelerde de uygulanmağa başlanan profesyonelce yaklaşım önemli bir rol almakta, reklamcılık ve danışmanlık şirketleri başta olmak üzere, kampanya yöneticileri ve menejerleri parti ve adaylarının pazarlanmasında önemli fonksiyonlar üstlenmektedirler.

İşte bu makalemizde, genelde ABD'de uygulanan politik kampanyalardaki strateji ve taktikler üzerinde durularak olaya pazarlama açısından bakılmış ve Türkiye için bazı dersler ve demokrasinin gelişmesinde katkılarda bulunabilir düşüncesi ile bazı "ip uçları" çıkartılmağa çalışılmıştır.

1. INTRODUCTION

Political campaign in a representative democracy necessarily involves communication; candidates must persuade to vote for them. Once, political communication could be done face to face at little cost, but that option is not available in most places today. so, someone must pay for the cost of democracy-but who? In countries with strong party systems, the costs are borne by the party. In other countries, state owned television picks up much of the tab. But in countries, like

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the United States, with its thousands of elected officials, relatively weak party loyalties and candidate-centered politics, campaign funds must be raised and spent largely by the candidates themselves. Although most candidates hate raising money, they know that they have to do it and that the legal rules governing their funding will affect their campaigns' structures, will guide their strategy and will influence the role and structure of the parties and interest groups that want to support or oppose them.⁽¹⁾

V.O. Key felt it necessary to argue in his book that "voters are not fools"⁽²⁾. Neither are politicians. Their career plans and decisions are strategically adapted to the political environment. National political forces which politicians expect to have some impact on voters shape their election plans. As a result, the relative quality of a party's candidates and the vitality of their campaigns-the things which have the strongest impact on individual voters-are not all independent of national events and conditions. Rather, they are a direct function of them. This has important implications for understanding how aggregate national phenomena affect aggregate election outcomes.

The aim of this article is to present a picture of political campaigns in The States, mainly of congressional, including the roles of parties and candidates' status and the information environment, and to focus on the development of campaign strategies and tactics as well as their management. The picture is inevitably to be framed by the United States' experience as the most data available exists there. This frame could be useful for developing countries' political campaigns, like Turkey's, where seems many a like events take place in the 1980s. It is believed that it would also lead the way to create an environment in which democracy breeds.

The article, on the other hand, shows how marketing strategies and tactics could be applied in the political arena mainly through mass media with the help of "professional people". This is of importance to the "Advertising and Consultancy Companies" which plan to play an active role in the Turkish political campaigns.

2. Political Campaigns

Political campaigns leading to an election have a simple dominant goal: to win at least a plurality of votes cast, thus the election.

(1) For details about how the extensive changes made in finance laws during the 1970's have affected and will affect political campaigns in the United States, see Malbin (1984)

(2) Key (1966), p.7.

However, this is not an easy task as campaigns confront candidates with difficult problems of analysis and execution which even in the best of circumstances are only imperfectly mastered.

First of all, voters do not form an undifferentiated mass. They are divided by boundaries of community, class, creed, politics and geography. Candidates (and those who help them put campaigns together) need to recognize these boundaries and understand their implications for building winning elections. Often those without political experience do not, and this in itself guarantees failure⁽³⁾. The basic questions are straightforward:

- Which constituents are likely to become solid supporters?
- Who might be persuaded?
- Which groups are best written off as hopeless?
- How can potential supporters be reached?
- What kinds of appeals are likely to prove effective?

All of these questions must be answered twice, and in different ways, if there is a primary election⁽⁴⁾. Successful campaigners recognize this need. Members of the House develop highly differentiated images of their constituencies. Their behavior is guided by a coherent diagnosis of district components and forces. Knowledge is grounded in experience; they learn at least as much about their constituents from campaigning and from visiting the district between elections as their constituents learn about them. This kind of learning takes time, and its necessity is another reason for viewing House elections from a time perspective longer than a campaign period or a two-year term.⁽⁵⁾ It is also one source of the incumbency advantage and helps to explain why politically experienced nonincumbents make superior House candidates.

