

Can Singapore's Development Model Be Successful in Rwanda?

Singapur'un Kalkınma Modeli Ruanda'da Başarılı Olabilir mi?

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ABSTRACT

Singapore has become a country that attracts attention not only in its region but also around the world with its economic development success. The present study examines the reasons behind Singapore's success by focusing on Lee Kuan Yew's policies following his assumption of government in Singapore. It is evident that the implementation of a meritocracy approach by Yew resulted in the effective resolution of a significant national challenge, namely corruption. In addition, a comprehensive restructuring of the country's education and infrastructure was implemented with the objective of enhancing its global competitiveness. Moreover, he elevated the nation to a position of prominence in the global trade arena through the implementation of a free market economy and the strategic investment in ports. Similarly, the efforts of Paul Kagame following his rise to power in Rwanda in 2000 to prevent the country from reliving its past sufferings and to gain a respectable place in the international system are emphasized. Adopting the motto "Singapore of Africa", Kagame's approach centered on the development of technology and service sectors, with the objective of reducing the country's reliance on the agricultural economy. The two countries are evaluated and compared on the basis of similarities such as colonial past, geographical smallness and authoritarian leadership. The present study provides a comparative perspective to understand the intersection of local dynamics and global integration in the development strategies of disadvantaged Singapore and Rwanda. The study's central argument concerns the question of whether Rwanda, adopting Singapore as a paradigm of economic success, might also attain comparable levels of prosperity within the framework of authoritarian modernization theory.

Keywords: Authoritarian Modernization Theory, International System, Economic Development

ÖZ

Singapur, ekonomik kalkınma başarısıyla sadece bölgesinde değil tüm dünyada dikkat çeken bir ülke haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada Lee Kuan Yew'in Singapur'da yönetimi devraldıktan sonraki politikalarına odaklanılarak Singapur'un başarısının ardındaki nedenler incelenmektedir. Yew'in meritokrasi anlayışı sayesinde ülkenin en büyük sorunlarından biri olan yolsuzluk çözülmüştür. Ayrıca Yew, ülkedeki eğitim ve altyapıyı küresel bir rekabete girebilecek şekilde yeniden yapılandırmıştır. Buna ek olarak serbest piyasa ekonomisi ve stratejik liman yatırımları sayesinde ülkeyi küresel ticaretin merkezlerinden biri haline getirmiştir. Benzer şekilde Paul Kagame'nin 2000 yılında Ruanda'da yönetimi devraldıktan sonra ülkenin geçmişte yaşadığı acıları tekrar yaşamaması ve uluslararası sistemde saygın bir yer edinmesi için gösterdiği çabalar üzerinde durulmaktadır. Kagame, "Afrika'nın Singapur'u" mottosuyla, ülkede tarımsal ekonomiye bağımlılığı azaltmak için teknoloji ve hizmet sektörlerini geliştirmeye odaklanmıştır. Her iki ülke, sömürge geçmişi, coğrafi küçüklük ve otoriter liderlik gibi benzerlikler temelinde değerlendirilmekte ve karşılaştırılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, dezavantajlı koşullara sahip Singapur ve Ruanda'nın kalkınma stratejilerinde yerel dinamiklerin ve küresel entegrasyonun kesişimini anlamak için karşılaştırmalı bir perspektif sunar. Çalışma özünde Singapur'un ekonomik başarısını rol model olarak alan Ruanda'nın benzer bir başarıyı yakalayıp yakalayamayacağını otoriter modernleşme teorisi kapsamında tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Otoriter Modernizasyon Teori, Uluslararası Sistem, Ekonomik Kalkınma

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Introduction

After the decolonization process, the states that gained their independence came to the world stage. While some of these states have been dealing with their own internal conflicts, others have endeavored to take the necessary steps to earn a place in the international system. One of the most notable of these states is Singapore due to its extraordinary economic success. Lee Kuan Yew, the founding leader of Singapore, which gained its independence after the British colonization, is the architect of the country's success today, despite his authoritarian rule. Lee Kuan Yew analyzed Singapore's current situation very well and succeeded in attracting capital by finding the most suitable economic breakthrough system for his country. Singapore's trademark is not only its economic success, but also the fact that the country has far exceeded its potential. This success story has attracted the attention of many other states, especially those with similar characteristics. Rwanda, the other subject of this study, is one of these countries. When Paul Kagame came to power in Rwanda, he wanted to change the country's image of its genocidal past in the international community. One of the pillars of such a radical change is the economic prosperity of the country. Kagame, who was determined to develop Rwanda, took Singapore as a role model for his country and believed that Rwanda could achieve the same success in Africa as Singapore did in Asia. Singapore and Rwanda share several similarities, including their colonial past, geographical disadvantages and authoritarian leaders. These factors suggest a plausible and realistic scenario in which one country could serve as a source of inspiration for the other.

Singapore ranks at the top of the Asian Tigers¹ in terms of per capita income. It is also very successful in terms of education, ease of doing business, anti-corruption and technology. The secret of Singapore's success depends on many parameters. The turning point for Singapore was the rise of Lee Kuan Yew to power. After coming to power, Lee Kuan Yew believed that poverty was not destiny for his country and that he could change it. This motivation is the basis for Singapore's success today.