The analytic tasks facing Senate candidates⁽⁶⁾ are, in most states in America, substantially more formidable than those facing House candidates. They normally deal with much more heterogeneous constituencies scattered over much wider areas. Incumbents as well as challengers usually suffer far more uncertainty regarding ways in which political elements may be combined into winning coalitions. Few have the opportunity to know their states as intimately as House candidates may know their districts.

The deepest understanding of the political texture of a state or district will not, by itself, win elections. Effective campaigns require a

(3) Fowler (1980)

(4) Jacobson (1983), p. 50.

(5) Fenno (1978), pp. 171-172.

(6) For details on Senate elections, see Westlye (1981).

strategy for gathering at least a plurality of votes and the means to carry out that strategy. The central problem is communication. As will be shown later, what voters know about candidates has a strong effect on how they decide to vote. Voters who have no information about a candidate are much less likely to vote for him than those who do. The content of the information is also consequential, to be sure, but no matter how impressive the candidate or persuasive the message, it will not help if potential voters remain unaware of them.

Two resources are necessary to communicate with voters: money and organisation. They may be combined in different ways, but overcoming serious opposition requires adequate supplies of both. Money is crucial because it buys access to the media of communication: radio, television, newspapers, direct mail, pamphlets, billboards, bumperstickers, bullhorns and so on. Organization is necessary to raise money to schedule the candidate's use of his personal time and energy to reach voters and more active supporters efficiently and to help get out the vote on election day.

3. Management of Campaigns

Although the candidates are the principal actors in political campaigns, the teams of advisers and managers they assemble play critical roles in orchestrating their activity. In conjunction with the financial resources the candidates accumulate, these staffers are the foundation for a successful campaign effort. The variations in the characteristics and qualifications of the managers are much greater than for the candidates and more sharply a function of other campaign resources. Candidate status consisting of incumbents, challengers and open races plays an important part in explaining the quality of these management teams. In addition to the manager, key positions in congressional campaigns in the United States are lawyer or counsel, accountant, press aide, treasurer and advertising or media specialist⁽⁷⁾.

The manager is the team leader for the campaign, responsible for the strategic decisions about scheduling the candidate's time and effort, the design and implementation of the game plan and the allocation of resources.

The information relating to the person who occupies the position of manager, the compensation arrangement and past experience can

(7) For details on the distribution of the staffing patterns and on the professionalization of the managers in campaign of congressional races, see Goldenberg and Traugott (1984), pp. 19-23.

be combined to form a measure of the professionalization of the position⁽⁸⁾.

American case shows that human resources represent one of the major advantages that incumbents enjoy their quest for election. Their campaigns tend to be managed by people who are experienced and earn their living by doing this kind of work. Previous experience in running political campaigns is therefore an obvious advantage that incumbents' managers have over their counterparts.

Attitudes also play an important role in the development of strategy and the conduct of campaigns. Not all managers begin each campaign with the same assessment of their chances to win. They feel more or less confident based on the strengths and weaknesses of their candidate and the opponent; the resources they have at their disposal; the characteristics of the constituents which they usually have to take as a given; and their own experience and abilities.

The significance of these assessments is that they set the tone for a campaign and regulate its activity, and this fact is true for both incumbents and challengers. These attitudes are grounded in their expertise, the resources they have to work with, and the equivalent qualities of the opposition.

4. Campaign Strategies

In a broad sense, everyone knows what campaigns are supposed to do: find and expand the pool of citizens favoring the candidate and get them to the polls on election day. Just how best to do it is another matter. As one political veteran said "I don't know very much about elections. I've been in a lot of them"⁽⁹⁾. In fact, the central motif of almost every discussion of campaign strategy is uncertainty. Political campaigning is, therefore, more art than science.

Nearly everyone agrees that money matters, and spending money is certainly one important form of strategic behaviour. Other important decisions must be made, however, before much money is spent.

(8) a "professional" manager has experience in previous campaigns and is a salaried member of, or paid consultant to, the campaign staff or a member of an incumbent's congressional staff; or the individual has been a manager for more than six years, whether or not compensated. An "amateur" manager is a manager or candidate serving in that role who has little or no previous campaign experience or who is serving as a volunteer.

(9) Kingdon (1986), p. 87.

- Who among the district's citizens should be targeted? i.e. which segment of voters?
- Which messages and themes should be emphasized?
- Which information vehicles should be used to transmit the messages?

The person occupying the pivotal role for developing and executing strategy is the campaign manager. There are three central elements that form the basis for a manager's strategic planning: a general theory concerning political campaigns and how they should be run, the realities of the current contest and an evaluation of the candidate's chances of success. In the first place, a manager is responsible for the broad outline of the political campaign—a notion of what a campaign is, how it should be organized, and what tactics succeed under a variety of circumstances. The "working model" is based upon the managers' training and experiences. In conjunction with a track record in past races, this model is what the candidates buy when they secure a manager's services. The manager's general theory of campaigns and elections has to be tempered by the realities of the current contest. Factors such as the nature of the constituency and the characteristics of the opponents provide a grounding for these theories in a specific electoral context. These two elements—theories of elections and district realities—are combined in assessing candidates' chances for victory; are they easy winners, uncertain combatants or sure losers? They are also relevant to the campaign's ability to influence the size of the margin of victory. Ambitious incumbents may choose to flex their electoral muscles and run up the margin to demonstrate their suitability for higher office; the fear of losing may not affect all challengers, only those who want to make a career of politics. Together these three factors—theories, realities and assessments—determine the strategy and suggests the tactics that can be used to implement it.

Despite their limited scope, some early studies provide valuable theoretical insights into congressional campaigns—concentrating on a few cases⁽¹⁰⁾, on races in a single state⁽¹¹⁾ or on a subset of types of candidates⁽¹²⁾—and bring out two factors that are especially important to the development of campaign strategies: the candidate's party and the candidate's status.

(10) Clem (1976); Fenno (1978)

(11) Hershey (1974)

(12) Huckshorn and Spencer (1971); Fishel (1973)

4.1. The Role Of Party

In the States, a number of previous studies have reported substantial differences between Democrats and Republicans in their campaign beliefs, strategies and patterns of resource allocations. It is reported that there are dramatic party differences in the makeup of candidates' supporting coalitions and in the types of issue appeals they made. Most Democratic candidates tended to be labour-oriented and made liberal issue appeals, while Republican candidates had business-oriented group support and made conservative issue appeals⁽¹³⁾. More recent accounts of party activities have commented on the Republicans' greater use of direct mail techniques and the larger dollar amounts their candidates receive from their national committees⁽¹⁴⁾. Thus, partisan differences in campaigns are expected because of characteristic differences in the groups supporting Democratic and Republican candidates, in the general ideology of the candidates and in the amount and types of outside resources available to Democratic and Republican campaigns. Partisan campaign differences also derive from the different challenges Republican and Democratic incumbents face in their districts. There are more Democratic than Republican House incumbents. Moreover, although a number of Democratic incumbents run in overwhelmingly Democratic districts (in terms of the distribution of party identification), very few Republican incumbents run in overwhelmingly Republican districts. As members of the minority party, Republicans rarely can afford to appeal only to their own partisan supporters. To assemble winning coalitions, they need to broaden their appeal to independents and members of the opposite party as well. As a result, the campaign strategies of Republican incumbents tend to be more broadly targeted and more ambitious than those of Democratic incumbents. This explains why there are party differences in resource allocations. Republicans, for example, were (and still are) more likely than Democrats to use television advertising.⁽¹⁵⁾

4.2. The Role of Candidate Status

A second theme in past studies of congressional campaigns is candidate status. The incumbency advantage in House races obviously is important even if the explanations of the advantage have differed. Many scholars have concentrated on explanatory factors that come into play before the immediate campaign period: perquisites of office⁽¹⁶⁾; positive media treatment⁽¹⁷⁾; opposition by weak challen-

(13) Kingdon (1968)

(14) Alexander (1984), pp. 71-72

(15) Hershey (1974), p. 91.

(16) Cover (1977)

gers⁽¹⁸⁾; constituent service⁽¹⁹⁾; the declining importance of party identification as a cue for voters⁽²⁰⁾; or positions on roll call votes⁽²⁾.