Singapore's example could potentially serve as a valuable model for Rwanda, another developing country striving for economic growth and development. The study of Singapore's successful strategies in the areas of education, infrastructure development, and government policies can potentially identify the most suitable methodology for Rwanda, allowing it to apply similar approaches to the promotion of sustainable economic growth and development. Furthermore, the significance Singapore attaches to innovation, entrepreneurship, and attracting foreign investment could also prove beneficial to Rwanda, which is attempting to increase its economic income sources and reduce its dependence on traditional sectors such as agriculture. Furthermore, the efficient and transparent structure of Singapore, along with its strong focus on technological advancement and skilled workforce development, provides a model that could inform the transformation of Rwanda into a viable country for foreign investors and a nation with a more balanced economic base. The lessons learned by Singapore in developing a knowledge-based economy, promoting stability and good governance, and prioritising human capital development offer insights that could guide Rwanda on its path towards economic success and sustainable development. Ultimately, despite the existence of distinctive attributes and obstacles in each state, the prosperity of Singapore serves as an exemplary model to be emulated by Rwanda, which is striving to attain its own economic prosperity while enhancing the well-being of its citizens.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the dynamics of Singapore's extraordinary economic and social success since independence. The study will analyze how Singapore, under the leadership of founding leader Lee Kuan Yew, has achieved a remarkable development miracle despite facing numerous disadvantages. The study also seeks to interrogate the applicability of Singapore's success in the Rwandan context. In this context, the economic and social steps taken by Rwanda to recover from the devastating effects of the 1994 genocide will be evaluated. Finally, the Singapore-Rwanda comparison will be used to facilitate an understanding of the intersection of local dynamics and the global system in the development roadmaps of states facing disadvantaged conditions. The objective of this initiative is to establish a framework that will empower these states to realize their potential on the global stage. The present study focuses on understanding the development strategies of disadvantaged countries using a methodology based on comparative history. Secondary data sources are also analyzed to support the arguments. The fundamental rationale for employing authoritarian modernization theory in this study is that Singapore and Rwanda exhibit notable parallels in their developmental models, characterized by centralized governance,

¹ The countries of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, which underwent a rapid process of industrialisation and development following the Second World War, are referred to as the 'Asian Tigers'. These countries have become significant players in the global economy, exhibiting high growth rates and serving as a model for economic development, according to numerous authoritative sources (Kırbaşoğlu, & Tüfekçi, 2020, pp. 52-53).

economic prioritization, and the curtailment of political freedoms. This theoretical framework is instrumental in elucidating the impact of political regime choices on the developmental trajectories of 'disadvantaged' countries.

In first part of this study, the authoritarian modernization theory will be discussed; second part will examine the secret of Singapore's success; third part will provide information about the steps taken by Rwanda and its future vision; and finally, the similarities and differences between Rwanda and Singapore will be mentioned. In the initial section of this study, an examination of authoritarian modernization theory will be conducted. The subsequent section will involve an analysis of the factors that have contributed to Singapore's success. The third section will encompass an investigation into the measures implemented by Rwanda and its future strategic aspirations. The final section will draw parallels and differentiate between the two nations, Rwanda and Singapore.

Authoritarian Modernization Theory

A subcategory of undemocratic rule is the concept of authoritarian modernism. The country in question shares with the broader universe of authoritarianism significant restrictions on civil and political freedoms. Furthermore, if elections are held at all, they are not free and/or fair. The main difference, however, is that this non-democratic form of government coexists with a highly developed economy and a high degree of social differentiation. In other words, economics and modernization coexist with significant constraints. There are some differences between authoritarian modernism and modernization theory. Modernization theory is community-centered and structuralist in nature. It examines the manner in which economic progress and social diversity give rise to political trends. Conversely, an authoritarian approach to modernism is state-centered and voluntarist. This perspective analyses the ways in which autocratic leaders resist liberalization and democratization despite accelerated modernization and the increasing complexity of social life. They attempt to neutralize civil society and justify the continuation of authoritarian rule in the context of modernity (Thompson, 2019, p. 7).

Nevertheless, it is erroneous to posit that authoritarian modernism is in contradiction with modernization theory. In fact, there is a dialectical relationship between the two. Regimes that seek to become authoritarian are, in fact, modern. They face a "modernization trap," however, in that socioeconomic developments in society and the rise of new social forces make it difficult to sustain non-democratic governments. However, authoritarian regimes are cautious against dangers that may pose a threat to them in society. Although modernization and authoritarian rule are unlikely to coexist for long, Meiji Japan and Singapore are exceptions. It is argued by modernization theorists that rapid economic development will inevitably trigger democratic demands, but a change may occur as the existing authoritarian regime loses legitimacy and control over the population. Only if an authoritarian leadership successfully suppresses major social actors while legitimizing undemocratic rule can a non-democratic modernity project succeed (Thompson, 2019, p. 8).