In addition to all these factors, campaign activity also matters. Campaign spending, especially by challengers, translates into votes⁽²²⁾. Various campaign strategies affect whether the voters recognize candidates and how they evaluate them. Recognition and evaluation affect electoral outcomes. Because challengers and incumbents tend to start a general election campaign from very unequal positions in terms of their name recognition and accomplishments in office, their managers differ substantially in their beliefs and strategies for the campaign.

In sum, campaign strategy is influenced by many factors-The role of the managers, party, candidate status, media, the mood of the country, the economic climate and even events overseas. It must be constantly revised and refocused to keep pace with changing conditions. For example, the presidential campaign in 1980 was greatly affected by the Iranian hostage crisis that was taking place at the same time. In 1984, the state of the economy and foreign policy were sure to be important issues. This year (1988), the candidates' status and the mood of the country might be decisive factors, as President Reagan has already put it through across the nation; "The United States does not need an administration based on-the-job training".

Before passing on to the next section, few observations must be taken into consideration. First, candidates must determine the image they wish to project and how best to bring their message to as many potential voters as possible, knowing that voters base their decisions on the candidate's party, stand on issues and leadership qualities. They must decide how to appeal to all factions within their own parties while also attracting independents and dissatisfied voters from other parties. Secondly, on issues, candidates can either appeal to a broad coalition of voters by blurring their stands on controversial issues or try to appeal to special interests by taking a bold and forthright stand. Often this decision has already been made by the selection of a nominee from either the broad mainstream of the party or the more extreme margins. Thirdly, During the nomination process it is crucial for candidates to mobilize early support from a squadron of devoted workers and voters who turn out for primaries and caucu-

(17) Robinson (1974)

(18) Mann and Wolfinger (1980); Jacobson (1981); Ragsdale (1981)

(19) Fiorina (1977)

(20) Cover (1977); Ferejohn (1977)

(21) Fiorina (1981); Johannes and McAdams (1981)

(22) Jacobson (1980)

ses. Thus, candidates are motivated to take strong stands in order to appeal to a dedicated group of zealous supporters in the initial stages of their campaigns. But they must also allow for flexibility later on, when they need to appeal to a broader electorate, without appearing to renege on earlier commitments⁽²³⁾.

One of political writers suggests that the most successful politician may be the candidate who creates no enemies—the lowest common denominator⁽²⁴⁾. Furthermore, one of the president of a campaign management firms advises candidates to sound as if they are saying something but actually to say nothing: "A strong position on an issue will only turn voters off"⁽²⁵⁾. In recent years, however, a more aggressive press and the voters themselves have appeared to demand that candidates take more definite stands on the issues. This observation has become a reality in the presidential election in the United States in 1984.

5. Campaign Tactics and Messages

While campaign strategy looks at the big picture, campaign tactics govern the day-to-day activities that implement the strategy. Even more than strategy, tactics must be flexible and able to be changed quickly as events warrants. Whereas strategy is developed and controlled from the national campaign headquarters, tactical considerations often determine the actions of the national and state party organisations, state and local campaign offices and volunteer and independent committees.

Successful tactics include careful advance work that guarantees a full house at a campaign appearance or frequent "media opportunities" that show the candidate interacting with citizens who belong to important minority or ethnic groups. Methods of bringing the candidate's message and image before the voters range from leaflets passed out or distributed door-to-door by volunteers to nationwide television advertisements (ads.). Celebrity endorsements and special appearances have become an important feature of campaigns.

Even if the candidate's campaign committee is not soliciting contributions, the party and independent committees are doing so, using traditional techniques like fund raisers and new tactics like sophisticated, computerized direct mail appeals. At the same time such committees are deciding how best to help their candidate through ad-

(23) The League of Women Voters Education Fund-LWVEF (1984), PP. 69-70.

(24) Reeves (1975)

(25) LWVEF (1984), p.70.

vertising financing opinion polls, setting up telephone banks to identify supporters or recruiting volunteers.