Although it is a matter of curiosity whether the authoritarian modernization that Singapore achieved under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew can be achieved under the leadership of Kagame in Rwanda, it can be said that both countries have a lot in common. The Democracy Index is a study prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the research department of The Economist newspaper. The index is designed to assess the state of democracy in 167 countries and categorize them into five fundamental groups. In the scoring system out of 10, Singapore is listed as a flawed democracy in the 70th place with 6.22 points, while Rwanda is listed as an authoritarian regime with 3.10 points (The Economist Democracy Index, n.d.). Although the reason why Rwanda received lower points than Singapore is that Kagame has been ruling the country since 2000, in Singapore, power only passed from the founding leader Lee Kuan Yew to his son Lee Hsien Loong.

The Secret to Singapore's Modernization

Located at the southern tip of the Malaysian peninsula, Singapore has a smaller surface area than Yalova, Turkey's smallest province. Until sixty years ago, it was a country with public order problems on its streets and struggling with internal turmoil. In 1965, Singapore gained its independence from Malaysia and had a per capita income of only 500 United States (US) dollars. In addition, Singapore was a city-state² where half of its people were illiterate and unemployment was high (Çakmak, 2022, p. 68).

In August 1965, Singapore was compelled to secede from the Federation of Malaysia and become an independent nation. At the time, the future of the nascent state remained uncertain. This was particularly evident in the mind of the then-Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew. Lee (2000) wrote in his memoirs: "We were requested to leave Malaysia and make our own way.


² A city-state, also known as a city-republic, is an independent state that consists of a city as its capital, with subordinate territories under its jurisdiction. Today, Singapore, the Vatican and Monaco are examples of city-states (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d).

We were faced with enormous difficulties where the chances of survival were incredible. [...] On that August 9th day in 1965, with great fear. I set out with concern for the future of my country. However, Lee's concerns about his country's future turned out to be misplaced, and his country not only survived but also rose from failed state status to strong state status. (Quah, 2018, p. 5).

The period from 1965 to 1973 saw unprecedented economic growth for the city-state. The average annual growth of real GDP during this period was 12.7 percent (Patterns of Development, n.d.). The city-state has experienced GDP growth rates among the highest in the world, with an average of 7.7% since its independence and a peak of 9.2% in the first 25 years. In the early 1970s, Singapore reached full employment, a state that was maintained for approximately a decade. This period of sustained economic growth led to Singapore's inclusion in the ranks of other newly industrializing economies in Asia, including Hong Kong SAR, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan (The World Bank in Singapore, n.d.). Figure 1 presents a chronicle of Singapore's economic growth rates. While there is a steady rise in the figure, there are also cyclical fluctuations.

Figure 1.

History of Singapore's Economic Growth Rates



Source: Singapore: Economic growth

How Singapore made such a leap is a dynamic process that depends on many parameters. In this article, certain parameters will be mentioned in the spirit of the study. These are meritocracy, education, ease of doing business and anti-corruption.

Meritocracy: The concept, which is formed by the combination of the words "merit" and "cracy", means that those with merit can obtain power. It is believed that meritocratic practices were first introduced in Germany with the steps of the Prussian King Frederick I. Because Frederick I made multiple practices and conditions mandatory, such as making law education compulsory and applying exams, for admission to state positions (Topdemir & Öncel, 2020, p. 565). At the same time, meritocracy is a social system that is still evolving. Within the same society, the concept of virtue may vary depending on culture or environment. The practice of meritocracy shows many varieties across Asian and Western countries. One of the most meritocratic countries today. Lee Kuan Yew, known as the founding father of Singapore, believed in the need for a culture of meritocracy in order to initiate economic development along with social progress and to establish an effective public service (Kim & Choi, 2017, p. 118). Lee Kuan Yew, who ruled Singapore for nearly 30 years from 1959 to 1990 and was the first Prime Minister of the country, emphasized the importance of good leadership in his memoirs: "Asian experience has shown me that for good government we need good people. No matter how good the system of government is, bad leaders harm their people. The only decisive factor for Singapore's development was the skill/talent of its ministers and the high quality of the staff who assisted them." (Quah, 2018, p. 7).

Education: The Singaporean education system, which is consistently evolving in terms of educational advancement, commences with pre-school education, during which nearly 100% of students are enrolled in school. While preschool education is not legally required in Singapore, it is widely perceived as beneficial for children and therefore desired by their parents and other guardians. The subsequent stage, primary education, encompasses a total of 10 years, with the first stage comprising six years (ages 7-12) and the second stage four years (ages 13-16). Upon completion of the initial stage, which entails the implementation of a comprehensive curriculum for all students, a final examination is administered, designated as the "Primary School Completion Examination." Those who demonstrate proficiency on the examination are permitted to proceed to the second stage. At this level, students may choose from a variety of courses, including private, express, and standard (academic or technical). Students enrolled in express and private courses are permitted to take the final

examination at the conclusion of the fourth academic year. As a general rule, individuals who are in the normal course are entitled to first take the final examination of their own course and then, at the end of a one-year period, take the examination for the next level (Bakioğlu & Göçmen, 2013).

Singapore has endeavored to mitigate the consequences of its limited natural resources by investing heavily in educational initiatives, with the objective of augmenting the skills and abilities of its population. According to Singapore, education has been identified as a crucial factor in the long-term future of the population. The government of the United States of America, recognizing the value of education as a national investment, increased its expenditure on education to 63.4 million dollars in 1959. It managed to increase approximately 200 times from the US dollar to 12.6 billion US dollars in 2016. This intense investment in education and training has led to significant increases in the quality of the population (Quah, 2018, p. 12).

Singapore, which is not a member of the OECD; He did not participate in the PISA exams held in 2000, 2003 and 2006. Participating in Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2009 for the first time, in which 65 countries participated, Singapore attracted all the attention with the scores it received in all three areas. In 2009, Singapore was ranked second in mathematics, fourth in science, and fifth in reading. With 526 points in reading, it achieved higher scores than countries whose native language is English, such as the United States and England (MOE, 2010). In PISA held in 2012, Singapore ranked second in mathematics with 573 points and third in reading and science, ranking in the top three in all three areas. According to the PISA 2012 results, Singaporean students are aware of what the 21st century requires; Research has shown that they have skills such as establishing cause-effect relationships and solving real-life problems (MOE, 2014).


According to the PISA test results conducted in 2015, Singapore ranked first in all three fields by collecting 556 points in science, 535 points in reading and 564 points in mathematics (OECD, 2016). In the 2018 PISA test results, Singapore ranked second with 551 points in science, 569 points in mathematics and 549 points in reading (OECD, 2019). According to the 2022 PISA test results, it ranked first with 561 points in science, 575 points in mathematics and 543 points in reading (OECD, 2023a). As illustrated in Figure 2, the data pertaining to Singapore's performance in mathematics, reading and science, as measured by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, is presented. This performance signifies that Singapore has achieved a level of success that surpasses the OECD average.

Figure 2.

Singapore: Trends in Performance in Mathematics, Reading and Science

Singapore

Score points



Source: PISA 2022 Results (Volume I)

Singapore Management University, Singapore University of Technology and Design, National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University (Nanyang). There are four autonomous universities in Singapore, including the Technological University. Among these, the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University managed to enter the list of the top hundred universities in 2010. The entry requirements for public universities in Singapore are quite rigorous, reflecting a culture where the pursuit of excellence and the achievement of success in academic settings are highly valued. This emphasis on academic rigor and success is seen as a key factor in identifying and nurturing the potential of students (Bakioğlu & Göçmen, 2013).

Ease of Doing Business: The data set for the ease of doing business index of countries is obtained by the World Bank through surveys conducted on employees of private and public institutions. The data obtained are sent to the World Bank's country offices in the member countries and to the governments of the member countries to enable them to contribute. The calculation of country scores in the ease of doing business index is done in two steps. In the first step, indicators under 10 different headings are reduced to a common unit. Best and worst performance values are renewed every 5 years based on the data collected in the index. In the second step in the calculation of the ease of doing business index, the simple arithmetic average of each indicator in the index is taken. Indicators are assigned equal weight. This process is done separately for 10 main indicators and sub-indicators. After this process, each country is given a performance score between 0 and 100. The value 0 represents the lowest possible performance, while the value 100 represents the highest possible performance (MTF, 2023). The Ease of Doing Business Index, which has been prepared regularly by the World Bank every year since 2004, evaluates the business regulations affecting the investment climate in member countries. According to the 2019 Report, Singapore ranks 2nd among 190 economies. As illustrated in Figure 2, the data pertaining to Singapore's performance in mathematics, reading and science, as measured by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, is presented. This outcome signifies that Singapore has attained a level of success that surpasses the mean average of OECD countries. Table 1 presents data pertaining to Singapore's performance in the World Bank's 2020 Ease of Doing Business Report. Singapore's policies have been instrumental in propelling the nation to a position of global prominence, as evidenced by its attainment of second place in the aforementioned list.


Table 1.

Economy Rankings

Rank	Country	Score
1	New Zealand	86.8
2	Singapore	86.2
3	Hong Kong, SAR China	85.3
4	Denmark	85.3
5	Korea, Rep.	84.0
6	United States	84.0
7	Georgia	83.7
8	United Kingdom	83.5
9	Norway	82.6
10	Sweden	82.0

Source: Ease of Doing Business rankings, 2020

The Doing Business Index measures the regulations that enable private sector businesses to start, operate and grow. The “Doing Business Index” report evaluates the economies of 190 countries. While in 2003 only 5 indicators were taken into account, the number of indicators has increased to 11. This measurement is made using the indicators in figure 3: (1) Starting a business, (2) Obtaining construction permits, (3) Electricity, (4) Registration in the land registry, (5) Obtaining loans, (6) Protection of minority shareholder investors, (7) Payment of taxes, (8) Cross-border business transactions, (9) Enforcement of contracts, (10) Resolution of bankruptcy, (11) Flexibility of employment legislation and quality of work (doingbusiness.org, 2017).

Figure 3.*Training for Reform*


Source: Doing Business, 2019

The conduct of business on an international scale is a phenomenon that is not merely a means of motivating domestic investors; it is also an instrument that is employed with the objective of attracting foreign investors. The International Monetary Fund has defined foreign direct investment as follows: "FDI refers to investments made by enterprises in other countries to acquire permanent interests". This definition suggests that the investment climate indicators provided in the Doing Business database can be important proxies when explaining FDI inflows in a country. Countries with an investment climate that firms perceive as business-friendly and in which they feel more comfortable attract more FDI (Singh, 2015, 13).