Tactical decisions also may govern how time, money, paid and volunteer staff and the candidate's energy will be allocated. This involves market segmentation-expanding effort where it will be most effective rather than trying to cover all areas and groups. Opinion polling can reveal those who are already in the candidate's corner and those who could not be won over by any action, thus helping campaigns target their resources. They can show where extra advertising would be useful.

There is no magic formula for appealing to voters; what works in one district or election year may not work in another. The problem of appealing to voters is often rather different for incumbents, challengers, and candidates for open seats in congressional elections, so it is best to consider them separately.

Challengers certainly hope to convince people of their own virtues, but they are not likely to get far without directly undermining support for the incumbent. The trick is to find some vulnerable point to attack; there are a number of possibilities. Personal failings-moral lapses, felony convictions, signs of senility or alcoholism-offer obvious targets, although a surprising number of incumbents with such liabilities manage to win reelection⁽²⁶⁾. Individual political failings-lack of attention to the district or to legislative duties, excessive junketing-also invite attack. But relatively few incumbents are open to serious public criticism on these grounds, and most challengers focus on more directly political behavior. They attack Incumbents on the general ideological or partisan pattern of their votes, on specific votes or on a combination of the two.

It is obviously no easy matter to undermine an incumbent's support; the challenger's ability to do so depends largely on the incumbent's own behavior. In the search for campaign issues, challengers are necessarily opportunists. It is a matter of exploiting the incumbent's mistakes-neglect of the district, personal lapses, a string of "bad" votes-and if the incumbent avoids them, there is little the challenger can do.

Incumbents pursue reelection throughout their term in office, so their campaign strategies and tactics are visible in all their dealings with constituents. Naturally they try to avoid the mistakes that would give opponents campaign issues, but in an uncertain and complicated political world this is not always possible.

(26) For details and interesting examples, see Paters and Welch (1980)

Fenno found out that House members projected a personal "home style" and in one way or another, sought to inspire "trust" among their constituents⁽²⁷⁾. They did this by emphasizing their personal qualifications, including moral character, by identifying with their constituents and by working to develop bonds of empathy with the groups and individuals they met. Simply, they said: "I am one of you, so you can trust me to take the right decisions".

Along with trust, members emphasized their "accessibility". Constituents were reminded continually that the lines of communication were open, that they had access to the member whenever they needed it. The payoffs are clear. A member who is trusted and accessible, thought to be "one of us", will have much less trouble defending himself against political attack. His explanation for controversial votes will be heard more sympathetically; institutional or partisan failures, even notorious ethical lapses may go unpunished.

Although incumbents, at least in the House, engage more or less continuously in activities aimed at assuring reelection, their real campaigns start when it becomes clear who the challenger will be; in the primary or general election or both. Different challengers present different problems and inspire different campaign strategies and tactics. Inept, obscure or underfinanced opponents can be dealt with by routine maintenance of ties with groups in the electoral coalition and otherwise ignored. Ignoring the opposition is a standard tactic of incumbents who feel relatively secure; why give an unknown opponent free publicity?

Common to most incumbents' campaigns is an emphasis on the value of experience and seniority and reminders of the things the member has done over the years for constituents⁽²⁸⁾.

Despite the knowledge members acquire of their constituencies, uncertain plagues incumbents as well as nonincumbents. Each election may present a new challenge and a new set of electoral variables. Since incumbents are not sure which of the things they did got them elected previously, they can not be sure what combination of campaign activities and tactics will serve them in altered circumstances. The desire to win decisively enough to discourage future opposition also leads incumbents to campaign a good deal harder than would seem objectively necessary.

Candidates for open seats face somewhat different electoral situations because none of the contestants is an incumbent or challenger

(27) Fenno (1978), p.55.

(28) Jacobson (1983), p.70.

with the accompanying advantages or disadvantages. They are much more likely to have to win hard-fought primary contests to get the nomination for the opportunity offered to ambitious politicians by an open seat attracts more and stonger candidates⁽²⁹⁾. Indeed, the primary is often a more difficult hurdle than the general election.

Both candidates are likely to have adequate campaign resources because contests for open seats are notoriously competitive; the best chance to take a seat from the opposing party occurs when no incumbent is involved. As a consequence, candidates for open seats are typically better known and better liked than challengers-but not so well as incumbents⁽³⁰⁾.