Fight Against Corruption: When we look at the definitions of the concept of corruption, there are generally three. It seems that this element is brought to the fore. These are private interests, public power and abuse. Private interest, money or valuables is closely related to acquisition and also increases power or status. Sometimes it is directly directed at the person, sometimes it is close to the person. Promises are made in favor of friends or relatives is the subject. Public power is exercised by bureaucrats and elected politicians through public services, subsidies, customs permits, public procurement and. It is used extensively in areas such as privatization. Another element of corruption is abuse. The concept of abuse is defined as the deviation in the duties and behavior of elected or appointed persons by preferring narrow interests instead of broad public interests (Lambdsdorff, 2007, p. 18).

In order to analyze Singapore's success in the fight against corruption the approach of the governments in the country to corruption in the historical process focus. An important turning point here was in 1952 leading to the establishment of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) the Opium Smuggling Scandal (Quah, 2007, pp. 2-3). Corruption was a significant concern in Singapore during the British colonial period, largely due to the government's lack of political resolve and the ineffectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), which had a limited number of personnel (17 staff members). Upon assuming power in 1959, the People's Action Party (PAP) enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) on June 17, 1960. This legislation strengthened the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) by conferring upon it greater legal authority, personnel, and financial resources. The effectiveness of the CPIB and the impartial application of POCA has led to the minimization of corruption in Singapore. The punishment for those convicted of corruption offenses is uniform and does not depend on the individual's position, status, or political affiliation (Quah, 2018, pp. 10-11).

Singapore government's implementation of constitutional and legislative changes ability of the ruling PAP government to influence the political system sovereignty. Since 1965, Singapore has been a sovereign republic with a parliamentary system of government that is modeled on the Westminster system. From 1968 to 1981, the People's Action Party (PAP) government enjoyed a majority of more than two-thirds in parliament. This gave the PAP government considerable leeway to implement radical and rapid changes to Singapore society through the legal system (Tan, 2000, p. 93). The figure 4 below presents Singapore's corruption control data for the period 1996-2022. Singapore's average is 2.14, with a reference range of -2.5 weak and +2.5 strong. In 2022, the average of 193 countries is -0.04.

Figure 4.*Singapore Control of Corruption Historical Chart (1996-2022)***Source:** Singapore: Control of Corruption

Rwanda: History, Development and Future

Rwanda, the most developed state in the African lakes region and the favorite of international development projects in 'Black Africa', is composed of two different ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi. In Rwanda, which was an independent state before colonial activities, the Hutus, who are among the indigenous people and make up 90% of the population, lived under the domination of the Tutsis, who made up 10% of the population, for many years. In this process, the attitude of Tutsis towards Hutus laid the foundations of the genocide that took place in 1994, and although they spoke the same language, the policy followed by the colonial powers was effective in creating this hostile approach between Hutus and Tutsis. Because when the colonial powers, who were determined to dominate new living spaces with their discoveries, first came to Rwanda, they were surprised by the culture and civilization here and, as they did everywhere for the continuation of the colonial policy, they first brought the people who settled in the region to the forefront, gave them the administration, and then ruled the majority with the hands of a minority. This policy was first realized when Rwanda was left to the Germans after the Brussels Treaty of 1890, and a shadow administration was provided by supporting the Tutsis. However, in the period following the departure of the Germans from the region, the Belgians, who came to Rwanda as a colonial power after World War I, continued this policy and sowed the seeds of hatred among them by drawing ethnic divisions. On the contrary to the Germans, the Belgians directly intervened in the administration of the country, forcing the people to drink coffee, sending them to the gardens, and punishing those who did not do what they wanted (UHiM, 2012, p. 108).

The anti-colonial movements that spread in Africa in the early 1950s were also welcomed by Rwanda. Rwanda's ruling elite, the Tutsis, sought independence and the Belgians realizing that the Hutus, the minority group in the country, were being raised and supported as the middle class. As a result, the Hutus believed that "the Tutsis had subjugated the Hutus for hundreds of years based on historical claims" and the Hutu Liberation Party (PARMEHUTU) was established (Kuperman, 2001, p. 6). While, on the one hand, Tutsis were struggling for liberation from colonial rule with the support of communist countries, on the other hand, Hutus' struggle against Tutsi domination began. These struggles led to great violence in 1959 when the Hutu tried to seize power (Kuperman, 2001, p. 7). In this process, the Hutus, with the support of Belgium, engaged in the burning of houses, the killing of hundreds of Tutsis, and the forced migration of thousands of Tutsis to Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire. In the end, Rwanda gained its independence in 1962 under the control of the Hutu who seized power (Kuperman, 2001, p. 7). Meanwhile, Tutsi refugees attempted to return to their country and initiated attacks with the objective of gaining power. These attacks were met with persecution of the Tutsis in Rwanda by the Hutu regime. The main objective of the Hutu extremist regime was to deter the Tutsis from rebellion (Kuperman, 2001, p. 7). The Hutus under President Kayibanda perceived a threat when Tutsis from Burundi approached the capital Kigali in 1963. However, President Kayibanda's response in 1964 was that "If the Tutsis try to gain political power again, they will find that the entire Tutsi race will be wiped out" (Grunfeld, 2007, p. 31) and as a result, 20,000 Tutsis were killed and 300,000 fled between 1959 and 1967 (Kuperman, 2001, p. 7).

Economic austerity began in Rwanda in the mid-1980s (Jefremovas, 2004, p. 30). The sharp drop in coffee prices, which accounted for about 75% of Rwanda's foreign trade, shook the country's economy (Des Forges, 1999, p. 41). At the same time, Rwanda experienced a minor drought in 1988-89 and cut its social services budget (Prunier, 1997, p. 87). The turmoil that had been unfolding for some time led the Tutsi refugees to decide to attack Rwanda. On October 1, 1990, the Rwandan

Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Tutsi refugees, initiated an incursion from Uganda (Prunier, 1997, p. 93). On October 2, President Habyarimana requested assistance from the French. Upon the French military's arrival to provide support to the Presidential Guard, their primary objective was to facilitate the evacuation of foreign nationals (Kuperman, 2001, p. 9). The European powers were therefore initially reluctant to enter the war; however, "to dramatize the perceived seriousness of the situation, the Presidential Guard staged a mock attack on Kigali by "enemy" troops" (Prunier, 1997, p. 101). With the support of the European powers, the Habyarimana regime began the hunt for Tutsis. In fact, the operations were directed not only against Tutsis but also against dissident Hutus. Around 10,000 educated Tutsis were arrested and the army threatened the RPF that all detainees would be killed if they entered the capital Kigali (Prunier, 1997, pp. 108- 109). Although the RPF did not emerge triumphant from the war, it demonstrated its capacity for military action, and from that point forward, President Habyarimana incorporated this into his considerations regarding political reforms (Prunier, 1997, p. 120).

In August 1993, the Arusha Agreement was signed between the ruling MRND (National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development) and the RPF. This agreement set out the terms of the transitional government. Subsequently, UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda) was deployed to the region in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 872 of October 5, 1993. UNAMIR is a 2,500-strong peacekeeping force composed of Belgium, France and Canada. As the Hutu attacks on Tutsis continued, the RPF first withdrew from the government and then stepped up its attacks. Despite all warnings, necessary measures were not taken. The International Human Rights Investigation Committee documented the massacres in the region and found that Tutsis were subjected to ethnic discrimination and massacred. In addition, a special report prepared by the UN drew attention to genocide and human rights violations against civilians (Reçber, 2016, pp. 159-160).

The downing of the plane of Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundi's Hutu President Ntaryamira in April 1994 marked the beginning of a human tragedy that will go down in history in Rwanda. In the aftermath of the plane crash, nearly one million people, 1/6 of Rwanda's inhabitants and 2/3 of its Tutsis, were brutally massacred. UNAMIR reported that the genocide could have been stopped by sending 5,000 more troops to the region. However, after the killing of 10 Belgian soldiers, the number of troops in the region was reduced from 2,700 to 270 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 912 of April 21, 1994. Therefore, UNAMIR became even more disadvantaged in stopping the genocide in the region. The then UN Secretary-General Boutros Gali called on the Security Council to send troop reinforcements to the region, but the US, which supported the Tutsis, and France, which supported the Hutus, could not reach a consensus within the Security Council. In the ongoing clashes, the pro-Tutsi RPF took control of the country and the Hutus fled to neighboring countries or to areas held by the MRND. Since the forces in the region were not sufficient, the genocide could not be stopped. In less than six months, 3,500,000 Rwandans were displaced and had to leave the country. The international community failed to take the necessary action steps in a timely manner. Therefore, the crisis in the region could not be prevented (Kalaycı, 2010, pp. 154-156, 159-160; Reçber, 2016, pp. 156-161, 168). The Rwandan Patriotic Front under the command of Paul Kagame came to the country and put an end to the genocide. After the events were resolved, the Rwanda Patriotic Front entered the elections in 2000 and won, and Paul Kagame became the president of the country (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 2016).

When the Kagame government came to power, it faced a series of problems stemming from both the general structure of Rwanda and its colonial past. These include;

- Although agriculture accounted for more than 90% of the labor force, yields and productivity were very low.
- Rwanda is a landlocked country, situated a considerable distance from ocean ports. This factor contributes to elevated transportation costs for both exports and imports.
- In 2000, Rwanda's main exports were coffee and tea. The government realized that increased productivity and exports in these areas alone would not be enough to grow and develop the country's economy.
- Institutional capacity was weak due to a lack of solid institutions and competent staff.
- The dearth of adequately trained personnel constituted the most significant impediment to the advancement of the sectors. The scarcity of skilled personnel in agriculture and animal husbandry has impeded the modernization of this sector, while the lack of technicians and competent managers has significantly constrained the expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors.
- In 2000, Rwanda's public debt stood at approximately US\$1.5 billion, which was greater than the country's current national GDP of US\$1.3 billion. Approximately 75% of this debt was with the World Bank, which constituted a significant obstacle to the country's economic development.