Lastly, an important element of campaign tactics is deciding which techniques are effective for learning what the people think. The need for political intelligence is common to all campaigns. In some, knowledgeable local party people serve as the major source of information. Other ways to learn what potential voters are thinking include conducting opinion polls; reading mail, newspaper columns, and letters-to-the-editor; and conversing with voters.

Uncertainty in political campaigns obviously invites tactic innovations. Challengers, underdogs and former losers have an incentive to try new tactics. For example, Lawton Chiles won a surprise victory in the 1970 Florida senate election by walking the length of Florida talking and listening to people along the way. Other candidates quickly imitated him. While it was still fresh, the tactic generated abundant free publicity and far more attention than Chiles and the other candidates could have afforded to buy⁽³¹⁾. Whatever seems to work is imitated by others, so the novelty and therefore effectiveness of such tactics fade.

6. The Information Environment

The campaign period provides an important opportunity for voters to collect information about elected officials and those seeking office. During the campaign, candidates attempt to communicate with the electorate in three ways⁽³²⁾.

The first is to have personal contact with as many voters as possible. This technique is very effective, but the candidate's time is perhaps the most limited campaign resource in a constituency of any re-

(29) Schantz (1980), s. 550.

(30) For examples, see Jacobson (1983), pp. 71-72.

(31) Jacobson (1983), p.62.

(32) Goldenberg and Traugott (1984), p. 109.

asonable size. The candidate has to rely, therefore, on what others—a few senior staff members and groups of volunteers, can do.

Using surrogates for the candidate is the second means of contacting voters. In many districts, however, these two types of personal contact are not sufficient to deliver appeals to large segments of the constituency. The candidate must rely upon a third way of spreading messages to the voters—mass media; television, radio, newspapers and magazines. The way the media cover the campaign and the way the candidates use paid media advertising can make a vital difference in election results.

6.1. News Coverage and Equal-Time Provisions⁽³³⁾

Today's media organisations have the ability to determine the shape and substance of a political campaign—the ability to mold images, to define issues, to play up some candidates and play down others, to interpret polls and the results, to generate a sense of gathering momentum or impending defeat.

Given this potential power, journalists must make some key decisions which are set below.

- How much coverage should each candidate receive?
- Should coverage focus on what the candidates say in official position papers?
- Should reporters cover details of what candidates actually do in a day of campaigning or their records in office?
- Should reporters attempt to make analytical interpretations of candidates' views and personalities?

The colorfulness of campaign reporting ebbs and flows, however, depending on the nature of the candidates (particularly in presidential elections), the events of a campaign and reporters' predictions.

Since 1960 in the United States, in-depth reporting has examined candidates' personalities and life styles, scrutinized family life and watched campaign organizations for signs of trouble or changes in direction. However, some within the media industry feel that attention to such matters obscures serious coverage of the candidates' stands on issues and their qualifications for office. Recently television reporters and print journalists have taken a harder stand with candidates by pressing them to answer tough questions as regards on some issues as mentioned earlier.

Of all the media, television bears the greatest responsibilities in campaign coverage for it is the major source of political news for

(33) For the so-called equal-time rule, section 315, see LWEF (1984), p. 73.

most voters. Yet there are many obstacles to thorough television coverage of campaign issues. Straightforward discussion of issues does not produce much colour or excitement for TV cameras; the medium thrives on action. The short time available for the evening news further restricts any real analysis of issues, and TV costs play a large part in curbing ideal coverage.

Perhaps the most unexpected finding is the relatively infrequent use of TV advertising in House races. The modern fascination with political advertising on TV, especially in presidential and statewide races, and visibility given to several well-financed but atypical congressional races each term can create the impression that TV is the communication vehicle of choice in all congressional races. TV was mentioned as the most effective means of getting information to the voters by 25 per cent of the managers, a greater number than cited any other technique except personal contact which was referred to by 33 per cent⁽³⁴⁾. Still, House candidates with enough money do use TV advertising even if it is very wasteful, for even so, it may be the only way to reach many of the voters.