- The 1994 genocide had a profound impact on Rwanda's economy and population. The country's GDP declined by 50% in a single year, with 80% of the population falling into poverty. Additionally, vast tracts of land were destroyed, and most livestock were wiped out. The genocide also resulted in the complete destruction of Rwanda's already weak productive structure, leaving the nation without a generation of educated teachers, doctors, public servants, and private entrepreneurs. Consequently, the consequences of the genocide had a devastating impact on the social, political, and economic fabric of Rwanda (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000).

The Kagame government has built specific goals to solve the above problems and take the necessary steps for Rwanda's future. The Vision 2020 initiative is designed to facilitate the transformation of Rwanda from a low-income to a middle-income country by the year 2020. The primary development strategy of Rwanda is to transform the country into a developed nation. Rwanda's prioritization in this plan prepared by taking into account the extremely scarce resources and divided into sections under short, medium and long term objectives (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000).

In the near term, it was determined that macroeconomic stabilization and wealth creation would be beneficial in reducing the country's dependence on external assistance. In 2000, Rwanda was burdened by an unsustainable debt burden and dependent on foreign aid. To reduce this dependence, it was decided that effective strategies should be developed to broaden the tax base, attract foreign investors, and address the debt situation. In addition, incentives should be announced to expand exports. The implementation of these policies is anticipated to mark the advent of a transformation in the economy from one that relies on subsistence agriculture to one that is based on the knowledge economy (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000).

In the medium term, the goal is to transform from an agricultural to a knowledge-based economy. Although the agricultural sector may undergo significant transformation, the potential for this sector to become a significant contributor to economic growth is limited. Therefore, a comprehensive exit strategy from the dependence on labor-intensive and capital-intensive sectors should consider the role of agriculture, industry, and services in this transition. But it is not only a question of agriculture, industry or services. strategy, but rather to identify and capitalize on Rwanda's comparative advantage to focus on strategies to address the shortage of cheap labor. One example is the abundant supply of cheap labor, strategic location as a gateway between East and Central Africa as well as infrastructure that it was a small country, which would make it easier to build (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000).

In the long term, the objective is to foster the creation of a productive middle class and to encourage entrepreneurship. Incentives will be provided to productive entrepreneurship in order to fulfill its traditional role of creating wealth, jobs, and vital innovations through profit opportunities. The provision of high-quality educational services in science and technology will be essential to consolidate the development gains achieved in the short and medium term. Additionally, Rwanda aspires to establish itself as a regional telecommunications hub. The implementation of these reforms will result in a transformation of Rwanda's economy from a subsistence agricultural base to a knowledge-based society with a flourishing entrepreneurial class (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000). As illustrated in Table 2, Rwanda's Vision 2020 encompasses key objectives and associated targets.

Table 2.*Vision 2020 Objectives*

Vision 2020 Main Objectives	Vision 2020 Parallel Objectives
1. Good Governance and a Capable State	1. Gender equality 2. Environmental Protection and Sustainable Natural Resource Management 3. Information Communication Technologies/Science and Technology
2. Human Resource Development and Knowledge-Based Economy	
3. A Private Sector-Led Economy	
4. Infrastructure Development	
5. Productive and Market Oriented Agriculture	
6. Regional and International Economic Integration	

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000.

In his article (2019) by Uwizeyimana from the University of Johannesburg, where he evaluates the indicators and results of Vision 2020, he says that although Rwanda has shown some success in social and economic indicators, overall it has failed. Uwizeyimana stated that at the time he wrote his article, the data of most indicators were a few years behind, and that he still predicted that the general picture would fail in 2020. He estimated that this unsuccessful picture was not given sufficient care in determining realistically achievable targets for Vision 2020, and said that the Rwandan government denied that they were wrong in determining the development targets, based on the fact that the Asian tiger countries have similar initial conditions but are successful today. He stated that only the authoritarian management style was taken as an example from Singapore. Uwizeyimana considers indicators that do not fully reach the targets as completely unsuccessful, no matter how close they are to success.

Takeuchi (2019) from Tokyo University also says that the main factor that enables the country's rapid growth is the authoritarianism of the government and that rapid growth may stop if political conditions change. Steady (2019) from Wellesley University says that Rwanda has made great progress despite some shortcomings in the development process, and that the biggest share in the development is Paul Kagame, whom he calls the "benevolent dictator". However, he adds that the building of strong and effective institutions must continue in order to sustain the gains achieved so far. It is beyond the scope of our study to examine how authoritarian Paul Kagame is or to determine whether the practices against dissidents in Rwanda are justified. The common point put forward by the above researchers is that Paul Kagame or the Rwandan government has an authoritarian structure and the impact of this situation on development may be negative in the future.

Popa and Betco (2020) from the University of Moldova found Rwanda's development process, especially after the genocide, to be quite successful in their study. They draw particular attention to the high growth rates achieved in the economic field. Rwigema (2022), also from Jomo Kenyatta University, finds Rwanda's development process in social and economic fields generally very successful. However, it only relies on annual average growth figures and the corruption index for economic development.

Singapore & Rwanda: Similarities and Differences

Singapore, which gained independence from British colonial rule in 1965, encountered significant economic challenges in the early years of its independence due to its limited natural resources. Nevertheless, it is evident that the meritocracy model which was adopted by Lee Kuan Yew was instrumental in the development of the country (Vogel, 1991). The Belgian colonial legacy in Rwanda proved to be a catalyst for ethnic conflict, ultimately leading to the 1994 genocide that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Following the genocide, Paul Kagame ascended to power and has pursued an economic development agenda modelled on Singapore's success (Kinzer, 2008). The pursuit of economic development by both countries was characterized by the adoption of authoritarian governance (Longman, 2017). Singapore attracted the

attention of multinational companies by adopting a free market economy and offering the advantage of low taxes after the Lee Kuan Yew government (World Bank, 1993), while Rwanda was able to increase investment in its country thanks to the ease of doing business offered to foreign investors after the Paul Kagame government (World Bank, 2022). Singapore's aspirations to evolve into a pivotal logistics hub, underpinned by its strategic port location (Huff, 1995), stand in contrast to Rwanda's ambitious pursuit of a leadership position in African technology, exemplified by its Kigali Innovation City and the deployment of drone technology (Mazzucato, 2021). It is evident that both countries have taken significant measures in their respective efforts to combat corruption. Singapore has been ranked 5th in Transparency International's 2023 index, a feat attributable to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (CPIB). Conversely, Rwanda has ascended to 54th position in the index, a noteworthy achievement attributable to the nation's zero-tolerance policy towards corruption under Kagame's leadership.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some differences between the two countries. Singapore, a densely populated island state measuring 728 square kilometers, stands in stark contrast to Rwanda, a vast, landlocked country spanning 26,338 square kilometers (World Bank, 2023). Singapore's economic structure is predicated on the service and financial sector, with a GNI per capita of USD 88,450. Conversely, Rwanda's economic structure is based on agriculture and small-scale industry, with a GNI per capita of USD 1030 (IMF, 2023). In conclusion, Singapore and Rwanda are two countries that have pursued development despite their shared traumatic past, adopting a similar strategy for achieving this objective. However, Rwanda, which considers Singapore as a role model, is likely to require a more protracted period of time.

Conclusion

Singapore has made a revolution with its extraordinary development success. It has done so far from the democratic traditions that Western states hold sacred. However, what Singapore has done is not a challenge to the West, but an attempt to adopt the development model that best suits it. Although the authoritarian modernization adopted by Singapore brought with it many prohibitions and oppression, it played a crucial role in Singapore's development. In other words, Singapore, which has lived under colonial rule for many years and has a cosmopolitan population, would be unlikely to develop with an unstable government. The fact that Singapore has been run by the same party in a planned and programmed manner for many years has been very effective in the development of the country and the sustainability of this success. Thanks to the accurate analysis of Lee Kuan Yew, the founding leader of the country, Singapore went from being a failed state to a strong state in a short period of time. This success of Singapore, which realized its development without any underground wealth that it could export, motivates countries in similar situations.

Singapore's development success has been a source of inspiration for Rwanda as it seeks to erase the traces of its genocidal past. In 2000, Paul Kagame, who came to power in Rwanda, often cited Singapore's success as a reference to his desire to make Rwanda the Singapore of Africa, and upon taking office, Rwanda embarked on an intensive development effort. Although Rwanda has been criticized for failing to meet its Vision 2020 targets, it has been successful in achieving an average growth rate of 7% in recent years, reducing the crime rate, preventing corruption, breakthroughs in the health sector and increasing the average human life expectancy. Like Singapore, Rwanda has taken steps towards authoritarian modernization and political stability has led to long-term plans for the country's development. With the ease of doing business offered to investors, it is aimed to make Rwanda an economic and financial center.

The present study discusses the question of whether Singapore's development success is possible for Rwanda, and underlines the similarities between the two countries. Singapore's transformation since the 1960s serves as a paradigm of an island country's transition into a preeminent global financial and trade centre. Despite the fact that the Vision 2020 targets aspire to emulate a developmental process analogous to that of Singapore, Rwanda's economic performance is significantly inferior to that of Singapore at this juncture. It is evident that Rwanda continues to face significant challenges pertaining to per capita income and income distribution inequality. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to evaluate the development process of a nation exclusively with economic indicators. Despite its comparatively lower economic performance, Rwanda has achieved notable social progress. In order to promote Rwanda and attract visitors, campaigns such as 'Visit Rwanda' have been organized to attract the attention of the international public, and Rwanda Airlines has attempted to facilitate travel to the country. Furthermore, Rwanda has been recognized as a global leader in this regard, with 61.3% representation of women in parliament. The country has demonstrated a commitment to sustainability by implementing environmental policies, including the prohibition of plastic bags, and aspires to be a trailblazer in Africa's digital infrastructure through the 'Smart Rwanda' initiative. In the contemporary era, Rwanda has evolved into a destination that caters to a diverse demographic, encompassing scientists and travelers alike. Consequently, although the replication of Singapore's developmental model appears improbable within the present circumstances, Rwanda possesses the capacity to devise a comparable developmental

narrative by adapting investments to its specific conditions. Singapore's history demonstrates to Rwanda that the seemingly impossible can be achieved, but only through flexible and long-term planning that is appropriate to local realities.

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