Senate campaigns are usually able to use TV much more efficiently because constituencies are entire states. This helps candidates who are not already well known, hence challengers, and can be added to the list of factors that make senate campaigns so much more competitive, on the average, than House campaigns.

6.2. The Print Media

While TV has a greater capability than print to capture a large audience, news coverage would be incomplete without the wire services, daily newspapers and news weeklies. The print media can probe the personalities of candidates and offer extensive serialized treatises on every aspect of a campaign in a way TV and radio are not equipped to do. Not being subject to the technical constraints of the broadcasting trade, journalists in the print media have a greater opportunity to fully develop coverage, no matter how many candidates are out on the campaign trail.

The national wire services, like Associated Press (AP) and Unitem Press International (UPI) in the States, provide the most widely circulated stories. And what the wire reporters view as the "lead" of a story will often end up as the meat of the story in a hundreds of newspapers across the country. Because of tight deadlines and space limitations, however, these stories are generally not as analytical as expected. The news media are much more interested in senators. House incumbents normally do not attract much attention from the news

(34) Goldenberg and Traugott (1984), pp. 116-117.

media. This means that, except during campaigns, they produce and disseminate much of the information about themselves that reaches the public. To a large extent, they control their own press; no wonder it is a good press, and no wonder voters tend to think highly of them⁽³⁵⁾. In most cases, only a vigorous campaign by the challenger spreads information critical of their performance with effects.

6.3. Use of Radio advertising

Candidates have come to rely extensively on the broadcast media to appeal for votes. Through short radio spots produced by their own media specialists and lasting 15 minutes to an hour, candidates hope to accentuate their own qualities and downgrade those of their opponents.

The importance of radio is that it gives the candidates massive, national exposure. What learn people from radio about elections is dependent on the quality of media markets in their district. In places with a good overlap of market and boundaries, broadcasting is an important campaign tool. On other hand, in dense metropolitan areas voters can not expect to learn much from radio about their House candidates.

Expensive though that exposure is, radio takes less energy than inperson appearances, makes it possible to use travel time more efficiently and opens up much wider audience. Personal contact may mean more to voters, but such contact becomes impractical when there is a whole nation to reach in a short time. Radio ads can be replayed again and again maximizing their usefulness. Use of radio spots peaks at the height of the campaign, usually just before election time. Many thoughtful persons fear that campaigns have become battles between advertising agencies rather than tests of candidates and issues.

Media specialists defend their work on a number of grounds and they are candid about the business they are in. One media specialist says: "Damned right we don't explain. We don't educate, we motivate. That's our job. We're not teachers, we're political managers. We're trying to win"⁽³⁶⁾.

Regardless of which combination of media is chosen, the basic goal is to get the candidate's name before the public. Though little else about mass communication may be certain, it is well established that mass media coverage is positively related to public awareness of pe-

(35) Abramowitz (1980), p. 639.

(36) LWVEF (1984), p. 76.

ople, products or events. The more candidates spend on a campaign, the more likely voters are to know who they are. Getting voters' attention is only part of the problem, of course, but it is an essential part.

7. Conclusion

In democratic countries political campaigns are mainly based on communication of various kinds to get in touch with as many voters as possible.

Strategies and tactics have to be carefully chosen, planned, organized and executed by the parties concerned and by the candidates and their "helpers" if a victory is desired.

As this article illustrates, there are many factors to be taken into the formulas of a political campaign of which the parties' and candidates' role take the first two ranks followed by the effective use of mass media. Televised appearances and debates are decisive, but are not the only way to pursue strategies and tactics to obtain the final result.

In countries, like Turkey, where national TV broadcasting is controlled by the government in office and where "gerrymandering" electoral system exists⁽³⁷⁾; in one way or another, there seems to be many more steps to climb up "the ladder of democracy". In this hard climbing-up, there are some duties to be fulfilled by those true professionals like "advertising and consultancy companies" and "managers" as well as the whole citizens. Finally, it must never be forgotten that, like in many activities, leadership in political campaigns has a vital role to play.

(37) Gerrymandering is an electoral system in which things are all arranged to the advantage of a particular party and which was applied in England in 1830's; see Doğan (1988).

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